European Union Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Liddle
Main Page: Lord Liddle (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Liddle's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 39B. These are probing amendments. We are not saying they are perfectly drafted but they are an attempt, as always from this side of the House, to be helpful to the Government. They are an attempt to substitute a parliamentary process for the Government’s attempt to define in the Bill every single circumstance and change of rule to which their referendum lock would apply. Instead of trying to define all the circumstances in the Bill, these amendments propose a parliamentary process by which the issues would be determined on a case-by-case basis. They represent a new subsection (4) to Clause 6. We put forward two options, which I will explain in a moment.
The basic difficulty with the Government’s approach to this Bill is that it requires an extraordinarily long list of issues to be codified in legislation that are subject to the so-called referendum lock. Heinz talked about its 57 varieties. This Bill has 56 varieties, we count, of referendum lock. These are not just major new treaties. It has become clear in our consideration of the Bill that a lot of changes within existing treaties would be subject to this lock.
The Bill allows Ministers but not Parliament some very limited discretion to decide that the referendum lock does not apply in limited circumstances that we have debated in our earlier sessions: the exemption clause under which Ministers can decide that the matter does not affect Britain or is simply a codification of existing treaties; and the significance clause, which is very narrowly applied to paragraphs (i) and (j) of Clause 4(1).
A better form of exercising discretion and judging whether a referendum is required would be to put the matter in the hands of Parliament and not in the hands of the Government. In these amendments we sketch out two possible ways of doing this. Amendment 39A suggests the establishment of,
“a joint committee of both Houses”.
This was proposed in roughly similar terms by the Opposition in the other place. Amendment 39B, which the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, and I think is a more interesting amendment, proposes the establishment of “an independent review committee”, which would advise Parliament on what matters it regarded as requiring a referendum. We can all envisage what the composition of such an independent review committee would be. It would definitely contain constitutional lawyers, judges and constitutional experts such as the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield—they are plentiful in our House. It might contain a business person, a trade unionist, a representative of civil society and people from the nations and regions of Britain. Its purpose would be to advise Parliament on whether, in the particular circumstances that arise, a referendum would be a proportionate way of dealing with the issue in question. It would be given criteria such as whether it was a significant issue, an urgent issue that had to be dealt with in a short period, or an issue of national interest that required to be carried through swiftly.
These issues would be discussed by the independent review committee, which would advise both Houses of Parliament on whether a referendum was justified. This idea is in keeping with the spirit of the Lords Constitution Committee’s recommendations in its report on referenda. It stated that referenda should be confined to fundamental constitutional issues, but acknowledged the difficulty of defining in a full list what those issues were. At the end of its list of recommendations, the committee stated:
“This is not a definitive list of fundamental constitutional issues, nor is it intended to be”.
It seems that it is a very difficult thing to decide in advance. Therefore, it is right that there should be some kind of parliamentary mechanism that would decide what issues are of fundamental constitutional importance. On the question of how we do this, and the detailed set-up of a committee on such a process, we on this side of the House do not have a dogmatic view. However, we would seriously like the Government to consider this point as an alternative to the incredible complexity of putting in the Bill all the different varieties of referendum lock.
That is the logic of our amendment. In my remaining time, I will say why this is a better way for the House to proceed. In the debate about whether referenda are required, a judgment should be made about proportionality. Is the issue really of fundamental constitutional significance, or is it a relatively minor issue that does not justify a referendum? The value of the judgment on proportionality was brought home to me when I listened to the very thoughtful reply that the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, gave at the end of last week's debate. I will try to summarise the Minister's argument without traducing him. He said that it was all very well for us on this side of the House and on the Cross Benches and other parts of the House to say that we were in favour of a referendum on the euro, but why then should we not have a referendum on common European defence, on participation in the office of a public prosecutor or on border controls? These issues, he argued, were as significant as whether Britain should join the euro.
There is a point here of fundamental importance. The reason why we have to have a referendum on the euro is that one is either in it or out of it; it is a fundamental choice about whether one joins or not. However, issues such as a common European defence are much more subtle and require a judgment about proportionality. I do not want to criticise the Minister, for whom I have the greatest respect. However, in his argument on a common European defence policy, he stated:
“Allow me to elaborate on some of my remarks. A decision on whether to join a common EU defence is fundamental, as it could result in a common EU army”.—[Official Report, 9/5/11; col. 759.]
That is a total straw man in the debate about a European defence. Certainly it would be a fundamental constitutional issue if we were to set up European military forces. However, if one thinks about the realistic development of European defence in the next 10 or 20 years, we are talking about better rules for the harmonisation of defence procurement, which is a very practical matter. Does something like defence procurement really require a referendum? In the parlous state of our defence budget—we have heard today about how the Government are planning further cuts in defence—a practical man or woman would say, “We have to have more practical co-operation in Europe on defence procurement”. Do we really think that this is an issue on which the British people think they should be voting in a referendum rather than that the people they chose to represent them in Parliament should decide?
