Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will deal first with the proposal to reform the compensation for whiplash arising from road traffic accidents. Let me say at once that I agree with the remarks made by the Delegated Powers Committee in its report of last Friday. It concluded, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has said, that there should be a definition of whiplash in the Bill, as should the tariff for damages. The committee says bluntly that it would be,

“an inappropriate delegation of power”,

for either of these matters to be handled by secondary legislation. The definition of whiplash is so central to any discussion of the Bill and any assessment of its consequences that I am very surprised that the Bill should have been brought before us with that definition absent. It is clear that the issue of how to define whiplash has been under consideration by the Government for some time. Surely it should be possible either to produce the definition for the Bill or to delay the Bill until the definition is available.

That is certainly a matter that we want to raise in Committee, as is the issue of the tariff and who should set it. Should it be, for example, the Judicial College? The impact assessment sets out the proposed tariff, but why is the proposed tariff not in the Bill? The structure and levels of the tariff will certainly influence our debates, and Parliament should be able to decide on the initial tariff, amendable later by secondary legislation.

In the case for reforms set out in the assessment there are many appeals to evidence, a lot of which is vigorously contested. That throws some doubt on the case for reform, but it would be very helpful if the Minister was willing to discuss these contested areas before we reach Committee. For example, there is the assertion that the number of whiplash claims is somehow too high or too fraudulent. The Access to Justice Foundation has published calculations showing that claims in total are already falling. In fact, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has pointed out, CRU data for 2016-17 shows a 10% decline in whiplash or whiplash-related claims since 2012-13. The Motor Accident Solicitors Society has strongly questioned the view that a high proportion of claims are fraudulent. It has said that, when proven and suspected fraud figures are disaggregated, proven fraud drops to 0.25% of all motor claims, while fraudulent whiplash claims will be a small percentage of that already small percentage.

The principal justification in the impact assessment for reforms is economic—specifically, that there are three market failures that must be addressed. The first failure is one of asymmetric information. Only a victim can really know the extent and duration of pain or suffering caused by a whiplash injury. The Government see this as an incentive to make false or exaggerated claims but, as I have mentioned, the incidence of such claims is highly contested.

The second market failure alleged by the Government is the creation of perverse incentives. Legal costs are recoverable by successful claimants from the defendants. The Government say that if legal fees were not, or less, recoverable, claimants would bear more of the cost of bringing such claims, which would help to bring down their volume to a level that was,

“optimal for society as a whole”.

Leaving aside the question of what “optimal” might mean or how it might be calculated in this context, there is the problem of access to justice, as noted by the Law Society in its comments on the Bill. The Access to Justice Foundation has estimated that the proposed new tariff would deny 600,000 people injured on our roads each year the right to legal advice when seeking compensation. The figure comes from a July 2017 study by Capital Economics. Then there is the question of whether, or more likely to what extent, making medical report costs unrecoverable impedes access to justice.

The third identified market failure is what the impact assessment calls, “negative externality”—a phrase that is clearly weapons-grade management speak. This refers to the practice of insurance companies settling claims without medical proof of injury. Here, I entirely agree that this drives market failure, and I support the provisions in the Bill that will ban this practice.

In addition to the reduction in access to justice likely to be brought about by these reform proposals, there is the obvious issue of fairness. If someone is involved, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has said, in a road accident, under the Government’s reform proposals they would be entitled to £3,500 for a neck injury lasting 24 months. They would also be unable to recover the cost of a lawyer to assert their rights. If someone suffered an identical injury at work, they would be entitled to £6,500 and would be able to recover costs. How is this fair, reasonable or coherent? I should be very grateful if the Minister could address this issue when he replies.

In all the very comprehensive information supplied to us by the Minister and his officials, I have been unable to find any mention of vulnerable road users. They are cyclists, motorcyclists, horse-riders and pedestrians. These people seldom suffer whiplash, and I have seen no evidence of fraud, yet they will all be caught by the proposed new system. I hope that the Minister will agree to remove them from the scope of this Bill.

Then there is the question of who benefits from these proposed reforms. The impact assessment estimates a total net benefit of £130 million. Within this, motorists gain £l.l billion by way of reduced premiums; insurers gain £190 million; HMT—the Treasury—loses around £140 million; and claimants lose £980 million. The impact assessment also sets out the risks assumed in calculating these figures. It explicitly acknowledges the risk that CMCs will produce more unmeritorious claims to offset the reduction in claims pursued as a result of the reforms. We all know how very vigorous and fast moving the claims industry can be, and as we speak, the Government are busy in the other place dismantling the reforms that we voted through to try to suppress cold calling.

However, the major risk surely lies in the percentage of savings to insurance companies that is passed on to motorists in reduced premiums. The impact assessment gives a figure on this and says it will be 85%, but it does not explain why. Is it, for example, that 85% of all savings will be passed on by 100% of insurers or that 100% of savings will be passed on by 85% by value of insurers? Perhaps the Minister could tell us which it is. In either case, what grounds are there for confidence that the insurers will pass on any particular percentage?

I note that the insurance companies which wrote to the Lord Chancellor in March ended their letter by saying that they,

“publicly commit to passing on to customers cost benefits arising from Government action to tackle the extent of exaggerated low value personal injury claims”.

Leaving aside the issue of whether cost benefits are the same as savings—I have no idea whether they are—is the promise to pass on all or only some of the cost benefits? Who decides what is a cost benefit for the purpose of passing it on, and how transparent will this decision be? What mechanism will there be for checking the sums actually passed on, and what remedy will be available if they turn out to be lower than expected?

I now turn to Part 2 of the Bill, dealing with the personal injury discount rate, and I should say at the outset that I agree there is an urgent need to change the basis on which the rate is calculated. But I have several concerns. The first is to do with timing. It is clear that the current discount rate needs amending, but the process proposed in the Bill means that there would be no change until 2020. This is three years after the implementation of the minus 0.75% rate, which is obviously wrong and is causing very significant financial damage to both private and public sector organisations. For example, the Minister will know that the National Audit Office has highlighted that the estimate from NHS Resolution, at the current discount rate, will add £500 million to the cost of claims in the year 2017-18 and £3.5 billion in overall provisions accrued. Clearly, it would be better to spend this money on front-line NHS services. Why wait? Surely there is enough information held by the Government and their advisers to enable a faster change.

My second concern is with the review period of three years that is proposed in the Bill. This may be too short. It may mean that a review is undertaken unnecessarily, incurring cost and creating market uncertainty. A three-year period may also create real incentives for gaming the litigation process by whichever side believes its objectives are most likely to be met by an impending rate change. A five-year review period, I suggest, would mitigate the risks associated with this. We will probably want to discuss this further in Committee.

My third concern is with having the Lord Chancellor make the decision on the rate, as at present. Under the new system, he or she will have the recommendation of the expert panel to take into account, but this will not be binding. How is this materially different from the current situation? Of course, the basis for setting the rate will have changed, but it will still be the Lord Chancellor who decides. In fact, there is a strong case for removing the decision from the political arena altogether and handing it over to an expert panel. The impact assessment reports that, of the respondents to the consultation on the matter, 35 favoured an expert panel, 17 favoured a co-decision between an expert panel and another person, and 48 favoured a Minister, based on advice from an expert panel. To put this another way, the majority of respondents to the consultation were in favour of not having the Minister make the decision. This kind of system works well for the economy as a whole, with the MPC setting the base rate quite independently of politicians. Perhaps the Minister can say whether he has considered this option and, if he has, why he has rejected it.

Finally, I would like to make a suggestion to the Minister. He will know that many Members of this House believe that we should repeal Section 2(4) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, which has the effect of greatly increasing the sums that the NHS must pay out in settlement of clinical negligence claims. The Public Bill Office has confirmed that any proposal to repeal this section via this Bill would be out of scope. Nevertheless, repeal is an urgent necessity, and suitable legislative vehicles are likely to be extremely rare. This Bill could be used for repeal if the Government were to agree to an out-of-scope amendment granting the right to repeal Section 2(4). In closing, I ask the Minister to consider this, and whether he would be prepared to meet to discuss this further with me and other interested Members.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 2 in this group, which is in my name, tackles the same issue. The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, has laid out the background and reasons why this House and the country should be concerned about whiplash—false whiplash—and what are rather inelegantly called “cash for crash” events. I do not propose to weary the House by running over those issues again, which we discussed quite a lot at Second Reading.

Amendment 2 addresses the point made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee about the lack of a definition in the Bill and does so in a slightly wider way than Amendment 1, moved by the noble Earl. It proposes a definition in proposed new subsection (1) but, at the same time, proposed new subsection (2) recognises the need for flexibility, in the sense that medical technology and medical sciences are always changing and there will need to be some flexibility in keeping the law up to date with those developments. Amendment 2 therefore aims to create an overarching definition, clarifying what is included within a soft tissue injury, but then provides room for flexibility, so that new ways of describing these injuries do not result in them falling outside the definition. At the same time, it allows the definition to be changed to reflect improvements in diagnosis and prognosis of these subjective injuries.

I should say that I was somewhat concerned that, having got a definition of whiplash in the Bill, a definition gap might have been left by not defining soft tissue. But the insurance industry tells me that this term is well understood and does not need a detailed definition here; the noble Earl referred to that. What I understand is called the pre-action protocol for low-value personal injury claims—I am reading this carefully because I am not entirely familiar with it myself—uses the term to define the scope of powers and has been in force since 1 October 2014, apparently so far without challenge or the need for a judicial ruling on its meaning. I hope that this amendment will be a useful contribution to the debate on this important topic.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 3 in this group is in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for whose support I am very grateful. Following the two preceding and eloquent speeches, I can be very brief. The point of the amendment is simply to put a definition of whiplash in the Bill. There are rival definitions in various other amendments, and there is now also a government definition contained in the draft SI published yesterday. At first glance, this government definition seems to provide a sound basis for discussion, but it is in the wrong place. It should be in the Bill.

As the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, has already said, our Delegated Powers Committee said clearly in its 22nd report that,

“it would be an inappropriate delegation of power for ‘whiplash injury’, a concept central to a full understanding of the Bill, to be defined in regulations made by Ministers rather than being defined on the face of the Bill”.

At Second Reading, many noble Lords strongly agreed with this conclusion and it is disappointing, now that they have a draft definition, not to see the Government bringing forward an amendment to put this in the Bill.

In his Second Reading reply and in his subsequent letter to us of 30 April, the Minister did not respond substantively to criticisms of using secondary legislation to define whiplash. He merely noted that he did not entirely agree with the DPRRC recommendations and that noble Lords were anxious about the definition of whiplash.

In fact, the Government had already set out elsewhere in correspondence with the Delegated Powers Committee their case for using secondary legislation. The DPRRC helpfully summarised this by saying that, first, whiplash must be defined accurately; secondly, there must be extensive consultation; and thirdly, the definition must remain accurate. The Delegated Powers Committee agreed with these propositions but said,

“it does not follow from them that the definition of ‘whiplash injury’ should be contained in regulations rather than the Bill. Neither the Lord Chancellor nor the Ministry of Justice is best placed to make this determination”.

We agree with the conclusions of the Delegated Powers Committee and invite the Minister to explain why the Government have rejected them and are still pursuing the statutory instrument route.

