Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McAvoy]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, has described better than I ever could the Alice in Wonderland nature of the debate. I can understand my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport picking credible holes in the amendment brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and it is certainly easy for the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, to do so.

We are holding this debate against a background of a Bill which is unnatural and is opposed by an overwhelming majority of Members of this House. A party which lost seats in the previous general election is blackmailing its partners in a coalition to accept constitutional change. We shall all end up being twisted and contorted by trying to take part in a debate on a Bill which is utterly flawed and goes against the natural flow of political events in this country. It is easy to criticise, but we are taking part in a debate on a Bill which is a strange and unnatural beast in British politics.

The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has tried within the context of that debate to play the constructive, revising role that people in this House look for and to make the Bill better. I do not think that he supports the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, but we have got it in front of us and it is what he is trying to improve.

Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause outlines the instances in which a vote of no confidence will be deemed to have been passed. They would amount to votes of confidence anyway. They are issues where, if a vote goes against the Government, Parliament is entitled to pass a vote of no confidence; that is the new world. Paragraph (b) states,

“denies a second or third reading to a Finance Bill”.

We all know that a Government need a Finance Bill to be passed. I take the point about a Prime Minister defining it, but that is his or her judgment as the Prime Minister of the country. Paragraphs (c) and (d) state,

“passes a motion of no confidence tabled by the leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition; or … defeats a motion of confidence tabled by the Prime Minister”.

The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is using real life to bring forward instances which determine whether there is a general election in this country. I, too, was in another place at the time of Maastricht. It is not the first time that people have combined in quite such dishonourable—in some ways—alliances.

I presume that the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, supported the 14-day provision. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack—I had better not call him my noble friend for the purpose of this debate—was paying me compliments in talking about black arts and sinister persuasions. That 14 days would allow all sorts of things to take place. There would definitely be no physical violence, but imagine the sheer pressure that you can generate by being able to say to somebody that you hold in your hand the power to determine whether, in my case, a Labour Government fall, or a Conservative Government, in the case of other people.

This is really nonsense, but we are all being forced to discuss it because we are being led by the nose—I hesitate to say anything that would upset or insult noble Lords on the Conservative Benches—by a comparatively small group of people, the Liberal group, who are hell bent on changing the constitution of this country. They are tinkering with it and coming up with all sorts of ill thought-out, ill advised and quite nonsensical proposals. In the likes of the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Cormack, and my noble friend Lord Grocott, we have people here who are prepared to listen to ideas for change but to take the best of this place to keep it going. We are in an unnatural situation where we are all discussing something which we know is not right and not practical.

I was particularly struck by a phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which was that he was trying to get a comprehensible Bill. That sounds to me like common sense. As long as we are forced to discuss a Bill such as this, we will all come forward with positions that we do not really believe in or like in a vain attempt to make a better Bill. We know full well in our heart of hearts that a majority of people in this House know that the Bill is nonsense; but as long as we are prepared to discuss in an Alice in Wonderland way, we can pick holes in reasonable suggestions.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I am very interested in the amendment and agree a great deal with the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Armstrong, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe. A common argument put here is that we did not need a Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. I come from engineering. My foreman used to say, “Michael, if it works, do not fix it; do not touch it”. There is nothing to stop the present Administration, the alliance, going for five years if they want to; but, as others have said, we are past that point now. I remember when the Labour Party decided that it would have mandatory reselection of MPs and that was made part of its constitution. We were warned that if you kick a ball into the constitution park, it can roll in many ways. That is what we are seeing here, when we do not need a change. Now people are attempting to fix it by ensuring that the legislation is watertight.

On the idea of a Speaker signing a certificate, the fact is that every decision of the House of Commons is then put in the Journal of the House. There is a dedicated Clerk to the Journal who makes sure that the Journal records the decisions of the other place and of this place. Perhaps the legislation should have a mechanism whereby someone would be presented with the Journal, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said, stated that a decision had been made by a two-thirds majority or that a vote of no confidence had been carried.

I think that it is on the steps of the Mansion House that someone comes out to say, “Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye”—there is going to be a general election. There is a delay while it goes up to Edinburgh because in the old days, someone went by horse and the announcement was made in Edinburgh a bit later—a lovely tradition. If I had my way, I would rather that that certificate did not have to be issued by the Speaker. It is different with Money Resolutions and other matters that the Speaker has to deal with.

I would rather that the provision be left out; if it is to be left in, I would rather that subsections (2)(a) and (b) be left out, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, what would happen if the gracious Speech was defeated and negated by a brand-new Government elected by the people? It would be hard for people to understand and very difficult for a Speaker to sign off a certificate in those circumstances. But what would happen if he or she denied the certificate? An element in the country would say, “Oh no, you have it in legislation. Sort that out”. I certainly would be uncomfortable. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that paragraph (b) is open to interpretation. For a Prime Minister to say, “Get this through or it is a vote of confidence in me”, is not the way things should go. However, a Speaker would be in a difficult position.

