Citizenship and Civic Engagement (Select Committee Report)

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 19th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome this report and congratulate the committee on producing it. I, too, wish to focus on that part of the report that deals with citizenship education. As the report makes clear, the case for citizenship education is compelling. The Government’s response, which promises nothing and is appalling in its complacency, fails completely to recognise its significance.

There are two reasons why we in this House should strongly support citizenship education. First, it is a public good. Citizenship education can fulfil an invaluable, indeed necessary, role in ensuring that we have a citizenry that understands our political system—not simply its structure but why it matters to everyone. As James Weinberg of Sheffield University told the committee:

“We have evidence … that citizenship education, where it is done effectively and consistently, can predict political efficacy, participation and levels of knowledge”.


It is thus central to the health of our political system.

Secondly, citizenship education is in our self-interest. At the moment, Parliament is neither loved nor respected. In the 2016 Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement, only 32% of those questioned were satisfied with how Parliament does its job. Eurobarometer data over a 10-year period from 2004 to 2014 show that only one-third of those surveyed in the United Kingdom “tend to trust” Parliament. The problem is that the public judge each House not on what it does collectively but rather on the behaviour of Members. A scandal affecting Members of either House impacts more on public attitudes towards Parliament than any increase in the effective scrutiny of legislation. The answer rests with Members making more of an effort to promote and defend the institution of Parliament and with citizenship education in ensuring that citizens have a better awareness of Parliament and the knowledge and incentive to engage with it.

Citizenship education is thus essential; that is my starting point. Despite being introduced to the national curriculum in 2002 by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, it has not become embedded in schools in a way that is necessary for it to be taught effectively. Indeed, the report provides a damning critique, concluding:

“The Government has allowed citizenship education in England to degrade to a parlous state. The decline of the subject must be addressed in its totality as a matter of urgency”.


If citizenship education is to be taught effectively, three conditions have to be met. First, it has to be taught by qualified teachers. The nature of the subject is such that being taught by people not qualified to teach it may be worse than it not being taught at all. The committee recommends that the Government establish a target of having enough trained citizenship teachers to have a citizenship specialist in every secondary school. The problem is that the subject is not being taught by qualified teachers.

In May, I tabled a Question about the number of qualified teachers. My noble friend Lord Agnew of Oulton replied. It was a detailed Answer, for which I give him much credit. I quote, in some detail, from it:

“In November 2016 there were 4,800 teachers in state funded secondary schools teaching citizenship. Of these we estimate that 8.7% had a relevant post A level qualification in the subject. A relevant post A level qualification is defined as a first degree or higher, BEd degree, PGCE, Certificate of Education or any other qualification at National Qualifications Framework level 4 or above in either citizenship, international relations, international, EU or UK politics or political theory. There are also 10.6% of citizenship teachers with post A level qualification in history that prepare teachers well for teaching British citizenship”.


Even if one includes those with post A-level qualifications in history, approximately eight out of every 10 citizenship teachers are still not deemed to have a relevant post A-level qualification. These data show that we are nowhere near achieving the target recommended by the committee. They reinforce the committee’s conclusion as to the parlous state that now exists. Can my noble friend Lord Bourne tell us what steps the Government are taking to bolster the number of trained citizenship teachers? By what date does he think it will be possible to meet the committee’s recommendation of having a citizenship specialist in every secondary school?

Secondly, citizenship education needs to be distinctive. Citizenship needs to be taught as a discrete subject and not be allied with or swept up in other subjects. To combine it with PSHE or other subjects is to dilute and miss its importance. The committee notes:

“PSHE is not citizenship education”.


It later states:

“The increasing need for more specialist citizenship teachers will not be solved by support for teacher training alone. It must be accompanied by a restoration of the status of citizenship as a subject worth teaching”.


There needs to be a recognition of its importance and, intrinsic to that, it must figure as a distinct and protected part of the curriculum. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that it is taught as a discrete subject?

Thirdly, it needs to be taken seriously by schools. The committee’s goals for citizenship education are not likely to be achieved if schools have no incentive to deliver and protect the teaching of citizenship. There may be a moral imperative to teach it, but moral imperatives do nothing to enrich the school budget or help the school’s place in the league tables. Schools need something more concrete to ensure that they take citizenship seriously and teach it effectively. If citizenship education fed into performance in the league tables, schools would very quickly take it seriously. Without such incentives, we shall remain in a position where schools are reluctant to take on a trained citizenship teacher and the task of teaching citizenship will fall to a member of staff who is free on a Wednesday afternoon. It is therefore imperative that the Government have a radical rethink about the place of citizenship and how the teaching of it is to be delivered.

Can my noble friend tell us what incentives the Government plan to introduce to ensure that schools take seriously their responsibility for delivering citizenship education? Pious observations about the value of citizenship education will not change the current totally unacceptable situation. There must be concrete steps taken by the Government, and taken quickly, to reverse the situation in which we now find ourselves. Of course, there will be a cost to ensuring that the resources are there, but it is essential to a healthy polity. At a time when politics is increasingly marked by tribalism, and with soundbites substituting for debate, the greater and more compelling is the need for a politically literate population.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

That is not the only pot used in relation to English-language funding. In my own department, for example, as part of the integration policy we are putting in substantial sums in relation to the teaching of the English language and working with the Department for Education. If I may, I will write to the noble Baroness with more detail but I simply say that it is not just about the one pot. It is about working together to ensure that we get the best value for money.

I turn to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, about honours for volunteering. I think he was tying that to some reduction in the fee for further or higher education. His essential point was that volunteers would get credits which they could then use for some abatement of fees, or something of that nature. On the surface, it seems a very constructive suggestion which I would like to look at. At the moment, as he would know, we reward—if reward is the right word—or honour people through the “Points of Light” programme for outstanding volunteering, which has an award every day. However, I appreciate his point in tying that to education and I will come back to him on that, if I may.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised a point about the voting age. He will perhaps know from the nature of the committee’s recommendation that the view he holds is not universal. But certainly some people hold it and, regardless of where the voting age should be, I think we would all agree that it is desirable to encourage democratic participation even before people are voting. A fair point was made there.

I think those were the main points. I fully accept that there are some issues to be looked at. As I say, this is work in progress so I would not want people to think that the Government regard it as a done deal. I am certainly not complacent. I fully accept that there is much work to be done—a substantial amount.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Before my noble friend finishes, I may have missed something but could he tell us what the Government are going to do as a result of this committee’s report that is different from what they did before?

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

The first thing we are doing is pulling it together to have ultimate responsibility resting with a designated committee. As a result, my noble friend can expect more to happen. I pointed out that I regarded silo thinking as one of the very serious issues that we seek to address along with the fact that each government department may be left to get on with it on its own, rather than coming together in a concerted way. I hope that that will make a substantial difference. I am not claiming that it will happen overnight or that my noble friend will see a change by the end of the year, for example, but it is only just now that the committee has taken over responsibility for this area. Now that that is happening and it is jointly chaired by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, which will give it some heft, I hope that it will make a difference. I urge noble Lords to be a little patient but to come back on the basis of the undertaking that I have given today at the Dispatch Box. I once again thank noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lord Hodgson, for an outstanding report.

Devolution (Constitution Committee Reports)

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 9th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of the Constitution Committee. I too pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Lang for the way he has moved the Motion and for his most effective chairmanship of the committee. In the time available, I wish to pursue two points that merit a response from the Government. Both derive from the two reports of the Constitution Committee that are before us.

As we have heard already, the basic message at the heart of the report on The Union and Devolution is that instead of being defensive, we need to spend more time saying what is right with the union. There is a clear, positive case to be made. As the report says, the union has brought stability, peace and prosperity to the United Kingdom.

I was a member of the Conservative Political Centre National Policy Group on the Constitution that produced a report, Strengthening the United Kingdom, in 1996. My noble friend Lord Dunlop was also a member, and the committee was serviced by my noble friend Lord Lexden. We emphasised the case for the union. We argued that it reconciled order with personal liberty, and national differences with common citizenship, thanks to one constitutional citizenship established by the union. We also drew out that it creates a constitutional citizenship transcending national and regional parochialism, that it successfully reconciles the ideas of nationalism and nationality and that it promotes cultural diversity and the sharing of rich differences which diversity produces.

I am sure my noble friend the Minister will endorse these essential attributes. I think it important we put them on the record. However, the first point I wish to develop, and invite a response to from my noble friend, derives from another, crucial observation in the report on The Union and Devolution. As it says:

“Proper consideration of the cumulative impact of devolution on the integrity of the Union itself has been lacking”.


This relates to a point that I have pursued for many years, namely the essentially incoherent approach taken by successive Governments to constitutional change. Changes to the constitution have been disparate and discrete, advocated on their individual merits and not set within a clear view of what type of constitution is appropriate to the United Kingdom.

I was recently invited to pen an article entitled “Constitutional Change: Unfinished Business?”. I argued that it was more appropriate to refer to “never-ending business”, because “unfinished business” implies that there is an end-point. There is presently no end-point, because no Government of recent years have articulated what they are working towards in terms of our constitution. Specific reforms have been advocated, and in most but not all cases implemented, by Governments, and there have been changes that are essentially the product of reacting to different demands. The reaction has been, in constitutional terms, incoherent, with no obvious thought about the impact on other changes. As Professor Charlie Jeffery told the committee:

“We have seen ... a real absence of territorial statecraft—thinking about how the state as a whole can accommodate the demands for decentralisation in its various parts. Unless we do that, we will continue on this ratchet process of gradual disintegration”.


Even within the context of devolution, there is a need to see it within the wider context of the union. As we have heard, we need a clearer articulation of the case for the union: to have a grasp of the principles underpinning that union and determining what government should seek to achieve. Unless we have that, government will spend too much time in firefighting mode. However, it was clear from the committee’s two inquiries—this brings me to my second point—that one impediment to achieving this was the structure of government. As we reported in our 2015 report, responsibility for devolution was dispersed within government, with a lack of effective co-ordination and oversight. Indeed, we said it was extraordinary that the Cabinet Minister stated to be responsible for devolution, the Deputy Prime Minister, was not a member of the Cabinet Committee on that very subject.

After the 2015 election, a Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Reform was established. However, it met only once in nine months, with constitutional issues being cleared instead through the Home Affairs Committee. As we said at paragraph 344 of our 2016 report,

“consideration of constitutional issues as simply one part of the work of the much broader-ranging Home Affairs Cabinet Committee risks the loss of any explicit focus on the constitutional implications of the UK Government’s policies”.

The situation has not improved since. If anything, it has got worse. There is no Cabinet committee dedicated to constitutional reform. There is no committee on devolution. The Government in their much-delayed response to the 2015 report said that,

“issues concerning devolution cut across a large swathe of Government business considered by different Cabinet Committees”.

They said that it was up to Ministers to consider the interests of all citizens of the UK and the impact of all policies on the whole of the UK. That is it. It is in effect conceding that the Government have no structured collective means of looking holistically and proactively at devolution, and more generally the constitution. There is the Minister for the Cabinet Office with responsibility for an overview of constitutional issues, supported by the Minister for the Constitution. Where is the Cabinet Minister—where is the Cabinet committee?—that has dedicated responsibility for devolution, for addressing what we need to be doing to preserve the union? Where is the Cabinet committee that has responsibility for looking holistically at our constitution?

There is within government an obvious and necessary focus on Brexit. That, though, should not be at the expense of looking at our constitution as a constitution and how the different parts fit within a clear and coherent framework of principles, derived from an understanding of the constitution we want for the United Kingdom. Without that, we are in danger of a never-ending process of disparate and largely reactive changes, resulting in a constitutional framework that no one wants or necessarily understands. How do Brexit, developments in the union, decentralisation in England and demands for a British Bill of Rights fit together within an intellectually coherent view of the constitution we want for the United Kingdom?

We can, I believe, start to get there from some of the principles enunciated in the committee’s 2016 report. There is value, as a witness citing the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, said, in looking at,

“the issues that bond the union”,

in essence the constitutional citizenship to which I referred in opening. Professor Adam Tomkins, of the University of Glasgow, now an MSP and formerly a legal adviser to the Constitution Committee, said in evidence:

“We really cannot carry on, in the United Kingdom, developing devolution or developing Britain’s territorial governance in silos … Really for me the value of thinking about principles of union constitutionalism is that it gets us, or might help to get us, out of those silos and into the space where we can start thinking about the things that we have in common”.


Getting out of the silos and thinking about our constitution as such—as a whole and not simply the sum of its parts—is essential. The Government need to be on the front foot and not hunkering down in their silos.

