Mortgage Prisoners Inquiry Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 7th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, mortgage prisoners are people who are stuck with their existing lenders and cannot access a better deal such as a fixed rate. As a result, mortgage prisoners continue to pay interest rates on their mortgages at around four percentage points over normal market rates, costing them hundreds of thousands of pounds extra per year. According to the mortgage prisoners action group, there are around 195,000 mortgage prisoners; by narrowing significantly the definition of a mortgage prisoner, the FCA, completely implausibly, comes up with a much smaller number.

This Bill proposes an independent inquiry into the 17 years of harm that has been caused to mortgage prisoners. For the past 25 years, the UK mortgage market has been dominated by short-term deals. Customers access a preferential rate for two years or five years and then move on to a higher standard variable rate. Those with active lenders can quickly and easily move to another short-term deal with their existing lender or switch to a different lender.

After the financial crisis, the FCA tightened the mortgage affordability rules. This was the correct response, but it created thousands of mortgage prisoners. If they tried to switch to a lower rate with a different lender, even if they were up to date with their payments, they would be told that they did not pass the new test and could not afford to pay a lower monthly rate. I emphasise that they were told that they could not now afford to pay a monthly amount that was significantly smaller than the one they were in fact paying.

Mortgage prisoners ended up stuck on a high standard variable rate, which is now between 8% and 9%, around four percentage points above what customers who could access fixed rates from active lenders were paying. This created two problems for mortgage prisoners. They are paying high rates, and so are more likely to struggle to make their payments, and they have no way of gaining certainty over their mortgage payments for the next two or five years.

The largest group of mortgage prisoners are former Northern Rock customers. After nationalisation in 2007, they were placed in a government-owned company run by UK Asset Resolution. When returning these mortgages to the private sector, the Conservative Government could have sold these mortgages to active lenders who would offer them a fair deal. However, the Conservative Government did not do that. They sold the mortgages on to non-active lenders and vulture funds, with the consequences which we now see. It is not as though the Government had not been warned about the problem. The risk to the customers was clearly identified.

In January 2016, the noble Lord, Lord McFall, wrote to the Treasury, UKAR and the FCA, highlighting that:

“Many of … those affected by these sales, will be mortgage prisoners and will be unable to switch lenders”.


He told the Government that the customers affected by these sales should be protected, offered a fair deal and given access to fixed rates. He warned that:

“Given the prospect of rising interest rates it is important that all mortgage customers are given the opportunity to achieve certainty over their payments by accessing a fixed rate”.


He told the Government that he was

“concerned that some customers affected by these mortgages sales … will not be offered reasonable fixed mortgage rates”.

UKAR responded that returning these mortgages to the private sector will mean that there will be

“the option to be offered new deals, extra lending and fixed rates should become available”.

However, this requirement was not written into the contract when mortgages were sold to vulture fund Cerberus. The BBC has reported that UKAR now claims to have been misled by Cerberus. A UKAR spokesman told the BBC’s “Panorama” that Cerberus had the ability to lend to the former Northern Rock customers and that UKAR believed that Cerberus intended to do so. It said:

“The reply to Lord McFall sent on behalf of the UKAR board of directors was based on information presented to UKAR and the board had no reason to disbelieve this at that time”.


However, the UKAR board did not put these terms into the contract of sale. The mortgage customers were left unprotected by UKAR’s incompetence, naivety and neglect.

Consumer champion Martin Lewis lays responsibility for the treatment of mortgage prisoners with the Government. He said that the Government

“have sold these loans to professional debt buyers who do not offer mortgages and left these people in these types of mortgages, which have been too expensive, crippled their finances and destroyed their wellbeing”.

It was at best very naive of the Government and UK Asset Resolution to think that a vague aspiration from a vulture fund such as Cerberus was sufficient.

Everyone must now acknowledge that the Conservative Government failed to protect these mortgage prisoners. They could have sold them to active lenders, but they chose instead to sell them to unregulated vulture funds. We need to understand why the Conservative Government made these decisions and why they ignored the risks, and we need to understand the ultimate impact on mortgage prisoners. The inquiry proposed by this Bill would examine the circumstances around the sale and the role of the Treasury and UKAR.

FCA supervision and policy also contributed to the harm caused to mortgage prisoners by trapping them within their existing lender but failing to intervene to ensure that they were treated fairly. In 2019, after years of inaction, the FCA finally introduced a modified affordability test, which enabled lenders to use a more proportionate affordability assessment when offering new mortgages to mortgage prisoners, but this did not work. The FCA found that

“Lenders have had a limited appetite”


for helping mortgage prisoners to switch, using the modified affordability test. In fact, only 200 mortgage prisoners were able to use this escape route.

There is also no evidence that the introduction of the consumer duty has had any benefits for mortgage prisoners. The FCA says that it has done all that it can with its existing powers, but it has not helped. For example, it allowed TSB to penalise the mortgage prisoners in its Whistletree brand by offering them higher rates than those offered to other TSB customers. I have contacted the Serious Fraud Office asking for an investigation into the actions of part of the Co-operative Banking Group: when it increased the SVR, it appears to have misled customers about an increase in the funding costs of their mortgage.

I now turn to the question of the regulatory perimeter. In 2009, the previous Labour Government proposed expanding the regulatory perimeter to include the new activity of managing a mortgage. They had identified the risk of mortgages being sold to unregulated firms such as hedge funds and private equity firms, and that this had the potential to cause detriment to borrowers. Andrew Bailey, now Governor of the Bank of England, told the Treasury Committee in 2020 that there was a population of mortgage prisoners who would not benefit from the FCA’s proposals and that expanding the FCA’s regulatory perimeter was the only way that the regulator could conclusively address the question of mortgage prisoners. He was right. However, after Mr Bailey left the FCA, the regulator had a change of heart and claimed that there was no need to expand the perimeter. The Conservative Government also rejected the proposal of the APPG on Mortgage Prisoners to expand the perimeter.

An inquiry is urgently needed, as the situation of mortgage prisoners gets worse every month. After the failed mini-Budget and the rise of interest rates, mortgage prisoners are now paying rates of between 8% and 9%. The campaign group UK Mortgage Prisoners has told me that firms such as Landmark, Rooftop and Heliodor have been quick to seek repossession orders.

Data from the FCA suggests that you are around 10 times more likely to be repossessed if you are a mortgage prisoner. This campaign group has dealt with many harrowing cases of suicide, or attempted suicide, mortgage prisoners struggling to eat or heat their homes, the children of mortgage prisoners suffering and mortgage prisoners with cancer enduring miserable final years while they wait for help. The inquiry will review and assess the level of harm caused to mortgage prisoners. No fault should be attached to mortgage prisoners themselves. They took out a mortgage with a fully regulated high street bank and found their mortgages transferred to inactive lenders and unregulated entities, which did not have to treat them fairly.

The LSE report on the situation is perfectly clear when it says:

“The borrowers themselves were not to blame”.


Martin Lewis has said:

“Mortgage prisoners have been left paying obscene interest rates for over a decade, through no fault of their own”


The inquiry will have the power to propose solutions to help current mortgage prisoners and prevent future generations of them being created. The LSE report, which was funded generously by Martin Lewis, put forward a number of solutions, including greater access to advice and government loans and guarantees along the lines of the Help to Buy scheme. The APPG on Mortgage Prisoners also put forward solutions, such as capping SVRs and an entitlement for all mortgage prisoners to access fixed rates, as well as changes to the FCA guidance concerning interest-only mortgages.

The Labour Party voted for this cap in your Lordships’ House and the Bill was amended accordingly. The amendment was removed by the Tories in the Commons. Despite having numerous meetings with several Ministers and Economic Secretaries over the 16 months leading up to the election, the Conservative Government did not provide Martin Lewis with a full response to his LSE report or the other solutions put forward by the APPG.

The excellent Library briefing for this debate notes that Martin Lewis wrote to the Chancellor in July

“asking for the new government to respond to the LSE reports”.

