National Insurance Contributions (Secondary Class 1 Contributions) Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st January 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Storey (LD)]

My Lords, I attended Second Reading but, as some noble Lords may have noticed, I was 90 seconds late and the Government Chief Whip said that I could not speak in the debate. I was quite disappointed by that, but never mind, here I am.

Nurseries have been struggling financially for more than 20 years, and the outcome of this struggle usually falls on parents in the form of increased fees. As Jess Phillips said, this NI increase will “undoubtedly” make this worse. This is supported by nursery spokespeople, who stress that the most likely outcome of this increase in NI is an increase in nursery fees. This is because the consequence of government-funded nursery places makes most nurseries ineligible for the employment allowance scheme, meaning that nurseries, which are already struggling to break even, cannot apply for discounted NI bills.

According to the qualifying criteria for the employment allowance scheme, if 50% of a non-charitable organisation’s work is determined as public work, and 50% of the organisation’s income comes from public funding, the organisation is designated a public body and therefore cannot claim employment allowance. Because of government-funded places in nurseries, many have become a public body under this policy, meaning that they are excluded from applying for the employment allowance.

The number of nurseries impacted by this is likely to increase as a result of increased government funding for nursery places. The Government are proposing to increase places by September 2025 so that any child of working parents earning less than £100,000 can receive 30 hours per week across 38 weeks between the ages of nine months and five years old. This will mean that around 70% to 80% of nursery places across the UK will be government-funded. As the number of funded nursery places increases, the larger a nursery’s public-funded income will be, removing them from employment allowance eligibility.

The chief executive officer of the Early Years Alliance, Nick Leitch, summarised this problem:

“Early years providers are stuck between a rock and a hard place”.


If nurseries do not accept government funding for free nursery places, they lose a huge proportion of their income. If nurseries do accept this funding, they lose a huge proportion of their income on NI bills.

The Government have yet to estimate how many early years providers will be eligible for the employment allowance when NI charges come in in April 2025, and there has been no explicit response from the Government about how they will support nurseries through this increase in NI costs.

In a speech on 17 December about the proposed changes in the Bill, James Murray, the Exchequer Secretary, commented only on the Government’s pledges to increase government-funded childcare places. He reassured that there will be a rise in funding for these places to “over £8 billion” but did not address the implications that the NI increase will have on these nurseries. Repeated throughout his speech was the lifeline that the employment allowance scheme will provide for many organisations, but overlooked was the exclusion of most nurseries from this scheme because of government-funded places. Currently, the likely solution for nurseries is to either increase fees or decrease the number of government-funded places they accept.

Neither is a good outcome for increasing access to early care for parents or for children. Nurseries do not have to accept government funding, and if they did not, they could apply for a decrease in NI bills from the employment allowance scheme. Many nurseries do not want to do this because of the income that government-funded places provide. It is also worth noting that currently, even with government-funded places, most nurseries barely break even. The most likely solution is therefore increased fees, so hard-pressed parents will have to shoulder the burden. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 4 in the name of my noble friend Lord Storey, which proposes to exempt universities from the NIC increase, among other things. I will speak to that exemption for universities. I am grateful for the extensive briefing provided by UUK, and I declare an interest as a member of council at UCL.

Even before the NIC increases proposed by the Bill, our university sector was in deep financial trouble. Funding per student has fallen to its lowest real level for 25 years and, because of an ongoing inability to recover the full economic cost of research—partly the fault of government—universities lost £5.3 billion on their research activities last year. A decline in overseas student numbers has made the financial problems worse. In the year ending last September, the number of visas issued to foreign students fell by 19% on the previous year, while the decline at master’s level was 25%.

All this has produced a situation where many universities face urgent and very serious financial problems. The OfS’s latest modelling suggests that 72% of our universities could be in deficit by 2025-26. It is not as though there are widespread reserves available to smooth the problem. In fact, 40% of our universities are predicted to have fewer than a month’s cash by the end of the next academic year. The proposed employers’ NIC rise will make an already fragile system more fragile and more precarious. The universities will have to find £372 million to fund this increase. There is a risk of real and hard-to-reverse damage to our higher education sector.

There has already been extensive media speculation about breaches of covenant, reluctance of lenders to lend, and even insolvencies. This sector is of critical importance to our future and to our prospects for growth. AI is an example. We are well placed to be world leaders because of our research and our research standing. But if we want to fulfil the Prime Minister’s aspirations, we need a healthy and sustainably funded university sector with strong connections to business. The higher education sector is critical in its liaisons with business and in its generation of spin-offs, start-ups and social enterprises, as well as in the generation of IP and in providing key public service workers. Every year, our universities train over 100,000 public service workers: around 42,000 nurses, 21,000 medics and 38,000 teachers. The total economic impact of the sector has been estimated at over £265 billion. This impact is widely spread around the country, not just confined to our largest cities and oldest universities.

In very many of our towns and cities, our universities are engines of growth and critically important supporters of the local economy. It is true in general that our universities are of exceptionally high quality and standing. According to the last QS survey, here in the UK we have four out of the world’s top 10 universities and 16 out of the top 100. These are astonishing figures and an astonishing advantage to be leveraged to help produce the growth we need. The figures demonstrate our international standing and our success in education and research, and this standing boosts our soft power. The HEPI 2024 soft-power index found that 58 serving world leaders received their higher education here in the United Kingdom.

Perhaps it is in research that our universities most obviously display their world-class quality and reach, but this kind of quality and reach is under severe financial pressures and increasing global competition. Our current financial arrangements rely on a high—disproportionately high—cross-subsidy from overseas students, which is an obviously unstable element in today’s geopolitical world.

If we want our international standing to remain at the highest levels, and our universities to continue to be engines of growth, then we need very urgently to do something about our funding system. What we do not need is to impose additional costs on an already overstressed system. We also should not discourage overseas students from coming to the UK, as the previous Government did. These students contribute at least £37 billion to the UK economy. That is important, but it is obviously not a substitute for sustainable funding. Increasing employers’ NIC will not help with any of that and may, in some cases, push some universities to the financial brink.

The Minister will be aware of the financial dangers faced by our higher education sector. He will be aware of the conversations in Whitehall and elsewhere about how to reform our funding system and of the urgency of producing a stable and sustainable funding system. He will also know that the employers’ NIC increase will damage universities’ finances, at least until we have a better funding system. The additional funds raised will be relatively small from a Treasury perspective, but relatively and dangerously large from the sector’s perspective.

Applying the NIC increases to our world-leading higher education system will inevitably damage its contributions to our leadership in research and in the production of IP. It will damage our prospects for growth. Can the Minister give us his assessment of the likely impact of this NIC rise on our university sector and its ability to operate? We need a proper impact assessment on this and many of the other things that we are discussing.

[Baroness Grender (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 5 in this group, which would amend Clause 1 to retain the original rate of 13.8% for both charities and housing associations. I refer to my interests as set out in the register. I also support Amendment 4 in the name of my noble friends Lord Storey and Lord Sharkey, and Amendment 8 in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Randall, for his support for my amendment.

Given the previous Government’s record and the legacy they left, charities and not-for-profit organisations, such as housing associations, will be a vital part of the Government’s future plans—for instance, to increase housing and end homelessness, which is an ambition that can and should be realised. I am going to use one case study to highlight what is going to happen to housing associations. I would really appreciate it if the Minister could respond to that case study, which is about the housing association Peabody.

