Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Criminal Courts Charge) Regulations 2015

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Wednesday 14th October 2015 Lords Chamber

I will add a point on which I touched in earlier debates that concerned the cutting of legal aid or increases in court fees. If the Lord Chancellor truly needs to achieve significant savings, he should revisit the whole question of jury trials. In particular, does a need remain for juries in all cases where presently there is a right to them—even, for example, in serious and complex fraud cases, and even in comparatively trivial cases where the jurors themselves feel that their time is wasted? In January of this year, Sir Brian Leveson—he of the inquiry into the press, now President of the Queen’s Bench Division—produced a comprehensive review of efficiency in criminal proceedings. I commend it to the Lord Chancellor. Pages 87 to 92 discuss these questions. That of course is for the future. For the present, these regulations must indeed be regretted.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, my contribution concerns both practicalities and the principle of the courts charge. I remind the House that I sit as a lay magistrate in central London. I agree with everything that has been said by the previous speakers. I shall avoid going over examples already given but shall walk through two simple sentencing exercises that illustrate the points with which we are dealing.

If an offender pleads guilty to a summary offence in a magistrates’ court, a band A fine is given. If he is on average income, that fine will be £150. That is at the discretion of magistrates. In addition, there are CPS costs of £85, the imposition of which is, again, discretionary. After that, there is the government surcharge or the victim surcharge of £20, which is mandatory. Then there is the new courts charge of £150, which is mandatory. The total is £405. In this example, 37% is the fine and 37% is the courts charge.

In the same circumstances, if the offender is on benefits the balance changes. The fine is £40, the CPS cost is £85, the government surcharge is £20 and the courts charge is again £150. The total is £295. In this example the fine for an offender on benefits is 14% of the total figure but the courts charge is half. This is a common type of fine given in the magistrates’ courts. The courts charge is clearly unjust on this consideration alone.

We have heard how unhappy magistrates are and we have heard about the resignations and retirements—and I personally know a couple of magistrates who have retired. However, it is not unusual for magistrates, and I am sure judges as well, to combine competing principles when they make decisions on sentences. We have the principle of totality when we are making a sentence—that is, what is the bottom line? Of course, we have to come up with a total sentence that is fair in all circumstances. But the competing principle is the advice that we get from our justices’ clerks, who are in turn advised by the Justices’ Clerks’ Society, whose advice to us is that we should sentence and then, after the sentence, add in an administrative charge, which is the courts charge. Clearly those two pieces of advice are in contradiction but, in the privacy of the retiring room, magistrates may look at the matters over which they have discretion. I was disturbed to hear about the case in the Independent this morning, where magistrates said that they actually reduced compensation. I believe that that is absolutely wrong, but it is within the power of the magistrates to reduce compensation to reflect the totality of the sentence that they are giving. When the Minister comes to wind up, I am sure that he will remind the House that it is open to magistrates to give an absolute discharge or “one day deemed served”. I and all magistrates in exceptional circumstances use those types of sentences, but it is absolutely wrong to use them as a way in which to circumnavigate the courts charge.

Noble Lords have spoken about the possibility of people changing their plea to guilty to avoid the courts charge. I understand that it is early to get a statistical basis for that, even though a number of anecdotes say that that is what defendants are doing. But it is worth reminding the House of the totality of the situation. We have already heard that the sentence itself can be reduced by up to 30% if somebody pleads guilty at the first opportunity. In addition, the costs asked for by the CPS will be much lower if somebody pleads guilty at the first opportunity, rather than going through trial. Admittedly, this is a discretionary amount, but the amount asked for will be much lower on behalf of the CPS. On top of that, you have the mandatory courts charge, which we have heard so much about, of up to £1,000 for a conviction on an either-way matter in a magistrates’ court. Putting those elements together could encourage people to plead guilty when they believe that they are not guilty.

On the principle of the courts charge it is worth reflecting that, when we debated this matter on the then Criminal Justice and Courts Bill last year, we did not know the level of the courts charge, and the briefings that we received—from the Magistrates’ Association, for example—set the courts charge at the same level as that of the victim surcharge, because they did not know any better at the time. So the debate at that time was on the principle of the courts charge, not the proportionality, because the figure is so much higher than we expected when considering the matter last year.

The Government have always justified this matter by saying that criminals should pay their way, and the previous speakers have accepted that principle, but I am not sure that I do accept it. The court system, right up until last year, was an independent administrator of the law, in which judges, magistrates and jurors had no interest in the outcome of a case, their only duty being to administer the law and come to a just outcome. Surely it is wrong that the court system has a financial interest in the outcome of a trial. I am not for a moment saying that any judge or magistrate would be swayed by that consideration, but from the defendant’s point of view and the public perception there is an institutional, built-in benefit to the court system on the result of a trial. On that alone, I oppose the principle of the courts charge.

There is a bit more to it than that—and I refer to some research sent to me about how people perceive how they are treated in court. It is not merely a question of the legal and constitutional rights that they receive but about what they believe to be the fairness of the whole system. There is growing evidence in America and the UK that if people are convicted and believe that they have been fairly treated, they are more likely to comply with the sentence and the sentence itself is likely to have a better outcome. This is a profound observation, which puts an onus on the court system to treat all parties fairly and an onus on treating convicted offenders in such a way that they think they have had a fair crack of the whip, so that they are more likely to comply with the sentence when it is given.

I urge the Government to bring forward a reconsideration of this matter. It is something which, in my 10 years as a magistrate sitting on the Bench, I have found people feel most strongly about.

[Lord Woolf (CB)]

My Lords, what we are discussing concerns what happens in magistrates’ courts up and down the country and, from time to time, in the Crown Court, where for reasons that can be good or bad, cases go to be heard. I fear that these regulations indicate that the Government have paid less attention to what they are doing because it concerns magistrates and the cases that come before them, and other cases that are not the most serious. I see no other reason why the Government could come to the conclusion that it is right and proper to do what these regulations seek to do. I suggest that this House should regard justice in the magistrates’ courts as every bit as important as every other court in the land. It is a total disgrace that we should put on to the statute book provisions that have the consequence that magistrates are so appalled about what they are required to do that they feel it necessary to resign. I regard that as shocking, and the only explanation that I can suggest is the one I have given: that insufficient consideration was given to what has been done.

Now that the matter has been brought to the attention of a new Minister of Justice and Lord Chancellor, he should look at it very carefully, as quickly as possible and, as he has been shown to have the courage to do, take his own decision and come to the right conclusion. I wish to put it on the record that I have been very pleased by the general approach of our new Minister of Justice and Lord Chancellor. It seems to me that he considers the facts; he may not always come to the decision I would want him to come to, but he comes to a fresh decision, as required by the circumstances as he sees them. I make no objection to the fact that he may take a different view from that which judges and retired judges would have come to. What is wrong here, though—this is the explanation—is that there was no proper consultation. I believe that if there had been proper consultation that had been objectively considered, these regulations would not have seen the light of day.

Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2015

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 7th September 2015 Lords Chamber

We have also suggested that larger companies should be required to carry compulsory insurance for directors and employees to cover the costs of fraud prosecutions; we have employer compulsory liability insurance, so why not that? Such defence costs are usually now incurred by the legal aid budget in disproportionately expensive very high-cost cases. These are practical ways to reduce the cost of legal aid without driving firms out of business or making criminal work a Cinderella service, and without destroying the morale of those who work in it. We wish to co-operate with the Government to find ways to save money that are effective and fair, and to be involved in a far more consensual approach.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on moving this Regret Motion. I sit as a magistrate in London in the family courts, the youth courts and adult criminal courts and I frequently hear cases where the defendant or applicant is a litigant in person. From the court’s perspective, some litigants in person represent themselves very well. They understand the advice that they receive from the clerks and manage both the legal process and the practical aspects of navigating the court system through to a conclusion that they believe is satisfactory. However, some—I would say many—litigants in person have difficulty understanding the guidance that they are given when in court. They struggle with the whole procedure and, at the end, do not feel that they have been treated justly by the system that they have grappled with.

