Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes a reasonable point, which is why I said at the start of my remarks that I understood the intent behind what she is trying to achieve. Without getting distracted, the challenge that we face at the moment is a crisis not of recruitment but of conversion. One of our biggest challenges is that we have a conversion rate—forgive me if this figure is not quite right—of about 13 or 14 to one in the Army and about 20 to one in the Army Reserve. The challenge is in the process of recruitment and the time that it takes. I am straying beyond my role here today, but I can assure the noble Baroness that the Armed Forces are seeking to address that. Those who are frustrated in that process probably should have the ability to have redress, but I am not sure that this process is the right one.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I too am persuaded that Amendment 2 is not necessary, but, with an eye to what one might consider bringing forward on Report, could I take the opportunity to ask the Minister to reflect a little more widely than simply the recruitment process and go into some detail on recruit training? Recruit training will be covered by the Armed Forces commissioner, but it is as a blanket coverage just like everything else.

But we are only too well aware of the serious concerns that exist about the abuse of recruits undergoing training. This is a particularly serious problem that, in my view, needs to be looked at outwith the general subject of the treatment of people in the Armed Forces. Why do I say that? Recruit training is and must be a tough and stressful endeavour. It has to turn civilians into effective members of a military organisation. It has to forge new bonds of loyalty and duty, and that will never be an easy or gentle process. But, simply because of that, recruit training becomes a particularly potentially dangerous area, because recruits are particularly vulnerable. Anyone in charge of recruits who steps over the bounds can cause serious harm.

The abuse of recruits is not just wholly wrong legally and morally; it is also damaging to the image of the Armed Forces more widely, and indeed it could be damaging to recruiting. So it seems to me that this area deserves some particular and special attention. The Minister might like to reflect on whether something should be included in the Bill, or in the regulations that flow from it, that pays particular attention to this.

It is not, of course, because commanders do not care; they do care. We have had the very recent example of the Chief of the General Staff expressing his shame at some of the some of the recent cases. But we have seen these cases year after year, stretching back as far as any of us can remember. The care, concern and statements of commanders have not changed things. As the Minister will be aware from discussions we had at Second Reading, the critical thing in the Bill is what it will do to change things on the ground. Recruit training, it seems to me, is an area that deserves particular consideration. I wonder whether he might reflect on that and perhaps have some further discussions before we get to Report.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I intervene at this point to say that I am very grateful to follow the two noble Lords who have just spoken because I learned a great deal. On Amendment 2, I hope that, when the Minister comes to reply, he will be as precise as possible in indicating exactly when the Bill will take effect on people joining. The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, referred to attestation: is that in fact the moment at which you go from being an applicant to being, as it were, a serving member of the Armed Forces—and hence the Bill applies?

Secondly, with respect to Amendment 10 and its reference to the regulations, which I got a copy of as I walked through the door, my noble friend the Minister made his declaration of interest again today, and I made one during the Second Reading debate—I will not bore the Committee with it again, except to thank the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, for his enthusiastic reply. Looking at the list of relevant family members, and bearing in mind my declared interest, am I right that someone who is engaged to a serving member of the Armed Forces does not come within the current definition of family members?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is a really helpful comment from my noble friend. These are draft regulations; we are not going to legislate them now. The Bill will give us the power to create secondary legislation, and those draft regulations can be changed when people make various comments, including the ones my noble friend has made. Those can be taken into account and, if there needs to be change, there can be.

The whole point of the draft is that it gives the opportunity for noble Lords to make various comments on them. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, may reflect that kinship is not covered in the way she would expect, and therefore could make that point in response to the remarks I have made and will make. That is the whole point of what we are discussing. If this draft is not drawn tightly enough, of course it will have to be changed.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

In my time, I have seen some mind-bogglingly complex family arrangements, some of which would not be comprehended by these regulations. I say to the noble Lord that I do not believe that it would be possible to write something out that will cover all possible contingencies. I wonder what degree of flexibility there will be in all of this to take account of the unforeseen when it comes to very complex family arrangements.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

One would expect the complexity of modern family life to be reflected in the regulations. In the end, one would hope that the commissioner would exercise some professionalism and care with respect to that. I take the noble and gallant Lord’s point and my noble friend’s point, but it is extremely difficult to do this and to capture every single potential arrangement.

