Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 20th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

The Government have indicated that this is not going to happen. The amendment is an attempt to bring forward a different model of governance. The proposal is for 25% of board members to be chosen by local authorities. Local authorities are struggling with social care, looked-after children, education and people with learning disabilities. They certainly do not need this added to their “to do” list.

I look forward to the Minister’s response to this group of amendments, particularly Amendment 9.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 57 is highly workable, because it advances democracy and public accountability of the regulatory bodies. As we have it now, the regulators of the water industry have failed the people, mainly because they are too close to the very interests that they need to regulate and far removed from the welfare of employees, customers and citizens, who bear the ultimate cost of regulatory failure. I am pretty sure that the Government will soon be asking customers to chip in more money to restructure water companies and taxpayers to pay more to reconstruct them. That is just one part of the cost which people will bear.

All regulatory bodies need to be guided by effective watchdogs and guide dogs, but Ofwat has neither any watchdog nor any guide dog; it just seems to be running loose and doing whatever it wishes. There is no mechanism for preventing capture of water regulators. The executives of Ofwat pass through revolving doors and join the water companies with dizzying speed and great regularity, undermining the independence of the regulatory bodies. Regulatory bodies must be seen to be independent rather than just claim that they are independent. At the moment, a director of Ofwat, a former Conservative Minister, is spearheading a campaign that would make it harder for consumers to sue water companies that breach legal sewage limits. Should a regulator be doing that—or should it be more even-handed between the regulated and consumers?

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have three amendments of my own in this group and I have co-signed Amendment 56 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka.

I spoke earlier about the Government’s plans not being strong enough to get a grip on these out-of-control water companies. The amendments in this group, including my Amendments 53, 54 and 59, are illustrative of what could be put in place to really force the water companies to clean up their act. There does not seem to be any protection whatever at the moment against a water company simply going through the special administration process and then hiking bills up on the other side. The moral hazard is obvious.

I am going to take my amendments out of order, and noble Lords will see why. My Amendment 54 would create a special administration process for environmental failures, such as persistent sewage dumping. I do not understand why only financial failure should lead to special administration, when a much bigger failure is the sheer amount of sewage pumped into our rivers and on to our beaches. Thames Water, for example, will come out of special administration still in private hands, but with the bulk of the debt paid off by higher bills. My amendment would change this by giving the special administrator the power to write off the bulk of the debt where it has been used to pay for dividends and where the company has failed to deliver the investment to fix the sewage system. Those powers are not in the current rules and the Government have the chance to change that. Otherwise, we will reward the failures and greed of companies such as Thames Water and will be blamed for it.

I will take my Amendments 53 and 59 together only because I would actually have liked to press them to a vote. They are two amendments I care about very much, on issues that I think the general population cares about very much, and it staggered me that there has not been more support for them in your Lordships’ House. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for supporting me: it is two Greens and him who have proposed this.

Essentially, my Amendment 53 would prevent water companies being bailed out by either the public purse or via consumers’ water bills. This is because I am quite suspicious that the whole Bill is a tactic to support the water companies, at vast expense to bill payers and eventually to taxpayers. I simply do not understand why profits are privatised but losses are not. We, the public, pay for the losses but do not get the profits.

My Amendment 59 would require the Government to conduct a full assessment of the costs of bringing water companies into public ownership. So much of the public ownership debate is dismissed based on dubious industry figures about how expensive it would be. These conveniently miss the fact that some of these companies are now distressed assets facing bankruptcy. I at least ask the Treasury to do a proper costings exercise which discounts the fact that water company valuations are based on expectations that taxpayers or bill payers will underwrite the future profits of the water companies. Given the total failure of water privatisation, the Government need to seriously plan to bring water back into public ownership. The public are crying out for it, and it would actually be good value for money. The first step towards that is to work out the real costs rather than regurgitating figures from a biased industry.

It will be a race against time whether we can pass this Bill before Thames Water fails. All the experts agree that Thames Water is going to collapse, so why are the Government not taking it into special administration immediately? My genuine fear is that this Government will find themselves in a political storm over the big rise in water bills to finance a new private company taking over. The Government would have three regrets: first, that they did not refuse a bailout; secondly, that they did not listen to the public and change the powers of the special administrator to write off shareholder-accredited debts; and thirdly, that they ruled out public ownership as an option and boxed themselves into a corner. I deeply regret this aspect of the Bill, and I wish there were support in your Lordships’ House for no bailout and public ownership.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendments 53 and 56, with some trepidation. At 4 pm today my heart soared, because the Railway Minister said that government policy was to bring these monopolies into public ownership. But by 5 pm the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock—said no, and that water companies must remain in private hands. It is nearly 9 pm now, so I do not know whether the policy has changed again. It would be interesting to know.

Water companies and shareholders and lenders have extracted vast sums of money, and under no circumstances must they be bailed out. We are now almost reaching the endgame and maybe the beginning of a new chapter in water companies. Thames Water is an interesting case. All nine of its shareholders have declared the company to be a basket case and are refusing to invest, after extracting billions of pounds in dividends and inflicting massive, real-term price hikes on customers. The value of those shares has been written off; the value of debt has also taken a haircut in the marketplace.

The interesting thing is that Thames Water is now going to borrow more money, which does not make any sense; I do not know how the Government have made any sense of it. Thames Water already has a debt of about £18 billion, and its gearing, as I said earlier, is already over 80%, compared to Ofwat’s idealised ratio of 15%. Thames Water is now negotiating a £3.5 billion new loan at 9.75% for two and a half years. This new loan will require it to pay £800 million over two and a half years, with interest and various fees, to intermediaries, after which it will also have to repay the loan of £3 billion. That is £3.8 billion—which it will probably try to recover from customers. It has 16 million customers, so that works out at a charge of £95 per customer simply to service this debt. This simply is not viable. There would be riots in the streets if water companies went ahead and squeezed the customers even more. It is simply and utterly unacceptable.

The company will continue to discharge tonnes of sewage in the rivers. Water leaks will still go unplugged. We are talking about not just investment in infrastructure; Thames Water has also neglected other investments such as investment in IT. Some of its IT systems date back to the 1980s and are obsolete. According to whistleblowers, some of its essential systems still use Lotus Notes software from the 1980s and 1990s, which cannot be updated any more.

Thames Water will run out of cash soon and will inevitably pass to its lenders. But that will not solve the problem either, because the lenders, as the new equity holders, would still want a massive return on their investment, so we are back to the territory of massive new bill hikes. The Government’s delay and dithering are not helping to clarify the situation. They need to bring this company into public ownership. Private equity and hedge funds are lurking—they are the new hyenas ready to feed on the carcass of Thames Water and grab whatever assets it has left. I have been told that they are especially after land. They are counting on some kind of government bailout so that the value of their investment soars.

Thames Water is not alone. The same scenario is being repeated at Southern Water. The Minister said today that Ofwat’s approval is needed to pay dividends, so it is interesting that today Severn Water declared six-months profits, which have nearly tripled in six months, and has increased its dividends from 46.74p per share to 48.6p per share. It would be interesting to know when Ofwat approved this. Can we have some public evidence to show that Ofwat approved this higher rate of dividend?

It is a matter of concern to me and others that the Bill enables the Secretary of State to dip into the public purse and also levy massive charges on customers to restructure the companies. That is effectively a bailout by another name. Through this process, the Government may possibly write off the debts of these companies and possibly take on the liabilities and costs associated with cleaning rivers, seas and lakes. So there is nothing of any value in this for the customers at all, because they will end up paying more and the citizens will end up paying more as well. The bottom line is that public money should not be used to bail out any of these investors, whether they are lenders or shareholders. Hopefully, the Minister will give that commitment.

I tabled Amendment 56 previously, but I got some strange responses so I want to return to it. In any civilised society, a key requirement is that all businesses, especially those that control services essential for life, must be operated by organisations that are law-abiding, ethical and responsible. But none of that applies to water companies. The whole industry is controlled by organisations with criminal convictions galore. It is not one or two, and it is not that somebody forgot something or perhaps there was an innocent oversight. There are 1,109 criminal convictions, and there is not a single water company without a criminal conviction.

This is the result of deliberate planning in company boardrooms: the directors decided to violate laws, lie and cheat. The field of these convictions is led by United Utilities, with 205; Thames Water has 187 convictions; and South West Water has 174. None has shown any sign of mending their ways; if they had, these convictions would have stopped years ago, but they continue. Just last month, the BBC reported that United Utilities dumped more than 140 million litres of raw sewage into Windermere between 2021 and 2023—at that time, it was not permitted to do so. A BBC investigation found that illegal discharges had been taking place for more than three years—far longer than the discharges in the four months the company retrospectively reported. In other words, it lied.