I want to tell noble Lords an anecdote from about a year ago. It concerns a woman who turned up in court charged with fraud against her employer. She was a litigant in person. She came into court and was correctly identified. The clerk then asked her whether she was guilty or not guilty. Her reply was, “I am guilty but I want to plead not guilty”. When asked to explain herself, she did indeed have a rationale for saying that. She was imminently due to have a medical operation. If she had pleaded guilty she would lose her employment and not be able to have the operation, so she was going to delay the finding of guilt until a trial.

It could be argued that the defendant had told us that she was guilty and that she was planning to commit a further fraud on her employer. But as a court we were limited in the advice that we could give to her other than to advise her of the benefits of a guilty plea. We had 30 other cases to deal with that day. We filled in the necessary forms and the matter was indeed put off for trial. If that lady had had some robust defence advice, she may have decided to plead guilty as she had indeed told us she was guilty. But her right to plead not guilty trumped everything else, resulting in the additional cost of the trial.

The overwhelming point that I want to make is that we see many vulnerable people in courts—people who are not able to represent themselves. There is a concern. The Magistrates’ Association, together with other interested bodies, has tried to judge whether the justice system is functioning properly with this increase in litigants in person. I draw the House’s attention to a survey of magistrates published on 13 January this year. Views were taken before costs came in in February 2014 and again in November 2014 after the increase in litigants in person. The survey shows a noticeable increase in the dissatisfaction expressed by magistrates because they felt that the system was not being as just as it should be.

I understand that there are a lot of surveys, but the current chair of the Magistrates’ Association, Richard Monkhouse, was a statistician in a former life and this is a robust piece of work. I have looked at it myself and I have a scientific background. I hope that the Government will look at these figures carefully because they raise a worrying growth in uncertainty and dissatisfaction with the increase in the number of litigants in person.

A wider point should be made. Other aspects of the legal and court system also feed into the general sense of dissatisfaction and the feeling that the court system as a whole is not properly offering justice to people. We have heard from my noble friend about the imposition of the criminal courts charge. In the family courts, we have had cuts to legal aid and an increase in the costs of drug and alcohol testing, which reduces access to fairness for people. We have had the increase in tribunal fees and cuts to CABs. These are off-topic for the purposes of this debate, but they add to the sense of many vulnerable people feeling that the court system as a whole is not open to them as it should be.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who brings a rich vein of evidence from his experience as a lay magistrate to your Lordships’ deliberations. I declare the interests of having been a barrister practising criminal law for 45 years and having spent 28 years, until I retired from these roles at the end of last year, as a part-time judge at various levels and, particularly for this debate, as a former president of the Howard League for Penal Reform.

In a few moments, I shall talk about prison law specifically, but I wanted to address some issues about the generality of this debate, if I may. I agree with the broad thrust of what has been said about the effect of the regulations. However, I want to commend the Lord Chancellor for his willingness to engage with the legal profession, both the Bar and the solicitors, during recent weeks and months. This has been appreciated. Other things could be done than cutting criminal legal aid in the way which has been described.

Criminal Justice System: Autism

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Thursday 22nd January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on securing this important debate. I will not be talking about the case of Faruk Ali, although I have read the material available on the internet. I propose to talk in more general terms about dealing with autistic people in the criminal justice system. It is indeed a large and difficult subject, and I shall talk about the courts system in particular, of which I have some experience.

In preparing for this debate, I have seen that a lot of guiding material is available published by the House of Lords Library regarding dealing with people with autism. There was a recent article in the Magistrates’ Association magazine about dealing with autistic people in a court setting. If one googles the issue, as I did, there are a lot of comment pieces about the appropriateness of different procedures within the criminal justice system as a whole.

A very important context for today’s debate is the rollout of Liaison and Diversion by the Government to those with mental capacity issues. My understanding is that the objective is that this will be fully rolled out within England and Wales by next year. Liaison and Diversion is where a mental health practitioner is available to the court, so that a hearing may be adjourned for an initial assessment to be done on the spot as to the mental capacity of either victims or the defendant. This has been at the instigation of leadership from my noble friend Lord Bradley and I understand that it has led to a measurable drop in such cases being brought to court in the pilot schemes operating to date.

I want to talk about my own experience as a London magistrate, where I have dealt with defendants who are autistic. I will not go into the details of the case I have in mind; suffice to say that I believe that the court system coped well with the challenges of the trial, in the sense that all the individual elements of dealing with this difficult situation were met. Nevertheless, by the end of the process the autistic defendant was bemused —he did not understand what had happened—and his family felt that they had not been treated fairly.

So what were the elements in place? First, the young man was charged with a sexual assault, so special measures were in place to protect the victim from the attention of the young man or his family. Secondly, an appropriate adult sat with the young man at all times when the case was being conducted. An intermediary was not believed to be required because the young man claimed he had no memory of the incident of which he was accused. We had an expert witness who gave lengthy evidence, having interviewed the young man, and was cross-examined. That was really the burden of the defence case. As the presiding magistrate, I could see that witness support was giving very active support to the family of the young man who was accused. We took regular breaks, as asked for by the defence lawyer; that would be good practice in such cases in any event. Legal aid was available but would not be for this level of charge for most defendants. Incidentally, that was one of the sources of delay.

We convicted the defendant of the sexual assault. As I said, he looked bemused as if he did not understand what had happened. The family made it very plain that they were unhappy with the result. We had no doubt that we had properly convicted the young man. After the trial, I discussed with my colleagues and the court staff what could have been done better. All the individual requirements had been complied with, after all, so what was the problem? It was the delay in the whole process. It had taken a year from the initial incident to when the trial took place. All the people completing their individual elements as part of the process no doubt believed that they had done their job but it added up to a long delay.

It was made plain to the court by the expert witness that delay disproportionately affects people with autism, because they are very likely to have worse memories than other people. This problem was not overcome and was, I believe, the source of the discontent of the young man’s family. We were never going to make them happy with the result but we could at least have made them feel that their son had had a fair trial. I am afraid that I do not think they believed that. My point to the Minister is very simple: all these elements are good and complex but they have to be done quickly, otherwise their benefit gets dissipated and people do not feel that they have had a fair trial.

I will close on one separate, short point regarding Liaison and Diversion. It is on the need to scrutinise whether these diverted cases are properly being diverted. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, will know, there are various pilot schemes in the country and various methods among police forces of recording the way that police forces divert cases. From a courts perspective, it is very important to have a realistic record of those diversions when they come to sentence people who have committed subsequent offences. We have this issue in the youth court, where we do not know which diversions have been done properly. It is potentially the case that we will also have this issue in the adult court if there is not proper recordkeeping of diversions for people with mental capacity issues.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 10th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Listowel (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 2 rectifies an ongoing anomaly in the way 17 year-old children are treated by the police. While all other children detained by the police are entitled to a local authority bed, 17 year-olds are not. This means they must be held in a police station. This is one of the remaining areas where 17 year-olds are excluded from the protections available to other children, and it needs to change. I tabled amendments on this matter in Committee and on Report and I will not repeat all the arguments made then, but I would like remind the House briefly why this matter is so important.

Since 2010, three 17 year-old children have taken their own lives after being treated as adults by the police. They were Kesia Leatherbarrow, Eddie Thornber and Joe Lawton. It is worth taking a moment to think about what it means for a child to die in this way, the terrible waste and the pain that it causes those they leave behind. These children are much loved and deeply missed, and I should like to take a moment to read out some brief words of remembrance about each of them. Nick Lawton said of his son, Joe:

“He was a beautiful boy, everyone agreed. Joe was a happy, successful 17 year-old studying for his A-levels. He is missed every moment of every day”.

Eddie Thornber’s mum, Ann, says:

“Eddie was head boy of his school, looking forward to studying in America. We would do anything to make sure Eddie was still with us”.

Martina Brincat Baines, Kesia’s mother, said:

“Kesia was my only daughter. She was beautiful. A funny, lively girl who, despite her mental health issues, was loving and great company, she was so hugely loved and is so hugely missed”.

In Committee and on Report, the Minister explained that a review was looking at the treatment of 17 year-olds in police custody and that the Government wanted to receive and digest its recommendations before acting. However, things have moved on since then. The review has recommended that the law be changed; the Home Office has committed to do so as soon as possible; and recently the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Children published the report of its inquiry on children and the police, and recommended that this change take place. I pay tribute to the chair of that group, the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, for the work of that important inquiry.