The same sort of argument about proportionality can be applied to other aspects of this Bill, such as the public prosecutor. We heard a lot from the Minister about how it is a fundamental issue in how we organise our legal system, but is it really? For instance, if it were limited purely to tackling financial fraud in the EU, surely this would be just practical common sense. In terms of proportionality, it is not a matter that would require a referendum, and nor would changes in Schengen. As a result of what is happening in north Africa, we may have to take steps towards much stronger rules on asylum, but is that something that fundamentally challenges our border controls? We need to make judgments about the proportionality of what is proposed, and in our opinion that can usually be done only by a parliamentary committee, ideally an independent committee, that looks at these matters.
The noble Lord seems to be saying that referendums should be held only on really important issues, such as whether we join the euro. Would he therefore agree that we should hold a referendum on something even more important: whether we stay in the European Union at all?
We all know the noble Lord’s views on this matter. The experience of the 1975 referendum was that it did not resolve the issue of whether we stayed in the European Union. We won a yes vote, but it did not resolve the fundamental issue. However, on issues such as the euro, there is a fundamental constitutional principle at stake, and it is right to have a referendum, so there are circumstances in which referenda are the right thing to do.
In the light of the AV referendum result, which I regard as the betrayal of the Liberal Democrats in the AV referendum by their partners, when I looked at the coalition agreement I was surprised by what it said. We are now told that the Liberal Democrats are going to adopt a much more muscular, robust relationship with their coalition partners. Well, on this Bill, let us have a look at what the coalition agreement says. It says:
“We will amend the 1972 European Communities Act so that any proposed future treaty that transferred areas of power, or competences, would be subject to a referendum on that treaty”.
In other words, you would have a referendum on a big treaty, but the agreement continues:
“We will amend the 1972 European Communities Act so that the use of any passerelle would require primary legislation”.
Yet every page of this Bill fully and directly contradicts that coalition agreement where the agreement says that passerelles and other matters should be subject to referenda.
I, too, have a copy of the coalition agreement in front of me. While the noble Lord is right in what he says about bullet point three, he is very selective in his interpretation of what to pick and choose, because he does not notice that bullet point four says:
“We will examine the case for a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill to make it clear that ultimate authority remains in Parliament”.
If the noble Lord had been watching the news, and was aware of government statements in the year since the coalition agreement was made, he would know that no sovereignty Bill is about to be introduced into either House of Parliament but that the areas where there might be changes in sovereignty—in other words, a transfer of power and competencies—might be covered for the use of referendums.
I have the greatest affection for the noble Baroness, but I think that her attempt to justify the fact that the terms of the coalition agreement have not been met in this case is neither muscular nor robust. I think, therefore, that our friends on those Benches have something to think about. What I am suggesting that our friends on those Benches think about is the merits of the amendments that this side is putting forward. We are offering a mechanism by which a lot of the unacceptable trivia in the Bill could be assessed in a proper way by an independent committee that would advise Parliament about whether they were fundamental or matters that would not require a referendum.
I suggest that there is possibly a germ of consensus in the coalition agreement. We on this side have moved our position from when Labour was in government because we now believe that matters such as passerelle clauses and simplified revisions of the treaty should be approved by a proper Act of Parliament. That is a significant move on this side of the House towards greater parliamentary accountability. I should have thought that the Lib Dems ought to seize that as an advance in accountability. We should confine referenda to these fundamental issues that your Lordships’ Constitution Committee said needed to be defined. An independent committee would be a good way of doing this.
I am sorry to have gone on at such length—
I intervene only briefly and thank the noble Lord for giving way. Is he not perfectly correct in general and in the specifics he mentioned? There is no apparent transfer of power, notion or concept built into the EPPO proposals. That is the European Union being allowed by the sovereign member Governments to deal with matters to do with any financial misdemeanours affecting Union finances. There is no extra transfer of power there at the margin at all. Why are the Government so obsessed? My noble friend the Minister kindly and co-operatively said at the end of the previous Committee session that he would focus on the important areas that the noble Lord has emphasised today in his remarks. However, he then goes back to say, “Ah, we must have the whole list as well. They are important as well”. There is no logic to it, particularly with the EPPO proposals.