There is no effective fit and proper person test in the UK to decide whether somebody ought to be allowed to run or control a water company or a wastewater disposal service. If there were, none of these companies would pass it. But, rather than punishing companies engaged in criminal activity, successive Governments have protected them. They ask people, year after year, to hand more money to these organisations, which obviously continue with their pattern of behaviour.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord has reached the time limit.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

Sorry, I did not realise. I was just beginning to enjoy that.

Just to finish off—not long to go now—the question is: why should these criminals be allowed to remain in charge? These things are not minor infractions. Last time we debated this, the Minister said that there were

“significant consequences for a company’s investors. Investors would not have the confidence to invest money if the special administration regime could be triggered without allowing a company to rectify any performance issues”.—[Official Report, 4/11/24; col. 1373.]

That is, again, a very strange argument that we should allow criminals to continue because somehow it might upset the market. On that basis, it would open the doors to criminal activities everywhere—

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I am so sorry, but we have reached time. Thank you.

Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

This legislation is a set of political choices, and I am very concerned that the next election will be tough on the Labour Government if this all goes through in the way they seem to predict it will. If they try to get water bill payers to carry the debt from all the decades of privatised failure, that will not be popular with the wider population. So I hope the Government have a proper think about this and make the choices that put them on the side of bill payers and the environment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 97, 99 and 102. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, on her speech. I fully support Amendment 97.

It is interesting that, following an article in the Telegraph, on 19 September, the Government issued a press release in which they said:

“These powers would never be used to pay bondholders, shareholders or creditors … we do not expect customers to pay the price for water companies’ mismanagement … The new measures in the Water Bill will protect taxpayers”.


At the same time, the Explanatory Notes state, on Clause 10, that the Secretary of State “may provide financial assistance” to companies. It is hard to see how these statements can be reconciled. I hope the Minister will tell us what kind of financial assistance the Government envisage providing to water companies while they are being restructured. Their being restructured means that they are already financially, environmentally and morally bankrupt, so why provide financial assistance?

In the debate last week, the Minister said that water companies are “private companies”. If they are, they should be fully exposed to the laws of capitalism, with absolutely no bailout of any kind. Why are we making these special provisions to indulge them and, presumably, write down some of the debt? This was a key assumption made by the last Government in what was code-named Project Timber. Information leaked out that it was talking about how the Government, presumably, may write the debt of Thames Water down to merely 40% of the amount owed.

Whenever we talk about not bailing out shareholders and bondholders, or refer to public ownership, the Government’s immediate response is to say that it will cost billions of pounds. I once again invite the Minister to show me the Government’s calculations—I will happily critique them for free and talk about whether those numbers make any sense. Will the Minister accept my challenge and please publish the numbers?

The Government also say that it would be hard to reintegrate the companies. We are doing it for railway companies, so why can we not do it for water companies? What exactly would be the hardship? Every day, there are numerous mergers and takeovers in the corporate sector, and they are easily integrated and rewired. I hope that the Minister will explain this. I would particularly like to see the calculations of what the cost of public ownership would be, so that we can then start looking at this and talking about the optimum solution.

I hope the Minister will not refer me, as she did previously, to the 2018 Social Market Foundation report. It fetched a number out of thin air and said it was worth about £90 billion—the following year, this was contradicted by Moody’s, which said it was only £14.5 billion. Since then, as we know, a lot of shares of water companies have become worthless and the debt has junk status, so it is easy to let the normal rules of capitalism apply.

I support the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on Amendment 99. I will say a little more about Amendment 102. Currently, water companies can violate rules and legal limits on sewage dumping ad infinitum. They can easily do cost-benefit analyses and see that it is cheaper to pay fines for illegal practices than to invest in infrastructure and act responsibly. This boosts profits, dividends and executive pay, while the public picks up the cost of unplugged leaks, sewage dumping, health hazards, and the destruction of biodiversity and marine life. To some, such costs are just externalities, but the public sees this as abuse, as clearly shown by yesterday’s mass demonstration in London.

The puny financial penalties have not curbed the predatory practices. The Minister promises us that there will be more and says that the executives may be prosecuted—that is, if they can wait another 20 years to have their cases heard, as there is already a backlog of 60,000 cases in the Crown Court. The result is that the whole industry is now under the control of entities that have criminal convictions. Wastewater companies in England and Wales have been convicted 1,109 times since 1989. The dismal roll-call is as follows: United Utilities has 205 convictions, Thames Water has 187, South West Water has 174, Anglia Water has 128, Yorkshire Water has 125 and Southern Water has 119. Perhaps the Minister would care to name a pristine water company—never mind pristine water, just a pristine water company. That would be helpful.

There are no pristine, honourable, responsible or ethical water companies, but successive Governments continue to indulge them and give them monopolies in an essential public good. What would happen if 10 major food or medicine companies were convicted of 1,109 crimes that they knowingly committed? They would be shut down and consumers would sue them, but regulators in the water industry do no such thing. Indeed, Ministers make excuses, and successive Ministers have done nothing.

My amendment requires that habitual offenders be placed into special administration, if two or more criminal convictions are secured in a five-year period. This is akin to yellow and red cards in football. The first yellow card is a warning, effectively saying, “Don’t do it again. Mend your ways. Clean up your act”. If no heed is taken, the second yellow card, which is effectively a red card, would follow, and the companies would be placed into special administration.

It is often claimed that shareholders are passive. The threat of special administration for abusive practices would encourage them to actively invigilate companies and their boards and take an interest in their governance. For far too long, companies have got away with abuses; my amendment would ensure that there were serious consequences for them. If the Minister does not accept my amendment, can she say how many convictions water companies need before they are considered unfit and improper to own crucial infrastructure?

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 73, moved by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. I thank the noble Earl, the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their contributions.

On these Benches, we have grave concerns about these amendments. While it is important that the water sector operates with integrity, we fear the amendments may have unintended consequences that could destabilise the industry and ultimately be detrimental to the public and the environment.

On Amendment 73, the power to revoke a water company’s licence is one of great consequence and must be exercised judiciously. An abrupt removal of a licence, without sufficient consideration of the ramifications for infrastructure and service continuity, could leave customers vulnerable and lead to service interruptions. It would also be a very substantial barrier to private sector investment. Investors must be able to have confidence that they will be able to enjoy returns on their investments without elevated risk of loss of licence. Should such an amendment be included in this Bill, it would lead to a much higher cost of capital for the industry and higher consumer bills as a consequence. While we appreciate the intent to hold companies accountable, we suggest exploring whether there are more balanced approaches to achieving compliance, without risking instability.

Amendment 97 raises further concerns. The possibility of cancelling debt in the event of special administration proceedings could create moral hazard. This amendment, while aiming to protect consumers from the fallout of financial mismanagement, might inadvertently incentivise risky financial behaviour by companies under the impression that their debts could be forgiven in times of crisis. The bankruptcy route already allows debt to be repaid in part or renegotiated in an orderly manner, respecting the contractual rights of all creditors. This would not be desirable.

As for Amendment 98, this is a matter of significant complexity. We must not overlook the potential costs and operational challenges associated with such transfers. The water industry requires immense resources, infrastructure investment and technical expertise. A shift to public ownership would strain government resources and create operational challenges. We support the Government in not wishing to see a return to public ownership of the industry.

I wish to address Amendments 99 and 102. These amendments would empower the Government to put companies into special administration if they breached certain environmental conditions or held criminal convictions. While we wholeheartedly support stringent environmental standards and rigorous compliance, it is essential that these mechanisms do not inadvertently undermine the ability of water companies to continue their core operations. The amendments could place companies in special administration for relatively minor infractions, which may not warrant such a severe response.

We must be careful not to adopt measures that could disproportionately impact employees, customers and investors who depend on the water industry. I thank noble Lords for tabling these amendments and regret that we cannot support them—and could not even before the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, gave her views on my party.

Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 30th October 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sikka]

29: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Prohibition of possible conflicts of interest(1) The Water Industry Act 1991 is amended as follows.(2) After section 35D (inserted by section 1 of this Act), insert—“35E Prohibition of possible conflicts of interest(1) An employee, director or advisor of the Authority, or the Secretary of State, may not—(a) take any employment, directorship, commercial opportunity, or other significant transactional relationship with any regulated water company, or connected party, or(b) accept gifts of any amount, that could produce the appearance of a conflict of interest.(2) A connected party under subsection (1)(a) includes a shareholder, significant creditor, or other entity with a significant transactional relationship with a regulated water company.””Member's explanatory statement
The amendment seeks to enhance independence of the regulator.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I should like to introduce the amendments in this group. They all seek to create, strengthen or delete regulations. Amendment 56 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, seeks review of the environmental permits. Amendment 78 tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Parminter, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, seeks to impose duties on the regulator to provide clean water. Through Amendments 79 and 80, the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, of Hardington Mandeville, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, seek to abolish the water authority and create a clean water authority. Through Amendment 81, the noble Earl seeks a regulatory review of the water industry. Through Amendments 84 and 85, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, seeks to remove the regulator’s growth objectives and make environmental protection a statutory duty. I am sure that they will have plenty to add when they speak.

Meanwhile, I should like to speak to Amendment 29, which is about the prohibition of possible conflicts of interests. The key principle is that regulators must not only be independent of the regulated entities and personnel but be seen to be independent and free from any conflicts of interests. They must avoid cognitive capture. Individuals from regulatory bodies are in demand by the regulated entities because they can open doors and help to secure favours, and enable water companies to game the regulatory system.

No matter how vehemently such charges are denied, that is how it will always appear to the public at large, and public perceptions matter. Thanks to the wage freeze and the real wage cuts over the past 14 years, too many regulators are poorly paid. While in regulatory positions, they begin to look for greener pastures or are targeted by water companies for enrolment. In fact, every interaction they have with a water company is a potential job interview. There is always a temptation to go easy and be extra helpful to a potential employer, as that can help to land a much better-paid job. No one wants to sour that potential by being tough, awkward or robust with their potential employer. That applies to the regulators’ employees too.

There is plenty of evidence about the merry-go-round between the core regulators and water companies. A report last year noted that at least 27 former Ofwat directors, managers and consultants working in the industry, which they helped to regulate, subsequently began to work for water companies, mostly in senior positions. Six water and sewerage companies in England have hired directors of corporate strategy or heads of regulation from Ofwat. They were the insiders. One celebrated name, Cathryn Ross, at one time interim joint chief executive of Thames Water, was a former head of Ofwat. Several former Ofwat senior people now work at Thames Water. In addition to Ross, there is Jonathan Read, who is a director of regulatory policy and investigations. There is also Giles Stevens, director of regulatory strategy and innovation. Another executive from a regulator was recruited by Thames Water as recently as March last year as a “regulatory engagement lead”. At Severn Trent Water, there are at least nine employees who were previously at Ofwat. They include Shane Anderson, director of strategy and regulation, and Jonathan Ashley, head of economic regulation. Both previously worked as directors at the regulator that oversees water and sewerage firms in England and Wales.

I add for clarity that none of these people has broken any rules; I am not accusing them of doing so. It is simply that the rules are inadequate or, if they exist, incredibly poorly applied and permit this merry-go-round.

Amendment 29 requires that senior staff who work at the regulator cannot and must not have a potential conflict of interest by being lured into a job at a regulated company. It also requires that the Secretary of State must have no conflict of interests or appearance of a conflict: for example, by accepting gifts, free tickets for football matches, or even possibly tokens to buy new suits. None of that should be permitted. All regulators must be seen to be above any reproach, and there must be no question whatever about their integrity. An enforceable statutory framework is needed, and that is what this amendment seeks. We do not need voluntary codes, because they cannot be enforced by any court of law. We need legal backing. I beg to move.

[Baroness Parminter (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to introduce Amendment 78 and to return to the issue we covered on the first day in Committee around the duty of the water regulator, Ofwat, and the fact that at the moment it does not have a core duty which comprises a public interest. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, who again is unwell and cannot be with us today, the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their support for this amendment.

It is quite clear that the public feel extremely strongly about how the regulator is ensuring, not ensuring or unable to ensure that companies perform their duties towards the public interest correctly. If we have any doubt of that, we saw the strength of feeling in the general election, we see it every day in the newspapers, and I am sure we will see it on the streets of London this Sunday with the March for Clean Water; I declare my interest as stated in the register.

However, if anyone were to sit down and read the Water Industry Act 1991, they would be amazed that there are no duties for Ofwat with regard to the public interest, to promote public health or to ensure the protection and conservation of our environment. They would see it as an absolutely astonishing omission. What they would see is a core duty to ensure the “long-term resilience” of water company services and sewerage systems. That is effectively a “keep the taps on” clause—which my local water company, Thames Water, seems to be unable to do on quite a regular basis, although that is beside the point. Then there is a whole swathe of legally binding economic duties which ensure that Ofwat absolutely focuses the water companies on making a profit. I am not against making a profit; of course they should make a profit. However, Amendment 78 says that we should look for a triple bottom line: for profitability, environmental returns and social outcomes.

As this returns to an issue that we looked at on Monday which is fairly similar to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, which talked about taking all reasonable steps to contribute to the environment and climate change targets, I made sure that I read the Minister’s reply carefully in Hansard because I thought I might get the same sort of reply myself. She made three points. She says that the amendment is not necessary because it overlaps

“with existing government requirements, Ofwat’s core duties and our ambitions for the future”.—[Official Report, 28/10/24; col. 939.]

The Government do not have of themselves the mechanisms to deliver on all these targets; they rely on other bodies to work with them. Giving Ofwat this duty would enable it to support those government requirements and targets.

Secondly, on the point about Ofwat’s core duties, I strongly but respectfully disagree with the Minister. There is no evidence in Ofwat’s existing core duty of any public interest duty. Thirdly, the Minister talks about our ambitions for the future, by which I think that, rightly, she means the water industry commission. I shall quote again from her response on Monday. With regard to the independent water commission, she said the Government would put the environment

“at the heart of what we are doing”.—[Official Report, 28/10/24; col. 939.]

Great, fantastic—but, as we discussed on Monday, once we get the commission done, we will have to wait for legislation and time is rolling on, while our environmental and climate targets are here and now. We cannot wait. We should be using this opportunity in the meantime to strengthen the duties for Ofwat to ensure that our water companies can support the Government in the very necessary task of protecting our environment and delivering clean water for the public.

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I once again thank noble Lords for their thoughtful suggestions. I very much appreciated the words of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, about the importance of working together constructively going forward. That is the spirit in which I would like to continue working on the Bill, and I very much appreciate the constructive debate so far in Committee.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply and all noble Lords for their observations, comments and speeches. Amendment 29 does have implications for other sectors, because they all suffer from the same malaise—a merry-go-round of regulatory capture. The result is that regulation is not what it should be.

The Minister referred to the Civil Service code on appointments and the migration of workers to companies. That has clearly failed—otherwise, how else do you explain the Ofwat chief executive becoming the chief executive of Thames Water, given the financial mess and other problems Thames Water has? No matter how the Minister explains it, people will not accept that everything is above board with that kind of migration. However, I hear what noble Lords have said and, in light of that, I may well revise this amendment and return with it. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 29 withdrawn.

Independent Water Commission

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

That is a really good question. I have met with Dan Corry and spoken with him about this. He is doing a very broad overview of everything; it is not limited to the water industry. His review is entirely separate from any work that the commission is doing. If there is any overlap on the effectiveness of the water industry regulators, I am sure that it will be fed into the commission as part of its discussions.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, the water commission’s terms of reference are full of motherhood and apple pie statements. They promise to protect customers and the environment, but matters such as flooding, agriculture, waste, the pricing formula, profiteering and the failures of privatisation are beyond the scope of the inquiry. Such constraints mean that the review will not be comprehensive. Can the Minister explain why the Government have handicapped the commission from the outset?

Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 28th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 3 in my name and I apologise for the typo. I had noticed it, but only recently, and only a moment or two before the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, brought it to the Committee’s notice.

As we know, Clause 1 contains rules about remuneration and governance. Most importantly, it contains provisions giving Ofwat the power to block the payment of bonuses to senior executives of water companies. My amendment clarifies that Ofwat’s powers under this clause cannot be exercised in a way which conflicts with its general duties with respect to the water industry and emphasises that the industry’s capital and human resources needs are of critical importance. I declare an interest as having been a non-executive director of Severn Trent, the largest of the listed water companies, for eight years, between 2014 and 2022, chairing the board’s remuneration committee for that time.

Why is it that these clarifications are required? Essentially, it is because we are giving extremely wide powers to Ofwat to draft rules in a very complex area, seemingly at its discretion and without further scrutiny by this House, which may have many unintended and harmful consequences. There is no clarity in the Bill on the appropriate targets and performance standards, how they will be measured, when relevant triggers occur and which remuneration, in which year, will be affected. This will all be for Ofwat to determine—yes, Ofwat.

