Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I want to draw attention to one or two other passages in the Government’s response, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, referred in his excellent introduction. Two features caught my eye. One is in paragraph 45. The Justice Select Committee had drawn attention to quite strong representation for the Civil Procedure Rules to make it a requirement that PPOs be offered; its advice was against that, because it was reasonably clear that not every case made a PPO appropriate—one has to be selective; some cases are better suited than others. The point of mentioning that is that one could adopt the approach of amending Section 100 of the 2003 Act, which is the basis for the award of PPOs, to toughen up the requirement that they be offered in every case, but that is not what is being suggested and, I think, rightly so.

The other question is whether rules of court are best equipped to deal with the problem. That is why I draw attention to what is said in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Government’s response. In passages that are written out in heavy print and underlined, they undertake to,

“investigate the quality and effectiveness of the advice currently available”,

with a view to endorsing,

“guidance on standard practice to ensure that claimants are properly informed”.

Will the Minister expand a little on what the Government had in mind in that passage? Was it guidance rather than amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules, guidance to lie alongside the Civil Procedure Rules or guidance which will inform the committees responsible for the revision of those rules?

What comes through from that and the following paragraph is that further investigation is in the mind of the Government. A little more information may be needed before the rules are revised in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has in mind. If the Minister could expand a bit on that, it would be very helpful.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee that I was not here for the first 90 seconds of what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, had to say, but I came puffing in as quickly as I could.

In our discussions so far, which I entirely understand and support, one feature has not yet been mentioned: the advantage of the PPO in the process from the point of view of the unfortunate man or woman who has suffered serious or catastrophic injuries. Both at the Bar and as a judge, one thing that you have to look at is how long the unfortunate individual concerned will actually live. I am sorry to say so, but when you talk to your client and say, “We have to discuss how long you will live”, or to the parents of a child who has suffered catastrophic injuries, “We are discussing how long your little boy or your little girl will live”, you are treading on what is obviously deeply sensitive ground. The answer is that it has to be discussed if you are proceeding by way of lump sum, because the calculation of damages depends significantly on whatever the medical experts say the life expectation of the man, the woman, the little boy or the little girl is likely to be.

The medical experts I dealt with were men and women of the utmost integrity. They would do their best. They would say, “Well, the best I can do is X”, or Y or Z. What you discovered after a little while doing these sorts of cases was that, actually, what they were doing—and who can blame them?—was taking an average: “We have had so many patients aged between 21 and 25 who have suffered these sorts of injuries, and they have lived for so long and then they have died”. So in addition to the sensitivities that go into a discussion of how long will the victim—the plaintiff, as they used to be in those days—suffer, be alive, and how long will the damages have to cater for his or her interests, there is also the uncertainty of the medical evidence, because no doctor can tell you.

I still remember a very distinguished surgeon from Stoke Mandeville, who, when I asked him this question in a conference just before I became a judge, said, “Well, we are asked the most ridiculous questions. We do our best. We offer you the best. The truth is that we do not know when this man or this woman’s will to live will go. When the will to live goes, that is when they will die. Some will wish to live and will have the will to live for longer than others, so what we are offering you is the best we can do”. He did not say, and it would not be fair to say, that it is speculative: it is the best they can do but, inevitably, it is almost certainly not going to be right. The end result is that the damages will be too much or too little. The great advantage of the PPO system is that it caters for however long this unfortunate injured person actually lives. I support the idea behind this amendment.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, the Act which this Bill amends gave the Lord Chancellor this power. I suppose that, at that time, the Lord Chancellor had intimate relations with the judiciary—but he also had the responsibility of accounting to Parliament if there was a question about the matter. The connection between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary has somewhat diminished since that time, but the Lord Chancellor still has a primary duty in relation to the judiciary that other members of the Government do not.

It is also important to have accountability in this matter. As my noble friend has just said, if the Lord Chancellor ignored the advice of the panel, he might have good reason for doing so, but it would be very difficult for him to explain it, because one would assume in this case that he or she would accept the judgment of the panel and he or she would be answerable to Parliament.

I share my noble friend Lord Faulks’s difficulty in relation to medical help. It is for the judge to decide on the length of time or the nature of the requirements for care, treatment and so on that a person may have. This particular exercise is primarily for those expert in the matter of investment.

I have perhaps interpreted the new schedule to which the amendment applies rather too generously. I assumed that there would be different rates of return fixed for different classes of case and that it might therefore be possible to change them on review—for example, to have no rate of return for a particular class or to enlarge the class that another rate of return applied to. It would be extraordinary if one could abolish this duty by the exercise of paragraph 8(2)(a). I do not think that that was intended—but my noble and learned friend may say that it was.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, perhaps I may add a footnote to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in favour of the Lord Chancellor having the decision. Paragraph 6(2) of the new schedule, on the way in which the panel is supposed to work, states:

“In the event of a tied vote on any decision, the person chairing the panel is to have a second casting vote”.


We then look at who is to chair the panel and see that it is the Government Actuary. I would much rather the Lord Chancellor assumed ultimate responsibility than the matter be determined in the event of a tied position by the Government Actuary. So the structure as set out supports the line taken by the noble Lord.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I have one point to add to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, on the effect of the different approach to the level of risk. One factor which was mentioned by Lord Lloyd of Berwick in Wells v Wells was the need to have a relatively stable, constant fund from which funds could be drawn as the need arose over a long period of time. The risk he was contemplating in that part of his judgment was not that of the funds running out, just that the value of the fund would diminish as the stock market went down. In its turn, this would prejudice the viability of the fund to maintain itself at the appropriate level as time went on. The risk we were contemplating then, in looking at the appropriate rate of return, was differentials in performance which would affect the ability of the fund to meet ongoing costs which would not fluctuate. They were the constant costs of equipment maintenance or nursing services which the injured person had to meet from time to time: a level rate of costs, against a fluctuating value in the fund available to pay for them.

There is much to be said for reducing the level of risk to the minimum possible compatible with the aims of the Government, to avoid the problems of fluctuation which affect the viability of the fund. I mention this because it is another factor which lies behind the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has pointed out, the advantage of the Wells approach is that investment advice was not needed. I am not quite sure how these things are structured, but if the fund were to be put in the hands of an adviser, there is usually a performance factor taken out of the management of the fund. It is not so much investment advice as the cost of managing the fund. The larger the fund, the more likely it is that the best way of handling it is to put the whole fund into the hands of an investment adviser who would simply manage it accordingly.

It is rather difficult to extract from that a recoverable figure of the kind that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is directed at. There is a lot to be said for just taking that factor out of the award altogether and leaving it up to the individual to decide how best to have the money managed. If it is a management figure, then that is all right: it is just part of the choice that the injured person makes. It should not be added in as an additional element of damages.

[The Earl of Kinnoull]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 80 and 81 in my name. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, on his heart-rending speech, but it seemed only to go back to saying, “My goodness, PPO is a good idea”. So many of the risks which the noble Lord identified would be sorted out by that, but that is in the past.

New Schedule A1 to the Damages Act is inserted by Clause 8(2). At Second Reading, I said that I was worried that paragraph 3(3) did not give sufficient clarity to what was being asked for in the investment. I was concerned that, without that clarity, there could be a plethora of new Wells v Wells cases, with people trying to grapple with what was actually meant. Amendment 80 probes the word “investments” in the phrase,

“the assumption that the recipient of the relevant damages invests the relevant damages in a diversified portfolio of investments”.

We should at least be clear that those investments were debt securities, not equities.

Secondly, I thought it would be helpful to try to define a “very low level of risk”. That does not actually mean anything to me, with my background, and I suspect it does not mean anything in law. I have tried to define it as the level of risk you have when you buy UK Government debt security. These are probing amendments and I regard this as a discussion, but clarity in this area of the Bill would be greatly to the advantage of everyone concerned.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

89DAA: Clause 11, in subsection (2), in inserted section 30A(1), leave out “in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown” and insert “by Her Majesty by Order in Council”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, before I introduce the series of amendments in my name, perhaps I can express my thanks to the noble and learned Lord the Minister for the very helpful way in which he has introduced his Amendment 89DA, and also pay tribute to the work that he and his Bill team have done since we began these discussions way back at the beginning of Committee. The Bill has changed very substantially since its original form. In many respects, I was concerned about the way in which it failed to recognise the structure of the Scotland Act. Considerable advances have been made to bring this Bill into line with the recognised approach to devolution in that Act.

There are 10 amendments in my name, grouped from Amendment 89DAA to Amendment 89DAE, then with Amendments 89DAG and 89DAH and two important amendments, Amendments 92BAA and 92BBA. These amendments come from a list of proposed amendments attached to a letter sent to the Lord Speaker by the First Minister of Scotland at the end of last week; in fact, I think that it arrived last Thursday. It is against the background of that letter that I have introduced these amendments for debate this evening. I shall quote short passages from the First Minister’s letter, because they set the scene for what she sought to achieve in writing to the Lord Speaker. Commenting on the amendments that the noble and learned Lord has introduced, she says:

“The amendments represent a considerable advance on the original position of the Bill, in its introduction to the Commons”.


She goes on to say:

“What is not acceptable to the Scottish Government is that these amendments would bind the Scottish Parliament in law in these areas, whereas the commitment on the part of UK Government is binding in political terms only”.


When she says “these areas”, she refers to the common frameworks to which the noble and learned Lord referred in his introduction. Near the end of her letter she says:

“Annexed to this letter are further amendments (with explanatory notes) which, if made, would resolve the concerns set out in this letter, and give the Scottish Parliament its proper place in the constitutional arrangements of the UK, during the challenging but necessary task of preparing our laws for EU withdrawal”.


