Drones: RAF Bases

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 27th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is obviously a matter of real importance, and the defence review is looking at what we should do with respect to air defence in the round, including defence of the homeland, as the noble Baroness asks.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, this is a question not just of defence sites but of much wider national resilience. We have seen the extensive use of drones in Ukraine against non-military targets. Can the Minister reassure the House that the Government will look at this problem in that much wider context? Quite clearly, we cannot mount air defence systems around every single part of our critical national infrastructure, and we have to ensure that we have some other method of protecting them against this new threat.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for that important comment, and I will make sure that it is reflected upon within the Ministry of Defence. He makes a really important point about air defence—of course that is an important aspect of it—but there are other ways of protecting our sites and other ways of conducting warfare. Ukraine has shown us the importance of hybrid warfare, and that certainly is something that the defence review will look at. But I will take his very important comments back to the MoD.

Defence: 2.5% GDP Spending Commitment

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 14th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister knows that defence requires 2.5% of GDP now if it is to avoid cuts in capability and will require even higher spending in future. When the men and women of our seriously underresourced Armed Forces are required to confront the increasingly perilous situation in Europe and beyond over the next decade and their lives are on the line, how much consolation does he think they will take from repeated protestations about a £22 billion black hole?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord raises a serious point. The Government have given a cast-iron guarantee to reach the cap of 2.5%. As he knows, I meet the forces all the time, and I would give them the reassurance that we are seeking to ensure that they have the capability they need to meet the future threats that will be identified by the defence review. We make that commitment.

Defence Policy: Deterrence

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, with whose remarks I entirely agree. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has asked whether deterrence is still at the core of the UK’s defence policy; the Minister’s answer will surely be yes, so I shall use my allotted time to highlight just four of the many consequences of that anticipated affirmative.

It is quite clear that this Government, like the last, are committed to the maintenance of our strategic nuclear deterrent, through the continuous at-sea deployment of our Trident-armed submarines. But as we transition from the Vanguard to the Dreadnought, we shall for some time need to operate both classes of boat. However, the two types are very different and will require different crews and different logistic support chains. This will place a considerable strain on the Royal Navy and on defence resources in the round. What planning has taken place to ensure that the strain can be borne without damaging other areas of defence capability?

Of course, nuclear deterrence by itself is not nearly enough. Effective conventional deterrence exercised through NATO is essential if we are to have any chance of avoiding future war. But almost everyone, perhaps most importantly the Secretary of State for Defence himself, recognises that our Armed Forces are too small and inadequately equipped to constitute much of a deterrent at present.

Remedying this will be a long, difficult and expensive task, but, as the saying goes, it is the job never started that takes longest to finish. The substantially increased investment in our fighting capability, our combat sustainability and the defence-industrial capacity that underpins both needs to start now. When will the Government give clear evidence that the security of this country and its people really is their top priority?

I have mentioned nuclear and conventional deterrence, but these cannot be considered in isolation. The NATO doctrine developed during the Cold War recognised the need for a so-called escalation ladder that provided for a graduated response to increasing levels of aggression. One important element of graduated response was the provision of an increased element of choice in the boundary between conventional and nuclear war. Moving from conventional fighting to an all-out strategic nuclear exchange was seen as far too big a step. It would present politicians with almost impossible choices and would leave little or no room for second thoughts on either side. NATO’s tactical nuclear capability is greatly reduced from the Cold War, and the UK’s is now non-existent. What thought have the Government given to these missing rungs on the escalation ladder, which are an important contribution to the overall effectiveness of a deterrence posture?

Finally, deterrence begins in the mind. One area of conflict that is attracting increased attention is termed “cognitive warfare”. It is about getting into the minds of one’s opponents and undermining their will and capacity to resist. It is not a new concept, but new technology such as AI is offering new ways of doing old things. China takes cognitive warfare very seriously, and Russia is already deeply engaged in it. We are currently poor at defending against it, and our offensive capabilities are even worse. We need to do much better if our deterrent capability is to be credible to potential aggressors. What priority are the Government giving to this crucial area of capability?

Today I have been able to do no more than scratch the surface of some very important issues. I hope that future debates will enable me to expand on them. Meanwhile, I ask the Minister to reflect on them most carefully.

Ukraine

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 25th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, this has been a difficult year for Ukraine, with a shortage of weapons and personnel hampering its efforts to deal with the grinding war of attrition that Russia is pursuing, but we should not assume that all the pressures are on the Ukrainian side. The appearance of North Korean soldiers in the conflict and the widening of the pool of prisoners from which Russia seeks to recruit soldiers for the front line underscore the difficulties that Putin is facing. The FCDO says that these difficulties will reach crisis proportions by the end of 2025 and beginning of 2026. The question is how Ukraine is to stay in the fight until then. For Ukraine to stay in the fight, Europe—and ideally the United States—must stay in the fight. In both regions, however, there are signs of growing war-weariness and a desire to end the conflict, whatever it takes. This would be a disastrous mistake. To illustrate the point, let me explore the logical consequences of some kind of near-term settlement.

