Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disapplication or Modification of Financial Regulator Rules in Individual Cases) Regulations 2024
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Baroness Vere of Norbiton
That the Grand Committee do consider the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disapplication or Modification of Financial Regulator Rules in Individual Cases) Regulations 2024.
The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)
My Lords, these draft regulations make use of a provision in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to enable the Prudential Regulation Authority to disapply or modify its rules for individual firms.
The ability of a regulator to flex the application of its rules for individual firms has been a long-standing feature of our approach to regulating financial services. This is a useful regulatory tool that can enable a regulator to take account of a firm’s specific circumstances in order to ensure that rules are applied in ways that achieve the best regulatory outcome. This flexibility has long been supported by regulators and the financial services industry.
Since it was introduced more than 20 years ago, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, known as FSMA, has included such a tool. Section 138A of FSMA enables either the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Financial Conduct Authority to disapply or modify its rules for an individual firm. Under Section 138A, the PRA or the FCA can disapply or modify a rule if a firm requests it or if the regulator has the consent of the firm.
As part of the work to adapt our regulatory regime for the UK’s new position outside the EU, this tool was reviewed. It was concluded that, while useful, Section 138A was not as effective as it could be. This is because it contains the test, which must be met before a regulator can permit a firm to disapply or modify rules, that the rules in question must be
“unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made”.
This requirement does not always allow for rules to be flexed, even where appropriate disapplication or modification of rules would provide a better regulatory outcome.
The Government addressed this by introducing a new ability for regulators to flex their rules in a wider range of circumstances. This was legislated for through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 and is now set out in Section 138BA of FSMA. Under Section 138BA, the Treasury may specify regulator rules made under FSMA, which the relevant regulator can then permit a firm to disapply or modify. As with the existing rule-flexing tool in FSMA, a regulator can permit a firm to disapply or modify rules under Section 138BA only if the firm requests this or consents.
These regulations exercise, for the first time, the power approved by Parliament at Section 138BA of FSMA. The regulations do two things. First, they enable the PRA to permit a firm to disapply or modify any PRA rule in accordance with Section 138BA except for conduct rules and threshold conditions rules, which FSMA excludes from the scope of Section 138BA. After careful consideration, the Government have concluded that the PRA should have the ability to permit a firm to disapply or modify any PRA rule. This is because flexibility in the application of rules is particularly important for banks, large investment firms and insurers that are regulated by the PRA. These complex institutions, with highly specialised business models, often require a highly tailored approach to ensure that they are appropriately regulated.
Secondly, these regulations apply certain procedural safeguards to the PRA’s decisions under Section 138BA. When the PRA refuses a firm’s application or imposes conditions on a firm’s permission to disapply or modify rules, the PRA must issue a notice explaining its decision. When a permission to disapply or modify rules is given, the PRA must publish a decision notice so that it is public knowledge that a particular firm is subject to a tailored regulatory requirement. The regulations provide for an exception where the PRA is satisfied that publication is unnecessary or inappropriate, taking into account certain specified matters, for example whether publication would be detrimental to the stability of the UK financial system. If an affected firm is aggrieved by a PRA decision, it may appeal by referring the decision to the Upper Tribunal, which is the part of the Courts & Tribunals Service responsible for hearing appeals against decisions made by various public sector bodies, including the PRA and the FCA.
These regulations make use of an important regulatory tool recently approved by Parliament in FSMA 2023. They provide the PRA with a level of flexibility needed to ensure that the application of prudential rules to banks, large investment firms and insurers can be flexed, where appropriate, to ensure that regulation of these large and complex firms remains effective. They also ensure that the PRA, when taking these decisions, is appropriately accountable and transparent. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, the Explanatory Memorandum and de minimis impact assessment for this SI contain a number of vague assertions. Nowhere is there to be found a plain English statement of the benefit brought about this SI, except in the vaguest and most general terms. In essence, as the Minister has explained, this SI does one important thing: it removes the two conditions, of which one must be fulfilled, for the PRA to allow modification or disapplication of the rules for individual firms.
This power to allow the modification or disapplication is, as the Minister has said, contained in Section 138A of FSMA. The two conditions to be granted a waiver are that the rule or rules in question are “unduly burdensome” and/or
“would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made”.