For the First Minister to write to the Lord Speaker in this way is a very odd way to proceed, but it was probably unavoidable, due to the refusal of the Scottish National Party to nominate anyone for membership of this House. Before I develop a point on that issue, one ought to recognise the fact that the amendment introduced this evening has been awaited for a very long time indeed. Various Members in the House of Commons were pressing for an amendment before the Bill left the Commons. I am not attributing any blame whatever to the Government for the fact that they have only now come forward with these amendments. The fact is that it has taken a great deal of work and much careful negotiation and planning to achieve what the noble and learned Lord has achieved in the amendment which we see before us this evening. It is a long way from what was being thought about in the House of Commons, and it is just a misfortune of timing that we are facing the position that the amendment comes so late in the process of taking the Bill through Parliament.

That being said, I very much regret the absence of at least one member of the Scottish National Party in this House who could represent the views of the Scottish Government. There is no shortage of suitable candidates, I believe. Their position is all about ideology and their view of the principle of democracy; they refuse to have anything to do with an unelected Chamber. We are not short of people—I look particularly to my right, towards the Liberal Democrat Benches—who believe that this House should be an elected Chamber, but they take the view that, while the present system exists, it must be made to work, and they are content to sit here recognising that that is how Parliament as a whole works today. In a way, it is rather like a bicycle, which has two wheels to it; you cannot really get anywhere unless both wheels are attached. That is how this Parliament works. The House of Commons works in tandem, to use another analogy, with the upper House, and we all know that this House performs a valuable function—much valued by the Government, I may say, on behalf of the whole country—as a revising Chamber. We also know that the House of Commons always has the last word, and we never assert ourselves to the extent of insisting on our view when the Commons has made its view, if it contradicts us, absolutely plain. So it is a real shame that the Scottish National Party cannot accept how this place works. If it is to participate fully in what this Parliament does, it needs to make use of the whole machinery, as it is an essential part of the legislative process.

One could say that, for much of the period when the SNP has had large numbers of Members in the other place, their absence from this Chamber has not mattered very much, but we are entering a time when it is going to matter a great deal, and this evening’s debate is one example. Much of the delegated legislation that we are anticipating, which is going to come through the mechanism to which the noble and learned Lord referred, will refer to Scotland, and many other bits of delegated legislation will come through Clause 7, and probably Clause 9, which will affect Scotland too. Who, then, is to represent the views of the Scottish Government? Are we to have a succession of letters by the First Minister to the Lord Speaker, which somebody might possibly pick up, to achieve what she seeks to do? It is very sad that the ideology is so deeply rooted that there is no real prospect of its being changed. The public should know that Scotland is not being very well served by adhering to it as precisely as we see being done today.

Despite all that, it is important that we should look at and debate at least some of the amendments that the First Minister attached to her letter. There were two sets. The first set took a more radical view of the amendments that we are considering this evening than the second. It invited the Government in effect to remove the entire system, which Clause 11 is really designed to set up, by placing restrictions on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament for a temporary period. It is far too late to engage in a debate fundamentally altering what we set out in the amendment before us, particularly having regard to the fact that the Welsh Government have agreed to what is on offer.

The second set is the one from which I have selected my amendments. I have not included all the amendments in that set, because I do not think that it is necessary to do that to put forward the basis of the argument which the Scottish Government seek to advance. I am taking my 10 amendments from that particular group. It may be convenient to start by addressing Amendments 92BA and 92BB, which refer to something called type C, with reference to Sections 30A(1) and 57(4) of the Scotland Act 1998.

Those not familiar with the systems might wonder what type C is all about and why my amendments seek to change type C to type A. The point is that Schedule 7 to the Scotland Act 1998 contains a table listing various provisions in the Scotland Act that are subject to treatment by delegated legislation, setting out in a table various types of procedure that are to be used to subject those bits of delegated legislation to scrutiny. The type C procedure requires that the measure be approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament; in effect, it is describing the affirmative procedure for dealing with statutory instruments, which we are very familiar with. The type A procedure has that too, but the essential difference between them is that type A requires the measure to be laid before, and approved by resolution of, the Scottish Parliament as well, so it seeks the agreement of both the devolved legislature and the United Kingdom Parliament. That is really the central point that runs right through all these amendments.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, it is for me to say what will happen to my Amendment 89DAA, which is an amendment to Amendment 89DA, moved by the noble and learned Lord the Minister.

I want to make a few short points. First, I want to pick up on a remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that he will not accept the opprobrium that was visited on the Scottish Ministers for the way they conducted themselves in these negotiations. Having had discussions with Michael Russell and the Lord Advocate—like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—the points I put forward in my introduction to my amendment were sincerely held. Those points were not made to cause trouble. The Lord Advocate in particular gave advice on his reading of the Scotland Act; Michael Russell, for his part, was entirely genuine in his points about principle as well. That should be clearly understood.

When I was in practice at the Scottish Bar, I was junior to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As he pointed out, if I appeared with him, I would speak first; it would then be his function, as my senior, to speak second. Quite frequently, I found that when he spoke, he refined the kind of argument that I was attempting to put forward. It took on a slightly different—rather more attractive, perhaps—appearance after he had refined it. As he pointed out in his speech, the points that I made about the construction of Section 30 and the other sections do not really apply in the situation with which we are dealing here. I was grateful for his remark that the situation is unique and not seeking in any way to undermine the devolution settlement. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for making the same point that there is no question of this being the thin end of the wedge or in any way seeking to undermine the devolution settlement, to which he wishes to adhere. These remarks should help a lot in reassuring those in Scotland on how they should approach the continuing discussions. I was glad to hear from the Minister that the door is still open; I think that the Scottish point of view still regards the door as open too.

Perhaps this debate has refined things and shown that the purist argument—that of principle—does not really apply here. This is not about trying to construct the market that we were trying to construct in 1998, which was done by separating out the bits that mattered for that market into Schedule 5 so that they were clearly identified. We are dealing with a different, rather more subtle, situation in trying, as the Minister said, to create a functioning internal market with what has come back to us from Europe. That requires a rather more subtle approach that is not really dealt with in the Scotland Act, for understandable reasons. That being so, I hope very much that the way forward will be pointed by our discussion this evening. Without any further ado, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I intervene to raise a point that I have spoken to the clerk about. Noble Lords might recollect that earlier in the evening I gave a passing imitation of a rabbit in headlights. The reason for that was that it appeared to me that the amendments in group three had been moved and agreed without me speaking to them—which is absolutely ideal, as far as I am concerned. They are highly technical amendments, but I felt I should mention that to the House, lest any noble Lord wishes me to speak to them. As I said, they have been agreed, but noble Lords did not have an opportunity to hear my dulcet tones on the subject.

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[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, Amendment 91 stands in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. It would require the consent of each of the devolved parliaments to be obtained before Clause 11 comes into effect.

Amendments 107 and 108, standing in my name only, provide that none of this Act, except for this clause, would come into force until the Prime Minister was satisfied that resolutions signifying consent have been passed by the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and, unless direct rule is in place, the Northern Ireland Assembly. Both amendments deal in different ways with the element of consent relating to the Act. Both would enshrine the Sewel convention in law. The Sewel convention dictates that the UK Government shall not normally legislate in areas of devolved competence without consent. Consent is sought through a legislative consent Motion. Very rarely do the devolved Parliaments withhold consent. It has happened I believe—I can be corrected if I am wrong on this—only once in Scotland and once in Northern Ireland since 1999. Ironically, it has been used seven times by the National Assembly for Wales. I am not quite sure what that tells us.

The point I am underlining is that withholding legislative consent is not used lightly. It is treated with caution and respect. It is the only constitutional tool available to the devolved Parliaments to challenge the balance of power across the British Isles. However, we know from the Miller case on the Article 50 Bill that the Sewel convention is merely that: it is a convention. The UK Government are wholly within their rights to override any decision made by the devolved Parliaments in relation to this Bill or any other Bill deemed within devolved competence.

I have spoken at length on previous occasions about the need for the Sewel convention to be enshrined in law in relation to this Bill. This is the most wide-ranging constitutional Bill since the European Communities Act 1972. I have spoken at length about the need for the devolved Parliaments formally to consent to Clause 11—I shall not repeat those arguments. I will, however, point to the most recent developments whereby the Welsh Labour Government have implied consent to the Bill, having accepted the amendment to Clause 11 laid by the Government, although time will tell whether that will carry through the Assembly. Those same amendments are insufficient for the Scottish Government and every opposition party in Scotland except the Scottish Conservative Party. The main sticking point for these parties is consent.

The UK Government have tried to devise a new meaning for consent in relation to the functions of Clause 11. They seem quite deliberately to be confusing “consent” with a consent decision. There is a difference, but I think that everybody who reads about this matter in the generality may not be aware of it. The UK Government can impose restrictions on the National Assembly for Wales’s competence as long as a consent decision has been made—not that consent has been obtained. The substance or result of that consent decision is immaterial. The UK Government can steam ahead even if a consent decision is not made. This, quite frankly, is a farce. I believe that there will be a lot of public discussion about that as matters move forward.

We have reached a point in history whereby the current constitutional arrangements, the political conventions underpinning the UK’s intragovernmental relations, are under pressure and in danger of unravelling. In the way that the UK Government are handling consent, they are making it a concept whose understanding among the public is in some doubt and it is causing severe mistrust across the four nations. I urge the UK Government to act, to listen to the Scottish Government and to come to an agreement on consent and a new UK constitution.

Amendment 91 should be grasped by the House today and the Government should accept it to resolve the position in Scotland and to get out of the unholy mess in which they have landed in Wales. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I have put my name down in support of the amendment. The arguments which led me to do that are those which I set out when I was moving my amendment earlier this evening, so I need not take up the time of the House in repeating them. What I said earlier is the full explanation as to why I put my name down.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his amendments, which are pertinent given the different positions of the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the imminent timing of votes in their legislatures that will address consent.

