Dunlop Review

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, in answer to my noble and learned friend’s opening remark about a republic, I cannot conceive that anyone would wish to remove Her Majesty the Queen as our Head of State. As for the other part of his question, everybody should advocate the United Kingdom and our union, and should have no fear in doing so. That goes from the lowest to the highest in the land, and in every corner of our kingdom.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the Dunlop review is about meeting the challenge of strengthening and maintaining the union. As each day passes, that task, as seen from Scotland, becomes more and more difficult, and constitutional changes will take time to deliver. Do the Government appreciate that they need to do much more now—from within Scotland, not just from Westminster—to make their voice heard there and their message understood?

[Lord True (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord makes a very strong point. I agree with him—and, indeed, with the preceding question—that that voice for the union of the United Kingdom should be heard. We recognise that political differences exist between the Administration in Scotland and our Government, but our ambition remains to conclude jointly the inter-governmental relations review. That is one of the important strands behind this Question.

European Union (Future Relationship) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

3rd reading & 2nd reading & Committee negatived & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee negatived (Hansard) & Committee negatived (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the agreement with the EU covers such a wide variety of matters, and the time for scrutinising this Bill is so very short, that one has to be selective. My choice has been to look at how this necessary Bill seeks to give effect in domestic law to the surrender provisions in Part 3.

The surrender provisions must be compared with the EU’s framework decision that governs the European arrest warrant to see what we have lost and what we have gained. We were always going to lose our right as an EU member state to require those countries whose fundamental principles prohibit the surrender of their nationals to third countries to surrender them to us— and so it has been. But we have made up for that by securing agreement to some new protections and to a more comprehensive scheme that, as the European Court of Justice now has no role, leaves as little room for mishaps and misunderstandings as possible. On balance, the scheme—though second best—seems to be as good as we could have hoped for.

How, then, does the Bill seek to give effect to these provisions in domestic law? Clause 11 tells us that member states are to remain category 1 territories. That means that the new scheme is to be dealt with under the accelerated procedure in Part 1 of the Extradition Act. That is as it should be, as the surrender scheme itself provides for an accelerated procedure for which Part 1 of that Act was designed. However, there are differences. Part 1 of the Extradition Act does not mention the principle of proportionality, for example, which lies at the heart of the new scheme, and the new scheme clarifies the circumstances in which a public prosecutor can be considered a judicial officer—something that always puzzled us—which that Act does not do.

It is plain for these and other reasons that Part 1 of the Extradition Act requires amendment if it is to meet the requirements of the new scheme. For the time being, we are left with the general implementation provisions in Clause 29, but that clause leaves too much to the judgment of the individual judges and others who will be required to operate this system. Uncertainty and inconsistent decisions will follow. It falls very far short of what is needed here. We can be sure that on its side, the EU will do what is necessary. These amendments are required and must be made as soon as possible.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 14th December 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

At end insert “but do propose Amendments 1F, 1G, 1H, 1J, 1K and 1L in lieu—

1F: Clause 10, page 7, line 23, at end insert—


“( ) The Secretary of State must by regulations under subsection (2) exclude the application of the United Kingdom market access principles to a statutory provision or requirement that gives effect to a decision to diverge from harmonised rules that has been agreed through the common frameworks process.”


1G: Clause 15, page 9, line 27, at end insert—


“( ) “Common frameworks process” means the process, established by the Joint Committee on European Negotiations, by which a measure of regulatory consistency to enable a functioning internal market within the United Kingdom may be mutually agreed between the United Kingdom and the devolved governments.”


1H: Clause 17, page 12, line 42, at end insert—


“( ) The Secretary of State must by regulations under subsection (2) add the services referred to in a statutory provision or requirement that gives effect to a decision to diverge from harmonised rules that has been agreed through the common frameworks process to the authorisation requirements in Part 3 of Schedule 2 or the list of regulatory requirements, as the case may be, to which section 18 (mutual recognition) or sections 19 and 20 (non-discrimination) do not apply.”


