(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said in Cairo on 2 May, we renew our calls for both sides to commit to peace talks, leading to a Palestinian state that exists in peace and security alongside Israel. We want to see a resumption of negotiations based on clear parameters supported by the international community: 1967 borders with equivalent land swaps, appropriate security arrangements, Jerusalem as the capital of both states and a just solution for refugees.
My Lords, the Minister will be aware of the widespread support that there has been for the Prime Minister’s recent positive approach to the agreement between Fatah and Hamas. What is the Government’s view on the Israeli Government’s threat to withhold $105 million-worth of tax and customs revenues from the Palestinian Authority in case it should proceed with this agreement with Hamas?
We think that that is the wrong approach. On the contrary, Israel and the two parties that are now coming together in some reconciliation should now take the opportunities offered to carry the whole peace process forward. It should be recognised that, unfortunately, Hamas’s commitment to non-violence has not yet taken place—it has not yet committed to the quartet principles and we would like to see it be a more effective partner for peace—but on the whole we see these trends as the right ones and we think that the Israeli withholding of revenues is the wrong approach.
While I support a genuine rapprochement between Israel and the Palestinians—most of the Palestinians, not all of them—is it possible to broker a real deal as long as Hamas pledges to destroy Israel? Is it realistically negotiable?
The noble Lord is right that that is the obstacle. As I have just said in my answer to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, we think that when Hamas is ready to be a genuine partner for peace and is committed to the quartet principles, we can go forward. Clearly, though, at the moment it is not and that is undoubtedly an obstacle, as the noble Lord acutely recognises.
My Lords, given that we all know that a settlement between Israel and Palestine can be based only on a two-state solution, and given that the present pattern of Israeli settlements makes the second state—that is, the Palestinian state—completely unviable, is it not the case that no such solution could ever realistically be achieved without a withdrawal of at least some, if not all, of the current pattern of Israeli settlements?
My noble friend is right that the settlements issue is also at the heart of this, and there are major difficulties ahead. In discussions on the two-state prospect, there have been some ideas of the settlements existing within Palestinian jurisdiction while, as my noble friend has said, other ideas include some withdrawal. These matters have all been examined in immense detail as part of the move forward, but first there has to be some movement in recognising that we now have opportunities for the peace process to develop in the right direction, rather than the attitude that we hear in some quarters at present that, “Nothing can be done for the moment because we don’t know where anyone stands, we don’t know where Egypt stands and we don’t know where the Fatah/Hamas agreement really stands”. That is a negative attitude. We must overcome that and move forward on all these fronts, including the settlements.
My Lords, was it not a great mistake to impose completely unacceptable preconditions on Hamas? Has the noble Lord noted that polls recently showed that 52 per cent of Israelis welcomed engagement with Hamas?
I hear what the noble Lord says, but our position remains that we are not prepared to talk to Hamas until it renounces violence, recognises Israel and adheres to the quartet principles. That is and will remain our view. If Hamas changes its attitude and moves forward, and if the partnership with al-Fatah comes to a positive conclusion, we will be prepared to review the situation, but at the moment that is our position.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that the recent withdrawal of residency permits from any Palestinians is a grave violation of basic human rights, and diminishes the capacity of many faith and community leaders to contribute to a peace settlement? In the case of Suheil Dawani, the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, it also further alienates the small Christian community in the Holy Land.
Yes, these are further concerns. I was about to say irritants but they are more than irritants; they are the sort of worries that we raise again and again with the authorities concerned and with the Israeli Government. We will do so in the future as well.
My Lords, many people will be pleased—if that is the right word—to hear that the Government are not prepared to deal with a terrorist organisation until it renounces its determination to drive Israel into the sea. Does the Minister agree with me that the first stage in getting the understanding that the Government are looking for is for the people who are lobbing missiles into Israel, almost on a daily basis, to be brought to book?
That is clearly one of the necessary cessations that must occur. However, one must take a balanced approach and recognise that it goes hand in hand with an acceleration of the easing of the supply of provisions into Gaza, where conditions have been horrific. These things all move together. If one concentrates on just one transgression on one side, progress is inevitably halted. However, the noble Lord is absolutely right that one of the essential conditions is for one of the key parties concerned—Hamas—to desist, or to persuade minorities that it may control to desist, from shooting rockets into Israeli towns, wounding and damaging completely innocent people.
My Lords, does the Minister accept that power is given to the extremist wing of Hamas by the relentless Israeli colonisation of the West Bank and east Jerusalem, and that without a cessation of that at least there is no chance that the moderate majority within Hamas will be able to bring about the conditions that he mentions? At the same time, will he urge the Israeli Government to observe the results of the forthcoming Palestinian elections and not scupper them, as they did in 2006 by kidnapping 26 Hamas MPs?
Balanced handling of settlements and the Jerusalem problem is at the centre of the whole situation. Urging the Israeli Government to proceed in a way that will not scupper—in my noble friend’s words—any progress is something that we do in our constant dialogue with the Israeli authorities. We will certainly continue along those lines.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, made the point that the arrangements made under the NATO treaty, about its command structure and the obligations on members, have the effect, whether described as law or not, of determining how we behave in the defence of this country. It is impossible to argue that that is not substantively the case.
As I said earlier, this clause provides, more than anything else, the opportunity for continuous internal division and splits—not harmonisation or bringing people back to political activism and political understanding but rather the alternative. If the argument flows in the other direction—that we will never use it, or that the process of being bound to the mast is not really there and we will sail by without anybody noticing that it is happening—the Government should, out of courtesy to the House, simply make a statement that this is a form of dressing up a political proposal for people who feel disenfranchised in any respect by what has happened in the development of the European Union. They should say that that is what it is for; it is not at all for anything practical. That is really the status of this clause.
My Lords, this has been a very wide-ranging debate, covering all these amendments. Some very wise and profound observations have been made. It would be quite wrong not to say that many of the points raised feed into the arguments, the presentation of the Bill and how Ministers should think about it. There are matters on which to reflect, which we will no doubt come back to again and again. Indeed, on the track record so far, we are likely to come round this course several times.
There are still some serious misunderstandings about the nature and purposes of the Bill. It ranges over several extremely complex issues. The whole EU structure and its legislative underpinnings are enormously complex and have grown over decades from a series of legislation, treaty-making and so on. I do not disguise that for a moment. If noble Lords would find it useful, I am willing to put on record that I am very open, as are my colleagues, to any degree of informal discussions to elucidate what is intended by the Bill, since some noble Lords are perhaps, in their own words, still confused about aspects of it. These amendments are wide-ranging but they nearly all have the same broad objective. They are designed to remove requirements for a referendum or Acts of Parliament from the list of decisions in Clause 6. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, rightly said, their intention is to shorten the list. I want to explain why we should not shorten the list and to deal particularly with the passerelles.
I accept that. I note that I had already crossed out the words “Act of Parliament” in my notes in anticipating that comment. Unfortunately, in the excitement, I put those words in, so I take them out again. However, when we come to the minutiae, there may be some qualification even to what I am saying.
I want to try to explain why shortening the list is not the right thing to do, and to deal particularly with the passerelle provisions, on which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, commented with his enormous expertise and hinterland of understanding of these things, having been in at the creation of not all the passerelles—some have existed for many years but never been used—but of those that we dealt with in the Lisbon treaty, which we had first seen given birth to in the constitution, which unfortunately came to a sticky end.
I say as a preliminary that all this discussion about referendum requirements against treaty changes and for certain decisions where no treaty change is required, and for giving up vetoes—in other words, allowing the right to be outvoted on certain issues—takes place against a background of huge areas of existing power and competence in the European Union. When one thinks of the enormous range of areas where the European Union can legislate, and where we can develop all kinds of positive ideas and initiatives to enable it to deal with entirely new global conditions of the 21st century, I am always left a little bewildered that we should come back again and again to the probably, I suspect, fairly marginal areas—these may be very small areas indeed—where there is supposed to be a tremendous yen for new treaties and extending the competences and powers of the European Union. These are areas in the margin of the real world of the European Union, where many of us have been involved over many years, and where enormous tasks have yet to be carried out which do not require yet a further extension of the powers and competences of the European Union. I say that just as background; I want to come back to that point in more detail a little later on.
I turn more specifically to the amendments. Of course I am very pleased that the signatories to the amendment have accepted the principle that a decision on whether to join the euro is of such fundamental importance that the people should decide. I have argued before—Ministers have argued, the Government have argued and the Bill argues—that the referendum requirement is a vital part of rebuilding trust with the British people. We perfectly accept the point made by the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House that referenda should not be used, as it put it, as a “tactical device”, and that referenda should, as we argue, be used for more critical issues of fundamental importance. We therefore come down to a central question running through all this debate—what are the critical issues? What are the fundamental problems and matters on which it would be right for people to be consulted before powers are pushed away or—whether through treaties, various procedures, the passerelle device or simply a decision of this Government—they decide to give away a certain power or move in a certain direction?
We begin with a puzzlement as to why the other one-way irreversible decisions in Clause 6 that we are talking about and I shall come to in detail are considered any less important in the minds of noble Lords than the euro. I find it difficult, as do a number of noble Lords who have spoken with great precision and accuracy, to conceive that the monetary independence of the UK should be considered essential to our national identity and economic interest—an argument apparently accepted by the supporters of the amendments—but not the UK’s military independence and commitments to NATO, if it were decided to establish a common EU defence that might well conflict with those commitments. We have held many debates in this House in the past four or five years about the dangers of that.
Why consider just the euro but not the impact that joining the European public prosecutor’s office could have on the UK’s judicial independence, as my noble friend Lord Faulks clearly emphasised. I want to refer to that in much more detail. I note that the previous Government opposed that. The present Government are against it. Many of the Nordic countries think that it is an extremely bad idea. There is very little support at all for the proposition. Yet the suggestion that there should be a safeguard against what would be a major incursion into the criminal justice system in this country is not seen as important. I cannot give all the details, because I know that there are different views on this. What about the UK’s ability to police its own borders? This is a red-hot issue, yet for some reason it is not included in the list.
Allow me to elaborate on some of my remarks. A decision on whether to join a common EU defence is fundamental, as it could result in a common EU army—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said that that may not happen immediately; but it could happen—and in giving the EU the power and legal right to decide on the deployment of UK civilian and military assets in a way that is not the case with NATO. It is of course perfectly true that operational command is under an American supreme commander, and that on the battlefield decisions and powers may be taken that can subordinate British forces to others. However, the suggestion that we should move in a new direction and be aligned with some of the European Union’s ideas is a new departure. These would be huge decisions on which the British people should decide that are discussed on the doorstep.
It is reasonable to suggest that Parliament and the people are entitled to ask what extra benefit would be bought by moves of that kind. The UK has long valued its NATO membership and key bilateral defence relationships within Europe, of which the treaty with France announced last summer is one. The UK also values existing mechanisms for security and defence co-operation within the EU. Bilateral and multilateral co-operation is an essential part of our approach in the UK and to wider international defence—as has recently been shown in Libya and earlier off the coast of Somalia, through Operation Atalanta. All that is going on; all that is thoroughly sensible; all that is within the operational activities of the European Union and I find it hard to see why an advance into a completely new area of power delegation and power transfer should be brushed aside. It would be a major development.
I turn to the issue of the public prosecutor, because a good many comments were made on that. It is coalition policy that we will not participate in the establishment of any European public prosecutor. We know that it is a sensitive issue, as was recorded by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union in its 16th report seven years ago. It is perfectly true—the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, spoke with great expertise on this—that Article 86(2) provides only for the European public prosecutor to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union. Although that is so, the participation of the UK in a European public prosecutor would mean giving up control of a fundamental part of our judicial system: the decision on who can be brought for prosecution in this country. That is not a small matter. That is a vital principle. As Article 86(2) states, a European public prosecutor,
“shall exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competence courts of the member states”.
In other words, a European public prosecutor would have power to prosecute in those member states within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.
In England and Wales, it is the responsibility of the Crown Prosecution Service to decide whether to prosecute and whether to take over any private prosecution, so powers granted to a European public prosecutor would cut across that well-established principle. As the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, when a Minister in the previous Government, informed this House:
“The Government have consistently opposed the creation of an EPP”.—[Official Report, 1/3/10; col. WA325.]
I agree with everything that the noble Lord, Faulks, said on the European public prosecutor. It seems to me highly unlikely ever to be suitable to a common-law country such as us or the Irish. I am delighted to hear the Minister say that it is coalition policy is to play no part in that. It was precisely because of such considerations that the article in the treaty specifically provides for a group of nine or more to go off to do their own thing, so we are in a rather unlikely scenario here when we come to the point on which a referendum requirement is imposed. That is the question of whether the European public prosecutor’s office, set up to look after the financial interests of the Union and prosecute fraud against the Community budget—and unsuitable in this country as a vehicle for doing that—should extend its role to cross-border crime—human trafficking or whatever. That is a really unlikely contingency, because we will not be in the thing anyway. Surely, if we had an issue for a referendum, it should be: should we have common procedures for prosecuting people who traffick children? That issue is referendable. The issue of whether the European public prosecutor's office, in which we will be playing no part, should have its role extended into that area is a very rum one to choose to block. That is why the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was absolutely right to say that this provision in Clause 6 is completely inappropriate, although I agree with the noble Lord, Faulks, on the substance of the EPPO.
All these issues are interconnected. In Clause 6 there are two concerns about the surrender of our veto, and therefore the opportunity for others to outvote us on those matters and the agreement to go along with the public prosecutor proposal, which is, of course, already in the treaty. One is joining up with and adopting the European public prosecutor proposal; the other is the extension of the public prosecutor's competencies and the regime which might follow.
Therefore, those are both areas where, because successive Governments have set themselves against them, one hopes that the matter will not arise. However, it is one of the issues involving big decisions—and they are big decisions; there are five such issues and I shall come to them in due course—where there would not be a treaty change but where, as Clause 6 suggests, the British Government should put the matter to the people in a referendum, and the public prosecution proposal is certainly one of them. Perhaps I may mention the big five issues. I do not want to take an unlimited amount of time over them, difficult as it is to cover all the issues.
The noble Lord may be right in what he has said—in fact, I think that he is—but there is a very simple answer. Cannot the Government just say no if they do not want any of these things to happen? That is surely the point.
It is not the point because, as your Lordships have been reminded in the debate in the past half hour, the proposition has been fundamentally questioned that the Government and even our parliamentary institution are always going to be the safeguard, ensuring that unconstitutional changes are not ceded and that powers and competence do not slip away, or creep away as some have said. Today, a majority in this country, so it seems—although we cannot be sure about the opinion polls—wish to have a greater say in these matters. It is not just a question of leaving it to the Government to say no.
I shall finish on the public prosecutor issue by saying that I continue to find it extremely difficult to understand why noble Lords opposite would wish to deny the British people the right to be consulted before any future Government decided to take such a sensitive and important decision on creating or extending—that is my point to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr—the powers of the European public prosecutor’s office.