First, what would be the instrument through which such a settlement would be given effect? Presumably it would be in the form of an international agreement signed by both sides, but we have been there before and have seen only too clearly how little Putin regards or respects such agreements. The moment he feels they constrain his ambitions, he casts them aside without a second thought. Any piece of paper to which he puts his name would have about as much value as the one that Neville Chamberlain waved in front of the cameras at Heston aerodrome in 1938. In fact, neither side would be satisfied with an outcome that left the other in control of part of Ukraine. Putin would simply pursue his assault on his neighbour by undercover means, while the Ukrainians would do the same in an effort to regain their lost territory, until open fighting eventually broke out again—unless there was some kind of security guarantee involving the employment of western military power in the event of a breach of the agreement. That would involve a far greater risk of direct conflict between Russia and NATO than currently exists and is therefore unlikely to be acceptable. In that event, a near-term agreement would not end the conflict at all.

Then we must consider the effect on nuclear proliferation. Whatever we might say, many would see the failure of resolve in the West as the result, at least in part, of Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling. The message to potential aggressors would be, “Attain or retain nuclear weapons and no one will dare to stand up to you”. There is also another side to the coin. Many already regard Ukraine’s agreement in 1994 to transfer the nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia as a catastrophic mistake. Some will no doubt reflect on this and decide that they need their own nuclear deterrent, not just against other nuclear powers but against potential aggressors more widely. This could be the final nail in the coffin of counterproliferation efforts.

The impact goes beyond nuclear weapons, though. Lithuania has already voted to withdraw from the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and other Baltic states are considering whether to follow this lead. This highlights the stresses within NATO and the EU that would follow any decision to make concessions to Russia. The Baltic states and Poland already—and rightly, in my view—feel threatened. Their concerns would be greatly multiplied should Russia’s aggression be seen to have succeeded even partly. If that success was as a consequence of a lack of resolve on the part of some of their western partners, they might begin to wonder where their best interests lie. RUSI has already suggested that Russian success could spell the end of NATO, at least in its present form. Nothing would delight Putin more.

More widely, Russia would certainly insist that any settlement included a restoration of its dominant position in the northern Black Sea and would very likely use this to render untenable Ukrainian grain exports through that route. Since February 2022, Ukrainian grain provision to Europe has increased from less than 2% to 50% of total exports. Meanwhile, Russia is providing grain to African nations that were supplied by Ukraine prior to the war. It is targeting those nations where it calculates that it can gain strategic influence. Its increasing use of food as a political tool will serve only to spread Russia’s malign influence more widely.

There are many other severely damaging consequences of even a limited Russian success, but time does not permit me to go into them today. I do not aim to convince either the Minister or the Government—I do not doubt their resolve—but European leaders need to do a much better job of explaining to their citizens the dire consequences that would attend a failure of nerve over Ukraine. Negotiating from a position of relative weakness would not bring an end to the conflict. It would carry huge nuclear risks, create fissures within western Europe, weaken deterrence and make a wider war more rather than less likely. It would leave our children and grandchildren a fearful legacy for which they would surely and rightly condemn us.

Combat Air Capability

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 10th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We certainly do understand that: 3,500 people are already employed in the development of this, £2 billion has already been invested in the research and development of the programme and further money will be invested, as we go forward. As the Prime Minister said a few weeks ago, the Global Combat Air Programme is “important” and

“we are making significant progress … There is … a review going on but … it is an important programme”.

I think that gives the reassurance that the noble Baroness is looking for.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, as I highlighted in Grand Committee yesterday, on current plans, by 2040 the UK will be down to just three combat air squadrons. Irrespective of the debate over the type and nature of future platforms, would the Minister agree that this position is wholly untenable for any Government who care about the security of this country?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes a good point. He is really referring to investment in our defence capabilities as we go forward. The review will look at the threats that we need to meet, but this Government have made an absolute commitment to go to 2.5% of GDP as soon as we can. I think that gives some reassurance to the noble and gallant Lord.

