House of Lords Appointments Commission

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 6th September 2021 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to place the House of Lords Appointments Commission on a statutory basis.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, this debate is limited to one hour. That is very tight and, in order to give time for the Minister to respond, all noble Lords apart from the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, need to stick strictly to no more than two minutes.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord True will note the number of Peers contributing to this short debate. Each, as has been mentioned, will have two minutes. My noble friend will have 10 minutes to say what he could probably say in 10 seconds: namely, that the Government have no plans to put the House of Lords Appointments Commission on to a statutory basis. They should have: for some of us, this is unfinished business.

I have the honour to be convener of the Campaign for an Effective Second Chamber. My noble friend Lord Cormack chairs the campaign. We formed it more than 20 years ago to make the case for strengthening the existing House in the valuable work that it does. The key changes that we sought were embodied in the House of Lords Bill introduced by Lord Steel of Aikwood. Some of what we included in that Bill we have managed to get enacted, primarily through the House of Lords Reform Act 2014. The House of Lords Bill included a clause establishing the House of Lords Appointments Commission—that is, putting it on to a statutory basis. I wish to explain why it should be done and how it can be done.

In an Ipsos MORI poll in 2007, respondents were asked which factors were important to determine the legitimacy of the House of Lords. The option attracting the most support was “Trust in the appointment process”—75% of respondents ranked it as “very important” and 19% as “important”. Trust in the appointment process ranked higher than “The House considering legislation carefully” and “Having many Members who are expert in their field”. I note that it considerably outstripped “Having some Members elected by the public”. How appointments are made is thus crucial to how the House is seen by the public. At present, the process falls short. At times it is mired in controversy, and there is little transparency in the selection of nominees. However worthy the individual nominees may be, their merits are lost in media criticism of the process and public perceptions of the type of person elevated to the peerage.

The existing Appointments Commission examines all nominations and puts forward nominations for Cross-Bench Peers, but it is limited in two significant respects. It can examine nominations only in terms of propriety, not suitability, and it is the creature of the Prime Minister. Having an Appointments Commission that is not only independent of the Prime Minister but is seen to be independent strengthens both the Prime Minister, confirming the merits of the persons nominated, and the legitimacy of the House.

Putting the Appointments Commission on to a statutory basis is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Powers will have to be vested in it and, I shall argue, can be without jeopardising the Prime Minister’s role as principal adviser to the sovereign in recommending individuals for peerages. How, then, can it be done? As noted in the Library briefing for this debate, I have introduced a Bill that has now had its First Reading. I have sought in it to ensure that the commission can have an impact through vetting nominations to ensure that they meet a high-quality threshold, through requiring the Prime Minister to await the advice of the commission before putting forward names to the Crown, and through ensuring transparency in the process by requiring the Prime Minister, and other party leaders as appropriate, to inform the commission of the process by which the names were selected to be put forward. As noble Lords will see, it also includes provision for the Prime Minister to have regard to the principles that I believe are widely supported by the House, not least in terms of size.

The case for putting the commission on to a statutory basis has been made by a number of bodies, including the Government, over the past two decades. It was made by the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, chaired by my noble friend Lord Wakeham. It was a proposal that was accepted by the Government but not acted on. I served on the Joint Committee on the draft House of Lords Reform Bill, which also endorsed the proposal. As I said, it was a key provision of the House of Lords Bill that was variously debated and widely supported in your Lordships’ House.

The proposal itself is modest relative to the report of the royal commission, which recommended transferring the power to nominate Peers from the Prime Minister to the Appointments Commission. My proposal would retain the existing position whereby the Prime Minister recommends names to the sovereign, although he would be required to wait until such time as he had received the advice of the commission. The Government, in 2001, proposed that the commission should have responsibility for managing the balance and size of the House. My Bill provides for the commission to offer advice on how to reduce the size of the House, but does not empower it to determine the size. This, therefore, is a modest proposal, and it may be prudent for the Government to accept it rather than wait until overtaken by more radical demands for change.

When questioned on the issue of reform of this House, my noble friend Lord True said that the Government did not support piecemeal reform. Well, as a Conservative, I do—and so, too, to judge by their election manifesto, do the Government. The 2019 manifesto stated that the Conservative Government had enacted legislation to enable Peers to retire and to remove those who committed a serious offence. That was not strictly accurate. What they had done was support, or at least acquiesce in, the passage of the Private Member’s Bill that I drafted, which was introduced in the Commons on behalf of the Campaign for an Effective Second Chamber by Dan Byles and taken through this House by Lord Steel. That was piecemeal reform, which I believe has proved its worth.