I think the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, is right on that subject. The problem is the people who believe in the thin end of the wedge, but the way to deal with that is to have a proper process for deciding what is significant and requires a referendum and what does not in the form of an independent process that people will respect. That is what we are proposing in these amendments. It is a sensible compromise for the way forward that I hope the Government will consider seriously. It would resolve an awful lot of the big problems that people have with this Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord referred to the two amendments as probing amendments. I think that they could better be described as tongue-in-cheek amendments. Similar amendments were moved in the House of Commons, but at least they applied to Clauses 3, 4 and 6. These amendments mysteriously apply only to matters dealt with in Clause 6. For the life of me I cannot understand why, as I am sure others will not either, if Parliament is to be involved in these matters, Parliament as a whole should not be involved. Quite obviously, members of the public will wonder what this mysterious body is. At least if Parliament as a whole was involved, they would know what was going on.
The noble Lord has made two points which reflect a misunderstanding of what this side is trying to propose. Parliament would be involved because it would be Parliament that would take the decision on whether a referendum was necessary on the basis of advice from either a Joint Committee of both Houses or some kind of independent committee which had real expertise on it. This is not being proposed tongue in cheek, but makes a serious point.
Of course I accept what the noble Lord says about the proposal not being tongue in cheek, but I certainly do not accept his argument. The fact remains that if you put in a Bill that a mysterious committee is going to have some say in the matter, you are moving even further away from a situation where the general public has any confidence at all that its views are considered when vital decisions are made. I fail entirely to see how giving a Joint Committee of both Houses a key role in deciding whether there should be a referendum will help to restore trust in the EU. I am bound to say—obviously this will not find favour with everyone in the House—that the House of Commons, controlled by the Whips, has never proved to be an effective check on the ambitions of the Europhiles, and this House, I have to say, seems to suffer from a built-in Europhiliac tendency. The idea of having a Joint Committee and expecting it to come up with a unanimous recommendation for a referendum is just pie in the sky, and I suspect that the noble Lord knows that perfectly well.
I remind the House that on 9 May, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, implied in an unguarded moment that it was inconceivable that a Government would just give everything away for no gain. But the public are of the view that we have made a habit of giving things away. Sometimes Ministers have listened to anguished cries from the Guardian that if we do not agree with our partners we are going to be isolated, when it really would not be the end of the world if the others went ahead without us and, for instance, wasted their money on empire building like the setting up of the European External Action Service while we continue to benefit from the single market. I think that that would be a good idea.
Let us face it: sometimes peer pressure has got to work on the vain and on those who wish to be thought good members of the club with disastrous consequences like Mr Blair’s surrender over the rebate. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, had to say about that matter at Question Time today. I invite him to read with care various contributions made in this House on 4 February 2008 when we had a debate on the European budget. Every action of Mr Blair was dissected and examined with great care. All his convolutions, distortions and changes of front were brought out into the open. I do not think that any impartial person could honestly say that it is a very happy story. Governments are often not very good at saying no and Parliaments have gone along with them. That makes this Bill as it stands very necessary and overdue and makes the amendments very dangerous.
My difficulty in answering that question is due to the difficulty that the Opposition have in stating why they want particular treaty amendments and expansions of the powers and competences of the European Union. When we have pressed on this matter, it has been a bit like “King Lear”: the Opposition seem to want to do “such things” and there will be uncertain futures in which new powers will somehow be needed for the European Union. Therefore, they want to amend the Bill by removing areas where the Bill would prevent the surrender of the veto. That would not prevent activity, because a huge range of competences accorded to the European Union allow it to be highly active in all these areas. However, the Opposition want to remove the vetoes on the big decisions. I think that they want a referendum on the euro, although I am not at all sure about the others and I want to go through them as we discuss these matters. The Opposition have not answered that. Why do they want these huge treaty changes, and why do they want the vetoes removed? It seems to me beyond understanding that they should want vetoes removed when so many powers and competences are now accorded to the European Union, and they can do all sorts of things to achieve the kind of Europe that we want in the future. If the Opposition have some new ideas for expanding the powers of the European Union, let them state them, otherwise we are left with a kind of “King Lear” situation—they will do “such things” as it is too difficult to mention at this time.
I want to turn to the 12 decisions in Clause 6, which cover highly sensitive areas. When I heard the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, call some of them trivial, it made me, in the words of Hilaire Belloc, gasp and stretch my eyes. When one looks at the reality of them—their real-world implications—they are anything but trivial. The big five decisions under Clause 6 include joining the eurozone, and there seems to be a general consensus that there should be a referendum on that. Incidentally, I reassure my noble friend Lord Lamont that there is not really a problem there at all. The referendum would take place before the UK took the decision, and the exchange rate would then be struck at a certain point in the middle of the night or whenever it was technically advisable to do so. I think that my noble friend put that in perfect perspective.