It quotes him as saying that

“the ‘financial, mental and physical toll on those trapped’ as mortgage prisoners had led to ‘repossessions, hardship and, terribly, suicide’. At the time of writing”—

six months on—

“the government has not publicly responded to the letter”.

I hope the Minister will tell us when the Government will respond substantively to the LSE report.

We need an inquiry so we can allocate responsibility and examine mistakes within government and regulators that caused the very bad situation for thousands of mortgage prisoners. We need an inquiry to identify and correct the failures of the regulators and correct any miscarriages of justice which have occurred. Most of all, we need an inquiry to develop and implement solutions to help the current generation of mortgage prisoners stay in their homes and stop them being exploited by vulture funds. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who has spoken so very powerfully about the plight of the mortgage prisoners. It is important to make one point about the mortgage prisoners: they are like everybody else in every other respect. They are not a delinquent or feckless part of society. They are not reckless. What befell them could have happened to a holder of a mortgage from any company that suffered the kind of damage that Northern Rock did during the crisis. No special characteristics of the mortgage prisoners somehow make them worthy of less attention or of getting worse deals.

I also note that the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, did not entirely rule out a cap on SVRs. That is encouraging and perhaps the precursor to a longer situation.

I also acknowledge the Minister’s invitation to remain involved with discussions about the plight of mortgage prisoners. This is an ongoing, terrible situation, and I do not think anybody disagrees with that. Before I get to the real question that arises from this, I should ask again when we can expect a reply to Martin Lewis’s letter to the Chancellor. I am prepared to give way if the noble Lord will tell me immediately.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

As I tried to indicate in my remarks, we will continue to engage and look at that report, but I cannot guarantee a reply on any particular timescale.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I close by reminding everybody that this is a current situation. Lots of people are suffering very badly indeed because of it, and it is not getting any better. So I close with Lenin’s favourite question: what is to be done? I beg to move.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

National Insurance Contributions (Secondary Class 1 Contributions) Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th February 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group: Amendment 35 from my noble friend Lady Barran, which asks for the new employer rates to begin after the tax year in which an impact assessment is published in respect of schools and universities, and Amendment 43 from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, to which my noble friend Lord Altrincham has added his support and which asks for a higher education allowance. I do so not only because the education of children is an obligation for their parents, who must ensure that children of compulsory school age are receiving an education—most do this in schools—but because, in this country, with its tradition of support for freedom of conscience as an enabling state, not a domineering one, Governments have gone hand in glove with the right of parents to decide what sort of education is best for their children. In these matters, the state has enabled parents to choose, rather than forcing them into state institutions through financial penalties or totalitarian laws.

That view has been part of the political arrangements for education when, irrespective of who is in power, the tradition has been that, where the law requires, the state enables. Barring the often political and ideological debates over education, it has done so through, among other ways, funding. Initially, it was a grant in the mid-19th century. That was followed in the 1870s by Gladstone’s Liberal Party introducing the obligation on parents of elementary education, but he refused the demands of what he called the “Prussian element” in his own party, who wanted to supersede the voluntary schools and replace them with a comprehensive, uniform state system. Thus, he allowed to survive, and indeed encouraged, what we now call voluntary schools: independent schools and Church schools which have educated children in this country for centuries. He expressly supported the right of parents to choose the best education for their children. Voluntary schools would be supported and supplemented by the new board or state schools.

That principle continued to inform education law in this country throughout the 20th century. Indeed, Britain’s history is a proud one. The education of children and young adults was often at the public’s expense, supported by those who could or would pay—be that the monarch, the guilds, the city corporations, the ratepayers or, later, in our own centuries, the taxpayer. In fact, until relatively recently, this country was an exemplar in educating its people irrespective of their parents’ means.

Under Elizabeth I, that tradition was recognised in law at the very start of the 17th century, when education was designated in law as a charity. Under the Tudors, some of the most famous schools had been just that: public schools. Winchester and then Eton were founded by the monarchs of the day to educate, as I recall, 70 poor boys so that their school education would equip them to go on to one of the universities of the day and be employed, I think, mainly as professional clerks in the Church, at the monarch’s service—a precursor to the Civil Service.

Anyway, many of those schools—Anglican, Catholic and dissenter—continue to flourish today, as Gladstone would have wanted. Not only were these schools regarded as the foundation of the education system, they were supported and encouraged in law through public funds. However, even if the funding systems changed, they were never penalised by discriminatory tax, as will happen under what this Government propose, not only in the extension of VAT but in the discriminatory penalty of the new NIC rates.

Despite stiff competition, they continue to be popular with parents, educating hundreds and thousands of children across the whole country. An impact assessment would reveal the true cost to children’s education and allow for a pause before this unthinking rush to destroy what works well and, as we have heard many times in this Room, continues to supplement what the state does and what the general taxpayer can afford.

There are 2,600 independent schools in the UK, mostly catering for the early years and primary stages of school. They educate more than 620,000 children, nearly 7% of UK school pupils and half of the parents who were at maintained schools: 25% in Edinburgh, 13% in London and 20% of all sixth-formers in the UK. They teach well. I will not go through the Ofsted reports on each of these schools but, on the whole, they do very well—better than maintained schools do on the whole, I am afraid, although some excellent maintained schools have done wonders recently; I take my hat off to them. They provide a school education to the highest potential of each individual student—just as the principles of the 1944 Act put it—which their parents judged was right for them.

I understand that one policy of this Government is an ambitious concentration on growing the public sector, with large pay increases—an aim of this Government that may go counter to the priority of economic growth for the whole economy. Perhaps the Minister would like to say, now or in writing, how many of the 28,000 new public sector appointments between July’s and October’s Budgets included new teachers and new doctors. Without good-enough teachers in our schools, maintained or independent, children at every stage of their education—early years and compulsory—will suffer.

Unless the Government listen and think again on these modest amendments, children’s education at this vital early and compulsory stage will suffer, as some independent and voluntary schools will be forced to lay off staff and will probably try to raise their fee income to make ends meet. They are the target of penal taxation, with the imposition of VAT and the new employer NIC hike. They are discriminated against because maintained schools will have these rises funded.

These amendments do not seek to run a coach and four through the measure. They are not demanding the outright abolition of the employer’s new NICs or the employment allowance, but they seek to improve the legislation. Wherever they are educated, we see the fruits of an education suited to the individual child. It is an essential stepping stone to adult life in which the recipient flourishes, and so the whole of society benefits. Education is not only a private good for a child; it is a public good for all of us and all who live in our country.

These are modest amendments designed to assess and ameliorate the impact on the independent sector—not to deny the Government their measure, but to do due diligence and mitigate the damage of an otherwise flawed measure. I hope that the Minister and the Government, in the spirit of the historic Labour Party, will be at one with the tradition of responsibility for the education of the young, in whatever institutions of the country they inherit, and will stop short of a new tax levy that will penalise those institutions and the education of our children. I hope that they will assess fairly the impact of the proposed measure on independent schools and will think again.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 35. I declare an interest as a member of council at UCL.

On the first day of Committee, I spoke in support of my noble friend Lord Storey’s amendment on education, including universities, as the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, mentioned. That amendment would have excluded specified groups, including universities, from the rise in the employer’s contribution. We prefer exclusion to the delays promoted by Amendment 35. We prefer exclusion because of the disastrous damage that this Bill will quickly inflict on, among other things, our higher education system. We are uncertain whether similar damage will be inflicted on our further education system. Some additional money appears to be promised to FE, but it is not clear how it is going to be allocated. There is talk, for example, of it being used to fund a pay rise.

National Insurance Contributions (Secondary Class 1 Contributions) Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st January 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Storey (LD)]

My Lords, I attended Second Reading but, as some noble Lords may have noticed, I was 90 seconds late and the Government Chief Whip said that I could not speak in the debate. I was quite disappointed by that, but never mind, here I am.