1J: Clause 21, page 14, line 35, at end insert—


“common frameworks process” means the process, established by the Joint Committee on European Negotiations, by which a measure of regulatory consistency to enable a functioning internal market within the United Kingdom may be mutually agreed between the United Kingdom and the devolved governments;”


1K: Clause 25, page 19, line 24, at end insert—


“( ) The Secretary of State must by regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure exclude the application of section 22(2) to a provision which has been agreed through the common frameworks process.”


1L: Clause 27, page 21, line 19, at end insert—


“common frameworks process” means the process, established by the Joint Committee on European Negotiations, by which a measure of regulatory consistency to enable a functioning internal market within the United Kingdom may be mutually agreed between the United Kingdom and the devolved governments;”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, in moving Motion A1, I shall speak to Amendments A1F to A1L in my name.

I am grateful to the Minister in the other place, Chloe Smith, and her Bill team, for taking time to discuss the common frameworks issue with me last Thursday. I am also grateful to the Minister for taking time on a busy day to attend that meeting, and for his very helpful introduction to this debate. As a result of that meeting, both sides now have a much better understanding of the issues that divide us. We are much closer to a solution, but we are not quite there yet, which is why I have tabled these amendments in lieu, and why I will be seeking the opinion of the House on them at the end of this debate, so that we can continue this discussion.

These amendments I now offer to the House contain two very significant changes from those disagreed to by the other place. First, I have removed a provision designed to protect the common frameworks process while it was in progress. It was objected to as it would have created delays and legal uncertainty. I recognise that it was not in the interests of the internal market, so it has gone. There should be absolutely no misunderstanding about that. Secondly, I have changed my approach to the way in which the common frameworks issue should be fitted in to the Bill, now seeking to use mechanisms already in the Bill to achieve that result. Their purpose is twofold: to cure the inconsistency between the Government’s support for the common frameworks on the one hand and its promotion of the market access principles on the other—which does not fit in with the Minister’s word “complementary” a moment ago—and to provide certainty so that everyone will know what the measure that needs protection is and why it is there.

One of the principles agreed between all four nations when the common frameworks process was set up in 2017 was that, as the devolution settlement required, it allowed for policy divergence where this was within devolved competence. However, a decision to diverge will be agreed under that process only if all the parties to it, including the UK Government, are satisfied after careful examination and assessment of its nature and effect that the decision will not create a barrier to trade across the UK. The Bill’s market access principles, on the other hand, operate automatically. As the Bill stands, a measure that gives effect to an agreed decision to diverge can be ignored by traders bringing goods in from other areas. This undermines the opportunity to diverge, rendering it worthless and ineffective. With reference to the Minister’s comment on what I was saying about uncertainty last time, my concern is not with traders bringing goods in across borders; they have the protection of the market access principles and their position is plain. My concern is with traders doing business within their own areas, having to decide what articles they could properly and safely put for sale on their shelves. That is no kind of answer.

The effect of the amendments is that the Secretary of State will be required by regulations to direct that the market access principles will not apply to a measure of the kind I have described. The UK Government will therefore be involved at every stage of the process. I stress that the decision cannot be put into effect unless the UK Government have agreed to it, and it is only the UK Government, through the Secretary of State, who can give it the immunity it needs.

I emphasise once again that my intention is not to create barriers. It is about allowing for policy divergence in ways found by this process to be consistent with the internal market. I hope that those noble Lords who have drawn on their long experience of what makes businesses work, which this House values so much during our debates, are reassured on that point. At heart this is an issue about devolution. It was because of devolution that the common frameworks process, and the opportunity for policy divergence, was instituted with the encouragement of the UK Government in the first place. Their support for that process must involve support for policy divergence too.