There has been much movement forward. Almost 30,000 people have signed a petition requesting that today be the day that this law is changed. I look forward to the Minister’s response and beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I have given the Minister’s office notice of the point that I am about to raise. It is to do with youth anonymity, which is a slightly different point from that made by the noble Earl.

On Report, the Government introduced amendments which are now Clause 77 of the Bill. Those amendments gave lifetime reporting restrictions in criminal proceedings for witnesses and victims under 18. The amendments clearly give the judge discretion to give lifetime anonymity to witnesses and victims. It is also clear from the Government’s amendments that that discretion of the judge does not extend to the accused.

What I would like to know—as I said, I have given notice of my question to the noble Lord’s office—is what the status would be of somebody if they had been found not guilty at trial. Clearly, after they have been found not guilty, they are no longer accused, but they may well still be a witness. Would that discretion of the judge extend to those found not guilty at trial?

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I commend and congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, on the progress that he appears to have been able to promote, and look forward to hearing the Minister confirm what the noble Earl has said after citing those very poignant cases. It seems that a mistake in the system can now be corrected. For that, although it has come late for the families to whom the noble Earl referred, I think everybody will be grateful. I congratulate the Minister in anticipation of his confirming that the Government have accepted that point. It is entirely to their credit that they have listened to the very strong representations made on that matter.

As to the point raised by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, again, I hope that the Minister will be able to offer him some clarification of the situation along the lines that he has suggested.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the world now knows about the technology used by your Lordships and their Saturday night viewing habits. I associate myself with the remarks that have been made. I was not able to be in the House while the Bill was in Committee. However, I was a bit surprised that, rather than a quite simple but perhaps simplistic amendment which restored what everyone had thought of as the status quo, instead the amendment is around 10 lines in length. Those among your Lordships and from the Government who carried out the drafting have come up with very many lines, which can sometimes prove more difficult than a more straightforward and prescribed amendment.

Having said that, I want to mention the position of defendants. I agree very much with what has been said, and I simply add that not to provide anonymity or reporting restrictions—whatever term you apply, although of course they are not necessarily the same thing—seems to me to undermine the whole purpose of the youth justice system, which is rehabilitation, reintegration, and so on. An enormously important principle is at stake here. The same really applies to the amendment of my noble friend Lord Marks. One cannot separate out the stages. I am sure that there is a sporting analogy for this. Having lost anonymity at that early point before being charged, there is really nothing more that one can sensibly do afterwards to fulfil the spirit of what the Government themselves seem to consider important, even if we would like to have more than the Government’s amendment.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 123 is largely superfluous in the light of the government amendments. The Standing Committee for Youth Justice has sent to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, I suspect, a briefing which was largely laid out by the noble Earl. He made the point very well about the high threshold test proposed by the Government in their amendments. He summarised that by saying that the new threshold test would be a diminishment of co-operation or evidence through fear on behalf of the witnesses or the victims. The Standing Committee for Youth Justice briefing makes the point that this higher threshold is even higher than that in the Children and Young Persons Act. This is an important point, which I hope that the noble Lord will be able to address.

This is a very difficult area of legislation. In my brief time in the courts, although the law has not changed in the adult courts, in practice what magistrates view as appropriate use of media within a courtroom has changed quite a lot. This is largely at the discretion of the magistrates and district judges involved. I very much hope that the noble Lord will agree that whichever amendments are agreed tonight will be kept under review, because this is such a delicate and difficult matter.

Where I diverge from the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is whether lifetime anonymity should be given to child offenders. The briefing was rather less nuanced than the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. To put it in stark terms, I do not think it reasonable that a young person of 17 and a half should get a lifetime of anonymity, whereas someone who is 18 gets no anonymity if they have committed largely the same offence. If one were to rely on the briefing alone, that is the burden of the argument which is being made. I know that that is not the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile; he presented his case in a more nuanced way. However, I find it troubling that there is potentially a very stark difference in the way that people are treated on either side of the 18 years of age barrier.

I would like to make a further point, which may be a technical one. I noticed that the briefing continually refers to child defendants and not to child offenders, whereas of course all the children about whom we are talking have either pleaded guilty or been found guilty in a court. They are not, in my understanding, child defendants. Having said all that, it is a real issue about the availability of the internet and how that might affect the rehabilitation and reintegration of young offenders into the community.

I conclude with an anecdote, which is not to do with youth. Recently, my wife employed a female offender who was still in prison but on release when she was employed by my wife. It was a wholly positive experience in that the offender worked well and the organisation benefited. However, when my wife searched the internet for the offences that the woman had committed, the information she got was not what she had been told by the offender or the organisation which facilitated the work placement. Nevertheless, I support the Government in their objectives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, my amendments in this group, which largely repeat the amendments I put down in Committee, have a simple purpose, which is to permit the court a discretion as to whether or not to impose the criminal courts charge. Because they largely repeat earlier amendments, I will be brief.

Under the new Section 21A proposed in Clause 46, the court has no discretion but to order a person over 18 convicted of an offence that is not excluded by regulations to pay the charge. Since Committee, I have moved towards the Government’s position by suggesting in these amendments that a relevant court must “consider ordering” that the criminal courts charge be paid, so that while they would have a discretion, the courts would receive a clear message that such a charge should be expected in the generality of cases, and the legislation would act as an indication as to how the discretion should generally be exercised.

However, I maintain the general position I took in Committee in suggesting that it would be completely senseless to make an order that a criminal courts charge be paid in every case. There would be many cases heard every day in criminal courts where orders were made and everyone in the court would know that there was not the slightest chance of the charges ever being paid. That would make a nonsense of the provisions, I suggest, and would risk bringing the courts into disrepute. Relying on a later power to remit the charge in such cases is unnecessarily burdensome on the courts and wasteful of everybody’s time.

Furthermore, I am concerned that imposing a charge upon offenders who are already without means and often in serious personal and financial difficulties is likely to reduce their chances of rehabilitation. The outstanding charge may have a significant impact on their ability to secure work and to meet necessary expenses, particularly where they need credit in order to do so and the outstanding charge will impede their obtaining such credit. For those reasons, I suggest that the imposition of a criminal courts charge needs to be discretionary.

I further suggest that it is not sensible to deny the court any discretion as to the level of the charge to be imposed. That is the reason for my Amendment 125D. New Section 21C would require the amount of the charge to be the amount specified in regulations. My amendment would simply make that amount a maximum. There will be cases where offenders of limited means will wish, or at least be prepared, to meet their obligations and pay the charge if they can afford it. I suggest that a sensible way of dealing with such offenders is for the court to set the charge at a level the offenders can afford, rather than charging them the full amount specified in the regulations and forcing them to come back on an application to remit the charge at a later date or, worse, leading them to the position where they do not pay anything. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I shall speak to my amendments in this group. I support 100% what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said. I moved similar amendments in Committee and the amendments that I am putting forward on Report are by way of a compromise. I regard my position as a fallback position and the position of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, as the primary position on judicial discretion.

My Amendments 125, 126 and 127 would allow the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee to specify the circumstances in which the charge should not be imposed. The idea behind this group of amendments is that it would provide an opportunity for the CPRC to ensure appropriate judicial discretion, while providing greater clarity than a more permissive wording, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is seeking. Of course, the CPRC operates independently of government.

I also thank the Minister’s officials for clarifying to me in the past few days that the court’s charge can be treated the same way as the victim surcharge under Section 135 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, which gives magistrates a general power to order a brief period of detention when a defendant is in default of any fine imposed by the court, particularly when that defendant is homeless and cannot pay. This, as any magistrate or lawyer will know, is a regular occurrence in London magistrates’ courts. This is the only practical way of dealing with this type of case.

