Tuesday 15th May 2018
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberCivil Liability Act 2018 View all Civil Liability Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 90-II(Rev) Revised second marshalled list for Commitee (PDF, 87KB) - (14 May 2018)
Lord Woolf
There is an answer to the problem that the noble and learned Lord raises. It might have implications for the workload of the judiciary but I think that could be handled. We should get away from the idea that a judge should assess damages in appropriate cases only at one stage. There is no reason why you cannot have a system where the matter can be restored to a judge in a case of differences of opinion to take into account succeeding circumstances. If the power existed, the courts would find that in the majority of cases, litigants—properly advised, as they are in these big cases—would come back only when there was a real difficulty between the insurer in practice and the claimant. In that way, matters could be reviewed to reflect any differing circumstances. It was not a one-off assessment that I was advocating but the ability to change the assessment. That would apply to PPOs as it would to any other laws.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I am obliged to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for setting out the background to this matter. His Amendment 55 would require what he referred to as new rules of court to be made that highlight features of periodical payment orders which may make them a more appropriate way for a person with a long-term injury to receive an award for damages for future care costs. I understand that Amendment 55 and the other amendments in this group are essentially probing amendments.
“Rules of court” in Amendment 55 means the Civil Procedure Rules. The purpose of the Civil Procedure Rules—and, indeed, all rules of court—is to govern the practice and procedure of the court and the parties in court proceedings. This may be a technical issue but that does not detract from the importance of ensuring that claimants who have suffered long-term serious injuries are well informed as to the implications of their choice between a lump sum payment of damages and a PPO. I am conscious of the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, about the care that the Executive must always exercise in circumstances where it may be perceived that they are giving directions to the judiciary. I will explain why the Government therefore take a more modest approach to this issue but one which they feel will be effective.
Of course, some Civil Procedure Rules have been made in relation to the exercise by the court of its powers under Section 2(1) of the Damages Act 1996 to order that all or part of an award of damages in respect of personal injury is to take the form of a periodical payment order. These rules already require the court to consider all the circumstances of the case, as well as the preferences of the claimant and defendant and the reasons for them. I appreciate that there are instances in which PPOs may not be available; for example, a mutual insurer such as the Medical Defence Union would not be considered sufficiently well reserved to meet future liabilities. I appreciate also that there have been reservations among insurers about the use of PPOs because of the way in which they are required to reserve for them and the capital requirements related to that.
PPOs are certainly in principle considered a better form of taking compensation for future loss than a lump sum because they provide strong protection for claimants who may be concerned about the return on a lump sum. This Government certainly support their use. At the same time, we must keep in mind that the person behind a claim has a choice and is entitled to make one in such circumstances. We consider it important that claimants making a choice in these circumstances should be properly informed, irrespective of whether their particular case reaches such a stage that the court has to consider whether to order a PPO. Of course, not every case will reach the court; many will be settled before that and, at an earlier stage, claimants have to be properly informed as to which option they should adopt.
I note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, with which I entirely agree. It is perhaps moot to say that no estimate of life expectancy is ever precisely accurate because they are just that—estimates—and one takes that out of the equation where you have a PPO.
The Government remain fully committed to ensuring that appropriate advice is available to claimants in all cases and stand by the commitments they made to action in their response to the Justice Select Committee. To pick up on the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, the point made in paragraph 50 of the response to the JSC was a concern to ensure that guidance was provided to individual claimants. It is our intention to put in place appropriate guidance and to ensure that it is available. We aim to do that by the end of 2018. In addition, we are investigating whether current advice received by claimants on the respective benefits of lump sums and PPOs is effective, and whether there are other ways in which the use of PPOs could be increased within the present system. At present, we intend to complete this work by the summer of 2019.
I hope that goes some way to meeting the concerns expressed by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on these matters. He raised a further question on indexing and I think the noble Lord, Lord Monks, touched on this. The reason that the ASHE 6115 index is taken is that it is the specific care costs index. It may be that wage costs have not increased at the same rate as the wider RPI, which may explain the discrepancy the noble Earl pointed out. However, the ASHE 6115 index is a specific care costs index, which is why that has been employed in the past.