The same applies to the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. She is unable to be here for this debate, but she would very much like to have been, to support the case for putting the Appointments Commission on a statutory basis.

Even if my noble friend Lord True says that the Government have no plans to place the commission on a statutory basis, he could indicate a willingness on the part of the Government not to oppose such a move. Simply saying that there are no plans does not mean that the Government do not accept the merits of the case. My noble friend has not really engaged with the principle. He has the opportunity today to say whether he accepts the principle. The Government need not commit significant resources, including time, to getting a measure through. They can instead facilitate the passage of the Bill or another Private Member’s Bill with a similar aim. The important thing is to get it on the statute book.

In short, it can be done. My contention is that it should be done. It will not undermine the position of the Prime Minister but rather bolster it, certainly in the case of a confident Prime Minister, in making nominations, and it will enhance the legitimacy of this House.

Constitution Inquiry

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, within that question there are absolutes and particulars. Having had the honour to be elected by my fellow citizens many times in elections, my own view is that accountability to the people is fundamental, and I also believe that transparency and openness are extraordinarily important. In that respect, I agree with the noble Baroness.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

Given the disparate and major changes to the constitution that have taken place in recent decades, does my noble friend agree that were any body set up to examine the constitution, it should engage in a take-stock exercise, making sense of where we are now rather than embarking on proposals for further change? Furthermore, does he agree that we should look at the union within the context of the constitution as a whole?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that there is an element of taking stock as well as of seeking change. The glory of our constitution is that it is flexible and has evolved, and I am sure it will continue with that strength in the future.

Size of the House of Lords

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

Do the Government agree or not agree with the Motion passed by this House on 5 December 2016 that steps should be taken to reduce the size of the House?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the Government always respectfully note Motions passed by your Lordships’ House. However, I believe I have answered that in saying that the Government’s view is that this House needs refreshing.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 22nd April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, all these matters are currently under review. I declare myself guilty occasionally of sending and receiving WhatsApp messages, in common with millions of other people in this country. I wonder which is the way to the guillotine.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

My Lords, my question complements that of my noble friend Lord Grade. Given that the 2014 Act did not increase transparency and was focused not on lobbying but on lobbyists—the people, not the activity—will my noble friend commit to looking at ways to ensure that details of all representations made to government on Bills and ministerial policies are released at the same time that those Bills and policies are published?

[Lord True (Con)]

Again, my Lords, the noble Lord raises a specific point, as have a couple of other noble Lords who have spoken. I repeat that the Government have significantly increased transparency. There is post-legislative scrutiny of the Act and the Government will be going further to review and improve business appointment rules and increase transparency in procurement. We need to maintain high standards in public life—I agree with all noble Lords who have spoken.

Constitution, Democracy and Human Rights Commission

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 14th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, those concepts are obviously extremely important and are no doubt the subject of continuing discussion in and across all parties. As the right reverend Prelate will know, regional assemblies were proposed by a previous Government and rejected by the electorate.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

My Lords, given the sheer scale of the disparate constitutional reforms that have taken place in recent decades and that derive from no intellectually coherent approach to constitutional change, does my noble friend agree that we need a body that can stand back and make sense of where we are, that is grounded in an understanding of our constitution—qua constitution—and that does not rush in with knee-jerk reactions and ill-thought-through proposals for more change?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure about the proposition of a body. I think that, ultimately, authority to determine must reside in Parliament and in part in your Lordships’ House. I hope that we will have debates and discussion. I agree with my noble friend that a lot of change was ill thought through, but I assure noble Lords that the Government intend to proceed cautiously and with independent advice.

House of Lords: Number of Members

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

Does my noble friend accept that an upper limit on the size of the House would impose a valuable discipline upon the Government in selecting nominees to fill a vacancy, and, combined with the other recommendations of the Burns committee, ensure a House that was not only smaller but more balanced than the existing House?

[Lord True (Con)]

No, my Lords. The cardinal facts of this House—which is unique, and that is one of its splendours—are that it is unelected, its Members sit for life and it cannot be dissolved. In those circumstances, the question of a cap raises profound constitutional questions, which, as the previous Prime Minister said, deserve reflection.

Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th September 2020 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

13: Clause 5, page 4, line 31, leave out “650” and insert “800”

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Cormack, who is a signatory to the amendment, sends his apologies for not being able to be present today, but has asked me to stress his support for what I shall be arguing this afternoon.

My amendment to increase the number of parliamentary constituencies from 650 to 800 is drafted for one purpose, and that is to get the Minister, on behalf of the Government, to explain the arguments against having a legislative Chamber of 800 Members.

We have a second Chamber of roughly 800 Members. The Government have not taken any steps to reduce the number—quite the reverse. What change has been achieved has been through pressure from within this House, primarily in the form of Private Members’ legislation, such as the House of Lords Reform Act 2014, which enabled the retirement of Members and the removal of Peers who fail to attend for a Session. Without that measure, the House would be closer to 900 Members. The committee under the noble Lord, Lord Burns, has come up with recommendations to reduce the number to give effect to achieving a House that is no bigger than the House of Commons.

If there is to be a disparity in size, it makes more sense for the Commons to be larger than the Lords. The greater the number of MPs, the smaller the size of the constituencies. That arguably would be to the benefit of constituents. It would make possible even closer contact between Members and their constituents. It would facilitate more cohesive constituencies, avoiding some of the anomalies that were described in Tuesday’s proceedings on the Bill. It would potentially reduce the workload of individual Members, which is now becoming quite onerous.

This House has no constituencies. Members do not carry the substantial burdens shouldered by Members of the other place. This House fulfils the role of a reflective Chamber. As such, it merits being smaller than the elected Chamber, as is the norm in other bicameral legislatures.

There is a case not only for this House being smaller than the Commons—a relative point—but for reducing the size of both Houses. I have form in making that case. I chaired a commission that recommended a reduction in the size of the House of Commons over time to 500. I have argued the case for this House to be no bigger than the Commons. Having smaller Houses reduces the pressure on resources, be it in terms of physical space or legislative proceedings. We are, I think, especially alert to the pressures on this House in terms of the number of Members seeking to intervene in time-limited proceedings. However, this is not a question of the convenience of Members. It is important from the perspective of the House if it is to fulfil its core role as a reflective Chamber. There is the danger of quantity overwhelming quality.

The Government also have form, but only in favouring a smaller House of Commons. This Bill stipulates a House of 650, but the Government would have preferred a House of 600. Why, then, has it argued the case for a smaller House of Commons but not for a smaller House of Lords?

Furthermore, what this Bill does is stipulate the number of parliamentary constituencies. The size of the House of Commons has varied. It has had a larger membership in the past, as a consequence of the number of seats in Ireland, but since 1918 the number of constituencies has varied between 625 and 659. The key point is that the number is set in statute. There is no such statutory limit for this House.

If a House of 650 is appropriate for the Commons, why not for the Lords? If there is a fixed number in statute for seats in the first Chamber, why do we not have a statutory cap for the number of Members of the second Chamber? A cap is an important discipline. Those wishing to be MPs have to compete for a parliamentary candidature. A set number for the upper House would impose a discipline on the Prime Minister of the day in nominating Members.

To argue that this House could not operate effectively if it was the same size as, or smaller than, the Commons, is clearly not sustainable. Following the enactment of the House of Lords Act 1999, the size of the House was very similar to that of the House of Commons. The number has expanded massively since, for reasons unrelated to what the House needs to fulfil its key functions.

If having 800 MPs will place too great a strain on resources in the Commons, why does a membership of 800 not place too great a strain on resources in the Lords? In short, what are the arguments against having a House of 800 in respect of the Commons that do not apply to the Lords?

This House has agreed, without a Division, that we are too large. We have pressed for action to reduce our size, making the case for a reduction in terms of output—that is, Members retiring from the House—and a limit on input, in the form of Prime Ministerial nominations. It has to be both if our size is to be reduced. That is key to the work of the Burns committee. The problem in seeking to reduce the size of the House of Lords lies not with the House but with the Executive—hence the following questions to my noble friend Lord True.

Do the Government accept, as the House does, that the House of Lords should be no bigger than the House of Commons? Why are the Government prepared to condone a second Chamber of 800 Members when they seek to limit the first to 650? I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s answers, and I beg to move.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, in light of the opening remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, perhaps I might start with, “Rwy’n flin, dwi ddim yn siarad Gymraeg.”. For those who are not fluent in Welsh—as I have just proved that I am not—that was my attempt at “I’m sorry, I don’t speak Welsh.” All I wish to add in relation to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Norton, is that I have signed and supported his amendment, which endorses the Burns committee report that was accepted by all sides of the House of Lords.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord True (Con)]

First, as I hope I indicated in my remarks, I accept the strictures of the noble Baroness on the phrase “part-time House”. It is a House whose expertise derives in part from the presence of people who are here part-time and bring us their expertise, which is a slightly long-winded way of saying the same thing. I think I said specifically that I would not want anyone to run away with that remark and say that that is what I think of your Lordships’ House. I revere it.