I was about to elaborate on what I call the big five issues—I shall come to some of the other veto issues in Clause 6—on all of which I think it would be perfectly reasonable to have a referendum. They are: UK agreement for the EU to move to a common EU defence; UK participation in the European public prosecutor, as we are currently discussing, and extending the powers of the public prosecutor, which we shall talk more about; the UK joining the euro, which does not appear in the amendment because noble Lords feel that that one is okay; and abolishing UK border controls under Schengen. These are vital, red-hot issues, all bound up with talk of red lines, which have been mentioned in the debate, and it is almost incomprehensible that noble Lords should suggest that they are not important, critical or fundamental. Of course they are.
Because of the time and the fact that we have been debating this matter for some hours, I shall not elaborate on why the Schengen issues would also be very important and justify a referendum. However, we think that they would, and we believe that it is part of a need to restore trust that that should be on the statute book. If decisions are taken in this area by the British Government, there should be a referendum on them.
I apologise for interrupting the Minister and shall be very brief. Given that a large part of his argument rested on the case that these were very important—in fact, he used the word “red-hot”—issues, can he say how we would sustain the argument that the referendum exercise would be inappropriate for important and red-hot domestic issues, such as council tax or taxation, because it would be for Parliament to make those decisions and not for a referendum of the people?
I can make the oversimple point that referenda have been used rather frequently, including by the previous Government and from the days of Harold Wilson onwards, as we heard. They have been used in this country and increasingly in other countries far more frequently than here. There is a more general point behind my noble friend’s intervention which is that we now live in the internet age. We live in an era in which people still admire, despite its many faults, and still support the principle of parliamentary government, as I most certainly do. There is a constant pressure for wider consultation and empowerment. Sixty-three per cent of people in this country are on the web every morning. People want a say. There is greater pressure coming for referenda. We heard from my noble friend Lord Deben that he does not like referenda. I think that several of my noble friends do not and I suspect that many throughout your Lordships’ House are not very happy about referenda. It is a question of balance and the balance has shifted. The shift is in the direction of a greater demand that fundamentally important issues, five of which I have just outlined—not one, but five—should be put to referenda.
I want to come in particular to the other items in Clause 6. There are six very important areas where noble Lords ask why they are there as they are issues that if decisions gave rise to treaty changes, they would be caught under Clauses 2 and 3. They are in Clause 6 because under the passerelle provisions, on which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is undoubtedly the leading expert, vetoes could be given up in those areas as well. The Government believe that the surrender of those vetoes would be transfers of power and that again there needs to be fundamental reassurance under this Bill and the beginnings of some kind of reconnection and support that there will be no further extensive and sometimes rather furtive concessions of powers and competences. We believe that these two should not be barred. The passerelle system should not be barred in any way, but if we look on it as a possible window for quicker procedures—I would question the quickness, incidentally, as I have some figures showing that it is very far from being quick—nevertheless one should put a lock on that window. That is all we are saying. We are not saying that the passerelle system should not be used but that there should be a lock to ensure that it does not provide the opportunity for power and competences to seep away. I add the point about the length of time taken. Passerelles are not the quick fix that some people suggest. In all the cases that one looks at about the future—of course, there is very little to look at in the past as most of these passerelles have never been used, which is for good reason—the evidence is that they would take six months or a year. They would have to clog up national Parliaments and would not be the easy way of getting round the issue of giving up vetoes.
In that sort of scenario I very much doubt that the British people would understand why they would be asked for their views on whether or not to give up the British veto on, for instance, common foreign and security policy by virtue of a treaty change but be not asked for their say before the British Government could do exactly the same thing through the passerelle procedure. That is why there is concern and why these matters are in Clause 6. I mentioned common foreign and security policy but there is a whole social policy area where there are very serious issues and the surrender of a veto would be a major surrender of power. The environment passerelle has been there since 1987. It has never been used, for the very good reason that countries do not want to use it because it takes time, is complicated and blocks up national parliamentary procedures throughout the European Union. The European Union's multiannual financial frameworks, introduced by the Lisbon treaty, are neither unimportant nor casual. They are highly important and giving up the veto over them would be a considerable departure and concession of power. The remaining vetoes concern not enhanced co-operation itself—which does not affect competence at all because it is not allowed to—but situations where, once we were in an enhanced co-operation operation, there might be pressure for it to go to QMV. All these areas are vital, not trivial. They are critical areas, in the language of the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, and there must be reassurance that they will not be, by a tick of a box, by launching into a long and complicated treaty procedure, or even by an Act of Parliament, simply turned into major concessions of power and competence.
I have not begun to answer every question and I will be happy to write to noble Lords about some of the very interesting amendments they tabled. I have in mind in particular the observations of my noble friend Lord Flight. As he said, they did not quite fit into the main thrust of many amendments from noble Lords opposite, but they were very interesting and raised important issues.
We have debated these matters very thoroughly and I will end by saying this. If one believes that the EU has enough competences and powers to proceed and to succeed, and that this is the context in which the UK can take the lead; that, far from being marginalised, we can continue to shape and be decisive in the European Union; and if one recognises that other countries are just as opposed to QMV and the moot case of passerelles—I mentioned Sweden, Spain, Ireland and Estonia, and there could be many others—one will see the case for the Bill. If noble Lords believe that all members of the EU are itching to bring forward new treaties, take new powers and extend competences, despite the fact that that would be a very slow and unpopular process in many countries and would clog up 27 national Parliaments, they will obviously disagree and there is nothing that I can do to persuade them otherwise.
If that is the way they see the future of Europe, and the future development of a successful and popular European Union that attracts and merits the public consensus in a way that it is not doing today, clearly they will also see the prospect of an endless treaty trickle that in my view would be a major contribution not to encouraging trust and support for a successful European Union but to undermining it. To noble Lords who insist on that view, there is nothing more than I can say, except that, in the view of the Government, such a procedure in future—a pattern that would come up against the proposals in the Bill if there were endless treaty changes appearing at all times—would be guaranteed to alienate people even more than they have been already, and would be profoundly hostile and not helpful to sound EU development.
Some noble Lords believe the opposite. The noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, believes the opposite with great force and vigour. I always admire his energies, but I believe that his proposition that the Bill would somehow simultaneously weaken popular support for the European Union and respect for Parliament is 180 degrees wrong. The Bill points the way to much greater public confidence in Parliament and public commitment to the benefits of the European Union, and our role in it, in a completely changed world and international landscape. That is why I strongly urge noble Lords not to press their amendments, which do not add to the aims and goals of the Bill, or the aims and goals of a better and stronger European Union.
I thank the Minister for his disarming response to the debate. It was an interesting debate. I am a little sorry that the Front Bench has not associated itself with the defence of the ECJ that I rather inadequately attempted.
Much of what the noble Lord said on that matter is correct. There is no question of challenging the integrity of the very senior legal figures who have served their country and Europe very well, and I associate myself with some of the noble Lord’s remarks, although some decisions coming out of the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights are a different matter, and I would question them very strongly. However, I would not question that the personnel involved are men and women of integrity, uprightness and skill.
I am grateful to the Minister. The most endearing feature of the debate was that it was the first of our debates in Committee where we all agreed on something. We all agreed that the grouping was insane. The Opposition Front Bench said that the grouping was insane, and the Minister said that the grouping was unfortunate. One wonders where the grouping comes from. Clearly nobody in the Chamber was in any way responsible for it. It came down from above. Perhaps it came out of Brussels or some dreadful place like that.
It was a difficult debate because of the amendments seeking to subtract, the amendments seeking to add and the amendments of very different weights. At the end of the previous short debate, there was, as the noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, pointed out, a very significant move by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, who indicated that he might be prepared to go away and think about something said in the debate. I urge the coalition to share this insight.
It would be extremely good if the Minister too would consider at the end of these debates whether there might not be something that he would be prepared to think about further. He has very kindly said that he would be happy to explain, meet informally and discuss, but that had slightly the ring of the schoolmaster: “If you guys only do your homework, you will in the end understand the wisdom of the Government’s Bill”. I am not sure that that is quite going to do the trick. I think it will be necessary to come back at a later stage to the scope of Clause 6, but for the moment, I withdraw the amendment.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Chidgey, and with his permission, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in his name on the Order Paper.
My Lords, around 300,000 people have left north Sudan for the south in the past six months. Around three-quarters have settled in rural rather than urban areas. There have been two meetings in Khartoum with South Sudan Caucus Ministers to discuss reintegration needs and regular meetings with the Government of Southern Sudan. A major meeting on reintegration needs will take place in Juba on 17 to 18 May.
My Lords, the United Nations Secretary-General estimates that that figure of 300,000 will have increased to 550,000 by the end of the interim period. If three-quarters of them are to be resettled in rural areas, what provision is being made by the UN for training and support for people who may have no previous experience of agriculture and horticulture? Is UNMIS prepared to offer protection to those returnees who have resettled in areas of conflict, particularly in Abyei and in Unity state?
My noble friend is right: this is a serious problem. There are various estimates of the numbers concerned. These are voluntary refugees heading south and there are enormous problems. Some 24 per cent have settled in urban areas, 76 per cent in rural areas. The problems of their reintegration and resettlement and of how they can adjust to new conditions are the top priority for the constant discussions that are going on, both those that I have mentioned and the regular ones that the troika of the UK, the US and Norway has fortnightly with the United Nations. These worries are being addressed but the numbers are large and the process is difficult to manage. However, we will make progress.
My noble friend also mentioned Abyei, which is on the border and was not able to join South Sudan. There have been ugly and violent developments there. We urge consultation and careful support from both Khartoum and Juba to ensure that militias and armies are not heavily involved and that proper consultation takes place, but these, along with South Kurdufan and the Blue Nile province, are all very difficult areas where there is considerable political tension.
Is the Minister aware that, with the advent of the rainy season, the problems of returnees will be severely exacerbated, particularly if they have not been resettled with adequate shelter? The rainy season also brings increased vulnerability to diseases such as malaria and gastrointestinal and respiratory tract infections. There is as yet inadequate healthcare for the existing population. Will DfID be able to assist the Government of Southern Sudan with these escalating problems?
As the noble Baroness knows extremely well, because she is very close to this problem, DfID has got substantial programmes. We do not assist with the funding, transportation and movement of refugees, but we most definitely invest heavily in the problems of solving reintegration that I have already described to my noble friend. That is what is being done. DfID is now committed to providing assistance over the next four years at the rate of £140 million a year for both north and south; £90 million each year for the next four years will go to the south. A very substantial proportion will go into precisely the problems the noble Baroness has raised.
My Lords, will the Minister comment on the intransigence being shown by the SPLM in allowing political space to opposition parties? How are the UK and other international donors responding to this? Is there any intention to invest in the capacity of political parties in Southern Sudan and increase their legitimacy, and to encourage the Government of Southern Sudan to loosen their grip and prepare for a broad-based Government in that country?
The noble Baroness is most definitely right. Of course we want to see more political activity and a downgrading and standing back of the militia wings of these political parties. It is the militias that lead to violence and difficulties, within both Southern Sudan and the three provinces I have already named. That is what we seek to do. The more we can move away from militias, killings and violence and have a proper political process, the better chance there is for this new nation of Southern Sudan to prosper, which we all want to see and should welcome and encourage in every possible way.
My Lords, are there any plans to establish diplomatic relations with South Sudan and to recognise that country?
Yes, there are indeed. We are moving ahead on that front. South Sudan will have an independence celebration on July 9, where there will be senior ministerial attendance; I cannot say precisely what it will be. This will place South Sudan in the comity of new nations. I am also glad to say that one of its aspirations—it is not for us to decide—is that it should join the Commonwealth of Nations. This encourages me, although it is of course a matter for all 54 members to decide and not just the UK.
Does the Minister agree that Juba, the capital, has some of the features of an old frontier town with the promise of oil revenues and a get-rich-quick mentality? Thousands of people are coming into this town, and yet DfID is wholly concerned with health and education. Those are good priorities, but what about employment, especially in the small business sector? Many of these northerners have skills that can be employed.
It is not quite true to say that DfID is wholly concerned with the two areas that the noble Earl mentioned. DfID has an elaborate programme which takes account of the need for economic development for smaller business enterprise. It is very concerned with the reintegration of the thousands coming from the north. It is a wide programme. There is a big and very effective team of 35 people from DfID in Juba, who provide the platform on which my department—the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—also works. This is not a backward or diminished operation. It is a very strong one. We are determined to support this new nation as effectively as we can in all sectors.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was going to go through one or two. Certainly Serbia will serve the purpose. A number of countries in the region, for one reason or another, went to war. It was only when a different kind of future was offered to them that they began to think about the alternative future that their children might enjoy which did not involve shooting each other.
I understand, in debating the amendment, that the issues that I have raised are not supported everywhere or by everyone. I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart: I regard the movement of labour in a free market as broadly beneficial, but I know that not everybody thinks so. Many people have expressed anxieties about it. This has been one issue that has come out of part of the accession. I believe that, broadly speaking, it has been economically advantageous to Europe rather than the contrary. However, I accept that many people who expressed anxieties were dismissed in a trivial way or saw their anxieties given grudging attention. Probably that did not serve the argument well.
Some people may have felt that changes of that kind were sufficiently profound that they wanted a say in the decision through a referendum. More than that, I suspect that they felt the need for some sort of shout about the overall size of the EU. For all that, were they to contrast the prospect of having a referendum on those questions with the ideas in the Bill about having a referendum on many minute, technocratic and in many instances unintelligible provisions, probably they would think that some of the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, were more important than others. It would be foolish of us not to recognise that.
I suspect that some of the same arguments could happen with the Turkish accession. Let me be clear that we—certainly I do—totally support it. I welcome the dynamism that it represents. I also have no hankering for a Europe that is built around a single religious tradition—a view which has been expressed by many of the Eurosceptics and, indeed, in some European capitals. It would be a huge gain to see Turkey as a full member of Europe. It is absolutely right, as the noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, said, that it has always played a fundamental role in the Council of Europe. This would be a huge gain for Europe in a much more profound sense—a Europe that is welcoming and able not only to cope with, which is probably too derisory a way to put it, but to embrace a major secular but also Islamic nation with a capability of bridging the interests of Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus and bringing a great deal to stabilising the discussion right around the southern and eastern flank of Europe.
Whatever the merits that I might express about it, I know that those merits have been accepted by all recent United Kingdom Governments. However, there remain people—it has been something of a cause in France and Poland, for example—who believe that Turkish accession would have a major impact on the style and culture of the European Union. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, described it as the ethos of the European Union. I look forward to these evolutionary changes regardless of whether others have expressed doubts. However, among those who have expressed doubts, some will probably feel that there will be an impact on them—a greater impact than some of the things that will be subject to referenda under the Bill’s provisions—and that they are not being asked their opinion.
The Minister will probably want to explain to the House the difference in approach and the apparent irrationality of the circumstances in which people will be asked for their view as between the different kinds of categories of issues at stake. The amendment draws the wrong conclusion. However, it cannot be said that the issue that it raises is inconsequential. Nevertheless, as I said at the beginning, we are opposed in principle, and we are. It would be better to remove the requirements for so many of these trigger clauses for referenda without providing any compelling definitions of issues of major constitutional importance and without an independent means of confirming the compelling nature of the decision.
It would be very helpful if the Minister could also comment on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, about what would happen were there to be a number of countries seeking accession at the same time. I will not invite him, however, to develop a new theory of AV which might allow for multiple voting—an outcome which probably everybody would fail to understand.