I have huge sympathy for regulators—I was one myself for a period, running the Takeover Panel—and know that they attract only criticism and never praise. Having said that, I thought the mood of your Lordships at Second Reading was especially stark in expressing views about Ofwat’s past performance, and some of those views have already been reiterated in the short time we have had today. That was as regards its role as an economic regulator—its core competence. We are now effectively extending Ofwat’s remit into difficult areas of fine judgment best left to company boards and for which Ofwat is totally unsuited. Can we be so reassured by the integrity of the ensuing process and the safeguards built in that my concerns can be assuaged by leaving this clause unamended? I fear not.

First, it offends the principles of natural justice, as there is no distinction between the legislative process and the judicial one. The powers will lie with one body, Ofwat. It will make the rules and then judge companies and individuals under them. Secondly, the Minister may refer me to the consultation process which Ofwat will undertake, to which she drew the attention of your Lordships in her helpful letter dated 25 October. I welcome that, although it would be a heroic achievement for Ofwat to decide definitively on such a wide range of questions and responsibilities that this Bill, if enacted, will impose on it. Yet we all know that consultation is no panacea. The responses will contain many conflicting views and the conclusions that Ofwat will reach will be influenced by the weight it gives to particular views and to some preconceived ideas that it will inevitably hold.

Thirdly, there will be no opportunity for your Lordships to scrutinise the rules promulgated by Ofwat. For this reason, I support the thrust of Amendment 27 in the names of my noble friends Lord Roborough and Lord Blencathra and Amendment 25 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which are designed to achieve such scrutiny. I will leave those noble Lords to talk to them in more detail.

But is this enough? I suggest not, because the scrutiny so achieved would be after the rules had been made by Ofwat. There is a need to influence Ofwat’s thinking much earlier in the process. That is what my amendment is designed to achieve. It is drafted with an eye to the wider objectives to which this Bill should aim: the need for more innovation, the recruitment of new talent and, above all else, the greater investment required to raise standards.

The amendment is in two parts. First, it is designed to ensure that Ofwat does not exercise its powers in a way that conflicts with its general duties under Section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991. Such duties include a consumer objective, a duty to have regard to principles of best regulatory practice and a growth duty. Indeed, Ofwat refers to such duties in its consultation document when it says that one of its desired outcomes is that the rules should be proportionate. That is to be welcomed.

The Minister may be tempted to say that existing duties in the Water Industry Act and Ofwat’s acknowledgement of them should satisfy me and render this part of my amendment redundant. Were she to do so, I would say that that might hold good if the Bill imposed some constraints on Ofwat rather than adopting a blanket “Over to you, Ofwat” line. In the same section of its consultation document, it appears to qualify its commitment to proportionality by saying that

“we will be bound by statute”—

presumably as a result of this Bill—

“to introduce rules with the requisite effect”.

It is therefore critical that there is not just implicit recognition of Ofwat’s duties under the Water Industry Act of over 30 years ago but explicit recognition of those obligations on the face of the Bill, linked directly to this new and additional power that we will be giving to the regulator.

The second part of my amendment requires Ofwat to have regard to two further considerations in exercising its powers under this clause: namely,

“the need for a relevant undertaker”—

the water company—

“to … attract the investment required for its capital programme, and … attract, motivate and retain persons holding senior roles”.

I can find no reference to these considerations in Ofwat’s consultation document generally, nor in the specific questions it proposes, yet the scale of the investment in the industry that is required is such that we cannot afford to deter that investment, or experienced executives from working in it. Unlike in the past, much of that investment will have to come from equity investors, who assume a higher level of risk than debt investors and have more of a vested interest in, and so take a more critical attitude to, the prospects of a company, its financial plans and, importantly, the quality of the management tasked with delivery.

There is a limited number of appropriately qualified and skilled candidates to take on the most senior roles in water companies, and one of the successes of privatisation has been the ability of such companies to attract successful individuals from outside the utilities sector. In a competitive world for talent, Ofwat should not introduce rules that put water companies at a significant disadvantage when recruiting and seeking to retain such staff.

When launching the independent review of the water sector last week, the Secretary of State was at pains to stress the importance of attracting the investment needed to clean up our waterways and rebuild our broken water infrastructure—and, specifically, facilitating a regulatory environment that attracts investment. The least we can do is play our part in supporting the Secretary of State in this noble endeavour. I should have thought that this amendment would be music to the Minister’s ears, so I look forward to her response with a great deal of hope and expectation, and indeed no little optimism.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I will speak to Amendment 25. This amendment seeks to strengthen Parliament’s role in crafting and approving regulations for the water industry. The Bill as it stands asks people and Parliament to trust regulators, which the Bill calls “authority”—currently they include Ofwat and the Environment Agency—to make rules. Well, that trust has already been severely eroded.

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Moved by

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

4: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, leave out “persons holding senior roles” and insert “all executive and non-executive members of the board of directors”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to confirm that all members of the board are held to account, in a way consistent with company law, and to remove any ambiguity in the Bill about what constitutes a senior role.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 4 seeks clarity as to what the Bill is getting at. The Bill’s intention appears to apply penalties to only selected directors and not the entire board of directors, even though decisions are made collectively. The Explanatory Notes say it commits to

“ban bonuses for persons holding senior roles”,

and the Bill defines a “senior role” as a person who

“is a chief executive of the undertaker”—

a somewhat unfortunate phrase—

“is a director of the undertaker, or … holds such other description of role with the undertaker”.

The tone of the Bill suggests that references may all be to executive directors, but we know that water companies also have non-executive directors, and under the Companies Act non-executive directors have exactly the same liability and responsibility as executive directors. The Bill does not mention non-executive directors.

Amendment 4 seeks clarity and asks the Minister to confirm that the prohibitions and penalties will apply to not only non-executive directors but legal persons who may be acting as directors, because natural persons can be directors as well as legal persons. I beg to move.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I must admit to having experienced a degree of trepidation on discovering that I was to share a group of amendments with the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and with him alone. Having listened to his views on the Bill in general, so eloquently expressed at Second Reading, I feared that we would find little common ground when debating particular aspects of it. Imagine my surprise, therefore, when I compared his Amendment 4, to which he has just spoken, with my Amendment 18, to which I am about to speak, to discover that we might have more in common than I had thought.

I think that some of the rationale behind Amendment 4 is misplaced. While I agree with the noble Lord that all members of the board under company law are held to account, performance-related pay is in practice paid only to executives, while non-executives are remunerated by way of fixed fee. Given that the provision to which Amendment 4 relates is in respect of performance-related pay, the inclusion of non-executive directors is of no practical importance. Notwithstanding this, Amendments 4 and 18 effectively would achieve the same practical impact in respect of the individuals to whom these remuneration rules apply. Amendment 4 would remove the reference to senior roles and replace it with a reference to directors of the company, while Amendment 18 would retain the concept of senior roles but effectively define them as directors of the company.

I do not believe that it is right for Ofwat to extend the rules to

“such other description of role”

as it specifies. Not only would such an extension be wider in scope than the current disclosure requirements of Section 35A of the Water Industry Act 1991 but it would be difficult to implement in practice, as different water companies will have individuals described differently by title and role. Nor would such an extension be consistent with the general remuneration and corporate governance rules for listed companies, which do not extend to individuals below board level.

I hope the Minister agrees that, through the adoption of my amendment, this additional power conferred on Ofwat by the Bill should be removed. If we wish to attract and support the next generation of leaders in this vital industry from middle management, this will not be achieved by extending these restrictive remuneration practices to them.

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[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their interest in the rules relating to performance-related pay. The public have been clear that they expect to see change in the performance of the water industry and, where performance is poor, that executives should not receive bonuses.

I turn to the amendments in this group: Amendment 4 from my noble friend Lord Sikka and Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. I thank them for their introductions and their unexpected agreement. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, for sharing her experience of working with Yorkshire Water; these shared experiences are important as we develop the legislation going forward.

In line with the general principles of regulatory independence, Ofwat will rightly be responsible for developing and enforcing the rules on remuneration in governance, including determining the individuals in scope. As I mentioned in the previous group, Ofwat published its policy consultation on 22 October, and this will run through to 19 November. This consultation is to design the rules that are outlined in the Bill.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, I will say that the consultation sets out Ofwat’s intention to apply rules on performance-related pay only to executive directors who are members of the regulated company board and receive performance-related pay. Ofwat has also stated in its policy consultation that it intends for the rules relating to fitness and propriety to apply in the first instance to chief executives and individuals appointed as directors to the board, and that would include both executive and non-executive directors. But Ofwat may consider extending the rules to other senior management roles in the future.