Amendment 92 would require the Lord Chancellor to conduct a review of the impact of setting a new discount rate on the extent to which PPOs are made by the courts, but within six months of the provisions in Part 2 of the Bill coming into force, and then to publish a report of the results within 18 months of commencement. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, hinted, that may be far too tight a timescale to produce an effective report. We certainly do not consider that a requirement to carry out a review of this nature at the time proposed would be particularly informative. That is because the first review of the rate under the Bill would probably not have been completed by the time at which completing the review under this amendment would be required. Effectively, that would mean that the review would have to focus on any impact that had resulted from the setting of the rate as of March 2017 under the present law, which was a rate of minus 0.75%. I suppose that such a review may, however, be of limited use given that the legal framework for setting the rate would have changed but I suspect that it would tell us only something about the past, not the future.
I also observe that the settlement of major cases can take some years to agree, whether or not they arrive at the door of the court, so it might be some time before there is sufficient evidence to draw meaningful conclusions about changes in claimant behaviour. We do not yet have the statistical information about the effect of the March 2017 change in the discount rate on the use of PPOs. We therefore do not know whether the lowering of the rate has diminished the take-up of PPOs, although there is certainly some anecdotal evidence to that effect. It is logical to assume that this would occur, given the size of the change that took place in March 2017.
The evidence from the previous four years does, however, suggest that the use of PPOs is concentrated in the most serious and long-term cases, with the propensity to use them increasing with the size of awards up to about £5 million. They are not really employed in cases where the award of damages is lower than £1 million. That is largely because the use of PPOs is concentrated on provision for future care costs—long-term care costs, generally in cases of catastrophic injury. That is why there is a large percentage of cases in which PPOs are not considered appropriate. The National Health Service pays out PPOs in about 70% of awards over £1 million, while the equivalent figure for insurers is only about 36%, and there may be further work to be done. That is why we are going to look at the question of further guidance in order to encourage their use. Certainly, the take-up is far from negligible in serious cases.
On the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, this is not just about funding clinical negligence claims by the NHS. It goes far deeper than that; it is about ensuring fairness between claimants and defendants in the difficult process of assessing damages, particularly damages awarded for future care. I do not accept the noble Lord’s general point that we are simply trying to move the cost of future care from victims to somewhere else. That is not what we are about; this is concerned with ensuring fairness between claimants and defendants.
I have spoken about the way in which the amendments would require some sort of review. Amendment 92A would also require such a review to assess whether the fact that a PPO may be uprated by reference to an inflation index other than the retail prices index is having an impact on the relative merits of PPOs versus lump sums in the context of a revised discount rate. That would go beyond a consideration of the impact of the discount rate to the overall level of damages award, and how individual elements may be indexed for inflation. At present, the index used for PPOs is a very specific care cost index rather than the RPI.
We will, as I have indicated, be taking forward a range of initiatives to encourage the use of PPOs and to ensure that claimants are properly advised when choosing the form of their award. We hope to have the first part of that process completed by the end of 2018 and the wider investigation completed by the summer of 2019. We believe that those practical steps will encourage the use of PPOs where appropriate—we will, of course, monitor that—and create a situation in which a review requirement, such as that envisaged by the amendments, will not be necessary. Indeed, it would be more appropriate to move in this direction rather than find ourselves in the somewhat invidious position of the Executive sending out directions to the judiciary about how it should approach the award and determination of damages in such serious cases.
With that explanation of the Government’s position, I hope the Committee will be reassured that we are committed to effective action to encourage the use of PPOs. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
Before my noble and learned friend sits down, I understood the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, to have suggested that a PPO could be reviewed as the instalments were going ahead. That would be something of an innovation but it might be worth considering. I do not know whether my noble and learned friend has that in mind.
Lord Keen of Elie
We do not have that in mind. One of the concerns about such a proposal is the impact it would have on the insurers and their inclination to embrace PPOs. At present they are concerned about their reserving liability and their capital requirement on the basis of risk when it comes to a PPO. If we were to add to that equation the possibility of the PPO being revived at some indeterminate point in the future, I believe it would have a counteractive effect on the employment of PPOs by insurers. I have noted what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said; I will take it away and consider it further, but my initial reaction is that it could act as a disincentive for the operation of PPOs.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for that extensive reply and other noble Lords for their contributions to this debate.
I take issue with my noble and learned friend on two matters. First, it is perfectly possible for us to deal with the question of PPOs for mutuals by setting up a proper reinsurance programme. That could be done quite easily. Therefore, to say that we would like to do this but we cannot because mutuals cannot provide it is inaccurate. We can sort that out with a certain amount of technical help.
Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said that we were engaged in a nudge. Personally, I am engaged in a bit of a shove, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Monks, will join us in in that shove. I am not sure that my noble and learned friend has given a shove; I think it is a very delicate pressure on the arm of the industry, which I am not sure will be effective.