Nurseries have been struggling financially for more than 20 years, and the outcome of this struggle usually falls on parents in the form of increased fees. As Jess Phillips said, this NI increase will “undoubtedly” make this worse. This is supported by nursery spokespeople, who stress that the most likely outcome of this increase in NI is an increase in nursery fees. This is because the consequence of government-funded nursery places makes most nurseries ineligible for the employment allowance scheme, meaning that nurseries, which are already struggling to break even, cannot apply for discounted NI bills.

According to the qualifying criteria for the employment allowance scheme, if 50% of a non-charitable organisation’s work is determined as public work, and 50% of the organisation’s income comes from public funding, the organisation is designated a public body and therefore cannot claim employment allowance. Because of government-funded places in nurseries, many have become a public body under this policy, meaning that they are excluded from applying for the employment allowance.

The number of nurseries impacted by this is likely to increase as a result of increased government funding for nursery places. The Government are proposing to increase places by September 2025 so that any child of working parents earning less than £100,000 can receive 30 hours per week across 38 weeks between the ages of nine months and five years old. This will mean that around 70% to 80% of nursery places across the UK will be government-funded. As the number of funded nursery places increases, the larger a nursery’s public-funded income will be, removing them from employment allowance eligibility.

The chief executive officer of the Early Years Alliance, Nick Leitch, summarised this problem:

“Early years providers are stuck between a rock and a hard place”.


If nurseries do not accept government funding for free nursery places, they lose a huge proportion of their income. If nurseries do accept this funding, they lose a huge proportion of their income on NI bills.

The Government have yet to estimate how many early years providers will be eligible for the employment allowance when NI charges come in in April 2025, and there has been no explicit response from the Government about how they will support nurseries through this increase in NI costs.

In a speech on 17 December about the proposed changes in the Bill, James Murray, the Exchequer Secretary, commented only on the Government’s pledges to increase government-funded childcare places. He reassured that there will be a rise in funding for these places to “over £8 billion” but did not address the implications that the NI increase will have on these nurseries. Repeated throughout his speech was the lifeline that the employment allowance scheme will provide for many organisations, but overlooked was the exclusion of most nurseries from this scheme because of government-funded places. Currently, the likely solution for nurseries is to either increase fees or decrease the number of government-funded places they accept.

Neither is a good outcome for increasing access to early care for parents or for children. Nurseries do not have to accept government funding, and if they did not, they could apply for a decrease in NI bills from the employment allowance scheme. Many nurseries do not want to do this because of the income that government-funded places provide. It is also worth noting that currently, even with government-funded places, most nurseries barely break even. The most likely solution is therefore increased fees, so hard-pressed parents will have to shoulder the burden. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 4 in the name of my noble friend Lord Storey, which proposes to exempt universities from the NIC increase, among other things. I will speak to that exemption for universities. I am grateful for the extensive briefing provided by UUK, and I declare an interest as a member of council at UCL.

Even before the NIC increases proposed by the Bill, our university sector was in deep financial trouble. Funding per student has fallen to its lowest real level for 25 years and, because of an ongoing inability to recover the full economic cost of research—partly the fault of government—universities lost £5.3 billion on their research activities last year. A decline in overseas student numbers has made the financial problems worse. In the year ending last September, the number of visas issued to foreign students fell by 19% on the previous year, while the decline at master’s level was 25%.

All this has produced a situation where many universities face urgent and very serious financial problems. The OfS’s latest modelling suggests that 72% of our universities could be in deficit by 2025-26. It is not as though there are widespread reserves available to smooth the problem. In fact, 40% of our universities are predicted to have fewer than a month’s cash by the end of the next academic year. The proposed employers’ NIC rise will make an already fragile system more fragile and more precarious. The universities will have to find £372 million to fund this increase. There is a risk of real and hard-to-reverse damage to our higher education sector.

There has already been extensive media speculation about breaches of covenant, reluctance of lenders to lend, and even insolvencies. This sector is of critical importance to our future and to our prospects for growth. AI is an example. We are well placed to be world leaders because of our research and our research standing. But if we want to fulfil the Prime Minister’s aspirations, we need a healthy and sustainably funded university sector with strong connections to business. The higher education sector is critical in its liaisons with business and in its generation of spin-offs, start-ups and social enterprises, as well as in the generation of IP and in providing key public service workers. Every year, our universities train over 100,000 public service workers: around 42,000 nurses, 21,000 medics and 38,000 teachers. The total economic impact of the sector has been estimated at over £265 billion. This impact is widely spread around the country, not just confined to our largest cities and oldest universities.

In very many of our towns and cities, our universities are engines of growth and critically important supporters of the local economy. It is true in general that our universities are of exceptionally high quality and standing. According to the last QS survey, here in the UK we have four out of the world’s top 10 universities and 16 out of the top 100. These are astonishing figures and an astonishing advantage to be leveraged to help produce the growth we need. The figures demonstrate our international standing and our success in education and research, and this standing boosts our soft power. The HEPI 2024 soft-power index found that 58 serving world leaders received their higher education here in the United Kingdom.

Perhaps it is in research that our universities most obviously display their world-class quality and reach, but this kind of quality and reach is under severe financial pressures and increasing global competition. Our current financial arrangements rely on a high—disproportionately high—cross-subsidy from overseas students, which is an obviously unstable element in today’s geopolitical world.

If we want our international standing to remain at the highest levels, and our universities to continue to be engines of growth, then we need very urgently to do something about our funding system. What we do not need is to impose additional costs on an already overstressed system. We also should not discourage overseas students from coming to the UK, as the previous Government did. These students contribute at least £37 billion to the UK economy. That is important, but it is obviously not a substitute for sustainable funding. Increasing employers’ NIC will not help with any of that and may, in some cases, push some universities to the financial brink.

The Minister will be aware of the financial dangers faced by our higher education sector. He will be aware of the conversations in Whitehall and elsewhere about how to reform our funding system and of the urgency of producing a stable and sustainable funding system. He will also know that the employers’ NIC increase will damage universities’ finances, at least until we have a better funding system. The additional funds raised will be relatively small from a Treasury perspective, but relatively and dangerously large from the sector’s perspective.

Applying the NIC increases to our world-leading higher education system will inevitably damage its contributions to our leadership in research and in the production of IP. It will damage our prospects for growth. Can the Minister give us his assessment of the likely impact of this NIC rise on our university sector and its ability to operate? We need a proper impact assessment on this and many of the other things that we are discussing.

[Baroness Grender (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 5 in this group, which would amend Clause 1 to retain the original rate of 13.8% for both charities and housing associations. I refer to my interests as set out in the register. I also support Amendment 4 in the name of my noble friends Lord Storey and Lord Sharkey, and Amendment 8 in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Randall, for his support for my amendment.

Given the previous Government’s record and the legacy they left, charities and not-for-profit organisations, such as housing associations, will be a vital part of the Government’s future plans—for instance, to increase housing and end homelessness, which is an ambition that can and should be realised. I am going to use one case study to highlight what is going to happen to housing associations. I would really appreciate it if the Minister could respond to that case study, which is about the housing association Peabody.

For context, the recent government announcement of £500 million for the affordable homes programme for the whole of the UK is the equivalent of around £500 million that Peabody alone spent in the last financial year on bringing new homes into play and having a development pipeline. It is a very significant partner, I would say, in terms of some of the objectives that the Government have.

Peabody estimates that the additional cost for it is likely to be around £800,000 and would challenge the viability of some of its services, particularly supported housing and care services that rely so much on high levels of staffing. Those supported housing and care services are provided for more than 10,000 people, with a wide range of complex needs, from addiction to recovery from mental illness, as well as people at risk from homelessness, those with learning disabilities and young people, as well as people who are older and in need of specialist accommodation. For some housing associations, the proposed increase would wipe out much of the additional revenue generated from the Government’s proposed five-year rent settlement. Across London’s 15 largest housing associations, it is estimated that the increase will cost around £30 million, which could impact other key priorities such as new homes in development.

National Insurance Contributions (Secondary Class 1 Contributions) Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, this is an unsatisfactory Bill, not because it raises taxes—that was, and is, an obvious necessity—but because it does so in a way that exacerbates existing unresolved and urgent problems or, as in the case of social care, in effect ignores them entirely.

