House of Lords Act 1999 (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Friday 9th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for introducing this Bill. It is a short Bill and, as I shall argue, a fairly modest one in terms of what we need to do to address the membership of this House, not least in terms of how Members leave and, most importantly of all, how they are appointed to this House.

I have previously spoken in support of what this Bill seeks to achieve. It comprises one part of the original House of Lords Reform Bill, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood. That is a relevant point to which I shall return.

The case for closing off the by-election option for hereditary Peers has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. It is difficult to defend the process, although not impossible, in that it is a process independent of party leaders. It brings in some able and independent-minded people. The hereditary Peers who are in the House are able, hard-working and effective Members. However, that has to be offset by how the process of them becoming Members is seen. As the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said, it is essentially past its sell-by date in terms of public acceptance.

I have argued the case before that closing off the by-election option does not prevent able hereditary Peers being appointed to this House. Following the enactment of the House of Lords Act 1999, more Labour hereditary Peers were brought back as life Peers than were returned as elected hereditary Peers. However, the procedure creates problems on this side of the House. I have previously made the point that for Conservative hereditary Peers the by-election is as much a block as it is an opportunity, since in practice it prevents able Peers coming in until such time as there is a death or retirement. They are not considered for life peerages but, instead, are left to take their chances when a by-election occurs.

I think therefore that some of the worries expressed about this Bill are misplaced. I would, though, have liked to have seen the Bill as part of a wider reform Bill. That was the point of the Steel Bill. There was a linkage between the provisions. Putting the independent Appointments Commission on a statutory basis would enable its independence to be protected. There is a route by which Peers can be brought into the House independent of party patronage—through the Appointments Commission—but that route needs some statutory underpinnings.

I also see the Bill as part of a wider process of addressing not just the size of the House but the process of appointment. The Bill covers both elements in that it closes off one method of joining the House and, in time, will result in a reduction in the number of hereditary Peers in the House, indeed logically and ultimately leaving only two—the two who are Members ex officio.

I would like us to go further and address not just hereditary Peers but life Peers joining the House. An Ipsos MORI poll in 2007 asked people what factors were most important in determining the legitimacy of the House of Lords. Having some Members elected by the public came some way down the list, at five out of seven. At the top of the list was “trust in the appointments process”. Excluding don’t knows, 76% of respondents rated that as very important and 19% as fairly important. Second on the list was that,

“the House considers legislation carefully and in detail”.

Therefore, we need to address the input side of membership. We have already achieved the enactment of a Private Member’s measure, the House of Lords Reform Act 2014, to enable Peers to retire—more than 50 have now done so—but, as Peers retire, new ones are created. We need not only to reduce numbers but to ensure a more rigorous appointments process, giving the Appointments Commission the power to vet all nominees for suitability—ensuring that they meet a high-quality threshold, as well as reflecting the diversity of the United Kingdom.

This Bill therefore is not the answer but, rather, part of the answer. I hope that the House will agree to its Second Reading and indeed its other stages, and that the Government will recognise its merits and seek to facilitate its passage.

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[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I rise in the gap to make a couple of quick points because I remember the entire debate around the passing of the 1999 Bill very well. In fact, I sat on the Cross-Bench group which produced some thoughts in response to the legislation. It could not be a representative Cross-Bench group but a significant number of us thought that it produced some useful contribution to the debate.

The major point that I remember from the 1998 debate was about further democratic reform of the House of Lords. Those key words—further democratic reform—form what we were left here to ensure. It was constantly referred to then because it soon became apparent that there was an argument between the democrats, who believed that the House of Lords should be elected, and the Commons supremacists, who were terrified of losing the greater power of the House of Commons. It is interesting that five ex-MPs have spoken today in this debate, if not all speaking the same way. I have the honour to serve as one of the hereditary Peers who were elected to stay here and ensure that further democratic reform. That is my basic position, which is why I cannot possibly support the Bill.

There is almost a touching naiveté about the second Chamber group believing that, if we have this incremental reform, there will be an incentive for proper reform in the future. All it will do is to erode slowly bits and pieces of the powers of this House. We will lose our effectiveness to challenge the Executive and Government of the day, as we have to do. We saw this in the rows about secondary legislation the other day, where it was suggested that the House of Lords should have its power to do anything about that removed, so there is this gradual erosion.

I shall finish with a couple of quick points. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Norton, said that an heir cannot be appointed to the House of Lords as a life Peer. They can; I do not think that there is any bar on an eldest son or daughter being appointed.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

No.

[The Earl of Erroll]

If there is not, that is good. I thought that there was not.

It amused me that the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, referred to the election of the hereditary Peers not meeting a democratic standard. I am pleased that he approves of democratic standards and will therefore approve of only further democratic reform of the House of Lords, not an appointed House. I also noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, suggested that if we were to go down the route of getting to the House of Lords that many other people use, you basically have to be useful to a Prime Minister. I am not sure whether that is the right way to get here. However, I was glad to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, approves of an elected House.

The point of all this comes down to what the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said, which was absolutely key: that we are watching control of the legislature by the Executive gradually creeping in. He may not have used those exact words but that is what it is. We watch this whenever Ministers in the House of Commons, who are heads of executive departments, think that they are more powerful and important as that than as Members of Parliament, controlling themselves as members of the legislature. We forget that at our peril. The real problem with an appointed House is: who will control and appoint the Appointments Commission? That is the key to the problem because if the Executive get control of it, they will have control of both Houses.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to address constitutional issues. The gracious Speech makes reference to several. In the time available, I wish to comment on what is in the speech and, more importantly, what is not, although the various references lead to my concern with what is missing.

The references to constitutional issues in the speech are several, but they are rather disparate, both in what they cover and where they are to be found. In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the speech we find a section headed “Constitutional Affairs”. It contains no reference to the proposal for a British Bill of Rights; that is to be found in the section entitled “Strengthening our National Security”.

The Speech includes the statement:

“My Government will hold a referendum on membership of the European Union”.

That statement is not included in the Explanatory Memorandum. More worryingly to my mind, which will lead to my general observation, is the language in which it is couched. Governments have no intrinsic power to hold referendums. They can propose referendums, they can initiate legislation to provide for a referendum, but it is Parliament that provides the authority for the holding of a referendum.

That may seem a pedantic point, but it leads to the wider problem that I wish to identify. In their approach to constitutional issues, the Government are following in the footsteps of their predecessors: the Labour Government returned in 1997 and the coalition Government. That is, they are bringing forward measures of constitutional reform but without any clear intellectual approach to constitutional change. The Labour Government implemented major reforms, but the reforms were justified on their individual merits. There was no intellectually coherent view, no overarching theory, that determined the type of constitution they were seeking for the United Kingdom. The then Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irving of Lairg, admitted in terms in a debate in December 2002 that there was no all-embracing theory. The coalition Government clearly had no coherent approach, given that the coalition was formed by two parties that took diametrically opposed views to constitutional change. The constitutional measures that were introduced were the result of concessions or compromise.

With the return of a Conservative Government last year, one may be forgiven for thinking that we would see a Conservative approach to constitutional change. There is a Conservative view of the constitution and, indeed, of the purpose of law. However, what has been brought forward to date, and what is proposed in the gracious Speech, has comprised disparate and discrete measures, exhibiting a somewhat cavalier approach to the constitution and the understandings that underpin that constitution. It is important to stress that the constitution is greater than the Government of the day, and not the other way round.

The Scotland Act, enacted at the close of the last Session, illustrates the problem. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act not only fly in the face of the Cabinet Office’s own guidance on drafting legislation but are at complete variance with what Conservatives view as to the purpose of law. The problem is illustrated more broadly, and more worryingly, in terms of the relationship of devolution and the decentralisation of power to different parts of England. Little connection is made between the various changes. We have a patchwork quilt of responses to differing pressures. There is an absence of a clear, coherent, Conservative stance. We are playing catch-up rather than embracing a clear view of what form our constitution should take.

I therefore have just two questions that I wish to put to my noble friend Lord Bridges. I do not ask him to justify each of the measures of constitutional change that are embodied in the gracious Speech; we will get the justification for each when the relevant Bill is brought forward. What I would like my noble friend to do, and this is clearly the occasion on which to do it, is, first, to put on record the intellectually coherent approach taken by the Government to constitutional change, and, secondly, to detail the mechanism within government for ensuring that it is delivered.

There is a Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of Cabinet, chaired by Oliver Letwin. However, in evidence to the Constitution Committee last year, Mr Letwin said that in practice it is concerned with devolution, not the constitution qua constitution. Issues of the rule of law, he made clear, were not for that committee. Can the Minister confirm that that remains the case and, if so, explain how the Government intend to ensure that constitutional change is put within a clear framework of Conservative thought? We have a Conservative Government, and I look forward to hearing from my noble friend how they plan to live up to their name.