We heard from the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, about how PPOs are declining in use and from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, about the culture and question of fairness, which must be at the heart of all our discussions. I was encouraged to think that such an eminent jurist as him should think that the rules of court could provide the flexibility to enable the issues covered by my amendment to be incorporated. We are in an era where things are moving fast, and we do not want to find ourselves stuck in inflexibility.
My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern referred to the question of interference by the Executive with the judiciary. I made clear that I was concerned about that in my opening remarks. The amendment is designed so that Parliament, the legislature, makes its view clear. It is nothing to do with the Executive. It is giving judges a steer, but after that, it is over to them how they proceed. My worry about my noble and learned friend’s comments is that the best remains the enemy of the good. We have a system that is not working very well, but we are saying, “This is frightfully difficult, so we should not change it; we are likely to cause more trouble by changing it than we solve, let sleeping dogs lie”.
The system is not working very well. The transfer of investment and longevity risk away from the individual has to be a key part of making matters fair. It deals with important and difficult cases of the sort raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I hope that the Minister will agree to meet some of us between now and the Bill’s next stage, because I do not think we have got to the bottom of this. We are missing an opportunity to do something seriously helpful for people who suffer long-term, life-changing injuries. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
In response to my noble friend Lord Hodgson, and a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I would be perfectly content to meet them before the Bill’s next stage to discuss this. If they contact my private office, that can be arranged.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I simply wish to confirm that we on this side agree with what noble Lords have suggested, so the quicker we can get things moving, the better for everyone.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I believe that we are as one in our desire to see these provisions brought into force as rapidly and as sensibly as possible, and all of these amendments stem from the entirely reasonable, and indeed strongly argued, wish for the review to be carried out in order to minimise the impact that the present discount rate is having—disproportionately, one would venture—on defendants and in particular on NHS Resolution.
As I explained in writing to noble Lords following Second Reading, to which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, referred, the Government remain fully committed to beginning the first review of the rate promptly after Royal Assent and to completing that first review as soon as is practicable in 2019. To that end, I indicated that although the expert panel cannot be appointed before the power to do so has been created, preparatory work on the setting up of the panel is already under way and the Government will progress the appointment process as far as they properly can before Royal Assent. I hope that that goes some way to meeting the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. As part of that preparatory work, the Government intend to publish the draft terms of reference for the expert panel in time for the Report stage of the Bill in this House. However, the appointment of the expert panel cannot take place until after Royal Assent and thus the completion of the appointment process cannot be predicted with absolute certainty.
The effect of Amendment 58 and its related Amendments 63 and 66 might be to force the Lord Chancellor to delay commencement or risk the time to conduct the review being eaten into, thereby reducing its effectiveness. We have in mind the stages that have to be gone through. Amendment 59 would reduce the period of time within which the first review of the discount rate must be started following commencement from within 90 days of commencement to 10 days of commencement, and other amendments specifying 30 days have been referred to as well.
What I would emphasise is the word “within”. These are outliers, but we are determined to carry out the process as swiftly as we reasonably can. Having regard to that, however, we have to make provision for any uncertainties that may emerge, and therefore to fix too stringent a period might impact adversely upon the whole process that we want to carry out. In other words, while it is important to move quickly, it is also important to ensure that any review is completed fully and properly and is not going to be the subject of untoward challenge.
As I have said, the appointment of the expert panel to advise the Lord Chancellor simply cannot take place until after Royal Assent and even then it may still take a little time, despite the preparations that are ongoing even now. If the review starts without the panel being ready to start work, the whole task is going to be thrown into some difficulty.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, I want to say just one thing about the nature of the Lord Chancellor’s judgment in this case. The noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said that the Lord Chancellor is acting on behalf of the Government, but that is not the nature of the decision: it is the Lord Chancellor’s decision as representing the Lord Chancellor himself. He has the responsibility of a personal decision in this matter, in the way this Bill is drafted. Certainly, when I had responsibility for these matters, it never occurred to me that I should consult the Cabinet about it.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Bill makes perfectly clear that this is a decision of the Lord Chancellor as Lord Chancellor, and it is in that context that it has to be seen and understood.