I can also see one other great risk in the kind of referenda that this amendment calls for, and that is in the area of producing campaigns which could very well be xenophobic and draw out the worst in relations between those seeking entry to the European Union and the domestic community of the United Kingdom, not least because many of those communities already in the United Kingdom are dynamic and vigorous parts of the society of the United Kingdom. The tensions that could be produced by that kind of approach would be quite unacceptable.
I also believe that accession does not transfer powers from the United Kingdom and that the House would do itself a considerable favour by recognising the beneficial characteristics of the growth that we have seen, a benefit which will unquestionably continue. As we look across the whole of the achievement of a peaceful European Union, I suspect that that will be seen historically to be one of the better departing points in our history.
My Lords, I begin by welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, to the forefront of the Opposition's concerns about this Bill. I think that he and I exchanged views from the Dispatch Box during the passage of the Lisbon treaty. We covered a great deal of ground then, and I think that we learnt a great deal from that process. Indeed, the British people learnt a great deal from the Lisbon treaty process, as did the whole of Europe. I look forward to lively debates with him in the future.
I have to say in parenthesis that should this Bill become law, the future will not be at all as the noble Lord describes it. The picture of a dribble of referenda on small issues completely misunderstands the way in which the European process works now or will work in the future, whether this Bill is on our statute book or not. I have obviously explained that insufficiently because the message has not got over, but as we continue our debates I hope to be able to make clear that the pattern will not be dissimilar to the pattern of the big treaty packages in the past, the difference being that if they contain matters that might look small but could be highly significant for this nation because they involve a transfer of competence or powers beyond the level of insignificance, that certainly requires consulting the British people. That is a very widespread view which this Government believe is important to satisfy in order to build a better consensus for the European Union than we have today from the British public.
However, that is for other debates: debates that we have already had and debates in the future. On this issue, we have had a very elegant exchange on the two sides of the argument. It is a debate in which the Government’s position is quite clear, as I shall make plain in a few moments. I find that when your Lordships tackle this sort of issue we put up a superb performance and all sorts of aspects are developed that do not necessarily emerge in the pattern of debates in the other place.
The amendments would alter Clause 4 to create an automatic requirement for a referendum in the UK to approve the accession of a new member state to the European Union. As your Lordships know, the UK has never required a referendum on accession treaties in the past, and this Government have been clear that there should be no referendum requirement merely for the accession of any new member state. That was the position also taken by the previous Government, of which the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, was a member. Why is that so? The simple point is this: the accession of a new member state alone does not constitute a transfer of competence or power from the UK to the EU. The transfer of powers or competence to the EU would be from the member state joining the European Union, not from the UK. Of course, there are some effects, possibly including a change in bilateral relations if a country becomes a member of the European Union. No one disputes that, but we are not really talking about effects or impact; we are talking about the transfer of powers and competences.
I apologise if that sounds narrow, but that is the limitation of the provisions of the Bill. Of course, we are aware of the need to avoid providing a loophole in our referendum provisions in case there is a proposal to use an accession treaty to transfer power or competence from member states other than the acceding state. That could occur, so this Bill provides for a clear requirement for a Ministerial Statement to be laid before Parliament about whether an accession treaty constituted a transfer of competence or power from the UK to the EU in accordance with Clause 4. If the Minister decided that such a transfer was proposed, a referendum would then be required, but if there was no such transfer no referendum would be required. I hope that reinforces the point that I was making earlier.
My Lords, as the Minister has touched on this point so clearly, will he make it quite categorical that if a Croatian treaty of accession in the next year or two is brought before Parliament and it contains the provisions on Ireland and the Czech Republic that were agreed as part of the ratification process of Lisbon, in which it was stated, by us as well, that they will be included in a future accession treaty, that will not give rise to a referendum requirement?
If one is talking about declarations or derogations within existing treaties and competences, that would not give rise to a referendum. If it was an occasion on which a whole range of new proposals were put forward, including some of those which noble Lords describe as minor or even trivial but which could in fact have highly significant effects on the powers, potentials, freedoms and obligations of this country, that would be a different matter. The kind of changes suggested by the noble Lord would not give rise to a referendum.
In line with all other treaty changes, an Act of Parliament would—
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for allowing me to interrupt him. This is a very important point. If the Bill is passed in its present form with its text unamended, is he confident that it could not subsequently be argued—if there are going to be judicial reviews of ministerial decisions on this matter—during the accession of a new member state that the mere fact of accession reduces the powers of this country because it dilutes our voting strength in the European Union under QMV and for other purposes?
It does not dilute our power to veto. Our power to veto is there unless it is removed by other transfers, which of course would trigger a referendum. However, if the power to veto is there, there is no dilution. We have heard from noble Lords who have spoken in this debate of the small but undoubted change in the proportion of the population of the total European Union that would result in this country if a number of other countries acceded. That is true, but the veto remains. There has been no transfer of power of any description or kind, which is what this Bill is concerned with.
I also wanted to say that any accession treaty provides Parliament with the full power and the opportunity to scrutinise the accession treaty, which we have done in the past. If it was so minded—a point that meets the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart—a Parliament could legislate for a referendum. It remains the power of Parliament to do so. It is perfectly free to say, “Here is an issue on which we think there should be a referendum”.
Is the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, not correct? If an accession reduces the voting power under majority voting procedure of the UK, that must mean a decline in power of the UK Parliament.
It does not alter the fact that the United Kingdom will continue to have a veto, as other countries will, unless we surrender positions of unanimity by abandoning our veto. That would be the position. It is perfectly true that there would be very marginal and small changes in the pattern of weighting, but there is no particular reason why they should involve a loss of power or a transfer of competence. They do not do so. The noble Lord, who is very experienced in these things, was talking about patterns in which all sorts of alliances are formed or not formed. All sorts of gatherings and countings of votes take place when Ministers go into these negotiations. That will continue as before. The accession of another country does not alter that pattern in any way.
The noble Lord, Lord Pearson, asked about the ways in which immigration or financial regulations might be affected by the arrival in the European Union of a new member state. He will recall that when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU, we put transitional arrangements in place. We had the perfect power and legislative opportunity to do so, and we can do so again. Nothing in the treaty of accession prevents us from doing so and nothing has prevented us from doing so in the past.
I emphasise, as the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, and other noble Lords have asked me to, that, as with all previous Governments regardless of their political composition, we are strong supporters of future enlargement. Like some noble Lords, I remember the considerable uplift in spirits when first there was the fall of the Berlin wall and the Soviet empire and then when the processes of enlargement embraced one after another of its former satellite countries. We all worked, planned and hoped for these things. Some of us thought that we would never see them in our lifetime, but they did occur.
EU enlargement helps to create stability, security and prosperity across Europe—we have never disputed that—and serves to spread democracy, human rights, the rule of law and fair rules for workers and businesses. These standards are high although they are not always achieved. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, for reminding us of a joke—which, frankly, I had heard before—about the standards of the EU itself. The EU is not, of course, a country; it is a vast confederal structure. It is a unique institution in the 20th and 21st centuries but it is not a country, and perhaps it is a little distorting to suggest that it should be judged in the same way as a nation state. However, that we favour enlargement in the way in which it has come about so far—and in the way in which it might come about in the future—should not raise one iota of doubt for a single minute.
Whenever a candidate country meets the EU accession criteria and it is decided that it is ready to join the EU, we will support its entry. The Government will present its case to Parliament through the introduction of a Bill that will be debated in both Houses and passed or not passed into an Act according to the will of Parliament.
I have little to add to the strong points that have been put by a number of noble Lords as to the fact that transfers of powers and competencies do not arise in the precise form in which we are dealing with them in the Bill; there is no competence or power transfer. The commitment in the coalition government programme for government is to have a referendum on treaties that change a power or competence from the UK to the EU. Treaties that merely allow a new country to accede do not meet this requirement. On that basis, I urge noble Lords to consider what I have said on this matter and to withdraw the amendment.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate, particularly those who supported the amendment—the noble Lords, Lord Pearson and Lord Willoughby de Broke. I confess that I did not think there would be a debate of nearly an hour and a half on my amendments; I thought they would be dealt with very swiftly. I am pleased that I tabled the amendments because we have had a well considered and authoritative debate on the subject, whatever opinion we hold. That has been altogether good. I would like to reply to all the points that have been made but, including my own speech, there have been 15 speakers—the equivalent of the number of speakers in normal short debates that are two and a half hours long—and I am sure that the House would not welcome a long speech from me in these concluding remarks.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, that I was interested in the way in which the Estonians were bribed, so to speak, to vote in the referendum with whisky and chocolates. I am sure that the Scots would be pleased that their product was being used in that way. I visited Estonia shortly after the referendum. It seemed, from the general view of the population, that they regretted the decision that they had made and wished that they could go back on it. That is by the by.
It has been a good debate with some important issues raised. Although the noble Lord, Lord Richard, does not support the amendment, he made a valid point that if we are going to have referendums on some rather less important things—public prosecutors and what have you—there is little merit in raising the question of having referendums on more major matters. That was taken up by several other noble Lords. It is clearly important that we realise that the Bill is deficient in many respects.
On the question of referendums, there appears to be a lot of opposition to referendums per se. That opposition is perhaps on the basis that those who do not want them believe that they cannot win them. That is a big mistake. We have referendums on all sorts of things such as mayors. The objective of having them is to give people a say on major items. I stress that it is on major items. We should not rule them out of our decision-making process.
Another point was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Triesman. I, too, welcome him to his new post on the opposition Front Bench. He may well be right to claim that the European Union has given us nothing but benefits. The noble Lord, Lord Pearson, and I have asked repeatedly for a cost-benefit analysis of our membership of the European Union. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, might support the next Bill which asks for a referendum.
Another point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, who suggested that we should not have referendums on the accession of new members because there are no new competencies. As I pointed out in my opening speech, the accession of new members has often if not mostly been the reason for new treaties transferring competencies to the European Union. In that respect, new accessions may well result in new competencies being given to the European Union and its institutions.
I again thank noble Lords for contributing to a good and essential debate. I do not intend to press the matter to a Division this afternoon but, after reading all the contributions to the debate, I might wish to bring the matter forward again on Report and perhaps even put it to a vote. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I certainly do not want to make a habit of too many interruptions, as we all know that debate in this place goes more smoothly without, but the noble Lord has made a number of statements which jar so strongly with the reality that I have to ask him what he means by them. He says that the passerelle and other arrangements in the Lisbon treaty would enable rapid changes to be made but we all know that any treaty, including the one now going through, takes 21 months. How can 21 months possibly be described as rapid? Furthermore, he seems to assume that the efficient and effective operation of the European Union demands all kinds of new treaties and to ignore the fact that within the vast range of competences that it has, a great deal can, must and will be done. Countries throughout the European Union are extremely reluctant to embark upon the complex, long process of European treaty change. These are all facts and they contrast completely with what the noble Lord has said in the past five minutes.
The Minister has misunderstood what I have been trying to say. I apologise to the Committee if I have been giving a false impression but this amendment’s subject encapsulates fully the point that I am trying to make. What concerns us is: why tie up all the flexibilities that are within the existing, ratified structure of the Lisbon treaty, which were discussed in this House in the previous Parliament? Why tie all of those up in referendum locks that could have a very negative effect on Britain's power to act in its own interests within the European Union? That is the point and this amendment looks at one of those specific and unnecessary locks. Let me try and explain its point.
Clause 4(1)(m), which we debated last week, requires an automatic referendum if any amendment is moved to the Lisbon treaty, as it could be within the terms of that treaty, to alter the right of member states to ensure suspension of the legislative procedure. In Euro-speak, this is called the emergency brake and covers three areas of EU activity: social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime. It is the right of a member state to refer a matter where legislation is proposed in those areas to the European Council before the legislation can proceed any further. Britain supported emergency brakes in these areas in the passage of the Lisbon treaty. It did so because the previous Government thought that as regards social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime there might well be an argument in principle for more Europe. Indeed, there were compelling arguments for more Europe in this area but as a safeguard, just in case we did not like the look of the way things were going, we wanted to see how it worked. Therefore there was a need for an emergency brake.
The logic of this very pragmatic position is that if we find in future years that the European Community is doing a good job in these fields, we will be prepared to rid ourselves of that emergency brake provision. Those who are disposed by nature to see everything that the EU does as a threat will never believe that anything can work, but those of us who think that it can be an opportunity should be open-minded about the possibility of the changes that are provided for in the Lisbon treaty.
I argue that these three areas are issues that are not of the highest national importance, like whether we join the euro, but are of significant importance where change might be necessary in processes that the Government might want to agree to. However, the Bill will require an automatic referendum. Look at them: first, social security legislation, which, as we know, is tied up with the right to work, study, and settle for retirement wherever you want in the EU, which is one of its most appealing citizenship rights; secondly, judicial co-operation, which is essential if we are going to effectively tackle the terrorist threats of the kind that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, talked about earlier in his Statement on Osama bin Laden; and thirdly, cross-border crime, in terms of which we are all aware of the increasing problems of criminal gangs operated from outside the EU but often on its borders, in countries like Russia and some parts of the Balkans.
Surely we want to retain the flexibility to make Europe effective in those areas. That may require changes in these so-called emergency-brake provisions but, on a narrow but significant point, the Government are saying, “Oh no, we can’t do anything for at least seven years or so because we have to have a referendum and we are certainly not going to do anything about that this Parliament”. The argument from this side of the House is a different one: let us not tie ourselves up in these knots but have the confidence that in a representative democracy Parliament should deal with these questions; there is no place for a referendum on them.
I am afraid that the noble Lord is going to be disappointed.
My Lords, if there are no further comments from your Lordships on this issue, it remains for me to seek to allay the fears of my noble friend Lord Waddington on a matter which is undoubtedly complex. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, remarked earlier, the entire area is complex because the interface between the powers and competences of the European Union and the powers, rights and obligations of the nation state members is vastly complex and, in some senses, is in a somewhat fluid state. Indeed, it is that very fluidity that gives rise to the unease for which I believe there is substantial evidence, and I speak as someone who has been involved for just short of 50 years—even before the UK joined the then European Community—in trying to see that the European Union works in a balanced, effective and beneficial way. Over the past few years, not only in this country but in many countries we have seen an appalling record of declining confidence in, support for and public consensus over the whole construct of the European Union. In my view, the EU has conferred considerable benefits on its members and on the peace and stability of the whole world in the past, and, provided it proceeds in a sensible way with good public support, it will do so in the future in a number of, although not unlimited, areas. This is a perfectly sensible aspiration and one which I think the Bill and its aims reinforce, although I realise that that is not understood or accepted by noble Lords opposite.
The amendment would remove the provision setting out that future treaty changes which serve to codify practice under the treaties, in relation to the previous exercise of an existing competence, should not in principle require a referendum. My noble friend is concerned, as he says Members in the other place were during debates on the Bill, that codification could be used as a vehicle for transferring power or competence from the UK to the EU and that this provision might provide a loophole to allow such a transfer under a future treaty change without a referendum. If a treaty change is merely a codification of the previous practice of existing competence and nothing else in that treaty would fall within Clause 4(1) of the Bill, the Government do not think that a referendum should be required and the matter would proceed on that basis. Genuine codification—I emphasise “genuine”—is not a transfer of power or competence. The EU competence in question already exists and the EU has already acted to that effect. Even if the UK did not agree to codify existing practice by means of a treaty amendment, the EU would be able to continue to act within the relevant existing competence. Therefore, in effect there would be no point in attempting to go down another path because the EU would already be doing what it was doing within the existing competence.
