Question to the Ministry of Defence:

To ask His Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to strengthen the resilience and readiness of supply chains for critical components used in uncrewed systems, including whether it maintains strategic reserves of key parts, and the criteria used to designate components as critical.

Answered by Lord Coaker - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)

The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) sets out steps to develop a more resilient UK industrial base and policies capable of adapting and surging to address emerging priorities and demands. It details steps to enhance the resilience of the industrial base and improve the readiness of supply chains. This includes regularly assessing the scalability and resilience of production for all major procurements and strengthening supply chain data and enhancing resilience of critical and cross-cutting supply chains (page 76, policies 6.2.2.3 and 6.2.3.1). Central to this is the Defence Supply Chain Capability Programme (DSCCP) which is pivotal to ensuring operational readiness and resilience across Defence and has scoped the work required to address critical minerals and component supply within Defence.

The autonomous systems are identified as a priority sub-sector in the DIS which include combat air, complex weapons, directed energy weapons and next-generation land and maritime capabilities.

Question to the Ministry of Defence:

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the United Kingdom’s ability to surge domestic production of uncrewed systems in the event of a conflict, including the principal industrial, workforce and supply-chain constraints identified.

Answered by Lord Coaker - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)

The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) sets out steps to develop a more resilient UK industrial base and policies capable of adapting and surging to address emerging priorities and demands. It details steps to enhance the resilience of the industrial base and improve the readiness of supply chains. This includes regularly assessing the scalability and resilience of production for all major procurements and strengthening supply chain data and enhancing resilience of critical and cross-cutting supply chains (page 76, policies 6.2.2.3 and 6.2.3.1). Central to this is the Defence Supply Chain Capability Programme (DSCCP) which is pivotal to ensuring operational readiness and resilience across Defence and has scoped the work required to address critical minerals and component supply within Defence.

The autonomous systems are identified as a priority sub-sector in the DIS which include combat air, complex weapons, directed energy weapons and next-generation land and maritime capabilities.

Question to the Department for Transport:

To ask His Majesty's Government what lessons they have learned from recent Russian-linked attempts to attack European logistics hubs; and what assessment they have made of whether current aviation and freight security measures are adequate.

Answered by Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill - Minister of State (Department for Transport)

The UK has one of the most robust aviation security regimes in the world. We continue to work with partners across government, internationally and with industry and will continue to monitor and mitigate existing and emerging threats to the transport sector.

Question to the Ministry of Defence:

To ask His Majesty's Government what milestones they envisage for Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Strike and Atlantic Shield; and to what extent a putative Arctic Sentry mission might intersect with these efforts.

Answered by Lord Coaker - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)

The Royal Navy will enhance warfighting readiness over the next four years through the innovative transformation programmes of Atlantic Bastion, Atlantic Shield, and Atlantic Strike. The Atlantic Bastion capability options submitted for consideration in the DIP include a blend of uncrewed systems, underwater payloads, options to increase lethality, and improvements to crewed platforms. These are consistent with the pivot to a Hybrid Navy and reflect industry maturity to deliver.

Arctic Sentry remains a concept, rather than an agreed activity. Discussions are ongoing between Allies on how NATO can continue to bolster security in the High North to address the increasing threat from Russia.

Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with technology companies regarding the use of platforms such as Telegram for foreign intelligence recruitment and sabotage planning.

Answered by Baroness Chapman of Darlington - Minister of State (Development)

In her speech on 9 December 2025, to mark the centenary of the Locarno Treaty, the Foreign Secretary highlighted the significant security challenge Russian interference poses to the UK and our partners. Cdr Dominic Murphy, the Met's head of counter-terrorism, has been clear that we are seeing younger people drawn into conducting this activity on behalf of foreign states and has urged parents to pay attention to what their children are doing online. The successful prosecution in March 2024 under the National Security Act of two individuals responsible for an East London Arson incident on a London warehouse, storing supplies and technology destined for Ukraine, stands as stark warning to the consequences of this activity. The Government continues to support our world class law enforcement agencies in disrupting state threats including through the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) who have constructive relationships with the major social media platforms which have significant reach in the UK. DSIT engages with them on issues, emerging online narratives, or events that may pose a risk to UK public safety or national security.

Question to the Department for Transport:

To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill on 2 February (HL13763), what recent evaluation they have made of the vulnerability of UK ports, rail freight networks, and warehousing facilities to sabotage or arson linked to hostile states; and how the conclusions reached compare with similar assessments of aviation security.

Answered by Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill - Minister of State (Department for Transport)

The government takes the security and resilience of critical transport infrastructure extremely seriously and has a robust security regime to tackle the range of threats the UK faces.

We work with the National Protective Security Authority, National Cyber Security Centre and across government to advise owners and operators of transport infrastructure on how they can protect themselves against sabotage. The Department will continue to monitor and mitigate existing and emerging threats across the whole transport sector, working with partners across government, internationally and with industry.

Found: Yours sincerely, Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC Chair of the European Affairs Committee

Found: Yours sincerely, Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC Chair of the European Affairs Committee

Found: Yours sincerely Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC Chair of the European Affairs Committee

Found: Flint Minister of State 2 Marsham Street London SW1P 4DF www.gov.uk/home-office Rt Hon Lord Stirrup

Found: Committee following the next Rabat Process Senior Officials meeting I will be writing to Rt Hon Lord Stirrup

Found: Yours sincerely, Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC Chair of the European Affairs Committee

Found: Yours sincerely, Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC Chair of the European Affairs Committee

Found: Yours sincerely, Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC Chair of the European Affairs Committee

Found: of St Johns; Baroness Ashton of Upholland; Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town; Baroness Ludford; Lord Stirrup

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