I shall conclude by putting the two questions that derive from this to my noble friend Lord Duncan. First, echoing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cullen, could he please delineate the principles that govern constitutional change? As I say, we need a clear and coherent framework, not only to know how to respond to demands for change but to be proactive in making the case for the fundamentals of the British constitution that have served us well and are in danger of being swept away.

Secondly, what plans are there to restructure the process of government to address constitutional change? There needs to be a structure to enable the Government collectively, at Cabinet level, to discuss and agree change within that framework of basic principles. The clear message in both reports from the Constitution Committee is that existing arrangements are not up to the task. These are crucial matters of principle and process that need to be addressed urgently if we are to maintain and promote the union of the United Kingdom.

Wales Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 31st October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Crickhowell has raised practical objections to the amendment. I do not wish to raise practical objections but I have an objection of principle. Amendments like this immediately concern me in so far as they restrict the choice of electors. Any amendment that places a restriction on candidates is in effect a restriction on the choice of those who have to do the election. It may be that, as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said, candidates may not know the problems of the local area or may not know the culture. That is for the electors to decide and not elect them as their representatives. It is not for us to say to the electors, “Sorry, you can’t elect them because we think they aren’t suitable to represent you”. That is fundamentally an issue for the electors. I am for widening choice for electors; if they want to elect whoever, that is entirely a matter for them. It is not for us to impose a statutory requirement.

I accept the point that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, made about the problems that derive from the particular electoral system in respect of some candidates, but the problem there is the electoral system. My point is one of principle; therefore, one would need to look at the structure and the process of the electoral system to enable the electors to have a better choice, so that they are choosing those whom they wish to represent them. If one wishes the candidates to live within the area, that is a political issue. It is for them to promise electors, rather like Members here can say to their constituents, “If elected, I will live in the constituency”. However, this is fundamentally a relationship between electors and those they choose to represent them. I am therefore wary of any amendment that restricts choice; various amendments have come up in different contexts that do that, and in the Bill I am particularly wary of moving in this direction. I hope the Minister will resist it.

[Baroness Randerson]

My Lords, I have great sympathy with the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. Although I understand the principle of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I fear that it takes rather too hard-line an approach to an important issue of principle. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell. The principle here is not the individual convenience of candidates who stand for the Assembly or those who are elected to the Assembly, but the fundamental principle that you should not be a member of a legislature to which you are not subject yourself. You should not pass laws that you yourself do not have to obey and take heed of. That supersedes anything that can be said about the practical problems, which undoubtedly exist, for people who live on the border. I think the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, deals with that issue in that you do not have to go through the upheaval of moving to Wales if you live a couple of hundred yards over the border. Indeed, if you live in the middle of Surrey, you do not have to go through that upheaval until you are elected.

Until this Assembly term, it has always been taken for granted that you would live in Wales. I recall that when the current Assembly Member for Cardiff Central was first selected as the Labour candidate, she lived in Islington, but she felt obliged to obtain a small flat in Cardiff when she became the Labour candidate—and rightly so. It is important that people feel obliged to live in Wales, that they feel part of the Welsh culture and that they understand Welsh media and Welsh issues. Without living in Wales, that cannot be so. Therefore, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen]

I think that can be addressed if, in dealing with this amendment, the Government look at what happens in local government. You can be a member of a local authority and live within, I think, three or four miles of the boundary of the local council, and I suppose that could happen with the Welsh situation. Thus, if you lived within a mile or two of the border but felt very much part of a town or village in Wales and you felt Welsh, the accident of the border could be overcome by applying local government laws to the Welsh Assembly.

I turn to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, about the ability of electors to elect an individual to represent them in the Welsh Assembly. There is an awful lot of merit in that. People should be given that choice but, again, there is a difference. The only example of someone living in England and not in Wales is the UKIP leader in Wales. He was elected as a top-up Member. He does not represent an individual first past the post constituency; he is part of a top-up regional list.

The difference is that on that regional list, one generally elects the party and not the individual. When people voted as they did in that region in Wales, they voted for Mr Hamilton not as Mr Hamilton but for UKIP. Therefore, they did not really have a choice of saying, “I don’t want this person because he doesn’t live in Wales”. They did not get a choice in that. In one form or another, I represented people in Wales for 43 years. People then had the option of saying, “I don’t want him on the local authority or in Parliament”, because, perhaps, the candidate did not live in the constituency, ward or whatever. They had that chance, but they do not have that chance with regard to the top-up seats.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Surely, the argument, therefore, is that they should be given that chance—that one changes the system so that they have that degree of choice.

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen]

If I had my way I would change the whole system—probably not to what the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, wants, but to the alternative vote system, for example. The point I am making is that the people in that part of Wales did not get the opportunity to say, “I don’t want that person because they do not live in Wales”. They were voting for a party instead of an individual. I cannot see any reason why, when we set up a Parliament or an Assembly in one of our devolved parts of the United Kingdom, a person should represent it without living in it. All the arguments that have been addressed are valid and I hope that the Minister will look favourably on these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My point was that one should change the system so that the electors actually have a choice. The noble Lord is quite right about the point I was making. I would make it as open as possible for electors to choose whoever they want. I am all for eroding the restrictions on candidature. It is fundamentally a matter for the electors, so if a candidate does live hundreds of miles away, that is a matter for the electors. I remind him that, many years ago, it was actually a Labour Member who listed his address as Greece.

[Lord Hain]

I did discover all sorts of anomalies when I was Leader of the House of Commons about what was actually going on in terms of people’s residence, and I will not embarrass the noble Lord by mentioning where some of the Conservative MPs lived—that is another matter entirely. I am, as I say, more persuaded by the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, than by my two, if I have not dropped my noble friend Lord Murphy in it, so I am happy to withdraw our amendment in his favour.

I also think that my noble friend Lady Gale made an important point about the Assembly having the right to do this and I would like the Minister to look at actually inserting into the Bill a power explicitly conferred to the Assembly to make provision for the eligibility of candidates. On that basis, and agreeing with the point of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the principle at stake here has to be addressed one way or another—if not by this Parliament, then I hope by the Assembly, though it is a matter for that body—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Wales Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 11th November 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

8: Clause 3, leave out Clause 3

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 3 is straightforward. It disqualifies Members of the House of Commons from sitting as Members of the National Assembly for Wales. The provision implements recommendation 40 of the 2009 report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, MPs’ Expenses and Allowances. The committee’s recommendation derived from consideration of the position in Northern Ireland, where all the parties with representatives at Westminster wanted to bring multiple mandates to an end.

The clause also appears to be supported by the main parties at Westminster. At Second Reading in the other place Owen Smith, speaking for the Opposition, said that the Labour Party welcomed the provision, as the party had,

“always had an internal party position whereby it does not support people having dual mandates”.—[Official Report, Commons, 31/3/14; col. 618.]

What, then, is the basis for outlawing dual mandates? The argument appears to be that one cannot do the job of an MP while also holding another mandate. It was that conceit of the European Parliament that led to the EU prohibiting members of national legislatures from serving as Members of the European Parliament. We had to legislate to exclude Members of this House who were elected as MEPs.

The Committee on Standards in Public Life also contended that a dual mandate did not meet the conditions it prescribed for MPs holding other jobs—namely that it did not interfere with the primary role of the MP, was completely transparent to electors, and did not present a conflict of interest. The committee conceded that the second of these did not apply to a dual mandate. There is obvious transparency.

I am not persuaded that the other two conflict with holding the dual mandate either. I do not see a conflict of interest—not, at least, if one is representing the same constituents. The point about interfering with the primary role of the MP brings us, in essence, back to the practical argument. I am not clear that a case has been made that it interferes with the primary role of the MP. One could argue that it introduces an element of cross-fertilisation of benefit to both bodies.

Last week I had the honour of attending, indeed of chairing, the Speaker’s Lecture, given by Nick Raynsford, a former Minister for Local Government, who drew attention to the decline, which he regretted, in the number of MPs who serve concurrently as local councillors. The numbers have decreased significantly in recent decades, to the point where there are now virtually no MPs who also sit as local councillors. As he pointed out, this is in stark contrast to what happens in a number of our European neighbours.

Supporters of the clause will doubtless argue that it is no longer possible to do justice to the job of an MP while also serving as a local councillor. Some seem to manage—but that is not my point. The argument ignores a fundamental issue of principle. If one is to have a public office filled by election, one should not infringe the freedom of choice of the electors. If electors wish for a particular candidate to serve them in more than one assembly, that is a matter for them. It may be difficult or near impossible to serve in both, but that is not a sufficient basis for prohibiting voters by law from electing whoever they wish to represent them.

The late Lord Bannside was well known for having a triple mandate, never mind a dual mandate. Fulfilling all three roles may have been overly demanding. He may not have served his constituents effectively—although I am not saying he did not. My point is that it was a matter for him, and for those who elected him. His constituents put him in those positions. They knew what to do if they felt he was not representing them effectively.

I have a principled objection to restricting by law the choice of electors. I do not regard it as our role to say who electors should or should not elect. It is for that reason that I supported lowering the age at which one could stand for election to public office. I have no problem with that age being lower than the voting age; it used to be the other way round. If you lower the voting age to 16, you empower 16 year-olds. If you lower the age at which someone can stand for election to 16, you empower electors. My view is that we should be widening the choice of electors, not restricting it.

There are some positions that are incompatible with elected office. Those are generally already provided for, but we should keep them to a minimum. I see that in Amendment 10 my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford wishes to exclude any,

“member of the legislature of any country or territory outside the Commonwealth (other than Ireland),

from being eligible to be elected to the National Assembly. I suspect the chances of any member of such a legislature standing are pretty slim, but why should we legislate to prevent that? If political parties wish to have internal rules to limit such dual candidatures, that is a matter for them, but we should not be using the statute book to forbid it. If an AM wants to stand for election to the House of Commons or an MP seeks election to the National Assembly, that should be a matter for them and for the judgment of electors.

As I said, my objection to the clause is one of principle. We should apply stringent standards of scrutiny to measures of constitutional significance, not least those that place a restriction on electors. That is what, in effect, the clause does. It is important to get this on the record. We are in danger of creating a patchwork quilt of restrictions through bans on a dual mandate. We need to be more alert to the implications. If we are to proceed with the clause, we need to have on record a clear, principled justification for it. I invite both Front Benches to address the issue of principle engaged by the provision. There is no need to address the practical implications; we know what those are. We need to have the principle underpinning the ban that trumps the right of electors to elect the candidates of their choice. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, says. He argues on a point of principle that the choice of the electorate should not be channelled in any way in respect of dual candidacy. He mentioned the position on the continent. He will know that the stream is moving strongly against an accumulation of mandates on the continent—certainly in France, which I know reasonably well. When I represented Swansea, I would have loved to be the Mayor of Swansea at the same time and, perhaps, to have had another mandate. That would have been very useful in cross-fertilisation and no doubt added to my local standing. I work on the simple principle of practicality. People tend to vote for the party, which stands against the principled point which the noble Lord enunciated. Also, no person can serve two masters. My experience in the other place was that, if done properly, it was a full-time job. Equally, as we add to the responsibilities of the Assembly, if an Assembly Member is to do the job properly, that is also a full-time job, and the electorate should not be short-changed by allowing a person to do the two jobs. They will do one well and the other not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Norton, for his amendment, which allows us to discuss a clause in the Bill that we have not touched on in our previous discussions. I should also say that this is an additional matter that was not covered in the Silk report. The noble Lord comes to this debate on Report with an enviable and well deserved reputation on constitutional issues. I listened very carefully to what he said.

The noble Lord touched on the 2009 report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which did indeed recommend that the practice of Members of the House of Commons holding a dual mandate with a devolved legislature should be brought to an end by 2015 at the latest. As my noble friend has set out, that has so far prompted action additionally in relation to Northern Ireland.

The committee questioned whether it was possible for someone sitting in two legislatures simultaneously to do justice to both roles. The Government share the committee’s concern, and listening to noble Lords across the Chamber, it seems that this is a widely shared concern. I very much agree with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, that this is not just about serving the needs of constituents, although, of course, that is important; it is also about the ground rules and the practicalities of what is going on in the institutions concerned.

No Assembly Member is currently an MP but, historically, a number have been so. Indeed, we have two distinguished ones here today who could probably speak to the difficulty—near impossibility, I think—of doing both roles, certainly on a sustained basis. In the Government’s 2012 Green Paper, Future Electoral Arrangements for the National Assembly for Wales, the Government consulted on whether the practice of having multiple mandates should be brought to an end. A large majority of respondents—this time a reliable sample, I think, and a very large majority of respondents—agreed that it should, including opposition parties in the Assembly and the Electoral Reform Society.