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[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very honoured to wind up this debate on the gracious Speech. It is my first time of doing so. I am very grateful to all those who have contributed and made such magnificent speeches. I include in that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, despite his jibes about blue on blue attacks. Indeed, I remember very well—far too well—the period when I worked for John Major in Downing Street from 1994 to 1997. Having seen a few leadership plots in my time, I say gently to the noble and learned Lord that people in glass houses should not throw stones.

I will endeavour to respond to as many points as possible. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not respond to all of them. I will endeavour to make sure that either my department or the relevant department responds in writing. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, made some extremely incisive points about the need for joined-up government. Of course, I would be delighted to meet her to discuss those points. She is always brimming with good ideas.

On the Bill of Rights, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Thomas, referred to the delay in publishing the detail of our proposals. As they say in advertising, good things come to those who wait. The Government agree with those noble Lords who believe that reform of the UK human rights framework must involve careful consideration. Our proposals will be published for consultation in due course. However, I can guarantee that there will be significantly more consultation on, and scrutiny of, the Bill of Rights than there was of the Human Rights Act, which was introduced without, I understand, formal consultation and within just six months of the 1997 general election. Our plans involve a Bill of Rights based on convention rights, but which takes into account our common law tradition and makes clear where the balance should lie between Strasbourg and the UK courts.

A number of noble Lords argued that any action might mean that protection of human rights is lessened. The Government argue that it simply is not the case that rights and liberties are guaranteed only because of the Human Rights Act. They were protected before 1998 and will continue to be in the future. The Bill of Rights will continue to protect fundamental human rights. It will also restore some credibility to human rights by better protecting the system from abuse.

On the rationale for the Bill of Rights, the Human Rights Act needs to be looked at to ensure that it is giving proper emphasis to public safety, as there have been too many instances recently of real evidence that something was going wrong. We are all agreed on the need for liberty and the right to life and privacy. The problem is not one of subscribing to those rights but of how the system operates in practice. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, agrees with that because those were his own words in 2006.

On the issue of human rights and the Armed Forces, raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, the Government are acutely aware of the issues raised and are actively considering the best way forward. Several noble Lords mentioned the UK’s international obligations. As my noble friend Lord Faulks set out, our reforms focus on staying within the European Convention on Human Rights but ensuring a more balanced application of human rights that restores some common sense. That said, we rule nothing out in the long term. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned prisoner voting. This is a matter for Parliament to determine. We do not seek confrontation with the Council of Europe and we are committed to a process of dialogue to find a mutually agreed way forward on this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, asked whether our intention was to allow other member states of the Council of Europe to decide the interpretation of the convention. It is important to remember that almost every major western democracy has its own distinctive way of protecting core rights. No one wishes to see countries—in the west or otherwise—flouting basic rights and freedoms, but the UK has led the way in pushing for greater recognition by the Strasbourg court of the principle of subsidiarity. Among other things, this allows member states a margin of appreciation in how they interpret the rights in the convention.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, pointed to the European Union Committee’s report on the Bill of Rights, which was a thoughtful contribution to this important debate. It highlights the complex legal area of the interaction between the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and domestic law. I welcome the noble Baroness’s acknowledgment of the Government taking a lead on human rights in the Modern Slavery Act, and her observation that our courts were protecting human rights before 1998. We will consider their Lordships’ report and respond in due course.

Today’s debate covered the topic of devolution, which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, mentioned in the context of human rights reforms. I reassure noble Lords that we will of course fully engage with the devolved Administrations and fulfil our mandate in a way that reflects the interests of all parts of the UK. Our focus will be on building consensus around sensible, necessary reforms across the UK. For example, your Lordships will know that the protection of human rights is a key part of the Belfast agreement, and our Bill of Rights will continue to protect the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights. We take our responsibilities under the Belfast agreement very seriously; we will not do anything to undermine it and we will work with parties to that end.

A number of noble Lords raised the issue of the Strathclyde review and the Government’s response to it. I do not wish to sound unduly opaque or obtuse, but I clearly cannot say, here and now, what the Government will do. That will be set out in our response, which will be published in due course. I gently point out that there is considerable confusion and misunderstanding about the conventions governing the relationship between the two Houses regarding statutory instruments. We do indeed need clarity and certainty. The noble Lord, Lord Richard, and my noble friend Lord Cormack argued for a committee of both Houses to consider the Government’s proposals. At this juncture, noting that the Government’s response has not been published, I say gently that three committees in this House, and one in the other place, have already considered the issue.

My noble friend Lord Cormack, the noble Lord, Lord Richard, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—who gave an excellent and very interesting speech at King’s College on this issue last month—have argued that the Government are using SIs inappropriately, that the powers being taken are too wide and the amount of secondary legislation is increasing. Although his speech was excellent, I do not want, at the late hour of 10.10 pm, to enter into a long-winded battle of statistics on the use of SIs. All I will say is that there has been no increase in the number of SIs laid before Parliament in the last 20 years. The total number made peaked in 2001, and more were laid before Parliament in the 1997-1998 and 2005-2006 Sessions than in any Session since, including between 2010 and 2012.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Will my noble friend tell the House how many pages these statutory instruments comprised?

Constitutional Convention Bill [HL]

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Friday 17th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, on bringing forward this Bill. However, like my noble friend Lord Forsyth, I have various difficulties with it. Constitutional change has occurred in recent years on an extensive scale and continues to take place. There are three distinct directions in which we can go in terms of such change. These can be subsumed under the headings of “incoherent”, “measured” and “new”. We have had major changes in recent decades under successive Governments, but each change has been justified on its own terms. There has been no serious attempt to look at the constitution as a constitution and consider what type of constitution we wish to achieve. There has been an intellectual discourse on different approaches to constitutional change but the measures pursued by government have not adhered to any one approach. There has been no intellectually coherent approach adopted by government. As a consequence, our constitution will be the sum of a range of disparate and discrete measures imposed on our existing constitutional arrangements. Without taking action, we will continue on what is an uncharted and potentially dangerous path.

I move from the incoherent to the measured. This is where there is some consideration of how changes fit within our constitutional arrangements. This entails reflection and dialogue, and seeing how existing and proposed changes impact not only on the constitutional framework of the United Kingdom but on how they relate to one another. No reform is exclusive to itself. Hence, my argument, which I have previously developed, for a constitutional convocation, a body that can make sense of where we are and provide some coherent framework for understanding how further changes relate to existing arrangements and to one another. It would provide some shape but without committing us prematurely to some new constitutional settlement.

This brings me to the third direction. This is where we move to a new paradigm, in effect a new constitutional settlement, which may mean a codified constitution. The vehicle that has been variously recommended for delivering this is a constitutional convention, which, to quote Black’s Law Dictionary, is:

“A duly constituted assembly of delegates or representatives of the people of a state or nation for the purpose of framing, revising or amending its constitution”.

The Bill is designed to formulate a new constitutional settlement, or at least a part settlement, for the United Kingdom. The sheer scale of change we have witnessed constitutes an argument against establishing a body that would craft a new constitution before we have had time to understand the consequences of those changes already undertaken or to which the Government are already committed. I want us to make sense of where we are, to understand what principles underpin, or have underpinned, the changes of recent years.

We are frequently reminded of the saying, “If I was going there, I wouldn’t start from here”. My point is that not only have we not determined where we are going, we have not even determined exactly where we are. My argument is that we need a much clearer sense of where we are constitutionally, of how the parts of the constitution as it now is hold together, if they do, before attempting to create a new constitutional architecture.

I turn to problems with the Bill on its own terms. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, rather skated over the provisions of the measure. It prescribes a limited number of subjects to be considered initially by the convention. I can understand the reasons for that but the parts of the constitution adumbrated in Clause 2 impact not only on one another but on other parts of the constitution not specified in the clause. It does not provide for an extensive examination of one part of the constitution but neither does it provide for looking at the constitution as a whole.

The provisions for a convention are too imprecise in form. Too much is left to the Secretary of State. The intention of utilising a convention, with at least half not drawn from politics, is presumably to establish some degree of public trust but it is not clear how that will be achieved. How many people will be chosen? How will they be chosen? What qualifications, if any, will they be expected to have? Do we go for ordinary members of the public? If so, will they be chosen by election, by lot or by nomination? Election may be preferable for the purpose of trust but, given that a proportion must not be politicians, on what basis will electors be making a choice? I agree with my noble friend Lord Forsyth and others who have spoken in the debate that the convention is given an essentially impossible timetable. If one is going to take seriously the task of examining thoroughly all the subjects specified in Clause 2, it will not be possible to do it within 12 months.

The Bill shows the problems with trying to create a constitutional convention when one is dealing with an extant constitution. We are not in the situation in which conventions normally find themselves. We have nothing approaching a clean slate or even a moderately clean one. Ours bears the markings of centuries, as well as the rushed and extensive writings of recent years. Trying to make sense of that and where we go imposes a particular burden that cannot be borne lightly or undertaken in haste.