However, as I said in response to the noble Baroness, we are trying to have as broad a definition as we can, including as many different arrangements as we can, with some flexibility to try to capture the sorts of arrangements that we may not have thought of—such as those who are engaged and so on. As my noble friend pointed out, in his view, this does not adequately capture that; we will have to reflect on that and, where necessary, change it. A point was made about the difficulty of this; one has to try to do it, but we are ultimately dependent on the sensitivity of the commissioner, which is what I would hope we would do. The noble Baroness will have to reflect on the kinship point.

I totally agree with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, made about attestation. The commissioner has a responsibility for the particular individual from that time. I will refer to that again in my remarks, but I totally agree with what the noble Lord said.

I thought the intervention of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, was extremely pertinent. Many of us here are concerned about the abuses that we have seen. He made a particular point with reference to recruit training and the balance there must be between rigorous training to make sure somebody is fit for service with the abilities and aptitudes that one would expect and ensuring that that training is not inappropriate, bullying or in any way abusive. Certainly there is an expectation that, were that a concern or something that is brought to the commissioner’s attention, they would look into it.

It is good to see the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, here with the experience that she can bring from her role. She is somebody who has shown that the “So what?” question can be answered, and she has made a very real difference with respect to victims. The “So what?” question is really important to the whole of the Committee.

Many of us who have served are sick and tired of reading report after report, but there are changes happening and improvements taking place. At the same time, in the evidence given yesterday to the Defence Select Committee by the Chief of the General Staff, the First Sea Lord, the Minister for Veterans and others, they were openly talking about their complete disgust at some of the things that still happen and their desire to continue to work for changes. In fact, noble Lords may have seen some of the changes that they suggested, one of which was the establishment of a specialist tri-service team to deal with the most serious complaints. This tries to take them out of the single service that they would normally go to, by having a tri-service complaint system. That was something that the Chief of the General Staff and others talked about yesterday.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

One of the issues that we discussed at Second Reading was the challenge of people actually accessing the commissioner. This seems to be a particular concern for those in recruit training. Old lags in the system will generally know how it works and will have friends around who can tell them; they will understand what they need to do to get the commissioner involved. However, recruits will be a bit hazy on all that and extraordinarily reluctant, in the environment in which they find themselves, to complain. This comes back to the point I made earlier: is there not a need for a particular set of arrangements for those undergoing recruit training beyond those applied to the broader swathe of service personnel?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes a good point. Let us reflect on that and see where we get to. But I could not agree more with him about the nervousness that you would expect from a recruit who has just joined and done the attestation and is part of the Armed Forces, but who feels that it is what is happening with respect to him or her is inappropriate.

Ukraine (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the members of the International Relations and Defence Committee on this excellent report. It is usually a matter of great regret that we are not able to debate such Select Committee reports until long after they are published, but in this case the delay is a positive advantage. Why? To echo the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, it is because, if the war in Ukraine was a wake-up call for us and our European partners in NATO, surely the events of the past few weeks in Munich and Washington have served to tip us entirely out of our cosy collective bed on to the cold, hard floor. The recommendations made in the report are based on a forensic analysis of the evidence and are well judged. I support them all. However, the context has clearly changed—and not for the better.

We all want NATO to survive and to continue the invaluable work it has done over so many decades to guard our collective security. The United States has been at the core of that endeavour, and we wish American involvement to continue. I believe that it will, but we can no longer expect it to be on the scale that it has been in the past. This goes beyond the vagaries of one President or any sense of growing American isolationism. Senior officials in Washington, both civilian and military, have made it clear that, despite their enduring commitment to NATO, they are substantially shifting their weight of effort from Europe to the Pacific. This should not surprise us. This development has been under way and slowly building in momentum over many years. That the American shift now coincides with a dramatically increased risk to our security has just served to open European eyes that, for too long, have remained resolutely shut.

It is now starkly apparent that if we in Europe do not provide adequately for our own security, no one else will. It is also clear that shouldering this responsibility is the surest way of retaining American involvement in NATO. For too long, we and our European partners have scrabbled around in the smallest margins of public expenditure to fund our defence. It was inappropriate in the past; it would be utter folly now. There is a growing acknowledgement by many political leaders in Europe that we are in an era of rearmament. This is right, but we need to define and follow through on what that means. Europe’s militaries, including our own, are too small as fighting units, inadequately armed and lacking in key strategic capabilities. Rearmament means making good these deficiencies. That will take two things: time and money. We have the first, but none to waste.

