Mental Health Bill [HL]

Lord Scriven Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I will be brief, but in following the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I have to note that I do not believe that a complaints culture is a problem in the contexts covered by this Bill. There is, perhaps, a lack of listening to patients and those affected, and a lack of action rather than a problem with listening to complaints. In that context, I commend the noble Earl, Lord Howe, who cited extensive testimony from Blooming Change. One thing that struck me when looking back over the previous days of Committee was that it would have been good to hear, perhaps even more than we did, direct testimony and the voices of those who are experts by experience. The phrase “nothing about us without us” really stuck in my mind and it is important that we keep that in mind throughout Committee. Again in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, I think it is important not to seek to downplay the mental health crisis that we are seeing across our society. There is a huge shortage of services meeting people’s very clear and acute needs, and acute needs are what we are largely covering in this Bill.

I attached my name to Amendments 50 and 51 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, which address non-drug-based interventions. In essence, I agree with everything the noble Baroness said; I just want to stress her points. When we talk about non-drug-based therapies, we are tempted to think we mean talking therapies and psychological therapies. Those are tremendously important, but this is where we also need to take the broader public health context. I mentioned on an earlier group digital treatments such as Avatar for those who hear voices. They are the kind of new, different ways of looking at things that people may not have been trained in, and it is important that they are considered. I also talked a fair bit about the gut-brain axis and dietary interventions such as green prescribing, in which we have seen great advances across the medical fields in recent years—exposure to green spaces and the chance to get exercise in green spaces. That makes me think that we need to think about facilities and how we make sure there is provision within them, which, in some ways, this amendment would help to cover.

As a noble Lord said earlier, we are talking about making sure we are treating the whole person and not a condition with a drug. I thought the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, was very important, as is his amendment. I am not sure whether it needs to be in the Bill, but it would be interesting to have the Minister’s comments on making sure that consideration of withdrawal symptoms is part of prescribing practice. That is absolutely key and central. I note a report from the universities of Berlin and Cologne out last year which showed that the second-most prescribed antidepressant in the UK, venlafaxine, also has the second-highest rate of problem withdrawal symptoms. We need to make sure that is carefully considered pre-stage—before we get to the withdrawal stage, are we going to create that problem? I do not know whether it could be incorporated in the amendment, but it is something to think about anyway.

The other amendment—slightly oddly—in this group in my name is Amendment 154, which again, as on a previous group, I put down at the request of the Law Society. It is about mental health tribunal pilots for challenges against treatment decisions. To some degree, we have already discussed this in the earlier group, but I would be interested in whether the Minister has any comment on the amendment. I think that it is fairly self-explanatory, so I will not go through it further.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 54A and 54B in my name, which are on a very narrow part of the treatment plan for individuals. Before I do that, let me say that I support the amendments in this group, particularly the general thrust of what been said; that is, that the automatic medical model must no longer be the default position and a much more social model must be added on to the medical model so that they complement each other.

Having said that, I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, but found it very difficult to understand what was required. She argued against the use of medication but then argued against quite a lot of the non-medicated issues. Her intervention was a bit confusing in terms of understanding what the importance was.

My amendments are predominantly about Clause 18, which is about the use of ECT. The clause allows for the emergency use of ECT based on a second medical opinion. The element I wish to speak to is the very wide Henry VIII power that the Government wish to give themselves in regulations to do away with the second medical opinion in an emergency. The Bill says:

“The appropriate national authority may by regulations amend this Act to provide for circumstances in which functions of a second opinion appointed doctor in relation to treatment falling within section 62ZA(1) may or must be carried out instead by the approved clinician in charge of the treatment in question”.


New Section 62ZB(3) then says:

“Regulations under this section may make … (a) provision subject to specified exceptions; (b) different provision for different cases; (c) transitional, consequential, incidental or supplemental provision”.


That is quite a wide Henry VIII power.

To prove that I really am Billy No-Mates and do not get out often on a cold night, I read the wonderful 10th report of this Session from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which makes exactly the same points but in more eloquent language. This is a very wide Henry VIII power, and the committee does not really understand why the Government are seeking—even though it is through the affirmative procedure—such wide powers in such broad language.

The committee said that it would expect the power to be drafted with significant limitations and a framework for when it could be used. My amendment seeks to do exactly that. It would not prevent the clinician in change from using ECT in an emergency case without referring to a second practitioner in certain circumstances, but the regulations would be within a framework laid out in Amendment 54B, that

“the treatment is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life … obtaining a second opinion would cause a delay that places the patient at a significant and imminent risk of death or serious physical harm, and … the treatment is reversible”.

