Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas (Con) [V]]

[Inaudible.]

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

We cannot hear you.

[Lord Lucas (Con) [V]]

It will be immensely helpful to have a process of gathering information ahead of the Law Commission report on whether extension of hate crimes to embrace misogyny will work, and how. At present, we do not have good information. This is a really difficult area; I do not think that any of us has trouble with the concept of hate crimes, but the Scottish Parliament is currently undergoing extreme difficulty with the concept of hate speech. Many police forces in the UK are doing some very strange things with “hate incidents”, where these can be recorded just on the say-so of one person and then appear in another person’s DBS check. There are some difficult things happening around hate crimes and hate incidents generally; having good data must, surely, be at the core of reaching good conclusions.

Here, we have a difficulty in that the police have changed their recording of crimes and reports so that they record only the reported gender of a person and not their natal sex, as is the protected characteristic under the Equality Act. Recently, we have seen extraordinary rises in the reported level of sexual abuse by women. Is this real? Is there something happening to women in our country that we really ought to understand, or is this a fiction of the change in the police reporting method? Not having accurate data disables us in understanding what to do.

I very much hope that, if something comes of this—I hope it will—the police will not only record the natal sex but will record the gender of all the people concerned so that we can understand exactly what is happening. It really does not help trans people that the hate they are subject to is subsumed under misogyny if they are trans women. We need to know whether this is happening to them because they are trans. We are trying to gather data and understanding; the better the data we have, the better our response.

I support, but would like to see extended, the definition at the end of this. It is really important that we have clarity and completeness. Let us record sex as per the Equality Act definition because that is, as my noble friend on the Front Bench has confirmed to me on previous occasions, the basis on which the Government are working. Let us also record self-identified gender or whatever other formulation works best—we could perhaps adopt the one from the forthcoming census—so that we have a complete picture of misogyny and trans misogyny and can, when the time comes, craft effective laws about it.

[Baroness Donaghy (Lab) [V]]

I am very pleased to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell. Members may have seen recent reports in the media covering the experience of elite female athletes being subject to harassment and intimidation when doing training runs in the street. They cannot go to their athletic tracks to train at the moment because of lockdown. As has been said, this is not about wolf-whistling; it is about violence and harassment, mainly against women. If those athletes were competing in an Olympic stadium, they would be cheered to the rafters for their success, but because they are training on the streets and are anonymous, somehow they are objectified and are easy prey.

During White Ribbon Week, I asked the Minister to accept the two year-old Law Commission’s report recommending that misogyny be made a hate crime. This is now a matter of increasing urgency. The police forces that have been adopting policies to record gender hate crimes are to be congratulated, but this needs to be adopted generally. Superintendent Andy Bennett of Avon and Somerset Police said:

“We know women are less likely to report hate crime committed by strangers in public, which could be because discrimination is normalised for many women.”


As the noble Lord, Lord Russell, said, Nottinghamshire Police was the first force in England and Wales to start recording hate crimes against women and girls. Sue Fish, the former chief constable of Nottinghamshire Police, said:

“Some of the feedback we had was that women, for the first time, described themselves as ‘walking taller’ and with their ‘heads held high’.”


According to the White Ribbon Campaign, one in five British men thinks that feminism has gone “too far”. Online misogyny can also be a gateway to wider divisions in society. A HOPE not hate report shows that some young men who interact with men’s rights activists online are on the first step to more extreme racist or far-right groups and regard more rights for anyone—such as people of colour, the LGBT community and people with disabilities—as a threat to their status. The chief executive of HOPE not hate supports this amendment. He states that misogyny is a recruiting tool for hate groups and a means to radicalise, especially among the very young. These online groups radicalise young men who go on to commit acts of aggression designed to intimidate, humiliate and control women.

Having better-quality information throughout all police forces is not just another paper exercise. It helps to increase understanding of the causes and consequences of violence against women and girls, and it gives women more confidence that their issue will be taken seriously. It may even go on to protect more women from violence and intimidation. I hope that the Minister will accept this amendment.

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[Lord Judge (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I apologise for unavoidably missing Second Reading. I will only add something that is based on my own experience. We are dealing with the instruments of power. The more personal they are, the more powerful they can be; the greater their use, the greater the risk of their misuse. I approach this amendment—the spirit of which I strongly support—on the basis of experience, or experiences, of the way in which all the horrors and indignities can now be heaped on victims in a non-domestic situation: it is rape by strangers, pervertedly using modern technology to add to the humiliation of their victim by taking intimate images before leaving them to all their harrowing distress.

What is the purpose of those photographs? Is it to humiliate, or to threaten? They can be circulated to others with potentially rather perverted sexual titillation in mind, who themselves will have the power to threaten the victim with yet further circulation of the images. Such threats are appalling and should be criminalised. I hear the Minister thinking, immediately, “But this is a Domestic Abuse Bill.” There is a link, however, between that sort of behaviour and the behaviour to which I now come.

I am assuming for present purposes that, far from being rape cases, the images which we are now discussing are based on participation in the taking of images at times of cherished joy by two perfectly happy, willing people. I know that is not always the case, but I am taking it at the other extreme end. They are taken consensually, on the basis of trust—that they will remain private and personal, that they will never be circulated, that the power they give to one participant over the other will never be abused, whether via circulation or threat of circulation, and trust in particular that they will never be abused as a weapon of power, pressure, or control. I emphasise that to me, a threat alone constitutes a grotesque breach of the trust which was once reposed in the other half to the relationship. It leaves the victim with an impossible choice to make: to risk circulation—how awful—or give way to what may be utterly outrageous demands by someone who was once trusted.

We criminalised the sharing of intimate pictures. Section 33 of the 2015 Act is a perfectly simple piece of legislation. We do not require the Law Commission. We do not require very much time to be able to adapt the Section 33 provision so as to make criminal the circulation and the threat to circulate or share images such as this. It is simple and obvious.

[Lord Lucas (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I add my name to those saying that this is a change we should make, and now. I would like to be sure, which I am not at the moment, that the wording will cover an image which does not actually exist but is merely asserted to exist. On some of these occasions, a recording will have been made or said to have been made without the victim’s knowledge, but she may well believe that the allegation is true because it is a believable one. Under those circumstances, it should be clear that this offence is activated. I would also like to understand better how one can consent to a threat. If it is a threat, what does consent look like? What would it take for someone to consent to a threat? How would that be phrased; how would it work? Is “publish and be damned” consent? If not, what would be?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for putting down this amendment, which I strongly support.

One way to judge the gravity of a crime is to assess the anguish it brings to its victims. Usually, this emotional suffering comes as a by-product of, say, physical harm or financial loss. However, sometimes the creation of anguish is deliberate, the whole point of the crime, and a source of great satisfaction to the criminal. It is perhaps no surprise that our courts have reserved special condemnation for those responsible for this sort of behaviour. In 2015, amid mounting evidence of a growing problem, the Government decided to tackle the ugly phenomenon of so-called revenge porn: the sadistic online dissemination without consent of sexually explicit photos and videos, usually of young women, and usually by disgruntled former boyfriends. Ministers recognised that this behaviour is particularly nasty because it targets the most private and personal aspects of life, exploiting intimacy to create ridicule, contempt and public shame. Indeed, each of these emotions is precisely what is intended by the perpetrator, particularly the public shaming. This conduct was thus made a crime that could lead straight to prison.

However, it is now clear that the present law does not go far enough, for what about threats to share intimate images? As your Lordships have been told, at present, these attract no criminal sanction at all, although the evidence shows that significant numbers of women and girls face this menacing behaviour.

Much has been said in this debate about the survey carried out by Refuge, the country’s largest provider of domestic abuse services. That is not surprising when the results of this survey appear to show that as many as one in seven young women in England and Wales have faced these threats.

These figures portray a world of anxiety and dread. Because most of these threats come from current or former partners, they also speak of deliberate schemes of domination and control that we should acknowledge for what they are: straightforward examples of domestic abuse. Like all crimes in this category, they gift a gratifying sense of power to the abuser, who is intent on using this power to signal the victim’s utter lack of worth.

Amendment 162 provides the opportunity to change the law to criminalise this behaviour, granting thousands of women and girls access to justice and protection—the first duty of the law. At present the Government prefer to push this issue off into the future, awaiting a Law Commission review into all forms of image-based abuse. But for all the reasons set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, people subjected right now to this behaviour should not have to wait. I hope the Government will accept what is widely acknowledged: that this is a gap in the law and the Government’s duty is to plug it without delay.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 3rd February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, like other noble Lords I pay warm tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Newlove, Lady Wilcox, Lady Meacher, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London for their tremendous campaign to deal with this abhorrent crime. It is so pleasing to know that the Government have agreed to put this offence on to the statute book.

I cannot really add to the extraordinary speeches we have heard tonight but I give my support to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, in proposing why this Bill—as opposed to the police and sentencing Bill—is the right vehicle for this offence. We have heard in this debate and at Second Reading about the issues facing the police; the problems they have experienced in giving the right attention to non-fatal strangulation and, subsequently, the undercharging of the offence. Surely then, if we want to change this around, it is better for this new offence to be part of a cohesive package of measures in the Domestic Abuse Bill. When the Bill is enacted—as it will be in a few weeks’ time—accompanying the rollout of the new legislation will be a package of training and support measures, so that people in the field are prepared for it. It also makes sense for the police that it is dealt with as a cohesive package of measures.