Although the Welsh Government did not consider legislation to be necessary, at the Bill’s Second Reading in the Commons the shadow Secretary of State agreed with the proposal, as my noble friend Lord Norton affirmed. Following consultation, in March 2013 the Government announced that we would introduce legislation to prohibit multiple mandates between the House of Commons and the National Assembly at the earliest opportunity. This clause provides that membership of the House of Commons automatically disqualifies someone from sitting in the Assembly, subject to specific exceptions.

If a sitting Member of Parliament is subsequently elected as an Assembly Member, they are given eight days’ grace in which to vacate their seat in the House of Commons, by requesting appointment to a disqualifying office such as the Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The eight-day period also applies if parliamentary and Assembly elections are held in close proximity and a candidate is elected to both legislatures. This is to allow them to decide which post to take up. Similar provisions apply in Northern Ireland.

No grace period is given to an Assembly Member who is elected as an MP except where a scheduled Assembly election is expected to take place within a year, the maximum possible period actually being 372 days between parliamentary and Assembly elections. In this instance, an individual will be able to retain both seats for that limited period of time to avoid a costly Assembly by-election when a scheduled Assembly general election is relatively imminent. The draft Wales Bill allowed for a six-month grace period, but following pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, the Welsh Affairs Committee recommended that the period be extended to one year, and the Government have accepted this recommendation. This clause does not apply to the House of Lords, where there are no constituency interests to represent.

This clause will ensure that an Assembly Member will be able to concentrate on representing the constituents and can contribute significantly to the institution. There was cross-party agreement on these proposals in the House of Commons, and I would therefore ask my noble friend Lord Norton to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, it is precisely because there was cross-party agreement that there is a valuable case for raising the issue. I am grateful to those who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, invites me to digress somewhat on to the proposal for a senate of the regions and nations—the words “back of an envelope” come to mind. In terms of the principle that would apply, it would be that which I have enunciated. He talked about caution, but I think that caution should apply to the very proposal for such a senate, rather than the method by which its members should be chosen.

On the points that have been raised, the principal argument deployed from both Front Benches against the amendment is, in essence, that being an MP is a full-time job. There are two problems with that. It was not accepted by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in its report, where the challenge was a conflict with the primary role, not an argument about its being a full-time job. It is also belied by the fact that the House of Commons is not unable to function because MPs are doing other jobs. It is quite possible for an MP to fulfil the functions of a Member of Parliament while being a Minister of the Crown, for example. I really do not see the argument that—

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

While there is a difference between being a Minister and a Member of Parliament, they are in the same building at the same time. I invite the noble Lord to consider the example of someone who is a Member of the Assembly and yet is called to vote in the House of Commons—as the Prime Minister was yesterday, in full evening dress—and therefore neglects what might also be an important vote in the Assembly. A number of conflicts will arise in that way and a Member of Parliament or a Member of the Assembly will have to choose which he would prefer.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I recall that, particularly pre-devolution, we had Ministers who were responsible for different parts of the United Kingdom and who had to spend an awful lot of time not being in London. If there are challenges from being in both assemblies, that is a matter for the Members. Certainly, at times Members have managed to achieve that. Let us not forget that when we talk about a dual mandate, we are referring only to the House of Commons. There are Members of this Chamber who have a dual mandate, including one who is present at the moment.

[Lord Crickhowell]

I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I was—

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

Perhaps I could remind the House that, after the Minister has spoken, it is only the mover of the amendment who can speak.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

In that case, I will not be able to anticipate what my noble friend Lord Crickhowell may have been about to raise with me. My point is that the objection to what I am bringing forward is one of practice. I am challenging whether, in effect, one can really do that. Essentially, when your Lordships think about it, those who are making that case are saying: “We know best”. That is not an argument for restricting the freedom of electors. The task may be difficult. It may be close to impossible, which is the point being put forward, in which case it is open to those people not to stand and put themselves up to fulfil those dual roles and it would be open to the electors to make the decision not to elect them. As the Committee on Standards in Public Life made absolutely clear, there is at least transparency in this respect. You know what you are getting into, at least on whom you are electing, because of the positions that they hold, so I think that that principle holds.

The other argument put by the Committee on Standards in Public Life is that of a conflict of interest. However, I do not regard that as being persuasive either, because Members of Parliament have at times a conflict of interest between what their party wants and what they see as the interests of their constituencies. I suppose that the logic of that would be to ban MPs from being elected on a party label, which I think is not what the parties particularly want.

In response to the arguments put forward, there is a practical argument, but I do not think that it is sufficient to overcome what is a fundamental issue of principle. We are restricting the right of electors and it is important to get that on the record. That may not suffice today to prevent such rights from being restricted but I hope that it may help to give thought and prevent such incursions in the future. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rowe-Beddoe (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment most warmly. I do not wish to rehearse the Committee stage of the Bill, but I moved a very similar amendment at that time, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Richard. I now have a mnemonic for the situation, PRAT. It works something like this: increased powers—which is what I focused on in Committee—brings increased accountability; increased accountability produces a necessity for greater transparency. I think those are totally linked. It is therefore important that we put a marker in the Bill. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, that this may well be determined in future by the National Assembly for Wales. In the mean time, a marker should be put down to recognise that we all feel—I think there is consensus in the House at this moment—that there are not enough Assembly Members to do the work that will be put on them by the powers they will be given by the Bill. I strongly support the amendment.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I, too, have sympathy with the amendment. I was recently in Cardiff Bay, speaking at a conference organised by the Welsh Government centre looking at the challenges facing the National Assembly. I focused on the challenges that derive from the fact that it is devolved, relatively new and small. Size does matter; it is especially important in a parliamentary system. As we have already heard, it affects the committees that are operating, not least because, with the small number of Members, there are problems setting up a comprehensive series of investigative committees where Members are not stretched by having to serve on several. That limits the capacity of the legislature to effectively scrutinise the Executive.

The other point about size is that the proportion of the Assembly that forms the Executive tends to be somewhat greater than with larger assemblies. The National Assembly is nowhere near the position in Gibraltar, where there are actually no Back-Benchers at all. However, the proportion of Ministers in the National Assembly is greater than it is in the House of Commons. In order for it to fulfil its functions effectively, you need members who can do that and to ensure that the Executive are not too prominent as a proportion of the Chamber itself. For these reasons, I have considerable sympathy with this amendment.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 12 in the name of my noble friend Lord Elystan-Morgan and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. I am compelled to do so as a matter of natural justice because I come from a region of the United Kingdom where the local Assembly has 108 members on the basis of a significantly lower population than that of Wales. Even if it is the case, which is widely rumoured in Belfast, that the Assembly will be reduced in size to 90 before too long, there will still be a significant anomaly in relation to Wales.

I have never been an uncritical admirer of the Northern Ireland Assembly. I am currently the chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. As has been referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth and Lord Norton, that committee has made significant criticisms of some of the practices of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Those criticisms are nothing to do with its size. The better features of the Northern Ireland Assembly are its greater size and, I submit, a greater variety of opinion and debate. It also has a greater representation of parties and politicians who would not normally find their way to that Assembly in the face of the large battalions of local politics.

The argument has been eloquently made in favour of the need for the Welsh Assembly to have more members in order for it to deal with the volume of business in a more effective way. That is not the only argument, although I fully support it. There is also the argument that the larger Assembly will contain more variety of opinion—and therefore more vitality—and that can only be to the benefit of the people of Wales.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster]

My Lords, my thought was that that sort of situation would be covered by the fact that the Prime Minister would be submitting a request for a Dissolution to Her Majesty. In all normal circumstances, of course, Her Majesty could act upon such a request. However, there could be circumstances in which Her Majesty might wish to say, “Before accepting this request, I wish to consider whether a Dissolution is the right course of action to pursue at this time”. She could then have consultations with political leaders to find out whether that is the case.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, it is a delight to follow a former chancellor of the University of Hull. I speak to my own Amendment 21, and also to all amendments in this group.

My starting point, like other noble Lords, is that all the amendments are an improvement on Clause 2. The clause seeks to translate a convention into statute, which is extremely difficult to do as my noble friend Lord Cormack mentioned, and is for that reason very rarely attempted. The Government rest on the confidence of the House of Commons. If that is withdrawn, the Prime Minister by convention has the option of resigning or seeking the Dissolution of Parliament. The circumstances in which the Commons can demonstrate a lack of confidence are varied, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thornton, has quite clearly adumbrated.

As we have heard, Clause 2 seeks to maintain these conditions but, in so doing, requires the Speaker of the House of Commons to be custodian of our present understandings of the convention. As we heard in Committee, that puts the Speaker in an untenable situation, having to make a decision that may be highly contentious politically, potentially sealing the fate of the Government.

The alternative, therefore, is to move away from flexibility to certainty or some degree of certainty. All these amendments, as we have heard, seek to do that. The one that comes closest to maintaining the current conventions is Amendment 22ZB of the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, in that it retains the power for the Prime Minister to designate any Motion as one on which defeat will be treated as a matter of confidence. The others are more restrictive.

It strikes me that there are four, not necessarily compatible, criteria by which we can assess the amendments before us. First, to what extent do they retain the existing conventions? As I have said, the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, comes closest, putting flesh on the bones of what Clause 2 seeks to achieve. If we wish to retain the flexibility of existing arrangements, that is the most desirable amendment. It does not replicate precisely the existing convention, as it precludes the option of resignation as an alternative to the Dissolution of Parliament, though in that respect it follows what has been recent practice.

My amendment is a close second in two respects. First, like Amendment 22ZB, it retains the capacity of the Prime Minister to move that the House has confidence in the Government. This enables the Government to seek the confidence of the House in the event of uncertainty, such as, for instance, following the loss of a vote on a major item of Government policy. Secondly, in the event of the House withdrawing its confidence in the Government, it retains the option, unlike Amendment 22ZB but in common with the other amendments, for an alternative Government to be formed without the need for an election.

As we have heard, all the amendments bar Amendment 22ZB include the 14-day provision. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in his amendment seeks to remove that provision. I was not quite clear as to why, and certainly was not persuaded by the arguments he adduced in favour of removing that provision. If you remove it you create a problem, which he recognises by the tabling of Amendment 20C, which essentially corrects the problem created by his Amendment 20A, for which I do not see a particularly strong case in any event.

Secondly, do the amendments meet a test of certainty? In other words, are the conditions under which the Government are deemed to have lost the confidence of the House clear beyond peradventure? The existing clause clearly fails the test. All the amendments before us come close to meeting the test. As far as I can see, Amendments 20, 21 and 22ZA are sufficiently clear as not to require adjudication, thus eliminating the mischief inherent in the existing provisions of the clause. The only possible ambiguity in Amendment 22ZB rests in subsection (2)(d) in the form of the declaration made by the Prime Minister. Is it to be in writing and laid before the House? Is it to be made in advance of the vote on the Motion or before the Motion is debated?

Thirdly, do they cover all eventualities? The amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Howarth and Lord Armstrong, do not address what happens if the Government resign without having lost a Motion of confidence or an early election Motion being passed by a two-thirds majority. This is what may be called the Belgian question. If a Government fall apart and the Prime Minister tenders the resignation of the Government but under conditions where the Opposition are not ready for an election and cannot realistically form an Administration, what happens? The Bill makes no provision for such an eventuality. Subsection (3) of my amendment seeks to cover such a situation, as does my noble friend Lord Cormack in subsection (1)(b) of his amendment. My amendment provides that if, after 60 days, no Government have been formed an election shall take place. My noble friend provides a 14-day limit. I prescribe a substantial time to limit the opportunity for exploitation. A lot can happen in 60 days. However, for the moment, my argument is that we need to cover such an eventuality.

I appreciate the argument that has been advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, who argued that such a situation is so unlikely that the provision is likely never to be invoked. The same argument can be advanced in respect of the provision for an early election Motion. The circumstances in which one is likely to need and be able to mobilise a two-thirds majority or a unanimous vote are likely to be extremely rare. However, neither situation is impossible. It is possible for the House of Commons to fail to agree on any option, as happened in 2003 in the votes on the various options for the future of this House. It may, therefore, be desirable to cover all eventualities. In terms of covering all eventualities, subsection (1)(a) of Amendment 22ZA presupposes that the Motion will be passed on a Division. Subsection (1) of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, originally did likewise, but has now been changed to cover such a Motion being passed without a Division.

The amendments to Amendments 20 and 22ZB, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, seek to cover the situation following the meeting of a new Parliament and the Government’s losing a vote of confidence. I can see why his Amendment 22ZD is desirable but, as I have said, I cannot see the argument for why his earlier amendment is required.