The regulations would have to be written so that

“Any amendment made under subsection (1) must specify the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which the second opinion may be dispensed with”.


A report to Parliament on subsection (1) dispensations would also have to be made.

I believe, from reading the wise words of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report, that it is important that the regulations have a framework, so that the Minister still has flexibility but is constrained by what is in the Bill. That is why I have spoken to this amendment.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I feel I must poke my nose in on these of amendments, even though I do not have an amendment. I support the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and his various amendments. I particularly like the amendment that would require children and their families to be asked the month after how it all went.

We are hearing described the appalling nature of many mental health services. It is not just children’s services. Although they may be a very good example, as many of them are not fit for purpose, we would get the same complaints and the same appalling state of affairs if we went around other mental health services across the country. It is heartbreaking. I truly believe that services have deteriorated since I practised in hospitals. People, including my former colleagues who are still practising, say that services are completely disorganised and not fit for purpose. We have known for 50 years that the social model of care was an appropriate model, and that you need psychological and social psychotherapeutic interventions, as well as any drugs that might be helpful. They are not going on because there is no availability anywhere.

We have known since at least the 1960s that patients with schizophrenia, for example, can benefit by being taught, one-to-one, about how to interact with people when they are recovering from an episode. That never happens, because we do not employ teachers in the NHS—we just do not do it. We do not employ the right sort of people and we do not have the right sort of facilities. When people are employed, there are so few of them that it is simply impossible to do what is necessary. I am not defending this, because there are some very good units—I am sure that there are some very good children’s and young people’s units—but they are not the norm anymore, and that is a very sad state of affairs.

Sadly, legislation through mental health Bills will not, unfortunately, solve the problem. What we are talking about is not only a fundamental change of culture and getting on with all the things that we know should be done; there needs to be investment and a totally different approach to mental health. All the things that we know should be done cannot be delivered by mental health legislation alone. I say that because we are trying to shove too much into the Bill and hoping for the best, but I do not think that it will work.

Later in the debate on these amendments, noble Lords moved away from talking about people who were very unwell and who need in-patient care to talking about this vast mass of people who are diagnosed with conditions where they cannot work. That is a whole new ball game. I agree with almost every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, because there is no doubt that there is a massive overdiagnosis of things that are called “mental disorder”, when they are in fact distress and need a different sort of approach.

A young friend of mine—a gentleman who is now in his final years training as a maxillofacial surgeon—had a period of great distress because of family circumstances. He sat down on his own one evening and went to a website, “Diagnose yourself”. He rang me and said, “I’ve been diagnosed as having ADHD”. I cannot imagine anybody who is less likely to have ADHD than this young man, who is the most socially competent young man I know. This morning, my husband and I had a go on the website together—he did one test and I did another—and we both came up with the same result: “You probably have ADHD”. Well, maybe I am, folks, but I am not going to go on the Ritalin yet. There are a lot of websites that are utter rubbish and encourage people to pay money to see psychotherapists and other counsellors to see what the matter is with them, so that other people can put money in their pockets for doing not much.

That is the different end of the spectrum. When we are thinking about these things, we have to think about what the patient has. Is it something that can be diagnosed—heaven knows that colleagues here were very keen that we should have a diagnosis—or something at the other end of the spectrum? With the Mental Health Bill, we are talking about when you can detain people, take away their rights and say, “We are detaining you”, to treat them, and protect them from wrong treatment, bad doctoring and bad staff. That is what the Mental Health Act is for.

But I am afraid that it is not to do with any of this other stuff. We have to think through what really has to be in the Bill to protect the patients and the staff and what cannot go in there because it is not relevant to these issues.

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Lastly on this amendment, while we are committed to expanding access to independent mental health advocacy, we are also mindful of not overburdening the workforce. This amendment is likely to be resource intensive, as well as resulting in a significant deviation from the IMHA’s current role: to support people to understand and access their rights when detained.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The Minister has reeled off a very good list of what is already in place. Have the Government done an assessment to see exactly how that learning is ingrained and how effective it has been in changing mental health provision and mental health services? If not, could she please go back to her department to try to find that, and write to Members of the Committee so we can see that in writing?