An example of a treaty change which we would consider to be codification would be the introduction of a separate legal base for action previously taken to provide macro-financial assistance to some third countries. Article 352 of the TFEU, which we all know well, was used in April 2004 to provide macro-financial assistance to Albania. It was then used a further seven times to provide macro-financial assistance in a similar way to other countries. When the Lisbon treaty came along, it codified this use by providing a separate legislative base under Articles 212 and 213 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which cover economic, financial and technical co-operation with third countries.
My Lords, can the Minister give us any idea of the quantum at stake in this amendment, given the European Union’s well known capacity to take power by whatever method it can? He mentioned the use of former Article 308 and the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, mentioned how we were deceived in the Maastricht negotiations over the working time directive which, in the end, turned out to be part of the social policy. How many existing competences are being practised which might require codification? Is this a big area or is it something that will not happen very often because there is not much left to codify or to put in the treaty or to agree?
I do not think it is possible to quantify what will happen, what is happening or what has happened. Codification has occurred from time to time and I described one or two instances where it has occurred. There have been more. I would love to be able to say to the noble Lord that it has happened 15 times and it will happen 15 more times, but that would be completely unrealistic. I have no idea how it will occur, but it is important to ensure that we understand what genuine codification is. It will occur again and, as my noble friend Lord Brittan said, it is an objective legal concept but it is a bit like an Omega wrist watch that seems to be genuine but turns out to have nothing inside. There are non-genuine codifications and we have to watch very carefully to see that they do not join the genuine move towards competence creep, which is a phrase that people do not like. The phrase that people like in relation to the European Union is “knowing where they stand”, believing, as I think the majority of people in this country do, in the value of the European Union but feeling thoroughly uneasy about it continuing to take too many powers away from the nation states. Most nation states in Europe do not want that and we do not want it either.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, when we leave the European Union, we will not do as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, suggests. We will take back those waters that were our waters, take back those fish that were our fish and re-establish our national fishing industry. That is what we will do. As the noble Lord has mentioned, this was not actually in the amendments but as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, mentioned it in connection with me, I thought that I would just touch on it in closing.
The noble Lord assumes, again, that some form of European common energy policy is in any way necessary for this country. We simply rebuild our own energy supplies. We do not let the European Union close down our coal-fired stations, as my noble friend Lord Willoughby de Broke has mentioned, but build new ones. We might even consider incineration of landfill. We certainly consider nuclear power. We therefore supply our own energy. If we then wish to go on buying Russian gas through France, which is what we have to do at the moment, then we may be able to, but I entirely agree with my noble friend that this pursuit of wind power is madness of a dimension that only the political class could be guilty of. I think that that covers everything that I had to say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and I shall sit down.
Perhaps your Lordships would welcome it if we began to come to the end of this enormous debate. I agree with my noble friend Lord Lamont that the effect of this debate has been to clarify our differences, particularly the concerns of noble Lords opposite, about the Bill, and the worries that lie at the centre of their anxieties.
I do not want to parody what the noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Triesman, have said again and again. They wish for more flexibility, and by “flexibility” they mean the readiness to agree to or even initiate treaty changes. They further argue that in some of its provisions—notably Article 48(6), but in others as well—the Lisbon treaty provided this flexibility, which somehow the Bill is reversing and putting back in the box. I think that that is a fair summary of where they stand. I question straight away whether they have got the Lisbon treaty quite right. We know that using the passerelle provisions requires a treaty change, and in a life experiment, not a laboratory experiment, we have seen how that is conducted. It is conducted through some very elaborate negotiations on an urgent issue that will not be solved by any immediate policies to hand—namely, the stability of the European financial and monetary system—and, to meet that, a treaty change is winding its way through the system and will take one year and three-quarters to come to fruition and be agreed. So that structure, that passerelle arrangement—which, incidentally, was as noble Lords know very well, an agonising compromise between several other suggestions at the Lisbon treaty negotiations—is certainly not a quick solution, a flexibility device, an emergency provision, which somehow the Bill is negativing. That is not the pattern.
Then we come to the broader question of whether treaty changes generally are synonymous with flexibility. I have considerable difficulty with the line taken by the Opposition. Not only does it take 18 months to two years to work up and elaborate treaty changes and get them agreed between the 27 members, which all have their own procedures for handling these matters, going through their own legislatures and constitutional arrangements and, in many cases their own referenda arrangements as well, but this seems to be a very poor response, a very poor kind of flexibility and a very poor pattern of responding to emergency and difficult issues.
As I understand it, the implication of the amendments, which extend the exemptions to a very wide range of issues, is that it would be nice to be ready to have treaty changes in an enormous list of things. We dealt with banking and financial regulation in the previous group of amendments, and I would be testing the patience of the Committee if I went through that again. However, these amendments deal with climate change, pollution, energy security, migration, cross-border crime, neighbourhood policy, maritime law, piracy and human trafficking, about which my noble friend Lady Williams spoke with such precision, knowledge and telling appeal. In all those areas, as I understand it, the amendments would like to see treaty change. I wonder whether the Opposition realise quite what they are asking for; it seems extremely doubtful that treaty change is the way to solve crises or problems in any of those areas. The amendments appear to have been drafted on the assumption that the Bill is trying to impair the UK’s role and participation in all these areas. They take no account of the fact—and it is a fact—that the existing treaties which extend enormous areas of competence to the EU already afford the European Union ample scope—I shall show in detail why this is so—to legislate in all the specific areas referred to in all the amendments.
If I were to go through that vast list now, we would be here till well after midnight and probably the early hours of the morning, so I cannot do justice to every aspect. But let me try to show how, in many of these areas, the competences are there. The need to plunge into this complicated area of treaty change is minimal; the opportunities for creating a highly effective European posture and policy are available within the existing competences and the existing absolute competence in particular is available to the EU in trade questions. Let me explain some of the points where this is so.
Perhaps I should begin with referenda generally and the concern that a multiple stream of referenda lies ahead if the Bill gets on to the statute book. That, I think we have established, is nonsense. Far ahead, a great new treaty could touch on a number of the issues we are looking at tonight. But the idea of a stream of referenda, which I know noble Lords in many cases dislike intensely, is unrealistic. In two highly eloquent pieces of oratory in two debates, my noble friend Lord Deben has let us know that he does not like referenda at all. That is my impression from listening to his words. He is perfectly entitled not to like referenda at all. However, he must face it: they increasingly creep into modern government, particularly in this internet age when 2 billion people, out of 6 billion on this planet, are on the web every morning. This obviously empowers people and leads to more consultation of public opinion than ever before in many democracies. It goes with parliamentary representative government; it does not undermine it, provided it is handled in a sensible way.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but no one, as far as I know, has tabled an amendment to Clause 2. It states that if there is a major new constitutional package there will have to be a referendum. No one has argued about that—not one person. What we are all arguing about is whether you need this cascade of Clauses 3, 4, 5 and 6 that block off the non-intergovernmental conference treaty big-package route. Honestly, I ask the noble Lord not to answer the wrong question. All the amendments relate to this cascade of referendums for matters that are dealt with within the Lisbon treaty.
The noble Lord, who is very skilled in these matters, knows that he is putting the question upside down. It is dangerous to halt a cascade, because you may have to divert it, and the cascade that the Bill is designed to halt is the cascade of small competence and power transfers that have been going on over the years in many areas and have caused a lot of people to fear that competence creep—I am sorry to repeat that unfortunate term—and power creep are continuing all the time, allegedly under parliamentary control, but somehow without proper public discussion, and certainly without the consent of the people.
The referendum-lock device is precisely to ensure that when the big transfers of competence and power come, they are in a clear package. The noble Lord said that that was the wrong thing to talk about, but that is the way that it will happen, like the Lisbon treaty, and the country will be invited, because of the many items that will involve competence transfer, to have a referendum on them. That is precisely my point. There will be no cascade because, if the Bill works effectively, which I think it will, the great changes needed in the 2020s and 2030s in the European Union, as it adjusts to new conditions, will have to be treated in a substantial treaty that must and will automatically trigger a referendum. That is entirely right and it will offend only those who, like my noble friend Lord Deben, do not like referenda at all. However, for most people, including 84 per cent of the country, or their children, that will be the right way to proceed. It should ensure that some degree of trust, reconnection and support for the great European cause is resurrected. At present that support is fading away very fast. It is draining away in Finland, Hungary, to some extent in Poland and in many other countries. I am not sure that even in Germany these matters carry the popularity and support needed for the kind of reforms we want to see in Europe.
This is a very serious matter. I do not say that this Bill alone will do the job of reconnection—of course it will not. We need leadership, articulation and an understanding that giving more and more powers to the centre is an outdated 20th century idea and that the more you accumulate powers at the centre, the more you get public disaffection and remoteness. That must be understood. It must be understood that in this networked age, you do not need centralisation to carry out effective powers. Once that is understood, we will begin to get shapes in the European Union that relate to and connect with the people, as the Laeken declaration pleaded for almost a decade ago. That is why I believe that these exemptions will increase mistrust and take Europe back, rather than forward to the 21st century adjustment needed in the information age, and why I therefore plead with the noble Lord and his colleagues to withdraw the amendment.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the contribution by the European Union and its predecessors to peace in Europe compared with that of NATO.
My Lords, both the European Union and NATO have made invaluable and complementary contributions to peace in Europe. We do not consider it appropriate to compare the two as they serve different functions. While NATO has ensured, and continues to ensure, our security, there is more to peace than just security. It requires stability, shared values, economic development and political co-operation. The European Union has contributed that. We firmly intend to remain an active and committed member of both.
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s compliment about NATO, but I am afraid that the rest of his Answer merely repeats the EU’s standard propaganda to justify its existence. Is it not true that democracy is the best guarantor of peace and that the EU is a deeply undemocratic institution? Secondly, is it not also true that the EU is failing on every other front as well so that it has become an emperor without clothes?
My Lords, I think the noble Lord will agree that democracy is a many-layered concept. It requires the rule of law, good judicial standards, effective policing, fighting corruption, good and free business enterprise and freedom of the press. All those are areas where EU operations are effective. No one is saying that everything in the European Union is perfect at the moment. It obviously has major problems, particularly for those who are members of the eurozone, but it is unrealistic to dismiss all those very important elements of peace and democracy to which the EU contributes alongside the harder power that NATO can deliver.
My Lords, at the expense of trying to do some damage to the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, I say that I thoroughly agree with the part of his statement about democracy being the best guarantor of peace. Will the Minister confirm that the European Union buttressing emergent new democracies in Spain, Portugal and Greece made a major contribution in that area and therefore relieved NATO of many of the problems that it would otherwise have had in defending its southern flank?
As I said, I think the two things are complementary. I know that the noble Lord, who is a considerable expert on these issues, would not forget the role of the Council of Europe, originally set up at the instigation of this nation which took a lead, which has helped to bring values to the whole European continent. All three institutions have made their mark.
My Lords, Senator John McCain, after recently visiting Libya, said that,
“the US has got to play a greater role on the air power side. Our NATO allies neither have the assets, nor frankly the will—there's only six countries of the 28 in NATO that are actively engaged in this situation”.
Does my noble friend agree with Senator McCain and what pressure is the UK putting on the non-participants to pull their weight? Is this not the real test of NATO’s credibility?
The Libya issue is going a bit further than this Question, but the Americans are playing an active part, as we know, in a whole range of areas in trying to bring some stability to a divided Libya. Other members of NATO are in constant dialogue and have been asked whether they will contribute. It is true that not every member of NATO is involved. There is the particular question of Turkey, which has not so far played a hard-power part in the NATO operation. At least this is a core of members in NATO and it is under NATO organisation as a whole, so it is working.
Does the Minister not agree that conducting a beauty contest of the sort posed by the Question is a futile exercise and that what we really need to be focusing on is how NATO and the EU can work together and co-operate in areas where they are both involved, of which there are quite a lot in the Balkans and north Africa? Will he say something about the progress of the remit that was given to the High Representative, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, and to the Secretary-General of NATO at the NATO conference last year to report by this spring on how the problems that have arisen about co-operation between the two can be eased?
The short answer is that foreign ministers, including our own Secretary of State, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, and NATO leaders are on the case. There is pressure to try to make progress and overcome the particular problems that arose over the Cyprus-related issue of Turkey, with which the noble Lord is extremely familiar, which have slowed down the integration and co-operation. Even so, in areas such as the West Balkans, where Eurofor and KFOR are operating, they have worked very closely together, so at a practical level there has been progress but on the bigger issues, which tend to be the visible ones, I agree that it has been slow progress for precisely the reason I mentioned.
My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that the two most militarist nations in Europe were France and Germany and it is one of the great miracles of the post-war period that they devoted their efforts jointly to setting up what is now the European Union rather than fighting each other? The implication of the approach to the economic union of the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, is that they have denied our children and grandchildren their inalienable right to die on the battlefields of Europe.
I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, with great moderation, that a beauty contest between these organisations is rather pointless. All one wants to avoid is immoderate statements claiming perfection for one against the other. All these institutions have played their part. Occasionally some enthusiasts get a bit too outspoken on the part that one institution has played and that is the time for moderation.
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his comprehensive reply to such a silly, childish and provocative question. Does he agree, further to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, that the east European countries becoming member states of the European Union has contributed massively to continued peace?
I think I heard a bit of immoderation the other way at that point. There is reason and sense in all these points of view and if anyone strives to go too far in claiming perfection for one organisation over the other it is bound to produce a reaction, which is just what we are hearing today.
Does the Minister agree that instead of this raking over the past of whether NATO or the EU made the biggest contribution to peace we should be looking to the future? Does he accept that this is a future where our great ally the United States, the anchor of NATO, is looking to Europe to step up to the plate and live up to its responsibilities in Libya and north Africa and that there is a huge responsibility on the British Government, with our French allies, to persuade the rest of Europe to live up to those responsibilities? We will be successful in doing this only if we have a British Government who are fully committed to and not semi-detached from the European Union. Will he persuade the Prime Minister to make a strong case for a bigger role for Europe in accepting these wider responsibilities?
The noble Lord makes a number of points. It is certainly true that the United States is expecting the European Union to contribute more to the overall NATO scene as we are doing. This explains why the original worries of the United States about duplication and overlapping have evaporated and the EU and NATO are working very effectively together. The coalition Government believe that we should have a very positive role in the present European structure, in its reform and in meeting its future problems. However, there is a wider world as well, with which we have to connect, and many of these issues are not just American responsibilities or European responsibilities but global responsibilities requiring a global partnership.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I know that it is something of a cliché to say that debates we have in this House are timely, but in this case the word has particular relevance, because it so happens that we are in a stage of review and policy advance in a number of key areas, of which this is one of the most key of all. Therefore, this kind of debate, which shows the House of Lords at its very best, is immensely valuable in influencing and sending messages to those who make the final policy inside and, indeed, outside government. In that sense the debate is particularly timely, and it was introduced brilliantly by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, whom we congratulate on choosing this subject and on the way in which she introduced it.