The Government have been clear that they wish to make the positive case for consent for this Bill. We have not just talked about our commitment to making that case but have shown it. We have engaged in extensive discussions with the devolved Administrations and have now introduced the amendment to Clause 11 that we have just discussed at some length to try to meet the expectations of the devolved legislatures. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will accept that our commitment to the legislative consent process is reflected in the agreement that we struck with the Welsh Government last week.

This is the legislative consent process in action. We have put forward policy objectives; we have worked through the differences, and we have found an appropriate compromise. As a result, the Welsh Government have recommended that the National Assembly for Wales grant legislative consent to the Bill when it votes on this matter, I believe, on 15 May. The Welsh Government agree that our amendments now strike the right balance between providing legal certainty and maximising assurances to the devolved legislatures on how we will jointly manage the process of powers returning from the EU in otherwise devolved areas. Of course we are disappointed that we have not been able to reach the same agreement with the Scottish Government, but this, I suggest, is not for want of trying. I stress again that time remains for the Scottish Government to join this agreement, so that we can all demonstrate that we have done what we consider to be the responsible thing in this context.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I do not wish to say very much about the general principle that lies behind Part 1, which deals with damages for whiplash injuries, except to make three points. First, we have been subjected to quite a bit of lobbying by those who object to the measures that it contains. Some, I have noted, say that they are punitive and arbitrary—words which I myself would not attribute to Part 1 as I read it. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord has said enough to persuade me that it is necessary to do something to try to minimise the abuse that has given rise to such a large and disproportionate number of whiplash claims. The abuse has been going on for some considerable time, and it is time that something was done to address it.

My second point is that I particularly welcome the provisions in Clause 3 for an uplift beyond the tariff amount in exceptional circumstances and the provision in Clause 2(8) which deals with the situation where a whiplash injury is combined with other injuries which also require to be compensated. Those are sensible precautions against the risk of unfairness in particular cases. Thirdly, I associate myself—at least for the time being—with the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Sharkey, on the need for thought to be given to putting the definition of the phrase “whiplash injury” in the Bill, rather than leaving it to delegated legislation, because it is so central to the whole system set out in this part. There is something to be said for at least the starting point of the tariff to be in the Bill too, although, of course, amendable in as simple a way as possible by statutory instrument.

My reason for speaking in this debate is that I would like to say a bit more about the personal injury discount rate provided for in Part 2. My reason for doing so is that I was one of the members of the Appellate Committee which heard the case of Wells v Wells 20 years ago in May 1998. Power was first given to the Lord Chancellor to set a discount rate by Section 1 of the Damages Act 1996, when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, was Lord Chancellor. I very much look forward to hearing what he has to say when he contributes to the debate later. I hope to be in the Chamber when he speaks, although I have other things to do. For reasons that he may be able to explain, he did not set a discount rate before the Government changed shortly after the Act came into force.

The baton passed to his successor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, who was here earlier but is no longer in his place to listen to the rest of the debate. He did not indicate that he was willing to exercise that power. One might sympathise with him, because of the difficulties in finding a solution to it. In that situation, it was left to us in Wells to deal with the issue and to devise what we thought would be a firm and workable principle which the courts could apply. The solution which we derived in that case set out the basic principle which was applied by the Lord Chancellor when, in due course, the power was exercised in June 2001 and again in March last year, resulting in the figure to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred. As is stated in the Explanatory Notes, Wells provided the basis for the calculation of the discount rate which has been followed ever since.

I certainly do not wish to quarrel with the proposition that a fresh look needs to be taken at this problem. It is, of course, an inescapable fact that the lower the discount rate, the higher the award will be. So there is a tension between those who wish to raise the rate so as to reduce the burden on those who have to bear the cost of the award and those who do not wish to see a reduction in the general level of damages where the award has to provide compensation for future loss. The Explanatory Notes say that the basis of calculation which was held in Wells to be appropriate is that the claimant is a very risk-averse investor. I do not think that any of us on the Appellate Committee used those very words, but the thrust of our judgment was similar to what the Explanatory Notes say, for reasons that I will explain.

The Bill seeks to change this assumption by substituting that which is set out in paragraph 3(3)(d) of the proposed new Schedule Al to the Damages Act 1996. This is that the damages will be invested adopting an approach which involves more risk than a very low level of risk, but less risk than would ordinarily be accepted by a prudent and properly advised investor. How one reacts to that proposal may well depend on how essential it will be for the claimant to be able to rely on the award to provide for his or her needs for the rest of their life. Claims that require recourse to the discount rate vary widely, from those in which the main element is to make good a relatively small element of future wage loss to those where the award has to provide for the future care and support of those who are very seriously injured.

As it happens, the claimants whose cases we were dealing with in Wells had all sustained very serious injuries of the kind which are normally classified as injuries of the maximum severity. In one case, the claimant had suffered serious brain injuries, as a result of which she was no longer capable of working or looking after herself or her family. In another, the claimant had been injured before birth, was suffering from cerebral palsy and was very severely handicapped.

It was against that background that, in my speech in Wells, I said that the assumptions that had to be made were, first, that the lump sum would be invested in such a way as to enable the claimant to meet the whole amount of the losses or costs as they arise as the years go by during the entire period for the assumed lifetime while protecting the award against inflation, and, secondly, that the losses or costs will have to be met entirely out of the relevant proportion of the lump sum. Those assumptions indicate the challenge that lies behind the exercise that we are contemplating. I went on to say that this meant that the rate should be one that is to be expected where the investment is without risk and which takes full account of the effects of inflation.

As Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who was with us on the committee, said, if the claimant has to realise capital from investments in a depressed market—and, as we know, the markets go up and down—the depleted fund may never recover. We were aware that a lower rate of discount would lead to increased insurance premiums. We were not addressed in detail on this subject, so we were not in a position to form a view about the wider consequences of our judgment. However, it is worth noting that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Steyn—who was also on the committee—pointed out that if the right decision was that the discount rate should be modified to ensure that victims were compensated as nearly as possible for the consequences of their injury, by and large the public would have to pay for the increase in awards. He said that because he was applying the principle which lies at the heart of the assessment of damages at common law, which is to provide injured parties with a sum which will be adequate to cover their loss over the whole of period during which the loss is likely to continue: no more, but certainly no less.

The noble and learned Lord talked about transparency and fairness, but there is no doubt that Part 2 seeks to alter the balance in favour of the public and thus, to an extent, undermine the principle that lies behind the common law. Reasons have been given as to why that might have to be done. For my part, I would have been very much more concerned as to where this reform was leading us if there had not been the provision in new Clause A1 of the 1996 Act which is set out in Clause 8(1) of the Bill. This is a clause which would allow a court to take a different rate of return into account, including a lower return, if any party shows that it would be more appropriate in the case in question.

I have in mind—and I have never forgotten it—a case I once had to deal with where a highly talented young woman had been rendered tetraplegic as a result of a road accident which was certainly not her fault. The injury was so severe that she was almost totally paralysed. She could not move any part of her body below the neck. She could breathe but she could not speak. She could communicate only by sucking and blowing through a tube to spell out words on a screen in front of her. For her, the award was assessed on the assumption that it would be necessary to provide and pay for 24-hour care and attention every day, and for the accommodation and equipment she needed to sustain any kind of reasonable comfort, for the rest of her lifetime.

It would seem quite wrong for someone in her condition to be required to expose the award to risks to any degree just because, without that, her award may bear more heavily on the defendants and their insurers—and perhaps through that, on the general public. So I not only welcome the new clause as a safeguard against the risk of unfairness in these extreme cases; without it, the Bill would risk, in the more extreme cases, giving rise to an injustice which ought never to be contemplated.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Newnham]

My Lords, I rise in the absence of my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who has also put his name to this amendment. I want to raise a point that he has already raised with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and a couple of my own.

First, my noble and learned friend asked how EU law will take effect, given that under Clause 1, the European Communities Act 1972 will be repealed. It may be that ensuring Clause 6 has effect only after the transition period gets around that, but there is a real question about the United Kingdom implementing EU law from the day we leave—30 March next year—through to the end of December 2020. During that period, we will be subject to the European Court of Justice but, in principle, will have no representation—that is the point the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, made in passing: we will not have a judge. The noble Baroness the Leader of the House was asked whether the United Kingdom will still have a judge on the Monday. We assume it will not, but is that the case? Have the Government discussed it? In addition, will we have an Advocate-General? My understanding is that the current Advocate-General believes she is in an ad-hominem position.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who pressed this point. The answer we received was that this would be a matter for negotiation, the suggestion being that we would somehow negotiate the presence of a UK judge on the court. Rather like the point about nationality, having looked at the treaties, I think it is almost impossible to see how this could be arranged. I think we have to accept that we will not have any representation on the court because we will have no Members of the European Parliament.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham]

I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord. In a sense, that puts us in an even more difficult position. Surely, one idea was that by taking back control we would be able to legislate and use our own courts. We will have 21 months in which we do what the European Union requests without having a say. What are the Government doing to ensure we have at least some sort of seat at the table?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

I shall speak briefly to the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I do not do so because I once enjoyed the privilege of being one of his deputies when he was Lord Advocate for Scotland—as did the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Cullen, both of whom are in their places this evening. I do so without detracting in any way from the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness. What attracts me to the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is its simplicity and practicality. It is easily understood, and coming, as it were, from a Scottish source, it pays due regard to economy. For those reasons it is well worthy of consideration. Its simplicity makes it easily capable of being understood not just by those who will have responsibilities under it, but by members of the public.