As to the Government’s definition itself, as I have said, it seems to provide a sound basis for discussion but we have not had enough time to make a proper assessment and to canvass the opinion of other stakeholders. We will want to return to this issue on Report.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, as chairman of the Delegated Powers Committee, which published a report on this Bill, I would like to make a few comments. First, I have a purely personal comment. Colleagues may be interested to know that I have made a full recovery from the serious accident I had in the last few days—not that I recall having had a serious accident, but my mobile phone tells me that I did and that I should pursue a claim. I say to my noble friend the Minister that this racket is still happening again and again. I had thought, as a passionate supporter of the Government, that we had nailed this down and stopped the grabby racketeering lawyers pursuing these claims. I hope in future we will be able to put a stop to it.

Going back to the Bill and the amendments, the Delegated Powers Committee looked at this and said we were becoming rather familiar with skeletal Bills. By any standards, this Bill is skeletal. Then we went on to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, so very kindly pointed out—the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, also paid tribute to our work—that:

“In this Part ‘whiplash injury’ means an injury, or set of injuries, of soft tissue in the neck, back or shoulder”,


and then the description stops to say that the rest of the definition will be,

“specified in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor”.

I am not revealing committee secrets but half of us on the committee thought that the parliamentary draftsman had been distracted—he was half way through writing the definition and stopped and forgot to complete it—because it seemed an elementary thing to complete.

I have not seen last night’s regulations—I shall look at them carefully—but I did a quick Google search last night on the definition of a whiplash injury. Even the NHS website states that:

“Whiplash injury is a type of neck injury caused by sudden movement of the head forwards, backwards or sideways”.


Wikipedia has a much more detailed definition, which I assume from some of the spelling is an American one. There is a fascinating point in it:

“Cadaver studies have shown that as an automobile occupant is hit from behind, the forces from the seat back compress the kyphosis of the thoracic spine, which provides an axial load on the lumbar spine and cervical spine. This forces the cervical spine to deform into an S-shape where the lower cervical spine is forced into a kyphosis while the upper cervical spine maintains its lordosis. As the injury progresses, the whole cervical spine is finally hyper-extended”.


That is not skeletal. It may be a bit too much fat on flesh on the bones but I quote it because I think it important that we have a technical medical definition, by physicians, relating to the distortion and flexing of the spine and not just a list of symptoms. If we merely make a list saying that people feel dizziness, nausea, headaches and so on, we could include everything. After a good night’s dinner one could feel those symptoms and not necessarily have been involved in an accident. If it is simply possible to get some definitions from Google and to look at the excellent definition from the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and from my noble friend—who is not a lawyer—these definitions seem to me to be a very good starting point. If the Government’s definition in the regulations is even better, let us go with that. My committee was at an absolute loss to understand why it was not in the Bill. There is no justification for it not being there. Of course, there can be an order-making power for the Minister to tweak or amend it in due course as medical science changes.

We said that there should be extensive consultation. If I go outside the Chamber right now and phone the Royal College of Physicians, within 10 minutes it will give me a pretty good definition. The doctors who deal with this issue are the experts, not the Lord Chancellor or the lawyers in the Ministry of Justice. We must let the doctors come up with the definition and put it in the Bill so that we have complete certainty in the future.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

11: Clause 2, page 2, line 35, leave out from “amount” to end of line 13 on page 3 and insert “determined in accordance with the 14th edition of the Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases or any subsequent revision to these guidelines.”

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, the long string of amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Marks has a very simple purpose: to enable us to debate the proposed tariff and, in particular, two different types of tariff. The first, essentially contained in Amendment 11, is a tariff based on the Judicial College Guidelines. The second is a fixed, specified and structured tariff. This is essentially contained in Amendment 96, where the amounts are place-holders based on the average of awards actually made. Before I discuss either of these variations, I should again mention the Delegated Powers Committee recommendation that,

“it would be an inappropriate delegation of power for damages for whiplash injury to be set in a tariff made by Ministerial regulations rather than on the face of the Bill”,

and that the tariff,

“should be set out on the face of the Bill, albeit amendable by affirmative statutory instrument”.

At Second Reading, the Minister noted this recommendation and responded by saying:

“We consider that being able to regulate the tariff by the affirmative procedure is a more flexible way of being able to respond to changes”.—[Official Report, 24/4/18; col. 1531.]


That is precisely what the DPRRC proposed should happen after first setting out the tariff in the Bill. I hope that when the Minister responds, he will give a fuller answer as to why he believes that the tariff should not be in the Bill but should be fixed by an unamendable statutory instrument.

I turn to the question of the tariff itself. Should damages remain determined by application of the Judicial College Guidelines, or should they be fixed amounts? If fixed amounts, what should those be? These questions go to the heart of the matter. If we stay with the Judicial College Guidelines, the system would be relatively unchanged, although we could reduce awards for injuries of less than three months’ duration if, for example, we thought that that was where fraudulent claims were concentrated. If we move away from the Judicial College Guidelines to the example tariff contained in the impact assessment or to the tariff published yesterday by the Government, there will be very profound changes. The tariff published yesterday is even lower—by about 4.7%—than the example tariff on page 26 of the impact assessment. It would be interesting to know how these tariff levels were arrived at and what objectives were used in deriving them. For example, was there a target reduction in the cost of total damages awarded? If so, on what basis was this target chosen? Can the Minister explain the basis of the construction of the tariff amounts and tell us whether there was indeed a target for overall damage reduction?

Whatever method was used to devise the Government’s proposed tariff levels, in either the example tariff or yesterday’s tariff, both would have a very large effect. These new tariffs would transfer £1 billion away from claimants, via insurers, wholly or partially to motorists in the form of reduced premiums. That is a very large transfer. It is made up of £240 million in claims that would no longer proceed under the new tariff—assumed to be around 133,000—£550 million because of the reduced awards for every successful claimant, and £190 million from insurers no longer picking up legal fees and VAT. On the way, and as a consequence of this transfer, the general taxpayer would be hit for £140 million by reduced revenue from IPT and some loss of revenue to the NHS. If the Government’s tariff levels are applied, there will be, they calculate, a lot fewer claimants and, it is to be hoped, fewer fraudulent claimants, deterred as they might be by the banning of no-med settlements and very low tariff awards. This means that those successful claimants remaining will carry the burden of this transfer. Claimants will be £1 billion worse off; motorists will be £1 billion better off. What is the Government’s justification for such a massive transfer of funds? There are two questions to answer. First, what is the evidence base that justifies any transfer? Secondly, why this amount? Why such a very large reduction in amounts awarded to claimants? Why not a smaller reduction—or, for that matter, a larger one? What is the justification for this level of transfer?

In the impact assessment and in the Minister’s speeches at Second Reading, it was clear that some care had been taken to avoid using fraudulent claims as the main reason for the proposed changes. However, I note that today the Minister seems clear that this is in fact the main driver. As we noted at Second Reading, claims about the incidence of fraud are highly contested. Is there in fact a reasonable and properly evidenced consensus about the extent or cost of fraudulent or exaggerated claims? I worry that there is not.

There are certainly competing claims from all the many vested interests involved, including the insurance industry, but no independent assessment to help us reach an evidenced view. The Government more or less recognised this when they set out in the impact assessment the principal justifications for the proposed changes. They were all economic and based on a need they saw to correct three alleged market failures. The first failure—if you can really call it that—was asymmetric information. Only a victim could really know the extent and duration of the pain and suffering caused by whiplash, and the Government see this as an incentive to fraudulent or exaggerated claims. So it may be, but we do not seem to know how many or to what extent. But punishing all genuine whiplash claimants by hugely reducing their awards is surely not a reasonable remedy. Why punish these people and reward motorists for an unquantifiable, or at least unquantified, number of fraudulent or exaggerated claims?

The second market failure is alleged to be that of perverse incentives. This refers to legal fees. The Government claim that if legal fees were not recoverable or were less recoverable, this would bring down the number of claims. So it might, but would this be reasonable? In any case, this alleged saving is by no means the major element in the transfer of funds away from claimants.

The third alleged market failure is that of insurance companies settling claims without proof of injury. Here, there is obviously a genuine market failure, and I am very glad to see the Bill banning this practice. However, nowhere in the impact assessment’s justifications for action is there any reference to the huge transfer—over £500 million—that is brought about simply by the introduction of much lower awards for all claimants. Again, what is the evidence base for such a reduction?

The Government’s proposed tariff is significantly lower than the current actual awards in every duration band. For injuries lasting up to three months, current awards average £1,800; the Government propose £225. For injuries lasting between three and six months, current awards average £2,250; the Government propose £450. That carries on all the way up the duration scale. This all looks like an arbitrary and huge transfer of money from claimants to motorists via insurance companies. The Government have given no justification for the scale of this transfer and no explanation why claimants should be so punished and motorists so rewarded. I imagine that we will hear such claims as, “It is generally accepted that claim levels are too high”. This is not a sound basis for policy decisions, certainly not involving huge transfers of funding on this scale, which also create very serious anomalies.

As we pointed out at Second Reading, an injury of 24 months’ duration identical in its effects, if suffered at work, would attract up to £6,500. For whiplash, the Government would restrict you to £3,725. If the Government want a fixed tariff, as they clearly do, then they should put this tariff in the Bill, so that we have the opportunity to amend it. As importantly, they must justify this £1 billion transfer from claimants to motorists. They must explain why all claimants for whiplash should suffer and all motorists benefit.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, if this amendment is agreed to, Amendments 12 to 22 inclusive cannot be called by reason of pre-emption.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions that have been made. It respectfully appears to me that the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Marks, materially bolstered the approach that the Government take in the Bill. Why do I say that? Because it is quite clear that we are addressing a matter of policy and have to do so as such. What ultimately has to be taken here is a political decision, not a judicial determination.

In fairness, I think it was a slip from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, but when he talked about the question of whether claims are genuine or not reasonable, he said that it was unquantifiable—and then corrected himself to unquantified. The former is more accurate than the latter.

Let us be clear. More than 80% of road traffic injuries are allegedly whiplash-induced injuries. The vast majority of all personal injury claims are whiplash claims. Over 10 years, the number of whiplash claims has rocketed—yes, it has stabilised a little in the past year or two, but it has still rocketed. At the same time, the number of road traffic accidents reported has dropped by 40%. At the same time, the number of vehicles classified by Thatcham as safe from the perspective of seating and headrests has increased from 18% to 80%.

As some people have said, an industry is going on. As others have suggested, there is a racket. We have a claims culture that has built up—I attribute no blame to any one party; all sides involved have contributed in one way or another to the ballooning of the claims culture. The time has come—indeed, the time may be almost past—when we need to address it as a political issue.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, suggested that somehow we were making a transfer from claimants to motorists. With great respect, a very large proportion of claimants are motorists, so it is not as simple and straightforward as that. Secondly, he talked about the transfer requiring to be justified. The transfer is a consequence of the policy decision we are making to deal with the industry, the claims culture; it is not the purpose of it. It is, as I say, the consequence.

[Lord Sharkey]

In fact, I was asking the noble and learned Lord, with respect, to justify the quantum, but perhaps he is going to deal with that.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, as I say, the quantum is a consequence of the steps we are taking to address the claims culture. The way in which we are doing it is such that we are confident that the benefits will be passed to consumers in the form of motor insurance premiums.

[Lord Sharkey]

In that case, perhaps the noble and learned Lord could explain exactly how the tariff was constructed—on what basis?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Yes, I shall come to that. We have had regard to the present level of damages awarded in these cases, we have had regard to expert input about how we can deal with the claims culture that has built up, and we have taken the view on the level of tariff required to implement the policy decision that we have made to deal with this emerging problem.