Amendment 61 would replace the proposed three-year maximum review cycle for the second and subsequent reviews of the rate with a system under which the need for the rate to be reviewed would be determined by the expert panel by reference to changes in returns on investment. Of course, there are then consequential and supplementary amendments. The effect would be to add a new and distinct responsibility to the role of the panel. It would in effect, as I believe my noble friend Lord Hodgson acknowledged, require a standing panel to be created. If more than a year had passed since the rate was reviewed, the expert panel would be required to assess the need for a review and then to advise the Lord Chancellor to review the rate if it considered that the nature of return on investment had changed enough to justify a review. If the panel decided that this condition had not been satisfied, it would have to report its reasons for this view to the Lord Chancellor.
The concept of a review based on changes in investment returns was canvassed as an alternative to a fixed review period in the Government’s 2017 consultation on how the rate should be set, and it was supported, let me be clear. However, basing the review requirement on changes in investment returns would, we believe, create more uncertainty and be less predictable than a regular fixed-date review. The introduction of a requirement for the panel to consider the need for a full review annually could further fuel such uncertainty.
I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Lord and others at Second Reading about the potential for a fixed review period to prompt undesirable litigation behaviour and the possibility of what is sometimes termed the gaming of the system in anticipation of a change to the rate. However, this problem would not be avoided by the system which the amendment proposes. Litigants would still know when the panel would be required to consider whether the rate required reviewing. Indeed, such occasions would be more frequent under the amendment than under the three-year cycle proposed in the Bill. One can imagine a stop-start mentality emerging leading up to the time when the panel was expected to report.
A further consequence of the amendment would be that the expert panel would have, in practice, to exist independently of the review of the rate, rather than being convened by the Lord Chancellor for each review, as the Bill currently provides. In effect, a standing panel would be required, which would have to exercise judgment as to the timing of reviews, rather than confining itself to the technical matter of advising the Lord Chancellor on the factors that might be considered in the setting of the rate, which is the purpose of the expert panel. The amendment would therefore make a very significant change to the proposals in the Bill regarding when the rate should be changed. The Government’s proposals for a fixed-period maximum cycle for the review of the rate have, as I say, been developed through consultation and been the subject of pre-legislative scrutiny, and we consider that they provide a simple and certain method by which reviews can largely be predicted.
Amendment 74 would require the Lord Chancellor to adopt any recommendation from the expert panel as to whether the rate should be changed and, if so, what the rate should be. Clearly, such a change would diminish significantly the responsibility and accountability of the Lord Chancellor for any review outcome—indeed, it would essentially remove it. Amendment 74 would also remove the requirements on the Lord Chancellor, the panel and the Treasury set out in paragraph 2(6) and (7) of new Schedule A1 to comply with or to take into account the duties of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the setting of the rate that are set out in paragraph 3 of new Schedule A1. What we would have is the elevation of the panel from an advisory role to essentially an executive role. That would be a major change and clearly greatly alter and increase the role of the panel.
The creation of the expert panel to advise the Lord Chancellor is, of course, one of the most important changes introduced by Clause 8. The panel is central to the Government’s proposals for the way in which the rate is set, introducing new expertise and transparency. The panel will play a very important role in providing assistance to the Lord Chancellor in setting the rate, but it would not in our view be appropriate for the panel’s recommendations to bind the Lord Chancellor in deciding whether the rate should change and what it should be. The setting of the discount rate requires the weighing of different potential outcomes for individuals in relation to a range of possible rates. An element of value judgment will ultimately be required. It is important, therefore, that the decision-maker should be politically and publicly accountable for decisions on the rate. That is why the Lord Chancellor is, in our view, the appropriate person to make that choice. Indeed, this was recognised by the Justice Select Committee, which stated in its report that:
“Setting the discount rate has repercussions on the taxpayer through Government expenditure and also consumers through its impact on insurance premiums and inflation; therefore we think it is right that the decision to set the discount rate lies with the Lord Chancellor”.
We agree with that assessment.
In addition to being influenced by the pre-legislative scrutiny carried out by the Justice Committee, the proposals we have put forward have been developed through the public consultation process. In response to the question of by whom the rate should be set, the largest single group of support was for the rate to be set by the Lord Chancellor following advice from an expert panel. I note the support for that which has been given, in particular, by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, expressing his experience as Lord Chancellor and underlining the distinct role of the Lord Chancellor in this context.
Lord Sharkey
The Minister talks about the consultation and the preferences expressed there. As I think I mentioned at Second Reading, there was no majority in favour of the Lord Chancellor being involved. There was a majority for other methods, not the Lord Chancellor.
Lord Keen of Elie
I acknowledge that. As I said, the greatest number of responses were in support of that particular proposal. I reiterate that.