The provisions of this Bill will probably not help with growth, the Government’s chief objective. I say “probably not help”, but that may be a little bit generous. Many noble Lords who have spoken this evening have felt strongly that the Bill will have negative consequences for growth. Arguably, two of the most important engines of growth, or what have been and should continue to be engines of growth, are our SMEs and our higher education sector. This Bill has damaging consequences for both. I will speak a little later about our university sector, but I want here to make some points about SMEs.

My colleague in the Commons, Christine Jardine, asked the Minister at Second Reading:

“How does it help morale and positivity among small businesses, which will be vital to economic growth, if some of them see their salary bills double?”


The Minister replied by saying:

“I urge her to understand that what we are doing on national insurance is taking a tough decision to fix the public finances, while at the same time providing the stability that businesses need to invest and grow””.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/24; cols. 202-03.]


It is the last bit of that, frequently repeated as an explanation of or an excuse for government proposals, that is the problem.

No convincing case has been made for the proposition that the measures in the Bill will provide stability. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that many see the Bill’s measures as actually reducing stability and creating further uncertainty. In a recent survey, 44% of UK SMEs said that the NI increases would negatively affect them. As Todd Davison of Purbeck Personal Guarantee Insurance, an important operator in the SME arena, noted:

“The increase in employer National Insurance contributions … could prove to be a fatal blow to thousands of small businesses, despite the increase in the Employment Allowance”.


He went on to say:

“There will be thousands of business people who have put their home and life savings on the line by signing a personal guarantee for a business loan who will now be facing some very difficult choices”.


I note in passing that, in trying to justify the national insurance rise, the Government have pointed to the increasing availability of funds for the NHS. This is, of course, welcome, but the extra funding is being raised in the wrong way and on the wrong people—and what about carers and the care sector? Will we have to wait until 2008 and beyond for any significant progress? In the meantime, what additional support will be available to offset increased costs? What about the additional payroll cost to GP practices? The Institute of General Practice Management estimates that the NI rise will mean that the average GP surgery tax bill will rise by around £20,000 a year. How is this to be mitigated? Second Reading in the Commons did not produce an answer to any of these questions. I would be grateful if the Minister could address the issues about SMEs, the care sector and GPs when he replies.

I now turn to another critical factor in growing our economy: our higher education sector. I declare an interest as a member of council at UCL. Our university sector has a very strong international reputation, very high academic standards and world-class research output and influence. This is despite the UK spending significantly less on R&D than our rivals. We spend 1.7%, China 2.2%, the US 2.8% and Germany 3.1%. However, in the last QS worldwide ranking, the UK had four universities in the top 10 and 16 in the top 100.

The Government explicitly acknowledge the importance of the sector. The Secretary of State for Education wrote to vice-chancellors on 4 November last. She started her letter by saying:

“The institutions which you lead make a vital contribution, as education and research institutions, to our economy, to society, and to industry and innovation. They contribute to productivity growth; play a crucial civic role in their communities; and have a key role to play in enhancing the UK’s reputation across the globe. I also passionately believe in education for education’s sake: a more educated society is happier, healthier, more cohesive, and socially and culturally richer”.


She went on to say:

“I am clear that we need to put our world-leading higher education sector on a secure footing”.


She went on to speak of student numbers, international students and the financial status of the sector. This financial status is in need of very urgent attention.

The main leader in last Thursday’s Times was critical of the very large travel and expenses costs of some vice-chancellors at a time when the sector is under critical financial pressure. The leader’s chief point concerned this financial pressure. It said:

“There is no doubt that higher education is experiencing extreme financial difficulties”.


It pointed out that these extreme difficulties will be made worse by the increase in employers’ NI. The small but welcome increase in student fees will increase revenue by around £370 million. The increase in national insurance will cost universities around £450 million.

The Times went on to note that, according to the OfS, the combination of lower revenues from both home and overseas students means that nearly three-quarters of our universities will be running a deficit by the end of this academic year. Some 40% already have less than a month’s cash in the bank and 10,000 jobs are expected to be lost in this academic year. This is a genuine and pressing crisis.

If we want to maintain our large and very high-quality university sector, if we want to remain among the global leaders in the life sciences, if we want to continue to create the IP that forms the basis of new and innovative commercial ventures, and if we want our towns, cities and regions to continue to benefit from their universities, we must act. Increasing the national insurance burden is to act completely in the wrong direction.

In the absence of a coherent plan for our universities, the Government have, in an almost cavalier way, significantly worsened their already extreme financial difficulties. There is a pattern here. There is no sign of a meaningful intervention to relieve social care of the increased costs imposed by the Bill. There is no sign of a meaningful plan for social care before 2028. There is no proposal for providing significant help to SMEs. There is no proposal for helping GP surgeries to mitigate the effects of this Bill.

There are plenty of indicators and predictions about the damage that these NI changes will bring to critical parts of our economy and society, but no indication of how this damage may be mitigated or avoided and nothing positive for growth—but plenty in the negative.

There is much to regret in how and on whom the Government are imposing this significant tax, and much to regret in the effect of this tax increase on carers, on SMEs, on GP surgeries and on our universities. I strongly support the regret amendment from my noble friend Lady Kramer. If she chooses to divide the House, as I hope she will, these Benches will support her.

[Baroness Sater (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for allowing me to make a small intervention. The noble Lord is arguing passionately against the Government’s job cuts and the damage that will be done to care providers, charities and others. Does he therefore agree with me that this Bill must be scrutinised in a Committee on the Floor of the House? Does he also agree that it is in the interests of the charitable sector for this Bill to be scrutinised as fully as possible?

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I think there were three questions there, so perhaps I can answer very quickly: no, no and no.

Autumn Budget 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Monday 11th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly about alternative finance. The Treasury defines alternative finance as

“a method of raising finance that characteristically involves the sale, purchase and renting of assets in circumstances where ‘conventional’ financing would involve lending at interest”.

It goes on to say that alternative finance products are

“based on Islamic financing but can be used by both followers and non-followers of the Islamic faith”.

Islamic financing has long been seen as important to the United Kingdom. In October 2013, the World Islamic Economic Forum was held in London. It was the first time the forum had ever been held outside the Islamic world. At this forum, Prime Minister Cameron said:

“I don’t just want London to be a great capital of Islamic finance in the Western world. I want London to stand alongside Dubai and Kuala Lumpur as one of the great capitals of Islamic finance anywhere in the world”.

We have not quite achieved that yet.

One of the barriers to the growth of this market has been the CGT treatment of alternative finance mortgages. Those who opted for these Islamic-style mortgages found themselves in difficulty when it came to remortgaging. Capital gains became an issue because of the structure of the finance, under which customers sell a beneficial interest to the bank for the term of the finance. This contrasts with conventional finance, where no CGT is triggered on remortgaging. This discrepancy in treatment causes serious difficulties.

I know of one Islamic finance case that is appealing a CGT assessment of £600,000, which would not arise if there was an equal treatment of alternative and conventional finance. So I am very pleased that the Government have committed, on page 231 of the Red Book, to introducing new tax rules which will level the playing field, at least prospectively, from last 30 October. This is a good resolution of a problem that has unnecessarily hampered the growth of Islamic finance in the UK and has needlessly disadvantaged those whose faith prevents them from taking out interest-bearing loans. Unfortunately, it is not clear if this levelling up of the CGT tax rules is to be applied retrospectively as well as prospectively. What is the Government’s position on this? I think I can probably guess.

There is a broader point here. Islamic finance must continue to be considered in the formation of policy, certainly with the aim of preventing unintended consequences such as the CGT issue, but with the larger aim of increasing London’s share of the Islamic finance market.