[Lord Sharkey]

Does the Minister accept that that is not really an explanation? It is simply a statement that the Government have done something. I was asking for the basis on which they arrived at these numbers. In fact, oddly, the numbers changed between the impact assessment and the SI published yesterday. There must be a reason for that; there must have been some discussion. There must be some basis on which these amounts were constructed, but it is not clear from his answer what they are.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, first, I understand that there was not intended to be a change between the impact assessment and the SI publication. That is why the rather odd difference of 4 point something per cent emerges. I acknowledge that that was not intended.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey]

I think this is a misunderstanding. I was not trying to imply that there was an element of certainty involved here. I simply wanted to know how the figures had been arrived at. Why not some other figure? Instead of 235, why not 200? Why not 400? How were these figures arrived at?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, a judgment had been made having regard to all the information available as to what level should be set for the tariff to address the very problem that we are attempting to deal with. It is not based on some mathematical formula or percentage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, as the noble Lord outlined, they are self-perpetuating figures. Therefore, although we have regard to those guidelines when coming to a view as to where the tariff should be set, that was only one element in deciding the appropriate levels for the tariff itself.

I shall turn for a moment to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, which would provide the court with complete discretion with regard to any percentage increase of exceptional circumstances. We do not consider that that is an appropriate way forward. It would simply lead to an increase in litigation and in the claims culture, so that is why we feel that there should be an appropriate limit on how any exceptional circumstances can be dealt with by the court.

In that context, I should point out that the tariff system is not entirely a novelty. Other European jurisdictions faced with the same claims culture and the same racket, as some people have called it, have introduced tariffs as well, or tables of predictive damages. That includes Italy, Spain and France. In due course both Houses will have the opportunity to debate the details of any regulations that are introduced to put forward the appropriate figures for the tariff, which at present we consider should be in the regulations, if only for the purposes of flexibility.

Again, I want to emphasise that this is essentially a matter of policy to deal with a very particular problem. It is a political decision; it is not one that we consider is for the judges; it is one that is ultimately for the Lord Chancellor to deal with in his capacity as a Minister. It is in these circumstances that I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Sharkey]

I thank the Minister for the long and comprehensive—and occasionally interrupted—answer. There is an issue here. I accept that it is a political decision, of course, and we are all operating on that basis, but I am still worried and puzzled about the way in which this table of tariffs has been devised. I have heard nothing from the Minister to suggest that it is not arbitrary. In particular, he did not answer my question so perhaps he can do it now. Were the figures devised on the basis of some target saving being set and then working backwards to say what the tariff would be to generate that saving? If that is the case, we ought to be told.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Can I be clear to the noble Lord? I am not aware of there having been any target saving. As I sought to indicate earlier, this was rather an approach from the other direction: what policy is required? Effective policy is required to deal with the problem facing us.

[Lord Sharkey]

The Minister will forgive me if I say that that sounds a bit like the back of a political envelope. The question still remains. We are interested in what these figures are, and it would help our discussions if we had a clearer idea of how they were arrived at. I am sure that we will want to pursue that as the Bill makes progress. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Young of Norwood Green (Lab)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House I will move this amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Berkeley, who is unable to attend this afternoon due to personal circumstances. This amendment addresses a slightly different issue from those that I have heard today. If the Bill is enacted, the Government also propose to increase the small claims track limit for personal injury cases from £1,000 to £5,000 for all road traffic accident claims and to £2,000 for all other personal injury claims. The Ministry of Justice’s impact assessment makes it clear that the small claims limit increase is part of a broader reform package, although the small claims limit proposals do not appear in the Bill, as they can be implemented through secondary legislation via an amendment to the Civil Procedure Rules.

When the Ministry of Justice published its consultation on reforming the soft tissue whiplash claims process, Cycling UK—to which I must pay tribute for providing the briefing—realised that the stated proposal to increase the small claims limit to £5,000 extended far beyond whiplash claims by car occupants. In partnership with RoadPeace, the national charity for road crash victims, and Living Streets, the national charity for everyday walking, Cycling UK launched its Road Victims are Real Victims campaign, the catalyst for which was the shared concern that the consultation ignored the interests of road crash victims, particularly pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists—generically vulnerable road users.

Within the consultation, no reference was made to vulnerable road users. The focus was on whiplash, fraudulent claims and motorists, without consideration of the complexity of vulnerable road user personal injury claims, the different nature of the injuries typically sustained and claimed for or their vulnerable status. More than 6,000 people responded to the Road Victims are Real Victims campaign, writing to the Ministry of Justice in support of Cycling UK’s submissions and outlining their opposition to the proposed small claims limit increase, which disproportionately affects vulnerable road users. The MoJ’s consultation response failed to address any of the arguments raised on behalf of vulnerable road users, including the complexity of their claims or the nature of their injuries, save for one sentence in paragraph 86 acknowledging that certain points had been made but not responding to them.

The Government’s proposal to increase the small claims limit to £5,000 for all road traffic accident-related claims will affect 70% of cyclist personal injury claims and a similar percentage of motorcyclist personal injury claims, where the general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity are under £5,000. Cycling UK met with officials at the MoJ following publication of the consultation response, and explained why vulnerable road user personal injury claims should be excluded from the small claims limit increase to £5,000 and how that could be achieved simply through adopting the same definition of a road traffic accident claim for the purposes of the small claims limit, as the Government propose to adopt in Clause 1 of the Bill, which defines whiplash injury and refers to whiplash injury suffered due to driver negligence when someone is,

“using a motor vehicle other than a motor cycle”.

The Bill excludes vulnerable road users from the definition of whiplash and the whiplash reforms in the Bill. The changes to the small claims limit catch all road traffic accident personal injury claims, including those by vulnerable road users.

The consultation document made it abundantly clear that the Government’s main aim was to tackle what they perceived to be the “compensation culture” and both fraudulent and exaggerated whiplash claims. Whatever the extent of these problems, the purpose of the amendment is to ensure that vulnerable road users should not be penalised as a consequence of measures the Government implement to address them. I do not think that we are trying to say that this is a perfect amendment. I hope the Minister will understand that this is a probing amendment; we are seeking an assurance from him that he would be open to a consultation process. Before I end my contribution I suppose that I should declare an interest as a regular cyclist and a member of the All-Party Parliamentary Cycling Group. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey]

Talking about vulnerable road users, I was reading Tuesday’s edition of Insurance Times, and the opening sentence was:

“Justice minister Lord Keen makes the first concession on Civil Liability Bill ahead of it entering the committee stage in the House of Lords”.


It went on to say:

“Lord Keen sent a letter to peers this morning, and in it, he made his first real concession regarding the Bill”—


and it then went on to quote the Minister at some length.

I looked on the Bills in progress website and could not find any letter. I searched through my emails and could not find any letter; I searched through my junk mail and still could not find any letter from the Minister. I wonder whether he will simply tell me that I should not believe everything I read in Insurance Times, or whether there is some letter that he would like to draw our attention to.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I, too, declare an interest as a regular cyclist and a member of the APPG on cycling. As has been made clear at all stages, the Government’s main aim in this Bill is to tackle what they perceive as the compensation culture, and in particular fraudulent and exaggerated whiplash claims. It should not be a by-product of that that vehicle road users, including cyclists, are penalised by measures designed for a completely different purpose.

Whiplash claims are brought by motor vehicle occupants, not by people riding bicycles or motorcycles or crossing the road. Nobody makes a fraudulent claim by throwing themselves off a bicycle or a motorbike or by jumping in front of a car. The point has been made to the MoJ that there is no evidence to suggest that fraudulent claims by vulnerable road users are an issue of concern—and, as far as I am aware, no evidence to the contrary has been provided by the Ministry of Justice.

Whiplash claims from cycle and motorcycle collisions are almost entirely unheard of. The mechanism of the typical injury sustained is, of course, different. People on bicycles tend to be injured by hitting hard surfaces—car bonnets or the road. They sustain fractures and injuries from those impacts. It is not at all likely that they would be making a fraudulent claim. Indeed, I think it is impossible to imagine that they would.

I support this amendment. I think that a Bill designed for whiplash claims should not accidentally spread its effect to vulnerable road users whose injuries are likely to be of a completely different nature.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, as we begin to discuss Part 2, I return to an issue I raised at Second Reading: the use—or perhaps the insufficient use—of periodical payment orders, particularly in cases where compensation is payable for long-term injuries.

To summarise the position, periodical payment orders are a form of annuity that ensures that a guaranteed sum, usually index linked, is paid to the injured party as frequently as he or she requires—weekly, monthly, quarterly or annually. PPOs have two particularly significant aspects. First, they transfer all longevity risk to the insurance company. The insured does not have to be concerned that he or she may live longer than is actuarially assumed, with the possibility of having to live in reduced circumstances for the last years of their life. Secondly, PPOs transfer all investment risk to the insurance company. The insured does not have to worry that bad investment decisions made on his or her behalf might result in a reduction in his or her income. Those are two significant factors.

I hope that it is common ground that one of the major purposes of the Bill is to ensure fairness—to ensure that individuals suffering life-changing injuries are properly compensated for the rest of their lives, however long or short these may be, and that these payments are made within a framework that is fair to the other insured individuals, who will have to pay their share of the expenses. I remind the Committee once again that I am not a lawyer—but a court must find it incredibly difficult from a purely practical point of view when faced with, say, the tragic case of a young man aged 25 who is badly injured in a road traffic accident, and the impossible task of ensuring fairness between the parties and deciding in such a case what the right single lump-sum award of damages should be. What is the life expectancy of such a person?

I have heard it argued that one does not need to be concerned about individual cases because average life expectancy over a number of cases can actuarially be determined fairly. However, that considers the case only from the point of view of the insured and, indeed, the co-insured. It is not much help to the individual injured party—injured, say, at the age of 25—to hear, “We thought you’d only live for 35 years, but here you are. I’m so sorry that you’re still living now and that the money is running out”. Nor is it fair to the insured and the co-insured, that when such a person, very sadly, dies early of complications aged, say, 40, a potentially significant lump sum is passed to his or her descendants, who have virtually no locus in the case.

In those situations, periodical payments would ensure fairness—so why are they not the default option in cases of long-term injuries and for people with low risk tolerance? There appear to be a number of structural reasons why that is so. First, from the point of view of the insurance company, a lump-sum payment is neater and more administratively convenient. In essence, one could put a pink ribbon round the file—or, in modern parlance, send the case to the cloud—and forget all about it. Further, PPOs are unattractive to insurers because of the method by which they are rated for capital adequacy purposes. I will not detain the Committee this afternoon with a detailed explanation except to say that, under the technical provisions of reserving, the combination of a best estimate of liabilities, the risk margin and the solvency capital requirements makes PPOs unattractive.

Secondly, from the point of view of the insured, particularly someone who is less financially sophisticated, an offer of, say, £6 million as a lump sum may on the surface appear to be more attractive than, say, a quarterly payment of around £50,000. I have also heard that it is not impossible that families might prefer the lump-sum route in the hope of some windfall, and there may be financial advisers who see a long-term stream of fees for providing investment management advice and might prefer a lump sum to a PPO.

Thirdly and finally, the individual judge considering the award might find it outwith the court’s role to opine too definitely on the method by which the award should be paid. All these influences, although individually not particularly significant or decisive, collectively tilt the balance away from PPOs.

The Government recognise the challenge in increasing the take-up of PPOs in paragraphs 48, 49 and 50 of their response to the report of the Justice Select Committee. Paragraph 48 states:

“The Government therefore sees many benefits in the use of PPOs to provide compensation in respect of future losses … particularly those who are most dependent upon the provision of long-term future care. The Government agrees with the Committee that it is not obvious why PPOs are used in relatively small numbers of cases”.