I understand that Amendment 74 is a probing amendment but it would at a stroke remove many of the benefits that the proposed reforms in the Bill are seeking to achieve. This is because paragraph 3 of the new schedule governs how the Lord Chancellor is to decide what the rate should be, and Amendment 74 would remove paragraph 3 from the schedule. The essential change made by paragraph 3 to the present law is that in future the rate is to be assessed on returns reasonably expected to be achievable from a diversified low-risk portfolio of investments. This has regard to how claimants actually invest and the returns available to them. This evidence-based process of assessment will replace the hypothetical approach of the present law, which leads to the rate being set largely by reference only to returns from UK index-linked gilts.
Our evidence is clear that claimants simply do not invest all their awards in UK index-linked gilts; in other words, claimants do not pay Her Majesty’s Government to look after their money. Our research indicates that setting the rate on this basis leads to awards of compensation that are expected to produce on average around 135% of the funds anticipated to be necessary to meet the claimant’s losses, although this drops to 120% to 125% after taxation and the costs associated with the management of investments have been accounted for—a point that I will return to in a moment. The new system will put the setting of the rate on a far more realistic basis and bring the average closer to the target of 100%. This will be fairer for both claimants and defendants.
In support of this process, the paragraph sets out a number of key assumptions that the Lord Chancellor must adopt in deciding what the rate should be and a number of supporting factors he or she must take into account. It also enables the Lord Chancellor to identify and apply further assumptions and to take into account further factors in determining what the rate should be. Amendment 74 would remove the entire framework provided by the Bill for the basis of the setting of the rate. The effect would be that, unless the Supreme Court were to decide to adopt a different basis for the setting of the rate in a future case, the rate would continue to be set on the basis of the present case law, principally the 1998 decision of the House of Lords in Wells v Wells, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, at Second Reading; it is a case on which I believe he sat. This would remove the central aim of the reforms to provide a fairer, more certain and more sustainable system for both claimants and defendants, and would remove any possibility of overcompensation and its impact on the National Health Service.
Clearly, we want seriously injured individuals to be fully compensated for all the losses caused by their injury. They should receive the full and fair compensation that is legally due to them. We do not seek to change the overriding objective of 100% compensation. The problem is that at present the rate has to be set largely by reference to UK index-linked gilts. But our evidence is that this is not how such claimants actually invest and therefore we have to move on.
I add that it might be a little odd to adopt the noble Lord’s Amendment 74 in light of his Amendment 71, which encourages us to have the Lord Chancellor fix the first rate without recourse to the panel at all. There seems to be a slight tension between the two amendments. I have expressed my view on Amendment 71, and we are going to look at that again, but I do not find it easily reconcilable with Amendment 74, albeit I acknowledge that it is a probing amendment.
Lord Sharkey
I simply observe that I do not think lawyers have an exclusive right to exercise and run conflicting arguments.
Lord Keen of Elie
Generally speaking, they are alternative arguments.
Amendment 77 would add an obligation on the Lord Chancellor to take into account the response of the expert panel in determining what the rate should be. Of course, that is exactly what the Lord Chancellor will do. Indeed, why would the legislation require the Lord Chancellor to consult the panel and require the panel to respond if the Lord Chancellor was not required to consider the panel’s response? Of course, there may sometimes be merit in stating every detail of a process in primary legislation but I suggest that it is not necessary in this case.
Amendments 82A, 85A, and 90A, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, relate to the procedures and responsibilities governing the operation of the panel. Clearly, the expert panel has an important advisory role but it is not appropriate or desirable to load it with the additional responsibilities suggested in the amendments. Paragraph 2(7) of new Schedule A1 already requires the panel to take into account the duties of the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 3. Paragraph 4 requires the Lord Chancellor to give reasons for his or her decision and to publish information about the response of the panel. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, observed, ultimately the Lord Chancellor’s decision on the matter, as it is disclosed, will be amenable to judicial review. It is not a case of the Lord Chancellor receiving the expert panel’s views and simply ignoring them. Clearly, such a perverse course of action, which one would not anticipate, would leave his decision-making power amenable to review.
The obligations are expanded by the commitments that we gave to the Justice Select Committee to consult the panel about the allowances to be made for taxation, investment management charges and inflation in the setting of the rate and, over and above that, to publish the panel’s report to the Lord Chancellor at each review. It is not a case just of disclosing what the panel’s advice may have been but of undertaking to publish the panel’s report and then to give reasons for the decision that the Lord Chancellor has made.
