Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, this is indeed major legislation—298 pages, and that does not tell us the whole story anyway; it is bunged full of regulations. There are 62 regulation-making powers, and, glory be, dear old Henry VIII comes to the fore to put right all 61 of the other regulatory measures, all 177 clauses and 20 schedules, which are eternal in their length. That is not the way to legislate.

I am not here to argue against any measure which promotes public safety, but I want to touch on one or two aspects of constitutionality that matter. If I really had the nerve and the time, I would simply re-read to the whole House the reports from the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee.

Can we just look at Clause 36 and that group, on the extraction of information from electronic devices? It is done by consent of the user, unless there is a death, in which case no consent is needed. That is fine until we remember—particularly looking around the Chamber, where I do not see many people under the age of 30—how people aged under 30 behave in a way that we do not; they use their devices to convey just about everything you can care to think of about their own lives. They send that to recipients, and they receive messages back. That information is private to the recipient. It may be very rude about the recipient; it may tell him in the nicest possible way that he is to push off and other things that people say to each other on their devices. I sometimes wonder why I should not have one myself—[Laughter.] I did not mean that.

The serious point is that the communications are not protected in any way, shape or form, so a constable, who is an authorised officer for the purpose of the Act, can on complying with the conditions simply extract a whole lot of information which may be immensely personal to lots of people other than the user. We need to think about that; we are talking about young people who have to have confidence in our criminal justice system. We even need to think about the convention, which the Minister has said we are compliant with; I just wonder whether that will turn out to be the case, because I do not share her conviction about it.

I am very concerned about the casual way in which this has been done. We are waiting for regulations. The Secretary of State has to decide about protected information and confidential information. Do we know anything about what they are going to do? No. We are waiting for it in Clause 41. And so it goes on.

We then turn to the provisions on demonstrations, processions and assemblies. I am not going to enter into the debate on that; others will speak on it—whether this is right or wrong or consistent—but I want us to ask this. We are accepting all this on faith. We do not know what this Act means; we literally do not know. We are waiting for a definition from the Secretary of State to tell us. I thought the words were perfectly straightforward, but, no, the Secretary of State by regulation is going to tell us what “serious disruption” means. I think we know what it means, but we are nevertheless asked to enact this measure waiting for the Secretary of State to tell us what she thinks it means. The important point is that what she thinks it means will be in a regulation and that is what it will mean. We will not have the slightest idea whether we agree with it; we may or we may not.

Going on with it, we turn to—no, I shall not go on with it; my time is nearly up.

[Noble Lords]

More, more!

[Lord Judge (CB)]

Noble Lords are very kind.

I support the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that we have to address the issue of the evidence in sexual cases. Judge Pigot has been dead years. He wrote his report way back in the 1990s. We have gradually introduced bits of it; we are still waiting. It is an eminently sensible, practical proposal. I shall support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment on that issue when I see it.

Can we do a bit more to protect women and children and victims of sexual violence? Can we please not wait for the report from the Law Commission? The consultation document outdoes even the Bill; it is 500-plus pages long without even an index and it is controversial. That Bill will not simply go through the House as a Law Commission Bill. Can the Government either amend the existing legislation or follow the amendment in the name of, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Russell—I am sure he will be talking about it—to add that safeguard?

I could not help reflecting on the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Many years ago, I heard a programme on the radio in which people were allowed to say what conversation they would most like to have heard of which they had heard only two words. Two dons are walking down the road in Oxford, and the listener hears one old boy say to the other, “And, ninthly”. That is the conversation he would have wanted to hear. We heard all nine from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, we are all agreed that terrorism has the most dreadful consequences and we all feel a deep sense of compassion for the victims of terrorism and their families. It has a societal impact too, beyond the suffering of individuals and their families. One of the societal consequences is highlighted in the Bill, in the proposal that we should have legislation leading to a reduction of the freedom of individuals on the basis of suspicion alone. That is a grim consequence. It may have to be faced, but we should recognise it. And when we face up to it, we also have to address another simple fact. I suspect that all noble Lords know of cases—I certainly do—where individuals have been arrested with reasonable grounds for suspicion, who have turned out to be completely and utterly innocent. It is something worth bearing in mind.

Your Lordships have addressed all the issues, so I am not going to repeat them. I will merely say thank you very much and think of something new to say. It concerns the sentencing decision. Anybody who has had to pass a sentence will know that a sentencing decision is not as easy as it may look on paper. You are dealing with a human being who has upset, offended, injured, damaged or murdered another human being. Everybody is involved. A judge facing a sentencing decision—and this is no time for a lecture on it—has to balance a series of factors, some of which are totally contradictory.

Related to that, fixing different aspects of the sentencing formula is dangerous, but we have decided to do it by having a provision that enables the defendant who indicates an immediate intention to plead guilty to the crime with which he is charged to have a discount against his sentence of one-third. I can argue with you about the wisdom or unwisdom of that, but it is what we have. The Bill proposes, in exactly that situation, to reduce the discount to 20%—from one-third to one-fifth.

This matters. It is easy to say that it is just paper, but let us think of the value of an early guilty plea. The victim of the crime knows that that part of this awful process is over. He or she will not be challenged about his or her evidence. It will not be suggested to a woman who says she has been raped that she consented. It will save the victim a huge ordeal to know for certain that that is now over. It also saves the time and trouble of police officers who have to give evidence, forensic scientists and the whole process of the court. It also saves the court’s time, so that it can move on to deal with the huge backlog of cases that there currently is. It knows that that time will be available.

So when we talk about the sentence being reduced or a discount for a guilty plea, we should remember the value to the victim of closure: the fact that the problem can now be addressed and that the long uncertainty will not be hanging over him or her for 12 or 18 months; and the value to the public interest, which means that that is the end of it, apart from the sentence. In terrorist cases, that value is just as great as it is in any other. I know I will be told by the Minister that there is a precedent for this. It is a bad precedent. It is illogical and it should not be followed in this case. You cannot increase sentences for those convicted of terrorism offences, which I support, by devaluing the guilty plea of those who are willing to admit from the outset that they are guilty.

I have one other tiny observation. Can we be careful not to assume that the Newton hearing, which gets a mention in the Explanatory Note, is an answer to the potential danger of finding that somebody is being treated as though he has committed a criminal offence for which he has not been tried, let alone convicted?

Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Bill [HL]

Lord Judge Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 15th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB) [V]]

We need a sensible extradition regime, and at the moment we have one. I strongly support it and nobody can think of a single reason why we should not work in a mutually acceptable way with territories, as the Act calls them—or countries, as ordinary people call them—that we trust: those we trust, those we trust to trust each other and those who we are confident will abide by the ordinary rules when seeking extradition of British citizens and vice versa. We all work together.