With that correction, I will not detain noble Lords further but I will bank the statement by the Leader of the Opposition that this House’s role is not to block legislation. We shall test those words in the coming weeks and months.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who spoke. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, just made two of the points that I was going to make but that will not stop me making them anyway.

The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, supported my case by speaking against the amendment; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, supported my case by speaking for it. I am not whether that means that I am more skilled or abysmal at drafting amendments than I thought.

That leads me to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. She argued the case for a formula linking the size of the House of Lords to the membership of the House of Commons. I agree; indeed, I tried to devise an amendment on that very point but getting it within the scope of the Bill was problematic, which is why I moved the amendment I did. The noble Baroness and other noble Lords will appreciate that sometimes one must go through some contortions to produce an amendment that will trigger a debate. I speak as someone who, a few years back, moved an amendment to the Psychoactive Substances Bill that would have had the effect of banning the manufacture and sale of alcohol. I realise that it was not going to go anywhere—it was not designed to—but it drew attention to a problem in that Bill.

I have four points to make, two of which the noble Baroness just made in response to my noble friend Lord True. One of her points was that the two Houses have different functions. Of course they do; that was precisely my point. Deriving from that is the case for the House of Lords to be smaller than the House of Commons, given the functions that it fulfils. We are a reflective House. We do not have an outward-facing role in the same way that the Commons does, with Members having to deal with constituencies in relation to their role and in relation to the Executive. The functions are very different. We fulfil different roles, and we add value to the political process by fulfilling that reflective role. Deriving from that, we do not need to be quite so big or, indeed, as big as the House of Commons.

Secondly, as was just touched on and as the noble Baroness stressed, this is not a part-time House. It is very much a full-time House, with some Members who work part-time, if you like, because they do their day jobs then come in to provide their expertise. It did a very good job in 1999 when we had more or less the same number of Members as the House of Commons, so unless my noble friend the Minister is going to argue that it was doing a worse job than now, again, there is no case for the arguments that he has advanced in terms of size.

My next point—again one that the noble Baroness touched upon—relates to my noble friend saying that reform should not be piecemeal. Well, the reform that has been achieved has been piecemeal; it has been the grand schemes brought forward by government that have got nowhere. Those piecemeal changes have I think been well considered—I speak as someone who drafted one of the Bills—and have achieved a great deal. Had we not achieved the House of Lords Reform Act 2014, just think what the size of the House would now be. We would be moving in the direction of the size of the House when we had the hereditary Peers and all the problems that derived from that.

Finally, while I am not saying that we should have a statutory number, there is a case for considering it. My noble friend did not really make an argument against that and I draw attention to the fact that it is not at all unusual for nations to have a set number of Members of their second Chambers. There is not really a clear argument against that. I am not necessarily beating the drum for it; I just say that there is no strong argument against it.

So I am not persuaded by any of the points that my noble friend made—he will not be surprised to hear that. I wanted to tease out the stance of the Government and allow us to continue to make the case—as the House has agreed, without a vote—that we are too large and that steps should be taken to reduce the size of the House. We can move towards that; the Burns recommendations create the means for achieving that. We can have a smaller House that fulfils its key functions and adds value. This House fulfils a very important role that is demonstrably different from that of the Commons. That is why it adds value, and that is why we should serve to uphold it. That would, I think, be facilitated by having a smaller, not a larger, House. We should follow Burns and try to reverse the direction of travel when it comes to the size of the House.

So I am, as I have said, grateful to all those who have spoken. I have made all the points that I think are important in this context, and I am extremely grateful for the support I have received from other Members. I am sure that this is something we will continue to pursue but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

House of Lords: Relocation

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord True]

I strongly with the noble Lord. Indeed, he echoed something said by the right reverend Prelate earlier. That is important. I revere this House and the work it does, but it should not present itself as being in a state of shock horror at the idea that some of its proceedings and activities might take place outside London.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

My Lords, moving the House of Lords to York will not bring Parliament closer to the people. Could my noble friend answer my noble friend Lord Young’s question? Has Civil Service time, and hence public funds, been devoted to considering a move of the House of Lords?

