Water (Special Measures) Bill [HL]

Committee stage
Monday 28th October 2024 Lords Chamber

Committee (1st Day)

Welsh legislative consent sought.

15:58

Amendment 1

Moved by

[Baroness Willis of Summertown]

1: Before Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Purpose(1) The purpose of this Act is to put in place measures to address river pollution by water companies and water and sewerage companies.(2) The Secretary of State and, as the case may be, the Water Services Regulation Authority must have regard to the purpose set out in subsection (1) in implementing the provisions of this Act, and in doing so must also have regard to—(a) the need to meet the biodiversity targets set under sections 1 (environmental targets) and 3 (environmental targets: species abundance) of the Environment Act 2021, and(b) the current or predicted impacts of climate change identified in the most recent report under section 56 of the Climate Change Act 2008 (report on impact of climate change).”

[Baroness Willis of Summertown (CB)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will also speak to Amendment 91 in my name. These amendments seek to set a strategic direction for the Bill and, crucially, to apply a new duty on the water regulator to take account of—and take all reasonable steps to ensure that Ofwat and, by extension, the water companies that it regulates, contribute to—our targets under the Climate Change Act and the Environment Act. It would have immediate effect outside the price review process by applying climate and nature considerations into yearly in-period determinations. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Parminter and Lady Young of Old Scone, and the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, as well as the Blueprint Coalition, for their support.

As the first speaker in Committee, and conscious that I was not here at Second Reading, I will quickly say that I fully support the general intent of the Bill and note that this is just one stage of the Government’s wider plans for tackling water pollution. While I do not have major issues with what is in the Bill, it presents us with a legislative opportunity to strengthen the regulator to ensure that Ofwat has the duty to contribute to the delivery of our climate change and nature targets. This is a key chance to modernise Ofwat’s remit and ensure that it is fit for purpose.

As we all know and hear daily, the water industry has a huge impact on our natural environment. Its shortcomings and their effects are well documented—I will not repeat them here—but it is not just the shortcomings of the water industry. It is hard to imagine that these shortcomings would have been possible with a regulator which had a remit that also ensured it took these issues seriously. But the fault, or reason, does not lie simply with Ofwat. It lies with the duties it has—or, more importantly, does not have—which have been legislated by this Parliament over the past three decades. In short, there is a misbalance between what Ofwat currently does and prioritises and what the Government and the public would like us to do: ensure that industry cleans up its act.

In Ofwat’s duties there is no mention of climate change—which is going to make its job harder as we experience more erratic weather events—or biodiversity, on which we have binding targets that will be impossible to achieve without putting an end to sewage pollution in our rivers. We can all acknowledge that the regulators are busy and, without these targets on their list of things to do, this will continue to fall by the wayside or be deprioritised, as it so obviously has been in recent years. That is why I have tabled Amendment 91, which would help the Government and the public to ensure that a greater contribution is made by the sector. With a clear duty, it would mean that the regulator has to further two of the Government’s core aims.

Amendment 91 would amend the Water Industry Act 1991, which established Ofwat, to require it to take all reasonable steps, in exercising its powers, to contribute to the achievement of our biodiversity targets under the Environment Act and our net-zero targets under the Climate Change Act, and to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Such a duty is currently missing from Ofwat’s governance.

Ofwat’s current primary duty, set under Section 2 of the Water Industry Act in 1991, is

“to further the consumer objective … to protect the interests of consumers, wherever appropriate by promoting effective competition”.

Section 3 goes on to state that Ofwat’s work to further the conservation of flora and fauna should be undertaken only as far as is consistent with the primary consumer objective. This clear subordination of environmental considerations to economic ones was not corrected by the introduction of a rather muddled resilience objective in 2014 and was actively exacerbated by the 2024 imposition of a new statutory growth duty on Ofwat

“to have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth”.

In a speech in the other place last Wednesday, the Secretary of State announced an independent water commission that

“will ensure that we have the robust regulatory framework that we need to attract the significant investment that is required to clean up our waterways”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/10/24; col. 279.]

That is good and welcome, as is the text in the notes that it must consider alignment with net-zero objectives. However, I went back through it and did a word search. Nature is mentioned once in the notes and there is no mention at all of biodiversity or of consideration of alignment with our mandatory targets for biodiversity, as outlined in the Environment Act and associated secondary legislation.

Is it relevant that we are asking Ofwat and, through it, our water companies to look at the biodiversity and water targets? Over the weekend, I went back and looked at the 2030 species abundance target, which was one of the biodiversity targets that was published as a statutory instrument in January 2023. I counted the list of species that will contribute to this target; included are 244 freshwater invertebrate species, which absolutely require clean water; 40 species of birds that forage and nest in riverine environments—that is 25% of the total list of bird species; and 48 plant species associated with, or growing in, rivers, streams or marshy freshwater environments, which is 22% of the plant list. By the most basic calculation, almost a quarter of the plants and birds on our species abundance list—the list that will be used to check whether we meet those targets—and 100% of our freshwater invertebrates rely on clean, unpolluted rivers to thrive, yet we have no statutory purpose or duty for Ofwat to look at this. Many of those species will not recover unless we improve the quality of our rivers, so this is a fundamental part of what we should be looking at. We urgently need every water company to acknowledge the Environment Act targets and for Ofwat to measure their performance against them.

It may well be argued that this would be covered by the independent water commission review, but there is an issue of timing as well. Even if these biodiversity targets are included as part of the consultation outlined by the Secretary of State last week in the other place, it will not, as stated, have any findings until the first half of 2025; and because of the current price review processes, changes will likely not come into effect until 2029 to 2030, which, if I have understood correctly, means they would be implemented after the biodiversity target to halt species decline in 2030 has come and gone. Perhaps the Minister can clarify on this.

A review is not legislation—I do not need to remind people in this Committee of that. Legislating for a climate and nature duty for Ofwat early in this Parliament would allow benefits to accrue ahead of the looming environmental deadlines falling at the end of Parliament, including the previously stated 2030 biodiversity targets. If we do this now, with a duty that will come into force in 2025, we can build these environmental objectives into work on the next price review from the start, as well as applying climate and nature considerations into yearly in-period determinations and everyday decision-making.

In summary, it would be counterproductive not to take this opportunity to give Ofwat a new duty to help ensure that we meet our climate and, crucially, Environment Act habitat and species targets. I hope we can find some agreement there.

The public were clear at the election that they expected change and that protecting and restoring our environment, including biodiversity, is a priority. This amendment would be a simple, proportionate, pragmatic and positive change that we could make today. I beg to move.

[Baroness Parminter (LD)]

My Lords, I will be brief because the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, has set out clearly the case for a duty for Ofwat to deliver on the Government’s biodiversity and climate change objectives. I just want to pick up on the point about the review, because I think the Minister will say, “This is a fantastic amendment, but we just need to wait for the review”, and there are three reasons why this Committee will find that response unsatisfactory.

The first point is that made by the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, which is around the timing of the review, which we all welcome, but we do not know when exactly it is going to finish. Of course, by the time it is in legislation, and we do not know when there is going to be a slot, we could have missed our biodiversity targets, let alone our climate target.

Secondly, there is nothing in this amendment which is not already Government-stated policy. It is Government-stated policy to deliver on our biodiversity objectives, to move towards our climate change objectives, and to adapt to respond to those. So why do we need to wait for the review? There is nothing about putting this in legislation now which is counter to the Government’s position and therefore there is no barrier.

Thirdly, the wording is rather clever. It does not say “Ofwat”; it talks about “the Authority”. So, whatever the review decides, it is relevant. It is also clever because it says that it must “take all reasonable steps”. Again, it is not precluding or being prescriptive about that future authority; it is just setting the parameters.

It is a very well-crafted amendment and I think the Committee will be deeply disappointed if the Minister comes back and just says we should wait for the review. It would also make us question what the point of the review is, and we would not wish to do that because we have the highest regard for the Minister. If the Government are not prepared at this stage to put in the Bill that part of the review is to ensure that we deliver on our environmental and climate targets, then how can we be sure the review is going off on the right foot?

[Baroness Young of Old Scone (Lab)]

My Lords, I add my support to these two amendments, to which I have put my name. I was pondering why Ofwat lost the plot on the environment around 2010. In a way, it is not surprising, because the reality is that it was getting a strong steer from government that the important thing was to keep bills down and that everything else should take second place. It was eminently possible to say that to Ofwat because the number of objectives and duties that it had been given was quite a large, disparate and often conflicting set and was growing yearly.

Ofwat currently has a primary duty under Section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991 to

“further the consumer objective … to protect the interests of consumers, wherever appropriate, by promoting effective competition”.

That really became the sole mission of Ofwat in the 2010s.

Section 3 says that Ofwat’s work to further the conservation of flora and fauna should be undertaken only as far as it is consistent with the primary consumer objective. So, there is a “get out of jail free” card for Ofwat about environmental improvement and biodiversity decline and they take a very second-class seat. Ofwat also has a duty for pursuing sustainable development and a whole suite of environmental and recreational duties.

In 2014, a very muddled objective was added to Ofwat’s increasing list relating to resilience. In 2024, Ofwat got a statutory duty to promote growth. If one was being benign towards Ofwat, one could say that perhaps it was a bit confused by a number of directions which were mutually inconsistent, but the primary one was that Ofwat was told very firmly to keep prices down, and it pretty well did that in terms of the environmental elements of successive price rounds since then. Had Ofwat been challenged at any point as to whether it was meeting these duties, many of which are about contributing to or furthering or having regard to, it would have been very easy for it simply to construct arguments that demonstrated that it had a limited compliance with almost anything and to deliver nothing that it did not want to deliver.

The Minister will no doubt say that the broader review which has been referred to will consider how to streamline and focus Ofwat’s duties, and I agree that that is important and that the review should do it, but I share the views expressed that we cannot wait that long. The review will report eventually and there will be a delay while legislation comes forward. This amendment, which gives equal prominence to environmental duties and consumer duties, is fundamental if Ofwat is going to immediately play its full part in meeting the legally binding targets of the Environment Act and the Climate Change Act. At the end of the day, though I gather the debate on climate change last Thursday tried to deny it, these are in fact existential issues, which is why there are legally binding targets on both climate change and biodiversity.

16:15

The Government are already being criticised for lack of progress in meeting those targets; the Office for Environmental Protection, for example, has done work to highlight that. The target of halting the decline of species and biodiversity by 2030 is incredibly close and the Government certainly will not make it if an important body such as Ofwat, which controls the framework within which our freshwater environment flourishes, or not, is not clearly tasked with doing its bit now. As has already been said, it is not just about the five-yearly price rounds; it is about the day-to-day decisions that Ofwat is making as we speak, and will make over the next five years, that certainly need to be guided by this revised duty. I hope that the Minister will give way on that amendment.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on bringing forward the first Defra Bill to Committee stage; I congratulate the noble Baroness and those who supported the amendments moved.

I wish to add a note of caution and I declare my interests in the register: not least, I am an officer of the All-Party Parliamentary Water Group, and I worked for five years with the water regulator for Scotland, the Water Industry Commission for Scotland. The degree of caution I would like to urge in this regard is that I believe we are already committed in law. The Water Industry Act 1991 reflects that very carefully, as do the Environment Act and the Agriculture Act and others, not least the Flood and Water Implementation Act 2010, which is built on that.

I urge the Minister to be cautious in trying to reach a balance both in the Bill before us in Committee today and, more especially, the review to which other noble Lords have spoken, which we will go on to consider. I believe that the balance is currently right but falls heavily on the side of environmental benefits. I do not think that it is entirely clear what the costs will be.

I will issue a note of regret that I have not had the chance to go through the 87 pages of the impact assessment, which was released only on Thursday when I was due to speak in a debate on the Friday—literally, the first working day before Committee. One thing I have picked up that the impact assessment looks at is what the cost of natural capital and decarbonisation, for example, would be. I would certainly like more information on this, if possible. In relation to natural capital and decarbonisation, it says:

“This measure will help to protect the Water Environment and improve the state of the UK’s natural capital. The measure will ensure Water Companies take steps to protect the environment”.


It goes on to say:

“The measure is not expected to significantly impact greenhouse gas emissions”.


That is possibly debatable.

We will go on to discuss my main concern in greater depth in relation to amendments in my name in later groups, so I will not argue this at length now. However, I was absolutely astounded to learn this week that water companies are prevented from encouraging customers to take water efficiency measures. This addresses the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone—a very pertinent point in this regard—about keeping customers’ bills down, which has been the concern of successive Governments as well as of the Consumer Council for Water, Citizens Advice and many MPs, as I found when I was next door, along with other noble Peers.

I am concerned that the definition of “wholesome water” is focused entirely on environmental matters and does not allow for measures to introduce water efficiencies, which I think all noble Lords would sign up to, such as recycling grey water to wash vehicles and, possibly, even dishes. I am a firm believer that clean drinking water coming into the home should be kept precisely for that purpose. It is extremely expensive to produce. We should keep drinking water for the purposes of drinking water. We should seek at every opportunity to encourage water companies to encourage their customers, in whichever area they live. In an area of hard water, for example, it is more difficult to work up a lather. Water companies are best placed to know the water quality in that area and I believe they should be allowed to address it.

The second thing that astounded me this week was that Ofwat had taken away some of the powers for water companies to introduce water efficiency schemes. It took some of those moneys away for better use—to give back as grants for water efficiency. I have no truck with Ofwat in this regard, but I would argue that water companies are better placed to know what water efficiency measures will work in each region in which they operate.

I conclude by saying that, while I listened very closely and admire the eloquence and knowledge with which the noble Baroness, Lady Willis of Summertown, moved the amendment, I think we have to err on the side of caution and make sure we are allowing the water companies the tools they need to do the job, to ensure that we preserve as far as possible drinking water for drinking water purposes, and allowing them to roll out measures to ensure that water efficiency going forward will encourage us all to use water differently. They are currently prevented from doing that by the definition as I understand it of “wholesome water”. We will go on to discuss that at a later stage, but one has to be cautious with the best intentions that are sometimes expressed in these amendments.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I also add my support for these amendments, and I agree with much of what has been said already. On the matter of water usage, I have lived in deserts and I find the idea of people power-washing their cars with pure drinking water in this country extraordinary. But that is where we are today, I guess.

Why do I support these amendments? It is simply because it is vital that this Bill is consistent with existing policy and legislation to which it naturally links. The only reservation I have, which may be something that comes out of the review, is that it brings us back to the question of whether Ofwat and the Environment Agency should be a single agency or two separate ones with a division of responsibilities.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as on the register. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Willis of Summertown, for moving the amendment and for the interesting points she makes regarding the importance of clarifying the intention of this Bill. As we said at Second Reading, we are committed to cracking down on pollution by water companies and we support the Government’s intention to deliver effective measures that bring polluters to justice. While government can always do better, we are proud of our record in the past: we increased the number of storm overflows monitored across the network from 7% in 2010 to 100% today; and the Thames Tideway Tunnel is now complete.

So we on these Benches share the Government’s concerns about the many instances of water and sewerage companies discharging pollution in recent years. This poses a risk to those who use and enjoy our waterways and is causing serious damage to the environment. It is imperative that the Government continue to build on the progress the previous Conservative Government made on improvement, monitoring and tougher action to tackle sewage overflow incidents.