Russia’s military capability, particularly in its ground forces, is depleted after three years of gruelling combat in Ukraine. This will take time to rebuild, but it can and will be rebuilt. Meanwhile, Russia has learned some important operational and tactical lessons from its early failures in the war, and its nuclear, aviation and maritime capabilities remain largely untouched. So, in one sense, we are in an arms race with Russia, and we cannot afford to fall behind.

This brings me to the cost of rearmament: it will be considerably greater than the Government have yet acknowledged. It is worth reflecting that, at the time of the first Gulf War—the last time we fielded a full armoured division for high-intensity conflict alongside an extended air campaign—we were spending 4% of GDP on defence. Even then, we had to cannibalise the whole of the British Army of the Rhine in order to field that armoured division. So the Prime Minister’s commitment to raise defence spending to 2.5% of GDP in the financial year 2027-28 is clearly inadequate; 2.5% of GDP would merely close the gap between the current level of resource and the cost of the existing programme, and there are two years before even that happens. As things stand, it seems that defence will actually receive less cash next year than it will in this. I cannot imagine quite how the Minister will defend this in the House.

So what is the cost? SACEUR has set out a defensive posture that, in his view, would deter Russian aggression —something the inquiry report rightly identifies as the overriding requirement. SACEUR has also identified the contribution that he needs from the UK. This should be costed and a plan drawn up to achieve the necessary force levels and sustainability as soon as possible. I cannot put an accurate price on this, but it will be well north of 3% of GDP so, to put us on the right path, we need 2.5% immediately and we need to pass 3% before the end of the decade.

Of course, the money should be spent wisely. Other noble Lords have commented and will comment on this, but I identify two important issues that need to figure prominently in our plans. The first is the requirement for continuing technological innovation and rapid capability development. This will involve a much closer and more flexible use of SMEs than has been normal in our procurement system to date. The second is the importance of well-trained and equipped reservists. With this in mind, I echo the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, in opposing any suggestion that this crucial part of our capability be put under a non-departmental body. That would be a bad idea at any time but folly today.

The Prime Minister has said that Europe must do the heavy lifting in Ukraine, but heavy lifting requires muscle. We have allowed our military muscle to atrophy for far too many years; we now need substantially to rebuild it and to rebuild it quickly, before it is too late.

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I say at the outset that I support this Bill and that I am very grateful to the Minister for the consultations that he has already held regarding the background to and purpose of the legislation. At this point, I have just a few concerns on which I should welcome his further clarification.

The first concern is with regard to an issue which he himself has raised: the extent to which the Bill’s proposals will lead to real change for our Armed Forces. Take accommodation as an example. I should be very surprised if a commissioner did not see the need to look into this aspect of service life. Numerous attitude surveys have made clear over a number of years how the poor standard of housing, particularly for single people, has affected morale and, in turn, retention. I have seen for myself some of the failings in this area and the desperate measures to which some local commanders have been driven.

Having said as much, it is patently clear that we do not need an Armed Forces commissioner to tell us about the problem. But despite us being all too aware of the issue, the problem remains. It is, of course, essentially a matter of funding. If a future commissioner were to produce a report on this matter and it had as little effect on the ground as we have seen so far, people might begin to wonder what the point was. If this legislation is to be successful, it is essential that the circle be closed—that identification leads to rectification. I know the Minister shares this view, but I wonder how the MoD intends to give effect to his good intentions. Perhaps he can enlighten us—if not today then as the Bill continues its passage through the House.

The second point is the method by which people will engage with the commissioner. We have had a Service Complaints Ombudsman for some time, but one of the key drivers of the Bill has been the ombudsman’s criticism of the complaints procedure. This is part substance and part perception. I do not believe that the chain of command is quite as protectionist as some claim. I accept that there might be a closing of the ranks in a few cases, but commanders are in general anxious to ensure the welfare of their people. There is, however, a sense that those same commanders sometimes act as judges in their own causes. This gives rise to a perception of unfairness, and it can make subordinates feel that complaining will damage their career prospects, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, observed.

These are good reasons for introducing a system that has a much greater degree of independence, but people will need to be convinced that the degree of independence is sufficient to protect them from what they might see as the risks of complaining. I know that some have suggested that the commissioner’s independence would be compromised from the outset, since he or she would be appointed by, dismissible by and report to the Secretary of State. I do not share that view, but I should be grateful if the Minister could say what thought is being given to the way complainants will gain entry to the system. In the other place, the Minister responding for the Government said that it would be for the commissioner to decide how people access them. That seems rather vague. Surely some consideration has been given to an issue that will be central to the success of the proposed arrangements.