Allowing Ofwat to set out in the rules the performance metrics to be applied will also enable those standards to be more easily amended, subject to the relevant procedural requirements, where or when it is appropriate to do so in the future. Ofwat will of course need to consult with the relevant persons, and this will include the Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers, the Consumer Council for Water and other stakeholders, before these rules are finalised.

In conclusion, the Government will therefore not be accepting these amendments, because we need to ensure that Ofwat can retain the flexibility to expand the group of persons covered by the rules in future if appropriate.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate and I am sure that some of the issues will return. Perhaps I may just clarify a point. The Bill also holds out the possibility of criminal sanctions against directors. Are we to assume that non-executive directors will never be charged with anything? The Post Office scandal shows that non-executive directors were culpable, so there appears to be a case for including them in some of these considerations. I am sure I will read Hansard with considerable interest and possibly return next time. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Sikka]

5: Clause 1, page 1, line 15, leave out “performance-related pay” and insert “total remuneration”
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment seeks to strengthen the Bill by focusing on total remuneration, regardless of the form.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

Gosh—my turn again. This amendment seeks to replace the words “performance-related pay” with “total remuneration”. At Second Reading, I raised the question of how the ban on bonus payments was actually to be implemented. At the time, the Minister did not reply and, to my mind, the question still stands. Over the years, I have written many executive remuneration contracts and seen many others; some of them contain many odd bits. For example, so-called performance-related pay may come in the form of cash, shares, share options, chauffeur-driven cars, even gardeners, rent-free accommodation, children’s school fees and much more.

Published company accounts never really make it clear what the complete components are and the executive remuneration contracts are never filed at Companies House for anyone to see what exactly they are getting paid for. The value of some of these payments may not be known until some time in the future. For example, the value of a share option granted today and exercisable after a certain number of months or years would not be known until the date of the exercise. So how will the regulator decide whether any bonus payment is materially significant and deserving of a possible ban? Somebody might simply say, “This does not appear to be significant at the moment, but it could be significant by the time it is exercised”.

Companies can also shift the basis of bonus plans to retain or attract executives. If Ofwat or any other regulator were to impose a ban, it might change the weight attached to the part of the performance that may be considered by the regulator, and thereby defeat the whole objective of imposing any ban. The company can also easily bypass any restriction on bonus payments by adjusting the bonus pay. It can simply say to directors, “Your basic pay will increase and your bonus pay is down”. As many water companies are part of giant conglomerates, directors can be offered seats on other company boards so that their total remuneration is no less, even if a bonus is banned.

So it is not clear to me how this ban is going to be implemented. It looks good on paper, but in practice I have yet to hear the details, so what I am suggesting is that the attention needs to focus on total pay, not just bonuses, because bonuses can easily be bypassed. That is why this amendment seeks to substitute “performance-related pay” with “total remuneration”. I beg to move.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. Amendment 6, tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Bakewell, to which I have added my name, would mean a water company could not give performance-related pay to persons holding a senior role if the company had failed to prevent all sewage discharges, spills or leaks. This definition also includes legal spills. We have included legal spills as this practice also needs to stop, and the only way to ensure that it does is by working to put pressure on private water companies to apply the appropriate and necessary levels of investment in infrastructure. Only then will these companies be operating as intended, and only then should they potentially be free to think about remuneration above and beyond basic salaries to their top executives.

I have also added my name to Amendment 28, also in the name of my noble friend Lady Bakewell. This amendment creates a new section in the Water Industry Act 1991 to require Ofwat to ban bonuses for water company bosses if they fail to prevent sewage discharges, spills or leaks. Taken together, these amendments seek to help tackle head-on one of the main issues that I am sure many of your Lordships had raised with them, with passion, on the doorsteps at the last general election: the sheer hypocrisy of water companies continuously and seemingly endlessly failing to protect our environment. It is outrageous that they are continuing to get away with unabated sewage spills in our much-loved rivers and lakes, all the while paying themselves massive bonuses and dividends and racking up huge amounts of debt.

We are not able to go to the beach or to wild swim, while they get rich off the back of failure after failure. All of this has been done while failing to adequately invest in the infrastructure that is so desperately needed to end this seemingly endless cycle of scandal. My party has tirelessly campaigned on this issue and we will continue to do so. No other issue has cut through to the electorate on such a scale and with such a level of arguable clarity as this one has. Indeed, the promise to scrap CEO bonuses was a core manifesto pledge we stood on at the last general election. The electorate are outraged and rightly so. No one feels good when they are overcharged for the privilege of receiving an appalling service. To be clear, this is exactly what bill payers are getting with a proposed 40% increase in bills and no end in sight to the pollution of our environment. Our rivers, streams and lakes have been polluted to the point of collapse. My party has led a campaign on these issues that cut through on all sides of the political spectrum.

The broken system has seen those who have a duty to protect polluting with no consequences, and time and again they have rewarded themselves lavishly for the privilege. Instead of the “polluter pays” principle ever being applied, we have the “polluter awards themselves a pay increase” principle applied every time. In 2023 alone there were some 3.6 million hours of untreated sewage discharges in England, up a staggering 105% on the year before. How many fines have been levelled against water companies in the previous few years? I have really struggled to find that information. Meanwhile, water companies have paid at least £78 billion in dividends while failing to invest.

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I once again thank noble Lords for their suggestions and their input to this discussion on matters for consideration in performance-related pay rules.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this debate, giving us much food for thought. I thank the Minister for her response and I withdraw my amendment for the time being.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

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[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, indicated, this group of amendments deals with a common theme of representation on water company boards but has several different facets.

Amendment 22 in my name would ensure that it is for the boards of water companies, rather than Ofwat, to decide in which forum—board, committee or panel—the views of consumers should be represented. As we have heard, Clause 1 includes provisions intended to establish consumer involvement in corporate decision-making. New subsection (6) provides that this

“may include a requirement for persons representing the views of consumers to be members of a board, committee or panel of”

the water company. While I support the principle of strengthening the voice of consumers, this should not be through a highly prescriptive, one-size-fits-all approach.

In this country we do not have different categories of director, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, reminded us earlier. Non-executive directors may have specialisations, but they are chosen for their wider skills and ability to make a comprehensive contribution. The noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, just made a similar point. Those representing consumer interests may not wish or be equipped to sit on corporate boards, with all the responsibilities and liabilities that entails. It should not be for Ofwat to require that such people sit on the boards of water companies but should be left to the companies to decide which forum best suits their requirements, whether that be board, committee or panel.

Providing similar flexibility was effective when companies enacted the workforce engagement mechanism under the UK Corporate Governance Code’s requirements. A very small number of companies appointed a director from the workforce, largely for the considerations I have mentioned. Some established a formal workforce advisory panel, and a greater number appointed a designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. Each company chose the mechanism best suited to its circumstances, and the system has worked well.

Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, extend the provisions of this clause to environmental experts. It will be for your Lordships to decide how widely to draw the categories of relevant interest, however represented, but the principle in the latter amendment of representation other than at board level is very much in line with the rationale behind my amendment. I shall listen with interest to the arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their Amendments 82 and 100 respectively. However, they would represent a radical departure from accepted standards of corporate governance and company law, so I would hesitate to support them.

My earlier dose of optimism is becoming somewhat jaded. A recurring theme seems to be emerging in the Minister’s replies: everything is for Ofwat to decide. That displays a touching and, if I may venture, possibly naive belief in Ofwat deciding wisely on many matters that are not within its competence as an economic regulator. Concerns have been expressed on all sides about its past record. Surely it should be the role of this House to take more responsibility on itself and give much more direction and guidance to Ofwat on how it should exercise the significant additional powers this Bill gives it—or, as in this case, remove the key choice from Ofwat and give it to the companies, within a defined framework imposed by us.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 82 addresses a major question that the Bill does not address: why do water regulators fail? After all, they have been at it for many years—at least 35 years, some of them—yet they continue to fail. No proposal in the Bill addresses that. They continue to fail because they are isolated from the lives of the people affected by sewage spills, high customer bills, low investment and water simply leaking away.

The regulatory bodies are generally made up of former Ministers and executives. Someone who has done a stint at a water company disappears to Ofwat; Ofwat’s former chief executive is now director of a water company. There is a revolving door. These people have a world of their own which does not connect with that of the people directly affected by their activities. For any regulatory system to be effective, it must represent a plurality of interests, but our regulatory system and bodies are closely aligned with corporate interests. They are, in essence, captured. If this capture is not there—and is not the reason for their failures—then someone will have to explain why the water industry is in a mess and why the guiding hand of regulators has not been able to put it on a path to recovery, good practices or good behaviour.