Although we are discussing these matters in advance of many developments, and despite the need for a policy review and, indeed, answers to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report, particularly in relation to the BBC World Service, I will seek to answer as many questions as I can in the time available. There are some things that I cannot yet answer, and some that I will not have time to answer, but I shall do my best, particularly to cover the five or six points put by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, from the opposition Front Bench—all of which strike me as highly relevant.
The noble Baroness began by rightly seeking to focus our minds on the question of what we mean by soft power. Those of us in government who are trying to look at these things consider that it is the ability to influence the actions of another through attraction, rather than coercion. Soft power is working to exert this influence in order to achieve our national interests in an interdependent world and to make our maximum effective contribution to the stability, balance and prosperity of that world.
In order to do this, we need now more than ever to appreciate what is sometimes overlooked in our foreign policy debates—the new landscape of power, influence and understanding of attitudes and motives which has emerged in perhaps the past two or three years, and certainly in the past five years since the rise of the internet age in this century, which radically changes the modalities of foreign policy. In this new world it is not about power over others but about working to preserve, promote and protect our interest through the appeal of our values and culture, historical and contemporary; working with, rather than working to impose.
As it is a central theme of the debate, I have been asked about co-ordination. I want to say a bit about that. The Government have been and are looking closely at how to improve the co-ordination across Whitehall of soft power resources. This is aside from the fact that a good deal of soft power projection lies outside government and its control—and rightly so. One of the priorities of the coalition Government, as set out in their structural reform priorities, is to use soft power to promote British values, advance development and prevent conflict. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s published business plan, to which the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred, recognises these aims and sets out the requirement for a long-term programme to enhance UK soft power, co-ordinated by the National Security Council. The work and review of the strategy foreshadowed in the business plan has started. I have been asked whether it has finished. Although there was hope that these matters would be completed by the end of last month, your Lordships will not be surprised to hear that one or two distractions have occurred on the foreign policy scene. In fact there has been a massive range of distractions which have had an effect on how we must order our priorities and work programme. We are therefore not quite there yet; there has been some delay.
My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary asked the FCO to undertake a review of how to achieve the best results for the country from the soft power activity across Whitehall. That is foreshadowed in the business plan. This review, involving engagement with external experts, will not only shape the future of the FCO’s soft power output but influence how best to co-ordinate our efforts across Whitehall to improve effectiveness and value for money. The review has started. It has been somewhat disturbed by Middle East events, but an initial framework document has been produced. We attach great importance to the review and are looking for robust outcomes to enable us to use our valuable assets to drive forward the Government’s foreign policy priorities. Our next immediate step is to use the annual meeting of the FCO’s heads of mission, which takes place early next month, to test ideas. We are always drawing valuable lessons from the unfolding and dramatic events in the Middle East.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, rightly asked whether we believe in all this.
No, we do not plan to publish the review.
I was asked the basic question: do we believe in this concept? Perhaps I may personalise this a little and claim a few veteran medals in the field. I was a member of the famous Foreign Affairs Committee in the early 1980s that invented the concept of cultural diplomacy and injected it into public debate. I was responsible—possibly it is unwise to admit this—for writing books in the 1980s about “softnomics”, which foreshadowed and preceded the development and picking up of the concept of soft power by the media, experts and academics in the late 1990s. It was a little late in the day, but they got there in the end. Therefore, I need not apologise for being slow off the mark in understanding the central nature, which was bound to come with the internet revolution, of soft power being the essential oxygen and blood flow of international relations in an increasingly important way.
When my right honourable friend made his first strategic speech after taking office, he talked of a networked world where connections between groups and individuals across the globe also make up the relations between nations, and where these connections are being rapidly accelerated by the internet. He was absolutely right. The interconnectivity that the internet has enabled has led to a diffusion of power from Governments to citizens. It has also led to a transfer of power, as we all know, from the Atlantic world to the high savers and dynamic economies of Asia, Latin America and so on. However, it means that Governments must operate differently. We do not have the monopoly of data that previous Governments had 20, 30 or 50 years ago: citizens do. Intercommunication is swift, cheap and instant. It has changed the balance of power between citizens and government and turned on effective protest. This was predicted in things we wrote and argued about 20 years ago, and has now happened. Effective protest on the streets is easier and can be organised much more swiftly. The streets have been enabled, as we have seen recently in the Middle East and north Africa. These forces have shown themselves to be potent against even the most entrenched regimes.
I will make one further general point before I come to specifics. Perhaps we should not think only in terms of soft power, or of the distinction between soft and hard power. As my noble friend Lord Alderdice rightly said in his superb speech, these matters are interwoven. First, wars tend increasingly to be intrastate rather than interstate conflicts that cannot be won by force of arms; the concept of overwhelming force is redundant. Instead, parties must include ways to engage with different levels of society, using, with agility, the appropriate soft power tools that are available, namely cultural, political, military and economic. Without the elements that focus on breaking down barriers of mistrust, conflict continues and grows worse. Power in its military form does not deliver.
There are also those—again, this was predicted in the past; we saw it coming—who use the internet to generate hostility and encourage violence against our society and all advanced societies. The modern media environment means that people's perceptions and misperceptions can matter as much as reality. Persuasive words, deeds and images can be transmitted globally in an instant. That is why we have to uphold our core values of democracy, freedom, poverty reduction and human rights. Hard power remains necessary in some cases, but as the nature of conflict and of threats to our security changes, alternative methods of credible influence will play an increasingly central role. I have spoken in general terms to answer the justifiable questions of noble Lords and of the Front Bench opposite.
I turn now to the issue of soft power assets and how we wield them. This has been the central theme of the debate. Our basic soft power resources lie, as the noble Lords, Lord Smith and Lord Hall, made clear, in our culture; in projecting the UK as a nation to which others feel attracted and amicably disposed; in our political values, so long as we are seen to uphold and prosper by them at home—it is no good if we do not; in the legitimacy and fairness of our foreign policy; and in the potential for British-based non-governmental and professional bodies and institutions to influence and bond with counterparts across the globe. Those are the resources. More specifically, moving on from generalisation, our attractiveness rests on offering a positive domestic constitutional model that appears to work—I think ours does on the whole—operating under a popular monarchy, which is itself a soft power asset, as noble Lords have rightly reminded us in the debate, and on having a successful economy.
It is no use arriving on the scene of soft power projection if we are in a state of economic destitution and have lost control of our budget. Our national credibility depends on the budget rigour to keep within our means, which of course is by no means the situation now but the one, alas, that we inherited from the past; on running an efficient and flexible military; on supplying generous overseas assistance and humanitarian aid; on a highly intelligent pattern conveying how we operate our own national intelligence model; on public diplomacy, public governance and administration; on high-quality judicial advice, training standards and personnel and best practices in law; on courses in a whole range of professional fields and skills; and, as noble Lords have mentioned, on increasing educational exchanges and offering scholarships, which we do. Indeed, I have some notes which show how we have expanded our commitment from the immediate dip which was about to take place in the Chevening scholarships and other areas. As we have heard in some brilliant speeches this afternoon, soft power impact also depends increasingly on artistic and design promotion and exchange.
That is undoubtedly a formidable arsenal. In many cases we have already put it in place, but it has not always been deployed or transmitted as effectively as it should, and that is what we have to put right. To wield our soft power resources effectively in today’s information-connected world we have to avoid the pitfalls of lecturing and seeming to confront rather than work with target recipients; of failing to show deep enough respect for other people’s cultures and, even more, their histories; and of glossing over our own past errors. That is especially topical at the moment. We have particularly to face that when we got involved, as we did, in the Iraq adventure—I know that it is controversial—there was an expenditure of reputation and of soft-power impact. It might have been justified for other reasons but we now have painstakingly to rebuild it. We would be shutting our eyes not to accept that.
Fortunately, we have one major ready-made system for soft power transmission through the Commonwealth network. Again, my noble friend Lord Alderdice and others pointed this out. We also have a huge reservoir of historical experience in the emerging world with which to help repair past damage. I wanted to say a little more about the Commonwealth contribution because we have an almost ready-made system—a gigantic transcontinental network of linkages—with many common values, giving this country a unique advantage which many other countries envy and wonder why we do not use still more effectively to link ourselves with the emerging powers and the new world landscape that lie ahead.
It is this Government’s very active policy, with which I am proud to be associated, to both reinvigorate our membership of the Commonwealth and to contribute with the other 53 members to the invigoration of the Commonwealth system throughout. We have plans afoot in detail which will unfold, first, with the eminent persons group of Commonwealth experts who are about to produce their ideas, and then as we move towards the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Perth at the end of October, to expand and gain general support for them. That will be one of the most important international meetings of the first two decades of the 21st century, on a par with the global governance group which is the counter group to the G20 group, which in turn has largely replaced the G8. This is an informational age in which we have to know how to use the electronic media sensitively, which means avoiding propaganda terms, and how to avoid overcentralisation of our soft power messages and influences by working with an opening gateway for non-governmental soft power activities. It has to be accepted, and has been pointed out by your Lordships, that other media systems have vastly multiplied in power and reach. Al Jazeera is usually the one we mention. We have to compete with these latest techniques by moving beyond traditional broadcasting systems. To that I now want to turn. I would like to say more about the targets and objectives, which are obviously commerce, security, humanitarian work, political goals in foreign policy, the impact of our foreign policy soft power and the feedback into our own sense of national pride, purpose and unity. All these are subjects that should be dilated on, but time prevents me doing so.
Now let me turn to the hot issue on which your Lordships have rightly focused: the cuts to the BBC World Service. The first question was about why we have cut this budget. I do not want to go into what I know noble Lords opposite will say is the boring subject of the financial situation, but there have to be cuts all round. The previous Government were planning very elaborate cuts. We have gone even further. Everyone has taken the pain.
It is also true that the World Service cannot stand still and that online and FM audiences are growing while shortwave listener numbers have been falling. That is not true in every area, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, reminded us, but in 2009-10, the shortwave audience for the BBC World Service fell by about 20 million, not because of closures but simply because of the change in the way people get their news. For instance, in Russia, online audiences increased by 120 per cent while radio audiences declined by 85 per cent. Television news remains the key vehicle, as we have seen in recent events in Egypt and the wider Middle East. BBC World News, which is not part of the World Service network, has a weekly audience of 74 million people and within the BBC World Service, the Arabic and Persian services have not reduced their broadcast hours. Therefore, I think that my noble friend Lord Fowler, who is enormously well qualified on these matters, has been misinformed on that question. BBC Arabic TV is keeping its hours.
Some of my noble friends and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee and its criticism. The Foreign Secretary will be replying in detail in a couple of weeks, which is why I cannot answer all the questions that have been put today. However, there are two things that I should briefly like to mention about that report. The first is about whether it is true to say that the cuts have been disproportionate. Everyone knows that the Foreign Office took an enormous hit from the fall in sterling, and if you measure over the period from 2008, when that hit really damaged the Foreign Office budget, the net effect of the cuts to the British Council and the World Service has been to bring them back to the same proportion as they were in 2008. In 2007-08, they were 13 per cent, and in 2013-14 they will be around 14.4 per cent of the total FCO budget.
Finally, there is the question of whether the aid budget can support the work of the BBC World Service. I cannot give a final answer, but in the remaining seconds of my ration of time, I will try to bring noble Lords up to date on where we are on this issue. We believe that the BBC World Service provides a development benefit to many countries, and we are continuing to explore with DfID and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development officials whether a proportion of BBC World Service expenditure should be reported as ODA assistance. This will require the agreement of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The BBC World Service portion of the overall FCO settlement includes £25 million a year in anticipation of being able to score some of these activities as official development assistance. I emphasise that this does not imply additional funding for the World Service although I understand that the World Service is in discussion with DfID about the funding of specific projects. Indeed, that matter is reported in the Foreign Affairs Committee report.
Any decision to reverse the reduction to the World Service’s budget would have to be funded from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s core budget. The Government believe that the transfer of funding to the licence fee will increase the BBC’s ability to achieve useful economies of scale through the whole of the BBC family. We will help a more secure future for the World Service. In spite of the challenging financial situation we believe the World Service has a valuable and promising future and I am pleased to say that we have managed to find an additional £3 million in the last financial year to help the World Service with its restructuring costs. We have also provided £10 million for investment in new services and £13 million per annum to help it meet its share of the BBC pension deficit. These are small but concrete signs that the FCO fully supports the value and reputation of the World Service.
Several of your Lordships asked whether the Government will reconsider. I cannot say that today; I can say that we will certainly consider. Some very powerful points have been made and these will certainly be brought to the close attention of policymakers. That is what I can say today—I know it is not enough for some of your Lordships but I hope it indicates the general approach and attitude of the Government to this crucial matter.
The Government are committed to refocusing our soft power efforts to ensure an efficient, innovative and more co-ordinated approach. We are currently working on a cross-government strategy, as I have described, on how best to deliver and take advantage of the tools and assets at our disposal. The key will be that our strategy has strong enough direction so that even when unexpected events occur, as of course they have in the Middle East, our response is flexible but consistent with our broad direction and not seen as a departure from the main path forward.
Finally, we must recognise our soft power limits and order our priorities accordingly so that we are clear that we cannot intervene in every crisis and to ensure that we have the public understanding of these limits. There are many more points that I wanted to add but time has run by. Let me emphasise that by increasing the effectiveness of our considerable soft power efforts we are already adjusting to the challenges of an entirely changed world. Many commentators have rightly suggested that we are moving into an age not of soft power, not of hard power, but of smart power which is a subtle new interweave of both power deployments. In the face of major new challenges from jihadism and Islamic civil war to pandemics and climate change, from rising protectionism to nuclear proliferation, we all have to formulate a new strategy that combines all the hard and soft power facets available to us not only in government but outside government as well. The Prime Minister has labelled this the new liberal realism and the task now is to tailor our UK resources and experience to fit the new direction. I believe that the UK has all the tools at its disposal to deliver on this goal in the 21st century.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in light of what the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, said a few moments ago, I seek a little guidance, before we go any further, about taking these amendments with the clause stand part debate, which will be voted on separately. Will the Minister reply to all these amendments and clause stand part together? It would help those of us who are going to speak on the second group of amendments to know in advance what the Minister is proposing to do.
The answer is yes.
My Lords, to come back to Amendments 16A and 16B, I oppose them because they make it possible for the Government of the day to avoid a referendum if they think that some new EU power grab, whatever it happens to be, is sufficiently urgent or if they think that it is in the national interest. I fear that the supporters of these amendments have not yet grasped the point that the British people do not want any more powers passed to Brussels, period, as the saying goes—full stop. In fact, a growing majority of the British people want all their powers back; they want to be a democracy again with the power to elect and dismiss those who make all their laws.