The third reason why it should be in this Bill is the one spelled out by my noble friend Lady Crawley: we are dealing with an abhorrent crime. This Bill, with its huge support around this House and in the other place, will be law in a matter of weeks. Why wait for a new Bill, which would take months to come through and be enacted? Ministers have shown that they are listening. It is much appreciated. I hope they will listen to our arguments that this Bill is the right vehicle.

[Lord Lucas (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I too welcome these amendments. However, if this law is going to be passed it should be accompanied by clear advice for the young. Having been guided around TikTok by a young, adult female, there seems to be something of a fashion for strangulation among young women. They say, “I like this”; they say that a boy who will not do it is a pussy, not sexy enough, not interesting enough and not man enough to do what the girl wants. Under those conditions, it is really important that the Government issue clear, unambiguous and easily found advice on the consequences that the introduction of this amendment would have for that sort of activity. I would be grateful if my noble friend would let me know what the Government’s intentions are in this regard, in writing if not this evening.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, the Committee has heard some extremely powerful and focused speeches this evening. I add my voice to those commending the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and the signatories of these amendments, and give my support to Amendment 137. Given what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has just said, I hope that the online harms Bill will deal with social media outlets that perpetrate the kind of messages that he enunciated.

The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and all those who have spoken, have done so with clarity and unusual brevity for the hybrid House; I will try to emulate that. I have two things to say. First, women police officers who have spoken to me are crying out for this focused and clear piece of legislation, as enunciated in Amendment 137. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London said, they do not want a tick-box approach. They want to change the relevant form—124D—to be able to obtain the Crown Prosecution Service’s direction to take those who are perpetrating this crime through to a successful criminal prosecution. As has been said so often this evening, this is clearly about domestic abuse.

Secondly, why should this Bill be the vehicle to take this forward? There are two reasons. One is that it is self-evident from everything that has been said, the briefings that have been received and offline discussions, that everyone accepts that this legislation is needed and is needed now. There is no reason whatever to delay until another criminal justice or sentencing Bill which may take its turn after a forthcoming Queen’s Speech, somewhere down the line, where this amendment would have to be moved all over again. We would have to go through all the same campaigning, representations and speeches to gain something that the Government themselves have thankfully conceded is a necessary improvement to the law.

I have one plea for the Minister. He has taken to this House like a duck to water, but there is one lesson that those of us who have been around in politics know all too well: you do not ask your own colleagues in another House to vote down something that they know is eminently sensible and required, in some vain hope that they will forgive you for not having done it as quickly and effectively as possible because someone in the legislative committee of government—it changes its name from time to time—has decided that they do not want to have any further substantive amendments to the Bill. We all know that this would be arrant nonsense: the Minister knows it, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who has been extremely helpful on this, knows it. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in his erudite speech, indicated that even the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has changed his mind since Second Reading. I am glad if he has, because I was going to refer him to the excellent Second Reading speech by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, about his experiences in 1975.

All of us can coalesce and praise the Government and applaud the campaigners, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, for what is tonight a unified approach to dealing with a horrendous crime, which has led to so many deaths and can be stopped from doing so in the future by a single agreement by government Ministers.

Defamation Bill

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, as a website operator, I urge my noble friend the Minister to take no rubbish from website operators. I have great sympathy with the purpose of this amendment. There are a lot of people out there who are essentially defenceless when things appear about them on the web. We need to make sure that the regulations enable them to get easy redress and relief and that we do not allow long timescales to suit operators when short timescales would suit the people who have been defamed. At the same time, as my noble friend said, we have to balance that with our freedom to be rude about people who we need to be rude about and to say nasty things about Ruritania or anywhere else, and to keep the powerful under control. It is a difficult balancing act. I think that the right way to deal with this is in the regulations under Clause 5(5), which can go into some detail and some precision about this. I would hate to be subject to this amendment. As a website operator I really would not know where I was, or what I was or was not allowed to do, particularly with no supporting regulations. Therefore, I cannot support the amendment but I very much support the spirit behind it.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Lester for his intervention.

Clause 5 provides a defence to website operators if, upon receipt of a notice of complaint, they follow a process designed to ensure that the issue is resolved with the poster of the material. My noble friends Lord Faulks and Lord Phillips raised concerns in Committee about Clause 5, and my noble friend Lord McNally and I met them to discuss those concerns. I am pleased to say that, as has been acknowledged, as a result of those discussions the Government have been able to bring forward Amendment 17 on the issue of malice, which I shall speak to in the next group of amendments. However, this amendment takes a different approach to that taken by the Government in Clause 5. As has been said, it would replace the Clause 5 defence and the accompanying process with provisions which substantially replicate the defence for secondary publishers currently found under Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 but with one important addition. New subsection (1)(d) would require the operator, on receipt of a complaint, to respond with expedition and to take such action as is reasonable in the circumstances.

This additional requirement would mean that, in order to have a defence, the operator would, on receipt of a complaint, need to make a judgment on what action it was reasonable to take. This would inevitably involve them reaching a view on the merits of the case, which in most instances they would not be in a position to do. The fact that they would lose the defence if a court decided that they had not acted reasonably would create a great deal of uncertainty for website operators, and we believe that in practice it would mean that many operators would simply choose to take the material down. That would result in exactly the same situation that we have now—an approach which has been criticised as unsatisfactory not only by a large majority of the responses to our public consultation but by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and by the Law Commission in its 2002 scoping study on defamation and the internet.

Subsection (2) in the amendment would require the court, in considering whether or not the defence was made out, to take account of any steps taken by the operator to have and comply with a code of practice in relation to defamation, a complaints procedure or a system for providing identity details of posters to claimants to enable them to bring proceedings against the poster. I totally understand the intention behind the proposed subsection but Clause 5 already sets out a simple process in relation to the handling of complaints and the provision of identity details. In the event that a complainant brings proceedings against a website operator, the court will be able to assess whether the operator has complied with that process. This will ensure that the court takes into account how the operator has responded to the complaint. Perhaps I may also inform noble Lords that we will be publishing specific guidance on how the new process will operate for all those involved.

We have heard a great deal about balance. This new approach is about striking the correct balance and also providing protection to website operators. It is about striking a fair balance between those who have allegedly been subject to defamation and freedom of expression and speech. We believe that the defence in Clause 5 strikes a fair balance between all the interests involved. It will help freedom of expression by giving the poster of allegedly defamatory material an opportunity to stand up for it if they wish to do so, and it will give greater certainty to website operators. At the same time, it will enable claimants to secure take-down of the material on a short fixed timescale in the event that the poster does not wish to defend it. Where the poster does wish to defend it, it will also ensure that the Norwich Pharmacal process is more likely to give the claimant the information they need to pursue proceedings. I hope that on that basis my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

Defamation Bill

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Lucas]

16: Clause 5, page 3, line 37, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations may make provision for a procedure whereby—
(a) a complainant may apply to the court for a declaration that his complaint meets the basic requirements of a libel claim; or(b) a website operator or the person who posted the statement complained of may apply to the court for a negative declaration that a notice of complaint fails to meet the basic requirements of a libel claim,provided in each case that the party making the application complies with the procedure laid down in any such regulations.”

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I was hoping to get some explanation of Amendment 15 as we have not debated it. I rather wonder why it was moved formally.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

Because we want to get home before 3 am.

[Lord Lucas]

Well, let me delay things a little—but not for long.

We have had a long debate and a great deal of discussion about this but it appears to me that the regulations as they are will not allow the Government to give website operators, such as myself and others, the comfort we need to be able to keep postings in place when we are challenged as to whether they should be and we think that they are fair comment. We need some way of discovering whether the law is on our side or against us. The amendment is intended to allow the Government to frame regulations that would give us that comfort and allow us to allow others freedom of speech. I beg to move.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, Amendment 16 would allow the regulations governing the Clause 5 process to provide for a procedure for a complainant, website operator or person who posted the statement complained of to seek a court declaration as to whether the complaint meets the basic requirements of a libel claim.

This amendment seems to envisage the creation of a system whereby, alongside the Clause 5 process, any party can seek a court declaration on a prima facie basis. It is difficult to see what incentive there would be for a complainant to do this. Such a declaration would not be determinative of the merits of the case or affect the availability of the Clause 5 defence, and so it would potentially just be an additional—and costly—step before registering a notice of complaint. Instead, the proposal appears primarily to be aimed at helping website operators to make informed decisions as to the strength of complaints so that they can be more confident in removing material or leaving it online depending on whether or not a declaration is granted.

We have serious practical concerns about this proposal. It has been suggested that the process could operate through consideration by a High Court master, on the papers, at very short notice and on payment of a nominal court fee. That seems unrealistic. We consider that it does not adequately take account of the time the process would take, given the significant additional burden on the courts, the extent of the evidence that could be needed to reach a decision and the consequent costs to the parties involved. There is also the possibility of rulings being appealed, which could add to the time and costs involved. Bearing in mind that the prima facie declaration would not be determinative of the merits of a case, it is difficult to see how that is warranted.

In any event, we do not consider that this additional process is needed. Clause 5 is intended to operate in such a way as to avoid website operators having to make decisions about the merits of defamatory complaints. The representations we received from many website operators during consultation on the draft Bill indicated that they did not have sufficient knowledge to make these judgments and that it was not appropriate for them to be doing so.

In response, we have sought to create a simple, quick, cheap and effective means for the complainant to request the removal of defamatory material and for the poster to engage with this request and stand by his posting if he wishes to do so. We think it is right to remove the website operator from the process as far as possible, so that if they follow the process as will be set out in regulations they will have a defence against a defamation action.