Constitution: Gracious Speech

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 25th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Wills, on initiating the debate. The Motion addresses the implications of constitutional changes. I propose to focus on the constitutional implications of those changes.

Robert Stevens, in his book The English Judges, published in 2002, makes the point that the nation witnessed massive constitutional change in the period from 1640 to 1720. He notes that there were major constitutional developments in later years, such as the Reform Acts, but these were essentially,

“independent acts rather than part of a dramatic period of constitutional restructuring”.

He then—this is my key point—says:

“For lawyers and courts, however, the period from 1970 to 2000 provided a practical and psychological transformation comparable with the earlier constitutional revolution”.

The Labour Government returned in 1997 introduced a whole raft of constitutional measures. Anyone expecting a period of quiet after 2010 was to be disappointed. The coalition agreement heralded concessions and compromises on a number of measures of constitutional reform. The current Government are committed to several major constitutional measures, not least—as we heard—in relation to devolution and the European Union. The sheer scale means that we are not looking at independent Acts—that is, piecemeal changes that have time to bed in before other changes are made. We are looking at a whole gamut of changes to our constitutional arrangements, changes that are significant quantitatively and qualitatively.

During the 1980s and 1990s, several coherent approaches to constitutional change developed, each stipulating a particular constitutional structure deemed most appropriate to the United Kingdom. The problem with the constitutional reforms implemented by the Blair Government was that they bore no clear relation to any approach. When I asked Ministers what was the intellectually coherent approach to constitutional change being taken by the Government, I received no answer. In 2002, I initiated a debate on the constitution. In replying, the then Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, admitted that there was no such approach. Rather, he said, the Government proceeded,

“by way of pragmatism based on principle, without the need for an all-embracing theory”.—[Official Report, 18/12/2002; col. 691.]

The principles that he enunciated were not necessarily compatible with one another, as they appeared to embrace power residing at the centre and power not residing at the centre.

The coalition Government fared no better in that they were formed by parties which adopted approaches that were almost diametrically opposed to one another. The Liberal Democrats adhere to the liberal approach to constitutional change and the Conservatives to the traditional, or Westminster, approach—approaches that are at different ends of the spectrum of negative and positive constitutionalism, of what one sees a constitution as being for.

The result is that we are seeing, and pursuing, major changes to our constitution without having a clear appreciation of the implications for the constitution as a constitution. What is the principled approach to constitutional change? What type of constitution are we trying to craft for the United Kingdom? As things stand, we are in danger of ending up with a constitution that is the sum of a raft of disparate constitutional changes, rather than a coherent framework that we have set out to create.

In the debate on the gracious Address, I made the case for a constitutional convocation, not to draft a new constitution, but rather to make sense of where we are. We need an exercise in constitutional cartography. My purpose today is not to repeat what I said then, but rather to put specific questions to my noble friend Lord Bridges about the Government’s approach to constitutional change—not to specific proposals, not to the implications of particular measures to be introduced, but rather to constitutional change as such.

First, what is the Government’s intellectually coherent approach to constitutional change? How do they see the constitution as a constitution? Are they wedded to maintaining the Westminster model and the attributes ascribed to it? Secondly, what are the mechanisms within government to ensure that it engages in joined-up thinking on constitutional measures? Who is in charge of constitutional issues, not least in terms of ensuring a coherent approach to constitutional change? This is a question not about, or not just about, co-ordination, but about leadership. It would be helpful to know from my noble friend how government is now structured in order to consider constitutional issues as constitutional issues.

My key point in this debate is to stress that in looking at the implications of constitutional change, we should not confine ourselves—indeed, must not confine ourselves—to looking solely at the implications of this Bill or that Bill. We must look at the implications for the constitution as a whole. To do that, we need to be clear as to what type of constitution we have, and want, for the United Kingdom.

Recall of MPs Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

26: After Clause 24, insert the following new Clause—
“Review
(1) The Prime Minister must make arrangements—
(a) for a committee to carry out a review of the operation of this Act and, if appropriate in consequence of its findings, to make recommendations for the repeal or amendment of this Act, and(b) for the publication of the committee’s findings and recommendations (if any).(2) A majority of the members of the committee are to be members of the House of Commons.
(3) Arrangements under this section are to be made at least five years after the day on which this Act is passed and no later than six years after the day on which this Act is passed.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment provides for a review of the Act five to six years after enactment. It follows debate in Committee when the noble Lord, Lord Soley, proposed a sunset clause, but raised as an alternative a review of the Act. I favour review. Debate on the Bill has demonstrated uncertainty about its effect. Throughout today’s debate on Report, most of the discussion on amendments made the case for this review. There is a clear degree of lack of knowledge of what the effect will be. It has not been thought through. We are totally unclear about what impact the Bill will have.

To reiterate what I have said on a number of occasions, the purpose of the Bill is to restore, or at least to enhance, trust in politics, so let us see after the experience of a whole Parliament whether it has made any difference. It may be that no recall petitions are started in the period. That does not mean that an MP has not become eligible for a petition to be raised. Even if there have been no MPs who have acted in such a way as to trigger eligibility for a recall petition, it would still be useful to review the situation. If no MPs have acted in such a way as to render themselves liable, it would be useful to examine whether that is a result of the provisions of the Bill. Has it had a deterrent effect, or does it appear to have been irrelevant? If one or more MPs have been eligible for a recall petition, have petitions been raised and, if so, with what effect? If they have been eligible but no petitions have been raised, what does that tell us about the Bill?

There is clearly a case for review. It may be that there is not that much to review, but that in itself is important to know, and it is important to examine why that is the case. The Bill will be subject to post-legislative review anyway but, given the nature of the measure, a formal review is necessary, not least given the degree of uncertainty demonstrated by our deliberations on the Bill. I think it will be helpful for Parliament, but it should be especially for the benefit of electors. It is designed for their benefit. Has it had the desired effect?

The Minister will recognise the wording of the amendment. It is taken in large part from the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. Parliament accepted the case for review of that Act. I think there is an equally compelling case for a review of this measure. I beg to move.

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[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, the Government are fully persuaded of the merits of post-legislative scrutiny as a general principle. There are frequently valuable lessons to be learnt for the future, and the Government are always happy to listen to and consider recommendations arising from such reviews.

As noble Lords have said, the Government have included review clauses in several of their Acts this Parliament, including ones affecting constitutional or electoral matters. However, the Government have some reservations in this case. My noble friend’s amendment commits to a review after five years. That is a reasonable period in some respects, but it is of course by no means certain that there will have been a recall petition by that point. In fact, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, was getting very close to that. A review of an Act which has not had the opportunity to operate as intended would be severely limited in its usefulness. It would be unable to consider the operation of the recall process, and its conclusions would have to be to some extent hypothetical.

Recall does not have to be regularly used for the power to be a good addition to democracy. Indeed, as I have said before—and I hope noble Lords will understand my good intent—the Government fervently hope that no petition is triggered because Members’ conduct is of the highest standard expected. I am sure that noble Lords would not suggest that Parliament’s disciplinary powers should lapse simply because Members’ behaviour does not cause them to be used.

It is, of course, open to Parliament and to the Government of the day to review legislation on their own initiative, without a statutory requirement to do so. It would be entirely appropriate for a parliamentary committee to conduct its own post-legislative scrutiny at such a point as it felt that it would be useful to do so. I am sure that the Government of the day would be more than happy to reflect on any considerations that might be brought forward in that case.

I hope that we will not have a recall because the standards of Members of Parliament are very high, so will not need a review. The Government are not happy about my noble friend’s amendment and we ask him to withdraw it, because in this case we are not convinced that it would be of the use that we know he intends. If there has not been a trigger, it would not be the sort of valuable review that we would like were we to have reviews. I hope that he feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is clearly not familiar with my reputation. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, may find himself rather busy in five to six years because this will probably coincide with the review of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I suspect he will be only too happy to volunteer to serve on that review as well and to reach similar conclusions on both. I may be able to allay the fears of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, on the content of the amendment in terms of how the review would take place. This also relates to what my noble friend the Minister said. It stipulates a review but there will not necessarily be any action in the light of the committee’s investigation. It may find that it has had a deterrent effect and there is not too much to be done, which might be worth celebrating. It would not be in the scope of the amendment to cause more problems or give an opening to those who want to pursue a more radical measure. It would only be if the committee came up with recommendations for repeal or amendment of the Act as it stands. It does not necessarily open it up for everybody to come forward with alternatives.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the underlying principle is the important point. The content of the amendment is not set in stone. I put it in its current form because the Government had already accepted it for the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and I thought this would make it a bit more difficult for them to say no to this. The arguments on both measures are identical. If you accept the arguments for the review of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—which might be working wonderfully, so why do we need to review it?—those same arguments apply to this Bill. You either have some provision for both or neither. That was the reason I drafted it the way I did: to entice the Government in this direction rather than setting something in stone. I would be quite amenable, if it was felt appropriate, to coming back to this with a differently worded amendment to achieve review.