In this particular situation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, just said, we have a Government who would produce a list of countries or territories with which we would all be happy, and, bingo, the affirmative resolution is passed and we all go away happy, and for myself I cannot imagine that a Government led by Sir Keir Starmer would be any different. But the future is long, and the problem is that, undoubtedly, the time may come—I am not saying that it will, and I hope that it never does—when a Government seek a favour from this country or we seek a favour from them. An example might be, “Do you really want our safety equipment? Do you really want our artificial intelligence? Let’s have a mutual extradition arrangement.” I can also envision the possibility, not immediately but not so remotely either, of a Government of the day wishing to associate themselves with a country that shared that Government’s political views but was nevertheless not a desirable country with which to have these arrangements.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has just explained, we have this ridiculous situation where affirmative resolutions cannot be amended—you either take the package or you lose it. Parliament could be faced with this situation: there could be a list of a number of countries with which it was entirely desirable and sensible to have a mutual arrangement plus one other, with which it would be extremely undesirable to have such an arrangement. What would happen then? Do we reject the territory and country that we think it would be totally inappropriate to have such arrangements with and therefore lose similar arrangements with all the desirable countries, or do we simply keep all the countries we think it would be a good idea to have and include the other one, although it is undesirable? That is a ridiculous situation, and the amendment is designed to avoid such an absurdity. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has already said, and I emphasise, the amendment proposes an utterly simple, totally uncomplicated system. It may cost the department a few more pages of paper, but not that many, and it may take a fraction more time, but it would be time valuably used. Statutory instruments should always be limited to one country.

The second reason I support the amendment has already been touched on. Through the passage of this legislation, from the beginning to where we are today, this House has raised this issue time and again. We have never yet been given a single good reason why the proposal in this amendment is unacceptable, would create difficulties for the extradition regime or would be unworkable. The Minister has not invented any spurious reason for that, for which we are of course grateful and unsurprised, but there are no reasons. No reason has yet been given. As a matter of common sense, as well as on a sound constitutional basis, the amendment has never been contradicted by a reasonable argument and should find favour with the House.

Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Bill [HL]

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 5th March 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

I rise briefly to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay. If he will now be covering some Home Office matters, we will be spending a lot of time together and will get know each other well, so that will be welcome.

The amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is very sensible and I am happy to support it. She set out the issue clearly: someone can be picked up on the Friday before a bank holiday weekend and potentially wait until the Tuesday morning before being brought before a judge. That is a fair point. If people are arrested, they should be brought before a judge quickly, so I look forward to the noble Lord’s response.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I also support this amendment. Would you believe it, there is a judge on duty all weekend, every weekend, and all night? If the period is reduced to 24 hours and this happens over a weekend, it can be treated as urgent business.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their words of welcome. There will, indeed, be plenty to keep us busy on the home affairs front. Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, concerns the period of detention. It seeks to delete the provision that, in calculating the 24-hour period within which an arrested person must be brought before the appropriate judge, no account should be taken of weekends, bank holidays and the like, as she explained.

It might be helpful if I first reassure noble Lords that this provision does not arise from any desire of law enforcement agencies to detain individuals for prolonged periods without judicial oversight. The Government have been very careful to ensure that sufficient safeguards exist against this. Our operational partners have already proved themselves effective at producing wanted persons before courts within strict timeframes. The practical question at the heart of this issue is one of being certain that, when a person is produced at court, an appropriate judge is available to hear their case. The key aspect perhaps is that, rightly, the requirement under the Act is for the person to be brought before the judge, not simply for a judge to consider the case on paper. I hope that addresses the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. If the Bill were to be amended along the lines suggested, it would render the power largely unworkable; in some instances, because of perfectly normal court closure times, if a judge were not available for the wanted person to appear before them—

[Lord Judge]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. It is questionable whether the word “brought” requires the physical presence of the judge and the particular person so that they should be facing each other directly. Nowadays we have all sorts of technology that enables people to encounter each other while not in one another’s physical presence.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay]

To be clear to the noble and learned Lord, it is the statutory intention that the person should be brought before a judge in person. It is an additional safeguard and a better situation for them to be seen in person before a judge. If the Bill were amended along the lines suggested, it would make the power operationally unworkable because, in some instances, normal court closure times would preclude that. As we have discussed, it could mean, practically, that arrests could not be made on a Saturday or on the Sunday before a bank holiday.

[Lord Judge]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again. This is his first outing and we are throwing bouncers at him. If that is the problem, we need to amend the legislation to make it clear that “brought before” does not mean that there is a personal, direct, physical confrontation. I would be very willing to talk to him about this at any time but, so far, I am not entirely satisfied with what he has had to say.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay]

I thank noble Lords for their forbearance on this, my first outing. It is our intention to replicate the existing provisions under the Extradition Act. It may be helpful for me to speak to the noble and learned Lord and others in greater detail about the statutory intention of what the Government propose. We seek to mirror the provisions already there, which are caught up in the usual formulation of “as soon as practicable” that already exists in the Extradition Act. There are precedents for these arrangements for provisional arrest under Part 1, under which a person may be provisionally arrested without warrant and brought before the appropriate judge within 48 hours of their arrest, subject to exactly the same conditions as set out in the schedule under discussion here.

My noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford has already cited the letter sent by the Director of Public Prosecutions to the Security Minister earlier this week, which welcomes the way the Bill, as drafted, will avoid unnecessary delay and ensure initial judicial scrutiny as early as possible, before the case proceeds through extradition proceedings in the usual way. It is for that reason that the Government are not persuaded that the amendment is needed. I hope that gives some reassurance to the noble and learned Lord, the noble Baroness and others.

--- Later in debate ---

I am perfectly happy to stand by whatever a British court decides, but I have certainly seen too many examples of American courts making decisions that would never be made in this country. Therefore, I ask the Government to remove the United States from the named countries, instead seek with it an understanding that has the reciprocity necessary and then add it to the list. Unless we have that reciprocity and can be assured that it is not being used for commercial or political reasons, I do not believe it ought to be given the status that is being given in these circumstances.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I support Amendment 9. As I indicated at Second Reading, I support the Bill. There is a great deal to be said for the proposition that there should be reciprocity between countries that respect the rule of law on the administration of criminal justice. However, I strongly support this amendment; I see absolutely no inconsistency between the two propositions.

The reasons why are very simple. We all know that there are countries in the world that do not respect the rule of law. I will not set about trying to give your Lordships a list because the list itself changes. Countries that respected the rule of law no longer do. Weimar Germany did; Hitler’s Germany did not. This is a moveable feast.

My concern is that we are giving the Secretary of State wide powers to add different nations to the list by regulations. At Second Reading I went through the possible reasons, and they are still there: political motivation, getting a good deal on a treaty, the fact that we need a bit of support on this or that, so we put a country on the list. There is a whole series of reasons why, in years to come, since this Act will be in force for many years, Ministers—not, I hasten to assert, either of these Ministers—will think it appropriate to add to the list countries that this House and the other place together think are inappropriate to be added.

We are doing this by way of regulation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, pointed out. The consequence is that the Prime Minister of the day or his acolyte—and we are talking about a Prime Minister who would not perhaps respect the rule of law himself, but who knows what could happen—would insist on having a country that we in both Houses would regard as totally inappropriate to be a brother or sister nation on such a list and with whom we would think it quite inappropriate to have any sort of arrangement of this kind simply because it does not respect the rule of law. I have been through that.