Of course, if for business reasons a website operator wishes to protect their users because doing so helps them financially, there is nothing in Clause 5 that will stop them from doing so. However, we do not think that an amendment to support them in doing so is appropriate.

I say again that the Government believe that the Clause 5 process, which, as I explained, focuses on creating a system under which website operators do not have to reach judgments on the validity of complaints, is a preferable approach which will be fair to all parties involved and will deliver additional certainty and protection for website operators. We believe that it is simpler and will not involve the cost and delay of the system envisaged under Amendment 16. With the explanation that I have given, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that. I say as an aside that I always considered that the business of this House was to consider a Bill properly, not to get home to bed, and that we should take the time that it takes. Perhaps my noble friend will give me at least a short explanation of Amendment 22 when we get there, but meanwhile I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

Defamation Bill

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 15th January 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I hear what my noble friend says. Perhaps we can refer to this matter; he makes a valid point. As he rightly acknowledges, we would not see this issue occurring on a regular basis, but I will certainly reflect on his comments on this.

A variety of amendments has been tabled. On “balance”, I suppose it depends how you define the word. However, in seeking to bring the Bill forward, and particularly with this clause, the Government are seeking to strike the right balance. We continue to listen, hear and consult with all parties on both sides of the coin. We are working to ensure that something practical and workable, which protects those who are subject to such actions, comes out of this process.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I was encouraged by my noble friend’s response, and by his batting at the subsequent bowling. It is clear that we are both aiming in the same direction and that, given the expertise of his colleagues and the good will of the Government, we may get somewhere interesting. I would be grateful if he would allow me to come in for a meeting with officials, preferably before the end of January if that is his consultation deadline, to pursue some of the practicalities; a nod will do on these occasions.

We should be more robust in talking to website operators about right of reply. This is merely a question of tweaking a few lines of code. It may be inconvenient for people to do it, but it is essentially practical. It is such a fundamental thing, given the way in which views, opinions and statements travel now, that one should be able to attach a reply to it and deal with it robustly in that way. To have a statement with a reply available to people as soon as they pick something up is a powerful thing in the internet world. That is has not been provided for is merely that it has not been coded. It is essentially not impossible under any circumstances with any website if people put their mind to it. It will not happen immediately, but it should certainly happen within a year if that is a requirement. I would be chary about accepting excuses on that.

There is something to be said for looking at different arrangements for statements about real persons as opposed to statements about businesses. Picking up on the points made correctly and forcefully by my noble friend Lord Faulks, if someone is accused of something which goes to their person, that cannot be allowed to hang around for seven days, or even seven hours, without being dealt with. It should not be within the policies of any reputable web operator that such statements are allowed on their website. These things belong in the hands of the police if there are real accusations. It should not be part of our view of electronic media that it is there to give currency to that sort of statement, whether true or not.

On the other hand, we must be powerful in allowing people to make statements about businesses or the way in which people do business, and to allow website operators to be robust in their defence of people who have made those statements on their websites. As Mumsnet said, the easy answer is to take them down. The only way to defeat that easy answer is to make very clear and very practical the responses that are available to the website operator so that they can have certainty in knowing whether a comment is sensible and that the law allows them to stand by it. That is what I want to pursue with the Minister when we have our meeting. On the point about maliciousness, we are talking about a lot of little website operators and not just the big guys, and there are some very malicious ones out there.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I would of course be happy to arrange a meeting. The benefit of being in the Moses Room is that your officials are right behind you, and I am sure that they have noted it as I have.

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[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, because of my general opposition to this clause, it is obvious that I would also oppose these very well meaning and well articulated suggestions of a mode of complaining by someone who feels that they have been defamed on a website. The debate has thrown up the fact that the industry is in the process of developing a response to this new problem, and I respectfully suggest to your Lordships that that is where the development should come from, not by means of legislation—we are bound to get it wrong and to be out of date. Rather, it calls for a response to a developing situation. If a code of practice is developed that provides an appropriate response, that will deter people from suing, certainly for anything other than the most serious defamations.

As for the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lord Lester, I entirely understand it and the fact that he wears his cloak from the JCHR. If there is to be such a procedure, however, it is asking quite a lot of an individual to make some form of assessment as to, first, whether it is defamatory and, secondly, whether it is unlawful. That would involve them reviewing possible defences: whether or not it was justified, which is an absolute defence; whether or not there was qualified privilege; whether there was responsible publication. That is a considerable series of hurdles for someone to overcome before deciding on and setting out the nature of their complaint.

On the alternative dispute resolution, of course I understand what animates that. It is very easy to sit around in a committee of any sort and suggest that something can be done quickly, cheaply and easily. The reality, of course, is that there are short cuts even within the current framework. People can get preliminary rulings on meaning and whether something is capable of being defamatory within the existing mechanism. I fear that what is suggested may sound like a good idea but may in fact simply be superorgative. It may add to what is already there and not provide the sort of cheap alternative mechanism that plainly is desirable. I respectfully suggest that the amendment should not be pursued.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I support what my noble friend has just said. Having listened to the various alternatives, I think that the idea of having to involve the courts is just going to freak out any website operator, particularly those who deal in any volume. You are asking for some sort of cheap way to get to a judgment that is essentially expensive because there are a lot of things to be considered.

I think that the right answer to this, as my noble friend just said, lies in giving really good guidance to the courts and to website operators as to what is protected under the Bill and what is not. That comes back to points that I made under previous clauses. I do not understand what is going to be protected under the Bill; what is going to be regarded as fair comment; what is going to be required in terms of the person making the complaint or statement stating the basis on which they have made it; or the references to “fact” that creep in, which is something that you as a website operator know that you can never establish. As my noble friend said earlier, we all have insurance to cover those things. I am sure that the same applies to Facebook as it does at the bottom end, which I occupy. That insurance is not vastly expensive and is available on sensible terms from sensible insurers. As long as you have reasonable systems to ensure that you are doing your best not to publish things for which you may be sued, you are protected.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this detailed debate. Arguments have again been presented to show both sides of the coin. Amendment 26, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lester, would require a claimant to set out in a notice of complaint why the statement complained of was not merely defamatory but also unlawful.

Our clear aim in bringing forward the Bill is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has said, to make the law on defamation clearer, cheaper and easier for the ordinary citizen to use. It is perhaps reasonably easy for an ordinary person to understand and explain why a statement may be regarded as defamatory; it is quite another for the same person to explain, without recourse to legal advice, how that could be deemed unlawful. That arguably would involve a thorough knowledge of the law, both statute and common, and a rebuttal of the various defences that might be available to the person making the statement. The aim is to avoid putting lawyers rather than the parties at the heart of the argument. For those reasons, the Government are opposed to the amendment.

That said, we of course share the concern of those who argue that complainants should give some explanation as to why they think a statement is defamatory. The note that we have provided to the House on the content of the regulations makes clear that, where appropriate, complainants should, in a notice of complaint, provide details such as the meaning attributed to the words complained of and why they are defamatory, including any factual inaccuracies or unsupportable comment. This reflects the wording in the defamation pre-action protocol in relation to the contents of a letter before a claim, and we believe that this is an appropriate level of detail to expect complainants to provide.

Amendment 27, in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, has two purposes. First, it seeks to place in the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, suggested, a number of requirements that a complainant’s notice of complaint should meet. As I indicated in speaking to Amendment 26, we share the concerns of those who argue that complainants should have to give some explanation as to why they think a statement is defamatory of them. I have explained the level of detail that we think is reasonable to expect a complainant to provide in order to enable the poster of the material to understand the basis of the complaint.

As I have also said, we believe that to require a claimant to go further and prove that the statement was unlawful would make it more onerous and difficult for a layman to make a complaint without first having sought sound legal advice, nor do we see how it would be in the interests of website operators, who would also have to seek legal advice, and could end up in litigation over the validity of notices that they chose to reject.

My noble friend Lord Marks talked about the need for as much detail as possible to be put in the Bill so that people can readily understand what is required. We believe that the regulations are the appropriate way to deal with the issues of detail within the framework established by Clause 5. However, we will ensure, after listening to the debate as well, that detailed guidance is published prior to the commencement of any new provisions to assist complainants, posters and website operators in understanding and following the new process.

The second part of Amendment 27 would allow the Secretary of State to make a provision in regulations for a procedure whereby a complainant can obtain from the court a declaration that his notice of complaint is valid—namely, that it meets the requirements of subsection (6). It has been indicated with regard to amendment that the procedure would also be available where either the poster of the material or the website operator wishes to apply for such a declaration.

I referred to the contribution made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I agree with him that the whole purpose of Clause 5 is to provide a simple, quick, cheap and effective means for the complainant to request the removal of potentially defamatory material and for the poster to engage with this request for removal and stand by his posting if he wishes to do so. It was suggested that the Norwich Pharmacal process may not be effective in securing the necessary information on the poster. We propose in the consultation that the poster should be required to provide the full legal name and contact details, including their postal address. If they fail to do so, the website operator would have to take the material down. This, we believe, should help to ensure that the Norwich Pharmacal process enables the complainant to obtain sufficient information to enable him to bring proceedings against the poster.