It is for those reasons that I am, with due deference, rather doubtful about the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. The problem with it is that, apart from the reference to the Supreme Court turning into some kind of court of arbitration, and I know of no process or procedure that would allow for that—

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Will the noble Lord allow me to take the opportunity to say that, as he will remember, there is provision in the Scotland Act and in the Government of Wales Act for a reference to the Supreme Court on issues of law—about the competence of legislation and whether something is within the competence of the legislatures? The problem with the situation that we are contemplating now is that the issues that remain in debate are not really issues of law, and I do not see how the Supreme Court could possibly deal with them. In fact, it is very anxious not to get involved in politics. There was a germ of good sense in the scheme suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, but it breaks down at that point. I am sorry to intervene, but it is worth mentioning that issue.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem]

The noble and learned Lord’s intervention is most helpful. Of course, the language of proposed subsection (17), in Amendment 318AA, to,

“refer any question to the Supreme Court”,

supports the view that the use of the Supreme Court in such circumstances would be, to put it mildly, doubtful.

My difficulty with the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is that it is bound to encourage delay. His amendment says:

“The Panel may call witnesses or take legal advice”.


If witnesses are called they may have to be cross-examined, and if there is to be cross-examination there may have to be representation by counsel, or something of that kind. It is not difficult to imagine what is proposed in the amendment turning into something of a full-blown hearing, rather like, for example, industrial tribunals.

Under suggested subsection (15)(a), regard must be had to whether something,

“is reasonable, in all the circumstances”.

As soon as the concept of reasonableness appears in a statute, it opens up the possibility of judicial review. Even if it were not to be granted, none the less an application for judicial review could obviously, and unfortunately, delay the outcome of a decision that might be of considerable economic as well as political importance. For those reasons, however well intentioned the noble Lord’s proposal is, I do not think it stands any proper comparison with that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. I therefore urge the Government to give serious consideration to that, for the reasons the noble and learned Lord set out, which I have tried to follow.

--- Later in debate ---

I The fundamental weakness of the Government’s proposals as they now stand—and which undoubtedly need changing—is that there is nothing in the Government’s amendments to limit the exercise of this power to the areas where frameworks are agreed as being needed. Neither is there a timetable put on such powers. The Government have made progress and I welcome it. But a great deal more needs to be done before we can get the assent of the Welsh Government.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I do not want to detain the Committee for very long; I will make just one or two points. First, I congratulate the Government on the steps they have taken to amend the original structure of the Bill so that it fits better with the architecture of the devolved statutes. If you look at the list of amendments, there are not just one but 22. That gives an idea of the scale of the exercise that has gone into preparing what we are discussing this evening. I congratulate the team that has been working behind the scenes to put this together. There are one or two loose ends, as I mentioned earlier this afternoon, but this has gone a very long way and—apart from on the one issue of consent, about which perhaps enough has been said—I support entirely the structure and wording of these amendments.

As far as the solution put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is concerned, one feature that is worth noting is paragraph 11, which is the requirement that, if there is disagreement—a failure to reach unanimous agreement—reasons must be given. I have sat for a long time in court where, if you want to dissent, you have to explain yourself, and it is quite extraordinary; once you start writing these things out, you begin to wonder whether the dissent was justified. It is an extremely good discipline, when somebody is in disagreement, to force them to sit round a table and express themselves in writing as to what the nature of the disagreement is. The disagreement may remain, but at least it focuses the mind and makes it easier for the dispute to be resolved by the final body that has the responsibility of resolving the issue.

Regarding the three solutions offered as to how we might deal with this, there are three different solutions for resolving the issue. I have already suggested that the solution put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would not work because the Supreme Court could not deal with that kind of issue. As for the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, I believe that the panel he is talking about has four members, three of whom are from the devolved institutions and one from the United Kingdom. It is a simple majority decision and the United Kingdom would be in the minority—and I am not sure that that is an entirely satisfactory solution to have arrived at. So I am brought back to the solution offered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, which, at the end of the day, is to refer to the United Kingdom Parliament. I am not quite sure what procedure would be adopted, but it seems to offer a fairer and better solution than the other two. Broadly speaking, I endorse the thinking behind what the noble and learned Lord suggested.

We have made a great deal of progress. My final point is to comment on the fact that the Government have undertaken to withdraw the amendments. I was arguing for that some days ago, because it seemed to me that if we had to vote on it tonight that would give a rather different flavour to the debate. It is a way of enabling us to talk around the subject and the way in which we on the Back Benches have to operate all the time. It may be unusual but it is part of the constructive way in which the Government are approaching this issue and I commend it.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, we sit here week after week and, wherever we started our careers, we cannot help but look at them now from the Westminster and London perspective—the UK perspective. As I have been sitting here this evening, I have done a head count. More than 10 of us in the Chamber during this debate have been Members of the devolved legislatures as well as here. We have First Ministers, Deputy First Ministers—a huge band of people here who have experience of seeing these things from the devolved perspective. It is important to bear in mind—and I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Lang, who said that there had been much too much emphasis on the importance of legislative consent in these debates—that legislative consent is the firm foundation on which confidence in the devolved system lies, in the absence of a full federal system, which of course we do not have in this country. I am a fierce unionist, but demonising the SNP does not help to bind the UK together. I assure noble Lords that there is a firm cross-party determination in Wales to insist on significant improvements to this Bill. The Government’s amendment is extremely welcome—but, so far, it is too little. It is a great pity that it is so late, because it means that people have not been able to give the full attention to it that it deserves. But I am sure that it is a good foundation upon which to build.

As noble Lords may remember, nearly two hours ago the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, intervened to ask the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, why the devolved legislatures and Administrations had been content to accept EU power but were not content to accept the UK Government’s power on these issues. I can assure the noble Lord that I went to a number of JMCs and, sitting as a Minister in the UK Government, there was never a time when I felt for one minute that the devolved Administrations did not question the need for more power to go to them. They have persistently and determinedly asked for greater powers and a greater say in negotiations with the EU. This is not something that has come out of nowhere; it is a persistent requirement from the devolved Administrations and legislatures that they should have a stronger voice. As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said, devolved Ministers could go to those meetings—and, indeed, often go to meetings of the European Council. I give way.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

266: Schedule 2, page 17, line 32, at end insert—
“( ) Sub-paragraph (4)(b) does not apply to regulations made under this Part by the Scottish Ministers or by the Welsh Ministers with regard to matters that are within their devolved competence.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 266, which is in my name, is in a series of groups dealing with devolution. It is in the first of five groups dealing with rather technical points arising out of Schedules 2 and 8. They precede a lot of government amendments which are in the group following my groups. I suggest that the main discussion about devolution and its consequences is best reserved for the government amendments which are focused on Clause 11 and other clauses. I am afraid my groups are rather boring, because I am dealing with a whole series of little technical points which need adjustment to some extent in the light of progress that is being made in discussions with the devolved authorities, among other points.

The theme that runs through all my amendments is the need to respect the devolution settlements in Scotland and Wales. I am confident that the Government share that sentiment. It is all a question of how the matter is worked out in points of detail. The basic rule following our withdrawal from the EU, I suggest, is that returned EU competencies in the devolved areas should be distributed among the devolved authorities in accordance with the devolution statutes. That means that what falls within devolved competence should be treated as devolved, with all that that means, and what falls within reserved matters should be treated as reserved, with all that that means.

The statutes that form the foundation for the devolution settlements—the Scotland Act 1998 and Government of Wales Acts, the latest of which was in 2017—were all built on the foundation of our membership of the EU. In each of these statutes, it was taken as accepted that it would not be within the competence of the devolved Administrations to legislate on matters relating to EU law or indeed to take executive action in relation to these matters either.

What we have in the Bill, in place of EU law, is a new creature called “retained” EU law, which is the law that comes back to us either because it is already present in the United Kingdom or is direct EU law that is coming back to us and is not yet built into our laws but requires being built in using the mechanisms described in the Bill. In the original drafting of the Bill, retained EU law is treated as simply a mirror image of EU law, so that in that original drafting—which can be seen in Clauses 11(1) and (2)—the same restriction on competence which applied in relation to EU law is applied to retained EU law. I am delighted to see that, in developing their thinking on this matter, the Government recognise that this really is not acceptable within the devolved arrangements. A much more nuanced approach to that topic can be seen in the government amendments that we will come to later this afternoon.

What I seek to do in the preliminary groups is to draw attention to various other passages in the Bill that need to be corrected in order to be compatible with the devolution settlements. In some of the groups—but not in the first—it is already clear from the government amendments that they are in almost the same position as I am as to what needs to be done.

I turn to Amendment 266, in the first of these groups, and also mention amendments 278 and 292, which raise exactly the same point in relation to different parts of the Bill. Amendment 266 deals with the power to deal by regulation with deficiencies arising from the withdrawal from the EU, which is the subject of Clause 7. It appears in Part 1 of Schedule 2 in the form that is appropriate for the activities of the devolved institutions in carrying out the exercise to which Clause 7 refers.

Amendment 278 deals with the power by regulation to prevent breaches of international obligations, which is the subject of Clause 8. The devolution mechanism for this is dealt with in paragraph 13 of Schedule 2. Amendment 292 relates to the power by regulation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the mechanism for the devolved Administrations is set out in paragraph 21 of Schedule 2.

The point to which these three amendments draw attention is a qualification that is to be found in each of these contexts on the power of the devolved authority to make provision by regulations regarding these three matters. The particular provision that I am concerned about is found in paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 2:

“Regulations under this Part, so far as made by a devolved authority … (b) may not confer a power to legislate (other than a power to make rules of procedure for a court or tribunal)”.


At first sight that qualification cuts across the concept of devolution, the effect of which is that if a matter is within devolved competence, it is for the devolved authority to take its own decisions as to how to deal with that matter, in whatever way it regards as appropriate. Under the devolution statutes, the qualification that we find in this provision and its equivalents in paragraphs 13 and 21 is new: in my experience it has not been encountered before. To an extent, therefore, these three amendments are probing, to enable the Minister to explain why this qualification has been inserted in these paragraphs and, if no reasonable explanation is given, to suggest to her that maybe the qualification should be removed, on the ground that when it comes to exercising powers within the devolved area, it should not be there.