For context, the recent government announcement of £500 million for the affordable homes programme for the whole of the UK is the equivalent of around £500 million that Peabody alone spent in the last financial year on bringing new homes into play and having a development pipeline. It is a very significant partner, I would say, in terms of some of the objectives that the Government have.

Peabody estimates that the additional cost for it is likely to be around £800,000 and would challenge the viability of some of its services, particularly supported housing and care services that rely so much on high levels of staffing. Those supported housing and care services are provided for more than 10,000 people, with a wide range of complex needs, from addiction to recovery from mental illness, as well as people at risk from homelessness, those with learning disabilities and young people, as well as people who are older and in need of specialist accommodation. For some housing associations, the proposed increase would wipe out much of the additional revenue generated from the Government’s proposed five-year rent settlement. Across London’s 15 largest housing associations, it is estimated that the increase will cost around £30 million, which could impact other key priorities such as new homes in development.

National Insurance Contributions (Secondary Class 1 Contributions) Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, this is an unsatisfactory Bill, not because it raises taxes—that was, and is, an obvious necessity—but because it does so in a way that exacerbates existing unresolved and urgent problems or, as in the case of social care, in effect ignores them entirely.

The provisions of this Bill will probably not help with growth, the Government’s chief objective. I say “probably not help”, but that may be a little bit generous. Many noble Lords who have spoken this evening have felt strongly that the Bill will have negative consequences for growth. Arguably, two of the most important engines of growth, or what have been and should continue to be engines of growth, are our SMEs and our higher education sector. This Bill has damaging consequences for both. I will speak a little later about our university sector, but I want here to make some points about SMEs.

My colleague in the Commons, Christine Jardine, asked the Minister at Second Reading:

“How does it help morale and positivity among small businesses, which will be vital to economic growth, if some of them see their salary bills double?”


The Minister replied by saying:

“I urge her to understand that what we are doing on national insurance is taking a tough decision to fix the public finances, while at the same time providing the stability that businesses need to invest and grow””.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/24; cols. 202-03.]


It is the last bit of that, frequently repeated as an explanation of or an excuse for government proposals, that is the problem.

No convincing case has been made for the proposition that the measures in the Bill will provide stability. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that many see the Bill’s measures as actually reducing stability and creating further uncertainty. In a recent survey, 44% of UK SMEs said that the NI increases would negatively affect them. As Todd Davison of Purbeck Personal Guarantee Insurance, an important operator in the SME arena, noted:

“The increase in employer National Insurance contributions … could prove to be a fatal blow to thousands of small businesses, despite the increase in the Employment Allowance”.


He went on to say:

“There will be thousands of business people who have put their home and life savings on the line by signing a personal guarantee for a business loan who will now be facing some very difficult choices”.


I note in passing that, in trying to justify the national insurance rise, the Government have pointed to the increasing availability of funds for the NHS. This is, of course, welcome, but the extra funding is being raised in the wrong way and on the wrong people—and what about carers and the care sector? Will we have to wait until 2008 and beyond for any significant progress? In the meantime, what additional support will be available to offset increased costs? What about the additional payroll cost to GP practices? The Institute of General Practice Management estimates that the NI rise will mean that the average GP surgery tax bill will rise by around £20,000 a year. How is this to be mitigated? Second Reading in the Commons did not produce an answer to any of these questions. I would be grateful if the Minister could address the issues about SMEs, the care sector and GPs when he replies.

I now turn to another critical factor in growing our economy: our higher education sector. I declare an interest as a member of council at UCL. Our university sector has a very strong international reputation, very high academic standards and world-class research output and influence. This is despite the UK spending significantly less on R&D than our rivals. We spend 1.7%, China 2.2%, the US 2.8% and Germany 3.1%. However, in the last QS worldwide ranking, the UK had four universities in the top 10 and 16 in the top 100.

The Government explicitly acknowledge the importance of the sector. The Secretary of State for Education wrote to vice-chancellors on 4 November last. She started her letter by saying:

“The institutions which you lead make a vital contribution, as education and research institutions, to our economy, to society, and to industry and innovation. They contribute to productivity growth; play a crucial civic role in their communities; and have a key role to play in enhancing the UK’s reputation across the globe. I also passionately believe in education for education’s sake: a more educated society is happier, healthier, more cohesive, and socially and culturally richer”.


She went on to say:

“I am clear that we need to put our world-leading higher education sector on a secure footing”.


She went on to speak of student numbers, international students and the financial status of the sector. This financial status is in need of very urgent attention.

The main leader in last Thursday’s Times was critical of the very large travel and expenses costs of some vice-chancellors at a time when the sector is under critical financial pressure. The leader’s chief point concerned this financial pressure. It said:

“There is no doubt that higher education is experiencing extreme financial difficulties”.


It pointed out that these extreme difficulties will be made worse by the increase in employers’ NI. The small but welcome increase in student fees will increase revenue by around £370 million. The increase in national insurance will cost universities around £450 million.

The Times went on to note that, according to the OfS, the combination of lower revenues from both home and overseas students means that nearly three-quarters of our universities will be running a deficit by the end of this academic year. Some 40% already have less than a month’s cash in the bank and 10,000 jobs are expected to be lost in this academic year. This is a genuine and pressing crisis.

If we want to maintain our large and very high-quality university sector, if we want to remain among the global leaders in the life sciences, if we want to continue to create the IP that forms the basis of new and innovative commercial ventures, and if we want our towns, cities and regions to continue to benefit from their universities, we must act. Increasing the national insurance burden is to act completely in the wrong direction.

In the absence of a coherent plan for our universities, the Government have, in an almost cavalier way, significantly worsened their already extreme financial difficulties. There is a pattern here. There is no sign of a meaningful intervention to relieve social care of the increased costs imposed by the Bill. There is no sign of a meaningful plan for social care before 2028. There is no proposal for providing significant help to SMEs. There is no proposal for helping GP surgeries to mitigate the effects of this Bill.

There are plenty of indicators and predictions about the damage that these NI changes will bring to critical parts of our economy and society, but no indication of how this damage may be mitigated or avoided and nothing positive for growth—but plenty in the negative.

There is much to regret in how and on whom the Government are imposing this significant tax, and much to regret in the effect of this tax increase on carers, on SMEs, on GP surgeries and on our universities. I strongly support the regret amendment from my noble friend Lady Kramer. If she chooses to divide the House, as I hope she will, these Benches will support her.

[Baroness Sater (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for allowing me to make a small intervention. The noble Lord is arguing passionately against the Government’s job cuts and the damage that will be done to care providers, charities and others. Does he therefore agree with me that this Bill must be scrutinised in a Committee on the Floor of the House? Does he also agree that it is in the interests of the charitable sector for this Bill to be scrutinised as fully as possible?

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I think there were three questions there, so perhaps I can answer very quickly: no, no and no.

Autumn Budget 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Monday 11th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly about alternative finance. The Treasury defines alternative finance as

“a method of raising finance that characteristically involves the sale, purchase and renting of assets in circumstances where ‘conventional’ financing would involve lending at interest”.

It goes on to say that alternative finance products are

“based on Islamic financing but can be used by both followers and non-followers of the Islamic faith”.

Islamic financing has long been seen as important to the United Kingdom. In October 2013, the World Islamic Economic Forum was held in London. It was the first time the forum had ever been held outside the Islamic world. At this forum, Prime Minister Cameron said:

“I don’t just want London to be a great capital of Islamic finance in the Western world. I want London to stand alongside Dubai and Kuala Lumpur as one of the great capitals of Islamic finance anywhere in the world”.