The Government are right to prioritise this issue, but we have serious concerns about the impact of this Bill on the water industry that we expect to explore as we go through Committee. I reiterate my thanks to the Minister, who has continued to engage constructively with us. I am grateful for the time she has given us in the lead-up to Committee. I hope we will continue to make constructive progress and improve this Bill for the benefit of all stakeholders—cost-effective water for consumers and security for the 100,000 employed in the water industry—while protecting the Government from financial risk and restoring our natural environment and incentivising investment.

Amendment 1 would make the purpose of the Bill clear and place a duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to that purpose, as well as the need to meet certain biodiversity targets and the current unpredicted impacts of climate change. The noble Baroness, Lady Willis, is right that we should take every opportunity to improve biodiversity, and there is an opportunity in the Bill to deliver transformative change for our rivers. We have amendments coming up in later groups that would help to incentivise the industry to invest in catchment restoration. That would not only improve water quality and flood management but contribute to nature restoration, biodiversity protection and, more importantly, the recovery of our biodiversity.

The Government want to keep the Bill narrowly focused on the regulation of water companies and their manifesto commitments on penalties for water companies, with the promise of further reform soon. We on these Benches are disappointed that the Government have not brought forward more comprehensive reforms in the Bill. If the promised water Bill does not materialise next year, it would not be the first time that a Government had delivered just partial reform.

We want to see a more ambitious approach from the Government, focused on the whole water sector and not just penalties for water companies—or for executives of water companies. For that reason, we believe there are areas beyond the Government’s fairly narrow focus in the Bill that ought to be included and should not be put at risk by the unclear timing of the future water Bill. The Minister has previously spoken about the need for incentives to attract talent to the sector, as well as an effective penalties regime. We need whole-sector reform if we are to deliver the clean rivers and healthy environment that people across the country are calling for. We support the spirit of the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Willis. We on these Benches agree that the Government must go further than the measures included in the Bill, and must do so urgently.

Amendment 91 similarly seeks to place duties on the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to contribute to the achievement of our biodiversity targets and our climate change targets and to adapting to the impacts of climate change. The Minister will know that, in 2023, the last Government published the first ever comprehensive Environmental Improvement Plan, setting out targets and indicators for water-quality improvement.

Over 25 pages of the plan are devoted to water and targets. There were targets to reduce nitrogen, phosphorus and sediments; a target to halve the length of rivers polluted by abandoned mines; an interim target to construct eight water treatment works; targets on reducing water waste, reducing leakage by a further 20% by 2027; a target to restore 75% of our water bodies to good ecological status; a target to require water companies to have eliminated all adverse ecological impact from sewage discharges at all sensitive sites by 2035 and all other overflows by 2050; a target to create a level of resistance to drought so that emergency measures are needed only once in every 500 years; a target to direct water companies’ fines relating to environmental breaches to improving the water environment; a target to crack down on sewage pollution by holding water companies to account for delivering the targets set out in the Storm Overflows Discharge Reduction Plan; a target to require water companies to upgrade 160 of the wastewater treatment works to meet the strictest phosphorus limits by 2028, with a further upgrade of 400 of them by 2038, which would reduce nutrient pollution from treated wastewater; and—of great concern to me—a target to protect our chalk streams by supporting the chalk stream strategy. Lastly, there was a target to make sustainable drainage systems mandatory in new developments, subject to final decisions following consultation on scope, threshold and process.

I mention those targets to show that the Opposition are not coming here to say that we have just discovered some good ideas and actions for the future. We have a track record of setting tough targets, and they are in the EIP. These targets are specific to water quality and will greatly increase biodiversity. They are not just reasonable steps but specific, measurable targets.

The Government have said that they are urgently reviewing the latest EIP, which is about to be published. I do not expect the Minister to say what the tweaks will be, but can we expect any changes to the water EIP targets when the Government publish them? We share the ambition of the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, for water sector reform, and we hope that the Government will listen to the concerns of noble Lords, who are calling from all sides of the Committee for a more ambitious approach.

16:30

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Baroness Hayman of Ullock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Willis of Summertown, for her interest in and general support for the Bill. I am sure that, despite missing Second Reading, she will make a very valuable contribution to Committee.

As I set out at Second Reading, the purpose of this Bill is deliberately narrow in order to improve water industry performance as an urgent priority. On her Amendment 1, I agree with the noble Baroness that addressing the wider issue of river pollution arising from water and sewerage companies’ operations is of critical importance, as of course is meeting our biodiversity targets. The noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, said that she hoped I was not going to just refer to the review, and I am sure she will be delighted to know that I am not.

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, made the important point that we already have commitments in law on this; we already have targets that we need to be meeting on biodiversity and the wider environment. It is important to stress that we must have regard to the Climate Change Act in this space. The Government are already required to meet the legally binding targets under the Environment Act 2021 and the Climate Change Act 2008, and to set out their plans to adapt to the impacts of the changing climate.

As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, just mentioned, we are doing a rapid review of the environmental improvement plan. This is because we are serious about meeting the Environment Act’s biodiversity targets. We did not feel that it was fit for purpose to meet those targets, which is why we are doing this review—to protect and restore our natural environment and come up with a delivery focus to help meet very ambitious targets.

Ofwat—I think the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, mentioned this—has a core duty under Section 2A of the Water Industry Act 1991 to work towards strengthening resilience. This duty ensures that Ofwat is already required to promote long-term planning for water companies to adapt to environmental pressures, including climate change. I take on board the comments of my noble friend Lady Young of Old Scone, who felt that Ofwat at some point lost the plot. This is why we need to look at the role of regulators through the review—I am afraid I will be mentioning the review from time to time today.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, is reassured that the Government share her ambition to tackle the wider issues of river pollution, biodiversity and climate change. I hope she understands that, because we feel we are already acting in this space through legislation that is in place, we will not accept Amendment 1.

Amendment 91 was also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Willis. In addition to the duty under Section 2A, Ofwat has a core duty under the Water Industry Act to work to ensure the long-term resilience of water companies’ supply and sewerage systems. Furthermore, on 23 October the Government announced the independent commission into the water sector and its regulation. This is intended to be the largest review of the industry since it was privatised, and part of the development of further legislation, not just a review. We want it to have a positive end in tackling the problems we see in our water industry. The objectives of this independent commission will include ensuring that the water industry regulatory framework delivers long-term stability to restore our rivers, lakes and seas to good health, to meet the challenges of the future and drive economic growth.

I hope the disappointment of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will be replaced with excitement when he sees that these will form the basis of this further legislation to attract long-term investment and set out recommendations to deliver a collaborative, strategic and, importantly, catchment approach to managing water, tackling pollution and restoring nature.

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, made a specific point about the impact assessment. I do not have the assessment in front of me, so I am not entirely sure what section she was referring to. I hope she and I can catch up following Committee and discuss this, so I can answer her questions in more detail.

The commission’s terms of reference do include environmental aspects. The commission’s objectives include to “support best value delivery” of environmental outcomes, and to:

“Rationalise and clarify requirements on water companies”


to achieve better environmental outcomes. Furthermore, under “approach and deliverables”, it says that the chair

“will invite views from an advisory group of nominated experts, covering areas including the environment”,

and

“will also seek views from wider groups of stakeholders, including environmental campaigners”.

Therefore, we are trying to make sure that, as well as meeting the targets already in legislation, we put the environment at the heart of what we are doing.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, is reassured that these two new Clauses are unnecessary as they overlap with existing government requirements, Ofwat’s core duties and our ambitions for the future. I hope she will take an active part in what we are trying to achieve with the commission, and I thank noble Lords for their engagement on these important matters.

[Baroness Willis of Summertown (CB)]

I thank the Minister and everybody else who has contributed to this discussion on my amendment. I am not going to repeat the valid and important points that have been made, but I will respond to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, on the term “caution on costs”. There is a lot of debate about costs, and nature-based solutions can often be much cheaper while also elevating biodiversity. For the last 20 years we have been told to be cautious about costs and on-costs, and as a result our species targets have gone down and down. The time has come to redress that balance, and I look forward to debating this another time.

On the commission, I appreciate the Minister’s comment that we already have commitments to the environment in the Environment Act and the Climate Change Act. However, I was shocked when I discovered over the weekend that, according to the list of protected species that we want to stop the decline of by 2030—not 2035—25% of plants and birds and 100% of freshwater invertebrate species rely on clean rivers. Therefore, while I am delighted about the commission and will absolutely get behind it and join in, it is going to be too slow and too late to achieve the biodiversity targets we set out in the Environment Act. I look forward to picking up this issue on Report, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Clause 1: Rules about remuneration and governance

Amendment 2

Moved by

[Earl Russell]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, leave out “may” and insert “must”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires Ofwat to issue rules about remuneration and governance.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, in rising to speak to this amendment, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I wish to inform the Committee that my noble friend Lady Bakewell is unwell and unable to attend today, so I will be speaking to many of her amendments as well as my own. This second group of amendments concerns the rules for renumeration and governance, and Amendment 2, tabled by my noble friend Baroness Bakewell, requires Ofwat to issue such rules.

This Government are seeking to strengthen the measures in this Bill by making them firm commitments with due weight in law, and not merely the vague assumptions as currently written into the Bill. We on these Benches have little faith that, without this amendment, the water companies will keep to the spirit of the law on these matters. I have a very similar “must” to “may” amendment, Amendment 24, in group 6, and I shall make general points on both in this speech. We have strong grounds for taking such a position, based on the past performance of the water companies themselves, especially in relation to awarding pay and bonuses and returns to shareholders, which have always come first. Meanwhile, investment in infrastructure and the protection of our environment from the harm these companies have caused and continue to cause have always come a very distant second, if at all.

By way of a very brief introduction, we would of course prefer it if this Government had a more comprehensive and clearer set of plans in place to make more rapid progress on these matters. We on these Benches are clear that we would abolish Ofwat and replace it with a new, unified and far more powerful clean water authority, and we would make water companies public interest companies. This Government have taken a different route and are of a different opinion, believing that the shopping list of measures in this Bill can bring improvements that will hold while a full review is undertaken, before fuller and more fundamental reforms are implemented later on.

We welcome the announcement of the review, but I share the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, particularly about our commitment to 30 by 30 and further delay on these matters. The trick for the Government is to make sure that they can make the rapid change required and make Ofwat fit for purpose, since that is their stated intention, and to put in place all our environmental regulations and protections in the timeframes available. That is a bit of a magic trick, and I remain to be convinced that the Government will be able to pull it off, so that is a key concern for us.

We will work to support the Bill where we feel that it brings improvements, and there are many measures that we welcome and will support. We thank the Government for bringing them forward and signalling the future direction of travel and intention to take these matters very seriously. But the measures are really a list of stopgaps and quick fixes, intended to make the system work somewhat better than it has until the full review is finished and implemented. These measures come first and will need to work alongside any further actions. That is something we will need to think about in Committee—how the measures and amendments we are bringing forward and discussing today might work with potential outcomes from the review that is yet to come.

For the measures in the Bill to work, even the stopgap measures, the clauses need to be strong and effective. If they are not firm or binding, or can be easily ignored or circumvented without clear consequences, they simply will not work or do what they are intended to do. This is one area of the Bill that we think can easily and should be strengthened, so that it has the intended and required effect. The wording here as it stands is simply not strong enough. We cannot allow weak and ineffective measures to stand while the country waits for the Government to consider making further legislative changes post the review, and these then to pass through Parliament, to be enacted at a much later stage, which, as we have heard, could be by 2030. I seek clarification from the Minister as to when those measures will go through that process and come into force.

Since privatisation 35 years ago, we have witnessed one of the worst environmental crises in the UK, with unabated and unprecedented pollution. Just 14% of our rivers and streams are in good ecological health. In 2023, there were some 3.6 million hours-worth of untreated sewage discharges in England alone. Meanwhile, water companies have paid at least £78 billion in dividends, while failing to invest adequately in the infrastructure required. At the same time, they have piled on £64 billion net in debt, yet they were privatised debt free. The levels of executive pay and remuneration have rightly caused outrage across the country, as water bosses have got even richer as our bills have got even higher and we face more and more pollution in our rivers and streams.

Clause 1 amends the Water Industry Act 1991 to insert new Section 35B, which links the remuneration of water company directors to the meeting of a single set of specified standards, which include environmental standards. This is a welcome and long overdue measure. Performance-related pay and profits must be linked to the outputs achieved, and investment and environmental standards must be the benchmarks. While the intention is clear, the determination of the proposed legislation is weak. As drafted, it simply says that the authority “may” issue such rules. That is neither clear nor well-defined enough as it stands. The Bill must ensure that Ofwat issues clear and well-defined guidance, in a defined timeframe. What is written is not enough and brings no guarantee that Ofwat will issue such guidance, with no means of holding it to account if it decides that it is simply not minded or does not see any need to issue any guidance.

16:45

This is a clear and simple amendment which I hope will win the support of the Committee. I will listen to the debate with interest and to the Minister’s response. We will reflect on the debate, but I ask the Minister to consider strengthening these provisions. Finally, are there any intentions to further define these measures via statutory instruments?

I look forward to hearing from the noble Lords, Lord Remnant and Lord Sikka, whose amendments seek to ensure that rules made by this authority can be scrutinised by Parliament. The amendment of the noble Lords, Lord Roborough and Lord Blencathra, seeks to set a six-month time limit for publication of the rules under new Section 35B. Finally in this group, Amendment 101, from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to give the authority the power to curb excessive dividends and empower stakeholders to object to excessive dividend payments.

[The Duke of Wellington (CB)]

My Lords, first, I congratulate the Government on having set up, last week, the review under Sir Jon Cunliffe. That is an excellent move by the Government; a very respected individual will carry out the review, and a number of us have been asking for this for a while. I really think the Government have made a wise decision.

I want to comment on Amendment 2. I have sympathy with “must” rather than “may”, but I have a reservation about the then wording, “must issue rules”. It seems to me that it is necessary for the authority to issue what I would prefer to call “guidance” rather than “rules”. That would give a certain flexibility to individual companies—no two companies will ever have the same set of circumstances, either among their executive management or in the environment in which they are operating. I ask the Government to consider changing the wording of the clause, so that it reads: “The Authority must issue guidance about the arrangements made by relevant undertakers”.

There is no doubt that the water companies have abused the total independence they have had to date around setting remuneration and everything associated with it. They are monopolies, and I think they have gone too far. Many people have been rather dismayed to see the levels of executive remuneration. I ask the Minister to consider changing “rules” to “guidance”. That would be a great improvement.

On Amendment 3, in a light-hearted manner I point out to the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, a misprint, where his amendment refers to “renumeration” rather than “remuneration”. I am sure that that is an oversight which he will have already noticed.

There is a good point in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, in his proposed new Section 35B(1B)(b), about the importance of attracting, motivating and retaining persons of sufficient quality to work in the industry. We must all remember that what we all want is better-run water companies. I do not think we should be tying too tightly the hands of remuneration committees and the board in general in how they attract and retain executives. I am very persuaded by that particular aspect of the noble Lord’s amendment, but I worry about seeking to define too closely exactly how water companies should make their remuneration arrangements.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 3 in my name and I apologise for the typo. I had noticed it, but only recently, and only a moment or two before the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, brought it to the Committee’s notice.