What are our processes? They are that such a country could be included in a list of perfectly acceptable countries—the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said the Netherlands and Turkey—but can we just cut down a little further into that? It means that when the House considers the regulation, it will have to decide whether to exclude Turkey—to use the country that the noble Baroness used—because it is really rather important and because we greatly respect the Netherlands, or whether to reject Turkey and the Netherlands. Or, to go the other way, we must have the Netherlands, so we must therefore have Turkey. If one or other of these courses is taken—whichever way round it is—if there is any amendment, the whole thing falls to the ground. We will not want the Netherlands to fall to the ground, nor Denmark, France or Germany. There are many countries that we would want to espouse as colleagues in respect for the rule of law.

What is proposed in this amendment is utterly simple. What is the difficulty in doing it one country by another? It might take a little longer; there might a little more typing, a little more printing—we could even have all the countries, except the ones objected to, come through as a job lot. I gave a little cricketing analogy earlier and I am sorry that I bowled bouncers not googlies at the Minister. One of the most famous things ever said at a cricket match was when, in 1902, Hirst came out to bat against the Australians with 15 runs to get on a difficult wicket in the dark; the story goes that Rhodes met Hirst and exchanged the words, “We’ll get them in singles”. Let us get this done in singles.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I cannot match the noble and learned Lord’s eloquence, except I remember that Lord Bingham used to use that phrase to describe how judges should nudge the law forward gently, step by step, rather than sit hitting sixes and fours.

I support this amendment for the reasons that have been explained. There are two features of the issue that are worth bearing in mind. First, the standard that the Government have set, which was described by the Minister, is a relatively high standard and, therefore, we are not talking about large numbers. Indeed, the Schedule itself demonstrates that we are not expected to have a great list, they will come in twos or threes at the worst, preferably ones, as the amendment seeks. Secondly, the issue of a standard is something that we would wish to debate, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, demonstrated in his contribution. It is a great shame if we are masked, as it were, by having one good country on the list that we would not object to but which is in the kind of pairing that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, so that we cannot really grapple with the one to which we are objecting because the instrument is not amendable.

With great respect, this seems a very sensible amendment that meets the problem of the non-amendable instrument without at the same time creating an insuperable difficulty for the Government. It enables a debate to take place that would have a real point to it instead of one that really does not have a point because one part of the list—if it is a list—is unobjectionable. I very much support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Clearly, if we are to leave the European arrest warrant scheme, something needs to follow. But it is objectionable and inappropriate that the substantial part of the extradition code of this country is not to be modified as a result of primary legislation. Extradition law is an important component of our country’s wider constitutional framework. As was pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and others, we will be faced with Hobson’s choice. This is not in any way desirable. That is the point about which I am concerned and the rationale that I worked out for my amendment.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, let us just look at what we are saying in paragraph 29(2): “Let’s pass this Bill, which is a very good idea, and let’s pass it in such a way that regulations may change the whole thing.” Is that really what we want to do?

[Lord Deben]

My Lords, I feel very strongly that although we may have disagreed on the subject of the United States, that should not stop us recognising the wider argument to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has referred. Far too much legislation going through both Houses ends up leaving everything to be decided in secondary legislation where it is almost impossible to make changes, and this is another example.

I want to underline what my noble friend Lord Inglewood has said, which is that extradition is far too important a matter to leave basic, material decisions merely to secondary legislation. This is part of the freedom that people in this country rightly feel they have and I do not believe that we should allow the Government to have the powers that this seems to allow. I hope that my noble friend will recognise that this is a matter of real principle, a principle that the party to which we both belong is supposed to believe in above all things—constitutional propriety. This is not constitutional propriety, but sleight of hand.

Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 25th April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments. I first came across unexplained wealth orders in Inland Revenue fraud proceedings where people had been accused of not paying their income tax. One of the methods of revealing that is by demonstrating that they suddenly have more wealth than their Revenue account suggests. Therefore, there is a question about whether the assets came from taxable income. That was the presumption at that time. That was before the terrific expansion of other forms of unexplained wealth that could arise. The explanation that someone had done something unlawful would not be a particularly good answer to a tax inquiry but perhaps that was not thought of. Certainly, that was a very useful tool in the armoury of the Inland Revenue in days past and is still so today. It is a very valuable method of dealing with this trouble. I find it very hard, however, to understand what is meant by purported compliance. As has just been said, it seems to me that you either comply or you do not. I must say that the explanation given in the draft practice system does not enlighten me any further. It suggests, indeed, that purported compliance covers certain aspects of non-compliance. It is a difficult definition to put in. I would have thought the measure would be better without it.

I raise questions with regard to the register. It is required to be done within six months of the passing of the Act. However, the commencement provisions of the Act allow the Act to come into force in accordance with regulations or orders made by the Secretary of State. I assume that the passing of the Act in this amendment is intended to refer to its getting Royal Assent. Strictly speaking, however, the Act comes into force only in accordance with orders made by the Secretary of State under the commencement provisions except in relation to certain aspects of that.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

I wish to add a few words of my own on purported compliance. I am not quite sure what we are supposed to cover. Obviously, there will be the individual who is potentially made subject to this order who will try his or her best to produce the necessary information. That may not be good enough, in which case the court will allow an adjournment so that a genuine attempt to produce the information can be made. That will then be compliance. On the other hand, some people will obfuscate and deliberately make life difficult to avoid the true facts coming to light. They will say, “That is purported compliance”, but it will not be—it will be a failure. Therefore, the words “purported compliance” simply do not apply and will not help.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has raised some very serious issues, expressing the concerns of a number of noble Lords, and he made some of those points at earlier stages. The Government have clearly not satisfied him or many others in the House, and we share their concerns. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made similar remarks.

The point about “purports to comply” was particularly well made by the noble Lord and others, including the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge. I hope that, in responding, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, will be able to satisfy the noble Lords who have spoken, as well as the rest of the House, that we have got this issue right. We are all very keen to get this legislation on to the statute book as quickly as possible. We certainly support its general aims—it is a good Bill—but the worst thing to do would be to put something on to the statute book that is not very well drafted and would cause more problems or be an aid to people who do not want to comply properly with the orders. This is a very important point and, although we want the Bill to pass quickly, the noble Baroness needs to satisfy the House that we have this measure right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 24, which is about the UK register of overseas property. Before I speak to it, as the noble Baroness was kind enough to refer to my remarks in Committee about drifting away to murkier regimes, I took it from the way that she quoted it that she did not approve of that. I was relieved that my noble friend Lord Blencathra quoted it with approval, which shows that you cannot please all the people all the time. However, I do not want my noble friend, or indeed the noble Baroness or the House, to think that that remark was made in isolation.

I said that the status quo was unsustainable and that at least three issues should be tackled as part of the new regime: first, there should be a register; secondly, our law enforcement agencies should have full-hearted access to it in a way that is prompt, helpful and consistent with a working relationship; and, thirdly, the Government should be satisfied with the probity and effectiveness of the register regime in the overseas territories and Crown dependencies. It seems to me that government Amendment 8 meets those tests, which is why I support it. Rather than talking about drifting away to murkier regimes, I should be saying that we must not let the best become the enemy of the good.