We have not quite achieved that yet.

One of the barriers to the growth of this market has been the CGT treatment of alternative finance mortgages. Those who opted for these Islamic-style mortgages found themselves in difficulty when it came to remortgaging. Capital gains became an issue because of the structure of the finance, under which customers sell a beneficial interest to the bank for the term of the finance. This contrasts with conventional finance, where no CGT is triggered on remortgaging. This discrepancy in treatment causes serious difficulties.

I know of one Islamic finance case that is appealing a CGT assessment of £600,000, which would not arise if there was an equal treatment of alternative and conventional finance. So I am very pleased that the Government have committed, on page 231 of the Red Book, to introducing new tax rules which will level the playing field, at least prospectively, from last 30 October. This is a good resolution of a problem that has unnecessarily hampered the growth of Islamic finance in the UK and has needlessly disadvantaged those whose faith prevents them from taking out interest-bearing loans. Unfortunately, it is not clear if this levelling up of the CGT tax rules is to be applied retrospectively as well as prospectively. What is the Government’s position on this? I think I can probably guess.

There is a broader point here. Islamic finance must continue to be considered in the formation of policy, certainly with the aim of preventing unintended consequences such as the CGT issue, but with the larger aim of increasing London’s share of the Islamic finance market.

There are two further issues to do with Islamic finance, which may be impeding growth. The first is the Bank of England’s alternative liquidity facility—the ALF—which is an important and innovative element in Islamic bank finance and which is not replicated anywhere else in the western world. The current limit is £200 million across Islamic institutions and there is a strong appetite for increasing that. The Bank of London & The Middle East said that

“we hope that the Bank will extend the size of the facility in due course, enabling banks to place even more money into the facility as they grow and further secure the future of Sharia’a finance in the UK”.

Is this something on which the Government would look favourably?

There is also an issue with settlements. HMRC has said that it does not consider that a diminishing shared ownership arrangement, as is typical in sharia finance, should be a settlement for income tax, CGT or inheritance tax. If this is a correct interpretation of the rules, then HMT should issue binding guidance. Otherwise, rating agencies will continue to take the opposite view, making securitisation very problematic.

I look forward to making further progress against David Cameron’s now 10 year-old growth objective, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disapplication or Modification of Financial Regulator Rules in Individual Cases) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 26th March 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations make use of a provision in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to enable the Prudential Regulation Authority to disapply or modify its rules for individual firms.

The ability of a regulator to flex the application of its rules for individual firms has been a long-standing feature of our approach to regulating financial services. This is a useful regulatory tool that can enable a regulator to take account of a firm’s specific circumstances in order to ensure that rules are applied in ways that achieve the best regulatory outcome. This flexibility has long been supported by regulators and the financial services industry.

Since it was introduced more than 20 years ago, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, known as FSMA, has included such a tool. Section 138A of FSMA enables either the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Financial Conduct Authority to disapply or modify its rules for an individual firm. Under Section 138A, the PRA or the FCA can disapply or modify a rule if a firm requests it or if the regulator has the consent of the firm.

As part of the work to adapt our regulatory regime for the UK’s new position outside the EU, this tool was reviewed. It was concluded that, while useful, Section 138A was not as effective as it could be. This is because it contains the test, which must be met before a regulator can permit a firm to disapply or modify rules, that the rules in question must be

“unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made”.

This requirement does not always allow for rules to be flexed, even where appropriate disapplication or modification of rules would provide a better regulatory outcome.

The Government addressed this by introducing a new ability for regulators to flex their rules in a wider range of circumstances. This was legislated for through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 and is now set out in Section 138BA of FSMA. Under Section 138BA, the Treasury may specify regulator rules made under FSMA, which the relevant regulator can then permit a firm to disapply or modify. As with the existing rule-flexing tool in FSMA, a regulator can permit a firm to disapply or modify rules under Section 138BA only if the firm requests this or consents.

These regulations exercise, for the first time, the power approved by Parliament at Section 138BA of FSMA. The regulations do two things. First, they enable the PRA to permit a firm to disapply or modify any PRA rule in accordance with Section 138BA except for conduct rules and threshold conditions rules, which FSMA excludes from the scope of Section 138BA. After careful consideration, the Government have concluded that the PRA should have the ability to permit a firm to disapply or modify any PRA rule. This is because flexibility in the application of rules is particularly important for banks, large investment firms and insurers that are regulated by the PRA. These complex institutions, with highly specialised business models, often require a highly tailored approach to ensure that they are appropriately regulated.

Secondly, these regulations apply certain procedural safeguards to the PRA’s decisions under Section 138BA. When the PRA refuses a firm’s application or imposes conditions on a firm’s permission to disapply or modify rules, the PRA must issue a notice explaining its decision. When a permission to disapply or modify rules is given, the PRA must publish a decision notice so that it is public knowledge that a particular firm is subject to a tailored regulatory requirement. The regulations provide for an exception where the PRA is satisfied that publication is unnecessary or inappropriate, taking into account certain specified matters, for example whether publication would be detrimental to the stability of the UK financial system. If an affected firm is aggrieved by a PRA decision, it may appeal by referring the decision to the Upper Tribunal, which is the part of the Courts & Tribunals Service responsible for hearing appeals against decisions made by various public sector bodies, including the PRA and the FCA.

These regulations make use of an important regulatory tool recently approved by Parliament in FSMA 2023. They provide the PRA with a level of flexibility needed to ensure that the application of prudential rules to banks, large investment firms and insurers can be flexed, where appropriate, to ensure that regulation of these large and complex firms remains effective. They also ensure that the PRA, when taking these decisions, is appropriately accountable and transparent. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, the Explanatory Memorandum and de minimis impact assessment for this SI contain a number of vague assertions. Nowhere is there to be found a plain English statement of the benefit brought about this SI, except in the vaguest and most general terms. In essence, as the Minister has explained, this SI does one important thing: it removes the two conditions, of which one must be fulfilled, for the PRA to allow modification or disapplication of the rules for individual firms.

This power to allow the modification or disapplication is, as the Minister has said, contained in Section 138A of FSMA. The two conditions to be granted a waiver are that the rule or rules in question are “unduly burdensome” and/or

“would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made”.

The PRA appears to be the sole judge of whether either or both of these conditions may apply. There is no definition of “unduly burdensome” and no specified mechanism for deciding whether the rules are fit for purpose or not. The Explanatory Memorandum seems to suggest that such rulings may be challenged in the Upper Tribunal. Is there a body of case law from Upper Tribunal hearings that helps with the definition of “unduly burdensome” and how “fit for purpose” may be established?

Currently, waivers may be granted only if either of the two conditions applies, and the PRA appears to have discretion over whether they do or do not. This SI changes that; it inserts an additional and unconditional waiver mechanism which allows the PRA, as the Minister has said, practically unfettered discretion to modify or disapply rules for individual firms as it sees fit. What justification is there for allowing this unfettered discretion? What is really wrong with the current arrangements?

The EM and the IA both have a go at answering those questions. In paragraph 5.4, the EM states that

“section 138A of FSMA … does not, by itself, provide sufficient flexibility for a truly agile regulatory regime … This requirement”—

by which it means the two conditions—

“does not always allow for rules to be flexed, even where appropriate disapplication or modification of rules would provide a better regulatory outcome”.

