Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Archbishop of Canterbury]

My Lords, many noble Lords will know that the Church of England’s view on abortion is one of principled opposition, recognising that there can be limited conditions under which abortion may be preferable to any available alternatives. This is based on the belief of the infinite worth and value of every human life, however old or young, and including life not yet born. The infinite value of human life is a fundamental Christian principle that underpins much of our legal system and has shaped existing laws on abortion. All life is precious. We therefore need to recognise that women confronted with the very complex and difficult decision to terminate a pregnancy deserve our utmost understanding, care and practical support as they face what is often a heart-wrenching decision.

However, I cannot support Clause 208. Though its intention may not be to change the 24-week abortion limit, it undoubtedly risks eroding the safeguards and enforcement of those legal limits and, inadvertently, undermining the value of human life.

I support Amendment 425 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, since it is not clear how the law can function in an enforceable way without in-person consultation before accessing early medical abortion. The risks of medical complications are, as we have heard, much greater if the pills for early abortion are taken beyond the 11-week limit. Although there are benefits to telemedicine—I do not dispute that—there are also flaws, and they are key to the debate on whether Clause 208 should pass.

As I have already said, this is not a debate on whether the legal abortion limit should change, but without the levers necessary to monitor and enforce the law, we are at risk of it becoming exactly that.

In the same vein, I support the amendment in the name of my right reverend friend the Bishop of Leicester, as we have a particular duty of care to those under 18 to ensure that they are properly cared for and supported while making such difficult decisions.

I am reminded of the call of the prophet Micah both to do justice and to love mercy. Balancing justice and mercy is the challenge that we are debating today. I do not think that women who act in relation to their own pregnancies should be prosecuted, but I also do not wish to see any increase in late-term abortions.

Although Clause 208 is well intentioned, it risks making an already imperfect situation worse. Therefore, I support Amendment 424 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton.

Decriminalisation of abortion is a question of such legal, moral and practical complexity that it cannot be properly addressed in an amendment hastily added to another Bill. Consideration of any alteration to the abortion laws needs public consultation and robust parliamentary processes to ensure that every aspect of this debate is carefully considered and scrutinised.

There are many outstanding questions, which deserve greater attention, about the tone of policing in this area, about how we can best ensure that women suffering miscarriages can access the right care when they need it, and about how those who provide abortions outside the law will continue to be held accountable for doing so.

As I have said before in this place, we need a framework that supports women, not one that puts them and their unborn children in the way of greater harm. On that basis, I will support the amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Monckton and Lady Stroud, and my right reverend friend the Bishop of Leicester should they push them to a vote.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

It was suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, that Clause 208 would undermine respect for the law. On the contrary, it will enhance respect for the law, because it will express in statutory form compassion for women who have the misfortune to suffer the loss of their baby at late term for whatever reason it occurs, and it will prevent intrusive, distressing police investigations at a most sensitive time in any woman’s life.

It has been suggested that there should be a balance in the law. Clause 208 already includes the necessary balance because it protects the woman but maintains the criminal liability of anyone who assists her to have a late-term abortion, whether it be the abusive partner, the rogue doctor or whoever it may be. That is right and proper, and that is the balance that should be accorded.

As a lawyer, I look for precedents. The precedent that occurs to me is the Suicide Act 1961, in which Parliament recognised that a person who had the misfortune to seek to take their own life should not be prosecuted. You cannot be prosecuted for attempting to end your own life. But the law says—I appreciate that we are currently debating the assisted dying Bill, but my speech has nothing to do with that—that if you assist a person to seek to take their own life, you can be prosecuted. That is the distinction there, and it is the distinction in Clause 208.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

There is another distinction that the House may wish to consider: under the Suicide Act, it is not a crime to take your own life, but we are talking about taking the life of an unborn baby.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Of course, the unborn baby, until it is born, has no legal identity. That is the law of the land. The unborn baby has no legal identity, and the mother is in the prime position in relation to that baby. We have to balance the interests of all concerned. My view is that Clause 208 does contain the balance that I have suggested to the House.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, if we have to balance the needs and rights of all concerned, does that mean that an unborn child that is viable beyond 24 weeks has no rights and should not be considered here? Does it mean that it is only the rights of the mother that matter?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am not commending late-term abortions. Nobody on either side of this debate is commending late-term abortions. The question addressed by Clause 208 is whether there should be a criminal liability: whether people should be investigated by the police and potentially sent to prison in those circumstances. That seems to me, with all due respect, to be the wrong balance. I say to the House that this is a very difficult issue, but I am afraid that those who oppose Clause 208 simply fail to recognise the arguments on the other side, which need to be balanced.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 426C and thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Falkner, Lady Spielman and Lady Lawlor, for their support. I will also speak in support of Amendment 422E, to which I have added my name.