I am afraid that the amendments do not work in detail, either. Who is to decide the urgency of the decision or whether it is in the national interest? The octopus in Brussels of course, not the British Government or Parliament. To be certain of this, we have only to look at the way in which Brussels has treated both our Government and Parliament over many years. I refer of course to its constant indifference to our scrutiny reserve. I remind your Lordships for the record, and for those outside your Lordships’ House who may not know, what the scrutiny reserve is. It is a promise made to Parliament—to the House of Commons and your Lordships’ House—by Governments of all persuasions over many years that they will not sign up to any new law or initiative in Brussels if the Select Committee of either House is still considering it. If the Select Committees have finished looking at it or have agreed it, or if it has been debated in Parliament, the Government of the day are free to sign up in the Council of Ministers in Brussels to whatever initiative is concerned. That is the promise or scrutiny reserve.
A Written Answer to me from the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, on 7 February this year reveals that in the past five years alone the scrutiny reserve has been overridden—in other words, the Government’s promise has been broken—no fewer than 267 times in the House of Commons and 248 times in your Lordships’ House. That means that in the past five years more than 500 proposals from Brussels, which the Select Committee of either House thought sufficiently important to examine and to advise the Government on, became law anyway. The juggernaut rolled on regardless. It is worth adding that the situation does not appear to be improving, despite regular complaints from the Select Committees to the Government. In 2010, 151 overrides were notched up between the two Houses—79 in the House of Commons and 72 in your Lordships’ House.
Perhaps I may also remind the noble Lord that Mr Hague did not fight that election on the issue of Europe; he fought it on the issue of the euro, the currency. He said that the election was, in effect, a referendum on the currency. That was not wise, because a referendum on the currency had already been promised by all parties. That election was not fought on the issue of Europe.
My Lords, perhaps your Lordships might find it useful if I were to intervene at this stage, because one or two noble Lords have had a bite at the cherry, as it were, and it might be helpful if I were to answer some of the many questions that have been put to this Bench and comment on all the amendments, although I should like first to address the two original amendments, Amendments 16A and 16B, which have a particular element to them which is very important and needs to be addressed. Then I will come to the broader issues raised by the broader amendments, of which the central theme is whether the significance condition should be enlarged or extended. It is interesting to note that in the other place, all the pressure was for them to be reduced, so there is a certain contrast between your Lordships’ views and those of the other place. Often that is healthy.
I say at the beginning that I strongly agree with the remark of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, that proper leadership in Europe best comes through using the powers that the EU already has. That is a strong statement and highly relevant to what we are debating in the Bill. I ask noble Lords to reflect on it, because I think that many of the worries about what the effect of the Bill might be in checking the expansion, development, changes of treaty, new ideas and proposals for the EU stand in contrast to the wisdom of that remark. An enormous amount can be achieved in our neighbourhood, in relations with the rest of Europe and in the reform of the EU itself to make it suitable to meet the totally changed international landscape which we now all confront, by existing powers rather than further changes in the treaty or transfers of power from member states to the European institutions.
I turn to the first two amendments, which would insert into Clause 3 a new type of exemption from the referendum lock in respect of Article 48(6) decisions, otherwise known as the simplified revision procedure. Perhaps I can deal right at the beginning with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, whom I very much respect for his vast experience in this area. He asked me—he said that I did not answer him very well before, but I will try to do better now—why we needed Clause 3 as well as Clause 2. The answer is simple. Clause 2 deals with ordinary revision procedures for changing the treaties; Clause 3 deals with the special revision procedure for transferring powers from the nation state—the UK in this case—to the European Union. It is the desire of many, not just in this country—I shall give examples from other countries—that changes, whether of the treaty or in powers, should be dealt with in the same way, regardless of whether they are dealt with under the ordinary revision procedure for treaty change or under the special revision procedure, otherwise known as the passerelle procedure. That is why we need Clause 3. I hope that that clarifies that aspect. Of course I shall come to the detail much more extensively in a moment.
I apologise to the noble Lord and am grateful to him for giving way. He does not agree, clearly, that the way we handle a treaty amendment should depend on the nature of the treaty amendment, not the process in Brussels which started it. I do not understand that. I do not know why treaty amendments should not be treated as treaty amendments whether they come under the procedure that we are now dealing with under Clause 2 or the procedure which we think appropriate to Clause 3. This is nothing to do with the passerelle. That comes later in a different clause. We are not talking about Article 48(7); we are talking about Article 48(6) here. I accept that the passerelle, on which I will disagree with the Minister on the substance, is a separate issue. I do not see why treaty amendments should not be handled by a single clause setting out a single procedure. In fact, I still think it would be better.
The reasons lie in the procedures that flow from the Lisbon treaty, which gave birth, rather unwillingly, to the ordinary revision procedure. The whole idea of it getting into that treaty was a compromise, as noble Lords who followed it all closely will remember, but that is where it comes from. Whether powers are transferred or treaties are changed by the ordinary revision procedure or by the special revision procedure is of no particular interest to those concerned with our powers and competences moving away from this country to the European Union in ways that are not fully explained or subject to the appropriate procedures and rules that this Bill lays down.
I hear exactly what the noble Lord says, but he asked me a specific question and I have given him the specific answer that whether these changes are under the simplified revision procedure or the ordinary revision procedure they should ideally be treated in the same way. That is what is happening in other countries. I have a note here that states that Ireland and Denmark examine all uses of Article 48(6), the simplified revision procedure, in the same way as the use of the ordinary revision procedure to decide whether a referendum is required. It is done by the Attorney-General in Ireland and by the Ministry of Justice in Denmark. I am told that it is now going on in Denmark in relation to the simplified revision procedure applied to the matter, already discussed in this House, of changing the treaty to accommodate the European stability mechanism. I will come back to that in more detail, but that is the answer to the noble Lord’s question.
In addition to the significance condition already provided for in Clause 3, the amendment would insert a provision that would allow for the possibility of a Minister seeking to rely on urgency as a reason to avoid holding a referendum. In a previous debate in Committee, we debated what the Government mean by a transfer of power, and I will recapitulate some of the points in detail when I come to my comments on the other amendments in this group. These two amendments would mean that if a Minister deems a particular decision to be urgent and in the national interest, he could dispense with the referendum requirement regardless of the nature of the transfer of power from the UK to the EU or the significance of that transfer of power. If there was ever a proposal under Article 48(6) to give up the member states’ veto over the areas where we will still retain the right to oppose measures taken at EU level, such as decisions on the seven-year financial perspectives or on social security, if these amendments are agreed, a Minister could claim that giving up these vetoes was considered urgent and in the national interest and therefore should not be put to the British people for them to have a say but should rather by approved solely by Parliament.
This shows a lack of understanding of how the system works and how the simplified revision procedure works. Let me give noble Lords an example. The use of the simplified revision procedure to enable member states in the euro area to set up the European stability mechanism to safeguard the financial and economic stability of the euro area is obviously a matter of vast import. It will take 21 months—one year and nine months, which is admittedly not two years—to be finalised. It was agreed in March 2011, and the target date for final approval is the end of 2012. That is hardly what most people would consider urgent. Even under the simplified revision procedure, which may or may not be associated with the passerelle—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that they are in a sense separate, although criss-crossing, issues—the whole process of changing treaties, whether by the simplified procedure or the ordinary revision procedure, takes a long time. The urgent issue of saving the eurozone from its tribulations will take one year and nine months. This example of an urgent and important treaty change certainly sets a precedent that shows that there would be more than enough time for the UK to hold a referendum, should one be necessary, under any future uses of the simplified revision procedure that I described. I remind noble Lords that one will not be necessary for the current use of the simplified revision procedure as the present change to do with the European stability mechanism does not apply to the UK.
The truth of the matter is that while urgent issues arise, the business of putting them through the simplified procedure or the ordinary procedure is extremely lengthy. This is one reason, which I shall come to in a moment, why these things will only rarely occur. The picture of a series of small referenda issues coming along is a completely unrealistic. In fact, it is a fantasy. Whether they go through one way or the other, it will be a lengthy and complicated process, and nations will rightly seek to exert the leadership that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, referred to of using existing competences rather than having to resort to the kind of treaty change that leads to major debates of the kind we saw over Lisbon. The truth of the matter is that this amendment would have no practical impact as there would not, in practice, be a situation where an Article 48(6) decision could be rushed through in a matter of weeks or months—it is more likely to be months and years—and the amendment would, in fact, be pointless.
That has dealt with those two amendments concerned with urgency, and I now want to turn to the broader issue.
The Minister said that it is a fantasy that there would be a series of small referenda. If it is an absolute fantasy, why do we need 58 policy areas described in the Bill that would trigger a referendum?
If the noble Lord casts his mind back to the Lisbon treaty and the previous treaties, he will recall that some of them tend to turn up in the great package treaties that emerge from the European Union from time to time. They emerged at the time of Lisbon and caused so many of the agonies and concerns, the consequence of which we are now debating. I forget the number of issues of this kind that were in the Lisbon treaty, but the answer is almost certainly a considerable number.
Now I want—I will give way again, but I have to say that I am trying to help the Committee and guide it through. I will give way once more, but after that I think I am entitled within the custom of the House to be rather reluctant to yield to constant interventions on things I am just about to say anyway.
I am most grateful to the Minister, and I will certainly not intervene in his speech again. Like the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, earlier in the debate, the Minister has taken us down this road that there will not be all these minor referendums provided for in the Bill because the habit of the European Union is to group all these things together in a major grouping.
I would plead with the Government not to go down that road of reasoning. Most of us, even those of us moving these amendments, believe it is not in the interest in the European Union or this country to have any major package of institutional reform in the period ahead, yet here the Government are using an argument that is inciting people in the other member states to go in that direction—they can read Hansard too. All they will see is that the noble Lord and his colleague are saying, “Do not worry, none of these mini-referendums will take place; it will all come together in a big package”. I ask that the Government not pursue that line because there is no difference between the two sides of this argument. Nobody wishes to argue—I certainly do not—for pushing towards a new major institutional package, but the Minister is making it impossible to avoid one.
My Lords, I fear that that is a good example of taking part of an argument, which I wish to develop much more fully, and giving it a particular boost. That is just one of a whole series of reasons why there will not be referenda over trivia and over small issues, which will come out separately, and why these matters simply will not arise. I could straight away give a long list of other reasons why it will never happen. Where there is no transfer of power or competence anyway, there will not be a referendum. There are plenty of powers already, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has said. Where it does not apply to the UK, there will be not be a referendum; as with the current treaty change going through. Where there are accession treaties, there will be no referendum—not in this country anyway. Where there is codification under existing competencies there will be no referendum. Where there are significant tests—we have yet to debate that in full—there will be no referendum. So there are five other reasons, as well as the question of the package, why we will look at these things in a mature and rounded way.
It is really quite pointless citing one issue and trying to project it to be the explanation of the whole situation. When you look at the whole situation it is perfectly clear that there will not be a whole series of tiny referenda on complicated issues that people will not want to vote for. That applies to almost everything that has been mentioned in this debate, including—I would love to dilate on it but it is probably out of order—the whole question of the European public prosecutor’s office, on which the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, is a great expert. We are going to debate that in Clause 6. Certainly it is one of many issues that may well come up, but the chances of it coming up as a separate issue as part of a treaty change, to which the Government would then agree and that other nations would all agree to, are very remote indeed—in fact, I would say, non-existent.
At this stage, it might be worth going over some of the essential points from the lengthy debate we had at the start of the Committee stage on the role of Article 48(6) of the Treaty on European Union and the rationale for Clause 3, which I mentioned in an exchange with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, a little while back. There are two types of treaty change. This does not seem to be totally understood. I will try my best to remind your Lordships what they are. There is the ordinary pattern which requires an intergovernmental conference and the simplified type of treaty change which does not require an IGC. Both of them result in an amendment to the treaty and so both should be treated in the same way.
It is not right as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said in the earlier debates that the whole point of the passerelle is to dispense with the paraphernalia of treaty change. It is not true. It has the same elaborate systems of treaty change through the simplified revision procedure as does the ordinary revision procedure. People simply will not understand that because one method of treaty change is being used a referendum would be required yet if the same treaty changes—in this case dealing with powers rather than competencies—were being proposed and agreed under the other type of treaty change, then it would not be required. It is just that kind of incoherent approach which will go against the Bill’s aims—they may be disputed by noble Lords opposite but they are our aims—of regaining some of the trust of the British electorate and seeking to reconnect them. It would leave people completely baffled—it would certainly leave many of the experts baffled—and not enlightened at all.
I thank my noble friend for giving way for a moment. How would he escape from the horns of a very difficult dilemma? If, on the one hand, Ministers, in order to avoid a referendum, had to tell themselves that something was not in the national interests of Britain, would one not find oneself subsequently an extremely weak force in the European Union? If, on the other hand, they decided to press on with something that they regarded as being in the national interest and that would attract a referendum, would they not find themselves subject to the kind of fragmented referenda that we discussed earlier and which the Minister described earlier in his own speech?
I do not think that that would be the case, for the very good reason that the great issues that concern our national interest can be delivered very largely by the co-operation and development of close working within the existing competences of the existing treaty. My noble friend has in her mind some thought that new treaty requirements would indeed come along that would somehow be in the national interest but which Ministers would be reluctant to push for fear that they would have to expose them to the British people. There might well be issues in the future, although I cannot see any countries at the moment being terribly willing to go through the complex treaty procedure for them, which Ministers believe are in the national interest and of value and which can be pursued only by treaty change. In that case, they would rightly be required first to come before both Houses of our Parliament so that it could be explained whether they were significant or not. If they were significant, they would then be required to be put to the test of a referendum, with the Government arguing that these changes, or this package of changes, were necessary to improve the national interest and the strength of this country. That is the kind of debate we should have had over the Lisbon treaty, but of course we did not.
No, I am not going to give way again, I am afraid. We have had enough interventions.
I was concluding by saying that all the long-standing accusations of decision-making behind closed doors without public consent would therefore still hold true if these amendments were accepted and the wider and wider number of decisions were left to the judgment of Ministers as to whether they were significant. There are concerns, as I have said, that creeping power and creeping competence are not being properly debated and explained and not justified as being in the national interest, and have weakened the European cause.
People talk about the need for “reconnection”—that phrase came up. We have to be realistic and accept that reconnection has failed. It is failing here in this country, although we are not the only country in which it is failing. Some noble Lords seem to want to continue as before and seem to be happy to see a continued advance of European treaty changing, competence transferring and power transferring, which are precisely the trends that have so undermined public trust, weakened the European cause and made the European Union today in need of reform and less well positioned to meet the colossal challenges of the future than it should be.
I must say that I hope that some noble Lords who are my noble friends, and noble Lords who I greatly admire, will not be offended if I see them as the last knights or the lost lords of the old Europe, of the Euro elite. They are the ones who want to go back while the world goes forward, and indeed I myself sometimes have the same wish that things could go back, but they cannot. We are now in the information age. In the age of the internet and the website, the age of public empowerment, those ideas are as out of date as the Teutonic knights with their armour and their glories. So I urge the noble Lords who have moved and spoken to these amendments to withdraw them and to understand that we are living in a changed age in which the requirements of a strong and democratic European Union will change in themselves and will require new and agile legislation, understanding, and a new connection with the people of Europe.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, with permission, I will repeat a Statement made by my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in another place.
“Mr Speaker, with permission, I will update the House on recent developments in the Middle East and north Africa.