I conclude on a wider point, by reiterating some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has made. Notwithstanding the people who are homeless and literally do not have any money in their pockets, there are many other people we regularly see in courts who are on benefits, perhaps because of disabilities. Any additional cost that is given to them will remain unpaid and accrue as a greater debt. Every day of the court’s week, magistrates and judges impose fines where they have discretion and come up with appropriate fines that they believe are realistic. They put in place tough measures, namely collection orders, to recover those fines, so magistrates and judges are well able to exercise discretion, and they should be given the opportunity to do so over the court’s charge.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 20th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, we have had something of a trailer from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and I do not propose to respond in detail at this stage. For the sake of clarity, I might say that these amendments are about determinate sentence prisoners as opposed to indeterminate sentence prisoners, into which category IPP prisoners fall.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to make one very small point about the Government’s proposals, which is mainly to do with the name “recall adjudicator”. I understand that when a district judge goes to prison and hears cases and then gives an additional period in custody to prisoners who offended while in custody they are referred to as adjudicators. We will have adjudicators turning up at the prison gates, plus recall adjudicators. I wonder whether that is a sensible way to proceed. I raise that as a small point.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his typically clear exposition of the Government’s position—or some of the Government’s position. I thought there were some omissions in how he put matters. He adopted the Candide style of defending the Government, where everything is the best of all possible judicial worlds, but that might be a slightly flawed approach in the circumstances. He did not, for example, deal with the point of the Government’s own estimate of 1,000 extra prison places being required as a result of the changes in category. That was before the Osborn case, which will clearly increase the load further. It may be that the board’s original estimates were on the high side, but there can be no gainsaying the fact that the board would be required to conduct a great many more oral hearings than at present.

There may well be merit in the Government’s proposals for recall adjudicators, but I do not know why the Minister should be so hesitant about reviewing the position in a couple of years. If, indeed, he is confident that the system will work, there would be no problem. If, on the other hand, the system presents problems, it is as well to deal with them before too long a period of time passes. I should have thought that the sunset position in respect of the new organisation would be worth considering. The problem that the Government and the Parole Board face is, of course, the huge number of matters to be dealt with. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, will hopefully be making his contribution to reducing those numbers, shortly, perhaps. We will see what happens.

At the moment, what we seem to end up with is a two-tier system and it is not quite clear to me how the two organisations will be managed. The Parole Board exists as a board. Will the adjudicators, for example, be directly a board or will there be a separate board for that? All of this is up in the air. It is, frankly, not good enough for the Government to say that they have to rush this legislation through because of the Whiston case. That is not the case at all. They could have taken the time to consult, not only with those within the system but with those outside it, and not simply—though necessarily—with the House of Commons and your Lordships’ House, but with other interested parties. None has been given an opportunity to be consulted on a major change of this kind. I do not blame the Minister, but it is regrettable that the Government have acted in this rather typical way under the aegis of the present Lord Chancellor.

I will not divide the House on this matter. We hope that the system works. We would like the Government to consult widely, even now, on how the matters are to be taken forward, and to keep the matter under review. It may be that, for example, the Justice Select Committee will want to look at the operation of the new system after a period. However, that does not excuse the Government for bringing legislation to us at short notice, in a matter as important as this, without allowing for a proper examination. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 6 is an extremely modest amendment. Your Lordships will appreciate that Clause 7(3) permits the Secretary of State to make electronic monitoring conditions compulsory. I spoke on this issue in Committee, arguing that the imposition of an electronic monitoring condition should remain a matter for the court. I argued that the power to impose such a condition on a prisoner’s release on licence was, indeed, a desirable and sensible power, and that such a condition should be imposed where appropriate. However, I also argued that there may be circumstances in which it would be impractical or unnecessary to impose such a condition, for example where an offender was disabled or was to be hospitalised upon release.

In response to my amendment, my noble friend Lord Ahmad said that he was aware of the concerns that physical or mental health issues or possible practical problems might make compulsory electronic monitoring conditions unsuitable. My noble friend also gave, as an example of impracticality, a case where arrangements could not be made for recharging the battery in the tag—he was right to do so and there may be many other examples of impracticality. However, my noble friend contended that there was flexibility in the order-making power under the subsection that would enable these cases to be taken into account. I am concerned about that. My noble friend said that the Secretary of State would be able to,

“provide for cases in which the compulsory condition should not apply”.—[Official Report, 14/7/14; col. 402.]

I regret that I do not read the clause in that way. While there would, under subsection (3)(3)(b), be power to make provision in relation to persons selected on the basis of criteria specified in the order or on a sampling basis, that is not the same as enabling cases to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

The amendment would, quite simply, enable the Secretary of State to incorporate into the order a small element of judicial discretion, whereby, in a given case, a court could decline to make an electronic monitoring condition if it considered it would be unjust, unnecessary or impractical to do so. It would be for the Secretary of State to decide whether to incorporate such provision as I suggest in the order he makes. For that reason, I reiterate that my amendment is modest and limited. It is intended to be helpful. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I want to speak in favour of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but to slightly widen the point that he made. It is my understanding that if one gives a suspended sentence when sentencing and includes, as a part of that, a curfew, then the court is obliged to provide that the curfew is tagged. Very often that is appropriate, but not always. I have certainly dealt with cases where it was totally unnecessary to tag the offenders concerned and it just added to the cost of the whole sentence. There should be judicial discretion when giving tagged curfews in suspended sentences.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the Bill extends electric monitoring, a procedure which thus far has proved problematic and extremely expensive, when you think of the problems with G4S and I think Serco in the contracts that they had. It extends the principle into new territory—namely, that of prisoners on licence. The policy in that respect has been criticised by the Chief Inspector of Prisons on the grounds that there is little evidence of absconding or committing further offences while prisoners are on licence. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s comments on that. In passing, I hope that he is in a position to deny current rumours that the highly respected chief inspector is unlikely to be reappointed. He has a deserved reputation for the job that he has been carrying out in difficult circumstances for the last few years.

The impact assessment in support of this provision is somewhat feeble. It states:

“Though benefits likely to arise from the increased use of ELM have been identified, we are not able to quantify these benefits at this stage, as ELM is not yet in widespread use in England and Wales. As such, we are unable to calculate impact”.

In other words, this is an impact assessment with no impact whatever. As the following further statement confirms, the number of additional prison places cannot be accurately estimated. Let us reflect on the terrible overcrowding in our prisons now, with a shocking rise in the number of suicides, as we read at the weekend. What is the Government’s estimate of the likely impact of the implication of this new technology, in terms of both cost and of increasing the prison population?

The way in which the Government intend to progress the matter is, as usual, equally unsatisfactory, with the Secretary of State empowered to impose a code of practice without parliamentary scrutiny or approval—hence Amendment 8, which would require such parliamentary approval for the code of practice that the Government envisage. Perhaps the Minister could tell us what is happening about the code. In Committee, the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, who has escaped or is on licence to another department, said that a revised code would be issued to promote transparency in relation to outsourced services. What is happening about this? What consultations have taken place, and with whom? Will there be reports on the outcome of those consultations?

Amendment 7 would make contractors subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act in the same way as public authorities. It seems absurd that, in the world of the Ministry of Justice alone, Her Majesty’s prisons are subject to FOI requirements while private prisons are not. Given that we are talking about encroachments on the liberty of the individual—and they may well be justified in many cases—it is surely necessary to extend the protection of the FOI regime to this area. I should make it clear that we are not against electronic monitoring, as it clearly has a place, but it must be technically effective and cost effective, especially in the light of the previous experience, with the contracts that went so badly awry and led to large sums of money having to be reclaimed from the contractors, and applied sensibly. We have very little to go on at the moment in terms of how the new scheme would work.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, to the issue, which I entirely accept is delicate. There can be no doubt that he would discharge the role of juror in an exemplary fashion and to the great benefit of all those who were tried—either in a way that they would want or not.

The respondents to the consultation about the upper age limit were almost equally divided as to whether there should be one, and I do not pretend that it is an easy issue, but the Government’s view was that, notwithstanding the health and vigour of many over the age of 75, an increasing number of people would find it difficult or almost impossible to sit as jurors and would therefore seek to be excused jury service. They might not want to have to go through the process of seeking to be excused jury service. Rather than putting them through the process of applying for excusal, and spending taxpayers’ money dealing with that additional administrative burden, the age limit is set at 75. I do not pretend that there is any precise science behind that, but it reflects a balance of different arguments.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

From the point of view of the magistracy, where there is currently retirement at 70, it is the view of the Magistrates’ Association that that is about right and that it should not be increased to 75. The reason for that view is that many defendants who come before the Bench are much younger. Obviously that is true in the youth court, but it is true in the adult court as well. The issue is regularly debated at the Magistrates’ Association, and the view of the association is that 70 should stay as the age of retirement for magistrates.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for that intervention. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, makes a good point in the sense that a defendant might feel more confident if there was not such a wide age disparity between him and someone aged, say, over 75. The noble Lord reminds me that the upper age for judges is 70, so it is not unreasonable to restrict jurors to the age of 75.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)]

My Lords, for the first time I have some hope that there may be an answer to the problem of that part of the Bill that has troubled everyone on all sides of the House, and which will never work in practice no matter how well intentioned it may be. We have now had from my noble friend a very clear outline of the sort of institution that would make sense.