As we know, Clause 1 contains rules about remuneration and governance. Most importantly, it contains provisions giving Ofwat the power to block the payment of bonuses to senior executives of water companies. My amendment clarifies that Ofwat’s powers under this clause cannot be exercised in a way which conflicts with its general duties with respect to the water industry and emphasises that the industry’s capital and human resources needs are of critical importance. I declare an interest as having been a non-executive director of Severn Trent, the largest of the listed water companies, for eight years, between 2014 and 2022, chairing the board’s remuneration committee for that time.

Why is it that these clarifications are required? Essentially, it is because we are giving extremely wide powers to Ofwat to draft rules in a very complex area, seemingly at its discretion and without further scrutiny by this House, which may have many unintended and harmful consequences. There is no clarity in the Bill on the appropriate targets and performance standards, how they will be measured, when relevant triggers occur and which remuneration, in which year, will be affected. This will all be for Ofwat to determine—yes, Ofwat.

I have huge sympathy for regulators—I was one myself for a period, running the Takeover Panel—and know that they attract only criticism and never praise. Having said that, I thought the mood of your Lordships at Second Reading was especially stark in expressing views about Ofwat’s past performance, and some of those views have already been reiterated in the short time we have had today. That was as regards its role as an economic regulator—its core competence. We are now effectively extending Ofwat’s remit into difficult areas of fine judgment best left to company boards and for which Ofwat is totally unsuited. Can we be so reassured by the integrity of the ensuing process and the safeguards built in that my concerns can be assuaged by leaving this clause unamended? I fear not.

First, it offends the principles of natural justice, as there is no distinction between the legislative process and the judicial one. The powers will lie with one body, Ofwat. It will make the rules and then judge companies and individuals under them. Secondly, the Minister may refer me to the consultation process which Ofwat will undertake, to which she drew the attention of your Lordships in her helpful letter dated 25 October. I welcome that, although it would be a heroic achievement for Ofwat to decide definitively on such a wide range of questions and responsibilities that this Bill, if enacted, will impose on it. Yet we all know that consultation is no panacea. The responses will contain many conflicting views and the conclusions that Ofwat will reach will be influenced by the weight it gives to particular views and to some preconceived ideas that it will inevitably hold.

Thirdly, there will be no opportunity for your Lordships to scrutinise the rules promulgated by Ofwat. For this reason, I support the thrust of Amendment 27 in the names of my noble friends Lord Roborough and Lord Blencathra and Amendment 25 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which are designed to achieve such scrutiny. I will leave those noble Lords to talk to them in more detail.

But is this enough? I suggest not, because the scrutiny so achieved would be after the rules had been made by Ofwat. There is a need to influence Ofwat’s thinking much earlier in the process. That is what my amendment is designed to achieve. It is drafted with an eye to the wider objectives to which this Bill should aim: the need for more innovation, the recruitment of new talent and, above all else, the greater investment required to raise standards.

The amendment is in two parts. First, it is designed to ensure that Ofwat does not exercise its powers in a way that conflicts with its general duties under Section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991. Such duties include a consumer objective, a duty to have regard to principles of best regulatory practice and a growth duty. Indeed, Ofwat refers to such duties in its consultation document when it says that one of its desired outcomes is that the rules should be proportionate. That is to be welcomed.

The Minister may be tempted to say that existing duties in the Water Industry Act and Ofwat’s acknowledgement of them should satisfy me and render this part of my amendment redundant. Were she to do so, I would say that that might hold good if the Bill imposed some constraints on Ofwat rather than adopting a blanket “Over to you, Ofwat” line. In the same section of its consultation document, it appears to qualify its commitment to proportionality by saying that

“we will be bound by statute”—

presumably as a result of this Bill—

“to introduce rules with the requisite effect”.

It is therefore critical that there is not just implicit recognition of Ofwat’s duties under the Water Industry Act of over 30 years ago but explicit recognition of those obligations on the face of the Bill, linked directly to this new and additional power that we will be giving to the regulator.

The second part of my amendment requires Ofwat to have regard to two further considerations in exercising its powers under this clause: namely,

“the need for a relevant undertaker”—

the water company—

“to … attract the investment required for its capital programme, and … attract, motivate and retain persons holding senior roles”.

I can find no reference to these considerations in Ofwat’s consultation document generally, nor in the specific questions it proposes, yet the scale of the investment in the industry that is required is such that we cannot afford to deter that investment, or experienced executives from working in it. Unlike in the past, much of that investment will have to come from equity investors, who assume a higher level of risk than debt investors and have more of a vested interest in, and so take a more critical attitude to, the prospects of a company, its financial plans and, importantly, the quality of the management tasked with delivery.

There is a limited number of appropriately qualified and skilled candidates to take on the most senior roles in water companies, and one of the successes of privatisation has been the ability of such companies to attract successful individuals from outside the utilities sector. In a competitive world for talent, Ofwat should not introduce rules that put water companies at a significant disadvantage when recruiting and seeking to retain such staff.

When launching the independent review of the water sector last week, the Secretary of State was at pains to stress the importance of attracting the investment needed to clean up our waterways and rebuild our broken water infrastructure—and, specifically, facilitating a regulatory environment that attracts investment. The least we can do is play our part in supporting the Secretary of State in this noble endeavour. I should have thought that this amendment would be music to the Minister’s ears, so I look forward to her response with a great deal of hope and expectation, and indeed no little optimism.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I will speak to Amendment 25. This amendment seeks to strengthen Parliament’s role in crafting and approving regulations for the water industry. The Bill as it stands asks people and Parliament to trust regulators, which the Bill calls “authority”—currently they include Ofwat and the Environment Agency—to make rules. Well, that trust has already been severely eroded.

17:00

If the current regulatory model is anything to go by, regulators are severely conflicted and are not independent of the industry. They have presided over the mass extraction of dividends of at least £85 billion. In addition to that, companies have also paid shareholders untold billions through intragroup transactions. Some water companies have been paying interest to other group members, the details of which I am afraid I have never been able to work out on a spreadsheet, but it also adds up to significant billions.

Current regulators have presided over the illegal dumping of raw sewage in rivers, seas and lakes; they have let trillions of litres of water leak away; and they have turned a Nelsonian eye for years to underinvestment in the infrastructure. The poverty of regulation has played a key role in the current mess that the whole water industry is in and the financial precariousness of the industry.

Ofwat is too cosy with the water industry; as has already been cited, two-thirds of England’s biggest water companies employ key executives who previously worked at Ofwat. Executives of water companies and regulators regularly meet in hotels and private members’ clubs to work out a common strategy to appease public opinion and distract people from the real issues. As I have pointed out before, there is nothing in the Bill which would check this collusion and cognitive capture of the entire regulatory apparatus.

It has been reported in the last few days that Seema Kennedy, a former Conservative Minister and now a director of Ofwat, is leading a campaign to make it harder for consumers to sue water companies that breach the terms of their licence. Can you imagine a regulator not protecting people and not keeping a distance from the industry but actually siding with the industry? Such revelations inevitably make people more sceptical of the alleged independence of regulators. The regulators have let the industry be controlled by companies with criminal convictions, and the Government are asking us to trust them.

The Environment Agency data shows that the 10 main wastewater companies in England and Wales have been convicted 1,109 times since 1989 for violation of the rules. They have been fined a puny £160 million and managed to keep their licences to operate. Can you imagine a food company or a company producing medicines being convicted 1,109 times and being allowed to retain a monopoly of something? Can you imagine their leaders then being indulged by Ministers and promised more goodies, such as restructuring the companies and handing them back to the same people? Well, that is actually what is going on.

United Utilities has 205 separate criminal convictions, more than any other firm. Thames Water has 187 convictions and South East Water has 174. United Utilities has now become the first water company to be hit with a special enforcement measure by the Information Commissioner’s Office over failure to comply with transparency laws. Companies are not even being honest with the people or the regulators.

No Minister has ever explained why such companies are permitted to run the water industry, and why the regulators that have presided over this should continue to be allowed to make rules. It has now been reported that water firms passed thousands of pollution tests under a self-monitoring regime, yet the tests were never actually conducted. The water firms’ own operational data for sewage plants across the country reveals how outflows or effluent had stopped, in some cases just for a few hours, on days the samples were supposed to be taken. The Environment Agency allowed these so-called “no-flows” to be recorded as compliant with the environmental conditions of their operating permits.

Regulators are utterly compromised. Instead of the prosecution and cancellation of operating licences, the Environment Agency covered it all up until civil society organisations began to investigate. Instead of toughening regulation, Ofwat is now actually considering plans to weaken the penalty regime so that water companies can claim higher performance, charge higher prices and pay higher executive pay to the directors of companies—the brains behind these violations.

Through PR24, the pricing formula, Ofwat is guaranteeing real returns to water companies’ shareholders, even though the calculation is based on a fictitious regulatory capital value or RCV, fictitious amounts invested during the year—because the numbers are inflated by financial engineering, such as capitalisation of interest and repair and maintenance—and fictitious levels of gearing. PR24 assumes that the average level of gearing is 55%; Thames Water already exceeds 80%, and that is what the regulator accepts. Fictitious levels of equity come into play in the calculation of the weighted average cost of capital, which then decides what return the companies are entitled to. Why would we want to trust regulators that just dream up numbers that cannot be substantiated in any way whatever?

Water regulators cannot be trusted by the people. They cannot be trusted to be even-handed to make the rules, and I have had time to present only a small sample of what they have actually been up to. This raises huge questions about their independence and effectiveness. The only way forward is for Parliament to scrutinise any rules and regulations they make, and for Parliament to approve. Only that way can we give some backbone to the regulators and ensure they act in the public interest, protecting people and the industry too.

I will now speak to Amendment 101, which seeks to impose curbs on the payment of dividends by water companies. As it stands now, the Bill does not curb payment on dividends, though it seeks to prohibit certain payments such as bonuses to executives. We know that these dividends have hollowed out water companies and are a major reason for their financial problems. In March 2023, Ofwat said that it would

“stop the payment of dividends if they would risk the company’s financial resilience”,

but dividend payments have continued. In July 2024, Thames Water confirmed that it paid two fresh dividends worth £158 million in March, despite its high debt and precarious financial position.

Neither companies nor regulators are honest and transparent about the payment of dividends. For a long time they have pretended that dividends were paid to parent companies and therefore were not really dividends at all. I am afraid that company law makes no distinction between who the dividend is paid to. Whether it is paid to a parent company or the shareholder, a dividend is a dividend. It is spelled dividend, it looks like a dividend and the accounts say it is a dividend; therefore, it must be a dividend.

That raises a more worrying question. If they are saying that they are making payments to a parent company to pay off debt, that means that the company’s debt is parked somewhere else and that its leverage or gearing—its debt—is understated. I hope that the Minister will tell us at some point by how much the debt of companies such as Yorkshire Water and Thames Water is understated, because some of it is parked somewhere else.

Under the Companies Act 2006, to pay dividends a company must have sufficient distributable reserves. These are, in essence, realised profits. However, water companies have manufactured distributable reserves through financial engineering. A good example is that they capitalise interest payments and part of the repair and maintenance costs. Thames Water capitalised borrowing costs of £159.4 million in 2024 and £215.2 million in 2023. In addition, the company also capitalised unspecified amounts of repair and maintenance costs. A note in its account states:

“The Group capitalises expenditure relating to water and wastewater infrastructure where such expenditure enhances assets or increases the capacity of the network. Maintenance expenditure is taken to the income statement in the period in which it is incurred. Differentiating between enhancement and maintenance works is subjective”.

What the directors are saying is that they use their discretion in deciding how much of the repair and maintenance expenditure they want to capitalise, and it is not possible to corroborate their judgment independently. The amounts they have so capitalised are not known. These imprudent practices were used by Carillion. We know what happened to Carillion, so we know where water companies are heading with the same practices.

Thames Water is not alone in these practices. Yorkshire Water capitalised £54.8 million in interest payments in 2024 and £50.8 million in 2023. There is hardly any water company that does not engage in financial engineering and inflate its distributable reserves. Ofwat and the Government have done absolutely nothing to check that. Over the years, the distributable reserves of companies have been inflated by billions and billions of pounds. The accounts of water companies do not disclose distributable reserves, and no information is provided about the composition of those reserves, but dividends continue to be paid.

I am asking the Government to ensure that the dividends cannot be paid without a disclosure of the distributable reserves by these companies. These dividends need to be approved not just by the regulator but by other stakeholders. We need to have customers sitting on these companies’ boards, and they must vote on this. We need to have employees sitting on these companies’ boards, and they must also approve these things. At the moment the authority does absolutely nothing. If the Government are really interested in improving the financial resilience of companies, I hope they will accept this amendment towards that purpose.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving the lead amendment in this group. I will speak to Amendment 27 in my name.

Amendment 27 seeks to set a timeframe of six months within which the authority must publish rules regarding remuneration and governance, and it ensures that these rules are scrutinised by both Houses of Parliament through the affirmative procedure for secondary legislation. This amendment is necessary to ensure that water companies are able to review the rules that Ofwat intends to implement within six months of the Act coming into effect. The amendment will also ensure that there are mechanisms for raising any concerns within which Ministers and Parliament can scrutinise them fully.

17:15

As drafted, the Bill grants very broad powers to Ofwat to make rules relating to pay and governance without parliamentary approval. We feel that this gives too much power, without appropriate checks and balances, to Ofwat, which has not always been successful as a regulator. We would like to see more accountability given to this House regarding the rules and their implementation. For example, the 2023 Industry and Regulators Committee report into the regulation of the water sector found that Ofwat had

“failed to ensure companies invest sufficiently in water infrastructure, choosing to keep bills low at the expense of investment”.

Given Ofwat’s failures in the past, Amendment 27 seeks to deliver scrutiny of these rules to ensure that Ofwat uses its powers under the Bill appropriately. We on these Benches are open to discussions about the timeframe for Ofwat’s publication of the first proposed rules, but we will be seeking movement from the Government on parliamentary approval for the rules. We also feel it is important for the industry to be given sight of the proposed rules before they come into effect, which is why publication prior to parliamentary scrutiny is important.

I was pleased to see Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which aims to deliver parliamentary oversight with a similar mechanism to that set out in my Amendment 27. I hope the noble Lord will be open to working with us on these Benches and others across the House to ensure that the rules Ofwat decides to impose on the water sector are appropriate and effective.

Given the expertise of so many noble Lords on the issues we face in our water sector, I have no doubt that parliamentary scrutiny of these rules will help Ofwat deliver rules that work. I hope the Minister will look at this closely and consider whether the Government might be able to accept parliamentary oversight of these rules. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Remnant for tabling his amendment on these rules, which would ensure that Ofwat can use its powers over remuneration and governance only to ensure that water companies are not in conflict with their duties under the Water Industry Act 1991.