The Bill seems to propose consumer panels, which are, in essence, toothless: they have no social constituency to report to because they are not really elected by anyone but simply co-opted on the basis that someone knows somebody and brings them in; they are not required to report to any constituencies; they cannot easily object to the practices of the regulatory bodies; and they can simply be bludgeoned into silence and just go along because that is the norm. We have heard that these amendments somehow propose something unusual and therefore we have to be bludgeoned into silence and simply go along, because tradition is oppressive and that is what we have to do.

My amendment calls for direct representation of elected representatives of employees and stakeholders on the board of the regulatory authority and to give them power to vote on executive remuneration. That would be the ultimate sanction when they disapprove of how the regulatory body is safeguarding or protecting the public interest. If they cannot vote on executive remuneration, they will simply be a shadow. The amendment seeks, in essence, to democratise regulation. I know that democracy is not very fashionable these days, so if the Minister opposes this democratisation of regulation, it would be helpful to know how the Government will check cognitive capture of regulatory bodies, because no other solution is being offered by anybody. If we were to expand on this, in the next group I could lay out a complete framework of what else needs to be done, but this is simply to test and, I hope, elicit a response from the Government.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 100. The issues of water pollution and the supply of clean water to everybody are ones I clearly care a lot about. But this Bill is just papering over the cracks. If we are going to paper over cracks, we could at least try a radical departure; perhaps we could try to bring some democracy into the regime.

I take issue with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. I have chaired a board and it was extremely successful. Part of that was because I invited people who thought very differently on to the board. We had 20 members or so. It was called London Food and we were tasked with writing a report for the Mayor of London on a sustainable food strategy for the city. It was successful, I would argue, partly because of my charm—obviously —but also because we had extremely good reports from every single aspect of food and food supply for London. We had a member from the City who was obviously a Conservative, we had an organic farmer and so on. We had a huge range of people, but we agreed on the strategy and we came to some very useful conclusions. This is what we need: we need some democracy in the systems that try to keep us safe.

Honestly, given the scale of the challenge that the water industry faces at the moment, in trying to make a system work that has proved not to work, we need to ensure that there are some new voices that can represent other parts of society that use the water system and care very deeply about it. We should also involve the people who actually do the work. My amendment brings in people from the workforce.

At the moment, the CEOs and senior staff are more focused on delivering dividends than they are on delivering a quality service, so having worker representatives on the board would provide a constant voice for those whose job it is to provide a service. The regulators have been captured by the industry they are meant to be keeping an eye on, so they are almost useless. This system should not be a national scheme but one based on the geography of the water systems themselves.

I am a believer in democracy and this would be an extremely useful way of making sure that a crucial industry for our society has some resonance with people out there. I am sure that this would be welcomed by the majority of people, just as I am sure that the Minister is aware that polls suggest a majority of people would prefer public ownership. Failing that, however, let us get the public in there, talking and being listened to.

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[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, this has been one of the really interesting groups in the Bill. I am not certain that any of us—from any party, in any amendment—has the complete solution. There are questions about whether a one-size solution fits all. In any case, there is a lot for all of us to go away and think about. These are crucial issues that go to the heart of what we do, how water companies operate, how they are accountable and how people who are impacted by them can feed in to and influence what they do and how they operate.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his contribution. I fully support him on the role of civil society. It is particularly important that we all acknowledge, as he did, that we would not be here without the role of civil society. I have an amendment in a later group to encourage the Government to work more with civil society in monitoring the environment.

I also thank the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, for his comments on the need for environmental representation. I am not quite certain where I agree on that debate; I will go away and think about it some more. I have also been on a board, and to be honest, it was one of the most difficult things I have done in my life. That was even on a good, well-functioning board. Sometimes, if you are in a difficult situation, even with good people who work together, things can be very difficult.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, for tabling his amendment. The board should decide on its own make-up and we should not dictate to it. Perhaps there is some kind of compromise here between the Government setting guidelines for what needs to happen, while perhaps allowing some freedom within the way that it is organised and monitoring the outputs that come from it. Maybe there is something we can all work on there.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for his contribution. It is a bold move, indeed, and I am not entirely certain that I agree with that kind of prescriptive democracy. I think that it is better to allow things to be inclusive, as opposed to dictating that they must be in their make-up, but again, I will think about that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, spoke about bringing some democracy into the regime. I certainly think we need that, and that the environment needs a proper, formal voice. I take up the point from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the need to watch the environment. If we do not do that, and if nobody has that responsibility or role, then that protective piece that needs to happen will not be there.

I think our areas of agreement were the need to broaden representation to include the environment and community, the need for diversity, the need for boards to work well, the need for constructive challenge to operate and to be brought to these companies at the highest level, and the view what we have now is not working, so we need to go away and find something else.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 100. The water authorities in Berlin and Paris are publicly owned and have stakeholder-elected directors. In most European countries, large companies have stakeholder-elected directors in them, as either a substantial proportion of the unitary board or a German-style two-tier board where one board is supervisory, and the other is executive. On the supervisory board, directors are directly elected. There are plenty of precedents for stakeholder-elected directors on company boards, and in many ways the UK is an outlier.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving the amendment. I want to speak in support of Amendment 22, from my noble friend Lord Remnant, as well as Amendments 21 and 23 tabled by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington.

My noble friend is right to note that the decision whether to be on a board, panel or committee is the job of the company rather than any kind of external regulator. By allowing the company to make that decision, it can decide based on its own business needs. If this was left to Ofwat, not only could it lead to a situation where the board, panel or committee did not fit well into the company structure but it might harm relationships between those forums and the board of the company.

It seems unlikely that a regulator would ever have access to all the information needed to make decisions on how a company’s decision-making systems should be structured, and it is surely the responsibility of the company itself to ensure that it has the right processes in place to make the correct decisions according to its needs. Indeed, as we have heard from many noble Lords, it is clear that the regulator has failed to get important decisions right in the past, to the detriment not only of companies but of the environment. Yes, of course, the regulator should have its role in holding companies to account for their decisions, but the moment regulators are involved in decision-making, it surely takes some responsibility for those choices too.

We are concerned that having consumer representatives on the board or their being involved in any decision-making within the company creates a blurring of responsibility. There is already the risk of some confusion, given the role of regulators, but they are at least experts in the industry and well informed about their roles, acting within well-defined parameters.

I agree with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, on sectional interests and the effective working of a board. Consumer representatives on a board lay themselves open to the responsibilities of being a company director and in some cases a director of a listed company. Do the Government really want such consumer directors to be open to fines or prosecution for failing to deliver accounts on time, trading while insolvent or even insider dealing? It is not clear to me as the Bill is drafted that those consumer representatives could not also be subject to fines or prosecution by the regulator. If a consumer representative proposed an action that led to penalties from the regulator, how could they not be responsible?

Turning this around to the perspective of the existing board and management, if consumers are part of decision-making, then it is conceivable that they could cause or prevent an action by the company that created regulatory breaches and punitive action. How would this coexist with the responsibilities and liabilities of professional managers and board directors? How could this not create liability for the consumer representative?

My comments about consumer representation apply equally, if not more, to the environmental experts proposed in Amendment 9 by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. I understand and applaud the sentiment behind the amendment, of environmental representatives representing the stakeholder that has no natural voice, the environment. However, environmental campaigners already have a strong voice. There are obligations already present for companies, and others may be imposed through amendments to the Bill. I also agree with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, that environmental representatives, alongside consumer representatives, should be limited to panels.

Allowing the company to decide the forum in which such representatives take part would benefit both sides of the agreement. If the company has taken this decision, then it becomes clear that the company, its managers and employees remain jointly responsible for decisions. I am not clear from the Bill exactly how the Government intend that its proposals should work. Both my noble friend Lord Remnant’s Amendment 22 and Amendments 21 and 23 from the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, have considerable merit. While there is a contradiction inherent between them, both are good solutions to creating the involvement of consumers that the Government want.

I thank all noble Lords for their involvement in this spirited debate. I ask the Minister to explain exactly how she sees consumer involvement working in practice under the Bill. I also ask that she give serious thought before Report to the amendments that I have addressed.

Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Lord Sikka Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 9th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, it is always a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. This Bill has more holes than Swiss cheese. I shall give noble Lords some examples. It promises to ban bonuses for senior executives but is silent on how the ban is to be implemented. Water companies can bump up basic executive pay and thereby eliminate the need for any bonus at all. Most water companies are part of large groups of companies and can offer multiple directorships to individuals, so no bonuses are necessary whatever. I hope that in her reply the Minister will tell us how this bonus ban will operate in practice.