Fourthly, do the amendments limit or eliminate the opportunity for the Government to engineer an early Dissolution for their political benefit? The purpose of the Bill, as we have heard, is to ensure that there are fixed terms and that there is an early Dissolution only in exceptional circumstances. Those circumstances do not include enabling the Government to trigger an election at a time that is politically beneficial. If they did, it would undermine the whole purpose of the Bill. I know that, as the noble and learned Lord has said, he would find that quite attractive.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Does the noble Lord recognise that there could be a legitimate concern since he provides that an early general election is also to take place if, on a specified date, the House of Commons has negatived a Motion that this House has confidence in Her Majesty’s Government? Does that not provide too tempting an avenue for the Prime Minister to contrive a vote of confidence, and to contrive to lose it? The noble Lord spoke earlier of the need to avoid exploitation; this is trying to do that.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

The noble Lord anticipates what I am coming on to. That is what I want to deal with. That is my whole point about this question. I know that some noble Lords would find it attractive if we undermined the Bill in this respect. However, if we proceed on the basis of what the Bill seeks to achieve, we need to identify any provision that could be exploited by the Government. The amendment that comes closest to being foolproof in this respect is Amendment 20 in that, apart from an early election Motion, the only way to trigger an election is through the House passing a Motion of no confidence in the Government. As the noble Lord touched on, there is no provision for the Government to move a Motion of confidence and then invite their own supporters to vote against it, as has happened in Germany and could, as he says, happen under my amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong.

A Government could also trigger an election under Amendment 22ZB by the Prime Minister declaring any Motion one of confidence and ensuring that government MPs voted against it or stayed away to ensure that it was defeated. However, Amendment 20 is not completely foolproof. There is no restriction on who can table a Motion of no confidence. It could be tabled by a government Back-Bencher, possibly at the behest of the Prime Minister, thus enabling the Government to engineer their own defeat. The amendment of my noble friend Lord Cormack provides that a Motion of no confidence may be moved only by the Leader of the Opposition. That may be deemed unduly restrictive, but it prevents the provision being used by the Government for their own benefit—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, mentioned.

However, although my noble friend’s amendment deals with what some may see as a loophole, it introduces a loophole of its own. Under subsection (1)(b), a Prime Minister could simply resign, and, if the Opposition take over, move a vote of no confidence—the outgoing Prime Minister presumably assuming the mantle of Leader of the Opposition—or deny them the opportunity to govern by voting down whatever they bring forward.

In short, each amendment has its merits, though none is ideal in terms of the criteria that I have adumbrated. That is more or less bound to be the case given that the criteria are not necessarily compatible. We are moving away from seeking to retain the existing conventions in favour of greater certainty.

My amendment seeks to provide for all, or at least more, eventualities than that covered by the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and to enable the Government to seek the confidence of the House. As I say, I appreciate that may be open to abuse by a Prime Minister, but the risk has to be offset against the value of retaining the existing practice.

I commend my amendment to the House but do so in the recognition that the ideal may not be one of these amendments but one drawn from what is before us. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, to which my noble and learned friend the Minister has added his name, is certainly a massive improvement on what is in the Bill. We may be able to tweak it further, but our deliberations on the clause show what can be achieved through debate and constructive discourse. If we are not quite there, we are very close.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness Hayman)]

My Lords, it may assist the House if I clarify the procedural position once more as I think that a little confusion may have arisen. I make it clear that although we are having a debate on all the potential alternative new clauses, some of them with and some without amendment, they are alternatives and no issue of pre-emption arises. Therefore, it is possible for the House to take a series of decisions about individual amendments as they arise in the schedule. Some noble Lords may not have been certain about their alternatives after a decision had been taken on the first proposed new clause. I hope that might be of some assistance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, the convention is that if the Government lose a vote of confidence in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister has the option of either requesting a Dissolution or resigning. Callaghan did not have to go to the palace: he could have chosen to resign.

[Lord Dobbs]

Yes, indeed. I shall try to deal with that issue in a second.

Far from the Prime Minister giving up his powers to Parliament and the people in these provisions, he would be handing them over to party bosses operating in back rooms. I have been there and I have been one of them, and I doubt if things would become any more fragrant simply because those back rooms are no longer filled with smoke. Let us go back to something like 1979. Imagine the haggling: “No, I won’t vote for you, Jim, because if I help defeat you on this no-confidence Motion, I will be able to squeeze even more out of you tomorrow”.

A no-confidence Motion should be more than simply a hand at poker, with players raising the stakes both before and after the vote. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, I fear that Clause 2 as drafted would allow just that—with the players pleading that haggling is precisely what the law allows, precisely what the law approves of. Fourteen days of it: crisis, what crisis? But that is not what anyone here wants, so I urge my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace to look at this yet again. If he feels he must codify this matter of no-confidence Motions, he should ensure that this part of the Bill is made more clear. I am not against safety valves, not against 14 days in all circumstances. But 14 days should not be so inflexible that it becomes a charter for chaos and an excuse for political fixes. What we do today in good faith must not become an excuse for excess at some future date.

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Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

I agree absolutely with the noble Lord. There is one condition and qualification which the Minister could bring forward as an objection. He could say, for instance, that it would be entirely unreasonable for us to ask the Government to give a commitment to a referendum on such a subject unless they knew the precise details of the referendum, of the question to be put and so on. That would be a cast-iron argument were it not for the fact that the Government have already rushed to the television studios to assure us that they would willingly accept a referendum on the Scottish question were it put, without knowing the wording, the timing or the conditions of it. So that objection would entirely fall.

I am trying to be helpful to the Minister tonight, not by laying down demands for a definition but by suggesting that there might be criteria which he would like to consider before he comes back to the House. Whether it is a White Paper that we have to expect or a grey paper—perhaps by tomorrow morning it will merely be an essay on the British constitution that is being proposed—and whatever the form of the coalition agreement’s operational eminences which exude from discussions in Cabinet, I hope that he will be able to come back and tell us that it is such an important subject that we will all get the chance to vote again, because we so enjoyed the last referendum.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, the key point has been made, but not yet by me. I want to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said. Many of the measures being brought before us are premised on the assumption that our political system is broken. Like the noble Lord, I do not accept that it is and there is empirical evidence for showing that the people do not accept it. I accept that there is a crisis of confidence, but it is a crisis of confidence not in institutions but in politicians. There is a danger of displacement taking place here, of saying, “Well, it is not us, it’s the system. We’ll change the system”. There are problems in that, so I accept the premise on which the noble Lord is proceeding.

My fear is that we may get ourselves into a situation where people do think that the system is broken if we keep messing about with it and making disparate changes without any clear rationale for them, rather than individual changes. If the Government start having a referendum on one issue which they feel for whatever reason there should be a referendum on, but then deny it on another issue which people think is important and there should be a referendum on, they will create problems in terms of how people view the system and how it is being operated.

I have always argued against referendums because I have an objection on principle to them; the Government’s problem is that they do not. When they start holding them, they need to have a clear rationale for those occasions when they are clearly appropriate and those when they are not. Otherwise, we create a problem of delegitimising issues, with people thinking, “Well, this is really important, but we’re not going to accept it unless it’s subject to a referendum. Why can the Government have a referendum on A, when we attach real importance to B and we’ve not been given a say on the issue?”. To cope with that, as the noble Lord, Lord Reid, indicated, you need a very clear framework which is transparent and explained to people, so that they know the basis on which the Government are proceeding. You cannot do it on an ad hoc basis. You need clearly to adumbrate the overarching framework or, if necessary, come up with those issues which clearly fall within the framework of necessitating a referendum.

The Constitution Committee of which I am member, as is the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, produced its report on referendums and tried to identify those areas so that we could at least get agreement on them. The Government need to think about what framework they are using for promoting referendums. They cannot do it on simply an ad hoc basis, saying that it is up to Parliament, because Government bring the Bill before Parliament. We need to know why they are doing that, and that they are doing it on the basis of principle rather than political desirability. The more politicians do the latter, the more we run the danger of people starting to worry about what the Government are doing and their trust being lost. It is essential that we maintain that trust. If the crisis of confidence is in politicians, it is up to us to get it right.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has served a very valuable purpose, because he has identified with precision one of the main defects in this Bill and so many of the proposals for constitutional change that have been brought forward by this Government and are still to be brought forward.

The essential point surely about constitutional principles is that they are intended to be neutral; they are intended to be objective criteria by which we and the people judge the propriety of the conduct of government. They do so by convention, by practice and, if change is proposed, they do so by public consultation, by pre-legislative scrutiny and by an attempt to achieve consensus. The Government’s inability to identify when a referendum is appropriate—the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, asked the Minister to explain the Government’s position on this in Committee and the Minister was unable to do so—is a manifestation of constitutional reform and change that is being proposed on an ad hoc basis; it is being proposed if and in so far as it is politically convenient for the coalition to do so.

Constitutional change cannot command public respect when the public perceive politicians as using constitutional means such as a referendum—means which are designed to control politicians—as a way of holding a coalition together. One has to do better than that. One has to identify a principled basis for using or not using a referendum. To bring forward constitutional change in this way—without public consultation and without any attempt to identify and then to apply objective, coherent principles on matters such as referendums—leads inevitably not only to poorly drafted, inadequate legislation but guarantees that the legislation, when enacted, will not command public understanding, far less public respect, and ensures that the legislation will remain on the statute book only in the short term.

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Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

Your Lordships’ House knows my tremendous admiration for the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. It is an index of my forgiveness of the fact that I am never going to know the answer as to why the Attlee Government was omitted from the analysis of Amendment 1 that I say to my noble and learned friend on the Front Bench that I think he has a question to answer from the noble Lord, Lord Grocott.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I had not planned to speak on this but, reflecting on what has been said, I am rather torn. I accept the logic of what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has said—I think that the argument he has advanced is impeccable—but I am reflecting on the value of the sessional cut-off, keeping it to a year, as has been advocated. It is quite right that the sessional cut-off is a discipline on the Government and it gives some leverage to the Opposition—capital “O”, and sometimes small “o”—because of the pressure. I am not sure that compression within one year as the length of the Session necessarily benefits Parliament, because legislation has to be got through in that time and it limits the two Houses in the amount of time they can devote to deliberation in Committee. In the Commons, there is a problem now with Public Bill Committees, because there is very little time between taking evidence and having then to consider the Bill in the normal way.

I am just reflecting on the fact that, while I accept the logic of what the noble Lord has said, maybe we need to think a little more imaginatively about how long each Session actually lasts. In a five-year Parliament, maybe we should think about a three or four-Session Parliament. There needs to be some discipline, but one has to try to get the balance on that right. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, because he has prompted me to think about that. We perhaps ought to reflect a little more seriously about it; there is a problem with the nature of rushed legislation of this sort, when perhaps we should be sitting back and thinking a little more constructively about how we want our Parliament to be run to the benefit of Parliament. As I say, there is that balance to be met between giving leverage to the Opposition and benefiting Parliament so that it has proper time to thoroughly scrutinise what the Government are bringing forward.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I suppose we could do what the Scottish Parliament does, which is to have no sub-division into annual Sessions within a four-year term—apparently shortly to be a five-year term in the Scottish Parliament. I think that we should either go the whole way in abolishing parliamentary Sessions and having some kind of continuing, rolling process of legislation, or have a rational, predictable, orderly division of the time available in a Parliament.

The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Grocott should not be necessary. It is clearly undesirable to legislate on internal proceedings in Parliament, but we have been driven to it by the behaviour of the coalition Government in awarding themselves a two-year Session in which they should have been able to get anything at all through. Their potential abuse of parliamentary strength has been mitigated only by their incompetence in failing to take advantage of the situation that they created for themselves. In the early months of this Session, we had almost no legislation introduced; we then had an immense amount of time spent on constitutional legislation, which the public did not want, culminating in the fiasco of the AV referendum. We now have the pause in the NHS legislation. I am given to understand that there are going to be new Bills introduced at Second Reading this summer, so that even with a two-year Session, they may run out of time to complete their programme; it really is pretty chaotic.

My noble friend does the House, and indeed Parliament, a service in drawing attention to this consideration. While I would not wish to see his amendment get on to the statute book, he very properly challenges the Government to think carefully about how they handle proceedings within this House. I do not want a written constitution but I want respect for the unwritten constitution.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

11: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, leave out subsection (5)

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 15 and 17. These amendments remove the provision that enables the Prime Minister by statutory instrument to vary the date of the general election by two months either way. We discussed subsection (5) in some detail in Committee and, in the light of that discussion, I came to the conclusion that rather than trying to build in safeguards or qualifications, as I sought to do on that occasion and as my noble friend Lord Rennard seeks to do today, it would be best to remove the provision altogether.