This will clearly be subject to post-legislative review by the relevant department after five or six years. It needed to be a wider review and be on record as more formal, as is the case with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I have made the case for it and I hope the Government might reflect on it, even at this late stage. It does not undermine the principle of the Bill; it just makes a sensible provision that we should look at these things in terms of how they work out. They may not be working as intended but that does not mean they have gone completely belly up—which is when we tend to do something about it—but they might merit modification. However, I do not intend to pursue it further at this late stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 26 withdrawn.

Recall of MPs Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Lords Chamber

It just happens that I tabled the amendment to do so, and the report came out today. I ask the Government to take this amendment seriously into account. If it is insufficient to deal with the concern expressed by the Procedure Committee, they might wish to come back at Third Reading to set in law the requirements that they believe are necessary.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 2 and 3, to which, as my noble friend said, I am a signatory. They are designed to remove discretion by judges and politicians. I appreciate the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I understand the case he is making, but I think the arguments for Amendments 2 and 3 are more persuasive.

It is important to remember, as my noble friend mentioned in moving the amendment, what the Bill is designed to achieve—it is to restore, or at least create, confidence in Parliament. I cannot see how the existing provisions of the Bill achieve that. A judge or members of the Standards Committee may be conscious that what they decide may render an MP eligible for a recall petition. It may or may not be a factor. However, the crucial point is not whether it is a factor but that members of the public may believe that it has been.

If an MP is suspended for eight or nine sitting days, there may be a good reason for selecting that period, but it may well give rise to suspicion that the number was chosen in order to avoid the MP being eligible for a recall petition. A judge torn between whether or not to sentence a Member to a period of imprisonment may err on the side of leniency, but, in so doing, may be accused of being overly lenient, ensuring that the MP is neither incarcerated nor subject to a recall petition. Electors may not share the judge’s view, but there is nothing they can do about it other than feel that the system has let them down.

These amendments take out the element of discretion. There is simplicity, there is objectivity. If an MP is convicted of an offence, any offence, he or she becomes eligible for a recall petition. The issue is simply one of innocence or guilt. If the Member is found guilty, it is then up to the electors whether to begin a petition to recall the Member. If it is a minor offence, as my noble friend Lord Tyler mentioned, they are not likely to take action, but it is up to them. There is no intermediary between the MP committing some wrongdoing and the electors.

In short, these amendments create conditions which electors will understand, and it is then up to them. I suspect they are more likely to feel strongly about MPs who break the law than those who offend against the rules of the House of Commons. If an MP accepts money for raising issues in Parliament, then that should perhaps no longer be a matter for disciplinary action by the House but for a change in the law.

As I argued at Second Reading, this is an imperfect Bill. These amendments are designed to render it less imperfect. I hope, even at this late stage, that the Government see, if not the light, at least a chink between the curtains.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 2 and 3, which have been spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Norton, have the combined effect of making the provisions of the Bill even more severe than they now are and of weakening the capacity of the House of Commons to discipline its Members itself. That seems to me to be an unhappy combination.

The noble Lords believe that a Member of Parliament found guilty by a court of any offence—not necessarily an imprisonable offence, but any offence—ought to become subject to the recall petition process. As the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, suggested, a minor motoring offence could expose the Member of Parliament to that process. He was optimistic that constituents would have the moderation and kindliness not to take advantage of that, but it does seem to me that a lot of politics could quickly come into this and that an opportunity might well be seized by those who wanted to see a Member of Parliament of a certain party displaced. Perhaps more seriously, a Member of Parliament who was found guilty in a court of some offence of obstruction during the course of protesting against proposals for fracking or wind turbines—or perhaps the tripling of tuition fees—would, again, be subject to the recall process.

This means that the Member of Parliament, instead of being subject to the rounded judgment of all his constituents in due course at the general election, becomes immediately subject to the wrath of all the Mrs Grundys in his constituency and of the censorious minority—only a small minority, 10% of registered electors, need to sign the petition to trigger the process. Members of Parliament will have to be paragons of virtue and constantly on their best behaviour. Those of us who know the character of the House of Commons well may think that pressures in that direction are not likely to be very positively productive.

The amendments would mean that suspension by the Standards Committee was irrelevant—that would be struck out as a trigger. Even if the amendment would not mark the formal abandonment of attempts by the House of Commons to regulate itself—I acknowledge that the rather substantial volume that the Committee on Standards has released today indicates that it has not given up on that process—it would certainly seriously undermine the capacity of the House of Commons to police itself.

The noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Lexden, made much in Committee of paragraph 13 of the report of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House. However, that report does not recommend removing the jurisdiction of the Standards Committee. What it does is to point to an inconsistency in the Bill, between its desire to increase the direct accountability of Members of Parliament to electors and its desire to retain a significant role for the Committee on Standards. There is a tension and a contradiction there, but for those of us who believe that it is grievously misguided to introduce this recall procedure, that tension or contradiction is something of a mitigating factor. I certainly do not think that the noble Lords can pray in aid the Constitution Committee as endorsing what they are seeking to do. They have decided that it stated a very important problem and that it is a problem that they want to solve.

Amendment 6, in the name of my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, takes us, as he has explained, only a small part of the distance that he wishes to travel. While I deeply respect his knowledge of the ways of the Standards Committee, on which he served for many years, I profoundly disagree with him. The noble Lord, Lord Norton, has reminded us that the stated purpose of the legislation is to restore the reputation of MPs and Parliament. The way for Parliament to restore its reputation is to demonstrate to the public that it has found better ways to handle, discipline and organise itself.

I am against what has already begun to happen. I am against the introduction of lay members. There is everything to be said for the availability of high-quality advice. I am much in favour of the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards but, as a famous parliamentarian once said, expertise should be on tap, not on top. It is for the House of Commons itself to find more convincing ways to regulate itself and demonstrate to the public that it is doing so.

Some people may ask what all this has to do with us in the House of Lords. I simply reply that we are a House of Parliament. We have a particularly close interest in the good functioning of Parliament, as do all the people of this country. I think that it is legitimate for us to offer advice. I agree that the House of Commons will surely wish to consider this important report from the Committee on Standards. That may mean some delay before we reach Third Reading, if matters are to be properly and decently conducted. There is no doubt that we are entitled to take a view on these matters. However, I disagree with noble Lords who have proposed these various amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with this amendment, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has come up with an ingenious way of bringing it forward. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, indicated, it raises an important issue of principle, which is the freedom of choice of the electors. This is something to which I keep referring and it is why I opposed attempts to ban dual mandate. My view is that if electors wish to put somebody into assemblies, it is entirely a matter for the electors. It might be impractical, but that is not for us to say. It is for us to allow electors to do that. So I agree with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, made. It may be that the court says, “You have committed an offence”, but if the electors feel it is important that that person should be returned to represent them, then it is entirely a matter for them.

We keep bringing forward rules that restrict the freedom of electors. We should be looking at it the other way, trying to open up our process as much as possible and leaving it up to electors. If they want somebody to represent them, that is a matter for them. Leave it to the electors. Do not impose restrictions on them. For that reason, I have considerable sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, is trying to achieve. Certainly, I am all in favour of reviewing that provision and perhaps even widening it, for the reasons I have given, to look more broadly at how we can protect electors in making the choice that they wish to make, having whom they wish to elect and not being restricted in that.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, as my noble friends have spelt out, the Bill raises the interesting question not just of the interplay between this process and that of the election court but also of what I think is the Government's slap-dash drafting of the Bill, with their cut-and-paste from other legislation, without actually thinking through the best way of dealing with allegations of wrongdoing. As I have said, and as the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner of Kimble, has echoed, we do not want ever to see this Bill used. We hope that MPs will never find themselves in the position of triggering a recall petition. However, if it happens, we need to be sure that the most appropriate mechanisms and penalties are available to suit the particular misconduct. We may have it in this Bill, but we may not; it may not be right. Indeed, on the reverse side, it might be much better for other misconduct to trigger a recall petition rather than straight expulsion, as my noble friend Lord Dubs suggested. The proposal of a report to consider this in the round and come forward with proposals on that basis seems eminently sensible. I hope that the Government will support this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I, too, very much welcome this amendment. It is a step in the right direction. I have just one question for my noble friend. Why was the consultation to which he referred not undertaken before the Bill was introduced?

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I am going to be a little more generous than the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and thank the Minister for listening to the debate on the amendment that we moved in Committee. He will not be surprised that we are delighted with this. Not only is it the right answer in itself, but I also think that it will reduce the demand for postal votes. That will save the resources of the petition officer—their time, their staff and their money—because there will be less need for people to apply for postal votes. So we are very happy to support this government amendment.