I share my noble friend’s concerns about the broad drafting of Clause 1, and we must ensure that we have the right balance between carrot and stick to effectively incentivise the behaviours we want to see from water companies without driving talent away from the sector. I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether it is the Government’s expectation that Ofwat should be allowed to vary the rules on performance and governance so that they apply to KPIs—key performance indicators—that focus on areas other than managing pollution and sewage overflows.

Amendments 3, 25 and 27 all seem to stem from a similar concern about the unchecked powers being granted to Ofwat under the Bill as currently drafted. I hope to work constructively with noble Lords across the House and the Minister as we seek to place appropriate checks on Ofwat’s new powers within the Bill.

I was interested to read the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, and I listened carefully to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, make her argument. I agree with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, that allowing some discretion over the making of rules under this section is attractive but if, as the noble Baroness would like, these rules were mandatory, it would be even more important that they were scrutinised properly.

Finally, I understand the intention of Amendment 101 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. The issue of capital leaving the water sector in the form of dividend payments and transfers to parent companies is a genuine one. I am not sure that water companies enjoy the friendly relations with Ministers and regulators that the noble Lord describes—perhaps the Minister would like to describe the nature of that relationship in reality. I wonder why the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, now places such faith in the regulator in this amendment, having thrown such doubt over it in previous ones. I would prefer a solution to this issue that would not require the regulator to come to a discretionary judgment on the subjective issues raised in Amendment 101; namely, sufficient surplus cash and complete details.

We would need guidance and rules from the regulator to define these terms. I can imagine whole teams of regulators being established to make what should be a relatively straightforward decision and to defend these decisions from legal challenge. It is our view that there would be significant and unnecessary costs to the regulator making decisions on these criteria. Additionally, the involvement of employees and customers in these decisions would require a no doubt overburdensome process for the approval of dividend payments.

We have looked at this problem in our amendments. Amendment 92 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Blencathra might be of interest to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. We will, of course, speak to that amendment when we reach it but, to explain very briefly, Amendment 92 would restrict dividends and returns to investors if the undertakers are taking defined excess financial risk and are overleveraged.

Once again, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, for leading this group, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for taking her place in this debate. I hope that the Minister can address noble Lords’ concerns in her response.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, clearly, public trust in the water sector has been severely damaged and the number of serious pollution incidents is increasing, as we heard very clearly from my noble friend Lord Sikka when he introduced his amendments. At the same time, companies have been paying out millions in bonuses. To rebuild public trust, the Bill enables Ofwat to issue new rules on remuneration and governance to ensure that companies and executives are subject to robust oversight and held accountable for failure. I thank the noble Lords who have tabled amendments relating to the application of these rules.

I will start with Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for introducing it on the noble Baroness’s behalf and wish her all the best from these Benches. I also listened with interest to the suggestions made by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington. Clearly, he and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, had different opinions on the wording. Our approach is intended to strike a balance between the approaches suggested by the noble Lords, to give Ofwat some flexibility while ensuring that it issues rules in relation to our priority areas.

However, I emphasise that the provisions in the Bill state that Ofwat must exercise its power to set rules in relation to performance-related pay, fitness and propriety, and customer representation. Ofwat may also make rules about other remuneration and governance arrangements at its discretion, but it must take action regarding the specific matters referred to in the Bill. We are pleased that Ofwat is already taking action to implement these rules through the publication of its consultation announced on 22 October. This was referred to by number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. I hope the noble Earl will tell the noble Baroness that we hope that this has reassured her that her amendment is unnecessary.

I turn to Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. Ofwat has a range of primary duties, including acting to protect the interests of consumers, ensuring that companies properly carry out their functions, and securing that companies are able to finance the delivery of their statutory obligations. I assure the noble Lord that Defra has worked to assure agreement with companies to update their articles of association to place customers and the environment at the heart of business decisions which impact on consumers.

The noble Lord is correct that I am going to say that Ofwat’s existing duties are already consistent with the outcomes that this amendment aims to ensure. This includes ensuring due consideration of the human and capital needs of the sector. He also raised concerns about influencing Ofwat. The current consultation that I have referred to is an initial policy consultation which has been launched with the express purpose of inviting views early. This will be followed up with further statutory consultations, which will also take into account the views shared through this initial policy consultation.

I thank the noble Lord for bringing his knowledge and experience to the development of this legislation. It is very valuable to hear his contributions. However, I hope that he is reassured that, in setting the rules about remuneration and governance, Ofwat will continue to act in accordance with its core duties and understands that it is for this reason that the Government will not accept the amendment.

Amendment 25, tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka, and Amendment 27, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, relate to the timing and process for setting the rules for remuneration and governance. My noble friend took the opportunity to lay out clearly the many concerns around the behaviour of water companies and the ability of regulators to hold them to account. Ofwat is required to undertake statutory consultation with the relevant persons, which includes the Secretary of State, before any rules are finalised. Allowing Ofwat to set rules in this way, rather than through legislation, will enable those standards to be more easily amended, subject to the relevant procedural requirements, where it is appropriate to do so in the future. The Government and Ofwat agree that the rules should be in place as soon as possible after Royal Assent, and Ofwat intends to implement them following its statutory consultation, which, as I previously mentioned, has already been launched. I hope the noble Lords are therefore reassured their amendments are not necessary.

Finally, Amendment 101, tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka, relates to dividend payments. Sustained investment in the water industry will continue only if the shareholders of companies can expect a fair return. Ofwat already has the power to stop the payment of dividends if they would risk the company’s financial resilience and to take enforcement action if companies do not link dividends to performance for consumers and the environment. The amendment risks deterring much needed investment in the sector. I highlight that the Government’s new independent water commission will look at how we can improve the regulatory framework to attract investment and support financial resilience for water companies. I hope this is helpful in explaining to my noble friend why the Government will not accept his amendment.

A few noble Lords talked about the importance of investor confidence and the impact that we could have on this and talent in the water industry. While we believe it is right that companies and their executives are held to account for basic and fundamental performance requirements, it is important that, should companies meet their performance expectations, executives can still be rewarded. The proposed £88 billion in investment under PR24 is the largest ever in the water sector and has the potential to create up to 30,000 new jobs. It is crucial that the sector can recruit the talent it needs to deliver the PR24 proposals, because improving the performance of the water industry will help the industry attract and retain talent. Private sector investment is also at the core of how we grow the economy, and the Bill is designed to deliver a clear and consistent regulatory framework for the water industry and its investors. Noble Lords may be interested to know that on 10 September Defra and Treasury Ministers held a round table with investors where they outlined how the Government will work in partnership to attract the billions of pounds in private sector investment that are desperately needed if we are going to clean up Britain’s rivers, lakes and seas.

Finally, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, that I always try to get on well and work constructively with everybody, including Ofwat. I once again thank the noble Lords for their suggestions and input to this discussion on the general application of the rules for remuneration and governance.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her comments. The noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, put forward an interesting idea on issuing guidance, and it is one that I will take back to my noble friend for further consideration. The noble Lord, Lord Remnant, talked about the lack of ability to scrutinise the rules, the need to attract talent and the carrot and stick approach. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, talked about broken trust, the poverty of regulations and the level of convictions in the water industry. His Amendment 101 would curb excessive dividends, financial engineering practices and practices inflating the worth of companies. The noble Lord, Lord Roborough, n his amendment said that rules must be published within six months and he talked about the powers of Ofwat being unchecked.

17:30

I notice that the Minister has not accepted any of the amendments but has sought, as is usual practice at this stage, to give reassurance on the amendments that have been tabled. Obviously, this is a crucial issue in the Bill for all noble Lords and delicate consideration needs to be given to all these issues, from the need for rapid improvement to the need to ensure that we continue to have investment and that we can attract talent to the industry, while at the same time making sure that progress is made and water companies are held to account. I guess that is the tightrope that the Government and noble Lords need to walk to find a way forward together, so that we can work to improve the water industry and see the benefits and changes take place that we all seek and desire. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

Amendment 3 not moved.

Amendment 4

Moved by

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

4: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, leave out “persons holding senior roles” and insert “all executive and non-executive members of the board of directors”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to confirm that all members of the board are held to account, in a way consistent with company law, and to remove any ambiguity in the Bill about what constitutes a senior role.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 4 seeks clarity as to what the Bill is getting at. The Bill’s intention appears to apply penalties to only selected directors and not the entire board of directors, even though decisions are made collectively. The Explanatory Notes say it commits to

“ban bonuses for persons holding senior roles”,

and the Bill defines a “senior role” as a person who

“is a chief executive of the undertaker”—

a somewhat unfortunate phrase—

“is a director of the undertaker, or … holds such other description of role with the undertaker”.

The tone of the Bill suggests that references may all be to executive directors, but we know that water companies also have non-executive directors, and under the Companies Act non-executive directors have exactly the same liability and responsibility as executive directors. The Bill does not mention non-executive directors.

Amendment 4 seeks clarity and asks the Minister to confirm that the prohibitions and penalties will apply to not only non-executive directors but legal persons who may be acting as directors, because natural persons can be directors as well as legal persons. I beg to move.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I must admit to having experienced a degree of trepidation on discovering that I was to share a group of amendments with the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and with him alone. Having listened to his views on the Bill in general, so eloquently expressed at Second Reading, I feared that we would find little common ground when debating particular aspects of it. Imagine my surprise, therefore, when I compared his Amendment 4, to which he has just spoken, with my Amendment 18, to which I am about to speak, to discover that we might have more in common than I had thought.

I think that some of the rationale behind Amendment 4 is misplaced. While I agree with the noble Lord that all members of the board under company law are held to account, performance-related pay is in practice paid only to executives, while non-executives are remunerated by way of fixed fee. Given that the provision to which Amendment 4 relates is in respect of performance-related pay, the inclusion of non-executive directors is of no practical importance. Notwithstanding this, Amendments 4 and 18 effectively would achieve the same practical impact in respect of the individuals to whom these remuneration rules apply. Amendment 4 would remove the reference to senior roles and replace it with a reference to directors of the company, while Amendment 18 would retain the concept of senior roles but effectively define them as directors of the company.

I do not believe that it is right for Ofwat to extend the rules to

“such other description of role”

as it specifies. Not only would such an extension be wider in scope than the current disclosure requirements of Section 35A of the Water Industry Act 1991 but it would be difficult to implement in practice, as different water companies will have individuals described differently by title and role. Nor would such an extension be consistent with the general remuneration and corporate governance rules for listed companies, which do not extend to individuals below board level.

I hope the Minister agrees that, through the adoption of my amendment, this additional power conferred on Ofwat by the Bill should be removed. If we wish to attract and support the next generation of leaders in this vital industry from middle management, this will not be achieved by extending these restrictive remuneration practices to them.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I start by reminding the Committee that I have an experience, rather than an interest, as I was a non-executive director for a number of years on the board of Yorkshire Water. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that I never had a bonus during that time, for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, has explained.

This group of amendments follows on neatly from the previous discussion about performance-related pay and the remuneration of senior directors of water and wastewater companies, so I thought it was worthwhile to draw out a bit more of the debate around this issue. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that water and wastewater companies are regulated by a number of different institutions. Ofwat is the economic regulator and, because of the way that the water Act was written, is primarily looking at the financial performance of the water companies. That inevitably leads to a disregard for the environmental outcomes of water companies as a priority. Consumers, who see that their rivers, lakes and coasts are being heavily polluted by these water companies, are astounded to see the same water companies giving huge bonuses to their directors. That is because the two issues are not related in the mind of Ofwat. That is why my party wants a single regulator for water companies, so that all the issues that are the responsibility of water and wastewater companies are taken into account. Part of that debate was reflected in the first group of amendments, discussed earlier.

We need to remind ourselves that remuneration in companies is decided by boards of directors. They will look at the financial objectives of the company and the outcome of the price review agreed by Ofwat and come to conclusions, whether or not objectives have been achieved or considerable benefit to the company accrued by the actions of directors.

That is part of the problem. As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has attempted to describe, the price review is a tussle of words and figures between the companies on the one hand and Ofwat on the other. I remember the discussions. If you are in a company and you want to make sure there is a good outcome for your owners and shareholders, you make sure that the submissions you make in a price review to Ofwat enable profits to be made. That is the whole purpose of a private company. It is at the heart of all the discussions we are having about water companies, their performance and their remuneration and bonuses. The 1991 Act was designed for them to be private companies with shareholders, who were going to receive dividends as a consequence. If that is the prime duty, and the main regulator oversees that prime duty, the other issues that water companies ought to be taking into account—the environmental issues in particular, as we heard earlier—become less important.

I hope that, when we come to Report and discuss these issues more closely, the Minister will think about a government amendment that strengthens the duties of water companies, and of Ofwat as the regulator, to take into account these other issues. For me, that is at the heart of the discussions we have had on this group and the previous group. I agree with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. You cannot try to control pay awards further down the company; those often very talented people need to be attracted into water companies if we are to improve what is a sad state of affairs.

[The Duke of Wellington (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, which simply deletes new subsection (5)(c) on page 2. It seems to me that we cannot allow the authority—whatever it may be in the future, after the review, or even from now on—to start getting involved in the remuneration of those below board level. That really becomes too much intrusion into the way a company is run.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is entirely correct that, in the end, a director of a company is a director, whether executive or non-executive, as covered by the Bill; it mentions “a director” of the company. It seems to me that, while senior role remuneration should have some guidance from the authority, that should be restricted to the chief executive and other executive board members. There is no point entering into a discussion about non-executive directors, who clearly do not participate in performance-related pay or bonuses or anything like that. I think the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, is right; it would be appropriate to delete new subsection (5)(c) and include in this clause only the chief executive and any other executive director.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for moving Amendment 4. It is right that the Government should take steps to put appropriate pressure on water and sewage companies to reduce the frequency and scale of water pollution incidents, and imposing financial penalties on board-level executives is a powerful way of disincentivising unwanted behaviours in the sector. But if we are to have financial penalties targeted at water executives who do not meet the standards expected of them, we must ensure that these are appropriate. As we discussed in the last debate, it is crucial that Parliament gets the opportunity to scrutinise the rules that Ofwat will be implementing.

17:45

In a similar vein, my noble friend Lord Remnant has tabled Amendment 18, which seeks to prevent performance-related pay rules applying to individuals below board level. The current drafting of this clause gives Ofwat almost carte blanche to apply the performance-related pay rules to any employee it wishes to specify. The wording of the Bill currently gives Ofwat the power to apply these rules to a person who

“holds such other description of role with the undertaker as may be specified”.

While we on these Benches understand the need for flexibility in effective regulation, I share my noble friend’s concern that this is too broadly drafted.

It seems reasonable to limit the application of these rules to the senior decision-makers at board level rather than giving Ofwat the power to apply them to other employees. Board-level directors are the people who make the decisions that direct the performance and activities of water companies, and it is clearly the behaviour of these individuals that the Government are seeking to influence under the Bill. Can the Minister confirm whether it is the Government’s intention that these rules should apply to employees in the water sector below board level?