It is right to add that Part 1 of Schedule 2, for perfectly understandable reasons, contains qualifications. For example, paragraph 2 states that:

“No regulations may be made under this Part by a devolved authority unless every provision of them is within the devolved competence of the devolved authority”.


That is a perfectly sensible provision, and consistent with the devolution scheme. What troubles me is why the qualification that I have mentioned should be there. My question is: should it be there at all? And if it should not be there, should it not be taken out? I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee is indebted to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his detailed analysis of the Bill as it originally stood, and the points arising. My name is on the amendment, but I would be happy to deal with the important issues of principle that prompted me to sign some of these amendments, in an attempt to honour the spirit of the original devolution settlement, when we deal with the group containing the government amendments. Obviously, however, I support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has moved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie]

I accept the distinction drawn by the noble and learned Lord. I am trying to address the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in the context of what the provisions do and his concern that they appear to cut off what he considers an entitlement of the devolved Administrations. I have tried to explain why, inevitably, these aspects are interlinked with the wider debate we will have on Clause 11.

The Government are prepared to listen to what has been said. I have indicated that we are prepared to look again at these provisions. I thank the noble and learned Lord for bringing forward his amendment, but in the circumstances I urge him to withdraw it.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her remarks. The use of the expression “sub-delegation” gives some insight into the thinking of the Government. As was pointed out, “delegation” is not an appropriate word to use where matters have already been devolved—by the statutes to which I referred earlier—to both Wales and Scotland. “Sub-delegation” is a very odd word to use. We are talking about a power within the devolved competencies for the devolved authorities to legislate, or confer a power to legislate, by whatever means they think appropriate. So I am encouraged by the fact that the Minister is prepared to look at this again. I think that she will agree with me that much of what we will be discussing in this little group of amendments is work in progress, as we try to work through the detail of the scheme that the Bill sets out. I am encouraged by her reply.

I also thank all those who have contributed to this brief debate. On the word “adjustment”, I refer to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, was saying. The Minister will remember, from her early days in the law in Scotland, that the word “adjustment” is sometimes used to take things out as well as to put things in. It is a word that came naturally to me as a means of dealing with bits in the statute that require to be trimmed, perhaps by removal, as well as by refining the language. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, for their emphasis that we are dealing with matters of great significance and importance. When I said that these were just technical points, I did not mean to suggest otherwise; rather, I was suggesting that the main thrust of our argument will be reserved for when we come to look at the Government’s amendments.

Lastly, on the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, I join in her tribute to the efforts that the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, is making to discuss matters with us and to reach as much common ground as possible. I, too, have had useful meetings with him and I am grateful to him and to his team for the attention they have given to the points I have been raising. As I have said, this is work in progress; I am encouraged by what the Minister said and, in the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 266 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

268: Schedule 2, page 18, line 39, at end insert—
“( ) This paragraph does not apply to regulations made under this Part by the Scottish Ministers or by the Welsh Ministers with regard to matters that are within their devolved competence.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this is the first of another group of amendments, all of which are in my name. Amendment 268 refers to a provision in paragraph 4 of Part 1 of the schedule, which states that no regulations made under that part by a devolved authority prevent it from conferring functions that correspond to functions under EU tertiary legislation. Amendment 296 relates to the same restriction which we find in paragraph 24. Amendments 280 and 294 deal with another restriction—that no regulations may be made under that part by a devolved authority which modify any retained direct EU legislation or anything which is retained law by virtue of Clause 4.

These are rather complicated matters to explain, but they are all examples of restrictions on the power of the devolved authorities to do what they are supposed to do under Part 1 of the schedule in the two respects mentioned in these passages. The whole point is the same one I mentioned before in regard to the previous group—that these are restrictions on actions which otherwise would be taken within devolved competence. The fact that there are restrictions at all is contrary to the philosophy on which the devolution system has been based. It is a given—as we have seen already in the passage I read out earlier—that, if the powers are exercised, they can be exercised only within the devolved area. There is no question of their moving into the reserved areas as that is not within their competence; if the matter is within their competence, the argument is that they should not be inhibited from doing what they consider to be right.

Tertiary legislation is an animal that has not been referred to much in our debates in this Committee. A fairly lengthy definition of it is to be found on page 10 of the Bill, but it is not obvious to me why the devolved authorities should not be able to deal with tertiary EU legislation in the same way as any other EU retained legislation. So, with that rather brief introduction, directed particularly to Amendment 268, I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her very helpful reply. Perhaps this is an example of another kind of adjustment—to return to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, picking up my use of that word. Rather than taking out or adding in, it is a case of refinement. I appreciate exactly what the noble Baroness meant in her reference to frameworks. In regard to tertiary legislation, it might be that a slightly less blanket provision could be used; that is, replacing the blanket restriction on competence with something more targeted to the particular needs to create and preserve the internal market that we are all looking forward to within the UK. What I take from what the Minister has said is that she will look carefully at this and consider to what extent she can come back on Report with something which meets the points that I have been making.

The noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord McConnell, referred to the reasoning behind the reference to EU law in the original statutes. EU law shared something in common with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. In both cases, when the Scotland Act was being designed, it was appreciated that the obligations which gave rise to convention rights and rights and obligations under EU law were based on treaties. So far as those treaties were concerned, in the framing of the Scotland Act and the Wales Act it was thought necessary to preserve the obligations that the United Kingdom had under the treaties and make sure that they were protected in the way that we found in the statute as originally framed; in other words, there was no competence to deal with matters which were the subject of those important treaties. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, was that once we leave the EU, that treaty fetter disappears completely; what we have is retained EU law, which is a completely different creature from EU law as we know it today. That is why it is important to appreciate that retained EU law is not a mirror image of EU law, although the subject matter and the detail are no doubt exactly the same.

I shall come back to that in the next group of amendments, to which I shall speak in a moment, because they raise the same issue. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 268 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

274: Schedule 2, page 21, line 29, leave out “and retained EU law”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this is the first amendment in a very much larger group, not all of which is composed of amendments in my name. Although the matter is lengthy and rather complicated, I can deal with it comparatively briefly and, I hope, in a way that is intelligible to your Lordships and in particular to the Minister.

Amendments 274 and 275 are related to paragraphs 9 and 10 in part 1 of Schedule 2, the former dealing with Scotland and the latter with Wales. I am concerned about the provision which states:

“A provision is within the devolved competence of the Scottish Ministers for the purposes of this Part if … (a) it would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that Parliament (ignoring section 29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998 so far as relating to EU law and retained EU law)”.


As I understand that provision, it excludes from competence provisions relating to retained EU law. That is a theme that runs through most of the amendments in this group. It is exactly the same point as we have been discussing in the earlier groups, the question being whether it can possibly be right that the devolved institutions should be prohibited from dealing with retained EU law when they work through the exercises with which part 1 of Schedule 2 is concerned. All the amendments in this group that are in my name raise that issue, except Amendment 363, which I will come back to in a moment. Some of them will require to be superseded in light of the Government’s amended version of Clause 11. I would have thought it was a fairly simple exercise for the Minister and her team to go through these various amendments, which I need not enumerate, just to be sure that the various passages to which I have drawn attention are corrected in light of the revised version of Clause 11.

Amendment 363 relates to the right of the Advocate-General to take part as a party in criminal proceedings so far as they relate to an issue as to whether legislation or an act of a Scottish Minister is incompatible with convention rights or EU law. Of course, the interest of the Advocate-General, if he wishes to enter the proceedings, is to ensure that the devolved institutions act within their competence in relation to these matters. What we have in paragraph 18 is a simple substitution of a reference to “retained EU law” for the reference that is in the statute at the moment to “EU law”. The competence restriction on EU law will of course be removed when we leave the EU, but once again I make the point that simply to substitute a reference to “retained EU law” is not the right thing to do: it is not a mirror image of EU law. Indeed, the fetter that applied to EU law should not apply to retained EU law. The amendment is simply designed to delete from the relevant section of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which would no longer have any relevance. I leave that point with the Minister to look at along with all the others.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

I have been listening very carefully. Can the noble and learned Lord explain again, in simple terms, why retained EU law on a particular area, such as agricultural support, is different from current EU law? I do not understand why he says it is different.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

In a sense, retained EU law is simply repeating what is to be found in EU law. The point is that the treatment of it, from the point of view of the competence of the Parliament and the Ministers, is different. Under the Scotland Act as it is, Ministers have no power to legislate or deal with EU law, because that is subject to the restriction in Section 29 of the Scotland Act, and also in Section 53, so far as Ministers are concerned. My point is that that restriction disappears because we are no longer bound by the treaty arrangements that gave rise to the restriction in the first place. I think the noble Lord is pointing out that much of retained EU law is already part of our law because it has already been built in to our legal system. The point is that I am suggesting that the Parliament and the Ministers should be able to deal with retained EU law in the same way as they can deal with any other domestic law, as long as it is not reserved.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I understand that—these debates are very useful. However, I am getting worried: as the noble and learned Lord knows, I am a strong devolutionist and a former Member of the Scottish Parliament, but in the last hour I have come to understand and sympathise with what the UK Government are arguing, which is a bit worrying.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

No, it is a serious matter. Surely there are areas that are dealt with now by the European Union because we have all thought that it was right to have standards for the European Union Common Market. Are the UK Government not arguing that if we have a UK common market—which we will in certain areas—it is sensible to have the same standards throughout the United Kingdom? Is that not a valid argument?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

If the noble Lord will forgive me, I was suggesting that we deal with that issue when we look at Clause 11 and the government amendments. The noble Lord raises a very important point, but it does not really relate to my amendments. I think it is much more fundamental and we will need to discuss it in light of the discussion of the reform of Clause 11. I hope I have answered the noble Lord’s question. There is a basic difference between the competence arrangements relating to EU law, which does not apply once we leave the Union, and retained EU law, either domestic or direct, as it comes in under Clauses 2 or 3.