As we continue our discussions, it may be suggested that what I am looking for could be met by assurances, but we are dealing here with arrangements designed to last for a long time. They need to bind future Governments as well as this one. That is why they must be in the Bill. The process of refining my proposals has been rather like opening a Christmas present buried within layer after layer of paper. Eventually it is revealed, smaller that the wrapping led one to expect, and one wonders why it took so much paper. I am afraid it has taken me some time to reduce my proposals to their essentials, but that is where I am now. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I am very grateful to those who have contributed to the debate. Although the cast is smaller, I know that the interest is no less great. The sense of respect for the devolved institutions, which has gone right across your Lordships’ debates on the Bill, is important and shared by all of us, however we view the question raised in the amendments.

I also thank all those who have participated in the ongoing dialogue outside your Lordships’ House on this matter. Naturally, I will shortly seek to persuade your Lordships not to support the noble and learned Lord’s Motion for the reasons I have given, but the strength of feeling expressed in this House and in the other place is testament to the important role that common frameworks play in intergovernmental working and this country’s future outside the European Union, and indeed within the overall structure of intergovernmental relations within the United Kingdom.

The Government are committed to working with the devolved Administrations to deliver these agreements to the benefit of people from all four corners of the United Kingdom, and we welcome the strong support that has been shown for common frameworks by both Houses, not least by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in his noble efforts to unwrap a Christmas parcel. I am sure that the jewel of mutual respect is there, whatever the outcome of the debates on this question.

Common frameworks allow the Government and the devolved Administrations to engage in meaningful dialogue about how all parts of the country can benefit from the new powers flowing from the European Union. I say to the noble Baroness opposite that they are flowing from the European Union. However, common frameworks are primarily concerned with processes rather than determining specific policy outcomes, and as such they do not obviate the need for the market access principles in these areas. I believe it is common ground across this Chamber that it is for the United Kingdom Parliament and its Members from all four nations to have a role in safeguarding a market across all parts of the United Kingdom.

Common frameworks are not intended to be an all-encompassing solution to the maintenance of that internal market. The Government’s belief is that additional legislative protection provided by this Bill will provide certainty for the status quo of internal UK trade. Broad disapplication of elements of the Bill risks removing that certainty, which is needed for business and citizens in all four parts of the United Kingdom. Again, I believe that is a common objective. For that reason, we believe both common frameworks and the market access principles—if the word “complementary” is not cared for, I will say “working in tandem”—to be necessary to guarantee the integrity of the entire United Kingdom internal market.

The security that this Bill provides is crucial for the people and businesses of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is essential that we ensure that this certainty is provided in all areas, including in the devolved policy areas, where powers flow from the European Union to London, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast.

Of course, I hear the arguments and representations put forward in the characteristically modest approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, but the Government’s belief is that we cannot afford to risk denying our citizens the ability to trade seamlessly across the United Kingdom, as they do now. I hope this is something that your Lordships’ House can agree with, and I hope that, in order to provide this certainty, the noble and learned Lord will find himself able to withdraw his Motion. In the event that he is unable to do so, the remarks that I made earlier obviously stand.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have contributed to this short debate. I would like to pick up on some words that the Minister said in his reply. The words “mutual respect” have characterised the meetings that I have been privileged to take part in as we have moved towards the position that I am adopting. I think it is a very healthy system that allows us to conduct these discussions in such a manner as we seek out the positions that each of us is trying to adopt and possible ways of accommodating them.

At the end of the day, as I have said on a number of occasions, it really is up to the Government. I am looking to them to facilitate in some way the process by which an agreed decision to diverge, which has gone through all the processes of the common frameworks system, may be protected against the sharp edges of the internal market principles. I do not believe that that will in any way disrupt the workings of the internal market; indeed, there are benefits from allowing the devolved Administrations to develop their ideas in a way that is consistent with the internal market by the use of this process and the opportunity for divergence that it allows for.