There are two further issues to do with Islamic finance, which may be impeding growth. The first is the Bank of England’s alternative liquidity facility—the ALF—which is an important and innovative element in Islamic bank finance and which is not replicated anywhere else in the western world. The current limit is £200 million across Islamic institutions and there is a strong appetite for increasing that. The Bank of London & The Middle East said that

“we hope that the Bank will extend the size of the facility in due course, enabling banks to place even more money into the facility as they grow and further secure the future of Sharia’a finance in the UK”.

Is this something on which the Government would look favourably?

There is also an issue with settlements. HMRC has said that it does not consider that a diminishing shared ownership arrangement, as is typical in sharia finance, should be a settlement for income tax, CGT or inheritance tax. If this is a correct interpretation of the rules, then HMT should issue binding guidance. Otherwise, rating agencies will continue to take the opposite view, making securitisation very problematic.

I look forward to making further progress against David Cameron’s now 10 year-old growth objective, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disapplication or Modification of Financial Regulator Rules in Individual Cases) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 26th March 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations make use of a provision in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to enable the Prudential Regulation Authority to disapply or modify its rules for individual firms.

The ability of a regulator to flex the application of its rules for individual firms has been a long-standing feature of our approach to regulating financial services. This is a useful regulatory tool that can enable a regulator to take account of a firm’s specific circumstances in order to ensure that rules are applied in ways that achieve the best regulatory outcome. This flexibility has long been supported by regulators and the financial services industry.

Since it was introduced more than 20 years ago, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, known as FSMA, has included such a tool. Section 138A of FSMA enables either the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Financial Conduct Authority to disapply or modify its rules for an individual firm. Under Section 138A, the PRA or the FCA can disapply or modify a rule if a firm requests it or if the regulator has the consent of the firm.

As part of the work to adapt our regulatory regime for the UK’s new position outside the EU, this tool was reviewed. It was concluded that, while useful, Section 138A was not as effective as it could be. This is because it contains the test, which must be met before a regulator can permit a firm to disapply or modify rules, that the rules in question must be

“unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made”.

This requirement does not always allow for rules to be flexed, even where appropriate disapplication or modification of rules would provide a better regulatory outcome.

The Government addressed this by introducing a new ability for regulators to flex their rules in a wider range of circumstances. This was legislated for through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 and is now set out in Section 138BA of FSMA. Under Section 138BA, the Treasury may specify regulator rules made under FSMA, which the relevant regulator can then permit a firm to disapply or modify. As with the existing rule-flexing tool in FSMA, a regulator can permit a firm to disapply or modify rules under Section 138BA only if the firm requests this or consents.

These regulations exercise, for the first time, the power approved by Parliament at Section 138BA of FSMA. The regulations do two things. First, they enable the PRA to permit a firm to disapply or modify any PRA rule in accordance with Section 138BA except for conduct rules and threshold conditions rules, which FSMA excludes from the scope of Section 138BA. After careful consideration, the Government have concluded that the PRA should have the ability to permit a firm to disapply or modify any PRA rule. This is because flexibility in the application of rules is particularly important for banks, large investment firms and insurers that are regulated by the PRA. These complex institutions, with highly specialised business models, often require a highly tailored approach to ensure that they are appropriately regulated.

Secondly, these regulations apply certain procedural safeguards to the PRA’s decisions under Section 138BA. When the PRA refuses a firm’s application or imposes conditions on a firm’s permission to disapply or modify rules, the PRA must issue a notice explaining its decision. When a permission to disapply or modify rules is given, the PRA must publish a decision notice so that it is public knowledge that a particular firm is subject to a tailored regulatory requirement. The regulations provide for an exception where the PRA is satisfied that publication is unnecessary or inappropriate, taking into account certain specified matters, for example whether publication would be detrimental to the stability of the UK financial system. If an affected firm is aggrieved by a PRA decision, it may appeal by referring the decision to the Upper Tribunal, which is the part of the Courts & Tribunals Service responsible for hearing appeals against decisions made by various public sector bodies, including the PRA and the FCA.

These regulations make use of an important regulatory tool recently approved by Parliament in FSMA 2023. They provide the PRA with a level of flexibility needed to ensure that the application of prudential rules to banks, large investment firms and insurers can be flexed, where appropriate, to ensure that regulation of these large and complex firms remains effective. They also ensure that the PRA, when taking these decisions, is appropriately accountable and transparent. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, the Explanatory Memorandum and de minimis impact assessment for this SI contain a number of vague assertions. Nowhere is there to be found a plain English statement of the benefit brought about this SI, except in the vaguest and most general terms. In essence, as the Minister has explained, this SI does one important thing: it removes the two conditions, of which one must be fulfilled, for the PRA to allow modification or disapplication of the rules for individual firms.

This power to allow the modification or disapplication is, as the Minister has said, contained in Section 138A of FSMA. The two conditions to be granted a waiver are that the rule or rules in question are “unduly burdensome” and/or

“would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made”.

The PRA appears to be the sole judge of whether either or both of these conditions may apply. There is no definition of “unduly burdensome” and no specified mechanism for deciding whether the rules are fit for purpose or not. The Explanatory Memorandum seems to suggest that such rulings may be challenged in the Upper Tribunal. Is there a body of case law from Upper Tribunal hearings that helps with the definition of “unduly burdensome” and how “fit for purpose” may be established?

Currently, waivers may be granted only if either of the two conditions applies, and the PRA appears to have discretion over whether they do or do not. This SI changes that; it inserts an additional and unconditional waiver mechanism which allows the PRA, as the Minister has said, practically unfettered discretion to modify or disapply rules for individual firms as it sees fit. What justification is there for allowing this unfettered discretion? What is really wrong with the current arrangements?

The EM and the IA both have a go at answering those questions. In paragraph 5.4, the EM states that

“section 138A of FSMA … does not, by itself, provide sufficient flexibility for a truly agile regulatory regime … This requirement”—

by which it means the two conditions—

“does not always allow for rules to be flexed, even where appropriate disapplication or modification of rules would provide a better regulatory outcome”.

The EM does not give any examples to show how dropping the two conditions may help in practice, and nor does it explain how a better regulatory outcome may be defined or by whom—I guess that that is the PRA again, at its absolute discretion.

The impact assessment tries to give a concrete example in the matching adjustment regime, widely criticised as being not fit for purpose and, therefore, a fairly obvious candidate for disapplication or, more likely, modification under the existing rules. This shows the weakness in the impact assessment’s case, which says rather limply:

“Without this SI, the PRA would find it much more difficult to allow firms to continue to use beneficial provisions like the Matching Adjustment”.


So it is clearly not impossible—it is simply saying that it is really difficult. Why is it much more difficult? Could the Minister explain the point about a possible difficulty in dealing with the matching adjustment using Section 138A rather than this new SI? Can she give perhaps more concrete examples of the dangers avoided in or the benefits arising from dropping the two existing FSMA conditions?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I too wish all noble Lords a very happy Easter—there is one more day to go, I believe. I am grateful to both noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I have the answers to nearly but not quite all of their questions. I am disappointed in myself, but never mind; we will keep going.

I would like to go back to first principles. This was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, and to a certain extent by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. The PRA is governed by its core objectives, which are set out in law. There are two primary statutory objectives for the PRA: a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised firms and an insurance objective to contribute to securing an appropriate degree of protection for those who are, or may become, insurance policyholders. Underlying that, FSMA also sets out two secondary statutory objectives for the PRA on effective competition, aligning to international standards and promoting growth in competitiveness. That is our starting point; that is the PRA’s job, per se. In taking a decision to disapply and modify rules, it must do so in that context.

The noble Lord, Lord Livermore, asked how many times Section 138A has been used in the last three years. I do not know, but I will write on that and explain what has happened to date. I will also write about the caseload and what we expect for the timeline in court. I do not anticipate that it will be enormous. With much of this regulatory behaviour, where there are disputes regulators will try to mediate wherever possible.