I would also be interested to hear from the Minister what impact assessment the Government have undertaken to establish whether the application of these rules to people below board level will have an impact on the number of qualified people coming forward to work in the sector. As my noble friend Lord Blencathra said earlier this evening, we must ensure that the 100,000 people employed in the water sector have the right protections and incentive structures so that we continue to attract talent. The Minister acknowledged this at Second Reading; I hope that she will listen to my noble friend Lord Remnant’s concerns.

Our concerns about incentive structures and the ability to attract talent to the sector also apply to Amendment 4 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. Applying rules about performance-related pay to the whole board, including non-executive directors, would potentially harm the water sector’s ability to attract talented and experienced non-executive directors. We on these Benches share the view that non-executive directors do not generally receive performance-related pay, but it may be necessary in some cases, so why limit this flexibility?

I think the Minister would share my view that we should not implement penalties unless there is a clear outcome that we want to achieve. It seems that the application of these rules to non-executive directors would not have a direct impact on decision-makers within water companies. It is vital that the Bill encourages senior decision-makers to take rapid steps to tackle pollution. However, we should seek to create the right incentive structure for those in senior roles rather than taking an approach that seeks punitive action without a clear objective to improve incentives for water executives. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their interest in the rules relating to performance-related pay. The public have been clear that they expect to see change in the performance of the water industry and, where performance is poor, that executives should not receive bonuses.

I turn to the amendments in this group: Amendment 4 from my noble friend Lord Sikka and Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. I thank them for their introductions and their unexpected agreement. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, for sharing her experience of working with Yorkshire Water; these shared experiences are important as we develop the legislation going forward.

In line with the general principles of regulatory independence, Ofwat will rightly be responsible for developing and enforcing the rules on remuneration in governance, including determining the individuals in scope. As I mentioned in the previous group, Ofwat published its policy consultation on 22 October, and this will run through to 19 November. This consultation is to design the rules that are outlined in the Bill.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, I will say that the consultation sets out Ofwat’s intention to apply rules on performance-related pay only to executive directors who are members of the regulated company board and receive performance-related pay. Ofwat has also stated in its policy consultation that it intends for the rules relating to fitness and propriety to apply in the first instance to chief executives and individuals appointed as directors to the board, and that would include both executive and non-executive directors. But Ofwat may consider extending the rules to other senior management roles in the future.

Allowing Ofwat to set out in the rules the performance metrics to be applied will also enable those standards to be more easily amended, subject to the relevant procedural requirements, where or when it is appropriate to do so in the future. Ofwat will of course need to consult with the relevant persons, and this will include the Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers, the Consumer Council for Water and other stakeholders, before these rules are finalised.

In conclusion, the Government will therefore not be accepting these amendments, because we need to ensure that Ofwat can retain the flexibility to expand the group of persons covered by the rules in future if appropriate.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate and I am sure that some of the issues will return. Perhaps I may just clarify a point. The Bill also holds out the possibility of criminal sanctions against directors. Are we to assume that non-executive directors will never be charged with anything? The Post Office scandal shows that non-executive directors were culpable, so there appears to be a case for including them in some of these considerations. I am sure I will read Hansard with considerable interest and possibly return next time. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

Amendment 5

Moved by

[Lord Sikka]

5: Clause 1, page 1, line 15, leave out “performance-related pay” and insert “total remuneration”
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment seeks to strengthen the Bill by focusing on total remuneration, regardless of the form.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

Gosh—my turn again. This amendment seeks to replace the words “performance-related pay” with “total remuneration”. At Second Reading, I raised the question of how the ban on bonus payments was actually to be implemented. At the time, the Minister did not reply and, to my mind, the question still stands. Over the years, I have written many executive remuneration contracts and seen many others; some of them contain many odd bits. For example, so-called performance-related pay may come in the form of cash, shares, share options, chauffeur-driven cars, even gardeners, rent-free accommodation, children’s school fees and much more.

Published company accounts never really make it clear what the complete components are and the executive remuneration contracts are never filed at Companies House for anyone to see what exactly they are getting paid for. The value of some of these payments may not be known until some time in the future. For example, the value of a share option granted today and exercisable after a certain number of months or years would not be known until the date of the exercise. So how will the regulator decide whether any bonus payment is materially significant and deserving of a possible ban? Somebody might simply say, “This does not appear to be significant at the moment, but it could be significant by the time it is exercised”.

Companies can also shift the basis of bonus plans to retain or attract executives. If Ofwat or any other regulator were to impose a ban, it might change the weight attached to the part of the performance that may be considered by the regulator, and thereby defeat the whole objective of imposing any ban. The company can also easily bypass any restriction on bonus payments by adjusting the bonus pay. It can simply say to directors, “Your basic pay will increase and your bonus pay is down”. As many water companies are part of giant conglomerates, directors can be offered seats on other company boards so that their total remuneration is no less, even if a bonus is banned.

So it is not clear to me how this ban is going to be implemented. It looks good on paper, but in practice I have yet to hear the details, so what I am suggesting is that the attention needs to focus on total pay, not just bonuses, because bonuses can easily be bypassed. That is why this amendment seeks to substitute “performance-related pay” with “total remuneration”. I beg to move.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. Amendment 6, tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Bakewell, to which I have added my name, would mean a water company could not give performance-related pay to persons holding a senior role if the company had failed to prevent all sewage discharges, spills or leaks. This definition also includes legal spills. We have included legal spills as this practice also needs to stop, and the only way to ensure that it does is by working to put pressure on private water companies to apply the appropriate and necessary levels of investment in infrastructure. Only then will these companies be operating as intended, and only then should they potentially be free to think about remuneration above and beyond basic salaries to their top executives.

I have also added my name to Amendment 28, also in the name of my noble friend Lady Bakewell. This amendment creates a new section in the Water Industry Act 1991 to require Ofwat to ban bonuses for water company bosses if they fail to prevent sewage discharges, spills or leaks. Taken together, these amendments seek to help tackle head-on one of the main issues that I am sure many of your Lordships had raised with them, with passion, on the doorsteps at the last general election: the sheer hypocrisy of water companies continuously and seemingly endlessly failing to protect our environment. It is outrageous that they are continuing to get away with unabated sewage spills in our much-loved rivers and lakes, all the while paying themselves massive bonuses and dividends and racking up huge amounts of debt.

We are not able to go to the beach or to wild swim, while they get rich off the back of failure after failure. All of this has been done while failing to adequately invest in the infrastructure that is so desperately needed to end this seemingly endless cycle of scandal. My party has tirelessly campaigned on this issue and we will continue to do so. No other issue has cut through to the electorate on such a scale and with such a level of arguable clarity as this one has. Indeed, the promise to scrap CEO bonuses was a core manifesto pledge we stood on at the last general election. The electorate are outraged and rightly so. No one feels good when they are overcharged for the privilege of receiving an appalling service. To be clear, this is exactly what bill payers are getting with a proposed 40% increase in bills and no end in sight to the pollution of our environment. Our rivers, streams and lakes have been polluted to the point of collapse. My party has led a campaign on these issues that cut through on all sides of the political spectrum.

The broken system has seen those who have a duty to protect polluting with no consequences, and time and again they have rewarded themselves lavishly for the privilege. Instead of the “polluter pays” principle ever being applied, we have the “polluter awards themselves a pay increase” principle applied every time. In 2023 alone there were some 3.6 million hours of untreated sewage discharges in England, up a staggering 105% on the year before. How many fines have been levelled against water companies in the previous few years? I have really struggled to find that information. Meanwhile, water companies have paid at least £78 billion in dividends while failing to invest.

18:00

In England and Wales, water firms handed out £9.1 million in bonuses. Thames Water, Severn Trent and Southern Water are the worst offenders for paying executives more in bonuses this year. That is why we are calling for an immediate ban on water company bonuses until the sewage finally stops. We have had enough, and so has the country. I hope the Minister agrees with us and has had enough of this ridiculous situation too.

The bosses of disgraced firms received more than £20 million of basic pay, pension contributions and bonuses last year. The Liberal Democrats’ annual sewage bonus tracker used analysis from Companies House records to show that water firms, including Thames Water, Severn Trent and South West Water, increased their bonus pool for executives despite polluting waterways with raw sewage. Thames Water bonus payments to executives almost doubled year on year, from £746,000 in 2022-23 to a staggering £1.3 million in 2023-24, despite Thames Water’s CEO quitting half way through the year following financial issues and Thames Water itself teetering on the brink of imminent debt-ridden financial collapse.

The biggest bonus payment for executives was at Severn Trent, which paid three executives £3.3 million. Pension contributions for water company executives also rose to a new high of £1.7 million this year. Thames Water paid its executives £754,000 in pension contributions alone. Base pay for water company executives also remained at over £9 million last year. Just one executive at Northumbrian Water paid themselves £421,000.

The Liberal Democrats remain resolute in our demands for an immediate ban on water company bonuses while the sewage scandal continues without further action or consequences. We are determined to push for a parliamentary vote on these matters on Report. We must have an outright ban on bonuses in the Bill, and these amendments would enable that to happen. These bonuses are an insult to the British public, and the Bill is an opportunity to stop this practice that must not be missed. It is a national scandal that these bonuses are being paid out by firms that pollute our rivers, lakes and beaches. These executives are pocketing more and more every year while sewage levels rise day after day. The last Conservative Government let these disgraced firms get away with it, and it is up to Labour to make sure that this practice stops now.

We will of course listen carefully to the debate. I hope other noble Lords can support the amendments, and I hope the Minister is able to offer government support to help ensure that the pay and remuneration system for top water company executives and senior officers is made fit for purpose and does not continue to provide lavish financial support for persistent failure.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 13 in my name. As this is my first contribution on an amendment of my own, I thank the Minister for meeting me, for the fact sheets and the letter, and for the good news that the commission and the review are taking place. We all appreciate that. I support the Bill and welcome the commission review to come.

I turn to the amendment. As touched on by other speakers, including the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, in the debates on the second and third groups of amendments, company employees require appropriate remuneration, just as investors need a return. But the financial engineering introduced previously by investors and company directors—for example, debt levels, transfers to parent companies and other practices that were forensically set out earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka —has enabled opaque enrichment, and has subsequently brought some water companies close to bankruptcy. That is not what monopoly water companies are for, and I believe it lies at the very heart of the current problems of the water companies.

The amendment enables the authority to include rules or guidance, as we may decide, with regard to a company’s structuring and its transparent reporting. It is deliberately left as “may” rather than “must” because the authority may want some flexibility here. Nevertheless, the amendment would act as an overt reference to the responsibility of the authority and water company employees to evaluate clearly the company’s financial structures and changes to them, and how those would impact on the distribution of financial benefits across investors, employees, directors and, indeed, consumers.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 17 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, yet again for introducing this group and raising these matters for consideration when the Government are establishing the regulations surrounding performance, pay and bonuses.

Amendment 17 seeks to clarify the definition of what constitutes performance-related pay. There are many ways in which companies can create performance-based incentive schemes. That can include multiyear programmes containing cash bonuses, share awards, restricted stock units, share options and pension contributions. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, it rarely includes chauffeur-driven cars, private schooling or any other benefits in kind, which tend to be part of the base package.

Is the intention to capture all forms of performance-based rewards within the powers of the Bill? If so, would it not be better to be exhaustive in defining them in the Bill? It is vital that such a definition be as clear as possible to ensure that the Bill achieves its intent to punish senior executives who are not fulfilling their obligations to us all in cleaning up our rivers, lakes and beaches.

In the Bill as drafted, the rules are not clear enough as to what financial components could make up the bonus of a senior water company employee in a given financial year. The amendment is therefore necessary to prevent water companies redesigning performance-based awards to take them outside the scope of the Bill. This is not to suggest any nefarious activity, but anyone currently captured by the Bill would choose not to be if they were able. It would then become impossible for a water company not to offer schemes outside the scope of the Bill if they wanted to attract the best talent.

I understand the intention of Amendment 5 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. It is indeed important that we ensure that water companies have no incentives to continue polluting our rivers. We have looked at this issue in our own amendments. Amendment 27 would ensure that any rules relating to pay and governance will be suitably scrutinised, so I believe the issue could be solved without the inclusion of Amendment 5.

Additionally, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, whether he has considered the impact that this amendment would have on the hiring process of water companies. I think it unlikely that many people would respond to a job advert indicating that you may have a salary but that there is a chance that by the end of the year it could be taken away from you. If the total remuneration of senior roles is included in the Bill, it is inevitable that water companies will lose people with relevant skills and experience in the sector. That will worsen the leadership and perhaps lead to more serious issues within the sector.

It is also possible that the water companies would be forced to delegate their own management to third-party consultants outside the scope of the Bill entirely, in order to find the necessary expertise to run the companies. Have the Government given thought to how to cope with the possibility of such third-party consultants not captured by the Bill?

On Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, I agree that both legal and illegal dumping of sewage lead to undesirable outcomes. As such, I agree with the sentiment of the amendment. In 2022 we published the Storm Overflows Discharge Reduction Plan, which put in place targets to reduce the release of the overflow of sewage and in fact to stop it, except in situations with unusually heavy rainfall, by 2050. So we recognise that the issue is a pressing one and that action must be taken to ensure our rivers are kept clean. However, in order to stop the legal release of sewage, a substantial investment of money and time is necessary, and the amendment does not allow for such provision of time.

Our sewerage systems are a result of Victorian infrastructure design, and the increasing population and heavier, more frequent storms have led to increased pressure on this system. The suggested penalty will make it even less desirable to hold a senior role in a water company. As such, it will further decrease the number of people with skills and expertise at senior levels. This is unlikely to lead to an improvement in the water system for consumers, which is ultimately the aim we share across these Benches. I fail to see how we can support the noble Baroness’s amendment, despite the case put forward by the noble Earl, Lord Russell.

The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, would require executives to take personal liability through their performance-related pay for unspecified structuring or restructuring that may put companies at financial risk. This would appear to us to be too vague to have much bite. It also potentially means that executives’ performance-related pay would be contingent on issues over which they might not have responsibility because they could be overridden by shareholders.

As I mentioned earlier, in response to an amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, I encourage noble Lords to support Amendment 92 in my name in a later group, which would be a clear-cut prevention of payments to shareholders where there are potential issues of financial distress.

I look forward to the Minister’s response and hope that the Government will tighten up the definition of performance-related pay in line with our amendment.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their suggestions regarding matters we need to be considering in the rules for performance-related pay. As I previously noted, to rebuild public trust we are creating a new framework for supporting accountability. As part of this, Ofwat will be issuing new rules on bonuses, including standards relating to environmental performance.

I turn to Amendment 5, tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka. In recent years, public concern has been focused on water company bonuses, particularly in the instances where performance has been poor. Companies must work to regain their customers’ trust, including by holding those in senior roles accountable so that their remuneration better reflects the service that customers rightly expect. We are giving Ofwat new powers to issue rules on remuneration and governance to ensure that companies and executives are held accountable for failure and to drive improvements in performance. We are requiring Ofwat to exercise these powers to prioritise making rules to prohibit bonuses for underperforming companies.