Before explaining why we have tabled Amendment 426C, I give a little context. Like, I am sure, all other noble Lords, I have received a great deal of correspondence on Clause 208. One thing repeatedly said by proponents is that, apart from decriminalising all instances of maternal abortion, nothing would change. The Fawcett Society, for example, says that apart from this one change, the Abortion Act 1967 would continue to operate as it always has. However, I think this is quite mistaken. We are not tidying up a small drafting error here; we are making a fundamental change to the law. When you make a fundamental change to the law, you change perceptions and behaviour, and it has knock-on effects.

We have heard, for example, that there has been a marked change in the number of investigations related to abortion. We have also learned—the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, alluded to this—that the changes are a bit more complicated than we might have thought. There has been an increase in the number of investigations related to procuring illegal abortion offences, but at the same time there has been a decrease in the number of investigations for intentional destruction of a viable unborn child. For example, there were seven investigations of intentional destruction of a viable unborn child in 2025, compared with 18 in 2023. Only one person, a male, was proceeded against in the most recent year. Clearly, something is going on but, equally clearly, it seems to be a little more complicated than we might think and the Government do not really know. To repeat the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, made, it is not possible to determine how many investigations there have been that relate to women, including women acting in relation to their pregnancy.

Alongside that we have had another major change, about which we have already heard a great deal this evening, in Committee and at Second Reading, and that is the arrival on the scene of abortifacient pills. They have completely changed the profile of abortion, including whether the foetus is dead before it is delivered. It is not just about telemedicine but about pills by post, which have become much more easily available, not simply within this country but increasingly across country boundaries.

The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and others have discussed consultations by pregnant women, and we have had some discussion of whether these should or should not all be in person. Our Amendment 426C has a rather different focus. It would create a new crime of obtaining abortifacients, which for the moment are pills, by false representation. To explain why this is desirable, I will say a bit more about the case of Stuart Worby, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, referred.

In 2025, Stuart Worby was found guilty of poisoning his pregnant wife by administering abortion medication without her knowledge or consent. She very much wanted the baby she was carrying and he did not. A female associate of Worby’s procured the drugs through an online consultation in which she claimed early pregnancy and was duly prescribed and sent the pills. Worby gave his wife the drugs without her knowledge. She suffered a devastating miscarriage and the government website summarising the case notes that she is left unable to bear children. The victim of Worby’s act was not investigated when she miscarried. The crime came to light only when she found messages on her husband’s phone and went to the police.

In another recent case in Scotland the abortion was procured by a paramedic who injected his partner without her knowledge. Again, she was not investigated; the crime only came to light indirectly. There may be many other cases like this, but it is possible and becoming easier to obtain these pills—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)]

No, I am going to continue. I agree with the Chief Whip on this; we should just keep going.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I took a number of interventions.

[Baroness Wolf of Dulwich (CB)]

That was your choice. I am going to follow instructions.

It is becoming easier to obtain these pills not least because of the balkanisation of American states on abortion issues, which has also turbocharged the use of pills in the United States. If, as seems likely, obtaining and administering an abortifacient without consent is going to increase, then we think there is a good reason to make this a clearly defined offence. Our amendment is drafted in consultation with some experienced KCs based on existing fraud law.

I realise that there will be an obvious objection, which is that there is existing legislation, but as the Government Ministers themselves have made clear when introducing specific legislation to cover retail workers, the fact that there may be legislation is not necessarily a compelling argument against creating a new, clear offence. Sometimes the legislature may want to go further to inform, to highlight particular risks, and to clarify the law in new situations, which is what we are in in this case.

We have drafted this amendment on the assumption that Clause 208 stands, because you have to have to make an assumption, but the fact that it was so difficult to do this, that it is so unsatisfactory and that, if we went forward, we or the Government would have to redraft in the light of what does or does not happen to Clause 208 makes it clear that we are in an unsatisfactory situation. We are making law on the hoof when what is needed is a really good look at the situation we are in and the way that the changes that we might introduce would impact on other behaviour, so that we could take a coherent, holistic view of whether abortion law needs to be rethought.

In that context, I return to Amendment 422E. The first rule of good policy-making is to be clear about the problem. I do not think we are. Amendment 422E therefore proposes an alternative to the unscheduled and unexpected introduction of the sweeping changes in Clause 208. It would require the personal consent of the DPP for an investigation, with a tight time limit. It would address the distressing situations that we have heard about and it would leave us time to discuss properly what changes could usefully be made to current law. It would also ensure that any change that occurred fulfilled the objectives of those who proposed and support Clause 208. I am really concerned at this pulling something out.

I have two final, quick points. Many people will say that lots of other countries have decriminalised, but that does not mean they have a situation that would be exactly like ours if we passed Clause 208. Whether you have full decriminalisation exists in a whole set of different situations, and it certainly does not mean that those countries allow abortion at full term by mothers. The second point is that it is perfectly possible to have a review. The Scots have just done so. They have had a thorough review. One may or may not like what they have done, but that is what we should be doing. Given where we are, I commend my amendment to the House and strongly commend a compromise that would give us time. I hope that the Government are listening to the degree of concern over this and considering whether they might, in the near future, do something serious on this issue.