My final point is on the potentially vexed issue of access. As we have heard, the Bill gives the commissioner power to view premises, observe activities, inspect and copy documents, inspect equipment, take measurements and photographs, and so on. These are very wide-ranging powers. The Bill goes on to say that, in exercising them, the commissioner should give notice to the Secretary of State, but only within such a period as the commissioner deems reasonable and not if they consider that the giving of such notice would defeat the purpose of the investigation. As the Minister noted, the Bill does indeed say:

“The Secretary of State may prevent or restrict the Commissioner’s exercise”


of their powers

“in the interests of national security”,

but the Secretary of State will not always have the necessary details—not in time, at any rate—to exercise such a veto effectively. Within the military, many premises and documents are, and much equipment is, highly classified, and access to them is very limited, even among currently serving personnel. It is inconceivable that a commissioner should be able to override such restrictions.

When I was a station commander, a very long time ago, the Secretary of State would not have had a clue which parts of my command were sensitive and which were not. What would have happened had a commissioner descended on me at short notice and then demanded access to such an area? As proposed, I would have had no power to deny them. I realise that this will not be an issue in very many cases—including the example of accommodation that I cited earlier—but thematic issues may well be raised to the commissioner that concern working environments, and here security may well become a serious concern.

I understand the need to prevent people using security as a shield against investigation. On the other hand, security is one of the fundamental principles of war, and we neglect it at our peril. Some might argue that we could leave this up to the good sense of the commissioner. I do not suggest for one moment that the commissioner would lack good sense, but I simply cannot accept that such an issue can be left to chance. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, that the Bill itself needs to address this more effectively.

Let me stress that I make these comments with the intent of improving, rather than undermining, the very welcome Bill, which has my strong support, and I know that the Minister will view them in that light. I look forward to working with him on these issues as the legislation goes forward.

UK Defence: Hypersonic Missiles

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 3rd March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I do believe that the United States—let us say again, we have a special relationship with the United States—is a really important ally for this country, if not the most important. We should state that now and we should state that as we go forward. In terms of AUKUS, we remain totally confident with respect to both pillar 1 and pillar 2, along with Australia. Australia, the UK and the US will develop AUKUS and that too, in terms of hypersonic capability in pillar 2, remains an important part of the work we are doing to defend our country and our freedoms, and democracy across the world.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, space-based surveillance plays a key role in hypersonic missile defence of the future. Can the Minister assure the House that this case has been made with sufficient vigour to those conducting the strategic defence review, not least because of the potential of leveraging the excellent satellite manufacture and delivery capacity in Scotland?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes an important point on the importance of space and satellites. That case has been made with vigour to the defence review and we await the outcome of that. On the second part of the noble and gallant Lord’s question and his point about Scotland, of course it is important. Part of what we are saying with the growth in defence spending is that we need to ensure that there is an emphasis on UK manufacturing and on the regions and every nation of the UK, so that they too can benefit from that. It informs and helps develop the Government’s growth agenda.

Major Defence Contracts

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, when the defence review finally appears, it is hard to imagine that it will not include a requirement for an innovative, agile and scalable defence industry. What impact does the Minister think that the continued uncertainty over funding, alongside the treatment being meted out to the defence industry at some of our academic institutions, will have on the long-term investor confidence so necessary to the future health of this crucial sector?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I say to the noble and gallant Lord that of course the defence industry will be an important partner for His Majesty’s Government. He will know that we are currently consulting on a new defence industrial strategy. That consultation finishes at the end of February and we will come forward with various proposals to deal with the defence industry and promote it in the future.

This gives me a chance to take the point he made, which I think most noble Lords will take. He made the point about the inability of the RAF to go to certain university campuses to recruit and the inability of certain defence industries to go to certain university campuses to promote, quite legitimately, their sales and defence jobs. That is an absolute disgrace. I hope the universities take that on board and do something about it.