The principal reason why subsection (5) is included is because it is in the devolution legislation. It appears to have been included without much thought. I have still not been able to find anyone who can think of a circumstance in which the provision to bring the election forward by two months could apply. What sort of emergency can one anticipate before it has happened? Is there really any prospect of the Prime Minister announcing that the election should be brought forward by two months because the Government anticipate that there may be a foot and mouth outbreak at the time of the election?

It is also not clear why the subsection is needed, given the provisions of Clause 2. If there is all-party agreement that the election should be brought forward by one or two months, one can introduce an early election motion under Clause 2(1). That would cover it. The only difference between this subsection and utilising a motion under Clause 2(1) would be that this subsection provides a role for this House, because both Houses have to approve the order, but I do not see why we should be empowered to block an election being held up to two months early when we cannot exercise a similar power over a motion to hold it some time in the preceding four years and 10 months. I also doubt that we would wish to challenge the will of the House of Commons on this matter. I thus favour the removal of the provision for the Prime Minister to bring forward a statutory instrument to bring forward the date of the election by up to two months. My noble friend Lord Rennard seeks to do likewise.

I also favour removing the other half of the subsection. Enabling the election to be delayed by two months is an arbitrary provision. Why two months and not three? A delay needs to be determined in relation to the particular crisis that prompts it. Given that, and the likelihood that any delay will be required only in the most exceptional circumstances, I suggest leaving it to the enactment of a specific Act tailored to the needs of the time, as happened with the foot and mouth crisis in 2001.

The requirement for an Act also emphasises that it is exceptional and does not, as this provision may do, tempt a Prime Minister to use his parliamentary majority to approve an order to delay the election for the purposes of political gain. Two months can make quite a difference. This House would be the only potential block on the provision being used in this way, but we may wish to avoid the potential for a major clash between the two Houses.

My noble friend Lord Rennard seeks to retain the provision but subject it to similar safeguards to those that apply under Clause 2(1) in relation to an early election. If one were to retain the provision to delay an election by two months, I would very much support his amendment. However, on balance, we may as well remove the whole subsection. There is no need for the “before” provision, and the “after” provision is likely to be so exceptional—and may require a delay of more than two months—that we should leave it to Parliament at the time to craft a measure appropriate to the nature of the crisis. I beg to move.

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 12, 14 and 16 in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Tyler and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. Amendments 12 and 14 reflect the position that I set out in Committee, when I made plain that I could not see any justification for a provision to bring forward polling day in a general election by two months, in the way that the Bill originally suggested. In all my consideration of the debates here and in another place, I have yet to hear advanced any argument for why it might be sensible to say that a Prime Minister might be able to foresee circumstances in which he needed to bring forward the election by two months.

As the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, said, no Prime Minister could be so prescient as to foresee such events and decide to bring forward the election in anticipation of them. I simply do not see the justification for the provision. However, there will remain in the Bill and in the detail now in Amendment 20, which we will come to later, a power for Parliament to have elections early if MPs vote for it by a two-thirds majority and this House endorses that proposal. I have no doubt that if there is reasonable political consensus on the need to bring forward polling day and have an early election, that will happen.

Amendment 16 deals with a power for which, I accept, there is a rather stronger case. That is the power for delay by two months. The commonly cited example of how a general election planned for one day might be postponed for a short while is our experience in 2001, when the foot and mouth epidemic broke out. Everyone knew that we would probably have an election in May. We had planned to have local elections in May. Those local elections were postponed and the general election, expected to coincide with them in May, was also postponed. I am therefore content that some power remains in the Bill for a delay and am now fairly convinced that there is at least some provision in the Bill to safeguard against abuse. That safeguard is this House, which would be asked to approve such a delay.

I was seeking through Amendment 16 to have a further safeguard built in for that—also a two-thirds majority in the House of Commons—but I now look at the changes that the Government have made by accepting Amendment 20. That dispenses with the role of the Speaker’s certificate. On that basis, I am prepared to accept that Amendment 16 is no longer appropriate, and I will not press that case; but the case for Amendments 12 and 14 remains strong. They simply retain the principle that if polling day is to be brought forward, it is Parliament by reasonable consensus and not the Prime Minister who should decide to bring forward the election.

The whole purpose of the legislation is to fix parliamentary terms at five years, notwithstanding the amendment which this House narrowly approved some hours ago. We need to remove from the Prime Minister the privilege of being able to hold the starting pistol in a race where he is also one of the runners. Amendments in the same form as Amendments 12 and 14 received substantial support from across the House when they were tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Rooker, in Committee. I therefore hope that the Minister will have had time since Committee to reflect on those amendments and to consider them favourably.

--- Later in debate ---

It is clear that the purpose of this Bill is primarily that we expect Parliaments ordinarily to last five years. However, for reasons which, again, we have highlighted and discussed, it may not be possible or desirable to hold the election on the scheduled date. If primary legislation had to be taken to move the date of the scheduled election in an emergency, then as long as that Bill had the consent of your Lordships’ House there would be no limits to extending the lifetime of the Parliament. It could go beyond two months, as happened during the Second World War. If the particular emergency arose which required that, no doubt legislation would have to be crafted, as my noble friend said. We are envisaging an extension for a very short period. We believe that it is properly contained by the requirement for a majority in both Houses of Parliament and by the fact that we have accepted the recommendation that it will require the Prime Minister to set out the reasons for it. I reiterate that having considered these matters, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not consider the power to be inappropriate in principle. Against that background, I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have taken part in the debate. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I was thinking along similar lines trying to anticipate possibilities. I thought about things such as the Olympics, but although they are not a crisis, neither are they an unforeseen circumstance. The same is true for the World Cup. They are not something that would necessarily get in the way, and those events would not require us to delay the holding of a general election in any event. To bring a general election forward, the provisions of Clause 2(1) could be utilised in any event.

My noble and learned friend Lord Wallace has accepted the provision that the Prime Minister would have to make a statement about why this power should be used, but I would have thought that if the Prime Minister planned to delay an election or bring it forward, he would in any event explain why. That really confirms what would be the practice. I cannot imagine the Prime Minister deciding to delay the election and not telling us why.

I do not want to respond on behalf of my noble friend Lord Rennard, but I am in a position where I suspect I might have to. An affirmative order requires just a simple majority, so that does not address the problem and the point made by my noble friend still holds. The only problem with his amendment is, as he admitted, in terms of drafting to refer to the Speaker’s certificate rather than to the principle that he advanced. I still maintain the argument I advance, for which I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who I have clearly persuaded on this matter. My noble and learned friend really did not provide a convincing argument in response to what I said. Primary legislation could be introduced and could provide for quite a long delay, but that is true in any event as long as you have a parliamentary majority. You could then craft it to the particular crisis of the time. He mentioned wartime when Parliament had to pass an Act each year extending its life.

The circumstances would be so exceptional that they would need a response crafted to the particular exception rather than just allowing a situation where a Prime Minister could come along and announce that he is bringing forward an SI to delay the election by two months and all that would be required is a majority in the House of Commons. We would then be in a position, if necessary, to block it, but I am not sure that the House would wish to invite a major challenge with the Commons, particularly on a matter of this nature, so I would be very wary about that. I would far prefer that there was all-party agreement and that legislation was introduced. If it was an emergency, you would require all-party agreement to get it through, and if you did not have it, you could not do so. I think that is entirely appropriate. I hope that my noble and learned friend will take up the invitation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to reflect on this and to think further because I remain unpersuaded that this subsection should remain in the Bill. In the interim, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

That may be a bit excessive, but then Belgium has some rather unique problems—which, so far, have not happened here—in terms of racial, linguistic and ethnic division. I take my noble friend’s point and I hope that he will take mine that most European countries do not expect to have the pantechnicons arriving on election day or the day afterwards. They have got used to it; why cannot we?

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend Lord Newton of Braintree. He is right about the international position; we are extremely unusual in the period of transition from Government to Government. I shall come back to that on a later amendment.

The problem with Amendment 37—I shall speak also to Amendment 34—is the premise that there should be a delay for a set period following the election. It may be for only five days rather than 14, but there is a delay, whereas the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, seeks to make provision for an election to follow in the immediate wake of the loss of a vote of no confidence. Given a choice between the two, I incline to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth.

However, the problem that I have with his amendment is that the loss of a vote of no confidence triggers an election as the only option. I believe that that should be, as now, one option rather than the only option. I shall come back to that issue in later amendments. Given the choice between the two I incline towards the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. However, we still need a provision for Prime Ministers to be able to tender their resignation rather than automatically request that Parliament be dissolved.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Newton, repeated an argument that has been used on many occasions, particularly by his noble friends on the Liberal Democrat Benches, that we are somehow in a new kind of politics now, having moved from the traditional two-party system to the less traditional three-party system, and that we therefore need to change huge swathes of our constitution, including changing the voting system and perhaps changing the mechanism for moving from one Government to another, in order to accommodate a fundamental change in our political system. I put it to him, and to them, that I do not take that view; I think that the fundaments of our politics are quite similar to what they were when I came into politics 50 years ago. I put it to them at least that, should any of the opinion polls be right—and we know that we should treat them cautiously—there is a fair bit of evidence that we are moving back towards more of a two-party system, which I for one would welcome. I would be interested to know whether all those who have been saying “New politics means new constitution” will now say that they want the constitution to revert to the way that it operated previously, should there be old politics after all—that is, fundamentally a choice between people who are broadly happy with the way things are and people who want to change them, which is basically what happens in democracies in the United States, here and in many countries of Europe—rather than a yes, a no and a don’t-know as we have at the moment. I make that point simply as an aside but it is worth considering.

This part of the Bill makes an extraordinary proposition. I think that we all more or less subscribe to the cliché “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”, but the Government seem not only to be rejecting that idea but also to be saying that, if it is working perfectly, we had still better fix it. My argument is very simply that the no-confidence system as has operated in this country works not just very well but perfectly. We have a test case: 1979. I am very pleased to see the noble Lord, Lord McNally, on the Front Benches; he remembers 1979 as well as I do. That was a perfect example of the no-confidence system, which is not written into our constitution, with there being no clear procedural rules that Jim Callaghan had to follow, working perfectly. He lost the confidence of the House on a motion of no confidence so he went to the country. Will someone please tell me what was wrong with that? One problem that the Government got themselves into in their five days in May, among many others, was trying to write in law aspects of our constitution which are perfectly well understood and which do not need writing in law. It is a bit like trying to write down prescriptively in legislation the procedures that the monarchy needs to go through in the event of a hung Parliament. That would be extraordinarily difficult, and what the Government thought was an incredibly simple Bill is not a simple Bill at all. It has serious complications, and this is the most serious of them.

I simply put this to the Minister. In respect of the 14 days, what is the problem that he is trying to resolve? I shall put it even more simply than that and ask him what Jim Callaghan did wrong. He lost a motion of no confidence; we all know what that is. He immediately went to the country. Under this Bill, he should have entered a period of 14 days’ negotiation, without any consultation with the British public. Worse still—at least from my perspective; nobody could accuse me of self-interest because I have mentioned to the Committee before that his decision resulted in me becoming unemployed—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As has been pointed out, what happened in Wales was that, after Mr Alun Michael resigned—he did not actually face a vote of no confidence but there was one on the horizon—a new Government were formed who quite successfully saw out their term of office. The point that I am trying to make is that with fixed-term Parliaments there is that certainty.

Equally, it has been widely recognised that there must be some mechanism that allows an election to take place if it is no longer possible for a Parliament to continue. That is why I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Cormack that these are devices that somehow are to help the Executive; they are devices for where Parliament can no longer function. If these rules had been in place in 1979 and the then Prime Minister, Mr Callaghan, had decided that calling an election was the right thing to do, I rather think that the then leader of the Opposition, Mrs Thatcher, might well have agreed with him and there would have been a two-thirds majority for a dissolution. Alternatively, as happened in 1924, it was possible for one Government to resign and for another to come in and form an Administration.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

What I have to say is fundamental to what my noble and learned friend is saying. In the present situation, if a Government lose a vote of confidence, the Prime Minister has the option either of calling an election or of resigning. The Government go. Under the phrasing of this Bill, the Government do not have to go; they can be reformulated. In that sense, the provision protects the Government as the present situation does not.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

They could if they commanded a majority in the House of Commons. It would require them to face the House of Commons and command a majority there. It is no good for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, to say, “Well, we have these two situations, as happened with Mr Baldwin in 1924, and somehow we have to find a means for that to happen”. This provision tries to find a means by which that could happen. He may say that this is not the best means of trying to do that; I have not yet heard from him how he would seek to do that, given that his party also believes in fixed-term Parliaments and does not believe that they should be rigid. If he thinks that there should be a mechanism for a Government to resign and a new Government to be formed without an election, we would certainly be open to hearing how he would devise the means by which that could be done. It is certainly not done by the amendment to which he put his name, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth.