With that, I turn to Amendment 24. It is important not to see the issues raised by my noble friend Lord Faulks as a problem for only central London and the inner suburbs. There is a knock-on effect from what is going on in central London with continuing overseas investment in London properties. That makes the urgency to which my noble friend referred a moment ago all the more pressing. First, there is a ripple effect on properties in the south-east of the United Kingdom: as the settled population sell their properties closer to the middle of London, they have further money to buy properties elsewhere in the region. A very interesting article in the Financial Times on Monday 3 April pointed out that house prices have increased by 102% since 2002, compared to a 38% increase in earnings; that Londoners now need to pay 12.9 times their earnings, up from 6.9 times in 2002, to buy a London house; and that if you wish to buy a house in Kensington and Chelsea, the heartland of the area that my noble friend has in his gunsights, you now need 31 times the median salary to afford it. There is a real sense that we need to get a grip and some clarity on what is going on.

There is a second impact because, as London has become more expensive, foreign investors have begun to look at other cities. The Times of Friday 7 April pointed out that Number One Cambridge Street in Manchester, a development of 282 flats over 29 storeys, has investment purchasers from Azerbaijan, China, Japan and Zimbabwe—18 nationalities. Only two of the 282 flats are owned by Britons. The developer wrote:

“The generously proportioned apartments … appeal to owner-occupiers, investors and renters. In other words, the scheme is appealing several sectors of the market, including those looking to make the step towards getting on to the housing ladder and more established owner-occupiers”.


I must say that I think first-time buyers in Manchester might wonder whether 99.2% overseas investors and 0.8% local ownership is a fair reflection. Here I offer my noble friend Lady Stern some comfort: one investor based in the British Virgin Islands has purchased 125 flats. A company called OFY paid £25.7 million for those properties.

Although the amendment is no silver bullet, it sets out an important direction of travel, which is why I support it.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, there have been many speeches and I, too, was unable to speak at an earlier stage, so I shall be brief. Amendment 8 is good, but Amendment 14 is better. The reason it is better is simply this: it adds greater certainty to the idea that we and the British Overseas Territories are doing our level best to destroy this scourge of corruption which infests so many countries and does so much damage throughout the whole world. It may be that we are at the start of this process—I think the Bill is the very beginning of a process—but we have to start somewhere, and this is where we should start.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have the privilege of being a name added to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern. I will use this opportunity to congratulate her not only on raising the issue but on pursuing it with so much energy. We can see from some of the results that the argument has moved; the profile of this issue has been very significantly raised and I think that government will struggle to ignore it going forward. We have had a small concession from the Government. I agree very much with the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, that it would have been encouraging to have a stronger response, because this is indeed the encapsulation of existing government policy and existing notes of exchange into statute. It is better to have it in statute than not to have it in statute. There is a little bit of movement forward, but it is extremely small.

What has disappointed me in a lot of the debate today is the range of views expressed opposing transparency. I am very appreciative of those who have spoken out who recognise the importance of transparency. The Panama papers have been an extraordinary illustration of what transparency can do, and does, to engage regulators and enforcement agencies to pursue what is not just naughtiness—it runs far deeper than that. It is real misbehaviour that distorts economies, including our own. Amendment 24, from the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Hodgson, in many ways illustrates the distortions that have happened in property markets in the UK, with huge consequences for many of our young people and many of those on lower incomes. There is a very big knock-on beyond just the initial misuse of bank accounts and investments.

I made a much longer speech on the issue in Committee, which I shall not repeat, but we have to face the reality that many of the problems that we face across the globe, including civil war in Syria, hunger in Africa, the absence of democracy in countries such as Russia and the impact of withdrawn democracy in places such as Turkey, depend on the capacity of those who are politicians or Governments who abuse their people and who are corrupt—vast criminal networks that exploit in every way—to take advantage by moving illicitly obtained money into the legal financial sector. When we look at anywhere around the world that functions in any way as a haven or portal for that transition from the illicit world to the legal world, we are facing a situation where we have to try to close down the ability of those funds to move. The impact of that would be huge in so many ways across the globe, including for us.

I very much support—and I am sad that not everyone did—the work that the previous Prime Minister, David Cameron, did in this area, and the stand that he took, saying that, first, we have to make the kinds of changes that give us central registers. I am very glad that this Government continue to move to make sure that that extends right across all our overseas territories and Crown dependencies. Many of them are ahead of us, as has been said—but this will now be a universal description of the UK, with its overseas territories and Crown dependencies. But I am sad that the principle of public registers is now being so thoroughly challenged. We all know that if we wait for a global standard we will wait generations. Secrecy provides the kind of cover used extensively by all those whom we would wish to stop. They are the people who will be very pleased today that Amendment 14 is not going to be put to a vote and potentially carried. They will be absolutely delighted, because that is the cover that enables them to continue to make the transfer between the illicit world and the legal world.

This is a path down which I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, who has been so vigorous on this issue, is going to continue. There will be many others around this House—we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich—who will continue, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be in that group as well. We must achieve that transparency. If we do not take leadership, there is no way that we can turn around to the United States or any other location and insist that they carry out those same measures, when we say that we are not willing to do it ourselves or to use our relationship with the overseas territories and Crown dependencies to achieve that goal.

I wish that the Minister could tell us more about a timetable to achieve greater transparency. That would give us a great deal of comfort, but there does not seem to be one with much force or energy behind it, which I find exceedingly sad. But this is a day when we recognise the pressures and needs delivered by wash-up, so I very much accept the need to support government Amendment 8, and recognise with regret that we are very unlikely to have an opportunity to push on Amendment 14.

Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 3rd April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I had intended to speak at a little length but the noble Lord, Lord Beith, has said everything that I wished to say about the dangers of creating criminal offences by secondary legislation.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to be able to return today to our debate in Committee, beginning with the very important issue of corporate criminal liability. Through this Bill the Government are building on the efforts of the last Labour Government, when they created the Bribery Act, by creating new corporate offences of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. These are significant proposals and I look forward to debating them further shortly. The amendments in this group relate to corporate criminal liability for other types of economic crime—that is, other than bribery and the facilitation of tax evasion. This issue has, of course, arisen a number of times in both Houses during the passage of the Bill, and these amendments have allowed us to have an insightful and constructive debate.

As noble Lords have said, the damage caused by economic crime perpetrated on behalf of or in the name of companies—to individuals, businesses, the wider economy and the reputation of the United Kingdom as a place to do business—is a very serious matter. As this House will be aware, the Bribery Act is widely respected as both a sound enforcement tool and a measure that incentivises bribery prevention as part of good corporate governance. As I have said, this Bill makes similar provision in regard to the facilitation of tax evasion. That provision has followed a process of full and lengthy public consultation, as did the implementation of the Bribery Act. As my noble friend Lord Leigh alluded to, these are very complex legal and policy issues with the potential for significant impact on companies operating in the UK.