Ofwat already sets expectations on executives’ performance-related pay. This measure will strengthen its existing powers to ensure that bonuses are not paid in any financial year in which standards are not met. Ofwat’s rules on remuneration will cover both financial bonuses and bonuses in kind, limiting any potential loopholes in the policy. We believe that performance-related pay can be an effective tool within the overall remuneration package and will incentivise leaders to focus on improvements that can transform performance. Remuneration committees for each water company independently determine the appropriate level of remuneration for their executives. We therefore do not propose to amend the requirement on Ofwat to make rules to cover total remuneration.

Amendments 6 and 28 were tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, and ably introduced by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. These relate to the consideration of environmental standards in the rules for remuneration and governance. In line with the general principles of regulatory independence, Ofwat will rightly be responsible for developing and enforcing these rules. However, the Government are clear that environmental standards are a vital component. Ofwat must, following consultation, provide that environmental standards have to be met by companies if performance-related pay is to be given to persons holding senior roles. Ofwat’s policy consultation, which we have previously discussed, proposes that bonuses will be prohibited if a company has had a serious category 1 or 2 pollution incident in the preceding calendar year.

The noble Lord, Earl Russell, asked for some figures. I can tell him that, since 2015, enforcement action by the EA and Ofwat has resulted in over £400 million in fines to water companies or money back for customers. I hope that noble Earl is therefore reassured that this new clause is unnecessary, noting that Ofwat must already include environmental criteria when designing the rules in relation to performance-related pay.

18:15

Amendment 13 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. The Government recognise the importance of water companies’ financial resilience. For this reason, the legislation already requires that Ofwat must include standards in relation to financial resilience in its rules on performance-related pay. Ofwat’s policy consultation outlines that it is considering the use of company credit ratings as a standard within the rules on performance-related pay. The inclusion of this standard in the rules on bonuses will ensure that companies do not pay bonuses where it would further impact their financial resilience, supporting the sustainability of the company.

On the noble Lord’s references to restructuring and transparency reporting, it might be helpful for us to have further discussions on those particular issues. I hope the noble Lord is therefore reassured that the rules already consider the financial resilience of companies, and therefore that this amendment is unnecessary.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 17, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Roborough. The legislation defines performance-related pay as

“any payment, consideration or other benefit (including pension benefit) the giving of which results from the meeting of any targets or performance standards”.

This definition therefore would capture all performance incentives paid if this was the result of meeting targets or standards. We believe that, as the independent regulator, it is more appropriate for Ofwat to determine the specific performance metrics that should be considered when setting the rules.

The legislation sets out that the rules on performance-related pay will have to include standards relating to consumer matters, the environment, financial resilience and criminal liability. There is also flexibility for Ofwat to include standards related to other matters where appropriate. Allowing Ofwat to set out in the rules the performance metrics to be applied will also enable those standards to be more easily amended where it is appropriate to do so in the future. For this reason, I hope that the noble Lord is reassured that the amendment is not required.

I once again thank noble Lords for their suggestions and their input to this discussion on matters for consideration in performance-related pay rules.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this debate, giving us much food for thought. I thank the Minister for her response and I withdraw my amendment for the time being.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

Amendment 6 not moved.

Amendment 7

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

7: Clause 1, page 1, line 17, after “standards” insert “, provided the undertaker is satisfied that the failure to meet relevant standards was due to a failing on the part of the person holding the senior role and not another person, including a developer”

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 8 in my name. These amendments are in a group looking at exemptions from the rules under Clause 1. My particular concern relates to the obligations being imposed by Clause 1, and indeed the rest of the Bill, on water companies where they may not and could not possibly be held responsible for the activities they are undertaking because the fault lies with others who are not currently within the remit of the Bill.

The purpose of these amendments is to reflect the fact that water companies should be held responsible under the terms of the Bill, in particular Clause 1, only for those activities within their specific responsibility. Clearly, for example, where there are missed connections between wastewater pipes and major developments, water companies should not be held responsible if they are obliged to fit these new connections into inadequate, antiquated pipes that simply cannot take the amount of waste coming.

The background to this very simple measure follows from the Pitt review—the noble Baroness will recall that I raised this at Second Reading—following the severe floods of 2007. I think it is worthy of note that Sir Michael Pitt is from East Yorkshire, which is more vulnerable to coastal flooding than just about any other part of the country. His 2007 review identified, for the first time, surface water flooding as well.

In connection with surface water flooding, the two most consequential amendments set out that mandatory construction of sustainable drainage systems in major developments should take place so as to contain floodwater and prevent it mixing with sewage through overflows into the combined sewers.

Further, and this is where the developers should have a responsibility and not the water companies, I ask the Minister to look favourably at ending the automatic right to connect, which has so far never happened. That one measure alone would mean that misconnections—whereby the existing infrastructure is deemed to fit the amount of wastewater coming from major new developments—would simply not happen in the future. Most of these developments are made up of four or five-bedroom homes with, dare I say, four or five times the amount of sewage coming out of them into inadequate Victorian pipes. Currently, under the planning rules, developers and local authorities deem those connections to be safe and refuse to put in appropriate infrastructure to ensure that a safe connection can be made. Were the water companies to be recognised in the planning application process as statutory consultees, on the same basis as the Environment Agency comparatively recently has been, those misconnections could be averted. The simple measure of making water companies statutory consultees, on the same basis as the Environment Agency, would help in that regard.

When she looks at these amendments in summing up, would the Minister agree to obliging developers to have sustainable drains fitted to take excess rainwater into a soakaway, pond or culvert to prevent it mixing with sewage water in combined sewers, which is currently leading to sewage overflows? It is not fair to make the water companies responsible for that. Were they to be statutory consultees, they would probably argue that the wastewater will not fit the pipes currently in place.

This has led to some very perverse sewage spills. I remember when I was in the other place there was a school in Filey that suffered £1 million-worth of damage to its swimming pool and, I think, the maths department. Existing developments had to be evacuated for six to nine months because of the public health aspect of sewage coming in. Precisely because a small development of only 30 houses was pumping out so much sewage, the rainwater when mixed with it had nowhere else to go and it went into the school and the existing developments. I am sure noble Lords could give other examples of this.

I ask the Minister to review the way in which highways currently contribute to pollution through rainwater running off the road surface, taking with it oil, brake fluid and other pollutants. When this combines with floodwater, it enters the combined sewers and then often goes into homes, causing huge damage and a public health disaster.

I hope the Minister will agree that water companies should be held responsible for those activities within their control but cannot be held responsible for circumstances which are outwith their control. These two small, tightly-drawn amendments would fit that purpose.

I conclude by asking the Minister this. If these amendments are not added to the Bill, what mechanism do the Government intend to use to ensure that water companies will be held responsible under the Bill only for activities under their direct control and not those under the control of others, such as developers and highways authorities, which are currently excluded from the remit of the Bill? I beg to move.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I broadly agree with the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. She raised some important issues, about, first of all, the way that surface water drainage is treated. As the Minister will know, surface water is combined with sewage water in the same pipes in many of our towns and cities, and increasing rainfall and development is putting pressure on that combined drainage system.

The other issue to consider, which the noble Baroness raised, is the pressure put on local authority planning services to agree to housing developments where the existing infrastructure is not appropriate to support them, with developers reluctant to fork out huge sums of money to pay for the additional drainage systems needed. The answer lies in empowering local authorities’ planning services to put conditions on planning consent which specifically require developers to build the appropriate infrastructure to support the development that they wish to build.

There is a related point. I am a local councillor; in my experience, where there is an issue of surface water, the planning services require underwater attenuation tanks to be built to hold that water until it can be released to the natural drainage systems, such as streams. However, the developers are very reluctant to do that, and are seeking to get around it in other ways. Surface water drainage issues and local authorities’ inability to enforce this is something that the Minister may wish to raise with her colleagues in local government when it comes to reforms of the planning system, as it will affect the Minister’s environment responsibilities. I agree with the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh.

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, I was not planning to speak this evening, and indeed I have to go shortly, but this debate raises broader issues.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, that water companies should not be pursued by the authority for things which are not their fault and which they are unable to do anything about. However, this underlines the need to ensure that the new authority, whatever it is, is a very powerful authority.

As noble Lords may recall, the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and I suggested that we should have a combined regulator. That has been rejected so far, but we need a regulator that can take steps against not only the water companies but other bodies which make the water companies’ tasks impossible or extremely difficult, and which are themselves primarily responsible for the pollution, flooding or other damage caused by the water.

That applies not only to developers, although I think that developers are probably explicitly the worst in this context, but, as the noble Baroness has just said, to highways authorities and to discharges from agriculture. If there is a water authority that has to deal with the far end of the effects of these discharges or the inadequacy of the piping, that authority should have the ability to take such steps. At the moment, it is either the local authority that does that in terms of planning permission, or it is the highways authority, which pays no attention whatever to water run-off, frankly, or it is the various bits of agriculture regulation. But if we are concerned about making sure that we have less sullied water and no threat of flooding, which may well be caused by people other than the water companies, I would argue that at some stage the Government will have to consider giving powers to the new authority that cover those companies, or particular actions by those companies, as well as the water companies.

18:30

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendments, but I want to make one comment on the discussion, which has possibly strayed a little from the Bill. Dealing with surface run-off and, in particular, developers’ right to connect are outdated. I hope that the Minister will urge those involved with the review to have a serious look at this, because it is completely outdated, and with increasing development, not to mention climate change, it will only get worse. It needs tackling properly.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering for moving this important amendment, which has caused a little bit of welcome excitement in the Committee. Both Amendments 7 and 8 seek to ensure that senior executives do not receive a financial penalty for failures that were not their fault or within their control, and we on these Benches feel that the noble Baroness’s amendments merit consideration by Ministers. The intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, at the end also merits some consideration.

It is right that the Government should take steps to ensure that, when a water company fails to meet the standards set by Ofwat, the responsible executive is held to account. While it is right that company directors take responsibility for the successes and failures of a business, under the Bill, other senior officers, who may not be members of the board of directors, could be penalised under these rules. The argument that the relevant senior executive is held responsible, rather than an officer of the company who was not responsible for the decision, is a simple one. Rather than applying financial penalties to all senior executives, including those below board level, these rules should penalise only those who are responsible for the company’s conduct.

It is quite a long time since I last worked in industry, but I do not think that much has changed to this day. Who is responsible depends on the level of direct supervision by a more senior officer. At lower levels of a company, it is quite straightforward: the supervisor or the foreman has minute-by-minute relationships with the team under him or her, so they could be held responsible for faulty work or bad behaviour by their workers. But that is at the lower level. As you get higher up a company, the whole ethos changes. Executives are supposed to set objectives and delegate to their other officers how it is done. The CEO, or directors, tell officers under their command, “Here are your legal duties and these are the company objectives. Here are your own personal targets and objectives—report to me weekly, monthly or whatever on how you are progressing. Now, just get on with it”.

There is no direct day-to-day supervision, and the CEO has to trust that the senior officers below him or her obey the law, behave properly and do not cause the breaches that we are concerned about. It would be wrong to blame and reduce the pay of CEOs or directors based on a mistake by a person under him or her where they have no direct control. Of course, the exception would be in the extraordinary circumstances in which the CEO or executive director gave instructions to the worker to break the law or not to care about the rules. That would be a different matter.

Without these amendments, we are concerned that it may prove difficult to find professionals willing to take on senior roles at water companies if there is a risk they will suffer an unfair loss of performance-related earnings through no fault of their own. It is a basic principle of performance-based pay for employees below board level that it should be tied to their performance as an employee within a team. It would not be an effective incentive scheme if one individual or team were deprived of their performance-related benefits because of the behaviours of failures of another individual below board level. As we discussed at Second Reading, arbitrary punishment will not improve performance; it will only encourage people to seek employment outside the water sector.

If we are to deliver the improvements to the water sector that the British people rightly expect, we must attract more talent to the sector through a fair incentives and penalties regime. The Bill is a bit too broad and could permit rules to be applied to the sector by Ofwat that are unfair and ineffective. Furthermore, when a current bonus scheme, or contractual bonus, provides for the bonus to be payable on the achievement of certain performance conditions, and the performance conditions have been met, an employer is, in effect, obliged to award the bonus. In cases where an employer may grant discretionary bonuses, employers are required to exercise this discretion honestly and in good faith, not to exercise it in an arbitrary, capricious or irrational way, and not to breach the implied term of trust and confidence.

It concerns me that, should the Government choose not to include these amendments in the Bill, and individuals’ performance-related pay was docked for actions or responsibilities beyond their control or remit, it would put the employer in a position of complying with the requirements of rules created by Ofwat under this Bill but then acting contrary to these common-law and contractual requirements. That leads to a concern that this scenario could result in costly and time-consuming litigation, thus diverting funds which would otherwise be better spent improving our water and sewage systems. Therefore, I encourage the Government to accept these amendments so that, should a water company fail to meet the standards set by Ofwat, only the relevant executives are held responsible. However, if the Government are unwilling to put this on a statutory footing, we hope that Ofwat would be willing to enact these principles under its rules, which could be overseen by the House under Amendment 27 as an affirmative instrument.

I want to comment on the points made by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering on surface water. I put it this way: if we were starting again from scratch a couple of hundred years ago, we would have designed a system whereby we never had rainwater from gutters or car parks running off into Mr Bazalgette’s sewage system—but we are where we are now. In an ideal world, two pipes would come into every house and, as the noble Lord suggested earlier, one would have clean water for drinking and the other water for flushing the toilet or for hose pipes. We cannot go back and do that now—but what we can do is look at new developments, and I hope that the Government will consider the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, in that regard.

I understood that it is possible if one is building a car park, before one puts in the hardcore, to lay a whole series of ooze pipes and then collect all the rainwater run-off, so it replenishes the underground stream by putting the water back into the subsoil. That should be possible. Whatever it is, we need to look at new developments to ensure that surface water is not unnecessarily going into our sewage system. I hope that the Minister will carefully consider what my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering has said.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, through provisions introduced by Clause 1, Ofwat will be able to issue new rules on remuneration and governance to ensure that companies and executives are subject to robust oversight and held accountable for failure. Among other things, these rules will ensure that executives will no longer be able to take bonuses where companies fail to meet standards on environmental performance, financial resilience, customer outcomes or criminal liability.

Amendments 7 and 8, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, seek to ensure that these rules apply only in instances where the failure to meet the required standards is due to a failing by that individual and not another person. I start by reassuring the noble Baroness that, should companies meet their performance expectations, executives will rightly be rewarded. However, the changes proposed through Amendment 7, in particular, would make it more difficult for Ofwat to implement the rules on remuneration and governance in a meaningful way. This is because it would introduce an additional test to be met before the bonus ban could be applied, where a link between the specific actions of an individual senior leader and the performance failings of a company as a whole might be difficult to demonstrate.

Senior executives are also collectively responsible for the actions of the company and therefore should be held responsible for poor performance. However, having said that, Ofwat has stated, in the policy consultation it published last week, that, while it intends for the rules to apply to most performance-related pay decisions by water companies,

“there may be … exceptional circumstances where a payment should not be prohibited”.

For example, if an incident leading to a rule breach was clearly and demonstrably beyond the control of the company, this could be grounds for an exemption from the ban.