The EM does not give any examples to show how dropping the two conditions may help in practice, and nor does it explain how a better regulatory outcome may be defined or by whom—I guess that that is the PRA again, at its absolute discretion.

The impact assessment tries to give a concrete example in the matching adjustment regime, widely criticised as being not fit for purpose and, therefore, a fairly obvious candidate for disapplication or, more likely, modification under the existing rules. This shows the weakness in the impact assessment’s case, which says rather limply:

“Without this SI, the PRA would find it much more difficult to allow firms to continue to use beneficial provisions like the Matching Adjustment”.


So it is clearly not impossible—it is simply saying that it is really difficult. Why is it much more difficult? Could the Minister explain the point about a possible difficulty in dealing with the matching adjustment using Section 138A rather than this new SI? Can she give perhaps more concrete examples of the dangers avoided in or the benefits arising from dropping the two existing FSMA conditions?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I too wish all noble Lords a very happy Easter—there is one more day to go, I believe. I am grateful to both noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I have the answers to nearly but not quite all of their questions. I am disappointed in myself, but never mind; we will keep going.

I would like to go back to first principles. This was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, and to a certain extent by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. The PRA is governed by its core objectives, which are set out in law. There are two primary statutory objectives for the PRA: a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised firms and an insurance objective to contribute to securing an appropriate degree of protection for those who are, or may become, insurance policyholders. Underlying that, FSMA also sets out two secondary statutory objectives for the PRA on effective competition, aligning to international standards and promoting growth in competitiveness. That is our starting point; that is the PRA’s job, per se. In taking a decision to disapply and modify rules, it must do so in that context.

The noble Lord, Lord Livermore, asked how many times Section 138A has been used in the last three years. I do not know, but I will write on that and explain what has happened to date. I will also write about the caseload and what we expect for the timeline in court. I do not anticipate that it will be enormous. With much of this regulatory behaviour, where there are disputes regulators will try to mediate wherever possible.

Turning to why the PRA would decide to disapply or modify rules, it is about getting greater flexibility to allow the system to work more effectively within the statutory objectives set out in FSMA. The provision does not direct a regulator as to how it should decide, because these are independent regulators. When this part of FSMA 2023 was debated, it attracted no debate at all, so I had therefore expected that noble Lords were very much onside with the powers we had given to the PRA, or potentially to the PRA, via this statutory instrument. It will be for the relevant regulator, in this case the PRA, to set out its policy for the disapplication or modification of rules. Noble Lords may have seen that it has already started to do this.

This goes back to the issue of transparency and ensuring that the public, and of course the industry too, are aware of what is going on. A whole series of industry consultations takes place whenever the use of 138BA is anticipated. Not only was the Section 138BA issue subject to consultations in 2020 and 2021, when we were developing and finalising our approach to the smarter regulatory framework, but, more recently, and more specifically, the PRA issued consultations on statements of policy. What happens is that the PRA says, “Okay, this is what we’re going to do. We’re going to put out a statement of policy”—for example, it has done it on Solvency II matching adjustments. The industry will then contribute to that, and it will go on to use whatever rules and regulations it now feels the industry agrees is appropriate.

So far, I think there have been two specific consultations and also a more general consultation by the PRA, basically saying, “Every time we do this, we will put out a statement of policy. Industry, do you think this is the right approach and the right thing to do?” So, I believe there is quite a lot of information being published around this. Obviously, it is not only for the industry to scrutinise that; it will be for others to scrutinise it as well, to ensure that we are not exposing our economy to detriment or, indeed, impacting our financial stability. That all seems fairly appropriate, straightforward and transparent.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about the Solvency II matching adjustment. It is our view, and I believe the view of the PRA, that it would not have been possible under 138A, because one of those two conditions would have had to have been met, and one could potentially say that it has not been. Is it unduly burdensome? I am not sure that it is, because it is more of an adjustment that annuity providers can use to secure more proportionate capital requirements. That is not a burdensome or non-burdensome issue; it is just that there is an opportunity to release capital by taking a sensible regulatory decision around matching.

The same goes for models as well. For example, in certain circumstances it may be the case that an institution’s model is better than the standard model that one tries to apply to the whole industry. If it can reassure the regulator that the model is robust, then, again, those might be the sorts of elements that one can put in to firm-specific changes to regulation. However, I fear that this will be returned to by the PRA over the coming years as we deal with assimilated law.

During the passage of FSMA 2023, we did say that we wanted agile regulators that are able to regulate and to change things according to risk. In this case, that will be by an individual organisation. But, as we go through and look at all the assimilated law that we dealt with under FSMA, some of it will then be able to fall away, because provision is available under 138BA that will be able to fill the regulatory gap that was previously occupied by that specific piece of regulation, but was then switched over to PRA rules and the way that it then chooses to put those into place. Again, this was the approach that was agreed during the passage of FSMA.

Sadly, I do not have anything on the PRA’s resources. I suspect that it has been gearing up for this for quite a long time; as I said, it has already started getting to work on consulting. Obviously, without the powers, it is unable to issue any firm-specific disapplications or modifications, but I will certainly write to the noble Lord if I get anything further on this matter. I have a few things to write on.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her explanations. I have two or three points to make.

First, I am still rather puzzled about the matching adjustment, for two reasons. As the Minister will know, there is quite a lot of criticism of the matching adjustment. There is a sense in which it would be, I would have thought, relatively easy to categorise it as not quite fit for purpose; that is why I am puzzled that Section 138A had not been, or would not be used in the case of matching adjustments. Also, the de minimis assessment says that

“the PRA would find it much more difficult”;

it does not actually say that it would be impossible using Section 138A. If the Minister is going to write to us, perhaps she might expand on this point a little.

Secondly, I am curious about the body of case law from the Upper Tribunal. It would be interesting to know whether there is such a body and whether we can learn anything from it.

My third point is to do with publication. As I understand it, the current waivers issued by the PRA and the FCA are published in some detail. I was asking for some kind of commitment. Under new Section 138BA, the waivers will be published, I assume, but will they be published saying what the problem is, why this course of action has been chosen, what benefits are expected to arise, why the powers in Section 138A of FSMA were not seen as appropriate and why new Section 138BA was necessary? When the Minister writes, perhaps she might say something about this.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I can feel officials sending me things but I will write, because the noble Lord has asked some very good questions. We will write him a nice letter with some good explanations.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I end by wishing the Minister a happy Easter.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

Happy Easter.

Bank of England Levy (Amount of Levy Payable) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations will ensure the implementation of the Bank of England levy following the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, which made provision for the replacement of the cash ratio deposits scheme with this levy. Currently, the Bank of England’s monetary policy and financial stability functions, including work on resolution, international policy, financial stability and strategy, and risk and monetary analysis, are funded by the cash ratio deposits, or CRD, scheme. Under the scheme, banks and building societies with eligible liabilities greater than £600 million are required to place a proportion of their deposit base with the Bank of England on a non-interest-bearing basis. The Bank of England invests these funds in gilts and the income generated is used to meet the cost of its monetary policy and financial stability functions.

However, due to lower than expected yields from gilts, the CRD scheme has not generated sufficient income to fully fund the Bank’s policy functions. The shortfall has been funded by the Bank’s capital and reserves. Alongside this, the scheme has led to higher than expected deposit sizes and a lack of certainty for deposit payers.