The Explanatory Notes refer to a bonus ban for degradation of “financial resilience”. I know a thing or two about financial resilience, but there is no definition in the Bill and I have no idea whatever of what the Government mean by that. Again, I hope that the Minister will give us some ideas. How is this assumed financial resilience to be secured? Shareholders are already reluctant to invest. More debt will not increase resilience. Currently some 28% of the gross revenue of water companies is used to service debt payments. With higher debt that percentage would rise, which would destabilise companies. That leaves higher customer bills as the only option. After 35 years of abuse, that is simply not viable. Again, I look forward to some clarity.

The Bill promises to bring criminal prosecutions against some water company bosses but provides absolutely no criteria. How much sewage and how often does it have to be dumped to trigger an event for prosecution? There is no clue in the Bill. In any case, there is a backlog of 60,000 Crown Court cases, so the chance of any timely prosecution is slim. Perhaps the Minister has in mind some additional investment in the legal system. It would be good to hear that.

The Bill does not curb the payment of dividends. In March 2023, Ofwat said that it would

“stop the payment of dividends if they would risk the company’s financial resilience”.

To date, there have been no restrictions on dividend payments. Not a single water company discloses its distributable reserves, so we have no idea of their dividend- paying capacity anyway.

The Government are pinning their hopes on Ofwat, but Ofwat is not really up to the job. It has presided over the entire mess. It has not curbed financial engineering. Water companies continue to inflate their level of investment by capitalising interest and repair and maintenance payments. That is permitted by Ofwat. Ofwat systematically favours companies over customers. Anyone has only to look at how the pricing formula PR24 operates. Ofwat uses fictitious gearing ratios to enable companies to receive real excess returns. That should really be a criminal offence.

Ofwat cannot be trusted. It is too cosy with the water industry. Two-thirds of England’s biggest water companies employ key executives who have previously worked at Ofwat. Executives of water companies and regulators regularly meet in hotels and expensive private clubs to discuss their common position and how to quell public anger about bill rises and sewage dumping. This Bill does absolutely nothing to check collusion with and the cognitive capture of the entire regulatory apparatus.

On 5 September, the Environment Secretary said that

“customers will have the power to summon board members and hold water executives to account through new customer panels with teeth”.

Without a statutory base, customer panels will achieve absolutely nothing. In my view, at least 50% of the board of directors of any regulatory body and the regulated entity need to be directly elected by customers. Customers must also vote on executive pay. If they think executives deserve higher pay and bonuses, then they can award them. Let there be a bit of democracy. At least give people the power to check abuses. If the Minister has any objections to the democratisation of the water industry, it would be good to hear them.

The main aim of the Bill seems to be to prevent public ownership of the industry. It enables Ministers to restructure water companies and return the monopoly to the private sector, with the cost borne by customers and the public purse. Clause 10 empowers the Government to provide financial assistance that they may or may not ultimately be able to recover. This strategy cannot address the cause of the crisis, which is profiteering and cash extraction by water companies.

If the water industry had been in public ownership for the last 35 years, £85 billion would have gone into infrastructure instead of dividends. Interest payments on debt would have been much lower as the cost of government-backed debt is always lower than that borne by companies; that would have freed billions more for investment. But the Government oppose public ownership.

In response to an Oral Question from me on 23 July 2024, the Minister said that public ownership

“would cost billions of pounds”.—[Official Report, 23/7/24; col. 364.]

That seemed to imply that the Government had actually done some calculation. So I quickly followed it up with a Written Question seeking details of that calculation. All I got in response was a reference to the Social Market Foundation report of 2018. If any of my master’s students had written that as a dissertation, they would have been guaranteed a fail. It is a dismal piece of work commissioned by water companies. A former government adviser has said that that report has “virtually no intellectual substance”. The £90 billion quoted in that report is utterly incorrect. When taking over an industry, one buys only the equity, not the debt—and that is what it included.

In 2019, Moody’s said that the equity value of water companies was only £14.5 billion. Since then, lots of changes have occurred: most water company shares are junk or worthless. Debt is junk: some of the Thames Water debt is trading at less than 6p in the pound. The Government should let the companies collapse and bring them into public ownership at low price. That is how capitalism operates: if a company collapses, it does not get bailed out. Only public ownership can provide long-term stability and it ought to be done through a not-for-profit organisation. The cost of this can be loaded on to the acquired companies, as the private equity model does, or it can be recouped by issuing public bonds, ensuring that people actually own essential industries.

The Bill is delaying the inevitable and, naturally, I will help the Minister by tabling some amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting and worthwhile debate. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken for their thoughtful, informative and constructive comments.

As we have heard, the Bill is going to be used to drive meaningful improvements in the performance and culture of the water industry, as part of our wider efforts to ensure water companies deliver both for customers and for the environment. Many campaign groups, as well as parliamentarians, have called for measures to hold water companies to account. We also know that there is huge public support for the Government to do something. There is clear and broad recognition of the need for action. Let me now take the opportunity to address some of the points and questions raised during the debate.

First, I would like to stress that the Bill goes beyond the previous Government’s ambition. It is not true that the Bill does not contain anything further than measures put in place by the previous Government. For example, the Bill will go beyond the current regulatory framework. To give a couple of examples, it will provide legal powers to ban bonuses—currently, you can only set expectations—and it will also require water companies to report in near real time on discharges from emergency overflows, which are at present largely unmonitored.

The noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, my noble friend Lady Young of Old Scone, the noble Earl, Lord Devon, and many other noble Lords were particularly interested in what exactly the review is going to do. As I said, the Bill alone is not enough to fix our water system; it is only an immediate down payment on the wider reform that is needed after many years of failure and environmental damage. As I mentioned, the review is going to be carried out to fundamentally transform how our water system works so that we clean up our rivers, lakes and seas for good. We will invite views from a range of experts, covering areas such as the environment, public health, consumers, investors, engineering and economics. We will have a public consultation to test that any proposals are robust and ambitious enough to clean up the pollution from our waterways. Through our review, we will look at long-term wider reform of the water sector as a whole, including considering and clarifying the roles of regulators. We expect this work to culminate in shaping further legislation and intend to set up further details about the review later this autumn. It is also really important that specific measures are consulted on during the passage of the Bill, and we will be looking to do so.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Sikka particularly asked about nationalising water companies. As I have said previously, the Government have no intention to nationalise the water companies. We are focusing on improving the performance of the water industry as an urgent priority. The measures in the Bill are designed to do exactly that.

As we have said, it will cost billions of pounds and take years to unpick the current ownership model, during which time underinvestment in infrastructure and sewage pollution will only get worse. Research that has been commissioned by the Consumer Council for Water, which we have heard about—

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

First, can the Minister say how many billions of pounds, and can she publish that calculation? Secondly, she says it will take a long time, but the Government are going to integrate the newly created companies to manage the railways, and there are numerous mergers and takeovers everywhere where new entities are accommodated. Could the Government publish a paper to see what the complications would be? Although I recognise some of the complications, I do not think that any of this is insurmountable.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

Rather than get into a discussion around this, as I have a lot of questions to answer, I suggest that perhaps the noble Lord and I—and the noble Baroness, if she so wishes—take this away into another meeting and discuss it further when we have more time.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, asked about the special administration regime, as did other noble Lords, and she asked particularly about profits for shareholders and creditors. The special administration regime is there to enable a seriously underperforming or insolvent water company to be put into special administration, with the requirement that vital public services—that is, water and wastewater—are continued to be provided pending a rescue package and transfer to new owners. This contrasts with normal administrations, where the appointed administrator is focused on the creditors’ interests only.

A number of noble Lords—the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, the noble Baronesses, Lady Parminter, Lady Pinnock and Lady Bakewell, and my noble friend Lady Young of Old Scone, in particular—asked why the Bill is not being used to reform Ofwat or the Environment Agency. The Bill introduces the most significant increase in enforcement powers for the water industry regulators in a decade and is designed to give them the teeth they need to take tougher action against water companies in the next investment period. However, we want to go further. Through the review, as I mentioned, we will look at the regulators in order to carefully consider their roles and responsibilities and how we can ensure that they operate as effectively as possible. So that will be part of the review.