Having digressed somewhat in my reply, I again thank the Minister for her helpful reply. I will be happy to withdraw the amendment in due course; however, there are others in the group that others may wish to speak to.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I will strike a different note as I put forward what are perhaps the substantive arguments—as we see them—in relation to these issues.

Amendment 304 has for some reason been grouped with these amendments, which does not make an awful lot of sense. It stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hain, and is based on one of the key amendments drafted by the Welsh and Scottish Governments ahead of the Bill’s passage through the other place. That amendment is also covered by part of Amendment 303, which surprisingly will not arise until very late tonight. None the less, Amendment 304 goes to the heart of the widespread criticism of Clause 11 as it currently stands—I am aware that amendments may come forward later—and lifts the restriction it places on the devolved parliaments in relation to EU retained law.

My fear—and that of all parties in the National Assembly—is that giving UK Ministers control in the EU withdrawal Bill over areas of retained EU law relating to matters which fall under devolved competences will, in effect, tend to normalise direct rule from Westminster in these areas. Given the powers under this and other recent legislation which enable Ministers at Westminster to amend devolved legislation by order, this will, in effect, undermine Welsh sovereignty in areas which are devolved to Wales and blur the responsibility of the National Assembly. Furthermore, there is a fear that this will set a precedent for this and future UK Governments, who may well be tempted when a devolved Government act in a way with which they disagree, to find a justification to intervene. This would be particularly galling if it were on issues where Welsh interests were seen to be in conflict with England’s perceived interests—perhaps validly so. The Prime Minister has, of course, pledged never again to “devolve and forget”. That can be interpreted in more than one way, and in this context it has generated quite a few ripples of unease.

In order to persuade the devolved parliaments to agree to legislative consent orders—which are currently not forthcoming from either the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly—the UK Government have tabled a set of amendments to Clause 11 which we will consider later. The Government’s proposals would provide a power to make regulations in certain devolved areas currently subject to EU law, and would prevent the devolved legislatures from taking action in the areas covered by those regulations. Whether noble Lords in this Chamber like it or not, this is regarded by members of all parties in the National Assembly as reflecting a growing approach by the UK Government—namely, in areas where devolution may be a nuisance or a hindrance to the UK Government’s agenda—to roll back devolution, or at the very least to attenuate it, and to centralise certain powers in London. The Welsh and Scottish Governments share this fear. That is why, in the Senedd—thanks largely to the lead of my inspirational colleague Steffan Lewis AM—the Welsh Government have introduced a continuity Bill to safeguard Welsh devolution. That Bill is currently progressing through its legislative steps with all-party support. Assembly Members are taking such a step not as a threat but as a safeguard: they still hope that there may be a meeting of minds between them and Westminster, and I understand they have even drafted a sunset clause which could be triggered if such an agreement were achieved. They look to this Chamber today to take a stand in facilitating that meeting of minds and to ensure that the centralist direction to which they feel they are being subject is brought to an end.

Alongside the amendments which the UK Government have tabled, they have published a list of 158 areas of intersection of devolved competences with EU law, noting that they envisage regulations temporarily restricting devolved legislatures’ competence—in advance of more substantive arrangements in primary legislation —in up to 24 of those areas. Taking such steps is, rightly or wrongly, widely perceived as a power grab. These 24 areas, all of which apply to both Wales and Scotland, cover a significant part of devolved responsibilities, including agricultural support, fisheries management, environmental policy, public procurement and food standards. These areas are vital for industries and businesses in Wales, and for the Welsh economy. The amendments would allow the UK Government to make regulations in any or all of these devolved areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It will last until we have managed to implement all of the framework agreement. That will be a finite period—there is no question about that. Indeed, if the noble Lord looks at the proposed amendment to Clause 11, he will see that there are various checks and balances, including the requirement that Ministers report to Parliament if they retain the powers for any longer. So that is already addressed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this debate has ranged a good deal wider than was necessary for the Minister to deal with my points on this group of amendments. With respect to him, he has not given me the kind of reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave me on earlier groups. My point is that this very disparate group contains a number of points that I raised with regard to Schedules 2 and 8, which need to be reconsidered in the light of the reformed Clause 11. A simple example is on page 56, where there is a reference to a fetter on the power to,

“make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation”,

which extends to the wording of Section 57(4) of the Scotland Act as in the Bill. However, that section is reworded by the proposed new Clause 11.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I just remind the noble and learned Lord that I said that when we come to Clause 11, we will move and withdraw the amendment. We appreciate that although we want Clause 11 in its present form, to put it forward in a form that covers all these matters we will have to address the impact it has on Schedule 2 in these contexts.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am grateful for that. Not every one of my amendments is a Clause 11 point—there are other points of detail which need to be looked at. If the Minister would be kind enough just to say that these will be looked at, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment. Can he give me that assurance?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am content to indicate that we will look at these points.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 274.

Amendment 274 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

282: Schedule 2, page 25, line 15, at end insert—
“( ) This paragraph does not apply to regulations made under this Part by the Scottish Ministers or by the Welsh Ministers with regard to matters that are within their devolved competence.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this is the last of my little groups of amendments. I will also speak to Amendments 284, 298 and 300 in this group, which all relate to what one finds in Schedule 2. This point goes back to what we discussed a little earlier about the difference between “consent” and “consult”. In the existing provisions in paragraph 16 in Part 2 and paragraph 25 in Part 3, which deal with the power of devolved authorities to make provision,

“for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO Agreement”,

that power may be exercised only with the consent of a Minister. The simple point I make in my amendment is—I am sorry: it is rather important that the Minister hears what I am going to say. I will be happy to wait for a moment, if the noble Lords would like to confer. Would it help? I can wait for a second.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)]

Please continue. We have said all that we need to say.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Thank you very much.

I want to explain to the Minister that the point is a very simple one about the difference between “consent” and “consult”, which we have already been discussing. I do not need to elaborate on the point that each of these amendments seeks to substitute in a revised formula a consent mechanism in place of the provision in the Bill, which is all about consultation. In a sense it is a probing amendment because I do not see why, for the moment, the existing situation where these things are done with consent should not operate in these contexts too. I moved the amendment so that the Minister can explain the position—I hope quite briefly—so that we can move on to what we are all looking forward to: his amendments on Clause 11. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I will respond briefly, without repeating what I said on the immediately preceding group, but this raises essentially the same issue. On these provisions, the circumstances in which consent applies to the powers—which are the obverse of some of the others—are those where the devolved Ministers could use powers in ways that have implications outside of their devolved jurisdiction, for example when making provision regarding the World Trade Organization obligations. That is why we have framed it in this way, but it raises the wider point made by the noble and learned Lord and I appreciate that that might be addressed in more detail when we come to Clause 11 and the government amendments. I wonder if, in these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord will, at this stage, withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am glad we have not provoked a longer debate on this group of amendments. There is a reason for being concerned about this; the provision I am concerned about deals specifically with something within competence—in other words, it deals with regulations made for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO agreement. It does not deal with the WTO agreement itself; it simply exercises the power given under paragraph 7(2)(b) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 to deal with these matters domestically. Since it is within competence under the Scotland Act, it is hard to see why the position should be regulated in the way proposed. However, I have listened to what the Minister has said and—on the understanding that we can look at all this again when we get to the revised formula for Clause 11—I am happy to withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 282 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My point is that we are all here. We have been taking part in a debate. Everyone who wants to take part in the next group is here and it seems sensible to continue. I do not understand.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

The Chief Whip did not discuss the matter with me but I support the position he is taking because it is very obvious that, once we get into Clause 11, we will be discussing it for some considerable time. I would have thought that the sensible thing would be to break now and to come back and deal with it in one go, rather than break up the debate, which we will be forced to do otherwise.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, as a party of one, I do not expect to be consulted on these matters—I realise that there are limitations. However, on Monday night we sat here until after 1 am, and I spoke after 1 am. Earlier we had a break of 20 minutes for food. Why on earth, when there is time available now, can we not carry on with the Bill, certainly if the implications are that we might go on until late again tonight?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

No, for one very simple reason. As the noble Lord knows, we cannot impose on the devolved Administrations by this mechanism. I am afraid that that is a simple statement of where the law and the devolution settlement rest.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is another way of approaching this, and that is to ask whether the provision in the treaty on which my noble friend Lord Warner has based his amendment is part of retained EU law. If it is, then it has a place in the statute and will be applied by the courts if necessary. Is the noble Lord able to answer that? Is it part of retained EU law?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

In this instance, it is not part of EU retained law, but that is not the point. We are saying that the powers that already rest in the Secretary of State’s hands are equal to the powers that would come through this amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I think that is meant to be an intervention, because I have not quite finished. The situation is that the British courts, the Supreme Court in particular, have discretion to look at any judgment that they wish, and to raise any question they wish in these judgments. There is nothing in the present Bill that impedes that, except in respect of questions of European law, because the courts themselves, and the members of the Supreme Court, have been anxious that if they paid too much attention to the European court after Brexit, they might be accused of being involved in politics. They have sought a direction from Parliament on this matter, and that has been attempted, and I hope it is successful.

I personally do not share the animosity that exists in some quarters towards the European Court of Justice. It is over 30 years now since I often appeared before them, and I have nothing but praise for the way in which they do things. They do things very differently to us. There are far fewer oral hearings—at least, there were when I did it, which was a long time ago. There is much less oral pleading than there is in our courts. Actually, our courts have moved slightly in that direction in recent years, since I was last involved with them—and in some cases quite far in that direction.