Undersea Internet Cables

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Of course, we are keen to support any country which supports international law and freedom of navigation, and Finland acted appropriately. As a member of JEF, we work very closely with Finland. The noble Lord will know—no doubt this will come up in many of the questions that follow—that the UK Government are leading a number of Joint Expeditionary Force operations. Operation Nordic Warden, for example, involves operations with respect to the Baltic. NATO is taking action with Baltic Sentry. All of us are acting more robustly with respect to the threats, as we see them, in the Baltic Sea and beyond, to ensure that we protect critical underwater infrastructure.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, NATO’s launch of Operation Baltic Protector and the other initiatives the Minister has mentioned are to be welcomed, but of course, the threats to our undersea infrastructure extend far beyond the Baltic and one or two isolated areas. What action is being taken to extend this initiative to a more comprehensive approach to our vulnerabilities? What discussions are being had to ensure that the actions of the military are fully co-ordinated with civilian investment in redundancy and resilience to ensure that we have a properly comprehensive approach to this very dangerous situation?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The need for greater resilience across government is something that the Government are taking up. We understand the need for all departments, not just the Ministry of Defence, to take action on resilience. The noble and gallant Lord will also have seen that the Ministry of Defence has taken action on other threats that have occurred in other areas, including the channel and the North Sea. We expect further attention to be given in the defence review to what resources and capabilities are needed to ensure we deal with what is an increasing and emerging threat.

Drones: RAF Bases

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 27th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is obviously a matter of real importance, and the defence review is looking at what we should do with respect to air defence in the round, including defence of the homeland, as the noble Baroness asks.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, this is a question not just of defence sites but of much wider national resilience. We have seen the extensive use of drones in Ukraine against non-military targets. Can the Minister reassure the House that the Government will look at this problem in that much wider context? Quite clearly, we cannot mount air defence systems around every single part of our critical national infrastructure, and we have to ensure that we have some other method of protecting them against this new threat.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for that important comment, and I will make sure that it is reflected upon within the Ministry of Defence. He makes a really important point about air defence—of course that is an important aspect of it—but there are other ways of protecting our sites and other ways of conducting warfare. Ukraine has shown us the importance of hybrid warfare, and that certainly is something that the defence review will look at. But I will take his very important comments back to the MoD.

Defence: 2.5% GDP Spending Commitment

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 14th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister knows that defence requires 2.5% of GDP now if it is to avoid cuts in capability and will require even higher spending in future. When the men and women of our seriously underresourced Armed Forces are required to confront the increasingly perilous situation in Europe and beyond over the next decade and their lives are on the line, how much consolation does he think they will take from repeated protestations about a £22 billion black hole?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord raises a serious point. The Government have given a cast-iron guarantee to reach the cap of 2.5%. As he knows, I meet the forces all the time, and I would give them the reassurance that we are seeking to ensure that they have the capability they need to meet the future threats that will be identified by the defence review. We make that commitment.

Defence Policy: Deterrence

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, with whose remarks I entirely agree. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has asked whether deterrence is still at the core of the UK’s defence policy; the Minister’s answer will surely be yes, so I shall use my allotted time to highlight just four of the many consequences of that anticipated affirmative.

It is quite clear that this Government, like the last, are committed to the maintenance of our strategic nuclear deterrent, through the continuous at-sea deployment of our Trident-armed submarines. But as we transition from the Vanguard to the Dreadnought, we shall for some time need to operate both classes of boat. However, the two types are very different and will require different crews and different logistic support chains. This will place a considerable strain on the Royal Navy and on defence resources in the round. What planning has taken place to ensure that the strain can be borne without damaging other areas of defence capability?

Of course, nuclear deterrence by itself is not nearly enough. Effective conventional deterrence exercised through NATO is essential if we are to have any chance of avoiding future war. But almost everyone, perhaps most importantly the Secretary of State for Defence himself, recognises that our Armed Forces are too small and inadequately equipped to constitute much of a deterrent at present.

Remedying this will be a long, difficult and expensive task, but, as the saying goes, it is the job never started that takes longest to finish. The substantially increased investment in our fighting capability, our combat sustainability and the defence-industrial capacity that underpins both needs to start now. When will the Government give clear evidence that the security of this country and its people really is their top priority?

I have mentioned nuclear and conventional deterrence, but these cannot be considered in isolation. The NATO doctrine developed during the Cold War recognised the need for a so-called escalation ladder that provided for a graduated response to increasing levels of aggression. One important element of graduated response was the provision of an increased element of choice in the boundary between conventional and nuclear war. Moving from conventional fighting to an all-out strategic nuclear exchange was seen as far too big a step. It would present politicians with almost impossible choices and would leave little or no room for second thoughts on either side. NATO’s tactical nuclear capability is greatly reduced from the Cold War, and the UK’s is now non-existent. What thought have the Government given to these missing rungs on the escalation ladder, which are an important contribution to the overall effectiveness of a deterrence posture?