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[Lord Tyler]

I was enormously impressed with the noble Lord’s very dramatic introduction of his amendment. Perhaps he has been over-Mantelled recently and has been watching too much “Wolf Hall”. However, in these circumstances, he has a perfectly valid point.

My questions follow on from the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hughes. Who advised Ministers that it should be eight weeks? Most significantly, there is the very important cross-reference with the number of signing places, which my noble friend Lord Norton and I referred to in Committee. If there are only two signing places, perhaps you do need longer; but if there are 10, you should obviously review that situation. Has whoever gave advice to Ministers on the number of weeks, on the original basis of a maximum of four signing places, been asked to review that advice in the light of the Government’s now much more flexible attitude? That is something we need to be told now, otherwise it seems to me that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, has huge merit, at least in making the Government think again about the very new circumstances that their own flexibility has now created.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I, too, support this amendment for the reasons we discussed in Committee. I argued then that the number of signing places should be expanded and the period of time in which you can sign reduced. The Government have got half way there, so I hope that they will now go the rest of the way as well, for the reasons that have been well advanced.

Like other noble Lords, I cannot understand the rationale for eight weeks. As the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said, it is much longer than an election campaign. In the case of one election, the Prime Minister announced it and it took place four weeks to the day after that. However, here we are saying that twice as long should be available for people to reflect on whether they should sign a petition—eight weeks. Why on earth should anyone take eight weeks to think about whether they should sign a petition or not? The news about the Member being eligible will be out quickly. It will be in the news and, as has been touched on, it will then cease to be newsworthy after a matter of days, if that. Why are we going to linger for weeks with people sat at polling stations twiddling their thumbs waiting for people to turn up and sign? I can see no argument for that length of time. It is not even as if we are still in the period where it took days for news to reach people and they then had to rely on some slow means of transport to get somewhere to actually sign something. Even if we were in that period, they could do it in less than eight weeks. Why nowadays, with instant communication and the ability to get to one of potentially 10 places to sign fairly quickly, do we need as long as eight weeks? It may be an arbitrary figure, but why eight rather than, say, six?

The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said that he is flexible and that it could be four or five weeks. I thought he was, if anything, generous in saying three weeks. Why on earth would you need three weeks to reflect? Are you going to call the family together to hold great deliberations about whether you should sign it or not? Once you know about it, you think about it and then you decide whether you are going to make the effort to go and sign the petition—you go and sign and that is it. That could be quite easily achieved within a period of three weeks and, to be honest, one could achieve it with a much shorter period.

As I said, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is being quite generous in putting down that figure. Had he not put down his amendment, I would have put one down to reduce the period and would probably have chosen an even shorter period. The argument for his amendment is eminently rational. It does not raise any serious issue of principle in terms of recall per se, so I see no reason why the Government, having moved on the number of places where signing can take place, could not be moved just as easily on this. It makes perfect sense. There is also the practical point that was touched on about people having to staff the places at which signing can take place. There is a cost to the public purse, and we should not lose sight of that.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport has made a good case for considering whether and why eight weeks is somehow the perfect period for the petition to run. We remain unclear on the question that my noble friend Lord Hughes raised as to why the Government chose this period—a question to which they never gave a clear answer in Committee. As I said before, two weeks, as it was then, did seem too short a period if it was to include the run-up to the signing period—in other words, the time to get the signing issues out and for everyone to get to know about them as well as the signing period itself.

The Electoral Commission thinks eight weeks is, in its words, a relatively “long signing period”. Certainly, in democratic terms, two months is a long period for an MP to be effectively out of the Commons and fighting to retain his or her seat. However, the period does have to be sufficient for people to know about it, to hear the debate and to come to a view, and three weeks probably is too short if it is to cover the whole of the public awareness period—I do not like the word campaign—as well as the actual signing period. Amendment 12, as it stands, might not be the right one, but it will be very interesting to hear whether the Government can give us any reason why they chose eight weeks and, even more interestingly, whether they are willing to consider some movement on this.

Recall of MPs Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 19th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Soley (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment would create a sunset clause; that is, it would bring the Bill to an end five years after the date when it became law. I came to the conclusion quite a few years ago that sunset clauses were useful in a couple of situations. That was originally drawn to my attention in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, in which we had a sunset clause because the Government accepted that the powers in it were very serious and we needed to consider the idea of letting the Bill lapse if it did not need to be renewed. In fact those powers had to be renewed, and we did that. The other case in which it is useful, which is much more relevant to this one, is where the outcome in the Bill as regards becoming a law and its effect is very uncertain, and it contains constitutional implications. That is the case for reviewing it at the end of a certain period. The Minister may want to say that the Government do not like the idea of a sunset clause—I know some of the arguments against sunset clauses—but if they would like to consider just reviewing it at that stage, that might be another option.

I have two fears about the Bill. I will start with the simple one that does not keep me awake at night much: that it would be largely ineffective and might not even reach the statute book intact. There are so many uncertainties in the Bill, many of which we have heard about this evening, that it is quite hard to see how it would be in good enough shape to become a complete law before the general election. It will not surprise me if it does not quite achieve that. You could say, “Well, that could be the end of the matter”. The second and much more worrying fear, which causes me concern and which has come up a number of times on both days of Committee, is that there are possibly quite serious implications here. Indeed, the Constitution Committee picked out one of them, which we have referred to on a number of occasions. If the offence that a Member of Parliament commits is a political one, the committee indicates that the outcome of that is a very serious matter.

The noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, who has gone now, used the example of Zac Goldsmith and Heathrow Airport, of which I have some knowledge. I have no doubt that in due course the Conservative Party will change its position on the third runway and conclude that it was its idea to expand the airport all along and that I had nothing to do with it despite the last 20 years of campaigning. However, the important point about Zac Goldsmith is that, to his credit, he has indicated that he will resign from the Tory party if it changes its position. Let us assume that the party changes its position—which I think it will, whether it is in government or not—and Zac Goldsmith resigns from it. That would not trigger an election. However, he feels very strongly about this issue, and if he feels so strongly that he does some form of demonstration in the Chamber of the House of Commons and gets himself excluded from the House for more than 10 days, we will enter into this process. You have to ask, “Do you really want to create that sort of condition?”. The last few debates have been about how important it is to debate the issue of the MP’s wrongdoing. In this case, I suggest that if Zac Goldsmith behaved so badly—I am not saying that he would—that would be the effect, but the election would be all about the third runway at Heathrow, and all the campaigners on both sides would pour in on it. There are many examples of that; my noble friend Lord Hughes gave some, and I gave others. There is a danger of politicising elections.

The other thing that troubles me about this, and the other reason why some form of review or sunset clause is necessary, is because there are umpteen opportunities in the Bill for pulling in the judiciary. The last few amendments we have discussed are all replete with opportunities for legal challenges, which would go either to an electoral court or—which would be less likely, but is conceivable—to a conventional court. All that seems to be opening up an area where we pull the judiciary more and more into the political process, which I am very strongly against. The case of Phil Woolas that I quoted at Second Reading is a dramatic example of why we should not get the judiciary muddled up with political process, and of how right the 18th-century political philosopher was—his name escapes me—who said that the electorate are sovereign in the British political system. The electorate must decide. That is very real and we should stick to it, so keeping the judiciary out of politics is a good idea.

All that suggests to me that the case for having some review system at the end of the Bill would be useful. We need to remember that the sunset clause is an advantage. If the Bill is not used at all, which is quite possible, it will just die. It will come off the statute book and we will not have to bother about it again. On the other hand, if it requires reform, we can reform it at that stage. That was done with the prevention of terrorism Acts. The alternative is that it works fine and we can renew it. That is not a bad safety valve to have in a Bill of this nature, which has constitutional implications and, as I have indicated, certain serious provisions.

I looked through the Constitution Committee’s report and it contains a number of important issues. I will not repeat them all now because we dealt with some of them earlier. It is not just a matter of politicisation. As has come up recently, if the Electoral Commission is not to be heavily involved in this—and clearly it is not, from what has been said in Committee this evening—then there are all sorts of opportunities for challenges for the proper running of a recall election. What will happen then? Are we going to have to have another recall election, just as we would if an MP or someone else challenged the validity of a conventional election for that MP? There is an opportunity here for all sorts of applications to court, particularly on the expenses issue. Incidentally, Edmund Burke was the philosopher that I was trying to remember at this late hour.