I mentioned earlier about the pressures on modern Speakers. I used to read some of the lovely stories in the beautiful books in Speaker’s House telling us what previous Speakers had to worry about. In one case, the Speaker had to worry about the price of coal being delivered to Speaker’s House. That was a big worry, and I wish I had had that worry. In the old days, perhaps in Edwardian times, the Speaker stayed in the big house, and would then go to his constituency or a place in the country. No one would bother him. Even if people wanted to apply pressure on him outside parliamentary hours, there was not the modern technology that we have just now. Nowadays, there is texting, e-mails and the mobile phone. As a result, I can envisage a situation in which, even if the period in which a Speaker had to sign this certificate was only 48 hours, he would be pursued and the pressures that would be put on him would be enormous. Forgive me, this applies also to lady Speakers.

The black arts of the Whip have been mentioned, and there are many black arts. There is the direct approach, when the Chief Whip comes in and gives the Speaker the rough edge of their tongue; or there is a more subtle way, when the pal of the Speaker is used. Bear in mind that the Speaker is elected from the ranks of the House of Commons, and he has friends. The pal is sent up and says, “You know, Michael, everyone in the Tea Room is worried”; but it is not everyone in the Tea Room who is worried—the Whips sent him. You get the friendly approach and then the Gypsy warnings, and so on.

There is another thing that we have to remember in these modern times—the 24/7 media. I mentioned the Edwardian Speaker who went away to the countryside. When I got to my home at weekends, if there was anything controversial going on, there were people at my door from the media, and they were not very nice at all. In fact, it is rule and convention of the House that the Speaker does not make statements anywhere other than in Parliament. A spokesman phoned me and said, “If you do not give a statement, this newspaper will doorstep you”. I said, “ I am bound by the rules of the House”. While I was speaking to that spokesman at 9 am on a Saturday, two reporters from a Sunday newspaper were outside in a car. The caller said, “I will phone the editor back and say that you are not going to speak”. One of the two reporters went to the side door of my home and the other went to the front door and battered it so hard. That is not a decent way to carry on. Had I or any of my family been in bed at the time, I would have thought that there was something very serious going on. I would have rushed to the door, opened it and been confronted by a newspaper editor.

I tell you that the pressures are tremendous. There is worry in every city about housebreaking. I even had a situation when a clown was outside my door—I describe him as a clown, although he called himself a journalist—from Sky TV, using big satellite television equipment. There he was, outside the house while I was in London. He said, “We cannot get him; the house is empty”. Anyone who is involved in security will tell you not to advertise that you are away from home, but here was somebody broadcasting live television, saying that my house was empty. That is the type of pressure I am talking about.

Something else must also be remembered. I was appalled when I heard that the Prime Minister of the day had a spin doctor whose only job—he had other spin doctors—was to put out negative stories about people in other parties and anyone else who was felt to be a danger to the Prime Minister. I do not wish to use the privilege of this House to mention his name. That person was sacked. It was public knowledge that he was putting out nasty, negative stories about members of the shadow Cabinet and their families. It absolutely horrifies me that the public purse was paying for this man and that the Prime Minister of the day was willing to employ him. Despite all my differences of agreement with Margaret Thatcher, I do not think she would have employed someone like that. Jim Callaghan would not have employed someone like that, and Ted Heath would certainly not have employed someone like that. That spin doctor was not the only one putting out negative stories, but he was paid by the Prime Minister of the day. If the Speaker of the House was going to do something that the Prime Minister was not happy about, there would be tough pressure on him with these people around.

We must also consider the public. We represent the people of this country. We must make sure that, if there is a vote of no confidence, the people understand what is happening. We are the anoraks of politics: we live and breathe politics; we look at politics in our spare time. However, there are other men and women who say, “We’ll leave that to the politicians”, although they want to know what is going on. They would not necessarily understand A and B.

[Lord Glentoran]

I have listened to the noble Lord with great care. He is somebody I have respected for a long time. However, I wonder where he is taking us in this debate, which is on an amendment to a very serious Bill. We have listened for 10 or 15 minutes to the experiences of a Speaker in the House of Commons. The evening is moving on and we have a lot of business to get through. Will the noble Lord, as an experienced former Member of Parliament, be good enough to tell us in a short sentence the point that he is trying to make?

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

If the House wants me to cease speaking I will do so. I am sorry—the noble Lord has put me off, but I think he will get my point in a moment. I will try not to take so long the next time I speak.