On the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, with regard to the period of 14 days, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern said, with the devolution settlements a period of 28 days is allowed for a new Government to be constituted after a Government in Scotland or Wales lose a vote of confidence. We took the judgment—and I accept that it is a judgment—

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

35: Clause 2, page 2, line 12, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“( ) the Prime Minister has decided to request a dissolution in place of offering his or her resignation.”

[Lord Norton of Louth]

I shall speak also to Amendment 38. I very much agreed with the arguments advanced earlier by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, but that is largely because they all supported my amendments rather than the one that he was addressing. Perhaps, given that he has now left the Chamber, he was trying to get his arguments in first in support of my amendments.

My amendments are designed to maintain features of our existing constitutional arrangements while addressing the problem for which the Bill makes no provision: that is, the Government opting to resign without having been defeated on a vote of confidence.

Amendment 35 would maintain the present constitutional convention that if the Government lose a vote of confidence in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister resigns or requests that Parliament be dissolved. The precedent was established in 1841 and has been maintained since. As we have heard, in January 1924, the Baldwin Government met the new Parliament, were defeated in two Divisions of confidence and resigned. In October of the same year, the MacDonald Government were defeated in two Divisions deemed matters of confidence and requested that Parliament be dissolved. As we have heard about in some detail, in 1979, the Callaghan Government were defeated on an explicit vote of confidence and requested the Dissolution of Parliament.

The advantage of the current situation is that it allows some flexibility in order to respond to the conditions of the time—the point made earlier by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. If it is clear that there is no prospect of an alternative Government being formed, there seems little point in waiting. If one takes the situation in March 1979, can one really claim that the Prime Minister should not have requested the Queen to dissolve Parliament and hold an election? There was demonstrably no case for waiting. Under the Bill, there would have been a delay of two weeks before an election was triggered.

I see no grounds for not allowing the Prime Minister to recommend an election if the Government have been defeated on a vote of confidence. Stipulating the 14-day gap serves no obvious purpose. It does not provide a disincentive for the Government of the day to manipulate a vote of no confidence. If the Government are able for their own purposes to persuade their supporters to vote for a Motion of no confidence, they can presumably also use them to ensure that no alternative Government can muster a majority for a vote of confidence. That just delays matters by 14 days.

My other amendment provides that if the Government opt to resign and no alternative Government are formed and achieve a vote of confidence, an election will be triggered after the passage of a set period. In my amendment, it is 28 days. That is in line with what is in the devolution legislation. That may appear too generous. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, stipulates 14 days. It may be that 14 days is preferable to 28; it may be that the period should be shorter. As I mentioned earlier, we are unusual in the United Kingdom in having a rapid transition from one Government to another. However, whatever the period, we need at least to stipulate a clear time limit, however unlikely it is to be utilised.

A Prime Minister is not expected to resign unless it appears that an alternative Government can be formed. Only in the event of the implosion of the Government is such a provision likely to be necessary, although in those circumstances it may be that the Opposition could muster sufficient support to pass a Motion of no confidence. However, my amendment covers the highly unlikely, but not impossible, situation of a Prime Minister resigning; the House failing to pass a Motion of no confidence or to mobilise the 400 votes out of 600 necessary for a Dissolution Motion; and the Leader of the Opposition, or some other figure, being unable to form a Government. Under the Bill, there could be stalemate until the election at the end of the five-year period. As we have heard, Belgium is presently setting the record for the length of time for which no Government has been formed. I am not suggesting that we will ever be in that situation. My amendment ensures that such a situation will not arise.

In essence, my amendments seek to maintain the benefits of the present arrangements within the context of fixed-term Parliaments. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel)]

I have to inform your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 36 or 37, because of pre-emption.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

If that was the scenario—a purely hypothetical one—I think my party would have a challenging time making the argument as to why things had changed. However, I do not suppose for a moment that the noble Lord—who probably was in the Commons in 1977—complained too much about an arrangement falling short of a coalition with the then Liberal Party, which actually sustained a Labour Government in power. Obviously the Liberal Party had to answer to the electorate for what it did then, and that is the political reality. These things are all considered in a political context. There is the political reality again, taking the point made by the noble and learned Lord, that if a Prime Minister of the day sought to try and abuse or contrive a vote of no confidence, that would be judged in a political context. It may be thought in some circumstances that it was right to do so, in others that it was duplicitous; the ultimate determination of whether it was right or wrong is one for the electorate, and so it should be.

The period in my noble friend’s amendment is 28 days. He indicated that he took it from the arrangements that had been made for Scotland and Wales in the event of a resignation of a First Minister. There are sufficient differences in the position between the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the United Kingdom Parliament that would make 28 days an inappropriate period. That is why we have exercised our judgment and said in the Bill that 14 days is more appropriate.

The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, would provide that an early general election could be triggered where the Prime Minister has resigned and 14 days have elapsed without the House of Commons passing a motion expressing confidence in a Government. Again, my point would be that in establishing fixed terms, we are seeking to deny the Executive their ability to decide if and when there should be an election. This amendment places one of the triggers for an early Dissolution within the hands of a Prime Minister. That is the problem which we would have with it. The noble Lord mentioned 1951 but it is generally accepted—indeed, I think Mr Jack Straw accepted this on Second Reading—that the circumstances there would almost certainly have triggered the two-thirds majority for Dissolution, because there was common ground that an election should take place. The problem with the noble Lord’s amendment, as I indicated, is that in an effort to try and take away the power from the Executive and put it into the hands of Parliament, it would return it to the Prime Minister.

However, subject to what I said in my opening remarks in response to the constructive point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and in wishing to look at the important contributions that have been made, I certainly intend to reflect on what has been said in this debate and in earlier debates on the same subject. I have no doubt whatsoever that these matters will be returned to on Report but I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have taken part in this short debate. It has been extremely helpful in elucidating problems with the Bill. On a rather small point, I have to correct the noble Lord, Lord Howarth: it was actually me putting the questions to Mark Harper as I was in the chair of the Constitution Committee on that day, which is one reason I am pursuing the issue today.

I have two points to make to my noble friend Lord Tyler. One is on drafting. It has to be about the Prime Minister resigning, not the Government, because when the Prime Minister resigns the Government go. The other point is much more substantive and relates to what we were saying earlier. Parliament is stronger under the present arrangements than under this Bill, because the key point is that under its provisions the Prime Minister gets a second bite of the cherry if he loses a vote of confidence.

On the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, my point is that if the Prime Minister resigns having lost a vote of confidence, formally the Government are out. In those circumstances, the Queen sends to whoever she believes could form a Government. Formally, that could include the outgoing Prime Minister but that is the present constitutional position anyway—one thinks to some extent of the circumstances of 1931. I would argue that what I have put forward is better than what is in the Bill because, as I indicated, my amendments are designed to maintain the benefits of the existing arrangements. However, I very much agree with the noble and learned Lord that they reflect the problems of trying to codify existing conventions. That underpins the problems with the Bill.

I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace for his response. He is quite right that the intention was to take these two amendments together. On his point about the example that I gave of 1972, if Edward Heath had said, “This is a matter where the Government cannot sensibly continue”, but the Speaker had not certified it as a confidence motion and if he had lost and a good number of Conservative MPs were not prepared to vote for Dissolution—not necessarily to vote against it but not to vote for it, so that it would have been difficult to mobilise 400 votes out of 600, although there was a slightly different percentage at that time—then you get into a stalemate.

I am grateful for what he said, particularly because I did not hear any strong arguments against my amendments. The Minister queried the 28-day provision; as he says, there are sufficient differences with the devolved Assemblies. I accept that and would like to apply it to the rest of the Bill.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am interested because I made this point in response to the comments by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Will my noble friend accept that there is perhaps this issue? If there is a choice between immediate Dissolution and a resignation with the possibility of another Government being formed, who exercises that choice? In a Bill where we seek to take power away from the Prime Minister, should that choice lie with the Prime Minister or does my noble friend accept that we should look at ways in which what happened would not be the Prime Minister’s choice alone?

[Lord Norton of Louth]

I do not really accept the premise of my noble and learned friend’s question in that the Bill does not take away the Prime Minister’s power where the Government are defeated on a vote of confidence. The Government are trying to limit the Prime Minister’s prerogative to request Dissolution at the time of the Prime Minister’s choosing, rather than in the context of the Government losing a vote of confidence. The Bill does not actually limit the Prime Minister on losing a vote of confidence; as I say, it gives him a second bite of the cherry. That is what my amendments are really trying to get at. I accept the point made about 28 days or 14 days, which is a matter for discussion, but my point is that to avoid an ongoing stalemate you need some cut-off point. That was the argument of principle there.

My overall proposition is that the benefits of existing arrangements outweigh those in the Bill which, in the context of a vote of confidence, do not limit the Prime Minister. As I say, the Government are trying to limit the Prime Minister’s prerogative to foreshorten an election when it is in the gift of the Prime Minister, rather than when Parliament is in effect seeking to take it out of the hands of the Prime Minister through a vote of confidence. I am advancing the argument that the Bill gives Prime Ministers a second chance—more so than under existing arrangements. I am grateful for my noble and learned friend’s willingness to reflect upon what has been said from all parts of the Committee. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 35 withdrawn.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

43: Clause 2, page 2, line 16, leave out subsection (4)

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, this amendment is designed to probe the reasons for the Speaker having to consult the Deputy Speakers before issuing his certificate. So far as I can see, there are two possible, if incompatible, reasons for the inclusion of this provision. The first is because of the provision of Section 1(3) of the Parliament Act 1911, which requires the Speaker, before certifying that a Bill is a money Bill, to consult, if practicable, two members of the Chairmen’s Panel. The Government may thus see the provision of the Speaker’s certificate as analogous to a certificate under the Parliament Act.

The second reason is that the Government recognise that the situation is not strictly analogous. As I pointed out at Second Reading, there is a statutory definition of a money Bill. There is no definition in this Bill of a motion of no confidence. There is therefore the prospect, as we have already heard, of the Speaker being dragged into political controversy. It is possible at the moment for the Speaker to be drawn into controversy over the certification of a money Bill. We saw a recent example in your Lordships’ House. That arose because some Members were ill informed about the provisions of the Parliament Act. However, that perhaps emphasises the point that the potential for controversy is even greater in a politically charged atmosphere where the fate of a Government may be involved, and there is no statutory guidance that would offer the Speaker a protective shield. It may thus be that, recognising that potential, the Government wish to provide some protective cover for the Speaker by involving the Deputy Speakers in the decision. Because the Deputy Speakers will be drawn from different parties, it provides a modicum of cover.

Whichever it is, neither justifies the provision. Ultimately, whatever consultations are held, the decision will be that of the Speaker and be seen as such, as is the position with money Bills. If one seeks to provide some degree of protection for the Speaker, the answer is not to require him to consult the Deputy Speakers but, rather, to provide a clear statutory definition of what constitutes a motion of no confidence. We shall come in due course to the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Cormack. That is the way we should be going. I appreciate that his amendment is not incompatible with subsection (4) but, whereas there is a clear, and I believe compelling, case for defining what we mean by a vote of no confidence, I am not clear that there is a compelling case for subsection (4). What value is added by consulting the Deputy Speakers? They are not necessarily experts on the subject. What if they disagree with one another? If the Speaker is to consult, why not give him scope to consult those who appear to him to be appropriate to consult? In practice, he could presumably consult whom he wishes, so there is no obvious need for the provision. Ultimately, if there is to be a Speaker’s certificate, it is the Speaker’s responsibility. He cannot pass it on to others. I am therefore unclear why this provision is necessary. I look forward to hearing from the Minister why it is in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I tabled an amendment in exactly the same terms as the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. As he is your Lordships’ leading constitutional expert, I felt very good that I had arrived at the same idea, and I am extremely happy to appear on the Marshalled List as having signed up to his amendment.

The provision is so vaguely drafted as to be almost entirely without meaning. I know that it is borrowed from the Parliament Act 1911 but that does not mean that it is an appropriate precedent, particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has just pointed out. In that Act, there is a clear definition of a money Bill, but there is no clear definition of a no confidence motion in this measure. The Clerk of the House of Commons, in giving evidence to the Select Committee in the other place, was of the opinion that the question of whether consultation was practicable would become a legal question. It would be open to legal challenge in so far as anything in the Bill is liable to be open to legal challenge. We had a full discussion of that in an earlier debate.