Considering the changes proposed by Amendment 8, we also consider it unlikely that individuals in senior roles will fail to meet Ofwat’s future standards of “fitness and propriety” due to a failing on the part of another person. The potential criteria proposed by Ofwat in its consultation to measure “fitness and propriety” include character, previous conduct, and knowledge. These criteria are specific to the individual, rather than the performance of the company, and do not obviously relate to acts by other persons.

I just want to mention an issue that the debate moved on to, around drainage and SUDS. We are going to be discussing SUDS further in group 8, so we shall talk about that then, but I want to assure the noble Baroness that we are engaging with officials in MHCLG, because it is really important that we have a proper discussion around planning and drainage as we move forward with development. I am very aware of the problems that surface water can cause in new development if it is not thought through properly.

The noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, drew the Committee’s notice to the commission and asked whether it would be discussed there. I will draw the Committee’s attention, for interest, to part of the scope of the commission:

“Where housing, planning, agriculture and drainage interlink with strategic planning for the water system, these are in scope. ... The commission should have regard to how the water sector regulatory system provides the certainty around the provision of water infrastructure needed to underpin development plans, housing growth and sustainable development, while strategically protecting and enhancing the environment. This should include how regulation and planning for water infrastructure and for residential and commercial development can work together more effectively to anticipate and invest to provide for future growth, to quickly resolve and prevent issues where water and wastewater capacity constraints may otherwise inhibit necessary development (such as through their impact on requirements for water and nutrient neutrality)”.


So, although it is not entirely dealing with the issue around SUDS, I think it is something we need to explore further with the housing department, for example, and with local government. There is an opportunity to look at development and water within the scope of the commission. I hope that is helpful for noble Lords to understand.

I hope I have reassured the noble Baroness that the rules will be applied to individuals in a proportionate manner, and made clear why the Government consider these amendments to be unnecessary.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to debate in some depth these two amendments. I just clarify that the automatic right to connect is very different from SUDS and I do not think the noble Baroness addressed that point. I still have reservations, because I believe it is inappropriate in terms of Clause 2 to speak about pollution incident reduction plans when so many of the sewage discharges can self-evidently be found not to be the responsibility of water companies at all. As the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, so eloquently and appropriately recorded, these incidents are only going to increase as we see the number of major new developments of four-bedroom and five-bedroom houses increase.

18:45

I believe that we are not doing justice to the Government’s Bill if we do not carry either the amendments before us this evening or a version—a much-improved version, I am sure—that the department and its legal team could come up with. It is unacceptable for sewage to continue to enter watercourses, to go into the rivers and the sea because we are not dealing with it at the time the houses are being built. I welcome support from across the Committee in this regard.

The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, spoke about the highways authorities. Again, the Minister did not address that being a missing link. The noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, voiced his support and my noble friend Lord Blencathra lent the support of the Official Opposition to these humble amendments from the Back Benches. So I will persist with these amendments at a later date, unless the Government are minded to bring forward amendments in their own terms. But, but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

Amendment 8 not moved.

Amendment 9

Moved by

[Earl Russell]

9: Clause 1, page 2, line 3, at end insert—
“(d) requiring a relevant undertaker to have arrangements in place for environmental experts to be members of a board, committee or panel of a relevant undertaker.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require Ofwat to create rules to compel water companies to place environmental experts on their board, committee, or panel.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group all relate to representation on water company boards. This is the third-largest of the 24 groups we are scrutinising in Committee, so it is clear that many noble Lords are concerned about these matters and have a number of ideas for discussion about how representation can be broadened, made more representative and more fit for purpose, and used as part of the wider toolkit to help ensure that water companies act appropriately and are held to account at all levels.

I have three amendments in this group. Amendment 9 in my name would require Ofwat to create rules to compel water companies to place environmental experts on their board, committee or panel. I find it extraordinary that water companies can be allowed to operate, selling a natural resource, where their actions are having such devastating impacts on our environment, yet they are still not required to have environmental experts at the highest levels of their corporate governance structures. To date, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that many non-executive directors on many water company boards have failed to bring significant added benefits for their presence. How do we expect senior leadership teams and the chief executive officers to have the necessary knowledge, senior accountability and the ability to have due regard in fulfilling their functions if environmental knowledge, expertise and challenge are not mandated at the most senior executive governance and decision-making levels? We have various rules and guidance in place for lots of other types of make-up, backgrounds and skills in other board structures, so why do we not have the environment as a condition? Is it simply that we do not value the environment in our decision-making at senior levels? I think this is something we should not allow to stand.

The environment and environmental decisions need to be at the very heart of water companies’ plans, decisions and actions. We must work to ensure that corporate governance is not able to use ignorance as an excuse for causing environmental damage or for failing to adequately prepare for the impacts of rapid global climate change. Our water companies need to have environmental concerns at the very forefront of their long-term thinking, plans and strategies, from issues such as drought and the impacts of extreme rain events and floods, to the projections and limits on abstraction and the need for new reservoirs. All these matters require environmental knowledge and challenge at the heart of water company boardrooms.

We also need community environmental experts sitting on water company boards—an idea my party included in our last election manifesto. As non-executive directors they could help improve accountability, transparency and community relationships, and provide an important interface that could help ensure that water companies take sewage spills seriously by ensuring that community concerns are raised at board level and that water companies take appropriate action and communicate it effectively with local communities. As environmental experts, they could hold community meetings and report back on action being taken by companies, improving information flows and accountability. Environmental governance concerns are at the very heart of the water companies’ business, and the case for requiring environmental experts to be included on their boards along with consumer representation is, in my opinion, very strong. I kindly ask the Minister to lend government support to this amendment and to give a response from the Government Benches to these ideas.

I have added my name to Amendment 20 in the name of my noble friend Lady Bakewell. This is another simple “may” to “must” amendment and would require Ofwat, as part of its rules on consumer representation, to require water companies to place consumers on their board, committee or panel. It would require Ofwat to direct water companies to perform certain actions if it considers them to be contravening rules under new Section 35B. New Section 35B(2) sets out that Ofwat must exercise this power to issue rules that achieve specific effects, but the power in new Section 35B(1) provides only that the authority “may” issue such rules. As the Bill is written now, it is not at all clear that it is incumbent on the authority to use the power specified in the Bill to lay such rules. In our opinion, it is necessary that the Bill clearly states that the authorities have a duty to lay out such rules. I call on the Minister to support this amendment to make certain that the Government’s own intentions are clear and well defined so that they can be enforced as they should. What is the Government’s thinking on when the initial rules might be published?

Finally, Amendment 24 would require Ofwat to direct water companies to perform certain actions if it considers them to be contravening rules under new Section 35B. The Bill says:

“If the Authority considers that a relevant undertaker is contravening the rules, the Authority may give the undertaker a direction to do, or not to do, a particular thing specified in the direction”.


All these clauses concern rules on remuneration and governance, including performance-related pay. If the authority does find that a relevant undertaking is contravened, the rules in the Bill do not say that the authority must give a direction. As written, it is not at all clear that it is incumbent on the authority to use the powers specified in the Bill. Why do we have the rules in the Bill if there is not also a clear requirement for breaches to be enforced? Left as it is, the clause leaves a get-out-of-jail-free card for the authority to not give a direction, even where the evidence of a contravention is clear.

Other amendments in this group include one from the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, which requires the regulator to engage formally with civil society; one from the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, which requires CEOs of relevant undertakers to have regular meetings with relevant consumer and environmental panels; and one from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, on the governance structures of the authority. I beg to move.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 16 in my name. I underline at the outset that this is not about putting people on the board; if that is a misapprehension, I want to dispel it. Civil society has been at the forefront of raising issues around water pollution, including monitoring pollution incidents, and, frankly, it has done a better job than the regulators, which have been playing catch-up ever since.

There is an unbalanced and sometimes adversarial power relationship between civil society, water companies and the regulator, and this has given rise to numerous complaints about a lack of transparency—for example, companies deliberately adopting a very narrow definition of “environmental” in order to reject and bat away inquiries from civil society and others. This amendment would require the regulator and water companies to engage with civil society on a regular and formalised basis to agree actions and to record these actions publicly.

This achieves two things. It addresses the disbalance between civil society, the water companies and the regulators and will be an important means to increase transparency, including detailed public transparency as to what is going on, what the regulators and water companies are being challenged on and what actions are planned. It is very easy to underestimate the importance of this. In a previous role I had, we were handing over large sums of money to organisations and one of the stipulations was that they had to publish on their own website exactly what actions they had committed to. This made life very easy for us, because the media then held them to account against those actions. I suggest that a formal process where these things are recorded properly and publicly will be of great assistance to keep the water companies and the regulators up to the mark. Without a formal process of that sort, the relationship will remain distant and most likely adversarial. Therefore, I hope the Minister will look favourably on this amendment or produce one of her own from the government side.

[The Duke of Wellington (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 21 and 23 in my name. In effect, they both seek to amend new subsection (6) on page 2. The main point of my amendment is that I believe it does not lead to effective governance of a board of directors if sectional interests are represented directly on the board. It is much more effective and likely to have more influence if a specialist panel is created to advise and meet the chief executive. I cannot understand why the Government’s clause refers only to the views of consumers. It seems essential—I agree in various ways with the noble Earl, Lord Russell—that environmental interests are similarly represented on a panel. It could be a separate panel or one representing both consumer and environmental interests; I think it would be better to have two panels.

The real point is that I have never seen a board work effectively where there is a sectional interest represented directly on the board, with one or two members of the board speaking only for that particular interest. It makes it very difficult to reach a consensus on a board. Most boards work by consensus, and there has to be a collegiate atmosphere on any board. Where a particular interest is represented, be it environmental or consumer, that is less likely to lead to effective management of the board of that company.

I would like to persuade the Minister to delete from new subsection (6) “board” and “committee” but leave in “panel”, to include consumers and environmentalists on those panels and, importantly, that those panels should have regular meetings with the chief executive to exercise real influence over the conclusions of the board when it next meets on that subject.

19:00

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Earl, Lord Russell, indicated, this group of amendments deals with a common theme of representation on water company boards but has several different facets.

Amendment 22 in my name would ensure that it is for the boards of water companies, rather than Ofwat, to decide in which forum—board, committee or panel—the views of consumers should be represented. As we have heard, Clause 1 includes provisions intended to establish consumer involvement in corporate decision-making. New subsection (6) provides that this

“may include a requirement for persons representing the views of consumers to be members of a board, committee or panel of”

the water company. While I support the principle of strengthening the voice of consumers, this should not be through a highly prescriptive, one-size-fits-all approach.

In this country we do not have different categories of director, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, reminded us earlier. Non-executive directors may have specialisations, but they are chosen for their wider skills and ability to make a comprehensive contribution. The noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, just made a similar point. Those representing consumer interests may not wish or be equipped to sit on corporate boards, with all the responsibilities and liabilities that entails. It should not be for Ofwat to require that such people sit on the boards of water companies but should be left to the companies to decide which forum best suits their requirements, whether that be board, committee or panel.

Providing similar flexibility was effective when companies enacted the workforce engagement mechanism under the UK Corporate Governance Code’s requirements. A very small number of companies appointed a director from the workforce, largely for the considerations I have mentioned. Some established a formal workforce advisory panel, and a greater number appointed a designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. Each company chose the mechanism best suited to its circumstances, and the system has worked well.

Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, extend the provisions of this clause to environmental experts. It will be for your Lordships to decide how widely to draw the categories of relevant interest, however represented, but the principle in the latter amendment of representation other than at board level is very much in line with the rationale behind my amendment. I shall listen with interest to the arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for their Amendments 82 and 100 respectively. However, they would represent a radical departure from accepted standards of corporate governance and company law, so I would hesitate to support them.

My earlier dose of optimism is becoming somewhat jaded. A recurring theme seems to be emerging in the Minister’s replies: everything is for Ofwat to decide. That displays a touching and, if I may venture, possibly naive belief in Ofwat deciding wisely on many matters that are not within its competence as an economic regulator. Concerns have been expressed on all sides about its past record. Surely it should be the role of this House to take more responsibility on itself and give much more direction and guidance to Ofwat on how it should exercise the significant additional powers this Bill gives it—or, as in this case, remove the key choice from Ofwat and give it to the companies, within a defined framework imposed by us.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 82 addresses a major question that the Bill does not address: why do water regulators fail? After all, they have been at it for many years—at least 35 years, some of them—yet they continue to fail. No proposal in the Bill addresses that. They continue to fail because they are isolated from the lives of the people affected by sewage spills, high customer bills, low investment and water simply leaking away.

The regulatory bodies are generally made up of former Ministers and executives. Someone who has done a stint at a water company disappears to Ofwat; Ofwat’s former chief executive is now director of a water company. There is a revolving door. These people have a world of their own which does not connect with that of the people directly affected by their activities. For any regulatory system to be effective, it must represent a plurality of interests, but our regulatory system and bodies are closely aligned with corporate interests. They are, in essence, captured. If this capture is not there—and is not the reason for their failures—then someone will have to explain why the water industry is in a mess and why the guiding hand of regulators has not been able to put it on a path to recovery, good practices or good behaviour.

The Bill seems to propose consumer panels, which are, in essence, toothless: they have no social constituency to report to because they are not really elected by anyone but simply co-opted on the basis that someone knows somebody and brings them in; they are not required to report to any constituencies; they cannot easily object to the practices of the regulatory bodies; and they can simply be bludgeoned into silence and just go along because that is the norm. We have heard that these amendments somehow propose something unusual and therefore we have to be bludgeoned into silence and simply go along, because tradition is oppressive and that is what we have to do.

My amendment calls for direct representation of elected representatives of employees and stakeholders on the board of the regulatory authority and to give them power to vote on executive remuneration. That would be the ultimate sanction when they disapprove of how the regulatory body is safeguarding or protecting the public interest. If they cannot vote on executive remuneration, they will simply be a shadow. The amendment seeks, in essence, to democratise regulation. I know that democracy is not very fashionable these days, so if the Minister opposes this democratisation of regulation, it would be helpful to know how the Government will check cognitive capture of regulatory bodies, because no other solution is being offered by anybody. If we were to expand on this, in the next group I could lay out a complete framework of what else needs to be done, but this is simply to test and, I hope, elicit a response from the Government.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 100. The issues of water pollution and the supply of clean water to everybody are ones I clearly care a lot about. But this Bill is just papering over the cracks. If we are going to paper over cracks, we could at least try a radical departure; perhaps we could try to bring some democracy into the regime.

I take issue with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. I have chaired a board and it was extremely successful. Part of that was because I invited people who thought very differently on to the board. We had 20 members or so. It was called London Food and we were tasked with writing a report for the Mayor of London on a sustainable food strategy for the city. It was successful, I would argue, partly because of my charm—obviously —but also because we had extremely good reports from every single aspect of food and food supply for London. We had a member from the City who was obviously a Conservative, we had an organic farmer and so on. We had a huge range of people, but we agreed on the strategy and we came to some very useful conclusions. This is what we need: we need some democracy in the systems that try to keep us safe.

Honestly, given the scale of the challenge that the water industry faces at the moment, in trying to make a system work that has proved not to work, we need to ensure that there are some new voices that can represent other parts of society that use the water system and care very deeply about it. We should also involve the people who actually do the work. My amendment brings in people from the workforce.