If a Speaker has to sign a certificate, it should be simple. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that the public outside should know exactly what is being voted on in the House. It will be very clear if it is a vote of no confidence: a clear resolution or Motion will have been put down, saying, “We have no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”. If that was voted on, at least the Speaker would be in the position of knowing what he or she was going to sign. A vote of no confidence will have been carried, the House will have made a decision, and the Speaker will be conveying the wishes of the House and putting that on a certificate. I hope that has helped the noble Lord.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I have added my name to the new clause as well. I will just begin by disagreeing with my noble friend Lord Tyler, because I do not agree that this new clause undermines the Bill—quite the reverse. The Bill as presently drafted requires the Speaker to certify whether a vote of no confidence has been passed. However, there is no definition in the Bill of what constitutes that. This new clause seeks to adumbrate what constitutes a vote of no confidence as presently understood. If the Speaker is required to determine a vote of no confidence, all he has to go on is present understandings; otherwise he has to devise a definition of his own, which would be a sure recipe for undermining, if not destroying, the office of the Speaker.

What constitutes a vote of no confidence is a serious concern, and one that has been acknowledged by Ministers. When the Deputy Prime Minister appeared before the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House to discuss the Government’s constitutional reform programme, he conceded,

“this is a really important area and it is a classic example of where we could perhaps work away at the Bill if necessary, to strengthen or clarify it”.

He went on:

“In a sense, we have provided the tramlines in this draft Bill, but at the same time, I clearly want to retain as much flexibility and autonomy as possible for the House to decide for itself how it then interprets that. That is exactly the kind of thing that now needs to come out in the scrutiny that the Bill will receive”.

The problem with the present provision is that it does not leave it to the House how it interprets a vote of confidence—it is left to the Speaker to determine what constitutes a vote of confidence. As we have heard, unlike with money Bills, there is no statutory definition to guide the Speaker and there is an obvious ambiguity with the current wording. Defeating a motion of confidence is not the same as passing a vote of no confidence. Last week, the Minister referred to the case of Germany, where he said the Government had engineered a vote of no confidence in order to trigger an election. I pointed out that they had not engineered a vote of no confidence; they had contrived to be defeated on a motion of confidence. What happens if the Government consider that a Division on a major issue of policy is one of confidence and the Speaker takes a contrary view? Worse, what if it is the other way round?

As we have already heard, the danger is that the Speaker will be dragged into political controversy. In the event of an expected close vote on the Second Reading of a major government Bill, the Speaker could, in effect, be holding the fate of the Government in his hands. The potential to damage the office of Speaker is immense, and it should be avoided. If we are to have a Speaker’s certificate—and I say “if”—then we need to define what constitutes a vote of no confidence in the Government. As we have heard, there is a statutory definition of a money Bill, and I believe a statutory definition is required of a vote of no confidence. My noble friend's amendment seeks to provide that.

Last week, the Minister mentioned that I had undertaken research of all votes of confidence. In fact, my research was of government defeats in the House of Commons in the 20th century and, as part of that research, I was able to determine what were deemed to be votes of confidence—and, equally, what were not. In essence, as has already been touched on, there are three types of vote in which the House of Commons expresses its lack of confidence in the Government. First, there are Motions that stipulate that the House has or does not have confidence in Her Majesty's Government. The House may carry a Motion of no confidence or negate one expressing confidence in Her Majesty's Government.

Second, there are Motions on measures that the Government consider so central to their programme that, if defeated, they cannot sensibly continue. Confidence has therefore attached to some Second Readings and on occasion particular provisions of Bills. I have previously cited—again, this has been touched on—the example of the Second Reading of the European Communities Bill in 1972, when the Prime Minister stated that, if defeated, the Parliament could not sensibly continue. As an aside, I would mention that, if one went down the route where the Speaker did not certify it as a vote of confidence, it would still be open to the Prime Minister to say that the Government could not sensibly continue.

The third category is that of implicit votes of confidence. A small number of issues are taken to be confidence votes even if not explicitly worded as such and without the Government having declared them to be so. This is essentially a residual category deriving from the Government’s need for supply—my noble friend Lord Forsyth touched upon it earlier. Failure to grant supply is regarded as the traditional means by which the House can demonstrate its lack of confidence in the ministry.

My noble friend’s amendment seeks to encapsulate these categories in his new clause. It provides the clarity I would regard as necessary for the Speaker. I have some sympathy for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. It may be that the definitions provided are such that no verification from the Speaker is required because, if a Government attempted to argue that a particular defeat, say, on an amendment to the gracious Speech, was not one of confidence, then it would be open as now for the leader of the Opposition to table an explicit vote of no confidence.