As I touch upon that, I recollect that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, raised the question of the experts on the panel. I will come on to the question of a medical expert in a moment but I note that with regard to the position of someone concerned with consumer investments, one would be interested there in the context of someone who acted as a financial adviser to those who made investments as consumers at various levels. That, I understand, is what is contemplated at that point.
As I have sought to underline, the overall thrust of the amendments is that the panel should, in effect, carry out a pre-review of the rate. This is not the intended role of the panel. The panel’s role is advisory. It will be consulted by the Lord Chancellor and it will provide the Lord Chancellor with its views. The report of the panel and the Lord Chancellor’s decision and his reasons for the decision will be published. But the role of the expert panel is not to take away from the role of the Lord Chancellor. It is not the role of the panel to make a decision on what the rate should be. Its role is to provide expert support to the Lord Chancellor.
At the end of the day it is the Lord Chancellor who will make the necessary determination and will be publicly answerable for the determination he makes. Therefore, we consider that the decision must be for the Lord Chancellor, who will take that decision in his role as Lord Chancellor and be legally and politically accountable for it. The process of the setting of the rate is going to be transparent. The panel has been created for a very important purpose—namely, to bring new expertise to the process of setting the rate—but it is not its role to second-guess the outcome of the final review by the Lord Chancellor.
Amendment 84 would require the Lord Chancellor to base the allowances to be made for taxation, inflation and investment management costs on recommendations from the expert panel. The Lord Chancellor is already required by paragraph 3(5) of new Schedule A1 to make appropriate allowances for each of these three items. This will be an evidence-based exercise requiring judgment as to what the standard allowance should be against the range of possible individual circumstances that might be foreseen. The expert panel forms an integral part of the Government’s proposals. It will introduce additional expertise but, at the end of the day, the final decision must be for the Lord Chancellor. The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, would in my submission take the role of the panel way beyond that of an expert consultative role.
I turn to Amendment 87, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and would extend the membership of the expert panel to include a medical representative. Here I concur with the view already expressed by my noble friend Lord Faulks. On one view, the effect of this amendment would be to broaden the general expertise within the panel, but I should explain that its role is intended to focus purely on matters relating to financial rates of return, in order to provide advice to the Lord Chancellor. The Bill therefore provides for the panel to be chaired by the Government Actuary and that the other members should have experience as an actuary, a manager of investments, an economist and, as I indicated earlier, in consumer matters relating to investment—for example, as a financial adviser.
The Government consider that this range of expertise is the most relevant for providing advice on what the relevant investments and rates of return are likely to be, and will be the most useful source in formulating advice for the Lord Chancellor. While medical expertise is relevant when determining a lump-sum amount of compensation to which the discount rate is to be applied, or in estimating the life expectancy of a claimant, these are separate issues to the setting of the discount rate and would be outside the remit of the panel, as an expert panel advising the Lord Chancellor. We do not see that a medical expert would contribute to the process of the expert panel.
I turn next to Amendment 88, which was also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and would require the Lord Chancellor to use the power to appoint the four appointed panel members to secure that each of those members approaches the work of the panel as an expert with the object of recommending a rate of return that is fair to the interests of both claimants and defendants. The appointed panel members are indeed intended to be experts in their fields. The expertise that they will bring to the process of setting the rate is one of the most significant reforms introduced by the Bill. The Government made it clear in their response to the Justice Select Committee that they intend to recruit experts who will act as independent experts in providing their advice, not as representatives of specific interest groups. This is not a representative panel; it is, I emphasise, an expert panel.
The appointed panel members will be required to disclose potential conflicts of interest and, under paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule A1, to take account of the duties imposed on the Lord Chancellor as to how the rate is to be set in deciding what response to give to the Lord Chancellor’s consultation. The mix of expertise stated in the Bill strikes, we suggest, a correct and fair balance between the various areas of knowledge that would be required. The proposed additional requirements on the Lord Chancellor in Amendment 88 are therefore unnecessary.
This amendment, however, also seeks to indicate what the objective of the work of each of the appointed panel members should be. The panel as a whole will play a very important role in providing advice, as I say, to assist the Lord Chancellor in setting the rate. It is very important that this advice is fair, which is why the Bill sets out the range of expertise referred to. However, the role and objective of the panel is to advise the Lord Chancellor on matters relevant to the setting of the rate by the Lord Chancellor. The role of the individual appointed members will be framed accordingly. We consider that the requirements on the Lord Chancellor under the terms of the legal framework for the setting of the rate, coupled with the advice from the panel of experts, who will bring a balanced range of expertise, and the requirements in the Bill which provide that the Lord Chancellor will give reasons for his or her decision, underline the way in which the decision-making process will be accountable and transparent. It will also have the objective of being impartial.