As we all know, so many of the children who end up in this position not only have had appalling backgrounds but often have had no education at all. One of the first things needed is a basic test of the extent to which they are able to read or write. I hope that the Minister will take this issue away and be persuaded that his proposals are absolutely no good and will not have the support—let alone the extra cost that they would involve. They would provide a solution that would be totally unsatisfactory.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. In his introduction, he gave a very comprehensive analysis of the secure college proposals and came up with positive alternatives, which he has every reason to believe would be more favourable than the secure colleges model.

I want to concentrate on one particular aspect that, as far as I know, no other noble Lords have looked at, and that is the costs involved. As I understand it, an adult male prison place costs about £40,000 a year; a place in a male young offender institute costs about £80,000 a year; a secure training centre place costs about £140,000 a year; and a place in a secure children’s home costs about £210,000 a year. Not surprisingly, those costs are completely dominated by the staffing ratios, which are what control the costs of running prisons. When I put the issue to the former Minister, Jeremy Wright, regarding the proposed staffing levels for the secure colleges, his answer was that that would be a matter for the company that was bidding for the contracts. However, this is fundamental to the cost and the quality of the education provision for young people in custody.

Why are the Government so reticent in talking about what they hope to be the running costs of these institutions when they are up and running? Like all noble Lords, I have had many briefings on this matter, and there was reference to a cost of £60,000 a year per boy in a secure college. I have not found any further reference to that and I do not know whether the figure is right, but the House would be better informed if we knew exactly what the Government aspire to in reducing the per-year costs of having boys in these secure colleges. The Government should not be reticent; there is nothing wrong with trying to save costs, but the Committee would be much better informed if it knew what cost they aspire to.

[The Lord Bishop of Rochester]

My Lords, I hesitate slightly to speak in this debate, not least because I am still rather new to your Lordships’ House and new in my role as bishop to prisons. However, I cannot help but note the wise advice of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, in encouraging some space for rethinking. Many of us would applaud the overall intention expressed by the former Prisons Minister to establish somewhere that is primarily an education facility but with detention aspects. The difficulty for some of us is that we cannot at the moment see the detail of how that might be provided. Some of the points that have just been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about staffing levels and so on are key to this. We encourage the Government to have the courage to be a bit more prescriptive regarding who might be the eventual provider than is the case now.

If a mechanism could be found for us to move forward without the need for the Committee to divide on this—which would put some of us in a difficult position—I am sure that it would be appreciated. Like others, I look forward to the Minister’s response in the hope that some consultative way forward on this might be found. I am sure that many of us around the Committee would be more than happy to be part of such a process.

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Moved by

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

48A: After Clause 32, insert the following new Clause—
“Application of reporting restrictions to social media
Sections 39 and 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 shall apply in relation to public electronic communications networks as they apply in relation to newspapers, and sound and television broadcasts.”

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 48A and others in this group. Amendment 48A is largely self-explanatory. The Children and Young Persons Act was enacted in 1933, well before the advent of the internet or any sort of social media. The purpose of this amendment is simple: to make it beyond any doubt that any repeating of things that are sub judice to do with a child’s identity would be prohibited and that orders under Sections 39 and 49 apply to social media just as they do to print and broadcast media. That is the effect of Amendment 48A.

Amendment 48B, which is in my name and the names of other noble Lords, seeks to close a legal loophole whereby children can be named before they are charged and appear in court. This is an anomalous situation that makes a mockery of the anonymity protection. In the recent tragic case of the murdered Leeds schoolteacher Ann Maguire, the Sun newspaper printed the name of the boy accused of her murder before he was charged. Now that the matter is before the court, it is illegal to name him. This is an illustration of the loophole that this amendment seeks to close. Pre-charge naming undermines any anonymity later afforded by the court. I am pleased to see that noble Lords from other sides of the House have added their names to this amendment.

The purpose of Amendments 48C and 48D is that anonymity provided by Sections 39 and 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 should last for a lifetime. Lord Justice Leveson has ruled that Section 39 orders expire when the child reaches the age of 18. This judgment is being appealed and the appeal is due to be heard in autumn this year. Lord Justice Leveson has said:

“It is for Parliament to fashion a solution: the problem requires to be addressed as a matter of real urgency”.

He is referring to precisely this question of whether anonymity should continue beyond the age of 18. The purpose of Amendments 48C and 48D is that the default situation should be that anonymity should be granted for life unless a court orders that it be lifted.

Why is this a good principle? The principal aim of all youth justice is to prevent reoffending. I would argue that naming a child as an offender, particularly in this day and age, would work against that child’s interests. Their name is likely to get on to the internet and to stay on the internet. It will make it more difficult, once the child is identified and named as an offender, for that child to change their ways. More than that, it will punish innocent families. We know that children identify very strongly with their siblings, more strongly than adults do. I have been made aware of a number of cases where the names of children who have been charged with an offence have come to light and the families, particularly the siblings, of the children have suffered as a result. This only serves to worsen the situation and to set back the prospect for rehabilitation. That is the purpose of Amendments 48C and 48D. I beg to move.

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I would like to revisit this matter on Report. In the light of that request, which I hope noble Lords will accept is entirely sincere and an appropriate response to this debate, I hope that they will, in the mean time, not press their amendments.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that response, which I found constructive in a number of respects. On Amendment 48A, the noble Lord said that he would give further thought to this matter and pointed out the issue of the amendment being so broadly worded that it might include private correspondence by e-mail. I acknowledge the point: the matter needs to be looked at more carefully.

On Amendments 48B and 48C, the noble Lord referred to the previous Government introducing the affirmative procedure and the adoption of new self-regulation procedures within the media. These are probing amendments and we on these Benches will consider whether to bring them back on Report. I acknowledge the points that the noble Lord made in addressing them and I was pleased with his response to Amendment 48D, when he said clearly that he wants to revisit the issue on Report. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 48A.

Amendment 48A withdrawn.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I welcome the Government’s move to single justice procedures. I have sat on many hundreds of these types of cases and it is absolutely not necessary for three justices to sit to make such determinations.

I have three amendments—the noble Lord referred to them in his comments—which the Magistrates’ Association has asked me to put forward to clarify particular issues. As the noble Lord said, Amendment 50A is an amendment to the Government’s amendment which seeks to add that specified and relevant information should be made available to the court. The concern raised by the Magistrates’ Association is that magistrates should have access to the right information, such as DVLA records, as appropriate. The amendment was worded in a wider sense because if one was dealing with television licences one would need information on non-payment. The amendment is to ensure that magistrates, when sentencing, have specific and relevant information in front of them.

Amendments 50B and 51A would require the court to give public notice of trials under the single justice procedure and to publish the outcomes of these trials. I know the Magistrates’ Association has been consulted fully on these changes and everyone is aware that we are dealing with high volume, low level regulatory cases more than anything else. Nevertheless, it is important that these cases are dealt with properly and that the public should have confidence in our legal system. Therefore they need to know when the trials are happening and the results of those trials. The purpose of the amendments is to provide some clarity on what the Government intend to do in making sure that the trials and their results are well published.

As the Minister pointed out in his comments, if anyone turns up for a trial, the matter would be put off to be dealt with by a Bench of three. That is, of course, right and proper.

[Lord Beecham]

It is some 23 years since I last appeared before Newcastle magistrates. I should make it clear that I was in a professional capacity, although I had the pleasure recently of seeing them in a political capacity. As I think I mentioned at Second Reading, I attended a meeting of what is now the Northumbria Bench—in the current state of play, of course, there is no longer just a local Newcastle Bench. Unlike my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who of course has long experience as a sitting magistrate, I was initially attracted to the notion that some have suggested; namely, that, although the procedure is generally to be welcomed, it should be not one magistrate but two who sit on these matters. However, I am persuaded not only by the eloquence and logic of my noble friend but, perhaps more relevantly, by the almost unanimous opinion of the local Bench in Newcastle and Northumbria that such a precaution is unnecessary.