The PRA appears to be the sole judge of whether either or both of these conditions may apply. There is no definition of “unduly burdensome” and no specified mechanism for deciding whether the rules are fit for purpose or not. The Explanatory Memorandum seems to suggest that such rulings may be challenged in the Upper Tribunal. Is there a body of case law from Upper Tribunal hearings that helps with the definition of “unduly burdensome” and how “fit for purpose” may be established?
Currently, waivers may be granted only if either of the two conditions applies, and the PRA appears to have discretion over whether they do or do not. This SI changes that; it inserts an additional and unconditional waiver mechanism which allows the PRA, as the Minister has said, practically unfettered discretion to modify or disapply rules for individual firms as it sees fit. What justification is there for allowing this unfettered discretion? What is really wrong with the current arrangements?
The EM and the IA both have a go at answering those questions. In paragraph 5.4, the EM states that
“section 138A of FSMA … does not, by itself, provide sufficient flexibility for a truly agile regulatory regime … This requirement”—
by which it means the two conditions—
“does not always allow for rules to be flexed, even where appropriate disapplication or modification of rules would provide a better regulatory outcome”.
The EM does not give any examples to show how dropping the two conditions may help in practice, and nor does it explain how a better regulatory outcome may be defined or by whom—I guess that that is the PRA again, at its absolute discretion.
The impact assessment tries to give a concrete example in the matching adjustment regime, widely criticised as being not fit for purpose and, therefore, a fairly obvious candidate for disapplication or, more likely, modification under the existing rules. This shows the weakness in the impact assessment’s case, which says rather limply:
“Without this SI, the PRA would find it much more difficult to allow firms to continue to use beneficial provisions like the Matching Adjustment”.
So it is clearly not impossible—it is simply saying that it is really difficult. Why is it much more difficult? Could the Minister explain the point about a possible difficulty in dealing with the matching adjustment using Section 138A rather than this new SI? Can she give perhaps more concrete examples of the dangers avoided in or the benefits arising from dropping the two existing FSMA conditions?
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing this SI, which delivers on one of the aims of the smarter regulatory framework, in that it will allow the Prudential Regulation Authority to disapply or modify the rules in the Financial Services and Markets Act in response to changing market conditions or emerging risks, and to facilitate innovation. We supported the principle behind this SI during the passage of the Act last year; as such, I have just a few questions.
First, can the Minister confirm how many times the existing power under Section 138A of FSMA has been used by the regulator in each of the past three years? Is there a forecast for how many times the new procedure is expected to be used in each of the next three years?
Secondly, the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the SI notes that PRA decisions under this new mechanism will be challengeable in the Upper Tribunal, as the Minister noted. Is there any estimate of the potential caseload that may result from this new system? Can she confirm how long the Upper Tribunal is likely to take to determine challenges, and at what cost to applicants?
Thirdly, can the Minister confirm that, in considering an application to flex the rules, the regulator will remain bound by its objectives around financial and market stability? Finally, the impact assessment accompanying the SI talks of familiarisation costs for businesses. Are there any similar resourcing implications for the PRA? Are any additional positions needed at the regulator to deal with potential additional workload?
I am grateful to the Minister in advance for her answers. I take this opportunity to wish her and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, a happy Easter.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I too wish all noble Lords a very happy Easter—there is one more day to go, I believe. I am grateful to both noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I have the answers to nearly but not quite all of their questions. I am disappointed in myself, but never mind; we will keep going.
I would like to go back to first principles. This was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, and to a certain extent by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. The PRA is governed by its core objectives, which are set out in law. There are two primary statutory objectives for the PRA: a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised firms and an insurance objective to contribute to securing an appropriate degree of protection for those who are, or may become, insurance policyholders. Underlying that, FSMA also sets out two secondary statutory objectives for the PRA on effective competition, aligning to international standards and promoting growth in competitiveness. That is our starting point; that is the PRA’s job, per se. In taking a decision to disapply and modify rules, it must do so in that context.
The noble Lord, Lord Livermore, asked how many times Section 138A has been used in the last three years. I do not know, but I will write on that and explain what has happened to date. I will also write about the caseload and what we expect for the timeline in court. I do not anticipate that it will be enormous. With much of this regulatory behaviour, where there are disputes regulators will try to mediate wherever possible.