I hope noble Lords will agree that this level of detailed consideration of both the existing legal framework and any proposals to extend it was crucial. That is why the Government announced, at the time of last year’s London Anti-Corruption Summit, that we would consult on the creation of new forms of criminal liability. The Government’s public call for evidence on corporate criminal liability for economic crime was published on 13 January. It openly requested evidence for and against the case for reform, and sought views on a number of possible options, such as the Bribery Act’s “failure to prevent” model, as an alternative to the current common law rules. The consultation closed only last week, on Friday 31 March. The Ministry of Justice is now assessing the responses received, but, as noble Lords will appreciate, it is too early to confirm the outcome. Should the responses received justify changes to the law, the Government would then consult on a firm proposal, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, articulated. I hope that reassures him that we are continuing to explore this issue as his amendment proposes. I trust noble Lords will agree that it would be wrong to rush into legislation, or to commit to doing so in the future, prior to giving the matter the appropriate consideration, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson said.

Amendment 161 provides for the novel approach that we could add additional offences to the legislation by regulations. I commend the noble Baroness on her ingenuity—I was promised she would show it—but, as I have said, these are complex issues with potentially significant implications for companies across the country. The Government do not, therefore, believe that it would be appropriate to extend the failure to prevent offences via secondary legislation, which would not allow for the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny of proposals such as this.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked about the timing of the failure to prevent measures and why the Government do not act now. She said we cannot afford to delay and made a point about the upcoming Brexit legislation. I remind noble Lords that the Bribery Act offence has been on the statute book for a number of years, allowing us to assess its effectiveness. We are now legislating on tax evasion and already looking closely and openly at the question of extending it to wider economic crimes. The Government are not delaying, we are acting—and we are doing so in a sensible and considered way.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, asked about the standard of proof for the failure to prevent economic crime. Her Amendment 163 allows for the defence of reasonable procedures to be satisfied by the civil standard—that is, the balance of probabilities. I can confirm, as she wanted, that it mirrors the approach in the Government’s proposed offence of corporate failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether HMG will legislate to create corporate liability for failure to prevent serious harm or human rights abuse. I wrote to the noble Lord about this—it is obviously seared in his brain or, probably, was passed straight to his outbox. All businesses are expected to comply with the legislation that comes under the jurisdiction of the UK, including that which relates to human rights. While the Government have no ability to regulate UK businesses operating in overseas jurisdictions, we encourage them to honour the principles of internationally recognised human rights wherever they operate. More broadly, in 2013, we were the first country in the world to produce a national action plan in response to the United Nations guiding principles on business and human rights.

Large UK-domiciled businesses must also comply with laws that require them to report certain human rights issues, including the Companies Act and our world-leading Modern Slavery Act, which requires them to produce annual statements on what they have done to ensure that such issues do not occur in their business and supply chains.

I hope I have fully answered noble Lords’ questions and that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, will feel free to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I have some doubts about Amendment 165. I find a corporate probation order to be rather unusual and although I am not an expert on crime, it seems to me that there would be considerable difficulties with it. Also, if one looks at subsection (5) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 165, the liability is,

“on conviction on indictment, to a fine”,

but it does not say how much. There would be a fine,

“on summary conviction in England and Wales”,

but there are limits to fines in the magistrates’ court. Whatever that figure is, it is not included. This seems an inadequately drafted amendment.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I add my voice to that. I support the general idea behind Amendment 165 but it proposes rather a bureaucratic new clause. Why cannot the court simply have power to make orders in accordance with its subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b), where it thinks it appropriate? Why do we need subsections (3) and (4) at all, as company B has already been convicted? It is a matter for the court to decide what sentence should be imposed; it does not need permission or an application by the prosecution. If I may say so, it seems that this would make a complex process to deal with something very straightforward. The court needs to be vested with the powers which are understood to be included on the basis of this amendment. Its compliance procedure would require an external body and, if we are doing that, can we perhaps add that there should be a report to the court about whether the appointed verifier is satisfied that verification has taken place?

As to Amendment 170, I am just a little troubled about subsection (2ZB) in its proposed new clause. It says:

“The court must not make any order under this section unless it is satisfied that the person bears responsibility”.


Fine—I understand that—but this is a penal decision. Are we saying that the court must be satisfied to a criminal standard or to a civil standard?

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, perhaps I may add one phrase only to this debate. I want to speak to Amendment 170 and suggest to the Government that this is frankly a no-brainer. We cannot afford to have inappropriate directors continuing to run companies, particularly when their inappropriate or inadequate behaviour has been exposed in the kind of circumstances discussed under Amendment 170. It is really important that the courts have a full range of tools. We no longer live in a world where the old-school tie and friendships determine who the appropriate directors of companies are. They have to be held to professional and appropriate standards. This proposed new clause would enable that to happen and I frankly cannot see why it should present any difficulties to the Government.

Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the issues raised by these amendments are extremely difficult. First, in view of all that has been said, it is difficult to distinguish, from this aspect, between sexual offences and other offences. There is much to be said for the view that if pre-charge publicity is to be outlawed, it should be so for all offences.

My second point relates to the safeguard, embodied in the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Marlesford and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, of application to a magistrates’ court for an order. I think I am right in saying that in respect of both Lord Bramall and Sir Cliff Richard there must have been a warrant to search their homes. A warrant of that kind must have been based on some sort of evidence that was accepted by, I assume, a magistrate. There is, therefore, a question about whether it is a sufficient safeguard for a magistrate to give the order. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, if a judge has said that there is enough to go forward, there is a slight difficulty in the clear way to a trial because a judge has already come to some point of view. However, that point of view is not that the accused is guilty; it is that there is sufficient difficulty in the evidence that in that judge’s judgment it would be right, in the interest of justice to all parties, for publicity to be allowed. There is a lot to be said for the view that publicity, up to the moment of charge, should not generally be allowed for sexual offences or others.

I have not found it easy to come to a conclusion about this and I have thought about it a fair amount. I have come to the conclusion that Amendment 182 is better but I would like to see a possible modification, in the light of what I have said, of the responsibility for allowing the matter. As I said, I think there were magistrates’ warrants for search in the two cases I mentioned: they turned out not to be particularly satisfactory.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I have been quoted on both sides, so I want to say something for myself. The most shocking aspect, to me, of the issues we are discussing was the BBC helicopter flying overhead while Sir Cliff Richard’s home was searched. There are many different aspects. Many of your Lordships have spoken today of your concerns about individuals you have known or individuals about whom you have known, who have been, in effect, traduced and brought low by publicity in the way in which we have been discussing. I do not support any such publicity, but I respectfully wonder whether we are addressing the wrong remedy in the wrong Act. For example, what is there to prevent a simple Act of Parliament that makes it a criminal offence for a police officer to disclose the name of any individual who is suspected of a crime, before he has been arrested? It should not be too difficult.

I do not want to repeat what I said last time, but the problem I invite noble Lords to consider is this. An arrest has to be justified. An arrest that is not based on reasonable grounds for suspicion is unlawful. Notice that I pick the moment of arrest—I am not talking about the allegation or the police officer telephoning the local press to say, “We are about to arrest the local schoolmaster”, or whatever it may be; nor am I addressing the issue in the context of sexual offences. The same story should apply to all offences.