As several noble Lords have noted, the system that Amendment 27 proposes would seem to require complainants to go to court at the outset, prior to making a complaint, to obtain a court declaration that their notice of complaint is valid. Presumably, any complainant who did not have such a declaration would not have their complaint processed by the website operator. It is unclear to us how this procedure could be adapted to deal with applications by posters or website operators, and at what stage these would be made. In any event, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has mentioned, this additional process is likely to add unnecessary cost, delay and burden for the individual. In at least some cases, we believe that posters will be content for their statements to come down. Under this system, complainants would have to incur the time and expense of going to court irrespective of the attitude of the poster. Additional burdens would be created for the court system. The proposed amendments do not strike a fair and appropriate—we come back to that word again—balance between the interests of freedom of expression and complainants’ rights to reputation.

I concur with many of the points made by other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Faulks, and hope on the basis of the explanation that I have given that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, my noble friend has got his answer to Amendment 26 completely wrong, particularly so far as website operators are concerned. I do not care a fig about knowing whether a comment is defamatory; it is obvious that “The food was filthy” is defamatory. What I want to know is whether I can publish it or whether the restaurant says, “No such meal was served on that evening” or “We know this fellow from before and he has been completely unreasonable on other occasions” or gives us some reason that the comment is fair. It is absolutely crucial that Amendment 26 is accepted. Just to know that something is defamatory gives you no information and you can see that with your own eyes; it is obvious. What is not obvious is why it is unlawful. In order to take a reasonably robust attitude to standing between a complainant and the person who has made the posting, and who may well quite reasonably wish to be shy, not least because they think that they have sinned against some large corporation that will skin them in the courts if they are identified, I would want as a website operator, as I imagine other website operators do, too—certainly, those to whom I have talked do—to be in a position to stand behind something that we consider to be fair comment. We need to know why the complainant thinks that it is unlawful. We all know why it is defamatory.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, it may be a response to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, to say that while there is of course a distinction between what is defamatory and what is illegal, it is not necessarily for the complainant to dictate why it is illegal. Thought might perhaps be given to making a regulation under Clause 5(3)(c) that put on the operator who sought to invoke this defence the need to say why, notwithstanding that the statement was defamatory, it was none the less lawful to publish it. That might be a better way of achieving the balance than putting, as other noble Lords have recognised, the often financially onerous burden on the complainant to anticipate and meet in advance the several defences that may or may not be urged as justification for the publication.

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[Lord McNally]

I hope that Hansard noted that comment from a sedentary position and the general approval from the non-lawyers in the Committee for that observation.

At some stages during those debates, as a non-lawyer, I thought of John Wilkes, the famous radical. When he was about to publish his newspaper, the North Briton, he was asked by a French acquaintance, “Is the press free in your country?”. “I am about to find out,” said Wilkes. I think, having listened to this debate, that in some respects the internet is going to find out whether or not it is free. My noble friend Lord Mawhinney asked me where we were with regard to balance. It is not a question of balance between right and wrong, but the debates that we have had today show that there is a balance.

One of the great things about continuity in this House is that I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee that looked at the Communications Bill, where we deliberately advised against trying to legislate for the internet. On reflection, I think that we were right. My noble friend Lord Phillips said that he was on the side of the little man. On reflection, one of the greatest boons to the rights of the little man over the past decade or so has been the worldwide web and its freedoms. While I hear the passion and the righteous indignation of those who have been defamed and hurt, we as a Committee have to be careful not to overlegislate something that on the plus side has some considerable benefits for the little man.

That was a complete abuse of procedure, because I am moving a government amendment of some simplicity. It was also because I am wracked by guilt: at one point during the debates, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, helpfully sent me a note saying, “Are you on holiday?”. The truth is that when we were setting out who was going to handle what, I thought, “Clause 5 will be a nice snappy debate, since my noble friend Lord Ahmad—although he is learning disturbingly fast—should be given some experience of Bill-handling”. Little did I realise that he was going to have such a baptism of fire.

Amendment 28 provides for the affirmative resolution procedure to apply to the scrutiny of the regulations to be made under Clause 5 of the Bill, rather than the negative resolution procedure as the Bill currently provides. That is in the light of views put forward on this issue by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others. The affirmative procedure will ensure that the regulations receive more thorough parliamentary scrutiny. I hope that, as such, it will be acceptable to this Committee and to the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for that explanation. Our noble friend Lord Ahmad has been doing a superb job, and I have been immensely impressed. I had assumed that my noble friend Lord McNally was silent because he was serving time in the penalty box after voting against the Government yesterday.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, those of us on this side of the Committee welcome this amendment because it follows the advice and recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the advice of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, but mostly because an amendment—identical in effect if not in words—was moved by my honourable friend Rob Flello in Committee in the House of Commons and was rejected by the Government. The reason given by the then Minister Mr Djanogly was that:

“The Government consider that the detailed and technical nature of the proposed regulations, and the fact that they will govern procedural issues, means that the negative resolution procedure is more appropriate, and provides the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny”.—[Official Report, Commons, Defamation Bill Committee, 21/6/12; col. 122.]

That sentence, in itself, argued for why that was exactly the wrong procedure for these regulations. I am pleased to see that the Government have accepted that that was the case and have now welcomed this provision into the Bill.

Having listened to the debate on Clause 5, I do not share the level of guilt that the noble Lord has for having had his colleague deal with it. I am delighted that my noble friend Lady Hayter has agreed to do this. She is well equipped for the job and, indeed, has much greater experience than I have in your Lordships’ House, which makes her better equipped for this complicated part of the Bill than I am.

I believe that the most important part of Clause 5 will be the consultation on the regulations, which everyone who has come to lobby me about this part of the Bill seems to be a part of. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, may well become part of this consultation process. Maybe it is time for all of us to become part of this consultation process, because looking as I do now, in the light of the discussion that has taken place in your Lordships’ Committee, at the 26 paragraphs of this consultation document, I would like to have my say about what should be in these regulations.

It might be helpful if some process was set in place so that those from all the various interests that are represented in your Lordships’ Committee who have shown an interest in this Bill could have an active role in a process of discussion in respect of these regulations. Otherwise, I suspect that at some stage in the progress of this Bill—perhaps on Report—we may find ourselves timetabling insufficient time for the debate that will ensue in relation to Clause 5.

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[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I hear what my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill has just said, and it is a very strong point. None the less, we have to legislate for our own circumstances. I come back to the point that we cannot leave the Bill in a state where individuals can be grotesquely, viciously and intentionally defamed, where huge platforms—website operators—can grow rich in allowing that to happen with total impunity and with no possible remedy for the individuals concerned. That cannot be right. I am reminded slightly of some of the arguments about the banking sector and the banks that are “too big to fail”. We cannot get into a mentality where website operators are too big to pay. We have never had a satisfactory answer for why website operators could not take out comprehensive insurance so that, if they were sued by individuals because of the defamations of those who post on their platforms, they could pay up in the normal way.

I have great sympathy for the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, put his case for Amendment 30, not least because we are all grappling with fiendish and unprecedented problems with no easy answer. Generally, I come down on the side of saying that nobody should have the right to defame others—in a way, incidentally, that will travel further and faster than any other system of publication in the history of the world—and be able to say, “Ooh, no, you can’t reveal my name; that’s a breach of my human rights”. There is another breach of human rights involved in defamation—indeed, it is worse because the defamer is doing it intentionally. I am, of course, taking the worst case. If you have to place in juxtaposition the vicious defamer on the one hand and on the other the possibility that that defamer’s particulars may have to be revealed by the website operator in the process of complying with our new legislation, I am afraid that I have to come down on the side of the person who has been defamed.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, speaking again as a web operator, I do not know any way of establishing a person’s identity just because they are posting. One could establish a web identity, but that may have a very fuzzy relationship with any individual. If someone posts, gives me an e-mail address and I verify that e-mail address, that is about as far as I can get. However, I think that we can reasonably insist on that. If we are offering website operators the protection of this Bill against being sued for what is posted on their sites, we can ask them at least to have verified a web identity. We can ask that they take some steps to have a method of communication with this person and do not just allow straightforward anonymous postings. Then, something put up on the net should come from someone with whom the website operator knows that they have an established means of communication. Whether or not that works, is fake or just ends in silence, I do not think you can ask the website operator to determine. But you can at least make them take the first step.

[Lord May of Oxford]

This is a sensitive and difficult issue but I find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and others that the downside of doing this outweighs the upside. However, it was also my impression—which may just reveal that I did not understand what was going on—that quite a significant recourse is already given by what we were discussing under Clause 5.

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[Lord Mawhinney]

My Lords, I support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Chesterton. Were I surrounded by the Joint Committee, it would be in agreement with my wanting to do so. I say to the noble Lord and, indeed, to my noble friend that the definition of “recognised” may need to be examined a little further and tightened just a little more, not least bearing in mind the point that the noble Lord, Lord May, has just made, but that is relatively straightforward. The principle seems to be a good one, in line with what we in the committee produced, and I commend the noble Lord.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I am slightly sad that this privilege should not be extended to the Daily Mail, if one can imagine how that would work. I am concerned that the definition of “journal” should be wide enough. There are a lot of what might be called open-access journals now, rather than just the ones that are paid for, and I find them much more useful because I can actually get to read what is in them rather than being asked to pay £20 a time to see if what is in there is of interest to me. As the amendments point out, there are a number of websites that serve very similar functions, where intense discussions take place.

Even with regard to the Bill, how much does the word “journal” cover? Would it include Scientific American, for instance, or similar publications? At what point does something stop being a journal and start being a magazine or a publication that is ineligible under this part of the Bill?