Turning to why the PRA would decide to disapply or modify rules, it is about getting greater flexibility to allow the system to work more effectively within the statutory objectives set out in FSMA. The provision does not direct a regulator as to how it should decide, because these are independent regulators. When this part of FSMA 2023 was debated, it attracted no debate at all, so I had therefore expected that noble Lords were very much onside with the powers we had given to the PRA, or potentially to the PRA, via this statutory instrument. It will be for the relevant regulator, in this case the PRA, to set out its policy for the disapplication or modification of rules. Noble Lords may have seen that it has already started to do this.

This goes back to the issue of transparency and ensuring that the public, and of course the industry too, are aware of what is going on. A whole series of industry consultations takes place whenever the use of 138BA is anticipated. Not only was the Section 138BA issue subject to consultations in 2020 and 2021, when we were developing and finalising our approach to the smarter regulatory framework, but, more recently, and more specifically, the PRA issued consultations on statements of policy. What happens is that the PRA says, “Okay, this is what we’re going to do. We’re going to put out a statement of policy”—for example, it has done it on Solvency II matching adjustments. The industry will then contribute to that, and it will go on to use whatever rules and regulations it now feels the industry agrees is appropriate.

So far, I think there have been two specific consultations and also a more general consultation by the PRA, basically saying, “Every time we do this, we will put out a statement of policy. Industry, do you think this is the right approach and the right thing to do?” So, I believe there is quite a lot of information being published around this. Obviously, it is not only for the industry to scrutinise that; it will be for others to scrutinise it as well, to ensure that we are not exposing our economy to detriment or, indeed, impacting our financial stability. That all seems fairly appropriate, straightforward and transparent.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about the Solvency II matching adjustment. It is our view, and I believe the view of the PRA, that it would not have been possible under 138A, because one of those two conditions would have had to have been met, and one could potentially say that it has not been. Is it unduly burdensome? I am not sure that it is, because it is more of an adjustment that annuity providers can use to secure more proportionate capital requirements. That is not a burdensome or non-burdensome issue; it is just that there is an opportunity to release capital by taking a sensible regulatory decision around matching.

The same goes for models as well. For example, in certain circumstances it may be the case that an institution’s model is better than the standard model that one tries to apply to the whole industry. If it can reassure the regulator that the model is robust, then, again, those might be the sorts of elements that one can put in to firm-specific changes to regulation. However, I fear that this will be returned to by the PRA over the coming years as we deal with assimilated law.

During the passage of FSMA 2023, we did say that we wanted agile regulators that are able to regulate and to change things according to risk. In this case, that will be by an individual organisation. But, as we go through and look at all the assimilated law that we dealt with under FSMA, some of it will then be able to fall away, because provision is available under 138BA that will be able to fill the regulatory gap that was previously occupied by that specific piece of regulation, but was then switched over to PRA rules and the way that it then chooses to put those into place. Again, this was the approach that was agreed during the passage of FSMA.

Sadly, I do not have anything on the PRA’s resources. I suspect that it has been gearing up for this for quite a long time; as I said, it has already started getting to work on consulting. Obviously, without the powers, it is unable to issue any firm-specific disapplications or modifications, but I will certainly write to the noble Lord if I get anything further on this matter. I have a few things to write on.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her explanations. I have two or three points to make.

First, I am still rather puzzled about the matching adjustment, for two reasons. As the Minister will know, there is quite a lot of criticism of the matching adjustment. There is a sense in which it would be, I would have thought, relatively easy to categorise it as not quite fit for purpose; that is why I am puzzled that Section 138A had not been, or would not be used in the case of matching adjustments. Also, the de minimis assessment says that

“the PRA would find it much more difficult”;

it does not actually say that it would be impossible using Section 138A. If the Minister is going to write to us, perhaps she might expand on this point a little.

Secondly, I am curious about the body of case law from the Upper Tribunal. It would be interesting to know whether there is such a body and whether we can learn anything from it.

My third point is to do with publication. As I understand it, the current waivers issued by the PRA and the FCA are published in some detail. I was asking for some kind of commitment. Under new Section 138BA, the waivers will be published, I assume, but will they be published saying what the problem is, why this course of action has been chosen, what benefits are expected to arise, why the powers in Section 138A of FSMA were not seen as appropriate and why new Section 138BA was necessary? When the Minister writes, perhaps she might say something about this.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I can feel officials sending me things but I will write, because the noble Lord has asked some very good questions. We will write him a nice letter with some good explanations.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I end by wishing the Minister a happy Easter.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

Happy Easter.

Bank of England Levy (Amount of Levy Payable) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations will ensure the implementation of the Bank of England levy following the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, which made provision for the replacement of the cash ratio deposits scheme with this levy. Currently, the Bank of England’s monetary policy and financial stability functions, including work on resolution, international policy, financial stability and strategy, and risk and monetary analysis, are funded by the cash ratio deposits, or CRD, scheme. Under the scheme, banks and building societies with eligible liabilities greater than £600 million are required to place a proportion of their deposit base with the Bank of England on a non-interest-bearing basis. The Bank of England invests these funds in gilts and the income generated is used to meet the cost of its monetary policy and financial stability functions.

However, due to lower than expected yields from gilts, the CRD scheme has not generated sufficient income to fully fund the Bank’s policy functions. The shortfall has been funded by the Bank’s capital and reserves. Alongside this, the scheme has led to higher than expected deposit sizes and a lack of certainty for deposit payers.

Following a review of the scheme, the Government set out their intent to replace the CRD scheme with the Bank of England levy. This will provide greater certainty to firms on their contributions, create a simpler and more transparent funding mechanism for the Bank and ensure that the shortfall in funding is addressed moving forward. Sections 70 and 71 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 amend the Bank of England Act 1998 to make provision for the replacement of the CRD scheme with the Bank of England levy.

The instrument under consideration by the Committee today makes provision for the eligible institutions that do not have to pay a levy, how the cost is apportioned between the eligible institutions that do have to pay it and how appropriate adjustments will be made for years in which there is a new levy payer. The instrument does not set the overall amount of the levy. The Bank determines which of its policy functions will be funded by the levy and the amount that it reasonably requires in conjunction with the funding of those functions for the levy year.

Under the regulations, the new levy year will begin on 1 March 2024, to align with the Bank of England’s financial year. An indicative timeline for the levy year is included in the Bank of England’s levy framework document. This sets out that the first invoice will be issued to firms in July 2024, with payment due in August 2024. This payment will cover the 2024-25 levy year.

Under the levy, for each year, the Bank of England will estimate the amount it needs to meet its policy costs. It will add any shortfall from the previous year and deduct any surplus. This is the anticipated levy requirement. The Bank will require institutions to submit data about their eligible liabilities and will usually take an average of the data provided between 1 October to 31 December in the previous year to calculate an institution’s eligible liabilities.

If an eligible institution has an average liability base up to and including £600 million, it will not pay any levy that year. If the institution’s average liability base exceeds £600 million, it will obviously pay the levy. This is the same as under the CRD scheme, therefore ensuring that the levy is fair as only the largest institutions, which benefit most significantly from the Bank’s monetary policy and financial stability functions, will pay. The costs that an institution will pay under the levy will be apportioned according to the size of the institution’s eligible liabilities, meaning that larger institutions pay a larger share of the costs. This is the same as under the CRD scheme and ensures that there will be no relative winners or losers under the new levy.

If an institution did not meet the threshold for paying the levy in the previous year but it does for the current year, the regulations stipulate that this firm will be treated as a new levy payer. The SI allows the Bank to treat new levy payers differently so that they contribute to the estimated policy costs for that specific year, and do not have to contribute to any shortfall from the previous year or gain any benefit from any surplus. This is a fair and proportionate approach.

This SI delivers a fairer and more transparent funding mechanism for the Bank of England’s policy functions. The regulations have been widely consulted on and the levy is supported by financial firms. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, it is obviously unacceptable that the Bank of England should be making a loss on its supervisory activities regarding the banking sector. We are happy to support this SI’s correction of that situation.

Before we allow the Bank to charge companies more, should we not ask ourselves whether there are any efficiencies that could or should be made in the Bank’s supervisory routines and systems? Could the Minister say whether the Bank has asked itself that question? If it has, perhaps the Minister could tell us what the answer was and how it was arrived at. If it has not asked the question, why not?