An arrest must be lawful. Please can we bear in mind what the consequences of a lawful arrest are? You are detained. You are removed from your home, if that is where you are on arrest, or the street, the town or the city, or your office, or even when you are out having a drink with your friends. You are removed and you are not a volunteer: you have to go. If you resist arrest, you are committing an offence, and down to the police station you go, if that is where they take you. But you are completely in the hands of the arresting officer, and you go through a process. You remain detained, either while further investigations are made or until such time as further evidence emerges or it is decided that, after all, you can be allowed to go, for now, on bail. This is a process that nobody goes into voluntarily. Please can we remember that it is the first stage in the operation of the criminal justice process—and often, of course, culminates in a trial, conviction and sentence.

My concern about both these amendments is that they fail to address the problem that arrest is part of the criminal justice process. If they are adopted or if either one is adopted, we end up not with a situation that is incommunicado, if I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We end up with a veil being drawn against any reporting of the fact that one of our fellow citizens has been arrested. I find that troublesome.

The idea of criminal justice being secret is abhorrent to all of us in this country; we do not want formal trials to be conducted in secret. This part of the process, I suggest, should not be seen as a private matter. The exercise of the power to arrest and the consequences of it are public matters. There are many hard cases we have heard about and there has been much abuse of the process, but these issues should be addressed in a different form of legislation.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I have been listening with a great deal of care to all that has been said. I have no doubt that Amendment 182 does not go quite far enough, in the sense that if there is to be the intervention of legal process before a court, it needs to be by a judge and not a magistrate. I am in the extremely unusual position of not knowing which way I am likely to vote. I find it very difficult. I am very attracted by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, says: that prior to charge, no one who is being investigated should have the information disclosed. But I do think that one has to point out—as, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and other noble Lords pointed out—that sexual offences, particularly with celebrities, are a special case that sells newspapers. In one of the magistrates’ courts where I used to prosecute and defend as a very young barrister, the custody officer told me that it was £25 for the information to be provided. So one knows about it, and the police have, indeed, been criticised.

I happen to know someone prominent in a particular career—I will not say which—who is about to be charged with an offence committed at the age of 13 against a girl of seven. Everybody locally knows about it. For him, that is quite as awful as it would have been for Lord Bramall or Lord Brittan, save for the fact that this man is not likely to be dying. But this very personal thing—it may or may not be true—of someone in their forties or fifties accused of what he did at the age of 13, which has suddenly come out in relation to a girl of seven, is a shock.

The question that I pose to the Minister is this. If we do not do anything by way of legislation, what can we do to protect those who are innocent and have been vilified, and those who may be innocent, and the presumption of innocence, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has rightly pointed out, is there but is totally ignored by the media, and consequently largely ignored by the public? The approach that “there is no smoke without fire” is attractive, and if the press say something—well, it may be true. If we do not do anything, how do we stop an injustice? With huge hesitation, therefore, I am likely to support the argument of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, rather than my very close friend, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.

Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I have great respect for both my noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On this occasion, it is with the former, rather than the latter, that I agree, although one takes on either of them with a measure of reluctance and trepidation. I was partly struck to say something in this debate when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asserted that to impose obstacles to convicting the guilty is a very high cost. We actually pay this cost throughout our criminal justice system. It would be a lot easier to convict some people that we and the police think are guilty if we did not have to prove that they actually are, to the satisfaction of a jury, or if various procedures, such as disclosure, did not have to operate—the prosecution must disclose any evidence it comes across that might support the innocence of the accused. Many of these things make it more difficult to convict people, but they are part of the protection for the innocent and uphold the principle that someone has to be proven to have committed an offence.

Much of the argument about whether the kind of prohibition which my noble friend has advanced—and I agree this should be done—revolves around whether people who have had similar experiences of the accused will come forward. There are several points at which, if this clause were in operation, they would still be able to do so: between charge and trial or between the various stages of a trial process, for example between committal and trial. I am not an expert in this, but it appears that in most of the cases where this has happened it has been at that stage, rather than at the stage of initial accusation, except perhaps in some of the most notorious cases, which have been referred to this afternoon, where injustice has been done by publicity.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, correctly pointed out, the proviso has to be precisely worded. The point of the proviso is that anonymity might be broken if the police and prosecuting authority consider that they would like to go to trial and the evidence is not quite strong enough for them to do so but there is some knowledge that it is likely that people will come forward. A case where there is substantial evidence that does not quite meet the Crown Prosecution Service’s normal criteria, yet there is reason to believe that there may be others, might be just the circumstances in which an earlier breach of anonymity would be justified.

The weakest point put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was the one about gossip and speculation. The whole process is attended by the risk of these. If the name of an accused person cannot be disclosed prior to charge, there may be those who seek to gossip about it. That is something we should try to deal with in whatever way we can. But of course the same applies to the anonymity of the victim. Most of us have read newspaper stories which speculate and hint at who the victim might be in such a case. We cannot use that as a reason not to afford protection to the victim, and we should not use it as a reason not to afford protection to the accused at a stage in the process when it is unreasonable to visit a punishment more severe than applies in many other criminal offences, arising out of the publicity and shame and loss of office and other consequences that have attended some of the cases that we have heard about.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, produced several convincing examples of drafting that might be improved in this Bill, but that is what it was—the principle needs to be addressed, and it is not adequately satisfied by guidelines. Even though the better the guidelines the better the situation, guidelines fall short of the value of a firm principle enshrined in law, which the criminal justice system can itself uphold.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I introduce what I want to say by suggesting that we need to question certainties that anybody advances in this debate. I went to, was well informed by and was deeply sympathetic to, the meeting arranged by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, where we heard the overwhelmingly poignant stories of Mr Gambaccini, Lady Brittan and Sir Cliff Richard, and I thought, “That’s a certainty, isn’t it?”. But then I remembered an experience that I had when I was a young member of the Bar, of a client in the Midlands arrested for murder. If he was arrested, it meant that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion—and there were. It was quite a notorious case, and the publicity given to his arrest meant that two people came forward who were quite unconnected with him and were able to establish an alibi for him. Another man was subsequently convicted for the murder, so this man was totally innocent. If those people had not come forward, he would have remained in custody pending trial. They might have come forward by trial, but he would have been in custody for many months before his trial began—and, if they had come forward then, the argument would have been, “How can they be so sure that they were together or they saw him in this particular place on this particular night?”.

So there are certainties both ways. I want to contribute to the debate by making two separate and additional points to the ones that have been discussed—perhaps one to meet a point raised in discussion. It is said that rape and sexual crime is particularly awful, and there is usually plenty of other evidence when other crimes are concerned. Well, with murder, the allegation that a mother has killed her children is not the kind of allegation that can be trivialised. There are cases in which mothers alleged to have killed their children have not done so. Noble Lords are all familiar with the phrase “cot death”, although it summarises a much more complex idea. There the question is whether the children were murdered at all, or whether they died from natural causes. It is a terrible allegation to have to face. Do we say, “Ah, well, it does not matter if they have publicity”?