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I support the direction of travel that the amendment proposes, but this is not yet a complete process. Let me explain. I had the benefit of a long engagement with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in the early stages of the evolution of this amendment, and I gave him my views on this issue, which were quite strong. My understanding was that the purpose of the early amendment that was put to me was to create an environment in which there could be a debate or dialogue on an issue of controversy, in the public domain and in a moderated fashion, but which would attract privilege.

I expressed my concerns to him about that as an idea, and I summarise them in this fashion: while I agree that there needs to be the sort of debate among scientists, technical people and academics that the noble Lord, Lord May, robustly describes regularly to us, to the benefit of our deliberations, I am not entirely sure that it is in the interests of everyone who is affected by that for it be taking place in public. To give an example off the top of my head, if someone had concerns, based on good technical analysis and engineering understanding about the braking system of a mass-produced motor vehicle, then if I were a shareholder in that firm I would be very unhappy if that debate took place in the public domain before it was settled. I would be equally unhappy if we as legislators allowed that public debate to have privilege, because one could guarantee that no one would buy that motor vehicle while that debate was taking place and it could ruin a business. I am sure that others can think of many other examples that would be entirely inappropriate. So I have reservations about that.

However, if the amendment is not seeking to generate that sort of debate or a forum for that sort of debate and to allow it to attract privilege, and I do not hear that it is, there is now an interesting evolution of the peer-reviewed statement in scientific and academic journals that Clause 6 was designed to create the opportunity for, and to allow there to be privilege. It could properly reflect the changing, modern environment that we live in, where there is the possibility that the organisations that have been given this role, if they all accept it, could provide an opportunity for healthy debate and discussion—an appropriate point in the public domain that would aid academic consideration, and which would aid technical and scientific discussion. I have a number of problems with that and I do not think that we should conclude our debate on this issue at this stage. I hope that the Minister will approach this in the way in which he approached Clause 5 and say that the Government will take this away and think about it.

My understanding of Clause 6 is that it depends on the fact that what is published in scientific or academic journals—they could be e-journals—is entitled to privilege because it is peer reviewed. It does not reach the public, a wider audience, until a controlled discussion has taken place among those people qualified to do so. People who work at that level in a discipline are used to reviewing each other at peer level. We have significant confidence in them. Those of us who do not have the expertise in particular disciplines rely on them heavily as regards what, for example, the BMJ, will allow to be published.

If another institution, or a set of institutions—for example, the institutions identified by these amendments —is willing to take on the responsibility of that level of peer review before it allows these statements to be published, I am entirely in agreement. If that generates a controversial debate, we should consider whether that debate started by a peer-reviewed assessment should attract a level of privilege. I do not know whether other Members of the Committee will share my view that this is a really interesting idea but that it needs a lot more work. I am not in a position to do that significant amount of work but the one question that I ask the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is: what is the equivalent of this addition of peer review? We on these Benches could not support a view on an issue of controversy, which potentially could be defamatory, being exercised in a privileged environment just because it was a view held among technically gifted people, scientists or academics. I think that it could be just as damaging.

Defamation Bill

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for arriving late for a group in which I have amendments, but I am not fussed about having missed Amendment 10A. These are only for discussion anyway. I am also delighted that the Minister is not a lawyer, no more than I. We are in very intimidating company, but I shall be comforted by the thought that I am at least talking on a sort of level with him.

I declare an interest in that I run the Good Schools Guide, and therefore the whole matter of opinion is central to my life. Knowing what is and is not opinion is something to which I have to give daily consideration when I am looking at the comments that people have posted on our website and the comments that we choose to make about schools. I am conscious that I do not get good, consistent legal guidance in this area.

When things are put as they are in subsection (2)—

“the statement complained of was a statement of opinion”—

there are clearly a lot of factual statements which I treat as if they are statements of opinion. If someone says in a restaurant review that the food was cold, that is a statement of fact but the courts are going to treat it as a statement of opinion. On the other hand, if I say about a school that my child was bullied, that is not a statement of opinion but a statement of fact. Yet they both appear in the same English construction as the statement which will be taken as a statement of opinion. Dividing the two for people who are going to practically use this legislation is something which they will find difficult and I have always found difficult; it has frequently cost me lawyers’ bills to decide. I would be comforted if the Government were to make some effort, since we have a Bill on the subject, to enable ordinary users of this legislation to have some certainty as to what is an opinion and what is not. I do not see anything in this clause that makes life easier for me.

The second thing that causes me particular concern is subsection (4)(a), where it seems that in this matter of opinion we introduce the question of a fact:

“The third condition is that an honest person could have held the opinion on the basis of … any fact which existed at the time”.

Even if we go back to the restaurant review, and I say in a review on a website that the food was cold, how can I establish that fact? I am being asked by subsection (4)(a) to say that there is a fact there. I have no way of establishing that fact. If the restaurant disputes that the food was cold, how will I argue that I am dealing with opinion? In my interpretation of subsection (4)(a) as a user of this legislation, rather than being given the freedom of expressing a reasonable opinion based on my experience of something, I am being called back to establish a fact in order to justify my defence that this is an opinion. I have to establish that I have this opinion based on facts. Therefore I have to establish the fact, and I cannot, so I am not entitled to an opinion. As a lay interpreter of the Bill, I find that a worrying clause. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why I should not be worried about it.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, first, I am glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, referred to Lord Ackner. I remember when I was arguing a case called Pepper v Hart and the Attorney-General said, “Don’t pay any attention to what Ministers say at three in the morning, it is often rubbish”. Lord Ackner looked at him and said, “Mr Attorney, is the proposition that Ministers should think before they speak incompatible with good government?”.

The purpose of Clause 3 is to get rid of the uncertain common law and make sure that the problem that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has just raised will not arise again. It is curious that he should mention the example of the food critic, because what convinced me that we needed a Bill, and particularly Clause 3 of the Bill—which was invented by Heather Rogers QC, in my view the most knowledgeable and open-minded of all the QCs practising at the libel Bar—was a case that I did in Northern Ireland about a food critic. A restaurant called Goodfellas, which was probably funded by the IRA, was reviewed in the Irish News by Caroline Workman, the newspaper’s food review critic. The review was very rude about the quality of the food in the restaurant. However, counsel on both sides and the trial judge—and certainly the jury—confused facts and opinion. Caroline Workman was put in the witness box for three days and cross-examined on whether the food was, or was not, of the standard that she had put in the review. When I came in on appeal, I attempted, successfully, to repair the damage by persuading the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland that if it is a food review, and everyone can see that it is about opinion, you need very few facts in order to justify the opinion. There are, for example, food or theatre reviews that just use stars, so that no stars means that it is terrible and five stars means that it is worth eating or seeing. It is defamatory to put no stars, or only one star, but it would be absurd for the reviewer to have to prove anything more than that they were there at the time; in other words, that it was not malicious. Leaving aside for the moment the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, the beauty of Clause 3, as it stands, is that it really does, for the first time, make the distinction between honest opinion and the defence of truth as good as I think one can get it.

However, I agree with everything that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has said about the Telnikoff case. I am not sure about the precise words of the amendment, but if the Minister were able to make a Pepper v Hart statement to indicate that whereas in subsection (8) we overrule the common law defence of fair comment—that we abolish it and start afresh—and that the intention in doing so is, among other things, to overrule the majority decision of the House of Lords in that case, then it might not be necessary for an amendment to proceed. One of the difficulties I have with the amendment is that although it singles out newspapers, there are of course other publishers as well—but that is a matter of boring technicality. I strongly support the spirit of that amendment and I hope that I have clarified why the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, can sleep easily tonight.

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[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, perhaps I may first ask a question on the matter raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. The Minister said in his reply that he thought that it would now, under this Bill, be fine if someone reading the letter could refer to the article, because that was referenced, and that would cover things. Would that be the case if the letter concerned was behind a paywall? As would commonly be the case on Twitter or blogs or whatever, you might well find that the letter had been published in the Times or the Financial Times or some other place which is only accessible if you pay some mogul a large sum of money annually, and is therefore not in a practical sense accessible to someone who just happens to read the letter and react to it. Would that mean that if you published behind a paywall and then commented on it you were not protected by the law as it is set out in this Bill?

Secondly, I turn to the subject of my amendments. As a practical user of the Bill, I am going to find it very difficult to know what is opinion and what is not. At the moment one has to go through ridiculous and convoluted forms of language such as, “I felt that the food was cold” or “I believe that my son was bullied”, in order to make it clear that you are talking about opinion. It does not say clearly anywhere in this Bill that when you are talking of personal experience, that is equivalent to opinion. We are coming to the effects of this clause on Clause 5 concerning website operators when judging whether an incoming comment is a comment or a statement of fact. It is very important to have rules and to know where the law lies, but at the moment Clause 3 does not make that clear. I continue to have a problem with the way paragraph (4)(a) is expressed. Something is not an honestly held opinion,

“on the basis of any fact which existed at the time”.

That does not appear to have any application to whether the person who held the opinion was aware of the fact, or indeed was even capable of being aware of the fact. If the fact existed, that makes the opinion a dishonest one and therefore not protected. Again, I find that concept very difficult.

I shall certainly bring these matters back on Report, but I will be grateful for any guidance and perhaps the opportunity to go through these things with officials before the next stage.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend for his questions. I can give him an assurance that we will write to him on the specific points that he raised. That will allow for a proper period of reflection.