Turning to why the PRA would decide to disapply or modify rules, it is about getting greater flexibility to allow the system to work more effectively within the statutory objectives set out in FSMA. The provision does not direct a regulator as to how it should decide, because these are independent regulators. When this part of FSMA 2023 was debated, it attracted no debate at all, so I had therefore expected that noble Lords were very much onside with the powers we had given to the PRA, or potentially to the PRA, via this statutory instrument. It will be for the relevant regulator, in this case the PRA, to set out its policy for the disapplication or modification of rules. Noble Lords may have seen that it has already started to do this.
This goes back to the issue of transparency and ensuring that the public, and of course the industry too, are aware of what is going on. A whole series of industry consultations takes place whenever the use of 138BA is anticipated. Not only was the Section 138BA issue subject to consultations in 2020 and 2021, when we were developing and finalising our approach to the smarter regulatory framework, but, more recently, and more specifically, the PRA issued consultations on statements of policy. What happens is that the PRA says, “Okay, this is what we’re going to do. We’re going to put out a statement of policy”—for example, it has done it on Solvency II matching adjustments. The industry will then contribute to that, and it will go on to use whatever rules and regulations it now feels the industry agrees is appropriate.
So far, I think there have been two specific consultations and also a more general consultation by the PRA, basically saying, “Every time we do this, we will put out a statement of policy. Industry, do you think this is the right approach and the right thing to do?” So, I believe there is quite a lot of information being published around this. Obviously, it is not only for the industry to scrutinise that; it will be for others to scrutinise it as well, to ensure that we are not exposing our economy to detriment or, indeed, impacting our financial stability. That all seems fairly appropriate, straightforward and transparent.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about the Solvency II matching adjustment. It is our view, and I believe the view of the PRA, that it would not have been possible under 138A, because one of those two conditions would have had to have been met, and one could potentially say that it has not been. Is it unduly burdensome? I am not sure that it is, because it is more of an adjustment that annuity providers can use to secure more proportionate capital requirements. That is not a burdensome or non-burdensome issue; it is just that there is an opportunity to release capital by taking a sensible regulatory decision around matching.
The same goes for models as well. For example, in certain circumstances it may be the case that an institution’s model is better than the standard model that one tries to apply to the whole industry. If it can reassure the regulator that the model is robust, then, again, those might be the sorts of elements that one can put in to firm-specific changes to regulation. However, I fear that this will be returned to by the PRA over the coming years as we deal with assimilated law.
During the passage of FSMA 2023, we did say that we wanted agile regulators that are able to regulate and to change things according to risk. In this case, that will be by an individual organisation. But, as we go through and look at all the assimilated law that we dealt with under FSMA, some of it will then be able to fall away, because provision is available under 138BA that will be able to fill the regulatory gap that was previously occupied by that specific piece of regulation, but was then switched over to PRA rules and the way that it then chooses to put those into place. Again, this was the approach that was agreed during the passage of FSMA.
Sadly, I do not have anything on the PRA’s resources. I suspect that it has been gearing up for this for quite a long time; as I said, it has already started getting to work on consulting. Obviously, without the powers, it is unable to issue any firm-specific disapplications or modifications, but I will certainly write to the noble Lord if I get anything further on this matter. I have a few things to write on.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
I thank the Minister for her explanations. I have two or three points to make.
First, I am still rather puzzled about the matching adjustment, for two reasons. As the Minister will know, there is quite a lot of criticism of the matching adjustment. There is a sense in which it would be, I would have thought, relatively easy to categorise it as not quite fit for purpose; that is why I am puzzled that Section 138A had not been, or would not be used in the case of matching adjustments. Also, the de minimis assessment says that
“the PRA would find it much more difficult”;
it does not actually say that it would be impossible using Section 138A. If the Minister is going to write to us, perhaps she might expand on this point a little.
Secondly, I am curious about the body of case law from the Upper Tribunal. It would be interesting to know whether there is such a body and whether we can learn anything from it.
My third point is to do with publication. As I understand it, the current waivers issued by the PRA and the FCA are published in some detail. I was asking for some kind of commitment. Under new Section 138BA, the waivers will be published, I assume, but will they be published saying what the problem is, why this course of action has been chosen, what benefits are expected to arise, why the powers in Section 138A of FSMA were not seen as appropriate and why new Section 138BA was necessary? When the Minister writes, perhaps she might say something about this.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
I can feel officials sending me things but I will write, because the noble Lord has asked some very good questions. We will write him a nice letter with some good explanations.