Then there is terrorism. Half the time with terrorism, if the police did not act before the bomb went off, on the knowledge that they have, we would be blown up. So terrorist offences usually consist of conspiracies and offences contrary to various terrorism Acts which never came to fruition. The whole case depends on demonstrating that there was going to be a bomb, or whatever, and it never happened. We have to be careful about the sorts of cases that we are thinking about. I suspect that causing death by dangerous driving is a dreadfully serious allegation to the public mind—and certainly, if it is said to be accompanied by drink, of course it is a dreadfully serious allegation, because it is a dreadfully serious crime.

I ask noble Lords to pause. I understand that sexual crime now seems to be at the forefront of public concern, but let us not just dismiss those other crimes as really not so important, so we do not really need to preserve the anonymity of the accused for them because it does not really matter so much. We need to have a clear principle about this. I think that we should have a principle that either says yes or no to publicity or anonymity at various different stages. But I do not, I regret to say, share the view that sexual crimes should be treated as entirely one-off, on their own, and separate.

There is one more point that I want to add to the discussion. We are working on the basis that the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are drafting points—I do not share the criticism made of him. But drafting points matter in this context. Let us pause to consider what arrest means, if we are saying that “don’t disclose anonymity” stands on arrest but, once the charge happens, the anonymity goes. Pitch the time where you like—arrest means that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. It means that you are incarcerated; it means that you have lost your liberty and that, lawfully, you have lost your liberty, and that it is justified because there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. I have concerns about a blanket prohibition imposing silence on the media in circumstances where somebody’s liberty has been taken from him or her, even if for a short time. That is not how we work in this country. We do not want people locked up for any time at all without anybody being able to say so. Those are considerations that I suggest should be added to the thought that we give to the issues in this debate.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, much gratitude is due to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Campbell-Savours, for introducing and seconding this amendment, drawing on their long experience of work and reflection in relation to a very important issue. I shall return briefly to a question that has come up naturally in the course of our discussion—the simple question of whether the presumption of innocence until proved guilty is still in practical, effective existence where allegations of sexual abuse are concerned. Last week’s Henriques report showed that during Operation Midland innocent people were treated as if they were guilty, even though there was no serious evidence against them. A recent detailed study by the Oxford University Centre for Criminology concluded that there has been a cultural shift towards believing allegations of abuse and the presumption is now in favour of believing those who present themselves as victims. The study documents in great detail the immense harm done to very large numbers of ordinary, innocent people who had unfounded allegations made against them. In any walk of life, a person whose name appears publicly in relation to a mere allegation of abuse can expect to suffer much hardship. This wholly unsatisfactory state of affairs extends from state to Church, from the living to the dead.

As I have mentioned on previous occasions in your Lordships’ House, grave damage has been inflicted on the reputation of one of the greatest 20th century bishops of the Church of England, George Bell, after a completely secret and internal investigation of a single, uncorroborated complaint, made many decades after his death. At least the injustice done as a result of Operation Midland has been the subject of a thorough authoritative inquiry. In June, the Church announced an independent review of the case involving Bishop Bell. Four and a half months later, we still await the name of the review’s chairman and his or her terms of reference. There is no right reverend Prelate in the Chamber at the moment but I hope that these comments will be noted by the Lords Spiritual.

The authorities of Church as well as state must recognise that we need not just to halt but to reverse the trend that has eroded the presumption of innocence. We need another cultural shift, a decisive, morally responsible one that will stop the ruin of innocent lives and reputations. This amendment, I believe, would help us to achieve that shift.

Historical Child Sex Abuse

Lord Judge Excerpts

Thursday 30th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, what a pleasant story to lighten up rather a gloomy morning.

I do not want to discuss any individual case. I share the anxiety of the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, about the number of cases where disquieting situations have been identified. Perhaps I will begin by saying that the presumption of innocence survives death.

I hope it will be of interest to the House if I discuss briefly the context in which we have arrived at where we are, in which the Crown Court is packed, day by day, with cases alleging sexual abuse going back many years. It starts from this: when I was called to the Bar, the general assumption was that a child’s evidence really should not be heard. The obstructions were huge and, when you did get to court, there were further obstructions. Let me start with the ones at court, because there is not time to deal with them all.

Something that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey, said reminded me of this. In 1958, Lord Goddard made it absolutely plain that it was ridiculous to suppose that the jury would attach any value to the supposed evidence of a child of five years old. Notice the word “ridiculous”—it is not moderate. That sounds like the five year-old girl spoken of as Carole. I do not know anything about what she did, but the reason I am describing this is that it exemplifies the then broad attitude to complaints made by children.

There was a competency test if a child came to give evidence. The judge solemnly asked questions about whether the child believed in God and hell-fire. Depending on the judgment that the judge made, the child could be sworn—or not. If the child was not sworn, there could be no conviction without corroboration, to which I will come. Five small boys or girls saying, on separate occasions, “The history master touched me on my bottom”, if they were all unsworn, could not provide support for each other. There could be no corroboration, although five little children happened to say that the history master happened to be doing this thing to them. As to the rules of corroboration, you have to imagine that only a legal technician could invent them.

Let us take the issue of distress. Distress is sometimes a sign that something has gone wrong, is it not? But the jury had to be directed: “Well, distress, members of the jury … Well, children often do suffer distress, so there may not be anything specific about it. Anyway, distress can be easily feigned, as you know”. Of course, it is true. We were treating children as though they were more likely to lie and make things up than adults. I regret to say that adults make things up and lie just as often as children. We then got to the solemn warnings to the jury, assuming the evidence got to the jury: “Now, you may think that little boy or little girl was a very impressive witness, but I must direct you on the dangers of convicting on the evidence of a child. And if it is a sexual offence, it is doubly dangerous to convict on the evidence of a child”. As to the courts’ arrangements, I still remember a stepfather coming into the court—it was not Crown Court; it was the Court of Session—bringing with him the 13 year-old stepdaughter he was alleged to have indecently assaulted. What kind of start to giving evidence against your stepfather would that be? The other problem was that a statement taken from a child could not be used in evidence, so six or nine months after the event the child had described in the witness statement, nobody said, “Have a look at your statement”. Six to nine months later, much of the periphery will have disappeared from the memory of a child, but of course the periphery is not what the issue is.

The whole process in court made life difficult and, although I am talking about courts, they simply reflected public views on these issues. Children invented allegations. History masters did not do dirty things. It was very easy for the child to invent and their allegations could not be true. Some of your Lordships will remember Esther Rantzen’s great efforts to heighten this issue on a television programme and I wonder whether your Lordships will be true to their consciences and remember wondering at the time whether she was exaggerating. I bet that, if you are true to your consciences, you will say, “That is what I thought”. We are now reaping the whirlwind consequent on silencing children who had complaints of serious sexual crime to make. The whirlwind is no place for calm justice, and that is part of our problem.