Following a review of the scheme, the Government set out their intent to replace the CRD scheme with the Bank of England levy. This will provide greater certainty to firms on their contributions, create a simpler and more transparent funding mechanism for the Bank and ensure that the shortfall in funding is addressed moving forward. Sections 70 and 71 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 amend the Bank of England Act 1998 to make provision for the replacement of the CRD scheme with the Bank of England levy.

The instrument under consideration by the Committee today makes provision for the eligible institutions that do not have to pay a levy, how the cost is apportioned between the eligible institutions that do have to pay it and how appropriate adjustments will be made for years in which there is a new levy payer. The instrument does not set the overall amount of the levy. The Bank determines which of its policy functions will be funded by the levy and the amount that it reasonably requires in conjunction with the funding of those functions for the levy year.

Under the regulations, the new levy year will begin on 1 March 2024, to align with the Bank of England’s financial year. An indicative timeline for the levy year is included in the Bank of England’s levy framework document. This sets out that the first invoice will be issued to firms in July 2024, with payment due in August 2024. This payment will cover the 2024-25 levy year.

Under the levy, for each year, the Bank of England will estimate the amount it needs to meet its policy costs. It will add any shortfall from the previous year and deduct any surplus. This is the anticipated levy requirement. The Bank will require institutions to submit data about their eligible liabilities and will usually take an average of the data provided between 1 October to 31 December in the previous year to calculate an institution’s eligible liabilities.

If an eligible institution has an average liability base up to and including £600 million, it will not pay any levy that year. If the institution’s average liability base exceeds £600 million, it will obviously pay the levy. This is the same as under the CRD scheme, therefore ensuring that the levy is fair as only the largest institutions, which benefit most significantly from the Bank’s monetary policy and financial stability functions, will pay. The costs that an institution will pay under the levy will be apportioned according to the size of the institution’s eligible liabilities, meaning that larger institutions pay a larger share of the costs. This is the same as under the CRD scheme and ensures that there will be no relative winners or losers under the new levy.

If an institution did not meet the threshold for paying the levy in the previous year but it does for the current year, the regulations stipulate that this firm will be treated as a new levy payer. The SI allows the Bank to treat new levy payers differently so that they contribute to the estimated policy costs for that specific year, and do not have to contribute to any shortfall from the previous year or gain any benefit from any surplus. This is a fair and proportionate approach.

This SI delivers a fairer and more transparent funding mechanism for the Bank of England’s policy functions. The regulations have been widely consulted on and the levy is supported by financial firms. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, it is obviously unacceptable that the Bank of England should be making a loss on its supervisory activities regarding the banking sector. We are happy to support this SI’s correction of that situation.

Before we allow the Bank to charge companies more, should we not ask ourselves whether there are any efficiencies that could or should be made in the Bank’s supervisory routines and systems? Could the Minister say whether the Bank has asked itself that question? If it has, perhaps the Minister could tell us what the answer was and how it was arrived at. If it has not asked the question, why not?

We note that the consultation on the levy produced only one relevant response—from, we assume, UK Finance. This response made five points; the Bank addressed four. The first was the rate of selldown of the Bank’s gilt portfolio. The concern appeared to be that this selldown would significantly increase the Bank’s costs and therefore the levy required. The Bank seemed to think that this was not an issue, but its explanation seemed very complex. May I ask the Minister for a “beginner’s guide” explanation? Is the industry right to worry about the levy increases potentially arising from a gilts selldown and, if not, why not?

The second point raised in the consultation response seemed the most important. The respondent suggested that the non-bank financial institutions, NBFIs, could in future be added as eligible levy-paying institutions in Schedule 2ZA to the Bank of England Act 1998. These NBFIs certainly seem large enough to be added. At the Managed Funds Association Global Summit in Paris in May last year, it was estimated that NBFIs now represent about 50% of global financial assets.

Addressing this point, the Bank simply says that the formal review referred to in paragraph 14.1 of the EM

“is expected to include assessment of which institutions are regarded as eligible to pay the Levy”.

I note the words “is expected to”. I also note that this review is five years away. Is not the growing size of the NBFI sector a reason for the Bank’s supervisory oversight to be much more extensive? Is it not simply unfair that NBFIs should get a free supervisory ride?

The third issue raised in the consultation and addressed by the Bank was the desirability, for planning purposes, of a five-year budget plan to help institutions plan their own budgets. The Bank has agreed to consider what is a perfectly reasonable request, but can the Minister say when it will have a substantive response to that comment from the consultation?

The fourth issue concerned the reference period; the Minister has mentioned this. The Bank concluded that the proposed reference period—the same period used for the PRA levy—is the appropriate one. Speaking of the PRA, can the Minister explain to us how the Bank of England levy and the PRA levy work together, as well as how double-charging is avoided?

Finally, why does this SI contain no coming-into-force date or commencement provisions?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, we fully support the replacement of the current cash ratio deposit and the proposed mechanics of the levy. We therefore support this statutory instrument.

I have only one question, related to the timing of this measure. As I am sure the Minister would agree, providing the banking sector with certainty is essential to securing the confidence needed to incentivise investment in the real economy. Can she therefore provide clarity on when this SI will come into force?

Social Security (Contributions) (Limits and Thresholds, National Insurance Funds Payments and Extension of Veterans Relief) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make a couple of brief points about child benefit. While of course I welcome the inflation-proofing after all the speculation there has been about it, it is important to put on record that it still represents a cut in the real value of child benefit since 2010, according to the Child Poverty Action Group, of which I am honorary president. Even allowing for this uprating, child benefit needs to rise by 25% to restore its real value.

I can remember when child benefit was introduced. I was working at the Child Poverty Action Group at the time, and child benefit replaced personal tax allowances as well as the family allowance. The Conservative Party then accepted the argument that child benefit should be thought of as, in effect, a tax allowance for children and treated the same as personal tax allowances. An increase in the real value of child benefit now could represent an effective way to target a tax cut on those below the tax threshold, whose needs are the greatest. Given that there is all this speculation about tax cuts, that would be my recommendation.

I realise that this is not part of the SI that we are debating, but the speculation that the Chancellor is also looking, for the Budget, at the high-income charge on child benefit is relevant. The threshold has not been uprated since the charge was introduced in 2013, so fiscal drag means that a growing number of basic rate taxpayers are now affected, whereas it was originally intended purely for those who are considered better off. Could the Minister give us an update on the numbers who have been pulled into the charge—perhaps not now, because I recognise that she may not have the figures here, but in a letter, because it would be good to know where exactly we are at?

Personally, I would like to see the end of the high-income charge on child benefit, because it compromises important principles of universality in child benefit and of independent taxation, as the Women’s Budget Group pointed out. At the very least, the threshold should be restored to its original value. I hope the Minister will convey that message to the Treasury.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak first to the draft social security contributions SI. Let me say at the outset that we support this instrument. However, we regret the announcement in the 2022 Autumn Statement that all NIC rates that are in line with income tax will be fixed at the 2023-24 levels until 2027-28.

This instrument is simply part of the long and damaging freeze of all the main personal tax thresholds across the entire period of the OBR forecast. HMT’s policy paper of 21 November 2022—Income Tax Personal Allowance and the Basic Rate Limit, and Certain National Insurance Contributions Thresholds from 6 April 2026 to 5 April 2028—is relevant here. The paper notes the fixing of thresholds up to and including the 2027-28 tax year, after which the default position is that they will rise by CPI inflation. It then goes on to say:

“This measure is expected to bring 92,000 individuals into Income Tax and 55,000 into paying NICs by 2027 to 2028”.