The following paragraph states:

“Perhaps even more tellingly, there was little enthusiasm for any changes to the law regarding PPOs in response to the consultation … It is therefore not clear what might be done to increase the take up of PPOs”.


For those of us who received today’s briefing from the Association of British Insurers ahead of this Second Reading debate, we can see the push-back already beginning. Under the section on PPOs, it says that they are,

“available in 99% of all cases … Insurers continue to make PPOs available for claimants when requested”.

I think that the use of those words indicates that it is not top of insurers’ lists to make sure that it is even Steven between the ways in which these awards are paid.

I have been seeking ways to redress this imbalance and move towards a position where PPOs might become the default option in cases where compensation for injuries will be paid out over the long term or where the injured party has a low tolerance of risk or is risk averse. Amendment 55 is intended to achieve this by requiring changes to the rules of court which would encourage or require judges to consider wider factors, in particular longevity risk and investment risk.

As I said a few moments ago, I am no lawyer, and I have no idea whether Parliament can require the inclusion of specific provisions in the rules of court without infringing judicial independence. It may be that, in the course of this debate, there are other, neater ways of achieving this shift of emphasis. So Amendment 55 is a probing amendment at this stage. However, I am convinced that the present position is not satisfactory, and the Government essentially agree that that is so. I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s reply. In the meantime, I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 92 in this group would require the Lord Chancellor to carry out a review of the impact of any new rate on the extent of the use of PPOs and to lay this report before Parliament. Our amendment has the same general purpose as Amendment 55 and as other amendments in this group.

The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has already spoken eloquently to Amendment 55 so I can be very brief. It seems to me that all the amendments in this group are intended to provide a gentle nudge in the direction of PPOs. Their purpose is to create conditions in which the incidence of voluntary uptake of PPOs may increase. Given the scope of the Bill, not to mention the ethical questions that would be created by any reduction in the freedom to choose or not choose PPOs, this is probably as far as we can go.

I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to the thinking behind all of these amendments, coming as they do from various parts of the House. If he is sympathetic, perhaps he would be willing to meet interested noble Lords before Report with a view to drafting an amendment or amendments that he might consider bringing forward or supporting.

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, in supporting Amendment 55, I will speak also to Amendment 92A. I declare my interests as listed on the register of the House, especially those in respect of the insurance industry. I can be very brief, because there have been two brief and excellent speeches before me.

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[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, my amendment is Amendment 59. Everything that I would have said has been said very well by the noble Earl. It is clear that we need to get on with this. The cost is extortionate. There was general agreement at Second Reading that any day’s delay was too many. I accept that there are things that have to be done, but not so many things and over such a long time as is currently within the terms of the Bill. The Minister made some encouraging noises at Second Reading and I hope he can go beyond those in response to this amendment.

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, we have Amendments 60, 64, 67, 68 and 71 in this group. They all have the same purpose. All are aimed at bringing forward the date of the first review of the PIDR and I want to thank the MDDUS for its help in drafting.

Amendments 60, 64, 67 and 68 each bring forward, in the appropriate place in the Bill, the start date for the first review of the PIDR to 30 days from commencement, which now seems rather timid in light of the proposals put forward by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. However, as things stand, the Bill specifies a 90-day period from commencement within which the first review must start. The likely timing for the new rate determination to take effect is set out on page 3 of the Minister’s letter to us of 30 April. He said:

“Assuming the Bill receives Royal assent this year and that the provisions are brought into force within two months, the statutory timetable means the first review would be completed before the end of 2019”.


That is to take too long. Specifically, the 90-day period from commencement to the start of the first review is too long, so is the 180 days from the review start to its conclusion, and so is the unsatisfactory commencement provision in Clause 11(1), which allows the Secretary of State to choose any commencement date that he likes.

Our Amendment 71, which I will come to an a moment, deals with the 180-day period and the noble Earl’s later amendment in this group, Amendment 94, to which he has already spoken, deals with the commencement date issue. For the moment, I will speak only to the amendments that deal with the period within which the rate review must begin after commencement. The Bill specifies 90 days. We see no reason why it should be as long as that and our amendments reduce that period to 30 days.

The protracted timetable imposed by the Bill is unnecessary and inflicts real damage. Most noble Lords would agree that the current PIDR is causing real commercial harm. It is also causing real and irreversible financial damage to the NHS. For each month that the current rate operates, the NHS must accrue an additional £300 million against future clinical negligence claims. Those are enormous sums that would be much better spent on front-line activity in the NHS.

Amendment 71 also aims to bring forward the date of the first review. It addresses the length of the consultation period, who must be consulted and the length of the whole review period. Amendment 71 replaces paragraph 2 in new Schedule A1, inserted into the Damages Act 1996 by Clause 8(2) of the Bill. Paragraph 2 as it stands sets out the various elements of the timetable for conducting reviews of the PIDR and the timetable applies to the first and subsequent reviews. New paragraph 2 also sets out who must be consulted in the course of the reviews. It stipulates that the determination of whether to change the rate must be within the 180-day review period. That period must start no later than 90 days following commencement, which is left entirely to the discretion of the Secretary of State.

Amendment 71 replicates new paragraph 2, except that it addresses itself only to the first review and makes the following changes: it shortens the review period from 180 days to 90 days; it shortens the 90-day consultation period to 60 days; and it restricts the consultation for the first review to the Government Actuary—or his deputy if the office is vacant—and the Treasury. In other words, there is no consultation with the expert panel defined in paragraph 5 of new Schedule A1. Actually, it follows the original proposal made in the September 2017 Command Paper. Amendment 71 then goes on to restore all the existing provisions of paragraph 2 so that they no longer apply to the first review but to every subsequent review.

Our amendments in this group, together with Amendment 94 of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, would significantly bring forward the review. By the Minister’s estimate, the Bill would produce the first review by the end of 2019 if all goes well. Our amendments, taken together, would produce the first rate review by mid-2019, at least six months earlier. This is what we should do and I commend these amendments to the Committee.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, if we are to establish an expert panel for the review, and the Lord Chancellor has not yet done so, might it be a good idea for him to decide whom he wishes to invite to join it? Unless something is done about that, just finding the panel will itself add to the time taken.

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[The Earl of Kinnoull]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. A standing panel would be a great advantage to a Lord Chancellor. Quite apart from the hassle of trying to reassemble a panel every whatever the periodicity is and the cost of assembling one—I assume a firm of suitably expensive headhunters would be involved—you would then have to take the panel up a learning curve as to exactly what is required of it, which would take some time. We do not need to go there.

The biggest thing, though, is that if I was the Lord Chancellor and Black Wednesday happened for a second time I would like to ring someone up and say, “Do I need to do anything here?” I would assume that, as Lord Chancellor, I would not be super-familiar with discount rates and things like that because my expertise would lie somewhere else. Having a standing panel that could answer curveball questions and interact as and when would not be expensive. It would probably cost the same as the periodic panel because of all the start-up costs associated with it, and it would be very helpful for a Lord Chancellor if something really bad happened.

[Lord Sharkey]

I have in this group Amendments 74, 87 and 88. Amendment 74 is a probing amendment. It provides the Committee with an opportunity to debate the value of the Lord Chancellor having a decisive role in determining the PIDR. As things stand, that is what he or she has—a decisive role. It is true that the Bill will create an expert panel to advise him and that it sets out the assumptions on which he must make that determination, but it is the Lord Chancellor who makes the decision. This poses the obvious question—why? What are the merits of having a politician making this judgment? What merit is there and what dangers might there be in having this decision in the political arena?

It is true, of course, that the rate decision has many serious consequences—for claimants but also for insurers and for the NHS, as we have discussed. These consequences are far reaching—but so are the consequences of changes to the Bank of England base rate. Changes in the base rate affect everyone who has a mortgage, every borrower and every saver. Some recent changes to the base rate have had dramatic effects on millions of people and continue to do so. For example, millions of people with savings have been dramatically disadvantaged by rate changes since 2007. Equally, millions of mortgage holders have benefited enormously from these changes. But these decisions on the base rate were taken not by politicians but by the MPC—an expert panel. If decisions on such wide-reaching and consequential matters can be taken by an expert panel without political involvement, why have political involvement in the PIDR? Why have the Lord Chancellor involved?

I raised this question when I met Ministers to discuss the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, commented that the Lord Chancellor’s role was a matter of government policy. I understood that. However, we did not have time to go into the question of why it was government policy or whether there were better alternatives. We did not discuss what grounds the Government might have for maintaining the policy or whether any assessment had been made of alternative arrangements. We now have a little more time to discuss the issue and the merits of removing this role from the reach of politicians for reasons analogous to removing control of the base rate from them. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

Amendments 87 and 88 are straightforward. They deal with the expert panel itself, as set up in paragraph 5 of the new Schedule A1 to the 1996 Damages Act, inserted by Clause 8(2). This panel is to be consulted by the Lord Chancellor in determining the rate. The Bill specifies the members of the panel as the Government Actuary, or his deputy if the office is vacant, who is to be chair, and four other members appointed by the Lord Chancellor, one of whom must have experience as an actuary, one experience of managing investments, one experience as an economist, and one experience in consumer matters relating to investments. All these roles seem pretty well defined, except possibly the last one. Could the Minister flesh that out a little? Can he give examples of the kind of persons who might qualify as having,

“experience in consumer matters … relating to investments”?

It seemed to us that the panel might benefit from an additional member with different expertise. Amendment 87 would add a member who is medically qualified and has experience of changes in medical science and their effects on life expectancy. The PIDR has a very significant effect on the damages awarded against the NHS for clinical negligence, as we have mentioned. Payouts last year amounted to £1.7 billion and the amount has been rising steeply in recent years.

Awards for clinical negligence frequently have to take into account estimates of life expectancy. The Committee will know that the PIDR has a very significant effect on damages awarded against the NHS for clinical negligence. As I said, payouts amounted to £1.7 billion last year, and much of this was determined by reference to life expectancy. Of course, actuarial methods can and do give an estimate of life expectancy, but for the most part this will be based on extrapolations of current trends. What might not be taken into account is the likelihood of discontinuous change brought about by the speed of advances in medical science. We live in a golden age of medical research. It is not a total exaggeration to say that one hears nowadays almost daily of some remarkable medical breakthrough that will in due course benefit patients by curing disease, improving quality of life and prolonging life itself.

It seems to us that the expert panel would benefit from having first-hand, direct experience of these new treatments and their likely effects. A member with such experience would make a valuable contribution to any assessment of the role played by life expectancy in determining awards. I look forward to the Minister’s thoughts on the matter.

Amendment 88 would impose a duty on the Lord Chancellor to secure that,

“each of the appointed members approaches the work of the expert panel as an expert with the object of recommending a rate of return that is fair to … both claimants and defendants”.

It could be argued, for example, that the last change to the PIDR was not fair to both claimants and defendants in that it produced a huge rise in the amounts awarded to claimants. And it works the other way: there might be rates that a panel thought unfair to claimants. If so, it would be important that that view helped form the recommendations. We see our amendments as allowing a dispassionate view of the effects of a change to the PIDR for both claimants and defendants, and this should have an explicit role in informing the panel’s recommendation. I hope that this is not controversial. In fact, I rather hope that the Minister will be able to demonstrate that the amendment is unnecessary and that the requirement for fairness is somehow already built into the procedure.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the question of whether this should be a political decision or one taken by the panel is difficult. I thought carefully about this, as I am sure other noble Lords did. Ultimately, I respectfully submit that it should be a political decision taken by the Lord Chancellor. Of course, that decision will be critically informed by what the panel tells him or her. The provisions in the Bill provide that, when a Lord Chancellor makes a rate determination, he or she must,

“give reasons for the rate determination made, and … publish such information about the response of the expert panel established for the review as the Lord Chancellor thinks appropriate”.