[Lord True]

My Lords, I am not in a position to answer that question. However, I will provide information to both the noble Lord, Lord Young, and my noble friend.

Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Monday 15th June 2020 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Norton of Louth]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government when they will announce the membership of the committee to review the provisions of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 as provided for by section 7 of the Act.

[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con) [V]]

My Lords, under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, the Prime Minister is required, between June and November 2020, to make arrangements for a committee to undertake a review of the operation of the Act. Announcements about arrangements for such a committee will be made in due course.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con) [V]]

Given that the Government have a manifesto commitment to remove the Fixed-term Parliaments Act from the statute book, as indeed do the Opposition, and given that one has to put something in its place because the old arrangements are not automatically resuscitated, do the Government agree that the committee that has to be set up on the Act is an ideal vehicle for generating—quickly—a replacement measure to enable the Government potentially to legislate by next year?

[Lord True [V]]

My Lords, my noble friend is an outstanding authority on these matters, and I am sure that all contributions from him will be heard on all sides of the House. He is quite right to say that the Government made a commitment in their manifesto to repeal the Act. However, I can only repeat that detailed announcements about how we will proceed will come in due course.

Ministerial Code

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 12th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, on initiating this debate. It is, I think, worth emphasising that the Ministerial Code has developed over decades, emanating from the Questions of Procedure for Ministers, drawn up under Clement Attlee and variously revised since. As we know, the document was formally secret, until John Major authorised its publication in 1992.

As Amy Baker notes in her book, Prime Ministers and the Rule Book, publication

“was a significant step towards a more open and transparent system of government.”

She also draws attention to an important difference in perceptions, one very germane to today’s debate. The view of Ministers and officials is that it is a guide. The public perception, certainly that of the media, is that it is a means by which to judge ministerial behaviour. There may well be a case for a thorough review of the code—as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, has suggested—both its content and its status. But there is a warning, in that we need to be clear as to the purpose of a review, given who undertakes it. Is the review for the purpose of facilitating good government—ensuring greater clarity over what is expected of Ministers—or to enhance prime ministerial control of the Executive? The code has been variously revised, including in a way that strengthens the grip of No. 10. Some may focus, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, has, on special advisers. I would mention paragraph 3.9 in respect of Parliamentary Private Secretaries.

The code is an extensive document, embodying some requirements that are precise and others that are general and amenable to interpretation. Some at times are honoured more in the breach than the observance. Under the principle of collective responsibility, the views expressed by individual Ministers while a decision is being reached should not be disclosed. The Prime Minister’s preface to the latest issue says “no leaking”. As we know, leaks of Cabinet deliberations have been taking place for years.

There are also sections that are remarkably light. This is notably so in respect of relations between Ministers and civil servants. Paragraph 5.2 lends itself to a considerable breadth of interpretation. It is in the interests of the Prime Minister and Ministers to have a more precise document, ensuring that Ministers are clear on what is expected of them, and hence reducing the potential for transgression and bad publicity.

The code, as I have touched on, has become more cluttered over time, extending beyond procedure to encompass behaviour. I draw to the attention of the House the suggestion proffered in Prime Ministers and the Rule Book, namely that the code be split into two documents, one comprising guidance—the original purpose of the publication—covering internal practices and procedures, and the other a free-standing code of conduct. If one were to pursue that recommendation, there is then the issue of who would have responsibility for drafting the documents. The first could be internal, but the latter could draw on others beyond No. 10.

As for strengthening the code as it stands, there may be a case for more consistent practice when the Prime Minister decides there is a prima facie case for investigation. However, there is a problem in enforcement, not just of the sort that the noble Lord has mentioned. Parliament has a role in respect of the requirements identified in paragraph 1.7 but, as has been touched on, ensuring compliance with the code rests on the will of the Prime Minister. That will is necessary but it may not be sufficient. It requires not only political will but political authority to ensure compliance. Normally, that is not a problem, but the circumstances of the last Parliament show what can happen when a Prime Minister lacks the authority to enforce all elements of the code. That was most apparent with enforcing collective responsibility.

Providing the means for more consistent enforcement would have the merit of reducing the gap between the public and official views of the code, reducing, as I say, the potential for ministerial transgressions. Put more positively, it could be seen to ensure that the Government are committed to high standards. On that analysis, everyone benefits.