We note that the consultation on the levy produced only one relevant response—from, we assume, UK Finance. This response made five points; the Bank addressed four. The first was the rate of selldown of the Bank’s gilt portfolio. The concern appeared to be that this selldown would significantly increase the Bank’s costs and therefore the levy required. The Bank seemed to think that this was not an issue, but its explanation seemed very complex. May I ask the Minister for a “beginner’s guide” explanation? Is the industry right to worry about the levy increases potentially arising from a gilts selldown and, if not, why not?

The second point raised in the consultation response seemed the most important. The respondent suggested that the non-bank financial institutions, NBFIs, could in future be added as eligible levy-paying institutions in Schedule 2ZA to the Bank of England Act 1998. These NBFIs certainly seem large enough to be added. At the Managed Funds Association Global Summit in Paris in May last year, it was estimated that NBFIs now represent about 50% of global financial assets.

Addressing this point, the Bank simply says that the formal review referred to in paragraph 14.1 of the EM

“is expected to include assessment of which institutions are regarded as eligible to pay the Levy”.

I note the words “is expected to”. I also note that this review is five years away. Is not the growing size of the NBFI sector a reason for the Bank’s supervisory oversight to be much more extensive? Is it not simply unfair that NBFIs should get a free supervisory ride?

The third issue raised in the consultation and addressed by the Bank was the desirability, for planning purposes, of a five-year budget plan to help institutions plan their own budgets. The Bank has agreed to consider what is a perfectly reasonable request, but can the Minister say when it will have a substantive response to that comment from the consultation?

The fourth issue concerned the reference period; the Minister has mentioned this. The Bank concluded that the proposed reference period—the same period used for the PRA levy—is the appropriate one. Speaking of the PRA, can the Minister explain to us how the Bank of England levy and the PRA levy work together, as well as how double-charging is avoided?

Finally, why does this SI contain no coming-into-force date or commencement provisions?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, we fully support the replacement of the current cash ratio deposit and the proposed mechanics of the levy. We therefore support this statutory instrument.

I have only one question, related to the timing of this measure. As I am sure the Minister would agree, providing the banking sector with certainty is essential to securing the confidence needed to incentivise investment in the real economy. Can she therefore provide clarity on when this SI will come into force?

Social Security (Contributions) (Limits and Thresholds, National Insurance Funds Payments and Extension of Veterans Relief) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make a couple of brief points about child benefit. While of course I welcome the inflation-proofing after all the speculation there has been about it, it is important to put on record that it still represents a cut in the real value of child benefit since 2010, according to the Child Poverty Action Group, of which I am honorary president. Even allowing for this uprating, child benefit needs to rise by 25% to restore its real value.

I can remember when child benefit was introduced. I was working at the Child Poverty Action Group at the time, and child benefit replaced personal tax allowances as well as the family allowance. The Conservative Party then accepted the argument that child benefit should be thought of as, in effect, a tax allowance for children and treated the same as personal tax allowances. An increase in the real value of child benefit now could represent an effective way to target a tax cut on those below the tax threshold, whose needs are the greatest. Given that there is all this speculation about tax cuts, that would be my recommendation.

I realise that this is not part of the SI that we are debating, but the speculation that the Chancellor is also looking, for the Budget, at the high-income charge on child benefit is relevant. The threshold has not been uprated since the charge was introduced in 2013, so fiscal drag means that a growing number of basic rate taxpayers are now affected, whereas it was originally intended purely for those who are considered better off. Could the Minister give us an update on the numbers who have been pulled into the charge—perhaps not now, because I recognise that she may not have the figures here, but in a letter, because it would be good to know where exactly we are at?

Personally, I would like to see the end of the high-income charge on child benefit, because it compromises important principles of universality in child benefit and of independent taxation, as the Women’s Budget Group pointed out. At the very least, the threshold should be restored to its original value. I hope the Minister will convey that message to the Treasury.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak first to the draft social security contributions SI. Let me say at the outset that we support this instrument. However, we regret the announcement in the 2022 Autumn Statement that all NIC rates that are in line with income tax will be fixed at the 2023-24 levels until 2027-28.

This instrument is simply part of the long and damaging freeze of all the main personal tax thresholds across the entire period of the OBR forecast. HMT’s policy paper of 21 November 2022—Income Tax Personal Allowance and the Basic Rate Limit, and Certain National Insurance Contributions Thresholds from 6 April 2026 to 5 April 2028—is relevant here. The paper notes the fixing of thresholds up to and including the 2027-28 tax year, after which the default position is that they will rise by CPI inflation. It then goes on to say:

“This measure is expected to bring 92,000 individuals into Income Tax and 55,000 into paying NICs by 2027 to 2028”.


It also asserts:

“This measure is not expected to impact on family formation, stability or breakdown”.


These are very strong assertions. Can the Minister set out the evidence for them?

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft statutory instrument makes an update to financial services legislation to make operating a pensions dashboard service a Financial Conduct Authority—FCA—regulated activity. As noble Lords will be aware, the Government have long held the ambition of delivering pensions dashboard services to the public. It is vital that individuals can easily access and view data about their pension savings in one place and at their convenience.

Executed well, pensions dashboards can deliver significant benefits to consumers, providing better access to information about their pensions held in different schemes and putting information about private and state pensions in a single place. This will bring a step change in how people can engage with their pension savings and will finally allow them to have a fuller picture of them. Equipped with this information, individuals will be better able to plan for their retirement, find lost pension pots, seek financial advice and guidance at the right time and, ultimately, feel more in control of their pensions.

As noble Lords will be aware, the Government are supporting the development of the digital architecture needed to make pensions dashboards a reality, as well as facilitating the development of a government-backed pensions dashboard by the Money and Pensions Service. The Government are also supporting the development of private sector pensions dashboards. Different individuals will have different needs, and this will ensure that a range of platforms exist to meet them. However, the Government have been clear that this can take place only with a suitable and robust regulatory framework in place, recognising that consumers using pensions dashboards could be vulnerable to potential harms. It is vital that consumers are adequately protected.

During the passage of the Pension Schemes Act 2021, the Government were clear that the operation of pensions dashboard services should be brought within FCA regulation. This order amends the regulatory perimeter of the FCA to make operating a pensions dashboard service that connects to the Money and Pensions Service dashboard’s digital architecture a regulated activity. Once in force, this will have the effect that anyone choosing to operate a pensions dashboard service will need to be authorised and regulated by the FCA. Firms that are authorised by the FCA and granted permission to undertake the new regulated activity will have to follow the rules and guidance set by the FCA, which has the relevant remit and objectives to establish an appropriate consumer protection framework for pensions dashboards.

As noble Lords will be aware, the FCA consulted on the rules for pensions dashboards. The consultation, which closed towards the end of last year, set out a proposed approach to ensure that the new market for pensions dashboards does not introduce or amplify the potential for consumer harms. We will continue to work with the FCA in the coming months as the regulatory framework is finalised.

This statutory instrument delivers a key part of the framework that we are establishing to make pensions dashboards available to consumers. It is imperative that pensions dashboards operate within a strong regulatory framework, providing appropriate consumer protection so that the consumer benefits of dashboards can be realised. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we support this pensions dashboard SI, just as we supported the pensions dashboards project during the passage through the House of what became the Pension Schemes Act 2021. We continue to believe that the dashboards should deliver more information to the consumer in a comprehensive and easily understood way, and that this will make it easier to make better choices.

We understand that providing these dashboards, both for MaPS and for commercial suppliers, is a very complex undertaking. We were not terribly surprised by the delays the project has suffered but we would like some reassurance about progress from the Minister. The new connection date is set for 31 October 2026, but some services may be available before then. Could the Minister tell us when we may now expect the MaPS dashboard to be available to consumers, when we may expect commercial variants to be available and what services short of a full dashboard may be available sooner?