The respect I have for the European Court is of the highest order, but I do think there is a difficulty because, after Brexit, no judges or advocates-general of the British Bar will be members of the court or advocates-general in the court. That is an important factor to be taken into account in the arrangements. I am not part of the negotiations—I have nothing to do with them—but I do believe that that point has to be taken into account. There is a usual rule that the people administering justice are the people who are in accordance with the arrangements between states. International courts, for example, may not have representatives from all the states that appear before them, but there is a question to be considered in that connection, because the Court of Justice referred to in the amendment will not be the Court of Justice as it is now.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to intervene, following what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has said, and referring to the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. One of the problems I have faced since looking at this Bill, is trying to find hard examples of situations in which the Supreme Court would wish to refer a matter to the European Court of Justice.

There is a very good example reported in Monday’s Times of a case called SM (Algeria) (Appellant) v Entry Clearance Officer. I will take a moment to explain what the case is about, because it is a good example of citizens’ rights. SM was a little girl, who was placed into the legal guardianship of EU citizens, who happened to be in Algeria. The question concerned her position in coming to the United Kingdom as a member of that family under the Immigration (European Economic Area Regulations) 2006. Merely referring to those regulations reminds us that they would become, as I understand the position, retained EU law under Clause 2 of the Bill.

The problem arose because the court saw that the regulation had been transposing wording from a directive, which is the normal way in which these things work, but the transposition was inaccurate. This is a situation I have encountered before—it happens from time to time. The question is how to deal with the inaccuracy. The inaccuracy was that while our regulation talked about “family member”—somebody who was put into the legal guardianship of a couple, would normally be regarded as a member of the family—the directive was talking about “direct descendants”, and she was not a direct descendant, because she was not actually related, in that sense, to the people who had become her guardians. In order to resolve that problem, the court found it necessary to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice—which it did on Monday. That was under the existing position.

In resolving the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it may help to ask how that matter would be handled after exit day. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that it would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue itself. The directive would come into EU retained law under Clause 3, so we would have both pieces of legislation to look at. I think that the court, having regard particularly to the way in which we had translated the directive, would give great weight to our own language and regard this little girl as part of the family and therefore entitled to take the benefit of the regulation.

In explaining the situation, I hope I have not made it too complicated, but it is a good example of citizens’ rights, accorded by our own regulations, giving effect to EU law. There must be very many in the corpus of regulations which forms part of EU law. It comes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Supreme Court looks very carefully at the interests of children and would accord every weight to the normal rules about the priority given to the interests of the child in construing the regulation in a sense that fits with our own language. I should have thought that, after exit day, the question of referring the matter to the European Court of Justice simply would not arise because the court would be capable of resolving the issue itself without being bound by the problem of having to refer something which was not that clear. If I may use the English expression, it was not crystal clear; therefore they were bound to refer. Under the situation after exit day, any superior court will be fully able to resolve the problems of interpretation that arise. Will the Minister confirm that, in this situation, there would be no need for a reference because our courts would be able to deal with it perfectly properly, looking at the language of our own regulations, despite the problem that might have arisen in translating them from the directive into English?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in moving this amendment— I referred to it myself—was that, as part of the agreement that was struck between the United Kingdom and the European institutions in December, provision was made to,

“establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it”.

So it is not a case of questioning the ability of the Supreme Court. We have entered into an agreement which says that there must be an opportunity or a mechanism to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union. How does the noble and learned Lord see the mechanism for giving effect to what the United Kingdom Government have agreed?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I have listened with great care to what the noble and learned Lord has said but I cannot look into the future. I do not know what is going to happen as a result. We just have to look at the present situation. There are two factors to bear in mind. As far as the UK is concerned, for people looking to come here, an immense amount of citizens’ rights are guaranteed already under the regulations which implement directives. We ought not to lose sight of that. Secondly, problems of interpretation because of conflicts between the wording of the directive and our transposition of it, give rise to some doubt. Under the existing position, there is an obligation to refer which will not be present after exit day. This is a different situation with which I believe our courts will be able to cope perfectly well.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, in summary, was he saying that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is completely unnecessary?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

With great respect, I would not put it in that way. It has given me an opportunity to bring forward an example which I am hoping the Minister will be able to comment on. The noble Lord has raised an important point. We all care about citizens’ rights. I hope I have drawn attention to the context in which one looks at the amendment. It is a well-crafted amendment to which the Minister may have an answer along the lines I have suggested.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I hesitate to follow the very careful analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, but perhaps I can add a few words. We are all trying to find the best way of expressing in clear and simple language, in statutory form, the guidance that the courts and tribunals will need about the interpretation of retained EU law. In particular, Clause 3 is about direct EU legislation which we will be receiving in the language of the directives and regulations to which this clause refers.

The position is fairly clear about judgments or decisions of the CJEU before exit day. That is retained EU case law which is referred to in Clause 6(3) and we are not in any difficulty on that; rather, it is what to do about the future. Had it not been for the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about the risk of being criticised for being drawn into areas of policy, I would have been content to see Clause 6(2) deleted and to rely simply on the normal, traditional way in which comparative law is applied by courts up and down the country. I have been doing this ever since I started sitting as a judge. Of course, there are examples outside the particular area we are dealing with here of conventions to which we are a party and which need to be interpreted. One looks at other jurisdictions to see how the language of a convention is interpreted and applied. This is a normal part of our jurisprudence and it would have been enough. However, I recognise the force of the points made in their evidence to the Constitution Committee and today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and I think that we have to do something to give the guidance for which they are looking.

One should also bear in mind that it will be some time before the Supreme Court handles cases of this kind. We are talking about tribunals as well as courts at every level. I am sure that when the Supreme Court gets hold of the thing, it will be astute enough to give the kind of guidance that one normally gets from the higher courts, but we have to look at the beginning of the process.

On the table at the moment we have Clause 6(2) as it stands and Amendment 56 from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me when I say that I think his amendment is like the curate’s egg. There are bits of it which I rather like and bits which I would prefer to drop, and the same goes for Clause 6(2). I suggest an amalgamation of the best bits of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the best bits of Clause 6(2).

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Cherry-picking.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Not at all. It is curing the curate’s egg and producing an acceptable piece of guidance which has the best bits of both, which is what we need to look for. I am not cherry-picking; I am analysing.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Having your cake and eating it.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

No, this is analysis. Let me explain what I would like to do.

I quite like the words of Clause 6(2) as it stands:

“A court or tribunal need not have regard to”,


a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after the exit day because that fits very well with the way we are looking at the position before exit day. It is certainly true that it is a negative way of putting it, but I regard it as a helpful transition to the new situation. However, I do not like the remainder of Clause 6(2) for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained. That is where I would like to bring in the passages from the latter part of his formula, which are that a court or tribunal may have regard to such judgments or decisions where it considers them relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law.

I would take out “appropriate” from Clause 6(2), for reasons that have been referred to already, and would leave out the early part of proposed new subsection (2A) in Amendment 56 where “must” is used. I would prefer “may” to “must”, leaving it to the court to make its own decision regarding whether the matter is relevant.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Would Amendment 55 tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Adonis not deal with the noble and learned Lord’s points?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord and I apologise for not having paid due regard to that formula because the wording is exactly what I am looking for, but I am trying to fit it into the opening words of Clause 6(2). However, it is certainly right; I respectfully suggest that “may” is the right word to use. It is better to add in the bit about,

“where it considers it relevant”,

which is what comes from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. So one is putting together bits and pieces of thought from various attempts to produce a formula.

Perhaps I may read out again for Hansard’s benefit how I suggest the provision might run: “A court or tribunal need not have regard to a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after exit day, but it may have regard to it where it considers this relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law”. If “may” is used—although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will correct me—proposed new subsection (2C) in Amendment 56 will no longer be relevant. I say nothing about subsection (2B) which may have force and value if the court requires guidance as to what to do with the agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU.

I hope that that contribution will give the Minister something else to think about. I think that we all hope that on Report he may be able to come back with a formula which we can all endorse.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may add a few words, simply because of the devoted affection in the Bill for the word “appropriate”. It is larded through the document. Its inappropriateness in this particular context needs to be underlined—I shall come back to it at a later stage under different clauses. It is terribly simple: if something is relevant to a court’s decision, it is likely to be appropriate that the court should look at it. If something is irrelevant to the court’s decision, it cannot possibly be appropriate for the court to look at it. So the term “appropriate” should go.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I rather agree that “appropriate” is not particularly desirable. I wonder whether putting “helpful” in Clause 6(2) would more accurately reflect the way that courts generally consider law from other jurisdictions in developing the law—one always invites courts if they find a particular decision to be helpful—whereas I understand that “appropriate” is considered perhaps to have too much of a political charge. However, I do not wholly understand why the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, finds the initial words of Clause 6(2) rather offensive, where it says:

“A court or tribunal need not have regard”.


All that is saying is that they are not obliged to have regard—I do not think it says any more. I personally read no particular charge in it, and I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, would agree.

There is something of an irony about these amendments, in that the only way to have real certainty would be to tell the court either to disregard it or to follow it. In a sense, we are dealing with an imperfect situation. We are trying, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, said, to craft something which helps judges by reducing any political element in their decision-making but which—I am sorry to use a political expression—allows our courts to take back control. In order to take back control, I am happy that they should have a great deal of freedom to do so without in any sense involving them in a political decision.

Amendment 56 from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others is of course much longer than the original wording, with three subsections as opposed to one. Respectfully, I say that using words such as “relevant” is only quite helpful, because in any event a court will ignore matters that are irrelevant. I feel similarly about the word “significance”: a court will itself have to decide significance. That of course may offend the political element but, if something is insignificant, the court will disregard it in any event. Although I understand what lies behind this amendment, I am not sure that it really does the trick.