At the moment, the CEOs and senior staff are more focused on delivering dividends than they are on delivering a quality service, so having worker representatives on the board would provide a constant voice for those whose job it is to provide a service. The regulators have been captured by the industry they are meant to be keeping an eye on, so they are almost useless. This system should not be a national scheme but one based on the geography of the water systems themselves.

I am a believer in democracy and this would be an extremely useful way of making sure that a crucial industry for our society has some resonance with people out there. I am sure that this would be welcomed by the majority of people, just as I am sure that the Minister is aware that polls suggest a majority of people would prefer public ownership. Failing that, however, let us get the public in there, talking and being listened to.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendments, particularly those placed before us by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington. To the last speaker I have to say that there is a fundamental difference between chairing a committee to produce a report and running a business, which is what the water company has to be. She is absolutely right, however, that this Bill does not properly address the fundamental problem that we have two regulators and they have failed to produce a co-ordinated programme for the water industry.

I speak as somebody who knows a bit about it because, until 10 or 11 years ago, I was chairman of a water-only water company—so do not blame me about sewage as I never had anything to do with that. However, I do therefore know a bit about water companies. It was always impossible to meet the requirements of both the Environment Agency and Ofwat. Ofwat was under pressure from the Government to keep bills down and the Environment Agency, perfectly rightly, was saying that we should do more for the environment. As chairman of a water-only company, I was interested in doing something about the pollution of the water sources right from the beginning instead of having to clean them up, which is a very stupid way of dealing with it. Ofwat, however, would never allow one to do those things, whereas the Environment Agency was much more sympathetic.

19:15

I am sorry that the Government have not seen fit to look at that fundamental dysfunction. If we are going to have two different regulators, we need some mechanism within the system to ensure that the environmental demands and needs are constantly under review by water companies. There is no point in saying there is this, that and the other. We just have to face the fact that it has not worked up to now. In that sense, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that because it has not worked up to now, we may as well look at the problem and see how we might solve it.

The nearest thing to a solution—which does not mix up running a business with trying to make sure that the business is run in a context that properly looks at these different issues—is to look at the amendments tabled by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and others. They are an attempt to make sure that any water company has to seriously consider these matters in all the decisions it makes.

I have a terrible problem with designated, chosen-by-whatever-means members of boards who are representing consumers. It always seems to me that, if you are on a board, you ought to represent consumers in any case. The consumers are a crucial part of any board’s decisions. The idea that Mrs Snooks or Mr Jones is the only person who speaks up for consumers seems to breed a particular kind of person who is a consumer representative—and all of us have suffered from consumer representatives. The fact is that you need to have every member of the board concerned about that.

On environmental concerns, however, we need regular meetings with people who have a regular information source, so they can watch what is being done by the water companies in their role of dealing with the environment. Without this, we will get back into the same problems we have now, with two competing regulators of different sorts. Ofwat is bound by any Government—it has happened under both sorts of Government—to be looking constantly at prices, while the Environment Agency is bound to make sure the environment is constantly looked at. Let us have a structure which faces that problem and ensures that the environment is not forgotten.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, we spoke earlier about the issue of two regulators and I will not go back over that. However, I will talk a little more about the presence of people on boards. I think there is a middle ground here—obviously beautifully set out in my amendment. To extrapolate a little from that, I agree that directors in a company have specific responsibilities which would not sit comfortably with having a consumer representative as a member of the board. That is clear and right.

These companies, however, are not just profit-making companies which represent shareholder interests; they are monopolies providing a service to the public for which they achieve a reward. That is an important distinction to make. For that reason, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that avoiding groupthink and having challenge on a board is a very useful thing. However, I would not go so far as to make them directors, for all sorts of legal reasons that others have already expounded.

It pains me to disagree marginally with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington. I do not like panels, because they become ghettos that the unfortunate member of board who has to interact with them dreads going to—but they go anyway, they go through the motions and then they come back. I far prefer something more formal: a regular cycle of meetings with representatives of civil society, which are going to be challenging and sometimes uncomfortable but which end with recorded actions that are made public. Otherwise, it becomes just a token exercise and a ghettoisation into panels. I will not try to emulate the tone of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, but the representatives of consumers or environmentalists can be listened to but not heard.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, this has been one of the really interesting groups in the Bill. I am not certain that any of us—from any party, in any amendment—has the complete solution. There are questions about whether a one-size solution fits all. In any case, there is a lot for all of us to go away and think about. These are crucial issues that go to the heart of what we do, how water companies operate, how they are accountable and how people who are impacted by them can feed in to and influence what they do and how they operate.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his contribution. I fully support him on the role of civil society. It is particularly important that we all acknowledge, as he did, that we would not be here without the role of civil society. I have an amendment in a later group to encourage the Government to work more with civil society in monitoring the environment.

I also thank the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, for his comments on the need for environmental representation. I am not quite certain where I agree on that debate; I will go away and think about it some more. I have also been on a board, and to be honest, it was one of the most difficult things I have done in my life. That was even on a good, well-functioning board. Sometimes, if you are in a difficult situation, even with good people who work together, things can be very difficult.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, for tabling his amendment. The board should decide on its own make-up and we should not dictate to it. Perhaps there is some kind of compromise here between the Government setting guidelines for what needs to happen, while perhaps allowing some freedom within the way that it is organised and monitoring the outputs that come from it. Maybe there is something we can all work on there.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for his contribution. It is a bold move, indeed, and I am not entirely certain that I agree with that kind of prescriptive democracy. I think that it is better to allow things to be inclusive, as opposed to dictating that they must be in their make-up, but again, I will think about that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, spoke about bringing some democracy into the regime. I certainly think we need that, and that the environment needs a proper, formal voice. I take up the point from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the need to watch the environment. If we do not do that, and if nobody has that responsibility or role, then that protective piece that needs to happen will not be there.

I think our areas of agreement were the need to broaden representation to include the environment and community, the need for diversity, the need for boards to work well, the need for constructive challenge to operate and to be brought to these companies at the highest level, and the view what we have now is not working, so we need to go away and find something else.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 100. The water authorities in Berlin and Paris are publicly owned and have stakeholder-elected directors. In most European countries, large companies have stakeholder-elected directors in them, as either a substantial proportion of the unitary board or a German-style two-tier board where one board is supervisory, and the other is executive. On the supervisory board, directors are directly elected. There are plenty of precedents for stakeholder-elected directors on company boards, and in many ways the UK is an outlier.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for moving the amendment. I want to speak in support of Amendment 22, from my noble friend Lord Remnant, as well as Amendments 21 and 23 tabled by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington.

My noble friend is right to note that the decision whether to be on a board, panel or committee is the job of the company rather than any kind of external regulator. By allowing the company to make that decision, it can decide based on its own business needs. If this was left to Ofwat, not only could it lead to a situation where the board, panel or committee did not fit well into the company structure but it might harm relationships between those forums and the board of the company.

It seems unlikely that a regulator would ever have access to all the information needed to make decisions on how a company’s decision-making systems should be structured, and it is surely the responsibility of the company itself to ensure that it has the right processes in place to make the correct decisions according to its needs. Indeed, as we have heard from many noble Lords, it is clear that the regulator has failed to get important decisions right in the past, to the detriment not only of companies but of the environment. Yes, of course, the regulator should have its role in holding companies to account for their decisions, but the moment regulators are involved in decision-making, it surely takes some responsibility for those choices too.

We are concerned that having consumer representatives on the board or their being involved in any decision-making within the company creates a blurring of responsibility. There is already the risk of some confusion, given the role of regulators, but they are at least experts in the industry and well informed about their roles, acting within well-defined parameters.

I agree with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, on sectional interests and the effective working of a board. Consumer representatives on a board lay themselves open to the responsibilities of being a company director and in some cases a director of a listed company. Do the Government really want such consumer directors to be open to fines or prosecution for failing to deliver accounts on time, trading while insolvent or even insider dealing? It is not clear to me as the Bill is drafted that those consumer representatives could not also be subject to fines or prosecution by the regulator. If a consumer representative proposed an action that led to penalties from the regulator, how could they not be responsible?

Turning this around to the perspective of the existing board and management, if consumers are part of decision-making, then it is conceivable that they could cause or prevent an action by the company that created regulatory breaches and punitive action. How would this coexist with the responsibilities and liabilities of professional managers and board directors? How could this not create liability for the consumer representative?

My comments about consumer representation apply equally, if not more, to the environmental experts proposed in Amendment 9 by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. I understand and applaud the sentiment behind the amendment, of environmental representatives representing the stakeholder that has no natural voice, the environment. However, environmental campaigners already have a strong voice. There are obligations already present for companies, and others may be imposed through amendments to the Bill. I also agree with the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, that environmental representatives, alongside consumer representatives, should be limited to panels.

Allowing the company to decide the forum in which such representatives take part would benefit both sides of the agreement. If the company has taken this decision, then it becomes clear that the company, its managers and employees remain jointly responsible for decisions. I am not clear from the Bill exactly how the Government intend that its proposals should work. Both my noble friend Lord Remnant’s Amendment 22 and Amendments 21 and 23 from the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, have considerable merit. While there is a contradiction inherent between them, both are good solutions to creating the involvement of consumers that the Government want.

I thank all noble Lords for their involvement in this spirited debate. I ask the Minister to explain exactly how she sees consumer involvement working in practice under the Bill. I also ask that she give serious thought before Report to the amendments that I have addressed.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has come across clearly that there is no agreement about who should sit on the boards. We want to rebuild trust in the water sector, and to do that we are giving Ofwat new powers to issue new rules on remuneration and governance.

I turn first to Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington. The powers on remuneration and governance outline a requirement for Ofwat to set rules on companies for including consumers in decision-making. We feel that it is appropriate for Ofwat, as the independent regulator, to determine how this is implemented. Water companies have a range of legal environmental obligations that they are required to meet, and actions related to these obligations will already be informed by specialists in the company.

We believe that introducing requirements to include environmental experts on company boards would take the focus away from involving consumers in water company decisions, which do not have the same level of legal requirements as the environment does. Environmental issues should already be a key consideration in water company decision-making. Importantly, my officials in Defra have worked to secure agreement with companies to update their articles of association, to place both customers and the environment at the heart of business decisions. I hope that this clarifies to noble Lords that the Bill ensures the prioritisation of consumer representation on company boards and that they feel able not to press their amendments.

19:30

I turn to Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, Amendment 23 in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, and Amendment 100 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The legislation provides Ofwat with the flexibility to determine the detail of the rules on remuneration and governance. As we have heard, that may include customer representation on boards, committees or panels. However, Ofwat will need to undertake a statutory consultation with relevant persons, including the Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers, the Consumer Council for Water and others, before the rules are finalised.

In its current policy consultation, Ofwat has proposed that this could be delivered in different ways by companies, including new consumer panels or expert groups. Ofwat has also proposed providing consumers with direct access to their water company CEO and board members through its rules on increasing customer representation in decision-making.

On employees electing members of the board, I stress that, as these are private companies, it is for them to determine how they elect the members of the board, so we do not propose to include this requirement in legislation.

On Amendment 23, I am very sorry to disappoint the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington. As the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said, it always pains to me to disagree with him on anything, but we will not accept his amendment.

I turn to Amendment 24 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, and introduced by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. We are unable to pre-empt the outcomes of Ofwat’s consultation but, once the rules are set, Ofwat will be able to use its direction-giving power and wider enforcement framework to hold companies to account where they have contravened the rules. A range of interventions short of a direction may be suitable in certain circumstances, and it is important that Ofwat has the flexibility to determine the most appropriate course of action to secure the best outcome for both customers and the environment.

Further, Ofwat’s independence is an important part of ensuring that there is trust in our regulatory regime. We consider it important that Ofwat has the freedom to use its enforcement powers as it sees fit and in line with its published enforcement policy. The noble Earl, Lord Russell, asked about the implementation of legislation and how we know that Ofwat will take action if a company breaks the rules. Ofwat will be able to use its direction-giving power and wider enforcement framework to hold companies to account where it has reason to believe that an executive does not meet the required standards and that the company is consequently in breach of the rules. We believe it is important that Ofwat has the freedom to use its enforcement powers as it sees fit, in line with the published enforcement policy. I hope that reassures noble Lords on their amendments.

I turn now to Amendment 16 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, who asked about transparency, consultation and engagement. Ofwat’s consultation says that there is a need for companies to demonstrate clearly how relevant consumer representation has been taken into account in key decisions. Ofwat needs to make very clear how that has taken place. We have other measures in the Bill that are designed to increase transparency, such as the pollution incident reduction plans.

We are absolutely clear that consumer standards are a vital component of performance. For that reason, the legislation already requires that Ofwat must set rules to involve consumers in decision-making that affects them in companies. In designing the rules on performance-related pay, Ofwat must include performance standards related to consumer matters. I hope that the noble Lord is reassured by that.

I turn to Amendment 22 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Remnant. As I previously mentioned and we have discussed, Ofwat is currently consulting on the rules for consumer representation in water companies. Ofwat has proposed that the rules could set out a range of options by which companies comply with the requirement to put in place arrangements for involving consumers in decisions that are likely to have a material impact on them. I would like to reassure the Committee that companies and other interested parties will be able to feed in their views on the proposed rules in response to this consultation and the statutory consultation that will take place ahead of the implementation of the rules.

The noble Lord, Lord Remnant, said that he was feeling less positive because I keep talking about Ofwat. I want him to get some of that positive feeling back. This is a part of the Bill where we are changing the rules for Ofwat to enable it to do a better job, so clearly we will talk about Ofwat quite a lot. Also in response to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, I say that it is important, at the same time, that the independent commission we have set up includes looking at the regulators. Although here we are talking about what we are doing with Ofwat, there is an opportunity, going forward with the independent commission, to look properly at the role of the regulators, to ask whether they are fit for purpose and to see where there have been problems. That is there for people to consider. I stress that the objectives of the commission include ensuring that water industry regulators are effective, have a clear purpose and are empowered to hold water companies to account.

Finally, turning to Amendment 82 in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka, I am sure he will be pleased to know that the appointments of non-executive directors to Ofwat’s board, including the chair, are already regulated public appointments and therefore must be made in line with the Governance Code on Public Appointments. The responsibilities and selection of those appointed rest with Defra Ministers, who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions. Ofwat also engages informally with customers, water companies and other stakeholders on relevant consumer and environmental matters.

As I said, the independent commission will carefully consider the roles and responsibilities of the regulators, but in this Bill we cannot pre-empt the commission’s outcomes. I encourage noble Lords to take part in any stakeholder engagement going forward. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions, and I hope that my response has reassured the Committee so that noble Lords feel able not to press their amendments.

[Earl Russell (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her response. This has been an interesting debate. There is more for us all to think about on these matters. I share a slight concern with the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, that the Government are looking back to Ofwat for a big, expanded role, even though there have been failures in the past. We will come back to the idea of expanding representation in further debates on the Bill.

For us, and I think for others around the Committee, the environmental aspect is important. I hear the Minister’s reassurances that there are new powers on Ofwat. I will go away and look at that, and I thank her for her response. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.25 pm.