There are, however, a number of issues, which are the subject of amendments to which I shall now refer. The first of those is Amendment 49A, which would ensure that there is a proper procedure for determining which offences can be tried under the new system. It is obviously sensible for many of the offences which have been canvassed in discussion—television licences and matters of that sort—to be dealt with in this way, but the amendment would require that the issues be determined by regulations and approved by Parliament. We do not want added to the list for disposal in this way matters which are not necessarily the first that come to mind as more or less formalities. It would not be asking too much of the Government for them to indicate what they intend and how many offences and for them to proceed by way of regulation. In this case, the negative procedure would be quite acceptable.

Amendment 49B would remove the automatic paper trial if the defendant did not respond to the notice that would have been given. There is a potential for difficulty to be encountered here if, for example, the defendant does not understand English or the purport of the document. What is sought in the amendment is that failure to respond would not itself trigger the automatic transfer to dealing with the case on the papers.

Amendment 49C, on the provision of evidence in respect of vehicle licensing cases, would require the court to be satisfied with the position as recorded by the DVLA, so that the defendant would have an opportunity to say that matters had been dealt with on the basis of the DVLA providing information. It is a relatively modest requirement.

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[Lord Faulks]

I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this useful debate. In addition to my response and the moving of government amendments, the debate has enabled the Government to place on record the rationale behind these provisions, which are broadly welcomed. I am reassured to hear, as I knew was the case, that the Magistrates’ Association is very much in sympathy with this, as are magistrates such as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and Newcastle magistrates’ court, which, sadly, misses the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. There is general consensus that this is a move in the right direction. Nevertheless, I also understand that there is the feeling that there should be safeguards to ensure that there is no sense that these hearings take place behind closed doors unless it is entirely appropriate that that should be the case.

I shall deal first with Amendment 49A, which seeks to require that the list of offences to which the new single justice procedure should apply is set out in secondary legislation. Our intention is that all summary, only non-imprisonable, offences should be in scope of the procedure. However, we anticipate this procedure being used only in the more straightforward cases, such as where the particular circumstances of the case mean there is no direct victim or specific threat to public safety involved, or cases that involve offences designed to regulate the conduct of some particular activity in the public interest where there is a minimal or no mental requirement needed to prosecute. In legal terms, this would mean cases where there is no mens rea or it is easy to prove mens rea.

We expect offences that are technically in scope of the legislation but which might not be suitable for the new procedure to be initially filtered out by prosecutors who make decisions on the handling of these types of cases on a daily basis. It will, of course, be for a single justice to decide whether a case is appropriate for this procedure, and he or she can refer it to the ordinary court at any time. I fully understand the temptation to try to limit or specify a list of offences to which the single justice procedure might apply. However, we have high-quality magistracy in this country who are well used to exercising their powers to determine the right forum within which cases should be heard.

Amendment 49B relates to the rights of the defendant under the single justice procedure. Our provisions allow the court to use the single justice procedure unless the defendant explicitly states that he or she does not want that to happen or intends to plead not guilty, in which case it will automatically be referred to a traditional magistrates’ court. The objective of the single justice procedure is to address the current situation, whereby a significant number of defendants fail to engage with the process at all. Although the effect of the amendment would be to allow a single justice to consider any case, regardless of the defendant’s response, I understand that the intention is to remove the ability of the single justice to hear cases where the defendant has not responded. I recognise that this may be in response to concerns about the assumption that, where a defendant does not engage, the case should nevertheless still be heard by a single justice. However, it should be remembered that the defendant will have the right to request a traditional hearing in open court at any point before his or her case is considered by the single justice. If a defendant does not know about the case until after it is finished, they can make a statutory declaration to that effect, which will start the proceedings again from the beginning.

Amendment 49C would introduce a new requirement that the documents sent to the defendant with the single justice procedure notice should include a copy of the submission from the DVLA informing the court of any penalty points on the defendant’s driver record. It is the explicit responsibility of the holder of a driving licence to ensure that it is kept up to date by surrendering it as and when required for details to be changed or endorsements added. If there are endorsements on a driving record that do not appear on the counterpart of the corresponding driving licence, the licence holder might well be committing a further separate offence. I assure noble Lords that courts will have direct access to DVLA records. The days that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, remembers of a moth-eaten driving licence being handed up to the justices have departed. A single justice will have information about an offender’s previous offences before them when trying a motoring offence.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I am sorry to disabuse the noble Lord, but those days are not departed. In fact, it is far more common for the defendant not to be able to produce a driving licence at all.

[Lord Faulks]

I defer to the noble Lord’s experience in that regard, although the new format of the driving licence makes it slightly less destructible than its predecessor. I maintain nevertheless that the courts do have access to the DVLA records, so, when trying a motoring offence, a single justice will have the information even if the defendant does not produce a driving licence at all. I am therefore confident that the safeguards we have built into this procedure make the amendment unnecessary.

Amendment 50AA would remove the provision that a court can decide a case under the single justice procedure other than in open court. That would undermine one of the main drivers behind this policy. We consider the time wasted and costs incurred in requiring magistrates to sit in open court and decide cases disproportionate in the type of straightforward, low-level cases that this procedure will apply to. Safeguards are in place to enable a prosecutor to ensure a case is heard in open court by issuing a requisition and a defendant to ensure the same by indicating his or her wishes in response to the single justice procedure notice. I reassure the noble Lord that the fact that a case is heard under the single justice procedure will not impact on the court’s duty to ensure that proceedings are open and transparent. The press and public will continue to have access to information about these cases, as they do now.

Amendment 50C would allow a single justice to hear and consider evidence from a party to the case if they turn up when the single justice is considering the case. In practice, parties will not know when a case will be considered by a single justice under this new procedure, so it is extremely unlikely that this situation would occur. However, there is a risk that it could be seen as encouraging prosecutors to turn up and assist the court. That could be perceived as unfair and unequal, particularly if the case was being heard other than in open court. We could not allow evidence to be heard by a magistrate when a single justice was making a decision, as that would lead to unfairness if the other party had not been given the opportunity to consider that evidence. In any case, there is clear provision in the Bill stating that when a person wants to be heard by a magistrates’ court, they are perfectly able to request a hearing.

Amendment 51B would introduce a legislative requirement to publish in advance details of cases to be heard under the single justice procedure and to publish the outcome of these cases. It is, of course, vital that the media and the public continue to have access to information on these cases under the new single justice procedure. However, the appropriate place for such provisions is within the Criminal Procedure Rules. Those make it clear that certain specified information must be made available to journalists and other members of the public on request. The rules also allow the court to make certain additional case information available to third parties on request. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee will be invited to review the Criminal Procedure Rules to make sure that they are fit for purpose for the single justice procedure.

I can reassure the noble Lord that the fact that a case is heard under the single justice procedure will not impact on the court’s duty to ensure the proceedings are open and transparent. The press and public will continue to have access to information about cases, as they do now. There is a protocol in place between Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, the Newspaper Society and the Society of Editors whereby magistrates’ courts routinely make written lists of cases and results available to local media, most often by e-mail. This arrangement will continue.

Amendment 52A introduces another condition on which a defendant can make a statutory declaration so that, in addition to being unaware of the proceedings, the defendant can state that they did not understand the information contained in the single justice procedure notice and the accompanying documents. This deals with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about things such as language difficulties. The associated documentation sent to defendants under the single justice procedure will be no more complex that the documentation which is currently sent in this type of case; indeed, we are confident that the flexibility afforded by this new procedure will enable us to make the whole system for these cases more easily understood by defendants. As with the existing process, prosecutors have developed strategies to identify those who may require further assistance and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service is also considering, as part of implementation planning, how it will continue to discharge its duty to provide assistance to unrepresented defendants. The provisions, as set out, provide magistrates’ courts with the flexibility they need to operate the single magistrate procedure effectively while ensuring that the rights of defendants are protected.