One observes that judicial reviews have been upheld again and again against the Government on the grounds that Governments had failed to consult properly. If it is a question of whether the Speaker may or may not have consulted properly according to the requirements in the Bill, I suppose that that, if anything, might give an opening to judicial intervention, although I am not seriously afraid that that is the case. The real concern about this provision is that it is almost meaningless. What does “so far as practicable” mean? What would be proper consultation in these circumstances? The requirement to consult does not oblige the Speaker to agree with the Deputies. The Deputies themselves might disagree. In fact, one might surmise that they are rather likely to disagree in the circumstance of a no confidence vote that will occur in the most fraught and complex political circumstances. There will be enormous pressure not only on the Speaker of the House but also on the Deputy Speakers if they are to be involved formally in this process. The Deputy Speakers have disclaimed their party allegiance in their new capacities but, none the less, it is only realistic to anticipate that they would come under immense political pressure from members of their own political parties. They would need to be very sturdy to ignore all that. In the previous debate, the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, and the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, described how they would imagine the atmosphere to be in the House on the occasion of a no confidence vote. They gave us to understand something of the sort of pressures that would be brought to bear not only on the Speaker but, if this provision remains in the Bill, on the Deputy Speakers, too.

In the end, the Speaker will be on his own. It seems that this provision gives him no useful cover or protection against the political storm. A very sensible conclusion of the Constitution Committee, contained in its report at paragraph 159, was that, whether or not this turns out to be a legal question, an obligation on the Speaker to consult with the Deputy Speakers should be a matter of internal House of Commons procedure, should not be contained within the statutory provisions of the Bill and therefore should be omitted. Rather regrettably, the Government rejected this advice in their response to the report of the Constitution Committee at paragraph 60. The Government are quite keen to pray the Constitution Committee’s recommendations in aid when they agree with them. They have not done so on this occasion, however. They cite the precedent of the Parliament Act 1911, which, they say, has worked well. As we suggest, it is not a terribly useful precedent; certifying a money Bill is a matter of ascertaining fact and hardly contentious. Certifying a vote of no confidence would be a very different thing.

I hope that the Minister will agree to look again at this sensible recommendation of the Constitution Committee and that he will agree to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and myself.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I see the irony. I still think that it is right.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this short debate, which is an important debate to be had. I am still left wondering what value is added by this provision. My noble and learned friend has confirmed that, of the two definitions I offered, the first was correct. The Government have looked at the Parliament Act in which there is a provision that has been carried over. That seems to be the sole reason.

In terms of the argument, I am not quite sure why the provision should be there. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, was right. The Speaker is quite capable of consulting those whom he wishes to consult. If the provision was not in the Bill, it would avoid the legal problems to which the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, referred. The more we can do to reduce the prospect of legal challenge, the better. As the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, pointed out, there is a problem with the position of the Deputy Speakers, who are neutral figures as Deputy Speakers but seek re-election as party candidates.

The Minister’s argument is that this is based on precedent, as it is in the Parliament Act, which also has a definition of a money Bill. I am not quite sure why we are following the precedent of consultation but not following the precedent of having a definition as the basis on which that consultation takes place. Either one follows precedent and does both or one does neither. I cannot see the argument for saying, “Well, this is in the Parliament Act, so we’re lifting that” and “This is in the Parliament Act, but we’re not lifting that”, even though the definition, to which we will come, is far more important. That is essential in this Bill and I do not see why we need Clause 2(4).

I hope that my noble friend will reflect on that. He has heard the arguments and I think that he has recognised the value of them. I hope that it is something he might consider between now and Report. But in the interim, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 43 withdrawn.

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[Lord Martin of Springburn]

If the House wants me to cease speaking I will do so. I am sorry—the noble Lord has put me off, but I think he will get my point in a moment. I will try not to take so long the next time I speak.

If a Speaker has to sign a certificate, it should be simple. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that the public outside should know exactly what is being voted on in the House. It will be very clear if it is a vote of no confidence: a clear resolution or Motion will have been put down, saying, “We have no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”. If that was voted on, at least the Speaker would be in the position of knowing what he or she was going to sign. A vote of no confidence will have been carried, the House will have made a decision, and the Speaker will be conveying the wishes of the House and putting that on a certificate. I hope that has helped the noble Lord.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I have added my name to the new clause as well. I will just begin by disagreeing with my noble friend Lord Tyler, because I do not agree that this new clause undermines the Bill—quite the reverse. The Bill as presently drafted requires the Speaker to certify whether a vote of no confidence has been passed. However, there is no definition in the Bill of what constitutes that. This new clause seeks to adumbrate what constitutes a vote of no confidence as presently understood. If the Speaker is required to determine a vote of no confidence, all he has to go on is present understandings; otherwise he has to devise a definition of his own, which would be a sure recipe for undermining, if not destroying, the office of the Speaker.

What constitutes a vote of no confidence is a serious concern, and one that has been acknowledged by Ministers. When the Deputy Prime Minister appeared before the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House to discuss the Government’s constitutional reform programme, he conceded,

“this is a really important area and it is a classic example of where we could perhaps work away at the Bill if necessary, to strengthen or clarify it”.

He went on:

“In a sense, we have provided the tramlines in this draft Bill, but at the same time, I clearly want to retain as much flexibility and autonomy as possible for the House to decide for itself how it then interprets that. That is exactly the kind of thing that now needs to come out in the scrutiny that the Bill will receive”.

The problem with the present provision is that it does not leave it to the House how it interprets a vote of confidence—it is left to the Speaker to determine what constitutes a vote of confidence. As we have heard, unlike with money Bills, there is no statutory definition to guide the Speaker and there is an obvious ambiguity with the current wording. Defeating a motion of confidence is not the same as passing a vote of no confidence. Last week, the Minister referred to the case of Germany, where he said the Government had engineered a vote of no confidence in order to trigger an election. I pointed out that they had not engineered a vote of no confidence; they had contrived to be defeated on a motion of confidence. What happens if the Government consider that a Division on a major issue of policy is one of confidence and the Speaker takes a contrary view? Worse, what if it is the other way round?

As we have already heard, the danger is that the Speaker will be dragged into political controversy. In the event of an expected close vote on the Second Reading of a major government Bill, the Speaker could, in effect, be holding the fate of the Government in his hands. The potential to damage the office of Speaker is immense, and it should be avoided. If we are to have a Speaker’s certificate—and I say “if”—then we need to define what constitutes a vote of no confidence in the Government. As we have heard, there is a statutory definition of a money Bill, and I believe a statutory definition is required of a vote of no confidence. My noble friend's amendment seeks to provide that.

Last week, the Minister mentioned that I had undertaken research of all votes of confidence. In fact, my research was of government defeats in the House of Commons in the 20th century and, as part of that research, I was able to determine what were deemed to be votes of confidence—and, equally, what were not. In essence, as has already been touched on, there are three types of vote in which the House of Commons expresses its lack of confidence in the Government. First, there are Motions that stipulate that the House has or does not have confidence in Her Majesty's Government. The House may carry a Motion of no confidence or negate one expressing confidence in Her Majesty's Government.

Second, there are Motions on measures that the Government consider so central to their programme that, if defeated, they cannot sensibly continue. Confidence has therefore attached to some Second Readings and on occasion particular provisions of Bills. I have previously cited—again, this has been touched on—the example of the Second Reading of the European Communities Bill in 1972, when the Prime Minister stated that, if defeated, the Parliament could not sensibly continue. As an aside, I would mention that, if one went down the route where the Speaker did not certify it as a vote of confidence, it would still be open to the Prime Minister to say that the Government could not sensibly continue.

The third category is that of implicit votes of confidence. A small number of issues are taken to be confidence votes even if not explicitly worded as such and without the Government having declared them to be so. This is essentially a residual category deriving from the Government’s need for supply—my noble friend Lord Forsyth touched upon it earlier. Failure to grant supply is regarded as the traditional means by which the House can demonstrate its lack of confidence in the ministry.

My noble friend’s amendment seeks to encapsulate these categories in his new clause. It provides the clarity I would regard as necessary for the Speaker. I have some sympathy for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. It may be that the definitions provided are such that no verification from the Speaker is required because, if a Government attempted to argue that a particular defeat, say, on an amendment to the gracious Speech, was not one of confidence, then it would be open as now for the leader of the Opposition to table an explicit vote of no confidence.

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[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, the hour is late so I have no wish to detain the House. First, I would like to congratulate my noble friend on this amendment, which I think is a great improvement on Clause 2. I have been reading Clause 2 again and it is like some kind of pre-nuptial agreement. If you look at the reasons behind it, clearly this is a clause put together by two parties who are not quite sure whether this marriage is going to work out. The reason we have the provision of more than a simple majority is clearly because the Liberal partners in the coalition were worried about the Prime Minister cutting and running and calling an early election when they were very unpopular. You can see how the architecture of this Bill has been created and it has nothing whatever to do with the proper functioning of the House of Commons.

Clause 2 is completely unnecessary, but I respect my noble friend’s very constructive attempt to try to go with the grain and not be too confrontational, as perhaps I am being now, about this clause. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, that my preference would be to leave out the proposed new subsections (3) and (4) for the reason that, as the noble Lord, Lord Martin, has so eloquently explained, we should not be putting the Speaker in a position where he is involved in this.

Throughout the evening my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace has been very patient and very good and very constructive. I have asked him on several occasions why we need to have the certification process at all. It goes back to the pre-nuptial agreement. Normally, if the Prime Minister wants to call an election, people accept that, but people have thought we cannot have the Prime Minister doing it so we have to have somebody else. You can see them sitting in a room thinking, “Well, who could we have? Well, we will have the Speaker”. It has not been thought through. It is not necessary. We do not need the Speaker to sign a certificate saying that a Motion of no confidence has been passed.

Where I take slight issue—I support my noble friend’s amendment, but it is not perfect—is with the list of what constitutes a Motion of no confidence. As has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, I do not think that you can have a Bill,

“defined by the Prime Minister of the day as being essential to his or her administration continuing in office”.

My noble friend Lord Tyler is absolutely right about that. If a Bill that was central to the Government’s programme, a flagship Bill, was defeated in the House of Commons, any leader of the Opposition worth his salt would the very next day table a no-confidence Motion, which would take precedence over all other parliamentary business under the rules and conventions of the House of Commons. Presumably, Members would either vote for or against that Motion. I do not see the need for this list.

In my noble friend’s amendment, I like the bit that says, “Leave out Clause 2” and I like the bit that says:

“An early parliamentary general election is to take place if the House of Commons passes a motion of no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”,

but then I think, “Why do we need any of the rest?”. I would be very grateful if, during the course of these proceedings, we could answer these very simple questions. You do not need the Speaker to sign a certificate and, if the House of Commons can pass a Motion of no confidence, that Motion does not need to be moved by the leader of the Opposition. But if the House of Commons no longer has confidence in the Government, there has to be a general election. That is a tried and tested thing that has continued for years.

I agree, too, with those who have said, “What is the point of this Bill?” If a Prime Minister wants to have a fixed-term Parliament, he can say, “I am not going to call a general election till the fifth anniversary of the previous election, or the last possible moment”—and there we have it. Normal conventions will apply.

We have this Bill, but it is a muddle, and if we are going to proceed with it we need something like my noble friend’s amendment, which leaves out Clause 2. If we could do away with the list or reduce its scope—perhaps continuing to include the Finance Bill but certainly taking away the requirement on the Speaker to issue a certificate—we would end up back where we started. The great advantage to where we started is that we know that it has worked and it has worked for centuries.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Before my noble friend sits down, I shall answer his question about the list. The reason why we need the list is because it has been our understanding about what a vote of confidence is for about a century. He is now being extremely radical in trying to limit the list in saying that only in certain circumstances would there be an explicit vote of no confidence. That is quite a constitutionally radical proposal.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

I stand corrected by my noble friend, who is very expert on these matters. However, a Motion that says, “This House has no confidence in Her Majesty's Government” is absolutely clear, and it would trigger an election. In the context of this Bill, with a fixed-term Parliament, it is going to change. I accept that, because the nature of the Parliament will have changed. But I would much prefer something clear-cut, simple and explicit. If you want to bring down the Government, you have to pass a Motion of no confidence. That is absolutely clear. If such a motion is passed, the Prime Minister has to go to the country.

