Defamation Bill

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Monday 17th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas]

Yes, but that is not the way things operate in practice. A lot of the time, the views expressed by someone like me are second-hand, while the views expressed by parents are perhaps not backed up by fact. It is not that we cannot comment, but in my view schools should have a defence against something that is unreasonable. At one point we had to pulp an edition of the guide because of what we had said, and I accept that as a proper interpretation of the law. To have a situation where no school can sue under any circumstances would put them at an unreasonable disadvantage. I appreciate that someone in my position has many privileges, but they should not be absolute.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, listening to our debate with great attention means that one defines it almost along the line of whether or not you are a lawyer. I am also conscious that we have heard an array of accents, including both Scottish and Northern Irish. I will do my best to explain the Government’s position in whatever accent noble Lords believe mine to be.

As has already been said, and as I am sure noble Lords appreciate, this is an area where the law is still developing. In Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers, the House of Lords held that local authorities and government bodies are already prevented from bringing actions for defamation. My noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill said that he was involved in that case. Therefore, I speak with a degree of trepidation. However, I heard him express support for the position that I am going to outline. My noble friend referred to the Government’s consultation paper in which we sought views on the suggestion that this principle should be put in statute and on whether it should be extended to a wider range of bodies exercising public functions. A clear majority of the responses considered that wider statutory extension of the Derbyshire principle would not be appropriate and took the view that this would represent a significant restriction on the right of a wide range of organisations to defend their reputation. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Lucas expressed that view. We share that concern. We also consider that a statutory provision would be too rigid and could also lead to litigation and uncertainty over whether particular bodies and functions fell within its scope.

As I have said, the law in this area is still developing and legislation could remove the flexibility that exists under the common law for the courts to develop the Derbyshire principle as they consider appropriate in the light of individual cases. We believe that it is better to allow the courts to do this rather than introduce a rigid and restrictive statutory provision. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, will agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that response. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Lucas and Lord Lester, for their contributions. Like the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, I quake when I hear the noble Lord speak who was the barrister in the case we are discussing. However, I am disappointed by the Minister’s response. To say that this matter is for the courts to decide seems to run counter to everything we are trying to do in this Bill, which is to provide people with a document that will inform them about these issues. Therefore, the noble Lord’s response is very regrettable. I also think it is out of time in that the increasing competition between providers puts one lot of people at a disadvantage compared with another because if a local authority is competing with someone else for the provision of a service, and one side can be sued for libel but not the other, that is a great inequality and it is not a level playing field. I dare say that cases will be brought on that basis. We shall need to return to this issue because there is inequality between different providers of services. However, for this evening, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.