I will say a little more about the suggestion put forward by the noble Lord about the availability of information on case outcomes. I agree that the information should be available as soon as possible after the trial has concluded. In both cases, the noble Lord suggests that this should be within 21 days. However, such detailed procedure should not be contained within the legislation itself. As I said earlier, the appropriate place for such detail is within the Criminal Procedure Rules.

We know that journalists and the general public seldom attend to watch this type of hearing and this is the reason behind the protocol to which I referred. As to the listing, we accept that it is vital for there to be access to information and we anticipate that cases will initially be listed in the same court buildings as they are at the moment. This arrangement with local media will replicate exactly what currently happens in practice. In future, we will want to take advantage of the fact that consideration of cases in writing can happen anywhere, and maximise the efficiency that can be derived from this greater flexibility. In doing so, we will want to maintain flexibility and transparency.

There are opportunities, as part of the criminal justice system digitisation agenda, to look more radically at how we can use the opportunities of digital to preserve and perhaps enhance open justice. It is our intention to make case information available on a self-service basis and enable the press and public to access cases in real time and follow the progress of the digital process online in a more meaningful way than they can at present. The rule committee will be invited to review the rules to ensure they are fit for purpose for the single justice procedure. I am sure that such a review will want to take into account the proposals made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Any necessary amendments can be made, subject to annulment by either House of Parliament in the usual way.

I hope that, in the course of rather too long a response to those amendments, I have been able to allay any concerns and explain the thinking behind the single justice procedure. With that reassurance, I hope noble Lords will not press the amendment.

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[Baroness Howe of Idlicote]

My Lords, I, too, have had correspondence from those very concerned about this issue. I do not intend to take up your Lordships’ time by going further into this whole matter, but in as far as this is not already in place it clearly needs to be, and the sooner it is put into effect the better. I am still rather surprised that it does not exist automatically as a natural procedure in court.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, first, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Low, for not being in the Chamber for the whole of his contribution. I wish to make a couple of points. The first is that this is good practice within magistrates’ courts at the moment. Certainly, every court I have sat in has made these inquiries. Nevertheless, I take the point that it may not be universal practice and it may not be a statutory requirement.

Secondly, I wanted to pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, about informing the schools and so on. It seems to me that this amendment does not go that far; all it does is allow the defendant to make a telephone call. Some of the defendants I see in front of me would make a telephone call, but one might not have confidence in the telephone call that they made. Therefore, I think there needs to be a more active inquiry by, for example, social services or the probation service about the possibility of dependants at home. Nevertheless, I agree with the objectives of the amendment. I look forward to the Minister’s response about the practicalities and also whether the amendment goes far enough.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)]

I am delighted to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Low of Dalston, Lord Blair and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. With their wide range of experience they have correctly identified that, despite the best of intentions, the support of the Courts Service and of charities, in too many cases courts are not making sufficient checks with regard to the immediate welfare needs of children and dependent adults. The amendment seeks to put in the Bill what should happen at present but has clearly not been delivered in many cases, and that is a matter of much regret. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that this is a fairly small measure but it deals with an important issue that needs to be addressed.

My noble friend Lord Touhig told the House of a number of young people and children who were put into difficult situations because simple provisions were not in place. I agree also with many noble Lords when they said that the children of prisoners were a highly vulnerable group of people who need to be looked after.

As the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, explained to the Committee, the amendment will require the courts to inquire of a defendant who has been sentenced or remanded to prison whether they have dependants and whether arrangements have been made for them. If they have not, they would be allowed to make a phone call to make arrangements or, where that is not possible, the court could direct someone to take action before the defendant leaves court.

People sometimes need to be sent to prison. All this amendment does is to seek to ensure that adequate immediate provision is made for dependants. As the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, said, all we are requesting is for two simple questions to be asked. I do not think this amendment in any way places a burden on the courts that could not be handled. If the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is going to say that, I hope he will explain very carefully why he thinks that is the case and answer the point that I and other noble Lords have made in this debate, which is that the voluntary provision has failed and that continued failure is likely to cost far more to dependants and to their welfare.

I see the provision working fairly simply. When I sat in court as a magistrate, although that was some time ago, courts adjourned for all sorts of reasons. It is very easy for questions to be asked and action taken. It is also true that in many cases, especially if the defendant fully expects to receive a custodial sentence, arrangements for dependants will have already been made.

All we are looking for is a clear set of proportionate responses to come into play with the welfare of the dependants of someone who has received a custodial sentence at their heart. I hope that the Government can either accept this amendment or at least look at this issue again and the problems that have been identified before we come back to it on Report.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 63B to 63E, tabled in my name. The effect of these amendments would be to remove the requirement to delay remitting the criminal courts charges; in other words, magistrates could remit in the same breath as imposing the charge, although only if they were satisfied that that was in the interests of justice. It is a different method of achieving the same aims as those of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lord Beecham. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said very clearly, what is the point of imposing court charges on people when it is plainly obvious that they will not be able to pay, and the court in any event has the power to remit the charges in the future?

I want to say a little more about the general principle of criminal courts charges. Magistrates’ courts, particularly those in London, very often deal with people who are poor and who have mental health problems and/or drug and alcohol problems. It is not that unusual to find defendants in front of one who have no national insurance number, no money, no benefits and no legal status within Britain. They come before the court for whatever reason has brought them there, and they are living off the kindness of friends with no recognisable status. It really is ridiculous for a court to be required to put a charge on these people in addition to the victim surcharge and other possible charges when there is absolutely no chance of them paying. It is already the case that one ranks the payments that are to be made. It is compensation which is discretionary so far as the courts are concerned. Compensation would be paid first, to be followed by prosecution costs, which are discretionary. Third in the rank would be the victim surcharge, which is non-discretionary, and then after that will come the courts charge, which is also non-discretionary. If defendants are made aware of the non-discretionary nature of the victim surcharge and the courts charge, poorer people could be more likely to plead guilty so that there are less extensive court charges, rather than going into a lengthy trial where there is an unpredictable but mandatory level of courts charge if they are found guilty.

I understand that there will be a three-year review period; I presume that one purpose of that review period is to look at whether there is any statistical basis for poor people being more likely to plead guilty. That is a very profound question, because it would be a consideration of some of the poorest people that we see in our courts today.

I will check one point with the noble Lord. I hope that I know the answer to it, but I wanted to check that it is open to the courts to deem the criminal courts charge served by time spent in custody—one day deemed served—in a similar way that that discretion exists regarding the victim surcharge. Therefore in that very specific way, with someone drunk and disorderly who has spent some time in the cells, you can deem both the victim surcharge and the criminal courts charge as served. I am not in favour of that in principle. My group of amendments try to restore finding a particular way to restore discretion to judges and magistrates so that they can deal with the reality of the situation they come across every day.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly from the Back Benches. I agree very much with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. I was a magistrate many years ago. I do not sit any more, but when I lived in the Midlands I used to sit on the Coventry Bench. Again, like my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, there were times when people came in front of me who had absolutely nothing. In particular, I used to sit in the fines court, to which people were brought back because they had not paid their fines. When you looked at their circumstances, the only way they could pay those fines was to go out and commit more crime; it was impossible otherwise. Now we have an additional charge here. It is important that we take into account people’s circumstances: not to allow the court to have that discretion is a bad move. To have loads of fines when there is no possibility of their ever being paid back is a complete waste of time. It makes a mockery of justice, and we should not do it.

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Preventing the use of the powers that these provisions contain would mean that offenders would have to face the consequences of defaulting on payment, which might include the use of bailiffs or a return to court to seek a variation, including additional costs for the court. We suggest that, notwithstanding the difficulties that are presented by those who do not have substantial means, as the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Beecham, and my noble friend Lord Marks, mentioned, they are met by the various provisions that I have outlined to mitigate the harshness, and that the transparency and consistency of this provision is an advantage and should result in financial benefit accruing to the whole criminal justice system. I therefore ask the noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

I have a point that is slightly tangential to the group of amendments we have just been debating. When magistrates are fining somebody, for a huge proportion of the time they do not know the existing level of outstanding fines; so they are fining somebody when they do not know what debts to fines they already have. I understand that this is a practical problem and a difficult issue that the court service is reluctant to address. Surely, however, if one is serious about reducing the level of outstanding fines, one should try to address it so that when a court sets fines it knows the level of the outstanding fines when it puts in place the sentence.