My noble and learned friend will correct me if I am wrong, but, if the Lord Chancellor were to take a perverse view, ignoring all the advice or not giving sufficient reasons for it, he or she would potentially be liable for judicial review. Ultimately on the question of accountability, this is a political decision and a politician should be answerable for it.

Of course I yield to no one in my admiration for doctors—we have a number of distinguished doctors in your Lordships’ House, and they are the experts who can assist the House on questions of life expectation. However, with great respect, that is not quite the question that the panel is there to answer; it is there to answer the question of yield for investment having regard to an investor of reasonably cautious nature. While some doctors might have a view about this, I am not sure that questions of life expectation have anything to do with what is essentially an actuarial or financial calculation. Therefore, I am afraid that I am unable to support that suggestion.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Bill makes perfectly clear that this is a decision of the Lord Chancellor as Lord Chancellor, and it is in that context that it has to be seen and understood.

Amendment 61 would replace the proposed three-year maximum review cycle for the second and subsequent reviews of the rate with a system under which the need for the rate to be reviewed would be determined by the expert panel by reference to changes in returns on investment. Of course, there are then consequential and supplementary amendments. The effect would be to add a new and distinct responsibility to the role of the panel. It would in effect, as I believe my noble friend Lord Hodgson acknowledged, require a standing panel to be created. If more than a year had passed since the rate was reviewed, the expert panel would be required to assess the need for a review and then to advise the Lord Chancellor to review the rate if it considered that the nature of return on investment had changed enough to justify a review. If the panel decided that this condition had not been satisfied, it would have to report its reasons for this view to the Lord Chancellor.

The concept of a review based on changes in investment returns was canvassed as an alternative to a fixed review period in the Government’s 2017 consultation on how the rate should be set, and it was supported, let me be clear. However, basing the review requirement on changes in investment returns would, we believe, create more uncertainty and be less predictable than a regular fixed-date review. The introduction of a requirement for the panel to consider the need for a full review annually could further fuel such uncertainty.

I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Lord and others at Second Reading about the potential for a fixed review period to prompt undesirable litigation behaviour and the possibility of what is sometimes termed the gaming of the system in anticipation of a change to the rate. However, this problem would not be avoided by the system which the amendment proposes. Litigants would still know when the panel would be required to consider whether the rate required reviewing. Indeed, such occasions would be more frequent under the amendment than under the three-year cycle proposed in the Bill. One can imagine a stop-start mentality emerging leading up to the time when the panel was expected to report.

A further consequence of the amendment would be that the expert panel would have, in practice, to exist independently of the review of the rate, rather than being convened by the Lord Chancellor for each review, as the Bill currently provides. In effect, a standing panel would be required, which would have to exercise judgment as to the timing of reviews, rather than confining itself to the technical matter of advising the Lord Chancellor on the factors that might be considered in the setting of the rate, which is the purpose of the expert panel. The amendment would therefore make a very significant change to the proposals in the Bill regarding when the rate should be changed. The Government’s proposals for a fixed-period maximum cycle for the review of the rate have, as I say, been developed through consultation and been the subject of pre-legislative scrutiny, and we consider that they provide a simple and certain method by which reviews can largely be predicted.

Amendment 74 would require the Lord Chancellor to adopt any recommendation from the expert panel as to whether the rate should be changed and, if so, what the rate should be. Clearly, such a change would diminish significantly the responsibility and accountability of the Lord Chancellor for any review outcome—indeed, it would essentially remove it. Amendment 74 would also remove the requirements on the Lord Chancellor, the panel and the Treasury set out in paragraph 2(6) and (7) of new Schedule A1 to comply with or to take into account the duties of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the setting of the rate that are set out in paragraph 3 of new Schedule A1. What we would have is the elevation of the panel from an advisory role to essentially an executive role. That would be a major change and clearly greatly alter and increase the role of the panel.

The creation of the expert panel to advise the Lord Chancellor is, of course, one of the most important changes introduced by Clause 8. The panel is central to the Government’s proposals for the way in which the rate is set, introducing new expertise and transparency. The panel will play a very important role in providing assistance to the Lord Chancellor in setting the rate, but it would not in our view be appropriate for the panel’s recommendations to bind the Lord Chancellor in deciding whether the rate should change and what it should be. The setting of the discount rate requires the weighing of different potential outcomes for individuals in relation to a range of possible rates. An element of value judgment will ultimately be required. It is important, therefore, that the decision-maker should be politically and publicly accountable for decisions on the rate. That is why the Lord Chancellor is, in our view, the appropriate person to make that choice. Indeed, this was recognised by the Justice Select Committee, which stated in its report that:

“Setting the discount rate has repercussions on the taxpayer through Government expenditure and also consumers through its impact on insurance premiums and inflation; therefore we think it is right that the decision to set the discount rate lies with the Lord Chancellor”.


We agree with that assessment.

In addition to being influenced by the pre-legislative scrutiny carried out by the Justice Committee, the proposals we have put forward have been developed through the public consultation process. In response to the question of by whom the rate should be set, the largest single group of support was for the rate to be set by the Lord Chancellor following advice from an expert panel. I note the support for that which has been given, in particular, by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, expressing his experience as Lord Chancellor and underlining the distinct role of the Lord Chancellor in this context.

[Lord Sharkey]

The Minister talks about the consultation and the preferences expressed there. As I think I mentioned at Second Reading, there was no majority in favour of the Lord Chancellor being involved. There was a majority for other methods, not the Lord Chancellor.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I acknowledge that. As I said, the greatest number of responses were in support of that particular proposal. I reiterate that.

I understand that Amendment 74 is a probing amendment but it would at a stroke remove many of the benefits that the proposed reforms in the Bill are seeking to achieve. This is because paragraph 3 of the new schedule governs how the Lord Chancellor is to decide what the rate should be, and Amendment 74 would remove paragraph 3 from the schedule. The essential change made by paragraph 3 to the present law is that in future the rate is to be assessed on returns reasonably expected to be achievable from a diversified low-risk portfolio of investments. This has regard to how claimants actually invest and the returns available to them. This evidence-based process of assessment will replace the hypothetical approach of the present law, which leads to the rate being set largely by reference only to returns from UK index-linked gilts.

Our evidence is clear that claimants simply do not invest all their awards in UK index-linked gilts; in other words, claimants do not pay Her Majesty’s Government to look after their money. Our research indicates that setting the rate on this basis leads to awards of compensation that are expected to produce on average around 135% of the funds anticipated to be necessary to meet the claimant’s losses, although this drops to 120% to 125% after taxation and the costs associated with the management of investments have been accounted for—a point that I will return to in a moment. The new system will put the setting of the rate on a far more realistic basis and bring the average closer to the target of 100%. This will be fairer for both claimants and defendants.

In support of this process, the paragraph sets out a number of key assumptions that the Lord Chancellor must adopt in deciding what the rate should be and a number of supporting factors he or she must take into account. It also enables the Lord Chancellor to identify and apply further assumptions and to take into account further factors in determining what the rate should be. Amendment 74 would remove the entire framework provided by the Bill for the basis of the setting of the rate. The effect would be that, unless the Supreme Court were to decide to adopt a different basis for the setting of the rate in a future case, the rate would continue to be set on the basis of the present case law, principally the 1998 decision of the House of Lords in Wells v Wells, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, at Second Reading; it is a case on which I believe he sat. This would remove the central aim of the reforms to provide a fairer, more certain and more sustainable system for both claimants and defendants, and would remove any possibility of overcompensation and its impact on the National Health Service.

Clearly, we want seriously injured individuals to be fully compensated for all the losses caused by their injury. They should receive the full and fair compensation that is legally due to them. We do not seek to change the overriding objective of 100% compensation. The problem is that at present the rate has to be set largely by reference to UK index-linked gilts. But our evidence is that this is not how such claimants actually invest and therefore we have to move on.

I add that it might be a little odd to adopt the noble Lord’s Amendment 74 in light of his Amendment 71, which encourages us to have the Lord Chancellor fix the first rate without recourse to the panel at all. There seems to be a slight tension between the two amendments. I have expressed my view on Amendment 71, and we are going to look at that again, but I do not find it easily reconcilable with Amendment 74, albeit I acknowledge that it is a probing amendment.

[Lord Sharkey]

I simply observe that I do not think lawyers have an exclusive right to exercise and run conflicting arguments.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Generally speaking, they are alternative arguments.

Amendment 77 would add an obligation on the Lord Chancellor to take into account the response of the expert panel in determining what the rate should be. Of course, that is exactly what the Lord Chancellor will do. Indeed, why would the legislation require the Lord Chancellor to consult the panel and require the panel to respond if the Lord Chancellor was not required to consider the panel’s response? Of course, there may sometimes be merit in stating every detail of a process in primary legislation but I suggest that it is not necessary in this case.

Amendments 82A, 85A, and 90A, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, relate to the procedures and responsibilities governing the operation of the panel. Clearly, the expert panel has an important advisory role but it is not appropriate or desirable to load it with the additional responsibilities suggested in the amendments. Paragraph 2(7) of new Schedule A1 already requires the panel to take into account the duties of the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 3. Paragraph 4 requires the Lord Chancellor to give reasons for his or her decision and to publish information about the response of the panel. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, observed, ultimately the Lord Chancellor’s decision on the matter, as it is disclosed, will be amenable to judicial review. It is not a case of the Lord Chancellor receiving the expert panel’s views and simply ignoring them. Clearly, such a perverse course of action, which one would not anticipate, would leave his decision-making power amenable to review.

The obligations are expanded by the commitments that we gave to the Justice Select Committee to consult the panel about the allowances to be made for taxation, investment management charges and inflation in the setting of the rate and, over and above that, to publish the panel’s report to the Lord Chancellor at each review. It is not a case just of disclosing what the panel’s advice may have been but of undertaking to publish the panel’s report and then to give reasons for the decision that the Lord Chancellor has made.

As I touch upon that, I recollect that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, raised the question of the experts on the panel. I will come on to the question of a medical expert in a moment but I note that with regard to the position of someone concerned with consumer investments, one would be interested there in the context of someone who acted as a financial adviser to those who made investments as consumers at various levels. That, I understand, is what is contemplated at that point.

As I have sought to underline, the overall thrust of the amendments is that the panel should, in effect, carry out a pre-review of the rate. This is not the intended role of the panel. The panel’s role is advisory. It will be consulted by the Lord Chancellor and it will provide the Lord Chancellor with its views. The report of the panel and the Lord Chancellor’s decision and his reasons for the decision will be published. But the role of the expert panel is not to take away from the role of the Lord Chancellor. It is not the role of the panel to make a decision on what the rate should be. Its role is to provide expert support to the Lord Chancellor.

At the end of the day it is the Lord Chancellor who will make the necessary determination and will be publicly answerable for the determination he makes. Therefore, we consider that the decision must be for the Lord Chancellor, who will take that decision in his role as Lord Chancellor and be legally and politically accountable for it. The process of the setting of the rate is going to be transparent. The panel has been created for a very important purpose—namely, to bring new expertise to the process of setting the rate—but it is not its role to second-guess the outcome of the final review by the Lord Chancellor.