It also asserts:

“This measure is not expected to impact on family formation, stability or breakdown”.


These are very strong assertions. Can the Minister set out the evidence for them?

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft statutory instrument makes an update to financial services legislation to make operating a pensions dashboard service a Financial Conduct Authority—FCA—regulated activity. As noble Lords will be aware, the Government have long held the ambition of delivering pensions dashboard services to the public. It is vital that individuals can easily access and view data about their pension savings in one place and at their convenience.

Executed well, pensions dashboards can deliver significant benefits to consumers, providing better access to information about their pensions held in different schemes and putting information about private and state pensions in a single place. This will bring a step change in how people can engage with their pension savings and will finally allow them to have a fuller picture of them. Equipped with this information, individuals will be better able to plan for their retirement, find lost pension pots, seek financial advice and guidance at the right time and, ultimately, feel more in control of their pensions.

As noble Lords will be aware, the Government are supporting the development of the digital architecture needed to make pensions dashboards a reality, as well as facilitating the development of a government-backed pensions dashboard by the Money and Pensions Service. The Government are also supporting the development of private sector pensions dashboards. Different individuals will have different needs, and this will ensure that a range of platforms exist to meet them. However, the Government have been clear that this can take place only with a suitable and robust regulatory framework in place, recognising that consumers using pensions dashboards could be vulnerable to potential harms. It is vital that consumers are adequately protected.

During the passage of the Pension Schemes Act 2021, the Government were clear that the operation of pensions dashboard services should be brought within FCA regulation. This order amends the regulatory perimeter of the FCA to make operating a pensions dashboard service that connects to the Money and Pensions Service dashboard’s digital architecture a regulated activity. Once in force, this will have the effect that anyone choosing to operate a pensions dashboard service will need to be authorised and regulated by the FCA. Firms that are authorised by the FCA and granted permission to undertake the new regulated activity will have to follow the rules and guidance set by the FCA, which has the relevant remit and objectives to establish an appropriate consumer protection framework for pensions dashboards.

As noble Lords will be aware, the FCA consulted on the rules for pensions dashboards. The consultation, which closed towards the end of last year, set out a proposed approach to ensure that the new market for pensions dashboards does not introduce or amplify the potential for consumer harms. We will continue to work with the FCA in the coming months as the regulatory framework is finalised.

This statutory instrument delivers a key part of the framework that we are establishing to make pensions dashboards available to consumers. It is imperative that pensions dashboards operate within a strong regulatory framework, providing appropriate consumer protection so that the consumer benefits of dashboards can be realised. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we support this pensions dashboard SI, just as we supported the pensions dashboards project during the passage through the House of what became the Pension Schemes Act 2021. We continue to believe that the dashboards should deliver more information to the consumer in a comprehensive and easily understood way, and that this will make it easier to make better choices.

We understand that providing these dashboards, both for MaPS and for commercial suppliers, is a very complex undertaking. We were not terribly surprised by the delays the project has suffered but we would like some reassurance about progress from the Minister. The new connection date is set for 31 October 2026, but some services may be available before then. Could the Minister tell us when we may now expect the MaPS dashboard to be available to consumers, when we may expect commercial variants to be available and what services short of a full dashboard may be available sooner?

It would also be very helpful if the Minister could tell us when she expects the FCA rules that she mentioned, which were previously consulted on, to be published. It is hard to see commercial enterprises being able to finalise their own dashboards without sight of and understanding of the new FCA rules.

During the debates in the House on what is now the Pension Schemes Act 2021, many of us thought that the MaPS version of the dashboard should be allowed at least a year of operation before commercial versions were allowed to enter the market. Can the Minister tell us whether there is likely to be a period when the MaPS version runs alone?

We also debated the issue of allowing consumers to make transactions via commercial dashboards. Can the Minister say what the current position is? Will transactions be allowed?

The mechanics of the SI before us seem entirely straightforward and are clearly vital to consumer protection. We have no issues with either its purpose or its mechanism. We do have a couple of very minor and tangential questions. First, we are curious about the date of the SI coming into force. Why is it 11 March? Does that date have any particular significance?

The second question relates to the final sentence of paragraph 7.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which reads:

“Operating a dashboard may include taking regulatory responsibility for any third parties involved in connecting to MaPS digital architecture on their behalf”.


I would be very grateful if the Minister could unpack that a little. Perhaps she could give an example of such an arrangement. What circumstances would trigger the assumption of responsibility?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, this SI makes good on a commitment given during the passage of what became the Financial Services Act 2021 to ensure that entities running a pensions dashboard will have to be authorised and regulated by the FCA. This is an important safeguard for pension holders and we welcome the SI, even if it has taken longer than expected to arrive and is not quite the final piece of the pensions dashboard puzzle.

In an age of scams, uncertainty about AI and increasing consumer concern about online safety, perhaps I might ask the Minister about technical safeguards that providers are expected to put in place. I understand that dashboards themselves will not store data, so there is no risk of mass collection. But if an app is not secure and someone is using a device infected with malware, for example, could bad actors still be able to view and therefore exploit data such as account names, numbers and balances? It would be helpful to know what specifications private providers will have to meet—or, indeed, whether the Government or the FCA will be setting any technology specifications at all.

Paragraph 7.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum to this SI states that the regulated entity will be responsible for the actions of third parties connecting to the Money and Pensions Service digital architecture on their behalf. In recent years, there has been a number of examples of websites or apps using plug-ins to process logins which it then turned out had been infiltrated and customer data breached. Are the Government satisfied that the FCA and dashboard providers will be on top of these issues and that they will go to the Information Commissioner if needed?

Although more guidance is being issued about pensions dashboards, it is still not clear when the Government expect the first products to be operational. Does the Minister have a specific target date in mind?

Finally, when this SI was debated in the Commons, the shadow Economic Secretary asked the Minister whether he could confirm whether pensions dashboards would be using the Government’s OneLogin service. The Economic Secretary said he would write on the matter but, as far as I am aware, has not yet done so. Does the noble Baroness have an answer to that point in her brief and, if not, whether she will commit to copying the Economic Secretary’s reply, when it comes, to the participants in this debate today?

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 13th February 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these regulations have been laid to amend the definition of high-risk third countries in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which I will refer to as the money laundering regulations.

The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to the UK and are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Illicit finance causes significant social and economic costs through its links to serious and organised crime. It also undermines the integrity and stability of our financial sector and can reduce opportunities for economic growth and legitimate business in the UK. The Government are bearing down on kleptocrats, criminals and terrorists who abuse the UK’s financial and services sectors. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act built on the earlier Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act to ensure that the UK has robust, effective defences against illicit finance.

The money laundering regulations are at the centre of the UK’s legislative framework for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. They set out various measures that businesses must take to protect the UK from illicit financial flows, such as conducting enhanced due diligence—EDD—in certain cases. EDD is required to manage and mitigate the risks arising from certain high-risk transactions or business relationships. Businesses must consider a wide range of multiple different factors when deciding whether there is a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in a particular situation. They include risk factors associated with the customer, product, service, transaction and delivery channel, as well as any geographical risk factors.

The MLRs set out that firms should consider the risk posed by customers or transactions relating to any countries which have been identified by credible sources, such as the IMF or the World Bank, as lacking effective systems; countries with significant levels of corruption or other criminal activity; or countries subject to sanctions, embargoes or similar measures. As well as these examples, EDD is required in any other case which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

The measures being brought forward today relate to another of the specific situations in which regulated businesses must apply EDD, being in relation to any business relationship or transaction with persons established in a high-risk third country—that is, a country identified as such by the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF.