It is not just out of nominative loyalty that I turn to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, but because he may be on to something. I agree with the use of “may”, which was endorsed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I am not quite so sure about “persuasive”, but I will listen to what the noble and learned Lord says. However, I like the succinct nature of the amendment and it seems to me to allow our courts the freedom that we have, as it were, granted them by the decision that the country has made in the referendum, but nevertheless not to compromise them.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Does the noble Lord have any reaction to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the reference to,

“another EU entity or the EU”,

in Clause 6(2) as it stands? Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 does not mention these and refers only to the European Court of Justice, so it may be that there is no need to refer to these entities and we can confine it to the European Court of Justice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is wondering why the word “appropriate” does not fit into the context of trying to limit judicial discretion, he should look at how many times it is used in this and other Bills to give Ministers the opportunity to decide one way or the other, in what are quite clearly different kinds of decisions from those you would expect judges to make.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said in reply is in my experience absolutely right. To a judge, the word “relevant” requires him to look at the issues that need to be decided. It is a much tighter word than “appropriate”, and is used frequently. In case law, one searches for the point that is directly relevant to the point at issue. It may be that legal terminology is best adopted because that is what judges understand. It is a different kind of word from “appropriate”, which judges do not normally use. Therefore, I suggest it is a better word to use in this context.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, given the time, it may be relevant, appropriate or even helpful to try to wind up this particular debate, although not in such a way that undermines the very real importance of the amendment.

I want to underline two aspects. The first aspect is legal certainty, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is very important, for example, that in considering cases where retained EU law is in question, people and businesses are able to recognise that if there are decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union that are relevant, then it is likely—though not an obligation—that the courts will take them into account. They can order their affairs on that basis, and that is a critical part of legal certainty. It seems right, therefore, that this amendment, to which I have added my name, gives direction or guidance that where such decisions are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law they should be paid regard.

The second principle is the independence of our judiciary. It is right in this context to refer to the shocking instance of the attack on our judiciary that took place at the time of the Article 50 decision. It was shocking not just that our judiciary was referred to in such terms by a popular newspaper but that it was not immediately defended and the accusation rejected by the Government, including Ministers whose job it was to do so. In dealing with this particular amendment we have to be alive to the risk that if after exit day a judge chooses—because he or she believes it right or relevant to do so; whatever word you want to use—to make reference to a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that judge is not then subjected to a barrage of criticism and the accusation, “How dare you take refuge in decisions of this hated institution, one which we have left, in making decisions on this law?” It is important that we should look at this carefully and make sure that judges are protected.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord knows that I took Article 1 as an example only because it is the very first article in the charter. I have respectfully invited noble Lords to look at the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, where the committee goes through each of the articles and through what the Government have said in relation to them, and identifies where they find place already in existing, enforceable UK law, and where they do not. It is where they do not that we are concerned with, and where they do not that there will be the very gap that the Prime Minister has said should not exist.

There is the further problem that, even if the rights survive, they will survive without the enhanced status and protection that they currently have. They have an enhanced status at the moment because of the 1972 Act and because of EU membership, but from the date of this Act they will only survive in a delegated form and be amendable by delegated legislation. They are not protected from being amended or removed by delegated legislation.

Compare the position in relation to the ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Bill says in three places—in Clauses 7(7)(e), 8(3)(d) and 9(3)(d)—that the Human Rights Act is protected from amendment or revocation. The classic civil and political rights, but no more, which are, rightly, protected by the HRA, are protected from being amended other than by primary legislation to which this House and the other place have specifically agreed after proper scrutiny. However, none of the rights underlying the charter will be protected in that way, unless they find themselves within the ECHR, which is only some of them. That is unacceptable for many people.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I find this very difficult to understand. If you look at the charter, you find reference to the Union in item after item. It begins with a series of rights, but as soon as you penetrate further you find that it is closely related to membership of the Union and things that are guaranteed by its law. If I understood the noble and learned Lord correctly, he wants the charter to be brought in and protected against that kind of amendment in the same way as the Convention on Human Rights. This charter will have to be largely rewritten if we introduce it into our law, but it is not designed for the kind of situation we are facing after Brexit. It is designed for use within the Union and to be interpreted by the CJEU. I simply do not understand how the system is intended to work if it were brought into our law in the way the noble and learned Lord is suggesting.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord will recall that, whenever he opposed me with that argument from his position in the House of Lords or Supreme Court, I did my best to try to explain why there is an error in his thinking. With respect, I do the same here. If one takes, for example, one of the rights in the charter which does derive from Union law, is it to be said that although it is going to be transposed into our law as an EU retained law, it will no longer be subject to any of the protections that it has at the moment through being subject to the charter? It does not mean, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, suggested, that all UK law will be subject to this protection. It does mean that that law which is currently subject to that protection will continue to be so unless and until it is amended. That is the way that one gives effect to the intention that the law should be the same the day after Brexit as the day before.

I want to underline that we are talking about the extent of substantive protections; other protections and their extent; and the lack of enhancement of rights. These are all distinct points. I will also refer to the loss of the effect of charter principles. Noble Lords who have studied the charter will know that as well as rights there are principles. The principles are more aspirational, but they guide the legislator and that is a useful thing to have. Even leaving that aside, the other items I identified—the substantive protections, their nature and their enhancement or lack of it—are all things which mean we will not have the same protections after exit day as we have at the moment.

Brexit: Devolved Administrations

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Thursday 25th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. I too congratulate the noble Lord, Lord McInnes of Kilwinning, on the way in which he introduced this important debate, coming as it does between the disappointment of last week in the House of Commons and our engagement next week in the Second Reading of the withdrawal Bill.

As I think everybody knows, the proposals in the Bill as it stands were described by the Scottish Minsters when they first saw them as a power grab. At first hearing, one is inclined to treat an expression of that kind, especially coming from Ministers in a Government that still seem to be planning a second referendum on independence for Scotland, as somewhat overblown and exaggerated. However, on closer examination of the Bill and what it seeks to do to the devolution settlements for Scotland and Wales, which have operated successfully for many years, there is some force in the point that the Scottish Minsters were making.

Of course I must avoid going into matters which we will discuss in detail next week at Second Reading, but there are provisions throughout the Bill, not just in Clause 11, that propose giving powers to Ministers of the Crown to do things by means of regulations in connection with withdrawal which could intrude to a major degree into areas where the devolved Administrations have devolved competence, without the consent—or even seeking the approval—of Scottish and Welsh Ministers.

This is not just a complaint about Henry VIII powers; if I may say so, there is a touch of Oliver Cromwell about this, too. There are powers which, unless controlled in a way that the Bill does not currently provide for, would seriously invade and undermine the way that devolved government is conducted at present in Scotland. They appear to centralise control and decision-making in the UK Government in areas of devolved competence, in a way that would seriously limit the ability of the devolved Administrations to deal with the consequences of withdrawal as they see fit. This may not be the Government’s intention, but as the Bill stands that is how it reads, which was why the Scottish Ministers said what they did.

The Motion asks what the role of the devolved Administrations is to be on withdrawal. To some extent, this is really a matter for the UK Government, who are, after all, the architects of the withdrawal. They should answer that question and we, I am afraid, are at a disadvantage in this House in that the party in government in Scotland has no one here who is in a position to speak for it. But, from such public statements as I have seen, the position of the devolved Administrations is quite easy to understand. It has the support of all parties, particularly in Scotland, as I think was made clear in a debate yesterday. It is fairly straightforward and not really in doubt. These statements show that the Scottish Ministers—I mention them particularly—appreciate that some EU competences cut across elements of both devolved and reserved powers, so we need to find a way, by the creation of appropriate frameworks for matters of common interest, to preserve the single market for goods and services throughout the United Kingdom.

The noble Lord, Lord McInnes, said that this was a matter for mature debate, and I entirely agree. It is also a wonderful opportunity to create something new in place of the void created by the removal of the constraint on EU competences on devolution, which now goes. There is a need to create something new, but UK Ministers must appreciate that those frameworks will have to respect the principles and structure of the enactments which created the devolution settlements in Scotland and Wales, and no doubt in Northern Ireland, too. That, for the Scottish and Welsh Ministers at least, seems to be a red line which must not be crossed. For my part, I see force in the position they are taking.

The settlement for Scotland, which I know best and have worked with for quite some time, has existed since 1998. The basic principle on which that Act was based is, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said, that everything which is not reserved is devolved. The reserved areas are set out in Schedule 5 to that Act, which has stood the test of time. There has been no lack of clarity about it. I have been waiting since 1998 for challenges to things to come before the Supreme Court; they have not emerged, because the system works. It is to those reserved areas that the frameworks must direct their attention. The position of the devolved Administrations is quite simple: they seek to be assured that things will be done only with the consent of the Scottish and Welsh Ministers in areas which are devolved.

I have to confess to some sympathy with the Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland, to whom he is answerable. They cannot say so, but I sense that the absence of agreement so far about the framework is due not to lack of effort on their part but to policy demands at a higher level in the Cabinet Office. I noticed that the Minister for the Cabinet Office said in debate on Report in the other place last week that he and his team are actively taking forward discussions, with a view to bringing forward amendments in this House. That is very much to be welcomed. However, those discussions must proceed on the basis that there is no point in bringing forward amendments here which do not have the agreement of the Scottish and Welsh Ministers. This is because there will be no prospect of legislative consent being given to this Bill by the Scottish Parliament unless the Scottish Ministers are able to say that it has their agreement, and I believe that the same is true for the Welsh Ministers too.

I do not detect an unwillingness on either side to continue these discussions, but I hope very much that UK Ministers will find their way to constructing frameworks that fully respect the established boundaries between devolved and reserved powers. They need to secure the agreement of the Scottish and Welsh Ministers, and they will, if they respect those boundaries. I look forward to discussing these issues further in our debates in following weeks.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, we are tight on time this morning. I would be grateful if Back-Bench speeches could firmly be concluded as the clock reaches seven minutes. In that way, Front-Bench speeches will have their full allotted time.