Britain has continued to take a leading role in international efforts to protect civilians in Libya, and the case for action remains compelling. Gaddafi’s regime persists in attacking its own people, wilfully killing its own civilian population. Our strategy is to intensify the diplomatic, economic and military pressures on Gaddafi’s regime and, since the House last met, we have made progress on all those fronts.
On the diplomatic front, I co-chaired the first meeting of the Libya Contact Group in Doha on 13 April. The 21 states and seven international organisations represented demonstrated clear unity, with participation from across the Arab world and the African Union in attendance. The group agreed that Gaddafi’s regime had lost all legitimacy, that the National Transitional Council should be offered further support and that the UN special envoy should take forward an inclusive political process. I will attend the next contact group meeting in Rome on 5 May.
At the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin on 14 and 15 April, I joined colleagues in showing our determination to increase the pace of military operations to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973. The 28 NATO member states and six Arab countries that attended, 16 of which are engaged in military action, agreed a common strategy. That is an important milestone in world affairs, a sign of a growing ability to work across traditional regional divisions and a demonstration of the breadth and unity in the international coalition in support of the Libyan people.
Economically, since my Statement on 4 April, further Libyan entities have been sanctioned and the regime is now subject to some of the most comprehensive economic sanctions ever agreed by the United Nations. On military matters, since NATO assumed full control over all military operations on 31 March, more than 3,500 sorties and 1,500 strike sorties have been conducted. This action has seriously degraded Gaddafi’s military assets and prevented widespread massacres planned by Gaddafi’s forces. They remain unable to enter Benghazi, and it is highly likely that without these efforts Misrata would have fallen, with terrible consequences for that city’s brave inhabitants. Yesterday, Italy announced that its aircraft would take part in ground strikes and the United States Government have contributed Predator unmanned aerial vehicles to the coalition forces.
Heavy fighting continues around the towns of Brega, Ajdabiya, Yefren and Misrata. The regime’s indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in Misrata shows that it continues to target the civilian population. Gaddafi has shown that he has no regard for civilian lives. The International Criminal Court prosecutor has said that there is evidence of a case against Gaddafi for crimes against humanity. We look forward to the prosecutor’s report to the United Nations on 4 May. By his actions, it is clear that Gaddafi has no intention of observing the conditions in UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that I described to the House earlier this month. He has repeatedly ignored the ceasefires that he has announced.
Our military action is defined by the UN Security Council resolutions. We are also clear that Gaddafi should go, and it is impossible to see a viable or peaceful way forward for Libya until he does so. The Libya Contact Group’s statement made it clear that we and our allies regard the National Transitional Council, in contrast to Gaddafi, as a legitimate interlocutor, representing the aspirations of Libyan people. Our diplomatic mission in Benghazi is working with it. Our special envoy, Christopher Prentice, will shortly be succeeded by John Jenkins, currently Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Baghdad.
Last week, I announced our decision to expand this mission with a small advisory team of British military officers. Their sole purpose is to support the National Transitional Council’s efforts better to protect civilians by advising on military organisational structures, communications and logistics. They are not involved in training or arming the opposition’s forces, nor are they executing or providing operational military advice. This is fully in line with the UN resolutions, with which, I repeat to the House, we will remain wholly in accordance, retaining the moral, legal and international authority that flows from that.
We have supplied vital, non-lethal equipment to assist the National Transitional Council in protecting civilian lives. So far, this consists of telecommunications equipment and body armour. We are considering with our international partners further requests. In the coming weeks, we hope to agree internationally the process for establishing a temporary financial mechanism to provide a transparent structure for international financial support for short-term financial requirements such as public sector pay. Yesterday, Kuwait announced around £110 million worth of support for the NTC.
I am sure that the House will join me in paying tribute to the skill, bravery and professionalism of the men and women of the UK’s and allied Armed Forces. Their actions in the NATO operation have saved many lives and their efforts are essential to bringing a lasting peace and a better future for the Libyan people, who have suffered so much at the hands of this brutal regime.
The UK is also supporting the other needs of the Libyan people in every way we can. The humanitarian situation in the west of the country is getting worse every day. Many civilians in Misrata lack access to basic necessities, including food, water and electricity. There is a shortage of some crucial medical supplies. That is why my right honourable friend the International Development Secretary announced last week that the UK will provide medical and other emergency supplies and undertake evacuations for 5,000 migrants stranded at Misrata port in squalid conditions. The UK has so far given more than £13 million to meet immediate humanitarian needs, providing funding for medical and food supplies, emergency shelter, and assistance for evacuating poor and vulnerable migrants. In Misrata alone, UK support has given 10,000 people food and 2,000 families water and hygiene kits, and provided essential medical staff. But the regime must guarantee humanitarian access, not just broken promises which then put the lives of aid workers and volunteers at risk.
The wave of demand for change in the Arab world continues to gain momentum in other nations. As I said earlier today, we condemn utterly the violence and killings perpetrated by the Syrian security forces against civilians who are expressing their views in peaceful protests. This violent repression must stop. President Assad must order his authorities to show restraint and to respond to the legitimate demands of his people with immediate and genuine reform, not with brutal repression. The emergency law should be lifted in practice and the legitimate aspirations of the people met. The UK is working intensively with our international partners to persuade the Syrian authorities to stop the violence and respect basic and universal human rights to freedoms of expression and assembly.
Syria is now at a fork in the road. Its Government can still choose to bring about the radical reform which alone can provide peace and stability for Syria in the long term, and we urge them do so. Or they can choose ever more violent repression, which can only bring short-term security for the authorities. If they do so, we will work with our European partners and others to take measures, including sanctions, that will have an impact on the regime.
Given our concerns for British nationals in Syria we changed our travel advice on Sunday to advise against all travel there and to advise that British nationals should leave unless there is a pressing need for them to remain.
In Yemen, the UK welcomes the news this morning that the efforts of the Gulf Co-operation Council to resolve the current political deadlock are close to success. I understand that President Saleh and the parliamentary opposition have accepted the GCC’s proposal. This is potentially good news. Both sides now need to come together to confirm their commitment to the peaceful, inclusive and timely transition process that the GCC has brokered. The UK remains committed to our long-standing support for Yemen in these difficult times.
Although the immediate situation in Bahrain is calmer, there continue to be many credible reports of human rights abuses. I urge the Government of Bahrain to meet all their human rights obligations and uphold political freedoms, equal access to justice and the rule of law. Dialogue is the way to fulfil the aspirations of all Bahrainis. I urge all sides, including opposition groupings, to engage.
In Egypt, which I will visit shortly, we welcome the actions being taken by the authorities to move towards a broad-based, civilian-led Government and an open and democratic society.
In Tunisia, with EU partners we are providing support to help the Government in Tunisia meet the wishes of the Tunisian people. On 11 April, the commission responsible for bringing together opposition parties and civil society approved the draft law for the constituent assembly elections scheduled for 24 July. This is a step further towards free and fair elections and an open, democratic society.
The European Union has a crucial role to play in the southern Mediterranean. The great changes in the Arab world are truly historic and the response from the nations of the European Union should be bold and ambitious. The review of the European Neighbourhood Policy is due to be published in a fortnight. We have been making the case that we have the opportunity to use that policy to help the peoples of the southern Mediterranean achieve their desire for freer and more prosperous societies. A renewed Neighbourhood Policy should see the EU using its economic magnetism to encourage and support political and economic reform in neighbouring countries. A partnership of equals should reward those who make the necessary political and economic reforms, and—importantly—withdraw benefits from those who do not.
Finally, it remains essential that progress is made in the search for a just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict. This is what the majority of ordinary Palestinians and Israelis demand of their leaders. The extraordinary changes in the region are an opportunity to be seized, not an excuse for further prevarication leading to more frustration and discontent.
In our response to the dramatic events in north Africa and the Middle East we will continue to stand for reform, not repression, and for the addressing of grievances rather than brutal reprisals. It is a policy in accordance with our own beliefs, in line with our own national interest and in pursuit of the peace and prosperity of the wider world”.
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
I thank the noble Baroness warmly for the supportive nature of her remarks and for her commitment that Her Majesty’s Opposition stand fast behind the UNSC resolution and its implementation. That is a warming and strong message, for which I am grateful. I cannot possibly answer all her questions in detail, but I will attempt to answer those that I managed to write down as she spoke.
On UK nationals in Syria, there are figures, although I give them with some hesitation. It could be from about 700 upwards, but I do not want the noble Baroness to regard that as the final figure, as it is not always easy to gather all details quickly. However, the figure is in that sort of range. We are most certainly talking and co-operating with the European Union at many levels on how to react to the Syria situation.
On what we are doing about the very concerning developments in Bahrain, the answer is that we are in constant contact. We have been talking to Ministers as well as to the chief authorities in Bahrain, urging that they get back to the national dialogue that the King always wanted to argue for and observe standards of human rights as rigorously as possible. We have expressed considerable concern about the reports of torture and other aspects. We believe that our representations have to be constant and strong and we are continuing to press them.
The noble Baroness raised the issue, which one sees in many commentaries, of the possibility of stalemate in Libya. To my mind and to many of those observing the situation closely, the position is fluid rather than stalemated. There is clearly movement to and fro. One moment, a street in Misrata is in the hands of the opposition and the next it is in the hands of Gaddafi’s forces. No one can say that a stalemate, implying some sort of rigid settling-in of defensive lines on either side, has anywhere near been reached. The interventions of NATO in protecting civilians and destroying the weaponry that is killing them, with some precision in many areas, are part of the means by which the situation remains extremely fluid.
In the Statement, the Foreign Secretary reminds us of the words that he rightly used. If I get his words precisely right,
“it is impossible to see a viable or peaceful way forward for Libya”,
until Gaddafi goes. That has been reiterated by a number of world leaders and is apparently very much the view of the entire Arab League and leading Arab nations. While the UN Security Council resolution obviously does not involve, require or authorise direct attack on the personality of Gaddafi himself, there was a clear statement by the contact group in Doha and by the allies that until Gaddafi goes there will be no solution and no achievement of the aim of the Libyans being able to decide their own future peacefully.
How is that to be done and what are the pressures? The first pressure is in implementing the resolution and doing everything to protect civilians by all possible means. Beyond that, the organisation of freezes and sanctions has been extensive. The movements, by no means fully achieved, towards controlling the financial resources available to Gaddafi and his team are strong. As far as possible, given that many of Gaddafi’s funds are under other names or obscure patterns of ownership, those funds are being frozen and individuals in Libya are being named as those who cannot have access to them or admission to other countries.
In addition, pressure is preventing Gaddafi from achieving further revenues from oil sales. There have been some unauthorised liftings of oil on the side, but they may be coming to an end. If he cannot get oil money, he will not get money and he will not be able to buy in weapons, mercenaries or any other of the instruments that he is using to attack his own people. In addition to that, we look for further defections of the kind that we have already seen from those closely around him.
This all adds up to a pattern of international pressures that come particularly from the Arab League. I stress that this is not just an Atlantic, a western or even a European project; it is a united project with the support of a very wide number of countries, representatives of many of which attended the contact group in Doha the other day, including Japan. I cannot go into details about the precise contribution that the various allies, including the Americans, are making, but we welcome the arrival of the UAVs. We believe that they will help to reinforce the protection of civilians, which is the main aim of the whole project.
Ahead lie fluidity and increasing pressures on Gaddafi himself. Ahead lies a pattern in which the nations and regions of the world, including the Arabs, the African Union—to a lesser extent so far, I admit, although there have been some strong voices there as well—and certainly the responsible nations and democracies of the world, through the UN, are all depicting an end game and a better future for Libya, in which Libyans can decide their differences and carry forward their prospects without the dark and malign influence of Colonel Gaddafi. This is a possibility. To say that it is a probability at this stage is going too far, but it is an aim that can be worked for and is being worked for at this moment.
My Lords, does the noble Lord recognise that the Statement he has just read is one of the most remarkable that many of your Lordships will ever have heard? It is about complete convulsion in a very important area of the world which threatens very significantly our whole economy and the stability of the region and the durability and survival of an enormous number of people. It is a remarkable Statement in the breadth that it has represented. We know about Tunisia originally and then Egypt; we have been involved in Libya; we now see the situation in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria; and there are uncertainties in other Arab countries, which I will not particularly mention except maybe Morocco and Algeria, where there are concerns and rumblings.
There was some comment made about the Prime Minister’s comment that we are in for the long haul. What is absolutely without question is that it is going to be a very long haul whether it comes out well or badly. The economic and security implications of what is happening now are going to be with us for a very long time indeed. There is an old phrase, “The future is not what it used to be”. There has been a convulsive change and we may be in the middle of it now or we may be only just at the beginning.
I want to add one particular point. In the first instance the Statement is concerned with the outcome in Libya. Can the Minister comment in particular about the situation in Algeria and the Polisario? What evidence is there that Gaddafi is purchasing a considerable amount of mercenary assistance which may be concealing the fact that the support he has within his own country is rather less than he might seek to pretend?
I am very grateful to my noble friend whose experience in these matters is unquestioned. What he says is right: these are historic developments. They are of course different in the different countries. There is a danger, while there is a certain degree of cross-border infection and contagion, of seeing the political mechanics inside each country as similar, which they are not. Each country is different and I have been reminded of that very vividly having spent the whole of last week in the Middle East.
My noble friend asked particularly about Algeria and its involvement in this. It is something we are watching very closely indeed. We welcome President Bouteflika’s announcement that he intends to introduce political reforms, including the setting up of a constitutional commission and a revision to the law governing political parties. We hope that is a political reform statement that will be put in practice. There is no clear evidence of Algerian support for Colonel Gaddafi but it is certainly true that in the past Gaddafi has sought friends in that large neighbouring country, as he has sought friends throughout the African Union further south. Some of these friendships probably remain but I do not think I can comment further on the precise posture being taken up by Algeria externally at the moment; internally it is clear that the Algerian authorities are aware of the reform pressure operating on all governments which do not recognise the need for reform and do not recognise that the world has changed and that people now feel empowered to demand the freedoms and justice which they have been denied in the past.
My Lords, while the Minister has said the Government are resisting mission creep, does he not accept that the greater danger is mission drift? The contact group met once this month largely to reiterate what the policy previously was and it will not meet again until next month. This does not show any degree of urgency in this matter. Does he accept that a lack of cohesion and urgency appears to be shown by ad hoc statements made by Ministers which they contradict the next day? We said we were going to arm the rebels. No, we are not. We were going to train the rebels. Well, not really. Although the Minister has said specifically today Gaddafi is not a target, the Defence Secretary in New York, I think, two days ago said that Gaddafi was a legitimate target. We cannot have this position where we swing from one to the other. While the measures on sanctions and so on are important the fact is the urgency arises in stopping the fighting and the killing as soon as possible. I regret the idea we seem to have settled easily into the acceptance that it is going to be a long haul. A long haul will not really protect civilians. We really must show a greater deal of urgency than at present.
I do not accept that depiction of the situation at all. Of course in all dramatic and violent situations, such as the one that has developed in Libya, it would be the unwise person who predicted exactly what is going to happen next and exactly which path can be followed with clockwork results. The situation simply is not like that.