I was going to sit down, but my noble friend has set me off again. To turn to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, the idea that a Prime Minister should somehow be prevented from going to the country to get the consent of the people for what he is trying to do, to call a general election, is also a deeply worrying change to our constitutional pattern. But I sit at the feet of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and I am perfectly prepared to alter my view and go along with this amendment, at least in part under his instruction, because it is a far better thing than Clause 2 as it stands.

I hope that my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness will accept the good advice that has been given him tonight and that at a later stage we will be able to discuss something that is more practical and workable and does not threaten the integrity of the office of Speaker of the House of Commons or the ability of the House to hold the Executive to account.

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[Lord Norton of Louth]

As the Bill now necessitates, instead of saying that we are on the Adjournment and that this will be treated as a Motion of confidence, one would put down explicitly worded confidence. That would be the essential change.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Is that right, because the wording in the amendment is:

“passes a motion of no confidence tabled by the leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition”?

The noble Lord is obviously right, but what about the position in relation to the Egyptian Motions to which I referred, or the Motion in which Mr Attlee, lambasting the Conservative Government in 1952, did not use the words “censure”, “Motion” or “confidence” once, yet regarded it as a motion of no confidence?

We already have a well understood definition of no confidence. The phrase is well known. What it means at any particular time depends on a consensus view that emerges from the Commons. The Commons understands when there is a Motion of no confidence. What it means is not something that is capable of being written down in a statute. I respect what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is trying to do in trying to define it, as it obviously is not working the other way. The Government’s problem is that they use the phrase “a Motion of no confidence”, as if it is a single, static thing that can be defined at any moment. Is not the obvious difficulty that it is not a static thing? One moment something will be a Motion of no confidence and 10 years later it will not because political circumstances have changed. As a consequence of what the Government are seeking to do, they are in effect changing the basis and moving it on from a political judgment made by the House of Commons to a legalistic issue that has to be resolved by the Speaker of the House of Commons. That is a fundamental change.

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[Lord Norton of Louth]

I understand the argument that my noble and learned friend is developing. One of his objections to my noble friend’s amendment was that it seeks to encapsulate what is the current position, where the Prime Minister can say, “Well, if we lose on this Second Reading of a major government Bill, we cannot continue; we make it a question of confidence”, and uses that to mobilise government supporters.

My noble and learned friend is objecting to maintaining the current provision, whereby the Prime Minister can simply say: “If we lose, we go”. I touch on the point that it is still open to the Government to resign. If the Prime Minister says, “This is crucial to our programme; if we lose, we resign”, and therefore goes to the Palace in the wake of that to tender the Government's resignation, under the Bill, what happens?

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[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I do not detect a huge zest in the Committee for considering the remaining amendments on the Marshalled List at this time of the morning. However, if that is what the usual channels have agreed and wish to insist on, it is not for the rest of us to argue.

In moving Amendment 55, I wish to speak also to Amendment 55A. Both these amendments would widen the range of circumstances in which Parliament may—not must—be dissolved beyond the two contingencies that are provided for in the Bill, which are the eventuality of the two-thirds majority and that of a vote of no confidence. My first suggestion is that if a new Prime Minister is appointed by Her Majesty, there should be the possibility of a general election quickly following that. I do not think that when Mr Major replaced Mrs Thatcher in 1990, and certainly when Mr Callaghan replaced Mr Wilson in 1976, there was widespread public demand that there should be a general election. It was accepted that it was reasonable and appropriate that the Government should be headed by a new Prime Minister without a general election taking place. On the other hand, when Mr Brown replaced Mr Blair in 2007, there was a very discernible feeling in the country that there should have been a general election. Professor Bogdanor has suggested that that may be because our politics had become more presidential by that time, but I think that when Mrs Thatcher was our counterpart to President Reagan our politics were already fairly presidential, so I am not sure that that is the explanation. Be that as it may, there was that feeling in the country.

It is also interesting that before the recent election Mr Cameron proposed that a new Prime Minister taking office should be required to go to the country within six months of doing so. It would be helpful if the Minister was able to cast any light on why that proposal was dropped and is not incorporated in the Bill. Perhaps the Liberal Democrats thought that it was a bad idea for whatever reason—I do not know. However, it was an interesting suggestion and one that should not be forgotten. If we are likely to have more frequent hung Parliaments, and there are indications that that may be so, it follows that there is a greater likelihood that there will be a change of Prime Minister within the Parliament. If we are to have a situation in which one Prime Minister gives way to another but there is no election, that raises questions about accountability, not least in the context of the coalition’s own insistence that its reforms are designed to improve the accountability of politicians to the people. That is one set of circumstances in which it would be appropriate to allow a general election.

I then propose in the amendment Dissolution if a Government of a different coalition are formed, so we are not just talking about a new Prime Minister of the same party continuing in government. However, if we get a new coalition, I suggest that again accountability to the people should require at least the possibility of a new election without having to resort to devices such as Motions of no confidence and so forth, or indeed getting a two-thirds majority in the House of Commons, which might still be difficult.

Thirdly, I have suggested that if,

“the Prime Minister considers it appropriate to seek the endorsement of electors following a change in government policy”,

it should be legitimate for him to go to the country. At this time of night, my memory is rather failing me, so perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, can help me. Did Mr Baldwin go to the country on tariff reform? I think that that may have happened, and in fact I see nods from better informed noble Lords on the other side of the Chamber. Had Mr Heath, when he performed the famous U-turn and adopted an incomes policy in 1972, thought that it was appropriate to go to the country, I do not think that anyone would have objected. If a similar situation were to develop now, surely that, too, would be appropriate. It should be possible for a major change of policy to presage an election in which the Prime Minister seeks the endorsement of the country for that new course of policy.

Fourthly, I have suggested that, if in the view of the Prime Minister a Parliament is no longer viable, again he should be able to seek Dissolution and go to the country. We talked in an earlier debate about just such a judgment made by Mr Attlee in 1951. Had this fixed-term Parliament legislation been in place, that Labour Government might have had to struggle on unable, by the Prime Minister’s own acknowledgement, to govern effectively unless it had been reprieved by a two-thirds majority. I think that there should be a surer way to provide that an election can take place in those circumstances.

My final suggestion is a bit arbitrary, if not even possibly whimsical. It is that where,

“the number of MPs in receipt of the governing party’s or governing coalition’s whip falls below a majority of 10 over the combined members of the other parties in the House of Commons”,

again it should be possible for a general election to take place. That is, in a sense, a variant of the situation in which a Prime Minister judges that a Parliament is not viable. However, in this case it would not necessarily be just the opinion of the Prime Minister that would count.

Amendment 55A is a little different. It picks up a suggestion made by Mr Gordon Brown that a Parliament may, not must, be dissolved if the House of Commons approves by a simple majority a Motion that the Prime Minister should request Dissolution from the Queen. This seems to be an elegant and simple solution to what the Government have stated as the key issue that they wish to resolve through this legislation. They think it is objectionable that the Prime Minister of the day should have the power to call the election whenever he wishes. Gordon Brown suggested that the Prime Minister should no longer have the power to seek Dissolution on his sole judgment—a power which I think was originally assumed by Lloyd George and which has rested with subsequent Prime Ministers. The Prime Minister would have to go to the House of Commons and secure a vote there before he could go to the Palace and request Dissolution. This would solve the main problem that the Government have set out to solve. It could be legislated for, although I do not think that it really needs legislation; it could be accepted as one of the conventions under which Parliament operates. I beg to move.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

I thought that I would speak briefly on the amendment. I can see the argument that it drives a coach and horses through the intention of having fixed-term Parliaments and I can see that it may attract some support in the House for that reason. I have problems with how the amendment is drafted, as it says:

“Parliament may otherwise be dissolved”.

Who determines that? It may otherwise be dissolved if Her Majesty appoints another Prime Minister. Is it the incoming Prime Minister who determines that there should be a dissolution? It also states that,

“the Prime Minister considers it appropriate to seek the endorsement of electors following a change in government policy”.

One can see how any Prime Minister could have a fairly minor change of policy and decide, “I’d rather like to have a general election”, and it could be used as an excuse presumably for triggering the election. There is no requirement here; it has to be a major change in public policy. There are obvious drafting problems because I am completely unclear as to who would be responsible for triggering a Dissolution. That is my problem with it, but some may find that quite attractive since, in effect, it would undo the whole Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am not sure that it would. There are drafting issues and the noble Lord is right about that, but there has been a mood around the House that when John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher or Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair, it might have been appropriate to have a general election. I understand that my noble friend Lord Howarth is saying, “Let’s define some circumstances which don’t say you have an absolute discretion, which is the current position, but there are certain defined circumstances”.

I agree that some of them, such as,

“the Prime Minister considers a Parliament not to be viable”,

and,

“the Prime Minister considers it appropriate to seek the endorsement of electors following a change in government policy”,

are a little vague. Would it be a change in any government policy, including where we stand in relation to the Forestry Commission? That might be a little bit unjustifiable, but if you wanted the Brown-Blair, Thatcher-Major; a change in the complexion of the Government; the Heath situation; and the October 1974 situation—there is a broad consensus round the House that those would not be bad—it is not necessarily a bad idea to say that tightly drafted provisions should be included at the end of Section 3.

We are dealing not with the safety valves but specific occasions when the nation would think it appropriate for there to be an election. I do not see that as being necessarily inconsistent with a fixed-term Parliament. As the noble and learned Lord rightly said, we are not in the Norwegian-type situation where it is X years come what may, and you soldier on to the end, come what may. You are identifying certain circumstances when the norm, whether four or five years, can be departed from. It is when there is a vote of no confidence, or questions when certain well recognised events occur, which justify the then Government seeking the endorsement of the electorate, even though there was no vote of confidence and even though there was no two-thirds vote, which would be, as I understand it, a Prime Ministerial discretion.

What the noble Lord, Lord Norton, is getting at is that if it is a Prime Ministerial discretion, you go straight back to where you were before. Let us suppose that the provision said that the Prime Minister—meaning the new Prime Minister—can go to the country if he takes over mid-Parliament. That would not be an absolute discretion; it would be a very constrained discretion, usable only when there was a change in Prime Minister. That would not strike me as driving a coach and horses through the Bill, although I can see that the noble Lord is dying to tell me why I am wrong.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Yes, I was going to suggest that he is. In circumstances that he suggested that it is the incoming Prime Minister who can opt to do that, as with Anthony Eden in 1955, presumably it will be used to the Prime Minister’s advantage. When the noble and learned Lord suggested that the mood of the nation perhaps favoured a change, one can see situations in which the very last thing an incoming Prime Minister plans to do is call an election.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Think, like the right honourable Nick Clegg, about giving the public more control over their politicians. There is always a sense of frustration that comes when a new Prime Minister comes in and the public get no say in whether this change is right. This would reflect this mood and give the public more control.

The noble Lord is right. I cannot think how I would have taken over as Prime Minister and at the same time been unpopular. It is an unlikely scenario. However, it is a way of avoiding lots of clubhouse politics, where you move from one to another. It does not necessarily drive a coach and horses through the Bill. It would do so if the viability provision or the change in policy were there. It would, however, be worth the Government thinking of a circumstance in which, for example, a Government totter on with a majority of one and want to have a general election but the Opposition will not give them a two-thirds vote. Why should there not be a general election in those circumstances? It might well be that the country is not assisted by there being weak government in those circumstances.

I completely understand why the Government would wish to knock out the very general reasons for Dissolution. However, if the Government are serious about trying to improve the constitution, it is worth them considering whether or not there are more specific reasons of the sort proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, that might be worth including in Clause 3(2) of the Bill that says that,

“Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved”,

except in those situations that we have dealt with before, which is the two-thirds majority, the expiry of the fixed term or a motion of no confidence.

Amendment 55A says that Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved,

“unless the House of Commons has approved on a division a motion tabled by the Prime Minister that the Prime Minister should request Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament”.

The effect of that provision is that it would not be in the discretion of the Prime Minister alone, which is the current position. Put aside everything else. Assume no Motion of no confidence. Assume no two-thirds vote. Assume no change to the Bill to allow any special measures. The Prime Minister could nevertheless table a Motion that says, “I think there should be a general election”, and, if Parliament backed him by a simple majority, there could be a general election. This is probably the position anyway because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, says, there is nothing to stop the Prime Minister from procuring a vote of no confidence to get rid of himself so that, for example, in the Heath situation, he could have an election to deal with a particular crisis that had struck the Government. Would it not be more sensible for there to be a straightforward mechanism that allowed that to happen? If it can happen by the back door, why should it not be allowed to happen by the front door? It does not offend against the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill because its stated purpose is to take away the right to call a general election from the Prime Minister and give it to Parliament. Amendment 55A does not offend against that principle