The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act changed how high-risk third countries may be defined under the money laundering regulations, and this statutory instrument simply implements this change. It removes the separate list of countries from Schedule 3ZA and replaces it with an ambulatory reference to those countries listed by FATF, which is the global standard setter for anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This means that countries listed by FATF will automatically be in scope of obligations under the regulations.

By taking this approach, we will ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of global standards on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing. This protects the UK financial system from illicit finance linked to the jurisdictions being listed. Where countries have made significant progress to improve their defences, it is equally important that we recognise that and promptly remove them from the scope of high-risk countries in the UK.

Ahead of this update, the UK and the FATF lists were already aligned. Indeed, since the creation of the UK list in 2021, the Government have always updated it to reflect changes to the FATF lists, and that remains our policy. This SI does not, therefore, add or remove any countries from scope, nor change the obligations on regulated businesses. It delivers on government policy in a streamlined way and ensures automatic alignment with the FATF lists without the need for frequent but fairly routine secondary legislation. It also ensures that firms will be notified in a timely manner of updates to the lists and their obligations, staying up to date as the risks change.

This statutory instrument has been reported as an instrument of interest by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which noted that it reduces parliamentary oversight of the process of adding or removing countries, although I note that of course it is government policy and would have continued to be government policy to introduce an SI every time the list changes. Therefore, in a sense this is automating the process. However, the Government are committed to keeping Parliament informed and will submit letters to the Libraries of both Houses at the conclusion of each FATF plenary meeting, when countries made have been added to or, indeed, removed from the FATF’s lists.

I also assure noble Lords that if at any time the Government saw fit to deviate from the FATF lists, they retain the authority and autonomy to do so. In such cases, a statutory instrument would be brought before Parliament for consideration.

I conclude by noting that the measures in respect of high-risk third countries are an important mechanism to mitigate the risks posed by illicit financial flows from overseas. We will continue to use this and, of course, many other tools available to us to respond to wider and emerging threats from other jurisdictions, including by applying financial sanctions as necessary. These amendments will enable the money laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as possible to protect the integrity of the UK financial system. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we support this very sensible SI and recognise the importance of the work FATF does in the fields of money laundering and terrorist financing. We recognise the importance of its lists of high-risk countries and the importance of the UK aligning itself with these lists, especially as they change from time to time.

Up until today, as the Minister said, we have kept ourselves aligned by using SIs to modify Schedule 3ZA to the MLRs. We have done this eight times; the last occasion was 8 January, a month ago. As the last of these SIs passed through the Commons, the Minister noted:

“I am aware that many noble Lords have expressed frustration at parliamentary time being taken up in the other place by such relatively routine matters to keep our high-risk third countries list aligned to the task force’s”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 8/1/24; col. 4.]


I do not know who those noble Lords were either. The Minister proposed a better way: the removal of the list in Schedule 3ZA and its replacement with, as our Minister said, an ambulatory reference to the FATF list itself.

This SI, which was debated last week in the Commons, does exactly that. It is true that it will undoubtedly save some parliamentary time, but it will remain important to ensure that all interested parties are aware of FATF list changes.

HMT issued updated guidance on high-risk third countries on 22 January. In passing, I should note that I could not find Russia on either list. Is that not a little odd? Coming back to the guidance issued by the Treasury, it would seem perfectly reasonable and not burdensome if HMT were to issue similar updated guidance after each of the three FATF plenary sessions that are held each year. Since Parliament will now lose an automatic mechanism for discussing changes to FATF lists, as the Minister said, I am very grateful for her confirmation of the commitments given to the SLSC to continue the practice of depositing in the Libraries of both Houses a summary of FATF meetings at which list changes are made and publishing an advisory note on the government website.

Financial Services Act 2021 (Overseas Funds Regime and Recognition of Parts of Schemes) (Amendment and Modification) Regulations 2024

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations make a number of technical changes to support the effective implementation of the overseas funds regime, prior to the first funds marketing under it, and ensure the correct treatment of recognised overseas funds.

The overseas funds regime is a new route that will allow overseas funds to be recognised for the purpose of marketing to UK retail investors, where the Government have determined that their regulatory regime is equivalent to that of the UK. Prior to the introduction of the overseas funds regime, there were two recognition routes for overseas funds allowing them to market to UK retail investors. If they were passporting to the UK prior to the UK’s exit from the European Union, funds may now have temporary recognition, which is due to expire at the end of 2025. The second route enables funds to be individually recognised by the Financial Conduct Authority, but this can be costly and time-consuming for both the fund and the regulator.

At present, there are more than 8,000 funds recognised via the former route and 48 funds recognised via the latter route. This is more than double the number of UK-authorised funds. The cross-border nature of asset management means that the overseas funds regime will be critical to ensuring a competitive funds sector for UK investors with an appropriate range of choice.

At present, no funds have been recognised under this regime. However, the Government are currently undertaking the first equivalence assessment for the states in the European Economic Area in respect of retail funds, specifically undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities—to note, money market funds are excluded from this assessment. Ahead of any equivalence decision or any funds becoming recognised under the overseas funds regime, it is important that the statute book adequately reflects its introduction.

This instrument makes two groups of technical changes. First, it makes amendments to ensure that, where appropriate, funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are treated in the same way as overseas funds which have been individually recognised for the purpose of marketing to retail investors. Secondly, it makes modifications to ensure that recognised sub-funds are appropriately captured. This is because it is common for funds to be structured as an umbrella, with multiple sub-funds beneath it, each with their own investment strategies.

More specifically, this instrument makes changes in the following areas. First, in relation to different pieces of rehabilitation of offenders legislation, it makes consequential amendments to the definition of “relevant collective investment scheme” to include reference to the overseas funds regime. This means that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are accounted for in the same way as existing individually recognised funds in these pieces of legislation, such as in relation to the disclosure of spent convictions by associates of these funds. The instrument also makes modifications to these pieces of legislation to ensure that recognised sub-funds are appropriately captured.

Secondly, it modifies the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003 to ensure that recognised sub-funds are treated appropriately for accounting purposes.

Thirdly, it amends the financial promotions order to allow certain communications made by operators of funds recognised under the overseas funds regime to be exempted from the general restriction on financial promotions. These are limited to cases where the fund in question is communicating with existing investors. This legislation is also modified to appropriately account for recognised sub-funds.

Finally, retained EU law on disclosure for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products is amended such that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime must provide the same retail disclosure documents as other recognised funds.

These changes are technical in nature and, as set out in the Explanatory Memorandum for the statutory instrument, are extremely unlikely to have any impact on business or public services. However, they are necessary to ensure that funds recognised under the overseas funds regime are treated appropriately and that the regime is able to function effectively. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we are grateful for the Minister’s clear and concise explanation of what this SI does and why it is necessary. I note the thorough and helpful consultation report, published as long ago as 2020. We are happy to support this instrument and have only a few questions.

The first question is to do with timing. The new OFR will come into operation only when the appropriate equivalence determinations have been made by HMT. The introduction of this new regime has been foreseen for at least two years. During that time, I am sure HMT has been working diligently to decide on the appropriate equivalence determinations. When might we expect these determinations to be published?

My second question arises from the 2020 consultation report. It makes clear the decision not to extend FOS and FSCS protection to the newly authorised funds. This is despite the recommendation of the Financial Services Consumer Panel. Can the Minister explain why these basic consumer protections were omitted?