However, the overall strategy and direction are clear. They are to act within the resolution and to make the obvious point, which has been made throughout the entire Arab world and in parts of Africa and indeed in Asia as well, that there can be no peace and better future for Libya until the civilian killing stops and the chief agents of the civilian killing—notably, Colonel Gaddafi—go. Of course that raises questions of where and how he should go, which are not questions we feel are our responsibility to answer. However, the general trend is a strong one, although the timing is impossible to predict.
The actions are firm and have already been decisive in some areas, although in other areas less so. There are major difficulties where tanks and Howitzer artillery and mortar artillery and possibly some revolting weapons as well are being used by Gaddafi’s troops inside civilian areas—within the narrow streets of Libyan towns they cannot be picked out. This is the problem of fighting, which is bound to go to and fro. However, I do not think the noble Lord’s picture of indecision and drift is a fair one. There is a pattern here of responsibility to protect and responsibility to open a more stable future for this very sensitive part of the Middle East and the north Africa region.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Statement. It has been widely reported that mercenaries from various African countries are now fighting for the Gaddafi regime. Referring to the question of the noble Lord, Lord King, the Algerian supported Polisario Front is reported to have now sent 450 members to fight for Gaddafi’s regime. Am I to understand from the noble Lord’s reply to the noble Lord, Lord King, that the United Kingdom has made no representations on this matter?
On the broader issue of the Polisario and the United Nations resolutions, and the way that that affects not so much Algeria as Morocco, we have certainly said that we think that the resolutions should be upheld. As for the cross-currents, though—either the one that the noble Lord did not quite refer to of apparent Algerian support for certain aspects of Polisario activity or the Polisario involvement in Libya, encouraged by Algeria—I am afraid that I cannot give him any precise information. I would say that I would write to him, but I am not sure that such detailed information exists in the smoke and fog of battle. Certainly mercenaries have been brought in, drawn from many areas of Africa, who are fighting for Gaddafi and are receiving large wads of money for doing so. That has been proved by some of those captured or killed who have been found to have this money on them.
My Lords, does my noble friend agree that the questions that have come from other noble Lords about the Polisario actually concern the no-fly zone and its effectiveness? Will he at least explain to the House why that zone does not seem to extend to the road routes into Libya, which is apparently where these mercenaries are coming from? I understand that maritime routes are being re-examined to ensure that they are sealed, but road routes do not as yet appear to be sealed.
On the broader point, does my noble friend agree that the most intractable conflict in the Middle East is Israel-Palestine? What discussions have the Government had with the Middle East envoy or indeed through the quartet to attempt to do something to kick-start the process again and get both sides to break the impasses and move forward?
On Bahrain, will the Minister tell us at what stage he will believe that we have got to a stage with regard to human rights violations where we might do something more than just implore the Bahraini royal family to sit down and negotiate seriously?
My noble friend raises three questions. The no-fly zone is authorised over Libyan airspace, not over the back channels through which manpower and weapons may continue to be supplied into Tripoli and into the hands of Gaddafi’s forces. That is not a possibility consistent with strict adherence to UNSCR 1973.
On the Middle East peace process, we are arguing strongly that this is an opportunity, not a time for the Israeli authorities to draw back, hunker down, hope that things will pass over and wait and see. On the contrary, this could be a large and open window through which those who genuinely want peace and a two-state solution, and who want to see Palestine emerge as part of a two-state pattern in a sensible relationship, should now be pressing forward. That is a view that we have pressed very strongly and which is represented by our actions at the United Nations in support of certain relevant resolutions, which my noble friend will know all about.
As for the Bahraini situation, we are concerned about what has happened and we think that the pattern of handling the protests has not been successful or the right path. We have urged that the whole emphasis should be on seeking a national dialogue, which the king himself and some of his advisers always wanted from the start. We think that that is the right way forward. We believe that the concern of surrounding countries, including that expressed by Saudi Arabia in physical form through its support of security in Bahrain, if rightly handled, is part of a beneficial theme, in that we are seeing the GCC countries and the leading Arab regional authorities take seriously the internal security of their own region. The same applies in Yemen, where there may be some hope, as the Statement said, that the GCC solution is going to bring a breakthrough and a pattern of less bloody and less violent development. These are early days, though, and all that I can tell my noble friend is that we are in constant contact with the Bahraini authorities and urging the sensible course, which we believe lies along the path of national dialogue and reform.
My Lords, one of the striking points in the Statement was the fact that only six Arab countries attended the meeting on 14 and 15 April. There are of course 16 countries in the Arab League, not counting Libya, which might have been there. It is worrying that 10 Arab League countries did not attend. Can the Minister offer an explanation for this? It was of course the support from the Arab League countries for the humanitarian objectives of the action in Libya that neutralised opposition at the United Nations and allowed the Security Council resolution to go forward, so it is enormously important that the support of those countries is maintained during this period.
While we are looking so hard at Libya, I ask the Minister to assure us that we are observing and, as the Statement says, concerned about the carnage on the streets in Syria. It would be difficult to defend going in on a humanitarian basis to stop the wanton killing of unarmed civilians in Libya while doing nothing at all about the newsreels that we have seen of the Syrian armed forces simply gunning down people in the streets in a number of different cities in Syria. We must not be caught on the argument of double standards. It is important that we respond in equal measure to equal problems.
I understand the sentiments expressed by the noble Baroness, particularly in her last remarks. She is well positioned to know about these matters in an acute and profound form.
Attendance at the contact group of the Doha meeting was by invitation. In a sense, the Arab League authorities represent the whole range of smaller and larger Arab countries; it is their voice that has been sought, and to a large extent secured, in the recognition that one of the causes of the civilian killings is the personality, actions and attitudes of Gaddafi himself. That has come out clearly from the Arab League as a whole. However, I do not think that we expected all the smaller Arab countries to attend the Doha meeting, nor did they want to. I am not even sure that they were invited. The invitation was to the countries that are in a position to make contributions, both financial, as Kuwait has just done, as noble Lords heard in the Statement, and in terms of hardware, as Qatar and the UAE have done, as well as in a variety of other forms, as a major country like Saudi Arabia is interested in doing. The aim of the conference was not to invite every country, large and small, in the Arab region but to ensure that the Arab League as a whole spoke as far as possible for the whole region.
As for Syria, the noble Baroness is completely right. There is murder and mayhem on the streets of Syrian cities, Deraa and elsewhere. Thinking back through history, we all know of the colossal massacre that took place at Hama when the former president, Hafiz al-Assad, was alive—under the aegis, I seem to recall, of his brother, who was the chief police authority there. Sadly, this is not a new phenomenon. Our protests are extremely strong but of course this requires international co-ordination, which we have with the EU and through the UN.
There is also the question of criminal charges being pursued by the International Criminal Court, and I believe that an investigation has opened. That is an independent court that makes its own decisions, but they are certainly ones that we welcome as we watch with horror the unfolding violence that will get the present president, Bashar al-Assad, and his Government nowhere. They will simply move constantly behind the curve, as I was told in the Middle East last week, and they will fail to catch up with the outrage and fury that will simply grow greater the more blood that is shed and the more violence that there is in that country.
The Minister has reiterated the consistent attitude of the Government to regime change in Libya. However, is it not the case that our own forces, with those of our allies, are taking part in rigorous battlefield activities which, if successful, will have the effect of emasculating Colonel Gaddafi and degrading his capacity to murder his own people and, if that continues, ultimately there will be regime change? Therefore, is this the answer to the question: we do not aim for regime change, but our actions, with those of our allies, could well bring it about, and if that happens we will welcome it?
The noble Lord, with his usual precision and crystal-clear legal mind, has put the matter in a nutshell. This is the way that things will go. It is not just about the battlefield activities, the aerial activities, the advisory role and the provision of telecommunications equipment mentioned in the Statement. The international freezing of resources, assets and oil revenues, and the international pressure from every side on the existing Libyan regime, will also be part of the package of forces that will lead in the direction that the noble Lord so rightly described.
My Lords, in repeating the Statement the Minister described the Libyan regime as illegitimate for the very strong reason of its treatment of its citizens. Given the violence in Syria that has been mentioned during this debate, do the Government take the same view of the Syrian Government and the presidency of Bashar al-Assad?
I refer back to my observation that each country is seeing a different pattern unfold. If my noble friend thinks about the Libyan pattern, to which he has just referred, it is a country with clearly organised opposition forces holding certain cities and territory against the organised force of a murderous regime, which still holds authority in Tripoli. That is one scene. In Syria, something else is unfolding—a very unpleasant pattern it is—in which the authorities are clearly acting in murderous ways and authorising their security forces to take part in actions that smash up human rights, destroy lives and create still rising tensions. It is not at the same point in the curve and is not the same pattern of development. There could come a time when the shape of things will change in Syria. There could come times when attitudes towards the Syrian authorities will evolve and grow increasingly determined to see changes in the pattern. It could come but you cannot compare like with like at the moment. These are different countries with different patterns of turmoil and political discontent, which all manifest in different ways. We in this country will use our tailored pressures with the EU, our American allies and our Arab and African allies to try to temper these great forces that are sweeping the Arab world, and see that they bring change—but change that is beneficial and not soaked in blood.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I should like to talk about Clause 3 standing part of the Bill, if that is agreeable to your Lordships.
The EU factsheet that the Government put out stated that the Bill is designed to strengthen the connection between the British people and the European Union. Actually, Clause 3 seems to be almost perversely designed to do the exact opposite of that perfectly reasonable ambition. The noble Lord, Lord Waddington, who, sadly, is not in his place, said that those of us who had supported the amendments to Clause 3 were in denial about the lack of popularity of the European Union. I am afraid that that is simply not true. I agree with much of the diagnosis about the EU’s lack of popularity, but I absolutely disagree with the treatment that the Government are putting forward by means of Clause 3.
The exceptions to the referendum lock are very limited. On most issues, that lock is unbreakable, as was pointed out earlier. It is enormously strict, and the purpose of the amendments has been to give Parliament greater flexibility in respect of whether or not a referendum is necessary. The Government are on record as saying that referendums should be kept for exceptional issues and important decisions that ought to be taken on a nationwide basis.
In an earlier debate in your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Williamson of Horton, described this as a “watershed” Bill. The measures in Clause 3 are watershed measures that need to be tempered by greater flexibility—the sort of flexibility that the amendments provided for—that will maintain the authority of this Parliament, which would otherwise be hugely undermined. We are a parliamentary democracy; that is the basis of our government. This Bill drives a coach and horses through that concept.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, said that it cannot be denied that the frequent use of referendums will seriously damage the legitimacy of Parliament. I think that the situation is much worse than that. The measures in Clause 3 will engender enormous cynicism among the British people if they are asked to take part in referendum after referendum, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, said. Worse, there will be not just cynicism, but ridicule—the worst of all possible weapons that can be used.
In time, Parliament will recognise that that is the case and will probably, therefore, avoid using referendums. The noble Lord, Lord Waddington, said earlier that he would welcome avoiding such referendums, because it would mean that a block on EU decision-making could be made. Of course we may be able to block EU decisions in order to avoid a referendum, but other countries may have decided to go ahead under the enhanced co-operation provided for in the Lisbon treaty. The Minister has not answered that point. There is no such thing as an absolute block in many areas because of the provisions of the Lisbon treaty in allowing for that enhanced co-operation, and I should be grateful if the Minister said a little more about those provisions and the likelihood—indeed, some would say, the inevitability—of them being used. If that is the case, this country would be pushed to the margins of Europe again—as a result, distancing the British people even further from Europe and even further from the objectives that the Minister so passionately espoused when putting forward the Bill.
The amendments that we discussed today have been designed to provide that greater flexibility and to give Parliament the ability to look at what really merits a referendum and consider the serious issues on which the people of this country, on a nationwide basis, should be called upon to take decisions. Somehow the impression has been given—notably by the noble Lord, Lord Waddington—that if the United Kingdom blocks a measure, that is the end of it. Those of us who went through the Lisbon treaty know that that simply is not true. On this issue I look particularly at the Liberal Democrat Benches. They are good Europeans. I regret to say that in many ways they have been better Europeans than my own party. That is the truth of the matter, and that they can go along with these sorts of measures in Clause 3 frankly beggars belief.
My Lords, we have discussed the principles and details embraced in this clause at some length and I am grateful for the additional points that have been raised in the stand part debate.
I apologise straight away if the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, thought that I cut him short or intervened as he expressed his very sincerely held views. I thought that he had commented earlier but I am very glad that he has now had an opportunity to speak. He raised issues that go wider than the Bill, although they are not totally unrelated to it. He raised the question of scrutiny in our two Houses, which is something that we want to strengthen. He is absolutely right that in the past the reasons for not observing or waiting for the scrutiny process were possibly a little too cavalier. These are matters that we have all argued for and there is a constant search for improvement. However, I think that the operation of our own European Union Committee and the European Scrutiny Committee in the other place are commendable. They cover an enormous amount of ground with very great thoroughness. Speaking from this government position, I can say that it certainly is right for the Government to pay maximum attention to that. It makes complete sense.
There is the broader question of the democratic nature of the European Union and the kind of issues that were addressed in the Laeken declaration. That declaration pleaded with the European institutions and national Governments to seek ways to bring European affairs closer to popular consent and to the people so that they had a greater understanding of where the European Union benefited its members—as a home club or home team it could achieve greater things in combination—and where it should not necessarily intrude on affairs that were properly the concern of nation states and those close to the ground of intimate local issues, which were best governed and decided at national or local level and possibly not at the loftier level of the European Union. That is a broader issue which we shall perhaps come to.
The European Union, like any great institution and certain institutions of the last century, needs reform. We are now facing totally different conditions from the ones that we faced even a couple of years ago, and so is Europe. Power has moved, wealth has moved and economic activity has moved. The things that some of us forecast 15 years ago, such as the rise of easternisation, as we called it—the rise of the eastern powers—have taken place. That is a question not just of shifting economic gravity but of shifting political gravity as well. In those conditions, Europe as an institution needs to move ahead and the nation states within it need to achieve greater popular support and democratic consensus than they have achieved so far. I shall come to that point again in a moment when I address the views of the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson, which were extremely interesting and stimulating.
I turn, first, to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I am sorry that he did not think that my answers were serious. They were intended to be deadly serious; obviously I did not have quite the right tone. However, I emphasised as strongly as I could that we need Clause 3 as well as Clause 2. Clause 3 is needed to address areas where there can be transfers of power and where the special short revision procedure is employed. The noble Lord asked why there was no significance test in the case of Clause 2. The answer is that in Clause 2 we are dealing with treaty changes where competences are shifted or not. In the case of the judges that he mentioned, there would not be a transfer of powers, so there would not be a transfer of competences. If more judges were appointed, the issue would not arise, so there would be no need for any of these procedures at all. Otherwise, all the issues in Clause 2 require treaty changes; and treaty changes, unless they are exempted or unless there is no transfer of power, qualify for and attract a referendum. In Clause 3 the pattern is completely different. There, we are dealing with transfers of powers which are not defined in the treaty, although they are defined to a considerable extent in the Bill. I have listed them again and again until I have become almost short of voice. This is a whole range of powers that can be transferred, and a degree of judgment—although not a vast degree—is required in relation to their significance. That is the difference.