We really need some way of ensuring that we can review this Bill. My best guess is that it might not be used much if at all, in which case it could die after five years. If it is used, frankly there could be very real dangers in it. It is very important, as the Constitution Committee pointed out, that there are ways of removing MPs. The expenses scandal was a classic example of that: several MPs were removed. Indeed, one of the saddest things about the Bill is that every MP in the House of Commons now has been re-elected by the electorate, who are sovereign in our system. None of them has done anything wrong. However, this Bill is about flagellation. As I think I said before, flagellation is a bad idea at the best of times but do-it-yourself flagellation when you are not even guilty of anything is ridiculous. No MP need be sitting at the moment thinking, “I have done something wrong”.

As the Constitution Committee points out, if the Bill is designed just to reassure the electorate, it is unlikely to have any effect. The most we can hope for is some sort of publicity of this sort of event and the hope that people notice it. The chances of people taking much notice of what is happening on this right now are very limited. If an MP did something, they would almost certainly be disciplined by the procedures that operated effectively even in the last Parliament. As I say, at best this Bill is unlikely to be used and therefore should die after a five-year period; at worst, we could have situations where very heavily political cases had to be fought on that basis. That is bad news for democracy and I ask the Government to look at a way of reviewing the effectiveness of this Bill after a five-year period and then to let it lie, to amend it and bring it back, to get rid of it or, if I am wrong and it works, to just accept that it works.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Soley, made a persuasive case. However, I am particularly drawn to the alternative that he identified, which is to provide for a review of the Act after, say, five years. The precedent already exists in the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. We have already written into that Act that it will be subject to review.

The Minister may say that this Act will in any case be subject to post-legislative review by the relevant department three to five years after enactment, but I think there may be a case with such a significant constitutional measure for the review to be post-legislative scrutiny and for it to be included in the measure. I commend that review proposal as an alternative to what the noble Lord is putting forward. It is something to which we may wish to return on Report.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, not for the first time I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth. However, I want to make one more substantial point about the Bill and say why I think that some form of review is necessary, whether it is a sunset clause or a review of the kind that my noble friend has suggested.

I have followed the course of these proposals from the very early days of the draft Bill in the other place. I have attended debates there and have watched and listened and have been involved in a number of discussions with Members of both Houses. We should recognise that a feature of this Bill which has been very evident from our discussions in your Lordships’ House is that Members of the other place were for understandable reasons very inhibited when they examined the details of the Bill. They felt that it was self-serving to some extent and they were embarrassed at looking at it in great detail and finding fault with it because they felt that, in so doing, they were somehow putting themselves in an invidious position. Indeed, some were also influenced by pressures from outside not to say anything, not to question, not to challenge and not to query. For that reason, the Bill, as it now stands, will satisfy no one.

In those circumstances, we should bear in mind very carefully what was said by noble Lords on all sides of your Lordships’ House—that they hope that the Bill will never be used. It was said most recently by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. He said that he hoped it would never be used or used very infrequently. In those circumstances, it would be irresponsible of Parliament not to set out some sort of review procedure to determine the timescale for looking at the Bill again. The proof of the pudding will be in its eating. If nobody eats it, is satisfied with it or finds it digestible in any form whatever, Parliament has a responsibility to go back and look at it again.

We have all discussed in various fora the advantages of post-legislative scrutiny, and I know that my noble friend is a protagonist for that. Of course, we should do that more often but in this particular case it is important that Ministers think very carefully between now and Report about what mechanism they would prefer for doing that. I do not mind which it is, whether it is a review or a sunset clause. This is an unusual Bill in the way it has been treated in the other place and the considerable concerns and anxieties that have been expressed throughout the House. I make no bones about it: I think it is still capable of being improved. Some think that it is beyond improvement. I have put forward some proposals and am still hopeful that Ministers will meet me and other colleagues from all sides of the House to look at the concerns and criticisms of the Constitution Committee to see whether we can meet them in a more effective way. However, as things stand, I believe that it would be simply irresponsible for Parliament to leave this Bill in its current state without including some mechanism for proper review in a prescribed way and at a prescribed time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My noble friend made the point that the Government wish to avoid a situation that would require the introduction of primary legislation should a sunset clause be effective. The advantage of putting a review into the Bill would be that it would avoid that, so that this would be a preferable way of dealing with the situation.

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, I shall reflect on that.

Recall of MPs Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 19th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

These are the merits of the Bill. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made very good points in relation to his former constituency. I have made the same points in relation to mine and they apply a fortiori—ad absurdum, if you like—to Orkney and Shetland, and to the Western Isles. I was merely making that point. I do not need to repeat the comments about what kind of buildings there should be in each of these areas or what provision there should be, for example, for blind and disabled people. There is a whole range of unanswered questions and, with great expectation, we look forward to the answers from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment, which should be read in conjunction with Amendment 39 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. It strikes me that the problem is that there are too few signing places but they are open for too long a time. If the period is shortened, that would presumably free up resources that might help to cover the cost of having more places open within a short period. If the two were put together, it could be cost-neutral but very beneficial to all those who want to take part in the process.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, managed to entertain us for more than an hour during the first day in Committee. I fear that he may be hoping to do the same on the second.

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[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I can intervene in what seems at the moment like a Second Reading debate. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, mentioned my noble friend Lord Tyler. I point out that although the electorate recalled him, I am pleased to say that they changed their mind a few years later and sent him back, and he served a number of Parliaments before he decided to stand down from the House. That is just for clarification.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords—

[Lord Grocott]

Perhaps I need to further clarify that exactly the same procedure happened in my own case.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I will get in eventually. I outlined my alternative to the Bill on Second Reading. Addressing the amendments before us, I reiterate my support for Amendment 39 in particular. I cannot see the logic of eight weeks because I cannot see who benefits from that. Obviously, you can argue that it is unfair on the Member over whom this sword of Damocles would hang for that length of time, but I cannot see any benefit to electors. If there is that demand to recall a Member, they will want the by-election as quickly as possible, and this will just delay matters. If they feel that strongly, they would not want that length of time in which to do it. It would make far more sense to provide a much shorter period but with greater opportunities for those who want to go and sign. Therefore there should be a correlation: the more you narrow the period, the more opportunities you provide for those who want to go and sign, and it benefits everybody involved to do it as quickly as possible.

[Baroness Corston]

My Lords, I support Amendment 39. I will follow on from the comment made by my noble friend Lord Grocott against the eight-week signing period. In every election I fought I was preached against from pulpits on the issue of abortion. A general election takes about three or four weeks. I can imagine what would happen to a Member of Parliament in a constituency when an issue such as that moulders on for eight weeks, and the degree to which that single issue could influence the outcome of an election. However, to return more specifically to the issues raised by my noble friend Lord Foulkes on the necessity for returning officers to become petition officers and oversee the recall mechanism, can the Minister tell us in his response what discussions the Government have had with the Local Government Association about the way in which it sees this legislation working—and, if there have been such discussions, what was its response?

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[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I argued at Second Reading that this Bill would not achieve its purpose, which is to restore trust in politics. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place made exactly the same point. In fact, in some respects, the Bill could be quite dangerous. By focusing on sanctions to deploy in response to bad behaviour, it detracts from the need to encourage strong and positive leadership.

I developed the point at Second Reading that if it is a true recall, electors would be in the driving seat. By that, however, I meant electors—not just a small proportion of electors. I take the diametrically opposed view to that of my noble friend Lord Finkelstein. I would argue for low triggers but a high percentage of electors who would have to trigger a recall. I take the point that it should not be a small number of electors, who could be the opponents of the Member, just being able to sign up and trigger recall.

If someone is elected in a general election and gets 40% or 50% of the vote, I do not see why a further election should then be triggered by 10%, who, as my noble friend Lord Hamilton was arguing, could be comprised of supporters of the opposing parties. There is a compelling case for a very high threshold. To some extent, Amendment 41 might be rather generous in being as low as it is. I can see a stronger case for a much higher percentage. If electors in a constituency really want to remove a Member, I think there should be a much higher threshold. I would move in that direction. It would not achieve what I was arguing at Second Reading in terms of a proper recall vote, but at least it would make a bad Bill less bad.

I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Hamilton because there is a lack of equity in the arrangements embodied in the Bill. Although I do not think that allowing a counterpetition would necessarily restore trust in politics, it would probably increase interest in politics. It would allow voters who have a view one way or the other to get engaged. If we got that far, that would be the preferable way to go. But, as I say, what we are debating is amendments designed to render what is a fairly bad Bill somewhat less bad.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, this is a heroic attempt to create, as my noble friend said, a level playing field. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, would acknowledge that Amendment 51 could be tidied up but the objective or principle behind the amendment of trying to make some provision for fairness is an important one in a very extended procedure. We know about the time between the Speaker and the petition officer and then the eight weeks that is in the Bill which will all have been preceded by lengthy considerations in perhaps a court or in the committee of the House of Commons, during which time the only case that will be heard is the specific case against the Member of Parliament. During the eight weeks, if the Bill stays as it is at present, the drama, at least at constituency level, will be all about how many have signed so far, “Have enough signed so far? Roll up! Sign up! We’re nearly there”. What is the defence against that? There is no defence.