Amendment 91, which I believe was spoken to by my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Hunt, who is still with us, would remove the provisions in paragraph 8 of new Schedule A1, which interpret provisions in relation to the setting of the discount rate to cover the possibility of the Lord Chancellor deciding on the occasion of a review to set no rate or no rate for particular classes of case, on the one hand, and changes from that situation, on the other. In fact, that new paragraph would reproduce the provisions in the Damages Act 1996 which indicate that the court must take into account such rate of return—if any—as may from time to time be prescribed by an order made by the Lord Chancellor. This wording implies that the Lord Chancellor might decide to set no rate under the present law. The provisions in paragraph 8(2) to (4) are intended to clarify how this power would operate.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
My Lords, I will briefly support the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, in what she just said. It is easy for us to overlook what quantitative easing has done to the returns on savings and fixed interest. It has been a much longer-running saga than was anticipated, and it is still carrying on. If we are to set up a system that precludes people investing in equities, which gives some protection against that, we will be doing no service to the people who need this money as part of the way to recover from terrible injuries they received. The last line on page 9,
“who has different financial aims”,
does not add anything at all to the situation and will merely provide fuel and funds for lawyers to discuss exactly what that means in cases in future years.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to all noble Lords for their contributions. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, began by referring to the briefing from APIL—the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. I am familiar with it, and indeed, the association invited me to speak at its annual conference, where I confirmed that we would take the Bill through Parliament. I have not cleared my diary for next year. Much of what they had to say, which was repeated by the noble Lord, was, as the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, pointed out, met by the need to encourage the uptake of periodical payment orders. We are committed to that and we will take it forward in various ways. They need to be embraced more thoroughly, not only by claimants but by defendants —insurers—as well. Nevertheless, I make that point.
The noble Lord referred to the case of Wells v Wells, which has been mentioned before. There we saw the reference to what was essentially construed as “very low risk investment in UK gilts”, and we are moving away from that. However, there is an additional element in that, which is volatility: you have an investment portfolio which may be subject to volatility, and you may find that it is at a low point at a stage when you need to withdraw capital funds. That has to be factored in as well, and we appreciate all that.
On the suggestion that we are somehow inviting people to invest their savings, or a majority of them, in hedge funds, that will not do at all. The portfolio A that was examined included 13% UK equities, 15% overseas equities, and 18% of alternative investments which could be modelled as hedge funds. We have to see all this in context. We took clear evidence on the nature of a low-risk portfolio, and there was reference, for example, to widows and orphans, but we are in a different climate in this context. We are not seeking to move away from the idea of 100% compensation. I will come on to the probing amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on setting the rate by reference to not only a floor but, I suggest, a ceiling—there are reasons for that—and the question of investment objectives, as distinct from different financial aims.
Amendment 78 seeks to amend paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule A1 by removing the words,
“in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor”,
from the requirement that the Lord Chancellor must decide the rate on the basis that,
“the rate of return should be the rate that, in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, a recipient of relevant damages could reasonably be expected to achieve”,
if he invested the relevant damages for the purpose of the assumed objectives. The effect of the amendment would be to prevent the Lord Chancellor seeking to justify a rate on the basis that it seems perfectly reasonable in his subjective opinion when, by any objective assessment, the rate proposed is not supportable.
The noble Lord referred to an “unfettered discretion” and conflict with a political interest, but we are talking about the Lord Chancellor making the decision in his capacity as Lord Chancellor. He does not have an unfettered discretion. He is subject to public law duties in the exercise of his functions. Any decision of the Lord Chancellor as to what the rate should be must be rational, and any failure in rationality can be challenged by way of judicial review. I have already touched upon that and the question of disclosure, and I shall not repeat it.
It is necessary to have reference to the opinion of the Lord Chancellor in relation to setting the rate because the setting of the discount rate is not now, and will not under the proposed legislation, be a precise science—it cannot be. The decision to be made on the rate will require the weighing of different potential outcomes for individuals in relation to a range of possible rates. An inevitable degree of subjective assessment is involved in this process. That is why it is appropriate that, although there is an expert panel, that subjective assessment is made by the Lord Chancellor, albeit with the reasons being given and explained, with a rational analysis of the information submitted to him.