Amendment 84 would require the Lord Chancellor to base the allowances to be made for taxation, inflation and investment management costs on recommendations from the expert panel. The Lord Chancellor is already required by paragraph 3(5) of new Schedule A1 to make appropriate allowances for each of these three items. This will be an evidence-based exercise requiring judgment as to what the standard allowance should be against the range of possible individual circumstances that might be foreseen. The expert panel forms an integral part of the Government’s proposals. It will introduce additional expertise but, at the end of the day, the final decision must be for the Lord Chancellor. The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, would in my submission take the role of the panel way beyond that of an expert consultative role.

I turn to Amendment 87, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and would extend the membership of the expert panel to include a medical representative. Here I concur with the view already expressed by my noble friend Lord Faulks. On one view, the effect of this amendment would be to broaden the general expertise within the panel, but I should explain that its role is intended to focus purely on matters relating to financial rates of return, in order to provide advice to the Lord Chancellor. The Bill therefore provides for the panel to be chaired by the Government Actuary and that the other members should have experience as an actuary, a manager of investments, an economist and, as I indicated earlier, in consumer matters relating to investment—for example, as a financial adviser.

The Government consider that this range of expertise is the most relevant for providing advice on what the relevant investments and rates of return are likely to be, and will be the most useful source in formulating advice for the Lord Chancellor. While medical expertise is relevant when determining a lump-sum amount of compensation to which the discount rate is to be applied, or in estimating the life expectancy of a claimant, these are separate issues to the setting of the discount rate and would be outside the remit of the panel, as an expert panel advising the Lord Chancellor. We do not see that a medical expert would contribute to the process of the expert panel.

I turn next to Amendment 88, which was also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and would require the Lord Chancellor to use the power to appoint the four appointed panel members to secure that each of those members approaches the work of the panel as an expert with the object of recommending a rate of return that is fair to the interests of both claimants and defendants. The appointed panel members are indeed intended to be experts in their fields. The expertise that they will bring to the process of setting the rate is one of the most significant reforms introduced by the Bill. The Government made it clear in their response to the Justice Select Committee that they intend to recruit experts who will act as independent experts in providing their advice, not as representatives of specific interest groups. This is not a representative panel; it is, I emphasise, an expert panel.

The appointed panel members will be required to disclose potential conflicts of interest and, under paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule A1, to take account of the duties imposed on the Lord Chancellor as to how the rate is to be set in deciding what response to give to the Lord Chancellor’s consultation. The mix of expertise stated in the Bill strikes, we suggest, a correct and fair balance between the various areas of knowledge that would be required. The proposed additional requirements on the Lord Chancellor in Amendment 88 are therefore unnecessary.

This amendment, however, also seeks to indicate what the objective of the work of each of the appointed panel members should be. The panel as a whole will play a very important role in providing advice, as I say, to assist the Lord Chancellor in setting the rate. It is very important that this advice is fair, which is why the Bill sets out the range of expertise referred to. However, the role and objective of the panel is to advise the Lord Chancellor on matters relevant to the setting of the rate by the Lord Chancellor. The role of the individual appointed members will be framed accordingly. We consider that the requirements on the Lord Chancellor under the terms of the legal framework for the setting of the rate, coupled with the advice from the panel of experts, who will bring a balanced range of expertise, and the requirements in the Bill which provide that the Lord Chancellor will give reasons for his or her decision, underline the way in which the decision-making process will be accountable and transparent. It will also have the objective of being impartial.

Amendment 91, which I believe was spoken to by my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Hunt, who is still with us, would remove the provisions in paragraph 8 of new Schedule A1, which interpret provisions in relation to the setting of the discount rate to cover the possibility of the Lord Chancellor deciding on the occasion of a review to set no rate or no rate for particular classes of case, on the one hand, and changes from that situation, on the other. In fact, that new paragraph would reproduce the provisions in the Damages Act 1996 which indicate that the court must take into account such rate of return—if any—as may from time to time be prescribed by an order made by the Lord Chancellor. This wording implies that the Lord Chancellor might decide to set no rate under the present law. The provisions in paragraph 8(2) to (4) are intended to clarify how this power would operate.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I have spoken at every stage of the Bill and I first thank the Minister for his time discussing matters with me.

For those who have been in your Lordships’ Chamber for the entirety of this debate, it is interesting to note how blame has been passed around like a squash ball. Is the fault that of the Government for not acting quickly enough, the insurance companies, those dastardly claims management companies or the judiciary for not getting a handle on this earlier?

While there is undoubtedly a problem with fraudulent claims, the one group not to blame is those people who are genuinely injured in this manner in an accident. Some of these cases indeed reach court: I have the privilege of representing those people.

Before I proceed, let me also comment on the matter of low-end claims or minor claims. I have met many a claimant for whom the difference in damages now proposed by the introduction of the tariff, taking some damages from four figures—£1,200 or £1,400—down to the likes of £470 is a significant matter for many people’s incomes up and down this country. I cannot have it portrayed that this might not make a great deal of difference to many ordinary people in the country.

From my experience in your Lordships’ House, we are in an unusual situation. We have so often spoken of the scrutiny of legislation needed here to avoid unintended consequences. But in this Bill, the intended consequence—whether that is the conscious intention of the judge or the virtually certain consequence of the legislation—will be to affect that group of people. Therefore, we are in the unusual situation where an amendment is laid on Report that is like a Second Reading point, because it is a point of principle about the Bill. It is also affects a point of principle that, as a law student, was the DNA of our justice system. It was taught to you from the moment you entered your lecture theatre—where, I have to say, I was taught by some amazing people.

I have thought much since Second Reading about how these genuine claimants might respond—the hundreds of folk who I have had the privilege of sitting with in waiting rooms on the northern circuit when I was a barrister—bearing in mind that they also, of course, care about their premiums and the societal implications of fraud, which is alleged to be so prevalent. It is these people to whom the justice system and the amount of compensation must be explained and make sense.

In my view, a genuine complainant might respond: “Her Majesty’s Government say that the insurance companies are to blame as well. Have you made them do everything possible before depriving me of my compensation?”. In fact, we know that insurance companies have often made commercial decisions to pay out for possible claims just to get rid of a claim at an earlier stage because it is cheaper—even suggesting to people that they might have been injured although they themselves have not mentioned it. Her Majesty’s Government have not asked the insurance companies to stop this behaviour first. The insurance companies have paid out without medical reports, so would it not be fairer to genuine claimants to have a period with the medical reports that the legislation will make mandatory before reaching for such a drastic policy solution?

Secondly, a genuine claimant might respond: “Was this situation so dire for the insurance companies that insuring everybody was really at risk? How are their profits doing?”. A report from Direct Line Group, the largest insurance group, shows profits for the financial year 2017 of £610.9 million—a leap of 51.4% on 2016. Dividends were up 40.2%. In its interim report in 2017, one of the reasons it gave was fewer than expected bodily injury claims. It is not the only insurance company to give this reason at the moment. I quote from the Insurance Times of 24 May this year:

“Fewer whiplash claims have helped Sabre Insurance Group’s gross written premium return to 2017 levels. Sabre said: ‘Pricing action was taken in early March to reflect the improving claims trends, specifically lower whiplash claims frequency’”.


Could the insurance companies not be asked to use perhaps a fraction of these profits to fight the fraud before genuine claimants have to be affected by such a policy decision? I could not help but notice that genuine claimants might actually see the flaw in the system: if, for example, Harry Kane were to get injured in a road traffic accident and was unable to captain England, that would probably merit more in compensation than my having a whiplash injury.

Genuine claimants might respond to the Government and ask, “With those enormous changes that you made as a result of the Jackson review and LASPO, introduced in April 2013, what happened then to premiums and savings made?” I repeat the figures I outlined in Committee. Insurers have saved £8 billion in claims costs between 2010 and 2016. The figure to date is £11 billion. But premiums have gone up from £385 in the second quarter of 2013 to £493 in the last quarter of last year, according to the ABI’s own premium tracker—an increase of 28% since the LASPO changes. Would not a genuine claimant ask, “Can the Government just make sure that the premiums will actually come down so that my compensation that I should have got will in fact be reallocated in lower premiums to everybody else, and not in higher profits for the insurance companies”?

Unfortunately, the legislation at the moment is unable to ensure that. There is nothing wrong with higher profits. Pension funds need them—I recognise that. But this is genuine claimants’ compensation that we are asked to redistribute in this way. I agree with the principle mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that this is a policy decision. For the reasons I have outlined, I do not think that we have reached the point—although the time is fast approaching—to so affect genuine claimants and their understanding in the waiting rooms of our courts throughout this country of what a justice system should deliver. More can be done, so unfortunately, at this time, I cannot support the Government.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 18, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and, as a consequence, I will not be speaking to my Amendments 9, 10 and 17.

As this Bill has progressed, I have repeatedly pointed out that the tariff levels proposed by the Government lack any substantive justification. It remains entirely unclear why these specific amounts have been chosen. What is clear, of course, is that they are very substantially lower than the amounts currently awarded. What is also clear is that they require genuine claimants to suffer a very large reduction in damages in order to try to reduce the incidence of alleged fraud or unmeritorious claims. The incidence of such claims is highly contested and relies, in part, on data that unhelpfully categorises dropped claims as probably fraudulent.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, if I heard him correctly, asked if there can be any doubt about the incidence of whiplash claims. The answer is yes; such a doubt exists, for example, in the House of Commons. The House of Commons Justice Select Committee discussed the question in its report of 15 May this year. Paragraph 2 of its conclusions and recommendations states that,

“we are troubled by the absence of … data on fraudulent claims and we find surprising the wide definition of suspected fraud that is used to collate the ABI’s statistics. In particular, the failure by the ABI to break down their figures by the nature and type of claim, and to isolate RTA PI claims broken down by type of road user, is a significant and regrettable omission that weakens their evidence base”.

The committee went on to recommend that,

“in the interests of accuracy, the Government work with the ABI to develop a more nuanced approach to avoid conflating innocent—if unexpected—consumer behaviour with fraudulent activity”.

It seems wrong in principle to look to genuine claimants to pay for what may reasonably be characterised as, at least partially, a failure of the insurance industry’s own practices. The long-standing practice of no-med settlements springs to mind here.

The Government’s proposals would also create serious anomalies, as mentioned at Second Reading and in Committee, and as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has again mentioned today. A whiplash injury of 24 months’ duration suffered at work would attract damages of up to £6,500. Under the Government’s proposed tariff, that injury would attract £3,725 in a road traffic accident, which is obviously undesirable and unjust. Finally, as far as I can see, the Government’s forecast reduction in the cost of fraudulent claims takes no account of dishonest claimants trading up. The Government’s proposed tariff may well deter small claims, but it may equally encourage dishonest claimants to attempt to move up the duration ladder to compensate.