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[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

To correct the record, the noble Lord, Lord Lester, referred to Sir Brian Neill and the huge contribution that he made to this part of the law, but he did say that he was in hospital. I am happy to tell the Committee that he is now back home and will no doubt be following this debate with the greatest interest, either in Hansard or possibly—he is sufficiently technically minded—on television.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, my noble friend in his speech, and my other noble friend subsequently, convinced me that my Amendment 16A was misguided, so I shall not pursue it. However, I will ask my noble friend how he thinks his Amendment 14, and in particular the words “reasonably believed”, will apply to Twitter. It is a common function of Twitter that one passes on interesting news, sometimes with an added comment of one’s own, attributing it to a source generally rather than appropriating it for oneself. Would one be expected, under this amendment, to pursue inquiries as to whether one believed the source, or the particular information; or will it be sufficient to reasonably believe that the place you got it from is likely to be reliable?

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[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I shall address my amendments in this group and reiterate that I have a considerable interest to declare in that I run the Good Schools Guide and, therefore, a website on which such comments are regularly posted.

So far as identity is concerned, I have a lot of sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said. I do not generally like people who hide behind anonymity on the web, although it has become a habit. One generally knows who one is talking to on Twitter, at least after a while, but there are other areas of the web, such as Mumsnet, where you do not have a clue and there is no indication of the identity of the person. Often that is just because people are talking more openly than they might if they were to be identified. They might say something about a shop that they use regularly or a school which their children attend which is helpful to other people to know, but which they would find it embarrassing to be linked back to.

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[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Why should the expense and risk be on the side of the citizen?

[Lord Lucas]

Absolutely—the expense should be on the citizen who, having made the comment, is the target of the defamation action; but the website should not be forced to take down the comment just by the threat of a defamation action against the person who originated the comment. Otherwise, it becomes all too easy to wipe complaints off the public record. It is not that I wish the person complained against not to have any means of action but it should be against the person posting the comment and not against the website that is hosting the comment, until it has been proved to be defamation and a court order comes saying, “You must take this down”.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My noble friend is putting forward a situation which has no parallel, for example, in newspapers, or radio or television. It is no good the newspaper saying, “Well, this isn’t my letter, this is the letter of John Smith and therefore it is nothing to do with me”. Why should it be any different for the web operator?

[Lord Lucas]

We are dealing with the web operator as a conduit and not as a publisher. If I want to make a particular statement about a company that I feel has wronged me, I will do so using public media such as Facebook, Twitter or other sites on which I might post a comment. That is me making that statement. If I am identifiable, which I think is quite proper, then the action should be against me. Otherwise, it means that those who are behaving badly and wish to hide that bad behaviour can simply wipe all record of my complaint off all public websites without any risk or trouble to themselves. I would say that it is in the public interest that I make my views on this particular company known, but I am going to be deprived of all means of doing so in an electronic world because I will have no access to what becomes the medium of communication, because as soon as I say anything there the company that I have complained about can wipe it out. That seems to me an entirely unreasonable situation.

We have to recognise that we are dealing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, with a different world and a different way of doing things and that if we want news of bad practice to spread, we have to allow it to be published. Allowing it to be published means holding harmless those who are acting as a conduit. I am a publisher and recognise that if I publish something unpleasant about some school or person then I, as a publisher, take that on the chin. That is part of my remunerated business. However, the owners of Twitter are getting no benefit from the fact that I have tweeted something on it—there is no revenue with which to offset the cost of establishing that I have a right under law to say what I have said, so they will immediately take it down, if complained against, unless we provide them with some kind of “hold harmless” defence. So it is very important that the conduits, if they behave well, establish the identity and share it with the complainant, and can continue to publish until the point has been reached where it has been established in a court of law, or by agreement or otherwise, that what has been said is defamatory.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that it is very important that, where something has been said about a company or a person that is considered defamatory, a statement from the person who is being defamed should be published alongside the original statement. That is a relatively easy technical thing to do, and I do not think people should have to wait seven days. It should be relatively automatic. These days, one day—certainly one working day—is enough to do that. That should be an automatic right, because it is easy to do and balances things reasonably.

I am also interested in the question of moderation, which has been referred to. The status of moderation under this clause seems to be very uncertain. By moderating to any extent, do you become the publisher of what has been said? A lot of sites will just allow unrestricted publication, and that appears to be safe, but we and many other sites will moderate; that is, we will want to see what has been said before we decide that it can be published. If we moderate and then publish, have we assumed liability for what is said? Have we assumed a liability for checking it? If not, it becomes impossible to moderate and you are saying, “We wish the web to be entirely unmoderated and we think that the process of moderation is undesirable”. I am not sure that that is what the Government intend to say.

If you allow moderation, do you allow within that any kind of editing or advice? If someone posts a comment and it appears to be a statement of fact rather than opinion, are you allowed to say to that person, “You have not phrased this as a statement of opinion. If you resubmit it as a statement of opinion, we will publish it”. Is that taking responsibility for what as been said? I think of moderation as something we should encourage. It improves the quality of the web as a whole, although it is an expensive thing to do. We should be clear in this clause about the extent to which we are prepared to support and protect the process of moderation.

Lastly, I come back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said about TripAdvisor. I think that it is barking up the wrong tree. I suggest that it employs what we have effectively used over many years and I will call the Good Schools Guide defence. If a school starts to complain about comments we have made, we merely post the fact that we are not prepared to allow comments on this school because we do not agree with the school’s policy on taking down comments. That is as good as anything. If TripAdvisor were to do that to a hotel, that would be worse than any comment that anyone could possibly publish. It would achieve the end result it wanted without pain.

[Lord Allan of Hallam]

My Lords, I also declare a considerable interest in that I work for Facebook, one of the web operators which may receive notices under subsection (5). In contributing to the debate, I am trying to bring some of the expertise that we have as operators of internet websites more generally to what is, I know, a complex and difficult debate and one which we make more complex and difficult by having fast-moving technology. In that respect, I shall touch first on the amendment which proposes that we should talk about electronic platforms rather than websites per se. In doing so, I will pick up on some of the other points made in the debate around whether websites are different and special; they may be or they may not.

There are essentially two classes of website. There are websites which are owned by a single organisation and over which that organisation has editorial control. It could be argued that such websites should be treated like a newspaper or any other form of media. Indeed, those websites are specifically excluded from having this defence because, under subsection (2), they are clearly the organisation that posted the statement in question to the website, so it runs the website and creates the content for it.

There is a whole class of other websites or platforms where the body which produces that platform has no direct interest in the content, exercises no editorial control and simply exists, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, described it, as a conduit that enables a citizen to speak with other citizens all over the world. These platforms have become tremendously successful precisely because they democratise speech in a way that was not previously possible because you needed a printing press or other expensive equipment. It is right that in the context of Clause 5 we should think about the position of those operators. That is much more widely recognised in law, if we look at the e-commerce directive, which has been very successful. It was designed precisely with the fact in mind that we have on the internet platforms the job of which is to connect people, but which are not responsible for the content being shared between the people connecting through these platforms. This covers a whole range of other areas such as copyright, illegal content and so on.

However, this does not mean it is a lawless space —that discussion was held earlier—in fact, it is a very lawful space. The operators have responsibility but the primary responsibility for content shared across a platform has to reside with the person who posted and shared that content. In that respect, Clause 5 takes us absolutely in the right direction. It directs platforms—the second type of website that is not editorially responsible—towards a regime within which it is in their interests to connect the poster of the content with the complainer about it and to seek to resolve the dispute between the two parties. Where that dispute cannot be resolved between them, the operator then has some responsibilities.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I should declare an interest as chair of the Enforcement Law Reform Group. As such, I count many bailiffs among my acquaintances—and do not know one who would not support this amendment. Everybody in the bailiff industry, from those who have spent a lifetime in it to the most vocal advocates of the poor, wants regulation and a complaints system. This has been an active subject in government since 1980. We have had several times when action has been promised and no times when action has resulted. It is high time that the Government did something. The previous Minister in charge of this promised that he would do something, and it was delayed and delayed. We have a new Minister in charge and again we are promised that something will happen, but nothing substantial has come forward. It is time we had action. It is no bad thing that we in this House should pass an amendment signalling just how seriously we regard this constant delay. It is very important that whatever we do about regulation, we have an appeals process: some way in which bad behaviour can be brought to book and in which complaints can be heard.

There are pros and cons of doing it in any particular direction. I have had very good experiences with ombudsmen—not in this area, but others; it is a system that works well. But it is not good enough to have no appeals process. Having done bailiff regulation in whatever way the Government propose to do it, we cannot even think of not having a serious system of appeal and for dealing with bad practice. Without it, the bad practice will not disappear. The serious members of the bailiff profession very much want it to, but they need the Government’s help. The Government have set up a system of remuneration for bailiffs which invites bad practice, because it makes it uncommercial and uncompetitive to behave according to the rules. Under those circumstances one should not be surprised that things get pushed a bit. Proposals and studies on the proper system of remuneration for bailiffs have been around for a long time; we have not yet seen them implemented. The Government ought to make progress, and I should be delighted if the Minister would give a firm promise on this to prevent the noble Baroness pressing her amendment. However, if she does press it, and if I am unhappy with what the Minister says, I shall be in the Lobby with her.

[Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope]

I follow my noble friend Lord Lucas and concur with what he and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, said. The House owes her a debt of gratitude for pursuing this matter to Third Reading. After these proceedings the House has many important duties and discussions, so I want to be brief. I concur with everything said by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. However, unusually for me given the context of the discussion, I want to ask my noble friend on the Front Bench a party-political question. It is a very simple one. The governing coalition agreement makes specific reference to more protection against aggressive bailiffs; that is what we as a coalition Government in 2010 undertook to do. Can the Minister assure me that in 2015, when the coalition agreement runs its course, he will be able to provide me with an answer to the question, “What additional protection against aggressive bailiffs have we as a junior coalition partner been able to provide?”? That is a very important question and I am certain that it will be asked.

That is the first point I want to make. The second point is that time is now running out; I know this as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. April 2013 is not a cliff edge that will suddenly cause an explosion of debt-enforcement proceedings. However, that date marks a significant change to the risks faced by low-income households against a very difficult financial background, which we all know about. It is not safe to leave in place the current inadequate proceedings—the framework within which debt enforcement is conducted—against the background of what we all hope will be a short-term period of financial distress. These low-income families have nowhere else to go. They are, by definition, the most vulnerable people in the country. Sometimes their heritable property and homes are at stake, so the stakes for them could not be higher. It is therefore essential that we do everything in our power to make sure that the rules are observed.

No one is suggesting that debt enforcement cannot be pursued. That would be quite wrong. There is no party politics in this, and I am not making a party-political complaint, but the department has been sitting on this for far too long. Speaking for myself, if the Minister is not able to give the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, her amendment as stated, I want to know how long it will take for him to bring about the change that the amendment requests. I know the Minister very well, and I know that he takes these issues seriously. I know that he has strength as a political operator and a huge amount of experience. I do not believe that it is impossible for someone of his stature to go back to the department and say, “You have a maximum of 12 months to sort this out, otherwise my reputation as a Minister will come under attack”. That is all he needs to do because if I was his senior adviser on this matter and he raised an eyebrow and uttered sentences of that kind, I would not think twice about trying to sort the problem. Time is not on our side.

People get touched by debt-enforcement proceedings after they have had personal experience. I know this because when I was fledgling provincial solicitor I used to instruct sheriff officers who were subject to the control of the sheriff. Any sheriff officer who got on the wrong side of the rules in front of Sheriff James Patterson in Jedburgh Court got a dose of Jedburgh justice himself. As a solicitor for organisations such as the then South of Scotland Electricity Board, I found that the operation of debt enforcement was perfectly controlled but deeply affecting. I remember as a young solicitor understanding the effects of properly enforced debt obligations on families in a small rural community. They made a real mark on me. My experience since is that anybody who is touched by any element of debt-enforcement proceedings is traumatised in a way that few other occurrences—domestic, personal or otherwise—produce, so we have a double obligation to try to get these things right.

I am about to retire as a lay member of the General Medical Council. For the past four years, I have had an engaging and enjoyable time watching the beneficial effects of a sensible, light-touch regulation system with licences, appeals and complaints that put a framework around everything that the professionals in the system do. I am absolutely persuaded that it is in the interests of bailiffs, debtors, creditors, courts and everyone else to have a playing field on which the rules are absolutely clear. The essential elements of that are an appeal system that people understand, a competent complaints service and licences that can be withdrawn if people flagrantly abuse the rules. It works in medicine and in other walks of life—it will work in debt-enforcement proceedings.

In conclusion, I say to my noble friend that, as coalition partners, we not only have to provide an answer before 2015 to the urgent political question of providing more protection but, more importantly, we have to get the system in place before universal credit compounds all the benefit problems, council tax debts and other issues to which the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, referred. Time is running out. We must get this done. I know the Minister understands the importance of this, so the key thing for me is the timeline. If the Minister does not in his response put his own imprimatur that he will get this done in a reasonable time, I may follow the noble Baroness into the Lobby if she decides to press this to a Division.

Defamation Bill

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Monday 17th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I declare an ancient professional interest. I was counsel in the Derbyshire case from beginning to end. I think that I should explain some of the background, which I hope will not bore the non-lawyers more than the lawyers. In the New York Times and Sullivan case in the United States, the problem was that a police officer brought libel proceedings against the NAACP. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a landmark case, decided that where a public figure was the alleged victim of a libel, he could sue only if he showed bad faith or a reckless disregard of truth.

In the Derbyshire case, Derbyshire County Council, rather than Mr Bookbinder, decided to bring libel proceedings to protect what it called its governing reputation. I argued that the Sullivan rule should apply in English law. I failed—and I failed for a very good reason, which is that American law, illogically, looks at the identity of the claimant rather than the subject matter of the libel claim. When the case reached the House of Lords, however, that great Scottish judge— I repeat for the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Browne—that great Scottish judge, Lord Keith of Kinkel, said that you do not need the European Convention on Human Rights to win this case. The common law matches Article 10 of the Convention, and Derbyshire County Council should not be permitted to seek to vindicate its governing reputation by using libel law and instead can go by way of malicious falsehood. In other words, rather like the United States, it could proceed if it proved bad faith or reckless disregard of truth.

That is the law as it stood and as it has stood ever since. Subsequently there have been some cases where for example a political party has been held to fall within this rule on a case-by-case basis. When the Human Rights Act came into force it could have listed, as does the Freedom of Information Act, hundreds of public authorities that would be subject to the Act. Instead it adopted a different test from this amendment—namely, whether the body was performing functions—even though it was a private body—of a public nature. Tomorrow the Commission on a Bill of Rights which my noble friend Lord Faulks, and I are both on, will be reporting about that definition and what has happened to it.

The argument in favour of an amendment of this kind would be that it would somehow clarify the law. I put my name to it because of my interest in the subject matter. Unfortunately, I do not think it does clarify the law because it does not use the same kind of test of what is a public authority or a private body performing public functions. It uses a different test. The argument, I suppose, against this approach is that it is better to leave it to the judges to do this on a case-by-case basis. I myself am attracted to the idea of including something of this kind. I did not put it in my own Bill—I did not think about it at the time. I failed to persuade the Government to put it in their draft Bill, but there was a consultation on it. I am bound to have to say that there was little enthusiasm in the consultation for doing this. So, although I put my name to it, I have some hesitation to the way it is worded.

This is a very important constitutional question. What we are really saying is that a public authority or a body exercising functions of a public nature should have to go through malicious falsehood and prove malice or recklessness.

We would also go on to say that, of course, the individual councillors or public officers could themselves still sue and therefore that we would not be doing any injustice to public bodies in doing this.

I have taken too long to explain all of that, but it is important that one understands the full context of this. I am sure that this is a matter on which the luckless Minister will have to reflect further.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, if this amendment was passed, it would make my life notably more comfortable, but none the less I do not think it should be. In my business of running The Good Schools Guide, I spend a lot of time being uncomfortable to schools and we have on regular occasions in the past 27 years been threatened more or less successfully with legal action for defamation. That seems reasonable. I do not see why schools should not react to what I say because what I allow to be published can have a considerable effect, not just on independent schools, which obviously rely on parents paying fees, but on state schools as well. That is because if children are discouraged from going to a particular state school, that school will suffer.

There are many occasions when parents say things about schools which are entirely unjustified and it is therefore proper that I or anyone else in my position should be careful of what we say and the basis on which something is said. We must ensure that we can reasonably believe that there is some truth behind what is being said. Although I agree that one should be uninhibited in one’s attacks on political parties and government generally, as you move away from them, you reach institutions that are smaller and more personal. An unjustified attack could have a very damaging effect, and so the law of defamation probably should apply. I would much rather see defences against the right to protest against bad public services as part of Clause 4; indeed, I think that Clause 4 could be made more specific so that it is clear that raucous views about public services are to be encouraged and given a wide latitude by the courts. Only under exceptional circumstances should those views be stamped upon. That puts the rights of the public in the context where they belong in this Bill, but to have a blanket prohibition would make schools and universities vulnerable to unjustified attacks. There has to be some form of protection against the most vitriolic.

[Lord Faulks]

Would not my noble friend’s criticisms in the capacity in which he has described them be protected in any event by qualified privilege? In the absence of malice, he or anyone in his position is able to express their view without fear or favour.

[Lord Lucas]

Yes, but that is not the way things operate in practice. A lot of the time, the views expressed by someone like me are second-hand, while the views expressed by parents are perhaps not backed up by fact. It is not that we cannot comment, but in my view schools should have a defence against something that is unreasonable. At one point we had to pulp an edition of the guide because of what we had said, and I accept that as a proper interpretation of the law. To have a situation where no school can sue under any circumstances would put them at an unreasonable disadvantage. I appreciate that someone in my position has many privileges, but they should not be absolute.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, listening to our debate with great attention means that one defines it almost along the line of whether or not you are a lawyer. I am also conscious that we have heard an array of accents, including both Scottish and Northern Irish. I will do my best to explain the Government’s position in whatever accent noble Lords believe mine to be.

As has already been said, and as I am sure noble Lords appreciate, this is an area where the law is still developing. In Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers, the House of Lords held that local authorities and government bodies are already prevented from bringing actions for defamation. My noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill said that he was involved in that case. Therefore, I speak with a degree of trepidation. However, I heard him express support for the position that I am going to outline. My noble friend referred to the Government’s consultation paper in which we sought views on the suggestion that this principle should be put in statute and on whether it should be extended to a wider range of bodies exercising public functions. A clear majority of the responses considered that wider statutory extension of the Derbyshire principle would not be appropriate and took the view that this would represent a significant restriction on the right of a wide range of organisations to defend their reputation. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Lucas expressed that view. We share that concern. We also consider that a statutory provision would be too rigid and could also lead to litigation and uncertainty over whether particular bodies and functions fell within its scope.