Another part of our problem is how we address the issue. Put simply, let us have no more historical sexual abuse cases, by which I do not mean today but that in 2035 we are not examining allegations made in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 or 2005. The process of reforming our system has been amazing when I compare the world that I was brought up in at the Bar—and it was the whole of my time at the Bar right until I left it in 1988—with where we are now. It is much better. But the processes still move with the alacrity of a disenchanted snail. His Honour Tom Pigot, the former Common Serjeant of London—he is not with us now—produced a report in 1989 which just about everybody who has read it thinks is a strong way forward to enable justice to be done: not to convict the innocent but to enable the matter to be properly looked at. In 1991, there were some small changes; in 1994, there were some small changes. In 1999, we had the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, which allowed for a pre-recording of the evidence of the child to be taken as the evidence, so the child would be interviewed and there would be the child’s story. Tom Pigot recommended that the cross-examination, too, should be pre-recorded—in 1989, mark you. In 1992, Western Australia introduced the system that Judge Pigot and his committee had recommended to us in 1989. In 2010, some marvellous research in Australia demonstrated that this process was not inimical to justice. There was no suggestion that there had been an increase in the miscarriages of justice—nothing like that.

Where are we in our jurisdiction? We now have a pilot scheme in Leeds, Kingston and Liverpool. Judges I have heard about think it is admirable, that the process is very good. Let us take one simple advantage. If the child is giving evidence of assaults in which he or she has been involved or been a witness to involving a number of defendants, the trial may be split for obvious reasons. This way round, you have the child’s evidence-in-chief and the child’s evidence in cross-examination. The child does not have to go through the process four times even though there will be four trials. It is admirable. You have the child’s evidence as it is, fresh. It is of course open to objection and to cross-examination—the processes have not changed.

There is one more plus, which I emphasise because it goes to the heart of whether there will be allegations in 30 years’ time of sexual abuse now which have been silenced. Once you have all the child’s evidence, you can then decide whether the child should have treatment. If the child has to be cross-examined it is difficult to arrange for treatment, if it is necessary, because by the time of the trial the child will be slightly confused, inevitably, about what was treatment, what the treatment was and whether the reiteration of the story to the psychiatrist, psychologist or whoever has changed the story. There is a great tendency in the system to say, “No, don’t let us have treatment until the process is complete”. However, once the evidence is there, you can get on with whatever is needed for the child.

Please do not misunderstand me. I am not saying that every allegation is true, that false allegations are not made or that mistakes will not be made. We must bring Pigot to the cross-examination issue and pre-recorded testimony into effect as soon as possible. It has been waiting since 1989. I cannot say more than that. The longer it goes on, the longer we will have the process I have outlined, with the difficulties in relation to treatment and getting a contemporaneous story, which is more likely to be true than a non-contemporaneous story, and so on.

One day it will happen. One day—this is not in Pigot’s report—I hope it will be quite unnecessary for a child ever to go to court to give evidence in the physical surroundings of the court building because the evidence will be there. The child will not be needed. Of course you build in discretion for the judge to say, “Yes, this is a case where, I am afraid, we must have the child here”, but it is not necessary once you have it all on tape.

These disquieting situations involving the historical sexual abuse of children which have been referred to have produced the whirlwind that puts us where we are. The presumption of innocence remains. The need to investigate modern, ancient or middle-aged allegations of sexual crime with assiduous fairness remains. There is no presumption. What is needed is an open mind and for us to bring our own system in the court up to date.

Modern Slavery Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Howarth of Breckland]

I have huge respect for him, but I really do think that this is a question of practice and of training. We keep repeating those words like a sort of mantra. What happens is the real issue—what action is taken to make sure that not just the police and the prosecutors but the health workers, social workers and voluntary workers, not those in the specific field of action but those who come across children in different ways, understand what they are seeing. I fear that, certainly in my area, modern social work training is not as precise in helping people to understand what they are seeing and then giving them courage and a legal understanding of what they can do next.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that I stand somewhere in the middle on this issue. I have never been a great believer that more legislation will make a difference. My experience—and history—tells us that it does not. Some legislation will make a difference. The Government’s clause may well give a little jolt to the whole issue, but I hope that they will tell us what they are going to do to encourage all the professions to take this seriously. That goes not just for this area but for the whole range of child care and protection. We are at this time in this country in serious difficulties in making sure that our children are adequately cared for and protected.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I rise because I have been quoted both in judgments and in evidence that I have given, and if I sit here and do not say anything, some might think that I did not agree with what I said last time. Well, I do.

I am concerned about child exploitation. I think that there are cases—and we have certainly been aware of them in court—where children have been exploited in circumstances which it would be difficult to describe as slavery or servitude or forced labour or even human trafficking. Children are exploited in many different ways and I do not think, if I may say so with respect, that the law caters adequately for those who exploit children who are not under some kind of parental or guardian responsibilities.

For that reason, I support the amendment. One problem with this area of the law seems to be that although we can often find the child who has been exploited we do not seem to be very good at hunting down through the chain of exploitation. For instance, we are very concerned, and obviously so, with children who come from abroad and are left in charge of cannabis factories. So far, we prosecute the child. We do not wait to see who is bringing the food once a week that is thrown through the prison door—because the house is no more than a prison. Where are they going? Who are they looking at? Who are they talking to? Who is making the money from the cannabis plant that the child is looking after?

The other feature that I want to draw attention to is how we relate to the provision on the protection of victims—that is, the defence under Clause 45. We provide a defence, which I strongly support, for slavery or trafficking victims who have committed an offence in circumstances that are defined, but the Bill speaks in Clause 45(1)(c) of “relevant exploitation”. Relevant exploitation in the Bill cannot address child exploitation of the kind that the amendment is designed to address. I ask the Minister to look at that, too.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, no one could possibly fault my noble friend for lack of persistence or focus, and no one would not want the best legislation for tackling—or, better, preventing—offences against children. I am afraid that I cannot support her amendment. I am sorry about that because I know her ambitions for the Bill, but I understand many of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, about practice. I would have thought that the point just made by the noble and learned Lord about cannabis farms was also one about practice and observation by the police; I would not have thought that a new offence was needed for that to be dealt with properly.

I have heard it said that a separate offence would mean that the police would take the matter seriously, but what we have heard from the criminal justice professionals, as other noble Lords have said, is that it is not a matter of an alternative but that there would be real risks to Part 1 of the Bill. They argue not just that a separate offence is not necessary—we often hear in this Chamber that something is not necessary and tend to ask, “Well, what harm would it do?”—but that in this case there would be harm. Alison Saunders and Kevin Hyland referred to the issue of determining age, which noble Lords have mentioned. This has bedevilled claims for asylum and responses to asylum seekers for a long time.

To add to the point that the noble and learned Baroness made, in relation to the letter that several of us received today from Kevin Hyland, the point about the case which he discussed with her was not just that so much time was spent on the issue of the woman’s age but that, as he writes, it was,

“distracting the jury from the real issue of her exploitation”.

I take that very seriously. I also take the point made by Alison Saunders that the clause would require evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the accused,

“believed, or had reasonable grounds for believing”,

that the person was under 18.