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness. I hope it was implicit in what I said that I would look to this Bill to include an order-making power that would enable regulations to be laid in due course that would cover not only 16 or 17 year-olds but also those under 16, and Parliament would then approve them. No doubt this is a matter that we can discuss further after this, but I hope that the point of principle is clear, which I fully support, that this issue needs to be sorted through this Bill.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I have listened to the noble Earl’s argument carefully, and in principle I support what he is trying to do. The only problem with leaving the matter to a statutory instrument, rather than putting it on the face of the Bill, is that it is far easier for the Secretary of State to change that, even despite the will of Parliament, based on the way that Parliament works. Why could it not be on the face of the Bill, to give absolute certainty, rather than in a statutory instrument, which normally gives flexibility and powers to a Minister?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

There are two answers to that. First, it is generally unthinkable for a Government to lay regulations without first having consulted the relevant parties. Secondly, if we are honest, putting something on the face of a Bill is not the whole story; there would need to be proper clinical guidance published alongside that for practical purposes for hospitals and elsewhere.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

The overall concern is as I have identified. Yes, indeed, as always, it is a complex area that we need to unpick, but our main concern has to be for the welfare of the young person. The concern about the amendment is that, inadvertently, it would work in the opposite direction.

To finish on Amendment 55—this might also be helpful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett—we are of the view that the Bill strikes the right balance between self-determination and responding to the needs and vulnerabilities of children and young people. For example, in the clinical checklist, many of the new treatment safeguards and provisions around care and treatment planning apply equally regardless of age and aim to ensure that treatment is more patient-led.

Amendment 56, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, is somewhat similar to Amendment 55 in seeking to change the Mental Capacity Act to provide a mechanism by which children and young people can make an advance decision to refuse medical treatment for mental disorder. However, under Amendment 56, the child or young person’s advance decision would have legal weight only if they were detained under the Mental Health Act. As I have already discussed, while we recognise the principled position to extend the rights of adults to children, giving under-18s the right to make an advance decision to refuse treatment would conflict with a long- standing legal principle established by common law in the courts and codified in the Mental Capacity Act and would, therefore, mean that the amendment would not achieve its desired effect. This principle recognises that, in some serious cases, the courts, parents or those with parental responsibility may overrule the refusal of a child or young person, especially in cases where the child’s life is at risk.

I reassure noble Lords that we are nevertheless committed to giving children and young people a voice as far as possible when it comes to decisions about their care and treatment. I refer again to the example of the clinical checklist, which requires consideration of a patient’s wishes and feelings, including those expressed in advance.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

What legal status does the checklist that the Minister keeps referring to actually have?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I will come back to the noble Lord on that, and I thank him for asking the question.

I was about to refer to the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I may not be doing so in quite the right place, so I hope she will forgive me, but I do not want to lose this point. She asked what engagement we have had with the Department for Education. Our officials have engaged with DfE officials on the development of the Bill, including on the interaction between the Bill and the Children Act, which I know is of quite a lot of interest to noble Lords. We have also discussed questions around the statutory test with both the DfE and the Ministry of Justice, given that competency tests apply in wider children’s settings than mental health. I hope that is helpful.

Amendment 136, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, would require the Government to hold a review of whether a statutory test of competence should be introduced into the Mental Health Act for under-16s within a year of the Bill being passed. While we recognise that there are competing views about Gillick competency, it is nevertheless the established framework for determining competency for children. To introduce a statutory test for under-16s only under the Mental Health Act is likely to risk undermining Gillick, which remains the accepted competence test for under-16s across all settings, including reproductive health and children’s social care, and the wider legislative framework on matters related to children.

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[Lord Scriven (LD)]

It is useful, but it is therefore contradictory to what the Minister has just said. If the checklist is statutory and it is legally binding that it has to be followed, how would a young person in that checklist having a view about their care be different from an advance directive? That is the issue. The Minister said the other alternative is that a person under 18 or 16 can make a decision in relation to the medical checklist, and she has just said that the decisions are legally binding. Alternatively, is it that carrying out the process is legally statutorily binding but the views of somebody who is 16 on that list are not?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I was referring more to situations, of which I know the noble Lord is aware, where there is a need for intervention. I think I used the word “overruling”, and I used some examples where there was a risk to life. So it is about application in that regard. I will look at that question in greater detail when I reflect on this area of debate and, if there is more that I can add to assist the noble Lord, I will be pleased to do so.

Amendment 147 is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. It would create a statutory test of competency for children in respect of decisions under the Mental Health Act. Under that test, competence for under-16s would be defined by reference to the functional test of capacity established in the Mental Capacity Act but without the diagnostic test, and by having due regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The courts have already made clear that the approach of the functional test is not suitable for children. We do not think that the functional test is appropriate or compatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the amendment itself makes reference to. The amendment, as drafted, is therefore not considered to be in line with established case law.

The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked about the justification for not including a test in the Bill. As I have mentioned, Gillick is established in case law, not statute, and the code explains how the Gillick decision is to be applied. But this does not mean that the House of Lords decision is not mandatory. There is a duty to follow case law. It is not discretionary, as I know noble Lords are aware.