The principle behind Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, is an impeccable principle. I hope that the Minister, even if he does not like the particular wording of the amendment, will at least acknowledge the importance of the principle.

Recall of MPs Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, a provision for a recall of elected representatives is used by a number of nations but it is an exceptional procedure. It is exceptional in that the nations employing it are in a minority and within those nations the use of the procedure is rare.

The Bill seeks to put the United Kingdom in that exceptional category. It does not replicate recall as understood in some systems; that is, by removing a person from office through a local referendum, asking should the person be recalled or not, and followed, in the event of a yes vote, by a new election. We have no experience of recall, although we do have experience of a mechanism for triggering by-elections: when MPs were appointed Ministers, they were subject to re-election in a by-election. That remained the case until 1926.

There is clearly a debate to be had as to whether such an exceptional procedure as recall should be introduced in the United Kingdom. That debate, though, has already been had in the other place. I do not believe we should be challenging the ends of the measure, as decided already by the Commons. Our task is to focus on the means. Given that it is clearly a measure of constitutional significance, it merits enhanced scrutiny.

My starting point, therefore, is the question: what is the Bill designed to achieve? Once we know that, we can see whether the provisions are adequate to the task. As we have heard, the Bill is essentially the product of the expenses scandal of 2009. In the wake of that, the three main parties brought forward proposals for recall. The intention is to restore trust in politics through allowing electors to remove an MP other than at a general election when the Member falls below expected standards. According to the Deputy Prime Minister in the other place:

“It strikes a fair balance between holding to account those who do not maintain certain standards of conduct, while giving MPs the freedom to do their job and make difficult decisions where necessary”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/9/14; col. 41WS.]

My concern is more with the first part of that balance than the second. If one wanted to ring-fence the independence of MPs, one would not have the measure at all. Given that the other place has agreed the Bill, the focus must be on having some safeguards. There is a need to ensure that the provisions do not work against Members who express independent views, though I am not sure that electors do have a desire to move against MPs who are independent in approach—rather the reverse. MPs who challenge their own party and are working hard in the constituency generally have no reason to worry. When Enoch Powell regularly voted against his own party in the 1970-74 Parliament—which he did 115 times—consideration was given to withdrawing the whip. It was decided not to pursue that because the Whips recognised that he was too well entrenched in his constituency.

In any event, provision for a form of advance recall already exists through local parties. They can deselect sitting Members. They are not removed immediately, but in effect are sacked, the sacking taking effect at the next election. That is likely to continue to be a more potent constraint on the actions of MPs than the provisions of the Bill.

My principal concern, therefore, is whether the Bill will do much to restore trust in politics. As it stands, I am not sure that it will. It is designed to hold to account those who, in the words of the Deputy Prime Minister,

“do not maintain certain standards of conduct”.

The problem, as we have already heard, is that these standards are determined by Parliament and not by electors. By-elections can be triggered only if an MP breaks the law and is sentenced to a custodial sentence, is convicted under Section 10 of the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 or is suspended for at least 10 sitting days by the House of Commons. In other words, it is a matter either for the courts or for the House of Commons as to whether a recall petition can be started, and judges and MPs will be aware of the potential consequences in passing sentence or voting for suspension. Electors can engage in a recall petition only when given the green light by a body external to the constituency.

The provisions leave out electors and they omit conditions that electors may well believe fall below their expected standards. One is where an MP switches party without triggering a by-election. Douglas Carswell made the point in the Commons that:

“I feel so strongly about recall that I recalled myself”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/10/14; col. 804.]

The conduct of Messrs Carswell and Reckless in triggering by-elections may have set a precedent, but what if future defectors ignore it? I am aware of the argument that they should not have to submit themselves for re-election. It is a powerful argument, but it has to be seen now in the context of the Bill and what it seeks to achieve. Will not electors in a constituency who have elected a Member on one political programme have cause to feel aggrieved if that Member then switches to another without them having a say in the matter? That Member will have fallen below the standards they expect. That grievance will be all the greater now given the combination of the precedent set and the provisions of the Bill.

The other condition would be where a Member neglected a constituency, failing to perform constituency duties but not in a way that fell foul of the Code of Conduct and triggered action by the House resulting in suspension. The neglect may be such as to result in deselection, but what if electors wish to take action to ensure that the neglect does not persist for the rest of the Parliament? My argument is that the Bill as drafted is in danger of raising expectations that cannot be met. Electors are led to believe that they can recall errant MPs, but they have no direct say in whether a recall petition can be triggered, and the triggering provisions in the Bill exclude conditions that to electors may constitute especially egregious failures to meet the standards they expect of their Member of Parliament.

What can be done to address these problems? The obvious answer is to provide for electors to have the capacity to trigger a recall petition. This need not be in place of the existing three triggers in the Bill, but rather in addition to them. In the Commons, Zac Goldsmith moved an amendment to provide that if 5% of voters in a constituency signed a “notice of intent to recall”, and 20% then signed a recall petition, a recall ballot would take place. That was rejected, and there may be little merit in pursuing it in that precise form. However, it may point us in a direction that is worth pursuing.

There is a case for pursuing a true recall provision, as utilised elsewhere. This would also have the advantage of building in a powerful protective element against misuse by political opponents or a minority of aggrieved constituents. One could have a recall petition which, if signed by 15% or 20% of registered electors, would trigger a true recall election—that is, a clear binary election in which voters say yes or no to the Member remaining in office. If a majority in the ballot vote against them, the Member is out. There is then a by-election to elect a successor.

I appreciate that such a mechanism would incur costs—elections are not cheap—but the likelihood of its frequent use is remote. The cost would be offset by the achievement of direct involvement by electors, and by the need to achieve a significant number of signatures for a recall petition and a majority in the recall election. I see no problem with setting a fairly high bar for the percentage of signatures necessary for a recall petition. For a recall election to be held, there needs to be both breadth and depth of feeling among electors that an MP has transgressed standards.

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 provides for five-year fixed—or, rather, semi-fixed—terms. As we have heard, that is relevant in the context of this Bill. As a result of that Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has said, electors are likely to have the opportunity to elect their MPs at less frequent intervals than was previously the case. That has the potential to undermine, rather than enhance, trust in politics—and this Bill will do little or nothing to counter that effect. My view is that if we are to restore trust in politics, we need something more imaginative than this Bill. However, given that we have the Bill, we must do our best to ensure that it at least goes some way to achieving its intended purpose.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, before I come to the substance of what I want to say, I will comment briefly on what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, just said. I found myself agreeing with quite a lot of it, until he came to his idea of recall petitions. I cannot think of anything that would undermine democracy more than to have an open door for any group of people in a constituency, particularly those who are well financed, to have a go at an MP. How can an MP vote according to their conscience, how can an MP do their job, if they are always watching their back to see whether there is a group of people trying to undermine them? It would destabilise the position of MPs, and I do not think it would be a good idea.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My whole point is that such a provision would raise the bar that would have to be overcome before there could be a recall petition. It would actually protect the Member far more than if there were a lower threshold. The chances of its being used are extremely slim, to put it mildly—but the fact that it was there would be a protection for constituents, a majority of whom in a ballot would have to vote for a recall.

[Lord Dubs]

I am afraid that if it is simply a matter of collecting signatures, I am not sure whether that provides the protection that the noble Lord claims. All I know is that I would have been miserably unhappy in my time as an MP if I had had always to watch my back—not on issues of principle, not where there were clear arguments at stake, but because some group of people who did not agree with my views on abortion, or whatever, might seek to undermine me. And they would have done—of course they would have done. I just do not think that representative democracy can work on that basis. I have to differ from the noble Lord; I think that if he talked to most people who have been elected to the House of Commons, they would agree with me and not with him.

I watch “Question Time” quite often, and I watched it last Thursday night. One of the things that happened also happens at other times on that programme. Whenever an adverse comment about the integrity of MPs is made, either by somebody on the platform or by somebody in the audience, there are enormous cheers from the audience. I find it rather depressing and sad that so many of our fellow countrymen and countrywomen—or at least, those who get selected as a “Question Time” audience—think that jeering and shouting abuse at the people who are elected is somehow helpful to democracy. I think that we have gone far too far in denigrating those whom we elect; I shall say more about that in a minute.

I support the principle of recall, as does everybody else who has spoken—but we must be careful that, in putting this Bill forward, we do not seem to overpromise to the voters about what will happen. I suspect that some of them will believe what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, has just said—that that is what they are in for. We must be careful, because the Bill is, in some ways, rather limited.

Comments have been made about whether, when an MP switches parties, there should be a by-election. To the best of my knowledge of this—I have not done a survey—MPs who switch parties have a by-election only if they think they are going to win. If they do not think that they are going to win, they jolly well hang on in there until the next general election. Looking back at this over the years, it seems to be the case. I am not arguing that this is not a matter of integrity, and that if an MP switches party they should not call a by-election. It may be a good thing—but I am talking about what happens in practice.