Amendment 78A would require the Lord Chancellor to assume, when considering the damages to which the discount rate would apply, that the relevant damages would be payable as a lump sum or partly as a lump sum. The current wording of the Bill requires the Lord Chancellor to assume that the relevant damages will be payable wholly as a lump sum. We do not consider that this amendment is necessary. The discount rate will only ever be applicable to damages payable as a lump sum, and in setting the rate the Lord Chancellor will have regard to that.
Amendment 79 would include the requirement to assume, among the assumptions which the Lord Chancellor must make under paragraph 3(3) of new Schedule A1 in determining the discount rate, that the cost to the claimant of investment advice shall not be recoverable by way of damages. I appreciate the point made by my noble friend Lord Faulks about the need to be clear about how investment management costs are to be treated in setting the rate, but we do not consider that this amendment is necessary.
Paragraph 3(5) of the schedule provides for the Lord Chancellor to make such allowance for “investment management costs” as he thinks appropriate. This provision has been included on the basis that under the current law the cost of investment advice is not, for the reasons explained by my noble friend Lord Faulks, recoverable as a head of damages and therefore needs to be taken into account as a factor in setting the discount rate. Should the law change, an allowance in the setting of the discount rate would then become unnecessary, as the claimant would already have the benefit of the compensation for the costs. However, we understand that paragraph 3(5) reflects the current law and can adapt to changes in the law. Therefore, we do not consider that it casts doubt on the present law regarding the unrecoverability of investment costs as a head of damage. That is a feature of fixing the discount rate.
Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, seeks to change one of the assumptions that the Lord Chancellor is required to make under paragraph 3(3) of the new schedule. Under the amendment, the recipient of the relevant damages would be assumed to invest in a diversified portfolio of investment grade listed debt securities rather than a diversified portfolio of investments. The range of investments to be assumed to be made and included in the diversified portfolio under the amendment is clearly narrower than that under the proposed assumption in paragraph 3(3)(c) at present.
The Bill does not restrict the investments that are to be assumed, save that the overall investment approach must be assumed to fall within the range of risk described in paragraph 3(3)(d). We consider that this approach avoids the rigidity of tying the assumptions to a single type of investment. The Lord Chancellor and the panel can therefore assess what the appropriate investments should be in the circumstance of the review. In making their assessment, the Lord Chancellor and the panel will have to have regard to evidence of how claimants actually invest and the returns actually available to investors. We consider that to be a more sustainable system for the future.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very detailed reply and all other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. On a small point of detail, I think the noble and learned Lord referred to 80% hedge funds. I do not think that is the figure I mentioned, but even at 18% it seems surprisingly high—but there we are.
One outstanding issue is that of how those who are compensated actually make their investments. I draw a parallel with the pensions system. We have just spent quite a long time in this House and at the other end looking at default arrangements for people who have a pension pot and want to transfer it or cash it in on some basis. Encouragement to try to get those individuals to take advice of one sort or another is exercised quite extensively. I raised the same point in relation to people receiving compensation for injury and damages. What happens when they get the cheque? Is there any encouragement for them to get independent guidance on where they should get such advice from? That is still a bit of a mystery to me, even after the debate. I do not know whether there is anything more the Minister can say on that point. The presumption is that individuals will make their own arrangements with presumably regulated advisers. But what about those who do not? What is the process and system that encourages them to avail themselves of investment advice?
Lord Keen of Elie
I do not know whether the noble Lord wants me to respond to that but I will, very briefly, if I may, with the leave of the House. Where you have major claims for catastrophic injury, the lawyers involved for the claimants are highly sophisticated. One clear message that I received when discussing this with claimants’ lawyers was that they are concerned not only with the processing and pursuit of the claim itself but with establishing a framework within which the claimant will be able to live. I imagine that almost invariably involves the provision of suitable investment advice, albeit no one is obliged to accept it.
Lord Faulks
My Lords, in practice, when these cases come before a court, particularly where there is a party who lacks capacity, a judge, before approving one of these orders—they have the right to approve or disapprove a settlement—must be satisfied that appropriate advice has been taken on the split between periodical payments and a lump sum and that, generally, it is a satisfactory settlement from the court’s point of view. If they are subject to the Court of Protection, the court will then be able to manage investments according to the best interests of the protected party. If I may say so, the noble Lord has a good point on what happens to those who do not need the approval of the court or who are outside the protected party, and who are like anybody else who comes into a large sum of money in any other context. They will be well advised to take advice: some do; some, I fear, do not.