Strategic Defence Review

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, am grateful for the opportunity to debate the strategic defence review that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, is leading for the Government. I will start by raising a point that is formally outwith his remit but is fundamental to the issues that he is addressing—the defence budget. NATO has calculated that for its members to contribute military capabilities adequate to the challenges that the alliance now faces, they will need to spend around 3.7% of GDP on defence. Even if NATO has overdone things a bit—it is not at all clear that it has—it is certainly the case that investment in defence needs to be above 3% of GDP, not the 2.5% that the Government say that they aspire to but for which they have not so far set out a firm plan. It is worth saying that 3% of GDP for the UK, allowing for all the accounting changes that have taken place in recent years, would not be much more than we were spending in 2010, when Europe was not facing a severe threat from Russia. It is important to make this point today because, if the issue is not addressed, the current defence review would be like someone deciding whether to buy two or three fire extinguishers while the building is burning around their ears.

This dichotomy is thrown into stark relief when one looks at the substantive issues that the review will need to address. A good starting point is the recent report from your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee on the implications of the Ukraine war for UK defence, to which the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, has referred. It is a good analysis and my only real criticism is that the compelling chapter on the importance of building mass focuses almost exclusively on the British Army, whereas the shortcomings in this area are being felt across all three armed services. On current plans, for example, the UK will have only three combat air squadrons by 2040—that would not even have filled one main operating base in my day. Given the lessons from Ukraine about the importance of air power, can anyone really think that this is acceptable? Numbers of airborne early warning and control aircraft are also woefully inadequate. In the case of the Royal Navy, the operational availability of nuclear attack submarines verges on the derisory. Even before our donations to Ukraine, stocks of weapons came nowhere near what even the most optimistic observer could regard as satisfactory. I could cite many other examples.

If we wish NATO to exercise a powerful deterrent effect on Russia, these issues must be addressed. The platforms in all three environments need the trained people, the weapons stocks, the logistics support and the defence industrial base to sustain them through the draining effects of protracted combat. Then there is the vulnerability of the home base. The necessity for significantly improved deterrent capability within NATO reaffirms the importance of the north Atlantic link, but that will be of little avail if the UK end of that link is not secure. At the moment, we could not counter the kind of missile attacks that Iran has launched against Israel. The requirement for a robust integrated air defence system can be ignored no longer. Effective defence requires an integrated system, which cannot be had on the cheap. It requires sensors, information management technology, surface-to-air weapons and air-to-air platforms and weapons.

Control of UK airspace will not of itself be sufficient, though. Again, the experience of Ukraine shows that trying to fight a land campaign without air superiority is a recipe for, at best, a long and bloody struggle and, at worst, defeat. There is nothing new in this. Neither El Alamein in 1942 nor Normandy in 1944 would have been successes without air superiority. The precise means of achieving that superiority will of course change over time, as technology offers new ways of doing old things, but the suppression and destruction of enemy air defences will continue to be a keystone of that effort. This is a complex and challenging role that involves cutting-edge and constantly evolving systems and technologies. It will also require the ability to operate effectively in the face of a hostile electronic and cyber environment, which of course will be true of the Armed Forces and their capabilities more widely.

The electronic warfare challenge that has emerged in Ukraine is well beyond anything we have ever seen before and we must expect that kind of challenge, or even greater, to be a feature of future battle spaces. This will require a response that goes beyond the purchase of certain kinds of equipment. It will need the fusion of experts and technology in an organisation with the agility, and the requisite industrial capacity, to respond to constantly evolving threats and the ability to adapt front-line platforms and tactics accordingly. Such agility and adaptability will be needed more widely across the entirety of our defence capabilities.

I could cite many other examples of the kind of improvements that will be required to defence in the years ahead, improvements across all three environments, and I have not even touched on the crucial issues of people—their recruitment, training and retention—that will be fundamental to our capabilities, let alone the question of wider national resilience. Time does not permit me this afternoon to do much more than to scratch the surface. Suffice to say that we face a double challenge: we have to make good the shrinking and hollowing out of our Armed Forces that has been the handiwork of successive, delinquent Governments. At the same time, we have to adapt those forces to meet the stark and pressing challenges of the future.

There will of course be debates about precisely how those future capabilities are to be provided, but two things seem beyond doubt. The first is that those capabilities will be essential. The second is that they are well beyond the financial guidelines under which this review is operating, so I end where I began: with the Budget. The mantra seems to be that no more money is available for defence. Of course the money is available; it is a question of choices and priorities. If the Government say that they cannot afford more than 2.5% when the need is so apparent, what they are really saying is that the safety and security of this country and its people are not their top priority. Looking back at our history, they would not be the first Government to say this, nor would they be the first to reap a frightful harvest if the current severe risks were to materialise.