All parties, in their last election manifestos, made some reference to the desirability of recall. I am conscious that when the House of Commons passes a measure that affects that House rather than what we do here, we must be very careful before we take issue with what its Members have decided to do—because it is very much their responsibility. Nevertheless, I think we are right to be critical: there is no point in having a second Chamber unless we can be critical of anything that the other House does.

I particularly want to comment favourably on the speech made by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours. He put his finger on something absolutely crucial. He speaks with a great deal of experience, and he has driven a coach and horses through that provision in the Bill—because it is obvious that behaviour on the Standards Committee will be precisely as he said it would be. We must look hard at that provision.

Of course it is right—this is where I differ from the suggestion of open recall—that elected politicians should not be subject, between elections, to recall for their views, even if some of their views might not be too popular among their constituents. The time to deal with that is at the following general election. Otherwise we would belittle the principle that matters of conscience are important, and belittle the ability of Members of Parliament to exercise their conscience without being under pressure from one moment to the next.

I looked up what the excellent Library Note says about other recall measures in different countries. In the United States they seem to have a variety of models of recall. Some of them are open, as the noble Lord, Lord Norton, suggested; some are more limited. I am not sure that there is anything very useful we can learn from them. In Switzerland, although there is no right of recall for federal elections, six of the 26 cantons do have the right of recall—but that right applies to the whole of the canton, not just to individual elected politicians. I am not suggesting that we should do that, although I suspect that if we had that sort of right of recall, the coalition would have been thrown out several years ago—I just mention that in passing.

One matter that bothers me is not included in the Bill. That is the question of the election court. I think it was in 2010 that Phil Woolas, a Labour MP, appeared before the election court, lost his seat and was not allowed to stand again in the following by-election. Whatever he did, some other potential wrongdoings by Members of Parliament may appear more significant. I am not saying that he did nothing wrong, but if we are to have a system of recall as envisaged in the Bill, we should include what the election court does, because I see no reason why Phil Woolas should not have been allowed to stand in the following by-election, his voters having heard what the election court said. The penalty on him was out of all proportion to what he did.

Perhaps I may say a little about respect for elected politicians, which I mentioned at the beginning. We now have a culture in which it is standard to abuse elected politicians. They would do it to us if we were elected. That does not mean that I do not support elections here, but that is a different argument. The way in which MPs are denigrated, abused and vilified, as my noble friend Lady Corston described, devalues democracy. One cannot run a democracy effectively unless there is some respect for the people who are elected through that system. We are weakening our democracy by allowing that to continue, and it is important that we speak up.

It may be that the Bill is intended to be a small step along that path—if so, fine, although we have reservations about the detail. It is time that we as a country stood up and said, “We elect these people. They face the electorate every few years. They can be thrown out, but in the mean time, we should not denigrate and abuse them and imply that they have the basest of motives”. From my knowledge of MPs—I have known quite a few over the years—whatever party they are from, they are all there to perform an act of public service. They are not doing it for the money—or if they are, they are jolly mistaken if they think that that is the way to get money—but for principles. I may not agree with some of their principles—that is why we have a party political system—but they are there because they want to serve their fellow citizens, and it is time that we all stood up and said that.

Electoral Registration

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Wednesday 26th November 2014 Grand Committee

Asked by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to increase the electoral registration of British citizens living abroad.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to raise this important but largely neglected subject. My starting point is that a high voter turnout is the sign of a healthy democracy. One cannot achieve a high turnout unless those eligible to register as voters actually do register. Many nations recognise and treat their citizens overseas as a major asset and actively solicit their engagement. In contrast, UK citizens living abroad are an untapped asset. Indeed, they are a largely ignored asset.

There are believed to be something in the region of 5.5 million Britons living abroad, and of those about 3 million are estimated to be eligible to be on the electoral register; that is, aged 18 and over and having lived abroad for no more than 15 years. It is very much an estimate as there are no official statistics, but the number is clearly substantial. How many are actually registered? The figure is believed to be between 20,000 and 30,000, well under 1% of the total estimated to be eligible. Even if the estimate of those eligible to register is substantially out—even if it is 2 million rather than 3 million—it is clear that an appallingly low percentage is registered to vote. Although a great deal of concern is expressed about low registration rates in the UK, this concern does not appear to extend to UK nationals living abroad. They are in many respects neglected voters, or rather, non-voters.

This neglect may stem from various myths that exist about British nationals living abroad. Contrary to how they are sometimes portrayed, most of those eligible to register are working abroad. Nor are Britons living abroad a drain on United Kingdom resources, but a major resource for the UK. Working abroad for UK firms means that many contribute significantly to the UK economy. There is clearly a case to encourage British expatriates to participate in the electoral process. It will strengthen their ties with the country and they will bring a valuable international perspective to our elections. Their active interest will be passed on to the next generation and beyond, and help to retain the latter’s ties with Britain. Furthermore, Britons living abroad are a major source of soft power for the UK. Encouraging their active participation can be a means of getting them to influence attitudes towards the UK in their country of settlement.

The most compelling case for action, though, is one of principle. British citizens who live abroad, and have done so for less than 15 years, are entitled under UK law to vote. They should therefore be encouraged in the same way as are citizens resident in the UK to ensure that they are registered and exercise their right to vote. As I said in opening, a high turnout rate is the sign of a healthy democracy. UK citizens living abroad should be seen as intrinsic to ensuring such a democracy.

Recognising the nature of the problem, a cross-party group of parliamentarians was formed last year to address the issue, and I had the honour of chairing the group. The other members were my noble friends Lord Lexden and Lord Tyler, who are present today, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, and the noble Lord, Lord Parekh. The noble Lord, Lord Parekh, is speaking at a conference today and cannot be with us. He had hoped to be here to explain the efforts being made by the Indian Government to engage with the Indian diaspora. We were joined by Geoffrey Clifton-Brown from the Commons. Our report, entitled Making Votes Count, was published in March of this year. Our task was to identify the obstacles to achieving a high registration rate and what could be done to tackle them.

We identified seven problems. First, there is the difficulty of identifying UK nationals living abroad who are eligible to vote. Their whereabouts are often not known. Data on citizens living abroad are held by public bodies, but the data are limited or not necessarily current, and the bodies concerned are usually precluded from releasing personal data to other bodies. Secondly, there is poor communication. Limited efforts have been made to reach citizens living abroad. One study of British nationals living in New Zealand found that those who were registered had discovered their right to register only through word-of-mouth rather than by receiving any official communication.

Thirdly, there are practical difficulties in registering and voting. British citizens resident overseas are to a much greater extent responsible for their own registration than citizens living in the UK. The current process of issuing and returning ballot papers also creates problems. That was highlighted by a number of UK expatriates in evidence to us. The extension of the election timetable will go some way to reducing this problem, as will the move to online application in respect of registration, but the problem of ensuring that those eligible to vote actually register to do so remains.

Fourthly, there are separate responsibilities within Government. It was clear from our inquiry that there is an absence of joined-up government. Responsibility for overseas voters is spread among a number of bodies.

Fifthly, there are different approaches taken by embassies and consulates. The willingness to encourage registration appears to vary considerably.

Sixthly, there is an absence of incentives. The absence of joined-up government means that there is no one body that sees it as its responsibility to give a lead or has an obvious reason to do so. The only body with a clear remit is the Electoral Commission, but its role is to encourage. There is no clear incentive within departments to devote money and resources to enhancing voter registration by UK citizens living abroad.

Lastly, at the root of the problem, from which the foregoing stems, is an absence of political will to ensure that British citizens living abroad are taken seriously as citizens eligible to register and hence to vote in elections in the United Kingdom. They are, as we noted in the report, forgotten citizens for the purposes of implementing effectively UK electoral law.

Tackling the problem has at its starting point recognition of the merits of encouraging British nationals to exercise their statutory rights. Once the political will is there, many of the practical problems that we have adumbrated can be overcome or at least tackled. Identifying the problems forms the basis of the solutions. We recommend joined-up government, with responsibility for British nationals abroad and driving up voter registration, vested in one Minister; incentives for different bodies responsible for enhancing voter registration; data sharing, so that citizens living abroad can be identified; greater dissemination of information, not least through social media; exhortation—citizens living abroad should be seen to be valued and voting encouraged as a civic duty; and, finally, enabling ballot papers to be downloaded electronically.

It is clear that a great deal can be done to encourage British nationals living abroad to register and exercise their right to vote and we believe that there is an overwhelming case for it to be done. My noble friend the Minister is, I know, very much seized of the issue—he was among the witnesses to give evidence to the group—and I look forward to hearing from him about what the Government are doing to address what is a very serious issue.