Finally, deterrence begins in the mind. One area of conflict that is attracting increased attention is termed “cognitive warfare”. It is about getting into the minds of one’s opponents and undermining their will and capacity to resist. It is not a new concept, but new technology such as AI is offering new ways of doing old things. China takes cognitive warfare very seriously, and Russia is already deeply engaged in it. We are currently poor at defending against it, and our offensive capabilities are even worse. We need to do much better if our deterrent capability is to be credible to potential aggressors. What priority are the Government giving to this crucial area of capability?

Today I have been able to do no more than scratch the surface of some very important issues. I hope that future debates will enable me to expand on them. Meanwhile, I ask the Minister to reflect on them most carefully.

Ukraine

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 25th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, this has been a difficult year for Ukraine, with a shortage of weapons and personnel hampering its efforts to deal with the grinding war of attrition that Russia is pursuing, but we should not assume that all the pressures are on the Ukrainian side. The appearance of North Korean soldiers in the conflict and the widening of the pool of prisoners from which Russia seeks to recruit soldiers for the front line underscore the difficulties that Putin is facing. The FCDO says that these difficulties will reach crisis proportions by the end of 2025 and beginning of 2026. The question is how Ukraine is to stay in the fight until then. For Ukraine to stay in the fight, Europe—and ideally the United States—must stay in the fight. In both regions, however, there are signs of growing war-weariness and a desire to end the conflict, whatever it takes. This would be a disastrous mistake. To illustrate the point, let me explore the logical consequences of some kind of near-term settlement.

First, what would be the instrument through which such a settlement would be given effect? Presumably it would be in the form of an international agreement signed by both sides, but we have been there before and have seen only too clearly how little Putin regards or respects such agreements. The moment he feels they constrain his ambitions, he casts them aside without a second thought. Any piece of paper to which he puts his name would have about as much value as the one that Neville Chamberlain waved in front of the cameras at Heston aerodrome in 1938. In fact, neither side would be satisfied with an outcome that left the other in control of part of Ukraine. Putin would simply pursue his assault on his neighbour by undercover means, while the Ukrainians would do the same in an effort to regain their lost territory, until open fighting eventually broke out again—unless there was some kind of security guarantee involving the employment of western military power in the event of a breach of the agreement. That would involve a far greater risk of direct conflict between Russia and NATO than currently exists and is therefore unlikely to be acceptable. In that event, a near-term agreement would not end the conflict at all.

Then we must consider the effect on nuclear proliferation. Whatever we might say, many would see the failure of resolve in the West as the result, at least in part, of Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling. The message to potential aggressors would be, “Attain or retain nuclear weapons and no one will dare to stand up to you”. There is also another side to the coin. Many already regard Ukraine’s agreement in 1994 to transfer the nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia as a catastrophic mistake. Some will no doubt reflect on this and decide that they need their own nuclear deterrent, not just against other nuclear powers but against potential aggressors more widely. This could be the final nail in the coffin of counterproliferation efforts.

The impact goes beyond nuclear weapons, though. Lithuania has already voted to withdraw from the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and other Baltic states are considering whether to follow this lead. This highlights the stresses within NATO and the EU that would follow any decision to make concessions to Russia. The Baltic states and Poland already—and rightly, in my view—feel threatened. Their concerns would be greatly multiplied should Russia’s aggression be seen to have succeeded even partly. If that success was as a consequence of a lack of resolve on the part of some of their western partners, they might begin to wonder where their best interests lie. RUSI has already suggested that Russian success could spell the end of NATO, at least in its present form. Nothing would delight Putin more.

More widely, Russia would certainly insist that any settlement included a restoration of its dominant position in the northern Black Sea and would very likely use this to render untenable Ukrainian grain exports through that route. Since February 2022, Ukrainian grain provision to Europe has increased from less than 2% to 50% of total exports. Meanwhile, Russia is providing grain to African nations that were supplied by Ukraine prior to the war. It is targeting those nations where it calculates that it can gain strategic influence. Its increasing use of food as a political tool will serve only to spread Russia’s malign influence more widely.

There are many other severely damaging consequences of even a limited Russian success, but time does not permit me to go into them today. I do not aim to convince either the Minister or the Government—I do not doubt their resolve—but European leaders need to do a much better job of explaining to their citizens the dire consequences that would attend a failure of nerve over Ukraine. Negotiating from a position of relative weakness would not bring an end to the conflict. It would carry huge nuclear risks, create fissures within western Europe, weaken deterrence and make a wider war more rather than less likely. It would leave our children and grandchildren a fearful legacy for which they would surely and rightly condemn us.