The noble Lord, Lord Douglas-Miller, asked whether the regulators were adequately resourced to implement all the new provisions in the Bill. Through the new cost recovery power in the Bill, we will enable the Environment Agency to fully recover costs for the full extent of its water company enforcement activities. That will include prosecutions and civil sanctions, revocation notices of permits, and pollution incidents. In addition, the EA is already recruiting up to 500 additional staff for inspections, enforcement and stronger regulation, increasing compliance checks and quadrupling the number of water company inspections by March next year. This will be fully funded by around £55 million per year through increased grant in aid funding from Defra and additional funding from water quality permit charges levied on water companies. I hope that helps to answer the noble Lord’s question.

There were also questions around the detail of Ofwat’s rules. The noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Remnant, mentioned this. We feel that it is more appropriate for Ofwat, as the independent regulator, to determine the specific performance metrics that should be considered when setting the rules. Allowing Ofwat to set out in the rules the performance metrics to be applied will also enable those standards to be more easily amended—subject to the relevant procedural requirements, of course—where or when it is appropriate to do so in the future. Ofwat would need to consult with relevant persons, including the Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers, the Consumer Council for Water and others, before such rules were finalised. I also reassure noble Lords that Ofwat will issue a policy consultation in October on the scope of the rules.

Consumers were mentioned a number of times. First, on representation on boards, as we go through the Bill, we will look at this in more detail, but the idea behind the Bill is that Ofwat will be required to issue rules on consumer representation. Customers largely foot the bills for water company decisions, so we believe it is right that they have a say where their interests are at stake. Ofwat will need to consult with relevant persons, including the Consumer Council for Water, before finalising the rules on performance-related pay, and fitness and propriety and customer representation. I think my noble friend Lord Whitty asked about some of those issues.

The noble Lord, Lord Roborough, asked in his speech just now about further increases to customer bills. Where increased costs are a result of penalties being issued by the regulators—for example, under the new automatic penalties regime—the penalties will come out of water company profits and not from customers. Where costs are unrelated to penalties—for example, where they will fund new and improved infrastructure—we are working closely with the water industry regulators to see how we can best minimise the impact of measures introduced by the new legislation on customer bills. We do not want to see the customers bearing the brunt of these new actions.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Remnant, Lord Douglas-Miller and Lord Cromwell, and the noble Earl, Lord Devon, asked about investor confidence. Private sector investment is at the core of how we grow our economy. The Government are committed to establishing a strategic framework in order to deliver long-term stability, and which is conducive to attracting the sustained investment in the sector that we need. The Bill will deliver a clear and consistent regulatory framework for the water industry and its investors. I do not think anyone would think that investors have a lot of confidence in much of the water industry as it stands. On 10 September, Defra and Treasury Ministers held a round table with investors where they outlined how the Government will work in partnership to attract the billions in private sector investment that we desperately need to be able to clean up our rivers, lakes and seas.

On that issue, there was also discussion around attracting talent. A number of noble Lords talked about the fact that it is more stick than carrot and asked how we are going to attract people into this. We believe it is right that companies and their executives are held to account for basic and fundamental performance requirements. Should companies meet their performance expectations, we believe that executives should rightly be rewarded, and there are also previous and existing examples of similar rules in other sectors. I will give a couple of examples. The financial services sector previously had a set cap on the level of bonuses—somebody mentioned that; I am sorry but I cannot remember who it was—and fit and proper person tests are also conducted by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority in that sector. Those sectors have continued to attract talent.

The noble Earl, Lord Devon, asked about ensuring that water companies invest sufficiently when considering pressures such as climate change and population growth, and about ring-fencing money for improvements. In July, Ofwat announced in its draft determinations a proposed £88 billion worth of expenditure between 2025 and 2030, which will be the largest investment in infrastructure that has ever been made by the water industry. We hope that that investment will deliver much of the work needed to achieve the issues that the noble Earl referred to.

The pollution incident reduction plans were discussed by many noble Lords during the debate. One question was: why have we not included a duty to implement the plans rather than just publish them? I think the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, in particular talked about this. We say that these plans should be seen as part of the broader package of powers for regulators which exist and which are strengthened through the Bill to reduce pollution incidents.

The Environment Agency already has access to a range of tools to enforce against pollution incidents and this Bill is designed to supplement this with its provisions for automatic penalties and for Ofwat to ban bonuses when water companies have not met environmental standards. Water companies will also be required to report on overall progress on the actions that were set out in the previous plans. A specific duty to implement the plan would make enforcement more difficult, we believe, as it would cut across the wider legal requirements for pollution reduction.

The noble Baronesses, Lady McIntosh, Lady Browning and Lady Pinnock, all talked about sustainable drainage systems—SUDS. This is a complex issue. Existing planning policy requires that SUDS are included in all new major developments unless there is clear evidence that that would be inappropriate. This is in addition to requirements that SUDS should be given priority in new developments in flood-risk areas. However, I am aware of the issue around the previous legislation that has been sitting in front of us for 14 years, so I want to assure noble Lords that the Government are currently assessing how best to implement their ambitions on SUDS, while also being mindful of the cumulative impact of new regulatory burdens on the development sector. We are having regular discussions and trying to co-ordinate joint work with MHCLG officials on this issue. We want to move this forward.

The impact assessment was mentioned. There is an impact assessment for the Bill—I am sure noble Lords will be delighted to hear that—but it is currently with the Regulatory Policy Committee. We will publish it as soon as it has concluded its review. We are hoping that will be fairly soon.

The timeline for implementation was mentioned. Our ambition is to implement the provisions to give the regulators the powers they need to take tougher action against water companies for the next investment period, which is due to start in April next year.

The use of delegated powers was mentioned by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and my noble friend Lady Young of Old Scone. I want to reiterate the reassurances I made in my opening speech that the provision of delegated powers will be subject to appropriate scrutiny and safeguards. We believe the powers are necessary to ensure that the provisions in the Bill keep pace with the changing requirements on the water industry and the changing expectations of customers. A full justification for the inclusion of delegated powers in the Bill is available through the delegated powers memorandum which has just been published.

On the statutory instruments for new penalties, we will be consulting on whether new automatic penalties can be used. Parliament will debate and vote on secondary legislation before any changes are made, so we intend to bring that before the House.

A few noble Lords mentioned local issues. The noble Earl, Lord Devon, talked about Devon, not unexpectedly, and my noble friend Lord Lipsey talked about the River Wye. I was impressed that he got away with that word. When I was in the other place and we had a similar debate, I got ticked off and had to change what I had said. But we are concerned about the issue of poo in the River Wye and he is right to raise it. There are also issues in Cumbria, where I live, around Lake Windermere and the other lakes, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood. This is something that I personally feel we need to sort out. Our national parks are hugely important. They should be peaceful, beautiful places, not places that have been damaged by sewage overspills and other pollution. I reassure noble Lords that cleaning up iconic sites such as the River Wye and Lake Windermere is a top government priority. We want to get this sorted. The 2024 price review package that I mentioned earlier will include funding for improvement projects at priority sites and we are also working closely with the Welsh Government, particularly on the issues around the River Wye.

I am just about out of time. If I have missed anything that I should have answered, we will of course check Hansard and I will get back to people in writing, but once again I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today for their valuable contributions. It is clear that we agree on the importance of addressing issues in the water sector swiftly and decisively and that there is a consensus on the core aims of the Bill. The water industry really does need an overhaul, so I look forward to continuing constructive engagement with noble Lords. My door is always open. I commend the Water (Special Measures) Bill to the House and beg to move.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Water Companies: Financial Resilience

Lord Sikka Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Sikka]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the financial resilience of England’s water companies.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Baroness Hayman of Ullock) (Lab)]

My Lords, Ofwat monitors the financial position of water companies, taking action when companies need to strengthen financial resilience. Ofwat has strengthened its powers to improve financial resilience, including requiring water companies to stop paying dividends where that is compromised and preventing customers funding executive bonuses where companies do not meet performance expectations. Our water Bill will put water companies under tough special measures by strengthening regulation, as a first legislative step towards improving the sector.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister to her post but let me illustrate the problems by referring to Thames Water. Its shares are worthless and its bonds are close to junk status, while 38% of its revenues service £18 billion of its debt. Based on the debt to asset ratio, Thames Water has a gearing of 80.6%; Ofwat’s target is 55%. The debt to equity ratio used by credit rating agencies gives it a gearing ratio of 1,000%. No amount of regulatory tinkering can change the fundamentals here. The Government need to create some certainty by nationalising it, so can the Minister tell us when that will happen, please?

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for his very warm welcome. However, the Government have no plans to nationalise Thames Water. It would cost billions of pounds and take years to unpick the current ownership model, during which time underinvestment in infrastructure and sewage pollution would only get worse. We want to improve the situation in the water industry that we find ourselves in as quickly as possible.