On the provisions relating to EU common defence, I think I heard the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, say such decisions could not necessarily lead to anything too serious—I do not want to parody him—because it was a complex issue and it might be desirable, I suppose he was saying, to give up the veto or decide to join without a referendum because not too much harm could come from it. That is miles from reality. In fact, under an EU common defence policy—on which we would urge there should be a referendum—we would no longer be able to decide independently which situations and developments we should respond to and which situations represented a threat to our national security, we would lose our ability to decide unilaterally which operations we would mount and it would no longer be our choice alone whether we should act independently or with whom we should act in concert. Of course, in this modern world we will always be acting in concert, but we decide. To say that is in the trivial category seems to me to be taking off to another planet.
I cannot recollect using the word “trivial”, to be quite honest. The key point we were trying to make is that, when he talks about a common defence as though we were going to pool all our military and have a common air force and a common army and all the rest, that is a complete straw man. That is not what anyone on the continent is proposing. The real issues in European defence are ones such as why we have—I cannot remember the precise figure—400,000 people under arms yet we can manage to mobilise only 5,000 for a particular operation and why, in terms of bang for the buck, Europe is so unbelievably inefficient, given all the different national procurement systems. When we are up against it on the defence budget, the Government are saying they are not interested in common procurement and how we make that work. What we are talking about is very small-scale, step-by-step, gradual changes that would be useful, not suddenly deciding that we want to have a common army and a common air force. It is ludicrous to say that the Opposition are in favour of that.
The Maastricht treaty and other treaties make clear that common defence means common control and common finance. There may be all sorts of arrangements short of that with some aspects of existing competencies already available to the European Union for all kinds of co-operation. I am going to come particularly to the question of enhanced co-operation and other military aspects in a moment. The noble Lord is splitting hairs. In the treaty it is perfectly clear what this step would involve. He says that there might be just one small step and it will be all right because we can have adjustments later on; that is not how it really works and certainly not how it works in law and under the treaties.
Let me move on, as I have plenty more to say on the other areas that were apparently described as trivial. Those included abolishing border controls—I feel it absolutely extraordinary to put that in the trivial category, as it is a major issue. Joining the European public prosecutor system, which is already in the treaty, or extending its powers when we had joined it is a very serious issue affecting the whole of our judicial system. Then we come to—
My Lords, I am very disappointed with the Minister’s reply to this debate. I think that we have made a simple argument in support of these probing amendments and it is not fair to criticise us on their detail. That is not the point. We are trying to put forward the argument that if the issue of whether a referendum should take place is in question, an issue of proportionality also has to be addressed. We do not want to have multiple referenda. Let us have them, as your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has said, on fundamental matters of importance. The question is how those fundamental matters of importance are to be decided. With these amendments we are thinking about a mechanism by which these issues could be considered in an objective and rational way that is detached from political partisanship.
Amendment 39B in particular proposes the setting up of an independent review committee that would advise both Houses of Parliament on whether an issue was large enough to pass the test of proportionality and thus whether a referendum should take place. To me, that is a simple argument which is worthy of consideration, but I do not feel that the Government have shown that they are really prepared to give it that proper consideration.
Members on this side of the House stand for greater parliamentary accountability in terms of the EU. We are arguing for Acts of Parliament for any changes that are made as passerelles, simplified revision treaties or whatever else. These would require Acts of Parliament, not just a resolution of Parliament. That marks a change from what happened under the previous Government, and it is quite a big change. It puts in place an additional safeguard in politics because it would not be just Ministers in their department pushing through parliamentary resolutions, it would require them to get the agreement of colleagues through the Cabinet Legislation Committee in order for the matter to be taken forward. It makes this much more of a collective decision of the whole Government and would enable more thorough scrutiny of issues through the procedure of creating an Act of Parliament.
We are in favour of parliamentary accountability. The question is this: what are the circumstances in which in addition to greater parliamentary accountability, there should be referenda? The Minister says that there are what he calls “key decisions” that require referenda, and puts forward a lot of proposals for change that no one on this side is actually proposing. We have not put forward dramatic proposals for the extension of QMV or for large transfers of competences and powers to Brussels. What we have said is that, as a Government who are sensibly trying to make the European Union work, some flexibility is required to deal with difficult issues as they come up. Moreover, circumstances change, so what you think about the future now might not necessarily still be what you think in five years’ time. Judging what would require a referendum to be held and what would not is of vital importance, so we are proposing a mechanism here that can deal with questions of proportionality.
What we are proposing here would fit the coalition agreement far better than what the Government are proposing. The coalition agreement draws a very clear distinction between treaties which would require referenda and other changes which would simply require primary legislation. That is what is in the coalition agreement which the Liberal Democrats signed up for. As with the Bill on the National Health Service, it is a bit like the Liberal Democrats have been sold a pup, because they have not got what is in the agreement they signed up for. What they signed up for here was a clear distinction between future treaties and other small changes which would be dealt with differently. We are proposing a mechanism which would enable that to be done. I hope that when we get to Report stage people will think again about this Bill and have the common sense to see that the mechanisms that we are proposing are in the national and the public interest. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.