I believe that we should remove Clause 2, which would leave the determination of damages where it currently is, with the judiciary. It would give the Government and the insurance industry time to reflect further on how better to assess the level of fraud and time to work out how to reduce it without unreasonably burdening genuine claimants, creating unacceptable and unjust anomalies in awards and creating incentives for larger dishonest whiplash claims.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

32: Clause 4, page 4, leave out line 27 and insert—
“(i) of the whiplash injury, and(ii) that the claim does not arise from cold-calling,and”

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, Amendments 32 and 39 return to the issue of cold calling, the problems of which we have debated on many occasions in this House. Our latest attempts to curb the menace of cold calling became law with the passing of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act, but, despite frequent debates and new laws, there remains significant uncertainty as to whether our current set of regulations is as effective as it should be. In particular, as we said in Committee, we are concerned at the extent to which cold calling will continue to drive fraudulent claims for RTA whiplash injuries. The Commons Justice Committee shares these concerns. Paragraph 133 of its 15 May report says:

“We conclude that the Government’s current package of reforms creates a risk of increasing cold calling by, or on behalf of, CMCs; we welcome the restrictions on cold calling in the Financial Guidance and Claims Act, but believe they do not go far enough and that an outright ban should be introduced. In the meantime, we recommend that the Government monitor the effectiveness of the proposed restrictions, particularly on calls from overseas, and that technical remedies are urgently explored to tackle any loopholes that might be exploited by overseas operators to circumvent the restrictions; we ask that the Government report to us on progress with this within a year of the proposed restrictions being implemented”.


In Committee we discussed amendments that would require an assessment of the real-world effect of all the current regulations trying to prevent cold calling. We also discussed the possibility of trying to cut off the revenue streams of cold callers by banning the commercial use of data so collected. I think that the Minister understood our concerns: he acknowledged, as he did again this afternoon, what he referred to as, “the problem of regulating the unregulated”. He mentioned that the Government were seeking to approach this problem by regulating the use of material gathered by cold calling, and we entirely support this approach. There is a widespread unease that we have not really cracked this problem yet—and I believe that the Minister shares at least some of this unease.

Our Amendments 32 and 39 do two things. First, they give the Minister the opportunity to address the House once again on the issue of whiplash and cold calling. Secondly, they propose yet another method of coming at the problem of cutting off the revenue stream of cold callers. Clause 4 sets out new rules against settlement of whiplash claims before medical report. Amendments 32 and 39 extend these rules to cover whiplash claims arising from cold calling. Amendment 32 does this by making it a breach to settle without seeing appropriate evidence that the claim does not arise from cold calling. Amendment 39 allows the Lord Chancellor to specify the form of any evidence required to demonstrate that the claim does not in fact arise from cold calling. Both amendments mirror the provisions in the Bill to ban pre-med settlements.

I realise, as I think we all do, that clamping down on cold calling is a difficult and complex business—but it is also vital. I hope that Amendments 32 and 39 will suggest to the Government a way forward in their attempts to cut off revenue streams and I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I advise the House that if Amendment 32 is agreed I shall not be able to call Amendments 33 and 34 for reasons of pre-emption.

--- Later in debate ---

The Government agree that social nuisances such as cold calling must be curbed, but replicating actions already enshrined in other legislation is not the way to do it. While I appreciate noble Lords’ intent, I respectfully request that they withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord Sharkey]

I thank the Minister for her reply about cold calling. It is a pity because, as I said in moving Amendment 32, there is a widespread feeling that things are not working. I hesitated to say this in the previous debate but I got three calls over the weekend—I thought it might be more appropriate to mention that now rather than earlier. There is a common unease, as my quoting the report from the House of Commons Justice Select Committee shows.

It may get better, and I hope it does, but, as I am sure the Minister knows, I was deeply involved—as was the whole House—in trying to craft regulations in the then Financial Guidance and Claims Bill, which were substantially watered down when they reached the Commons. When they left here, they were much stronger than they turned out to be after the other place had had its way with them. Again, that seems to reinforce the possibility that actually we have not yet got a grip on this. I ask the Government to reflect on whether or not the current package of regulations is going to work and exactly how we will monitor its working. In particular—addressing the point the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, made a moment ago—given that these factories in Pakistan can generate a million calls a day, then close down and reopen next door as another, separate legal entity, how are we going to deal with that if not by cutting off the revenue? I would welcome a conversation—perhaps not on the Floor of the House—about what progress we think we have made in the existing regulations in cutting off the flow of the revenue. In the meantime, and pending that kind of conversation, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 32 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

46: Clause 6, page 6, line 2, at end insert—
“(4A) The Treasury must, within one month of the passing of this Act, make further regulations specifying that the Financial Conduct Authority is to require all insurers holding a licence to offer UK motor insurance to publish a report—(a) on the loss cost savings achieved as a result of the provisions of Part 1 of this Act, and(b) how, and the extent to which, such savings have been applied to reduce motor insurance premiums.(4B) The first such report from insurers must cover the period of 12 months beginning with the first day of the month immediately after the commencement of Part 1 of this Act and must be sent to the Financial Conduct Authority by the end of the period of 15 months beginning with the commencement of Part 1 of this Act.(4C) The regulations must grant the Financial Conduct Authority the power to require further reports on an annual basis. (4D) The Financial Conduct Authority, within the period of 18 months after the commencement of Part 1 of this Act, must make and publish a reasoned assessment of whether it is satisfied that each such insurer is passing on to customers any cost benefits arising from Part 1 of this Act.(4E) The regulations under subsection (4A) must make provision for the Treasury to grant powers to the Financial Conduct Authority to enforce a requirement for insurers to pass on loss cost savings, achieved as a result of the provisions of Part 1, from insurers to consumers through a reduction in the cost of premiums if, after the period of 30 months following the commencement of this section, the Financial Conduct Authority advises the Treasury that such powers are necessary.”

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, Amendment 46 is in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Marks, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I am grateful to them all for their support. The amendment addresses the question of pass-through. How much of the savings generated for insurance companies by whiplash reforms would in fact be passed on to motorists, in the form of reduced premiums?

Most of the insurance companies wrote to the Lord Chancellor in March. The penultimate paragraph of their letter said that,

“the signatories to this letter today publicly commit to passing on to customers cost benefits arising from Government action to tackle the extent of exaggerated low value personal injury claims and reform to the personal injury Discount Rate”.

There would obviously need to be clarity about: the definition of a cost benefit; whether all customers would share the promised distribution or just those with motor insurance; and how the savings would be passed on. This might be in lowered premiums or just the promise of lower than expected premiums in the future, for example.

The House of Commons Justice Select Committee again noted the problem in its May 2015 report. Paragraph 3 of its conclusion and recommendations said:

“Potential savings to motor insurance customers are central to the policy justification for these reforms, but we conclude that the Government’s estimate of the pass-through rate may be over-optimistic, given the lack of robust evidence and the unenforceable nature of insurers’ promises to reduce premiums”.


The committee recommended that,

“if the reforms are implemented, the Government work with the ABI and either the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Financial Conduct Authority to monitor the extent to which any premium reductions can be attributed to these measures and report back to us after 12 months”.

Our amendment would require the Treasury to make regulations specifying that the FCA would require all motor insurers to publish a report on the savings made as a consequence of the whiplash reforms in the Bill, and how and to what extent these savings have been applied to reduce motor insurance premiums. It specifies the period to be covered by these reports as 12 months after commencement and how long the insurance companies would have to submit reports to the FCA, which would be three months. The FCA would then have a further three months to make and publish a reasoned assessment of whether the insurers have made the promised passed-on savings. The amendment also gives the FCA the power to request further reports from insurers annually as it sees fit. Finally, it would ensure that the FCA has the power to force the insurance companies to pass on savings if they have not done so, or done so sufficiently, within 30 months of commencement.

I think most if not all noble Lords would agree that the insurers should be held to their promise. To do that, we need to monitor and assess whether they have in fact held to their promise and, if they have not, to have the power to force them to do so. To do these things requires a tough and experienced regulator. Only the FCA has the resource, reputation, toughness and experience to be the regulator to do that, which is why this amendment gives it the job.

I know that the Minister feels strongly that insurers must be held to their promise and I realise that achieving this may be a rather complex matter. However, it is critical that we achieve it. It would be absolutely scandalous if savings made by insurers as a consequence of the Bill were retained by insurers. Amendment 46 sets out a method by which we can hold insurers to account for their promises. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we have on several occasions referred to the savings under these measures, which will be passed on to consumers by motor insurers. I understand that a number of Peers clearly have concerns about ensuring that this actually occurs.

I should say that the Government hold firm that the highly competitive nature of the motor insurance sector will mean that insurers have little or no choice but to pass on savings to consumers or risk being priced out of the market. An in-depth investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority in 2012 found that the motor insurance market is highly price-sensitive, driven by low levels of market concentration and high levels of penetration by price comparison websites. Resulting estimates indicate that 85% of insurance savings from whiplash measures will be passed on to the consumer. Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, observed, motor insurers providing cover to 84% of the UK market have already written to the Lord Chancellor to make the welcome commitment that they will pass on any savings.

That said, the Government are not unsympathetic to the underlying intention of Amendment 46, as tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. The point is that having made a firm commitment, insurers should be accountable for meeting it. It is, however, important that any amendment in this regard is drafted with care so that it is effective but does not also impose requirements that push beyond the recognised remit of regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority. I also observe that we must ensure that any legislative requirement in this area does not infringe on the very important area of competition law.

I therefore confirm that the Government will accept the views of Peers and develop an amendment, to be tabled in the House of Commons, that meets these requirements and provides an effective means for reporting on the public commitment made by the insurance sector, showing that it results in savings being passed on to consumers and thereby holds insurers to account. This is quite a complex and delicate process and it is ongoing at present.

I add only one further matter. Requiring a report to be made within 12 months of commencement is not likely to be the best way forward because claimants have a three-year period in which to make claims. After the Bill receives Royal Assent, there will therefore be an overhang for up to three years of claims that fall outwith the requirements for the tariff to be applied. We will have to look carefully as well at what point it would be appropriate for a report to be made and laid before Parliament. However, that is under active consideration and, in light of that indication, I hope the noble Lord will consider it appropriate to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the Minister’s answer and encouraged by it, too. I take the points about being careful on competition law and the period over which we assess the insurance companies’ return to the people they insure. I will follow with interest the progress of a government amendment as it goes through the House of Commons. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 46 withdrawn.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

51: Clause 8, page 8, line 12, leave out “90” and insert “25”

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, all the amendments in this group are aimed at significantly bringing forward the date of the first review of the discount rate. They are all in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and I am very grateful for their support. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and to his officials for the considerable time they gave to the discussion of this matter between Committee and Report, and for their help in suggesting drafting for some of the amendments in this group.

As the Bill stands, the timetable for the first review would be as follows. The Lord Chancellor can decide when the provisions in Part 2 commence and there is no minimum or maximum period laid down. At his sole discretion, he can take as long as he likes to commence the provisions that enable a review of the discount rate. Once he has decided to commence the provisions, he then has up to 90 days to trigger the start of the first review. The review must conclude within 180 days, during which the expert panel has up to 90 days to respond to the Lord Chancellor.

All this means that the entire process will take up to 270 days plus the time elapsed before the Lord Chancellor commences the provisions in the Bill itself. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said in his letter of 30 April, assuming the Bill receives Royal Assent this year and that the provisions are brought into force within two months, the statutory timetable means that the first review would be completed before the end of 2019. This will take far too long, as I think all those who contributed to the debate in Committee recognised.

The amendments in this group replace the existing process for conducting rate reviews with a separate and much faster process for conducting the first review. They leave untouched the process for subsequent reviews. Amendments 51, 55, 58 and 59 shorten the length of time after commencement that the Lord Chancellor has to trigger the first review from 90 days to 25 days. Since other amendments in this group will later remove the expert panel from the first review, there is clearly no need for the three-month maximum delay.