As I have said, the law in this area is still developing and legislation could remove the flexibility that exists under the common law for the courts to develop the Derbyshire principle as they consider appropriate in the light of individual cases. We believe that it is better to allow the courts to do this rather than introduce a rigid and restrictive statutory provision. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, will agree to withdraw the amendment.

House of Lords: Reform

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, it is a complete pain to be speaking after the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. He said so much that I wanted to say that I shall have to prune my speech as I go along. I suppose I can summarise my attitude to this Bill by saying, “I agree with Nick, but not much”. I agree much more with the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I am a thoroughgoing supporter of an elected House of Lords, but rather in the mould of my noble friend Lord Waddington. I want to see a more balanced bicameral system. I want to see the Executive having less power. As the Executive have so much power in the Commons, a stronger, elected House of Lords would be a useful change to the British constitution, but that is not what we are talking about now.

What we are talking about now is a completely botched reform, concocted in dark rooms by a party that is meant to believe in openness, without even involving the Front Bench of the Labour Party or taking any account of all the expertise around this House about how it might have got further in achieving its aims. As my noble friend Lord Lang pointed out, leaving the powers and functions as they are but changing the composition of the House is a recipe for instability. The powers and functions will have to be rebalanced, and how that will happen is essentially unpredictable. I believe that, as others have said, we will go through a period where an elected House under this Bill will fight to improve its position, to get power and to make itself worth while. How could it do otherwise because the alternative is grim, dull and uninteresting?

We are offering people coming into this House 15 years with the wages of a moderately senior teacher, no prospects of promotion, no afterlife and no influence. How are people like that going to be respected by the House of Commons? It is the respect that the House of Commons has for the people here, for us, that makes the whole thing function. A lot of people here were senior Ministers, have played a part in Government and have the same qualities as the people in another place, except that they have been through it all and succeeded. Added to that, there is a collection of people who have succeeded in the courses that they have followed in life. Although we are a nuisance, get in the way of what the Government want to do and do not have to go through elections, none the less we are accorded respect, and that makes for the balance in the House.

We have a Bill and I do not see how, in the course of coalition politics and looking after the pride of the Liberal Party and its leader, we can get away from the fact that this is the Bill we will probably end up with. However, as many Peers have said, a lot in this Bill reproduces what is in the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Steel. Therefore, we can actually build on many of the proposals in this Bill. If we cut away the bits that do not work and do not make sense we may end up with this Bill looking remarkably like the Steel Bill, perhaps with a few improvements. It is a task which I do not envy the noble Lord, Lord Richard, and his committee. I am delighted he has taken it on. I am sure he will chair it brilliantly. I have no wish at all to join him but I look forward very much to what he has to say in a year or two’s time.

I have some suggestions for him. Now that we are going to have a fixed pattern of elections, it seems to me that even in an appointed House we could take a step towards election by making sure that at election times the parties expose to the public the list of those they intend to put forward for the House of Lords under the Steel Bill. If we are having the Steel Bill system with a 15-year term and a regular flow of new entrants, the major parties—Conservative and Labour—will have about 70 or 80 Peers to create in any five-year period. They can safely expose the top 30 or 40 names without any risk that anyone on that list will not get into the House of Lords. That would mean that when you were voting for a party you knew what they were going to do with the House of Lords and you knew the quality of people they were going to put in there. It would be something which was a matter at the general election. It would be an element of democratic accountability. You could even have a separate vote for the lists of Peers that parties were putting forward. This would have the advantage of dissociating the percentages in this House from the percentages that had voted for the other House and would greatly weaken any claim to democratic legitimacy that this House might feel as a result of having had an element of election.

I would also suggest, in contrast to what my noble friend Lord Marlesford said, that when it comes to reducing this House, as needs to be done, we should not pay people, we should offer hereditary peerages. It is an attractive thing. My peerage, if I am cynical about it, is a reward for buggery and bribery but hallowed by several hundred years in between. Noble Lords have got here for entirely legitimate and honourable reasons, certainly by comparison, and they would be elegant additions to the hereditary peerage as it will then be, which is something entirely irrelevant. It will have been severed from its connection with this House and will be merely a decoration rather in the way that French titles are a decoration. It would be a pleasant badge for people in this House to be able to hand down to their successors and adequate compensation for many people who were looking for a good reason to retire. Giving money to people to retire is going back to sinecures and to bad old ways I would not like to see reproduced.

I want to see a House of Lords which is as strong as it is now and which is an attractive place for the many people who get here because of their own experience and skills. That is the right balance to try to maintain. I think we can do it while improving, in many ways, the House at the moment and I wish the noble Lord, Lord Richard, every success in that. I hope, too, that he will manage to remove IPSA from the Bill. I do not think we should wish that on ourselves.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tyler]

I am very grateful to my noble friend, but there is an additional reason. In fact the average is not 300; it is over 400. That figure is out of date. I accept entirely what my noble friend said and I hope that there will be support from other Members across the House when it comes to looking at this issue in the Joint Committee.

Finally, under whatever system of PR, if the number is so small it will be quite difficult to get diversity—indeed, even gender balance—in the membership of this House. If only 80 Members are elected in each tranche there will be relatively small multi-Member seats and it will be quite difficult to get the sort of diversity and gender balance that I know many Members of your Lordships' House wish to have. Many have already expressed concerns on this.

[Lord Lucas]

Does the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, accept that whatever way I vote today and whatever I think of his speech as a whole, I am in total agreement with that last section?

[Lord Tyler]

I am embarrassed by this support from all sides. It is an unaccustomed experience. I hope that this will be a very early discussion in the Joint Committee.

The Government’s proposals are incremental and evolutionary and take advantage of the work of the royal commission led so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham. They take advantage of all the thinking that went into the work on the Jack Straw White Paper and it is simply nonsense to suggest that this issue has suddenly burst upon us in this House and in the other House and among the public. People have been talking about these issues for a very long time and been studying precisely the concerns which have been expressed in your Lordships' House yesterday and today. These proposals maintain the best of this place and will give it the legitimacy and credibility that I believe it not only needs but deserves. The pace of change will still be slow, but its direction will be clear. For that, it is very much welcome.

Prisons

Lord Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 13th July 2010 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I declare an interest as I have a close association with a charity called Safe Ground, which works in prisons and addresses the third point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern. May I say how much I agree with her about how effective it is and how difficult it has been to get funding and attention from a Prison Service obsessed with targets and tick-boxes? I hope that that will not be a characteristic of the Prison Service of the future. I greeted Ken Clarke’s announcement with total delight. I have waited 15 years, which is most of my time in this House, for a Home Secretary about whom I can say that—and at last I have one. If we can get the people out of prison who should not be there—principally, to my mind, those with drug and mental health problems—and treat them properly elsewhere, we would make the space in prisons for prison to work properly and do what it should be doing to rehabilitate the people who are in there.

There is no time to put what I am going to say in context, I shall just fire off words of advice at the Minister and hope that he takes them. First, he should not abolish NOMS but allow it to evolve. When you make big reconstructions in places such as the NHS and schools it takes a couple of years for the system to stabilise, for everyone to know what they are doing and for it to become easy to work with again. Prisons just do not have that resilience. There are no populations of qualified professionals such as doctors and head teachers around to bring a system back to normal quickly. It has taken five plus years for NOMS to settle down. It has at last got some degree of stability. Parts of it work very well but there are elements of extreme waste and misallocation, which I am sure this Government will take a knife to. But, for goodness’ sake, allow the structure to evolve rather than shake everything up again, which will make it impossible for other people to work with it. We must also look carefully at this election mantra of payment by results. The only people who can stand that are big commercial organisations. How can little charities, focusing on one part of the problem, ever live under that sort of structure? You will lose an awful lot of good work if you make that the centre of what you are doing.

Secondly, take a lesson from schools and make governors and management teams stay a decent length of time. What would you think of a school which changed its headmaster every 18 months or two years? You would never send a child there, and quite right too. It takes time for a governor to get to grips with a prison. They need to be there five or seven years to make prison somewhere where the governor is the governing influence rather than the bureaucrat in the middle of tick-boxes and targets. You have to learn more from schools than that. You have to support and find ways to involve governors stuck in prisons in outside things, but for goodness’ sake leave them in charge of prisons. The Prison Service could take a lesson from Teach First. Having really high-quality people in a profession makes an enormous difference. You cannot easily take people straight out of university or school into the Prison Service; they need to spend a bit of time in the world first. There has always been a connection with the services and a good flow of people between the services and the Prison Service. There is no reason why that cannot be made into something much more formal whereby we take the best people coming out of the Army, train them up and support them and get a really high-quality cadre into the Prison Service, making it something which people look up to, as they should.

Ministers have set out on a 25-year journey. This is real long-term stuff. The Secretary of State for Justice should be there for the full five years of the Government. The Prisons Minister should be there for the full five years of the Government. If you have rotating Ministers all the time, it is terribly difficult to keep long-term objectives in mind. Your job as Ministers is to take the flak and to stand up there while the Daily Mail throws stuff at you. Things go wrong in prisons. You must have the courage of knowing that you are not risking your next promotion by getting some little thing wrong and running for cover, as Ministers have done so often in the past 15 years. We want to see courage and commitment right at the top.