It would also be very helpful if the Minister could tell us when she expects the FCA rules that she mentioned, which were previously consulted on, to be published. It is hard to see commercial enterprises being able to finalise their own dashboards without sight of and understanding of the new FCA rules.

During the debates in the House on what is now the Pension Schemes Act 2021, many of us thought that the MaPS version of the dashboard should be allowed at least a year of operation before commercial versions were allowed to enter the market. Can the Minister tell us whether there is likely to be a period when the MaPS version runs alone?

We also debated the issue of allowing consumers to make transactions via commercial dashboards. Can the Minister say what the current position is? Will transactions be allowed?

The mechanics of the SI before us seem entirely straightforward and are clearly vital to consumer protection. We have no issues with either its purpose or its mechanism. We do have a couple of very minor and tangential questions. First, we are curious about the date of the SI coming into force. Why is it 11 March? Does that date have any particular significance?

The second question relates to the final sentence of paragraph 7.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which reads:

“Operating a dashboard may include taking regulatory responsibility for any third parties involved in connecting to MaPS digital architecture on their behalf”.


I would be very grateful if the Minister could unpack that a little. Perhaps she could give an example of such an arrangement. What circumstances would trigger the assumption of responsibility?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, this SI makes good on a commitment given during the passage of what became the Financial Services Act 2021 to ensure that entities running a pensions dashboard will have to be authorised and regulated by the FCA. This is an important safeguard for pension holders and we welcome the SI, even if it has taken longer than expected to arrive and is not quite the final piece of the pensions dashboard puzzle.

In an age of scams, uncertainty about AI and increasing consumer concern about online safety, perhaps I might ask the Minister about technical safeguards that providers are expected to put in place. I understand that dashboards themselves will not store data, so there is no risk of mass collection. But if an app is not secure and someone is using a device infected with malware, for example, could bad actors still be able to view and therefore exploit data such as account names, numbers and balances? It would be helpful to know what specifications private providers will have to meet—or, indeed, whether the Government or the FCA will be setting any technology specifications at all.

Paragraph 7.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum to this SI states that the regulated entity will be responsible for the actions of third parties connecting to the Money and Pensions Service digital architecture on their behalf. In recent years, there has been a number of examples of websites or apps using plug-ins to process logins which it then turned out had been infiltrated and customer data breached. Are the Government satisfied that the FCA and dashboard providers will be on top of these issues and that they will go to the Information Commissioner if needed?

Although more guidance is being issued about pensions dashboards, it is still not clear when the Government expect the first products to be operational. Does the Minister have a specific target date in mind?

Finally, when this SI was debated in the Commons, the shadow Economic Secretary asked the Minister whether he could confirm whether pensions dashboards would be using the Government’s OneLogin service. The Economic Secretary said he would write on the matter but, as far as I am aware, has not yet done so. Does the noble Baroness have an answer to that point in her brief and, if not, whether she will commit to copying the Economic Secretary’s reply, when it comes, to the participants in this debate today?

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these regulations have been laid to amend the definition of high-risk third countries in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which I will refer to as the money laundering regulations.

The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to the UK and are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Illicit finance causes significant social and economic costs through its links to serious and organised crime. It also undermines the integrity and stability of our financial sector and can reduce opportunities for economic growth and legitimate business in the UK. The Government are bearing down on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists who abuse the UK’s financial and services sectors. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act built on the earlier Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act to ensure that the UK has robust, effective defences against illicit finance.

The money laundering regulations are at the centre of the UK’s legislative framework for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. They set out various measures that businesses must take to protect the UK from illicit financial flows, such as conducting enhanced due diligence—EDD—in certain cases. EDD is required to manage and mitigate the risks arising from certain high-risk transactions or business relationships. Businesses must consider a wide range of multiple different factors when deciding whether there is a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in a particular situation. They include risk factors associated with the customer, product, service, transaction and delivery channel, as well as any geographical risk factors.

The MLRs set out that firms should consider the risk posed by customers or transactions relating to any countries which have been identified by credible sources, such as the IMF or the World Bank, as lacking effective systems; countries with significant levels of corruption or other criminal activity; or countries subject to sanctions, embargoes or similar measures. As well as these examples, EDD is required in any other case which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

The measures being brought forward today relate to another of the specific situations in which regulated businesses must apply EDD, being in relation to any business relationship or transaction with persons established in a high-risk third country—that is, a country identified as such by the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF.

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act changed how high-risk third countries may be defined under the money laundering regulations, and this statutory instrument simply implements this change. It removes the separate list of countries from Schedule 3ZA and replaces it with an ambulatory reference to those countries listed by FATF, which is the global standard setter for anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This means that countries listed by FATF will automatically be in scope of obligations under the regulations.

By taking this approach, we will ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of global standards on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This protects the UK financial system from illicit finance linked to the jurisdictions being listed. Where countries have made significant progress to improve their defences, it is equally important that we recognise that and promptly remove them from the scope of high-risk countries in the UK.

Ahead of this update, the UK and the FATF lists were already aligned. Indeed, since the creation of the UK list in 2021, the Government have always updated it to reflect changes to the FATF lists, and that remains our policy. This SI does not, therefore, add or remove any countries from scope, nor change the obligations on regulated businesses. It delivers on government policy in a streamlined way and ensures automatic alignment with the FATF lists without the need for frequent but fairly routine secondary legislation. It also ensures that firms will be notified in a timely manner of updates to the lists and their obligations, staying up to date as the risks change.

This statutory instrument has been reported as an instrument of interest by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which noted that it reduces parliamentary oversight of the process of adding or removing countries, although I note that of course it is government policy and would have continued to be government policy to introduce an SI every time the list changes. Therefore, in a sense this is automating the process. However, the Government are committed to keeping Parliament informed and will submit letters to the Libraries of both Houses at the conclusion of each FATF plenary meeting, when countries made have been added to or, indeed, removed from the FATF’s lists.

I also assure noble Lords that if at any time the Government saw fit to deviate from the FATF lists, they retain the authority and autonomy to do so. In such cases, a statutory instrument would be brought before Parliament for consideration.

I conclude by noting that the measures in respect of high-risk third countries are an important mechanism to mitigate the risks posed by illicit financial flows from overseas. We will continue to use this and, of course, many other tools available to us to respond to wider and emerging threats from other jurisdictions, including by applying financial sanctions as necessary. These amendments will enable the money laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as possible to protect the integrity of the UK financial system. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we support this very sensible SI and recognise the importance of the work FATF does in the fields of money laundering and terrorist financing. We recognise the importance of its lists of high-risk countries and the importance of the UK aligning itself with these lists, especially as they change from time to time.

Up until today, as the Minister said, we have kept ourselves aligned by using SIs to modify Schedule 3ZA to the MLRs. We have done this eight times; the last occasion was 8 January, a month ago. As the last of these SIs passed through the Commons, the Minister noted:

“I am aware that many noble Lords have expressed frustration at parliamentary time being taken up in the other place by such relatively routine matters to keep our high-risk third countries list aligned to the task force’s”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 8/1/24; col. 4.]


I do not know who those noble Lords were either. The Minister proposed a better way: the removal of the list in Schedule 3ZA and its replacement with, as our Minister said, an ambulatory reference to the FATF list itself.

This SI, which was debated last week in the Commons, does exactly that. It is true that it will undoubtedly save some parliamentary time, but it will remain important to ensure that all interested parties are aware of FATF list changes.

HMT issued updated guidance on high-risk third countries on 22 January. In passing, I should note that I could not find Russia on either list. Is that not a little odd? Coming back to the guidance issued by the Treasury, it would seem perfectly reasonable and not burdensome if HMT were to issue similar updated guidance after each of the three FATF plenary sessions that are held each year. Since Parliament will now lose an automatic mechanism for discussing changes to FATF lists, as the Minister said, I am very grateful for her confirmation of the commitments given to the SLSC to continue the practice of depositing in the Libraries of both Houses a summary of FATF meetings at which list changes are made and publishing an advisory note on the government website.