My third question arises from the decision to reject these protections. In paragraph 2.44, the consultation report notes that:

“In general, respondents to the consultation considered that if the scope of FOS and FSCS remain unchanged, funds should inform investors through disclosures in the fund prospectus”.


The Government agreed that some form of disclosure was necessary, and in paragraph 2.46 said:

“The government will consider the appropriate framework for disclosing the absence of FSCS and FOS in the future. The FCA will also explore whether it is necessary and appropriate to require enhanced risk warnings or explicit acknowledgement from investors about the lack of availability of FOS and FSCS coverage”.


That was over two years ago. How is HMT getting on with the framework thinking? How is the FCA getting on with its exploration? Can the Minister tell us what HMT has concluded about the appropriate framework for disclosing the absence of FOS and FSCS cover and what the FSA has concluded about enhanced risk warnings? If at this late stage there is as yet no conclusion from HMT or the FCA, will she commit to write to us, setting out the conclusions when they are finally arrived at?

[Lord Jones (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister is clearly up to speed on these detailed matters, as I know my noble friend Lord Livermore is—but I am not. I recollect that, when I was in another place, the late Lord Cecil Parkinson, a very able Minister, introduced his great City finance reforms—what we knew then in the other place as the “big bang”. Lord Parkinson was a clever and adept Minister; he rose to even higher rank in government, and was a party chair for the late Lady Thatcher. But it seems to me that, in his reforms, simplicity was not one of the ingredients. With reference to the Explanatory Memorandum, at paragraph 7.1, what are sub-funds? Might the Minister throw some light on that detail?

Data Reporting Services Regulations 2023

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Wednesday 10th January 2024 Grand Committee

In closing, these SIs replace key parts of assimilated EU law, putting in place new frameworks tailored to the UK as the Government deliver a smarter regulatory framework in financial services. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak first to the data reporting services SI. The Explanatory Memorandum for this instrument helpfully reduces its 28 pages to a succinct six pages. It makes plain what the scrutiny situation with regard to the SI will be. Paragraph 7.4 says:

“Before FSMA 2023, the FCA did not have any rule-making powers over DRSPs, except for some limited powers in respect of technical standards, as well as limited powers of direction enabling them to establish the current authorisation process. These were not sufficient to replace the detailed provisions currently in retained EU law”.


Paragraph 6.6 goes on to remind us:

“Separately, Section 11 of FSMA 2023 inserts new section 300H into FSMA 2000 which establishes a general rule-making power for the FCA in relation to DRSPs. Going forward, it will be the responsibility of the FCA to make firm-facing rules in relation to DRSPs within the powers established by FSMA 2023”.


These new FCA rules will not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny—unlike the retained EU law provisions, which were. We should be clear that Parliament will be bypassed by these new FCA rules.

In this SI, we are simply being asked to consider a set of framework proposals for these new FCA rules, not the rules themselves. The helpful de minimis assessment makes this point very clearly in its opening paragraph when it says:

“Retained EU law will be replaced with rules set by our independent and expert regulators, operating within a framework set by government and Parliament”.


We regret that Parliament is being excluded from effective scrutiny here.

There are some questions relating to this framework; I would be grateful if the Minister could address them. In paragraph 7.10 of the Government’s response to the consultation on the WMR, there is a note on the issue of removing the requirement for CTPs to provide data streams free after 15 minutes. The report notes that most respondents favoured removing this requirement but others argued that

“retail and non-professional investors currently benefit from this obligation and removing it, even for CTPs, could risk disadvantaging them”.

Have the Government discussed this with the FCA? Which approach is currently favoured? Are we going to leave the 15 minutes in or take it out?

In paragraph 7.11 of the WMR response, it is noted that some respondents suggested that

“the current requirement in legislation for market participants, operators and data reporting services providers to make data available on a ‘reasonable commercial basis’ (RCB) is not working”.

These respondents argued that this is because the FCA

“does not have sufficient enforcement powers and asked for the FCA to be given appropriate enforcement powers to control the cost of market data”.

Can the Minister say whether this framework SI will allow the FCA to take on these obviously necessary enforcement powers?

I turn now to the 44 pages of the second SI before us, the Securitisation Regulations 2023. We acknowledge the need for action in this area but, as with the previous SI, we strongly regret that Parliament is in effect excluded from scrutiny of the rules to be set by the FCA and PRA. There are several areas in the instrument where it would be helpful to hear more detailed explanations from the Minister.

Paragraph 7.12 of the EM notes:

“This SI makes some changes to the regulatory perimeter, including scoping out”—


I take that to mean “ruling out of scope” rather than “investigating”—

“non-UK AIFMs from the definition of institutional investor”,

and transferring

“the responsibility for the supervision of providing securitisations by occupational pension schemes”

from TPR to the FCA. Can the Minister explain on what basis these two changes are thought to be beneficial and to whom?

I am also puzzled by this comment in paragraph 7.14 of the EM:

“Due diligence requirements for occupational pension schemes will remain in legislation and be supervised by TPR”.


It goes on to say:

“These requirements will be restated as part of a further SI in 2024”.


Why is there a need for restatement? What deficiencies are there in the current legislation?

Paragraph 7.20 of the EM says that

“this instrument exercises sections 71N(3) and 71N(4) FSMA to allow the FCA to disapply or modify their rules in relation to securitisation activity”.

Are there any limitations here to what the FCA may do or does it have carte blanche to do as it sees fit, absent any scrutiny from HMT or Parliament? If there are any limitations, where are they set out?

I close by referring to paragraph 10.4 of the EM and the Q2 2024 date for the publication of the outcomes of the FCA and PRA consultations and, therefore, of their new rules. This is a long wait. It is extremely unfortunate that these outcomes and the final new rules are not available to Parliament to inform our debate on this SI. No doubt we will have many more financial services SIs in this Session. Will the Minister ensure that the relevant consultation outcomes and proposed new rules are available to Parliament before we debate future SIs?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these two grouped SIs, both of which we support.

The Explanatory Memoranda accompanying these regulations note that the repeal of retained EU law remains subject to the entry into force of commencement regulations in order to ensure that there is no overlap or gap between the two different regimes. How soon is commencement expected once this package of SIs has been debated and passed?

I note that the consultations and reviews underpinning these regulations were held in 2021. Although the industry has commented on drafts of the SIs, not all feedback was incorporated and, in some specific areas, the regulators’ rules are still being finalised. Is the Minister satisfied that the changes in timelines have been communicated adequately to the relevant entities? Does she believe that any further communication needs to take place before commencement?

The Explanatory Memorandum for the first of these SIs notes, as did the Minister in her introduction, that

“there is no consolidated tape provider in the UK”.

Apparently, the MiFID II framework “attempted” to bring one about but the requirements for running a tape were thought to have made it “commercially unattractive”. The EM goes on to outline new measures contained in the SI aimed at facilitating a UK consolidated tape, including giving the FCA the power to run a tender exercise based on revised governance arrangements.

I wish to ask the Minister three related questions. First, what practical impact is the lack of a UK tape having and what alternative data sources are being used? Secondly, what is the timescale for the tender process? Thirdly, what will the Government do should there be no suitable bids or if concerns around the governance of a tape remain?

The Explanatory Memorandum for the second of these SIs notes that the FCA will have the power to review and modify its securitisation rules for specific purposes. When is the next overall review of securitisation expected?