[Lord Faulks]

It is certainly the case that the court should know, as far as possible, the level of outstanding fines. I understand the practical difficulties that can be encountered by courts but, with great respect to the noble Lord, we are concerned here with a definite, fixed cost in relation to the particular nature of the offence, which will not depend on fines outstanding. That is not a question—reasonable though it is—that arises on consideration of these amendments.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 4, 5, 8 and 16 relate to the obligations imposed on the Parole Board by Clauses 3, 4, 5 and 7. Clause 3 adds terrorism and explosive offences to the category of the enhanced dangerous offenders sentencing scheme. Cases will be referred to the board for a decision about release instead of offenders being eligible for automatic release after serving two-thirds of their term. Clause 4 extends this to all such offenders serving extended determinate sentences. Clause 5 applies a similar provision to other offenders convicted of serious crimes, as listed in the schedule, who will be subject to discretionary rather than automatic release between the halfway and end points of their sentence. Clause 7 creates a new release test for recalled prisoners to be applied by the board under which the Secretary of State or the board has to be satisfied that it is highly unlikely that a prisoner would breach a condition of his licence.

All these measures are likely to increase the pressure on an overstretched and underresourced Parole Board. The Government estimate an increase of 1,100 hearings a year by 2030, rising by an estimated 50 next year, 400 by 2020 and ultimately requiring an extra 1,000 prison places. As the Prison Reform Trust points out, the Ministry of Justice has form in these matters. When indeterminate sentences—IPPs—which we will be debating later were introduced, the ministry, under a previous Administration, estimated an increase in the prison population of 900, but by the end of last year 5,335 people were serving IPP sentences, two-thirds of them beyond their tariff date.

This was in good measure a result of the failure, frequently commented upon in this House and beyond, to provide the necessary resources to the Parole Board to prepare people for release and rehabilitation. As the Prison Reform Trust reported, offending behaviour programmes are scarcely available and limited in their scope and effectiveness, and it is inherently difficult to demonstrate reduced dangerousness and pass the high safety threshold for release. That was in 2010, when numbers were smaller and staffing greater. Moreover, as the Prison Reform Trust points out, the Government’s impact assessment of the provisions of the Offender Rehabilitation Act estimated that 13,000 offenders would be recalled or committed to custody a year, leading to an extra 600 prison places being needed. Have the Government looked into the real impact of the Offender Rehabilitation Act on this situation to date and as anticipated in the near future? Further, what assessment have they made of the effect of the recent Supreme Court judgment in the Osborn case requiring the board to hold more oral hearings, which last December alone had increased by one-third in indeterminate review cases to just under 400 in a month and to 90 in indeterminate recall cases?

The board warned in its annual report, as it appears from today’s Daily Telegraph, that the number of oral hearings could increase from 4,500 a year to as many as 14,000, and at an additional cost of £10 million. What is the Government’s response to this estimate? The Minister has apparently indicated that an extra £3 million will be allocated to the Parole Board. How does that square with the board’s own estimate of the potential cost? What is the Government’s estimate of the impact on prison numbers and on the work of the board of the Secretary of State’s latest headline-grabbing decision that no prisoner may be transferred to an open prison if he or she has previously absconded, which is apparently already building up a backlog of Parole Board hearings? How do the Government expect the board to cope with these pressures when it has already lost 20% of its staff and when its members are now having to use an unreliable video link system to conduct hearings—another example of the problems associated with rushing headlong into the all too frequently costly and inadequately tested application of IT and electronic systems?

All this is set against a background of massive overcrowding in many prisons with the attendant problems that that poses for prisoners and staff, and with the system too often being pared back to one of simple confinement. The chief inspector has spoken of dangerous instability in the prison estate and has pointed out that despite some recent high-profile cases, there is a very low failure rate for release on licence. Further questions arise over the Government’s apparent intention, as reported in the Times on 21 June, to transfer responsibility for the administration of recall cases to the magistrates’ courts. Can the Minister tell us whether this is the Government’s policy, because of course the report may be wrong, and if so, what consultations have taken place with the Parole Board, the Magistrates’ Association, the judiciary and other interested parties? Is there an intention to pilot such a concept before rolling it out?

It really is time for the Government to adopt less of the kind of muscle-flexing populism that is so often exhibited by the Secretary of State and more of the considered approach we have come to expect of the Minister. These amendments are designed to ensure that the Parole Board is fully engaged with any plans to implement these measures and that Parliament has an opportunity to scrutinise and approve their implementation on the basis that the necessary resources will be made available to ensure that the pathway to rehabilitation is properly and securely paved. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to add to some of the comments made by my noble friend Lord Beecham on the make-up of the review of the Parole Board. My understanding is that at present Parole Board members can either sit as a single Parole Board member or as two or as three. They can be a mixture of lay people and lawyers. It is of course desirable that the more serious the case, the greater the legal training and the more appropriate the experience of the people sitting on those hearings. I also wonder whether the Minister can comment on the possibility of using lay magistrates to sit on parole hearings. Is this something that the Ministry of Justice is willing to consider? We have a resource in the pool of magistrates throughout England and Wales, so is the ministry considering the use of magistrates in parole hearings? The whole subject of the Parole Board is extremely important, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Beecham, and is something that needs to be managed very carefully, given the reduction in the resources being made available to it.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may add a word to what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has said in amplification of his noble friend Lord Beecham. In addition to saying that £3 million would be made available, the Minister has been quoted as saying that a number of changes are to be introduced to ease the pressure on the Parole Board. In addition to the possibility of lay magistrates being used, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, can the Minister outline exactly what those changes are? I am quite certain that the Supreme Court introduced the Parole Board in oral hearings because it was satisfied that the board gave a fair hearing to people, and that was how it operated. I would hate to think of some of the parole decisions being reduced to bureaucratic decisions taken by officials.

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[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I know that it is normal that the Front Bench on this side finishes any debate before the Minister answers, but I really have a bad feeling about the clause and I want to support the amendment. The provision smacks to me of the outcome of lobbying by those who will have highly remunerative contracts, if it comes to pass. We are not hearing any costings on this, and I would very much like the Minister to tell us what it is going to cost the public purse. As others have said, there are circumstances in which it is very useful to tag someone when there are concerns about whether they might not respond to the ordinary inhibitions on their liberty during a period of parole, but I am concerned about it being used in this wide way. Behind the provision is the lobbying by those private sector companies that now make a great deal of money out of this very kind of thing. Have any costings been done? How much will it cost the public purse?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, I want to pick up on the point that my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws has made and speak to Amendment 13, on the review of this extension of tagging. My honourable friend Dan Jarvis made the point in the other place about possible unforeseen consequences of this extension. I was talking to a magistrate colleague of mine only last week, and she pointed out to me that the new GPS tags are physically much larger than the existing tags used today. That means that they are possibly easier to remove—but there is another possible consequence, in that they need charging much more often. The existing tags do not need recharging because the battery lasts for the length of the period that the person is tagged. Potentially, that raises a whole series of issues with offenders—people out on bail or offenders in the case that we are now discussing—who are not properly recharging their GPS-driven tags. My understanding is that they would have to do it by an induction loop; it would not be a physical connection. That could raise a lot of unforeseen consequences, which is why I reiterate my support for Amendment 13, so that it can be looked at when the provision comes into force.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the effect of Amendments 9, 10 and 14 would be, as my noble friend Lord Marks said, to remove from the Bill the provisions which would allow for compulsory electronic monitoring conditions to be imposed on offenders on release from custody. This would leave the use of these conditions on a discretionary basis, as they are now under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. I understand that there are some concerns about how these powers will be used. Therefore, it may be helpful if I take some time to explain how the provisions would work and why the Government consider them necessary and important in our drive to deliver a more effective sentencing and rehabilitation framework.

I emphasise that legislation has been in place for some years to provide for the use of electronic monitoring as a condition of release, both to monitor compliance with other conditions, such as curfew or exclusion conditions, and to monitor the offender’s whereabouts as a condition in its own right. The limitations of the current technology have meant that, in practice, electronic monitoring has been used so far simply to monitor compliance with a curfew. However, we are reviewing the electronic monitoring contracts, which provides us with the opportunity to take advantage of new, cutting-edge technology that will enable us to track offenders in the community.