Amendments 64 to 66, 72, 74, 78 and 87 set up the new process for the first review. The essence of this new process is contained in Amendment 65. The other amendments are enabling or consequential, with the exception of Amendment 90, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, to which I have added my name and which I will discuss later. Amendment 65 requires that the review is held and the rate determined within 140 days from the Lord Chancellor’s triggering of the first review. It also requires that the Lord Chancellor must, within 20 days of the start of the 140-day period, consult the Government Actuary and the Treasury. The requirement to consult an expert panel is removed entirely from the first review. The only consultees are the Government Actuary and the Treasury. The amendment specifies that the Government Actuary must respond to the consultation within 80 days of the Lord Chancellor requesting the consultation, while Amendment 65 sets out that:

“The exercise of the power … to determine … the rate … is subject to paragraph 3”,


exactly as at present and exactly as for subsequent determinations.

In summary, the changes brought about by the amendments to the process of the first review are as follows. They will reduce the time between commencement and triggering from 90 days to 25 days; they make it plain that the Lord Chancellor must request consultation no later than 20 days after triggering a review, a period unspecified in the Bill as it stands; they will remove the expert panel from the first review and the only consultees will be the Government Actuary and HMT; they will require the Government Actuary to respond to a request for consultation within 80 days after the request has been made; and the entire review must be concluded within 140 days of the Lord Chancellor’s triggering the review.

In all, these measures will reduce the time to arrive at the first determination from commencement by 105 days. This will represent a very significant saving, especially to the NHS, where it may be as much as £300 million a month. Amendment 65 and the other amendments in my name do not address the absolute discretion the Bill gives the Lord Chancellor to decide when the provisions governing rate reviews should commence, but this is addressed in Amendment 90 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. There is no good reason to allow the Lord Chancellor unfettered discretion and I support Amendment 90, which removes it.

In my view, the time between Royal Assent and commencement should be either zero or some small number. When we discussed these matters in Committee, the Minister opened his response to our proposals to bring forward the first review by saying:

“I believe we are as one in our desire to see the provisions brought into force as rapidly and sensibly as possible”.—[Official Report, 15/5/18; col. 633.]


He went on to commit to reflect further on the matter. It is quite clear that he and his officials have done exactly that. Many of the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 65, are largely the fruit of that reflection and of our discussions. I am grateful for that and I commend these amendments to the House. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments relate to the speed with which the first review of the rate can be conducted. Initially, I will focus on Amendment 65 and the related consequential Amendments 64, 66, 72, 74, 78 and 87.

The amendments would accelerate the conclusion of the first review in four ways: first, by replacing the need for the Lord Chancellor to consult the expert panel with a requirement to consult the Government Actuary, thereby simplifying the preparation for the first review. Secondly, by reducing the maximum period within which a review must be completed from 180 days to 140 days. Thirdly, by requiring the Lord Chancellor to consult the Government Actuary within the first 20 days of the review starting. Fourthly, by reducing the time for the Government Actuary to carry out his or her review following the Lord Chancellor’s request, from the 90 days currently afforded to the expert panel in the Bill to 80 days. The remaining changes made by the amendments, including the obligation on the Lord Chancellor to publish information about the Government Actuary’s advice, are consequential to these four changes.

The Government have made clear on several occasions that they are committed to starting and completing the first review as quickly as practical after Royal Assent. The amendments will assist the achievement of that objective because they will remove much of the uncertainty that would exist as to the readiness and availability of the as-yet-unknown members of the panel to commence the review promptly. This means that the open-ended period for the request to the panel can be confined to a specified period.

In addition, the carrying out of a review by the Government Actuary rather than a panel is administratively and substantively a simpler proposition. The overall period for the review and the period for the Government Actuary’s response can therefore both be shortened. The proposal that the Lord Chancellor will make the determination on the rate within 140 days of the start of the review, and that the Government Actuary will respond within 80 days of the Lord Chancellor’s request, recognises these changes in the proposals. The amendments do not affect the timing of the commencement of the review.

However, the removal of the panel from the first review reverses a policy decision that the Government took when replying to the Justice Select Committee’s recommendation to involve the panel in the first review. The reversal of this decision is not something that the Government would do lightly—but, having listened to strong arguments from noble Lords across the House that the first review needs to be completed more quickly than would be possible if the panel had to be constituted, the Government accept that the proposed approach is a sensible and pragmatic step. We have spoken with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and are grateful to him for agreeing some changes from the terms of his initial proposal in Committee. On this basis, the Government are content to accept Amendment 65 and the related consequential amendments.

Turning to the other amendments in this group, the effect of Amendment 51 and the related Amendments 52, 55, 58 and 59 would be to require the first review to be started within 25 days of commencement, rather than the maximum 90 days as provided for in the Bill at present. Amendment 90 would be even more restrictive on the time allowed, as it would require the timetable for the first review to begin on the date of Royal Assent. As I have explained, we share noble Lords’ desire to ensure that a review is carried out as quickly as is reasonably practical. However, reducing the period within which the Lord Chancellor must begin the first review—which is a maximum period that may well be bettered in practice—runs the risk of creating unnecessary problems around compliance with time limits for those involved in translating this legislation into action. This is particularly the case given the Government’s acceptance of the reduced time limits in Amendment 65.

Even though the review will no longer involve the expert panel, there is still a need for extensive pre-review research and analysis to be completed to enable the Government Actuary to provide input to the review on a fully informed basis. This will include developing the data requirements to inform a call for evidence on investment advice and behaviour, funds available to investors and their risk characteristics, and allowances for tax and investment management costs; preparing and publishing the relevant call for evidence documents; and collating and analysing the responses. While we will ensure that the gathering of evidence proceeds as quickly as possible, that work will require time and it is important that it is done properly. At present we estimate that it will be completed around the end of November, but there is a possibility that the Bill may achieve Royal Assent earlier than expected.

The Government are, however, sympathetic to exploring ways to reduce the 90-day period within which the first review must begin, without making the period so short as to cause problems for the rest of the timetable. In light of this we would be happy to discuss the detail of these amendments further with noble Lords before Third Reading if they would be willing to do so. I hope that this commitment will reassure noble Lords that the Government are prepared to examine how the 90-day period following commencement might be reduced and, on that basis, I urge them not to press their amendments.

[Lord Sharkey]

I am very grateful to the Minister for her response, particularly to Amendment 65 and the consequential and preparatory amendments. I am also grateful for her comments about Amendment 51 and the allied amendments. I think it is generally agreed, as she said, that 90 days is too long. Perhaps 25 days is not quite right; perhaps we need a Goldilocks solution. I would be very happy, as I am sure others would, to join in a conversation between now and Third Reading to discuss exactly what size of bowl Goldilocks would like.

I notice, though, that the Minister did not address Amendment 90. I acknowledge the comment that it would be difficult to reduce it to zero, but I heard nothing else. I did not hear a suggestion that it could be some number that is not zero but is still quite small—and certainly less than the number that is currently in place. Would the Minister be happy to discuss that number as well between now and Third Reading?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton]

Yes, I reassure the noble Lord that we would be very happy to do that.

[Lord Sharkey]

I thank the Minister very much. That is very helpful—and having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 51 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

64: Clause 8, page 8, line 31, leave out “2” and insert “1A or 2 (as the case may be)”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

72: Clause 8, page 9, line 18, after “paragraph” insert “1A or”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

74: Clause 8, page 10, line 20, leave out from “information” to end of line 22 and insert “as the Lord Chancellor thinks appropriate about—
(i) the response of the expert panel established for the review, or(ii) in the case of a review required by paragraph 1(2), the response of the Government Actuary or the Deputy Government Actuary (as the case may be).”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

78: Clause 8, page 10, line 24, after “return” insert “required by paragraph 1(3)”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

87: Clause 8, page 12, line 6, after “paragraph” insert “1A or”

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 27th June 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

6: Clause 13, page 15, line 39, leave out “This Part comes” and insert “Part 2 and this Part come”

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, a key focus of our discussions of Part 2 has been to reduce the time taken to reach the conclusion of the first review of the PIDR. In Committee, the Minister encouraged more discussion about how to do that, and on Report the Government accepted amendments that brought forward very substantially the first determination. We were very grateful for that and for their very constructive involvement.

There were, however, two remaining issues to do with the timing of the first review. The first was on the 90-day period from commencement that the Bill gives the Lord Chancellor before he must trigger the first review. The second was on the absolute discretion given to the Lord Chancellor to decide when commencement should take place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, not only for his contribution to this part of the Bill but for his engagement since Report in addressing these matters. I extend those thanks to other noble Lords, including the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, who has also engaged extensively on these matters.

Just to be clear, the Government are fully committed to beginning the first review as soon as possible after Royal Assent and to completing it as soon as is practicable. I hope that I can extend that comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. That is why we have no objection in principle to the amendment. The only remaining question for the Government was the practical one of whether the 90-day period will be sufficient to ensure that all necessary preparatory work can be finished before the 140-day period for the completion of the first review. The Government have begun this work and are making good progress and, although there are public expenditure rules that may affect the timing of its completion, the Government now consider that the 90-day period is sufficient.

In view of this and having regard to the strength of opinion expressed across the House that the first review should proceed quickly, I am pleased to indicate that the Government intend to accept this amendment as well. Perhaps I can refer back to the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Monks, when I move that the Bill do now pass. For the present purposes, we accept the amendment.

[Lord Sharkey]

I simply express my gratitude to the Minister and his team for accepting the amendment and their co-operation throughout the passage of the Bill.

Amendment 6 agreed.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 20th November 2018 Lords Chamber

I hope that noble Lords will be content to accept the amendments from the House of Commons, and I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and his officials for their continued engagement on the Bill, which has been very helpful.

The Bill transfers over £1 billion from whiplash claimants to motor insurers. This transfer is only justifiable if the insurers do not retain this gigantic windfall—and, of course, they have promised that they will not. They have promised in writing to pass on to motorists, in the form of reduced premiums, cost savings made by the provisions in the Bill. A huge amount of money is involved, and a significant promise. Without that promise, I doubt the Bill would have been brought to the House—and without it, it would certainly not pass the House.

On Report, we set out the case for checking that insurers keep their promise. The Government accepted the need for checking the insurers’ compliance and committed to bringing forward in the Commons a mechanism for doing that. New Clause 11—Commons Amendment 3—is the proposed mechanism. I was pleased to see a mechanism in the Bill, but was surprised by its length and complexity. The new clause is very long and very complicated. The whole Bill, before this new clause, ran to only 16 pages, and the new clause by itself adds a further three pages.

When on Report we debated the issue of checking on pass-through, and when this was discussed in the Commons, there was an argument in favour of a much simpler approach. We saw the way forward as simply giving the FCA the power to demand whatever data it considered necessary for the purpose, and then to make an assessment of whether and to what extent insurance companies had in fact passed on the £1 billion to motorists via reduced premiums. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the complex approach taken in new Clause 11 is better than the simple approach I have just described. In particular, I would be interested in what influence any specific competition concerns may have had in producing the baroque structure of the new clause.

There are a couple more points where additional information would be helpful. The first is to do with anonymity. The Minister’s officials have confirmed that the report on compliance mentioned in new Clause 11 would reference only aggregated data. It will not name companies that have broken their promise to pass through the savings made for them by this Bill. In a written note, the Minister’s office said:

“It would be an extreme step for the Government to identify firms individually and this type of action against a particular firm—as opposed to holding the industry to account as a whole—could leave the Government open to challenge, both on the argument that the Government has facilitated anti-competitive behaviour and further on human rights grounds”.