Ministry of Defence: Expenditure

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. I think she slightly gets in front of herself. We have made a commitment to 2.5%, and that is a cast-iron guarantee. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is in his place and has heard the points she has made. We look forward to a deliverable, affordable plan that will meet the threats we will face in the future—not the threats now or in the past, but in the future. That is why the review of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is so important. The money that we spend has to be spent to deliver the capabilities needed to meet those threats. That is the fundamental principle that underlies what we are doing, and it will be maintained.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, we are still awaiting the outcome of the review, and in the light of the undoubted financial pressures it faces, can the Minister assure the House that his department will not view as easy options for in-year savings levels of training upon which military capability so crucially depends, and the adequate maintenance of infrastructure, which is already in a poor condition and is an important factor in the retention of experienced personnel?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes an important point. Of course there are competing pressures on any budget, whatever its size, but infrastructure—the hangars, runways and accommodation—is an important consideration. He also makes a point about the level of skills training. He will know, as will many Members in this House, that there are serious skills shortages in all the Armed Forces, and we face a challenge to meet the requirements we have because of that skills shortage. Skills training, accommodation and infrastructure will play an important part in any review that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, conducts.

King’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, an incoming Government inevitably consider that their predecessor got most things wrong, but the Prime Minister has already conceded that on some issues—Ukraine, for example—his Administration will continue the policy of the last Government. Given the things they said in opposition, I assume that the Government agree with the previous Foreign Secretary’s assertion that

“the lights are absolutely flashing red … on the global dashboard”.

The accuracy of the last Administration’s analysis was, unfortunately, not matched by the adequacy of their response. I fear that this, too, is an area where the new Government seem tempted to tread the same path as their predecessor. They have committed to increasing the defence budget to 2.5% of GDP. Why? Presumably, it is because they have correctly reached the conclusion that the current budget is insufficient in light of the circumstances in which we find ourselves as a nation and as an alliance. But we find ourselves in those circumstances now, not at some indeterminate point in future, so saying that “Defence expenditure will be increased, but not now” is completely illogical.

Some might say that we cannot increase the defence budget until the defence review has reported and set out how the money should be spent. This argument fails on a number of counts. Do we need a defence review to tell us that Putin is a clear and present danger, that there is a growing strand of isolationism in America whatever the outcome of the forthcoming presidential election, that weapons stocks across the Armed Forces are perilously low, that the Armed Forces are failing to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of the engineers and technicians on which modern military capability so crucially depends or that the current defence budget is inadequate to address these issues? The answer to these questions is no. In truth, the defence review will need to set out how far and quickly we should go beyond 2.5% of GDP and the balance of investment to be made in future capabilities. It cannot wish away the current deficiencies, which are so pressing in light of the present threat and which require urgent investment.

I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who is leading the review. He conducted a similar and well-regarded exercise in 1997-98 when Defence Secretary. Unfortunately, the Treasury refused to fund it adequately, to the tune of between £500 million and £1 billion per year. It was in trouble almost from the moment it left the starting blocks—and then we were spending 2.6% of GDP on defence, which would equate to an even higher figure today, given changes in accounting practices.

The mantra seems to be that we will increase the defence budget when fiscal conditions allow. This reflects an amazingly unrealistic view of international relations. Much though we may regret it, the world will not wait upon our pleasure. Putin will not wait upon our pleasure. I suppose we could send him a note saying: “Dear Vladimir, we know that you’re a dire threat to the peace and security of Europe, but would you mind holding off until we get the books straight?” I doubt that he would pay attention. Given the lessons that Russia has learnt from the war in Ukraine and the extent of its military expenditure, we have perhaps five years to put NATO’s own house in order. We will need every minute of those five years to redress the hollowing out of the Armed Forces that has been the dominate feature of recent decades.

I suspect that the Minister might agree with much of this, no matter how straight a bat he may of necessity play in winding up. My remarks are aimed less at him, and more at the occupants of Downing Street. I urge them to heed the words of Shakespeare’s Richard II, as he languished imprisoned and uncrowned in Pontefract Castle. Having squandered his many opportunities, he lamented:

“I have wasted time, and now doth time waste me”.


It concerns me not at all if politicians are wasted by their squandered opportunities, but it concerns me greatly when it is the security of this country and its people that they risk wasting.

Tempest Global Combat Air Programme

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his important Question. The strategic defence review is a root-and-branch review to look at the capabilities that our Armed Forces will need as they meet the threats of a changing world. It will look at defence in the round—and, of course, it will look at programmes across the whole of defence. Can I just pick up on one point from my noble friend? As he says, in the review we do emphasise the importance of the deterrent as well as support for Ukraine and AUKUS.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

With the global combat air programme, will due weight be accorded to the importance of breaking into the Japanese defence programme for the first time in any substantial way, with the associated financial and technological benefits that will bring and the linkages it will create in a crucial strategic area?