The Minister has invited me to withdraw my Motion, but in truth I cannot properly do that, given that we are in a process of continuing discussion and we have not yet had a proposal from the Government that provides a solution to the problem that I am seeking to address in my amendments. For those reasons, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Parliamentary Proceedings: Statistics

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I too congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, on securing this debate and on the masterly way in which he has revealed what it is really about. I have to confess that I was attracted to it for reasons that have very little to do with the issue to which he addressed his remarks. My reasons go back to the time which I spent here when preparing judgments as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. One of our tasks was to interpret the legislation which emerged from both Houses. From time to time, appeals would come before us which required a close examination of the words used in order to find out what they really meant when they were applied to the facts of the case before us. That was not always easy, as one might imagine. It is the product of the difficulty that I think confronts every legislator, which is that it is difficult to predict every situation to which the words may have to be applied when the legislation takes effect. The words chosen may matter a great deal, and the words used will always deserve careful scrutiny.

One of the tricks of the trade that we who were engaged in this exercise learned from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Steyn, was to look to the Explanatory Notes for assistance. We as Law Lords had the advantage over the justices in the Supreme Court in that all we had to do was to go downstairs to the Printed Paper Office, where they were readily available. Today the preamble to the notes says:

“They do not form part of the Bill and have not been endorsed by Parliament”.


I cannot recall whether those words were there when we were looking at them 10 or more years ago. But we thought it was proper to look at them for such assistance as they might give, on the view that they were part of the travaux préparatoires, as the Europeans would say, to the Bill. We were accustomed to using the travaux when construing international conventions so it did not seem a very big step to look at the Explanatory Notes, and it was information that was readily available. So I take this opportunity to assure those who prepare these documents that they are read and that there are occasions, although perhaps not all that many, when they are particularly helpful.

As for the question that lies at the heart of this debate, it follows from what I have been saying that there is a real value in line-by-line scrutiny. As I have said, we all find it hard to predict the future, and it is hard for even the most experienced and skilful drafter to examine the effect of a clause from every possible angle. The benefit that comes from line-by-line scrutiny is that it offers the opportunity for these angles to be explored in debates to which people from all sides can contribute. The policy objective, the practical effect and the meaning of the words used all need to be examined. But parliamentarians need to be given the time and opportunity to do this. This is not really a serious problem in this House, given the way that we organise our business. I am sure that the Minister knows very well how much value the Government attach to the work that is done here because of the way we work, and how essential our contribution is to the quality of our legislation.

However, there are grounds for concern about what happens in the other place. The best example that comes to my mind relates to what happened last year on the then Scotland Bill. It was exacerbated by the fact that the SNP, which played an active part in the debates in the House of Commons, has for reasons of principle no Members in this House. Coming as I do from north of the border, I tried to trace what its position had been on the various clauses that we were examining here, just in case there were points that it was seeking to make which we might overlook. I found this very hard to do, as it seemed that many of the amendments that it had tabled were not reached. The consequence was that some of the provisions in the Bill were not debated at all in the other place, and I fear that on a number of points of importance that party’s voice was not heard at all in either House. That is an example of the kind of problem to which the noble Lord referred, and I support everything he said in his opening remarks.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grade of Yarmouth (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both Front Benches for the warmth of their greeting to me as the chairman-designate of this new fundraising regulator. I hope that the depth, sincerity and warmth of their kind remarks bear no relation to the level of lethal poison in the chalice that I have inherited. I join the thanks expressed to the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Wallace, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, for the incredible work that they put into the Etherington review, which has been so unanimously welcomed.

It might help the House if I gave a short update on where we have got to in the fast-track creation of the new regulator. The show is on the road: the chief executive has been appointed and began work on 4 January. Within four weeks, we now have an office, generously provided by the Charities Aid Foundation, and six staff. Appointments to the board will be announced in the next few weeks, and we will also need to put in place a standards committee and, to hear and resolve complaints, an adjudication committee.

I do not think I underestimate the task ahead if we are to deliver on our intention to be fully operational in the early summer, but we are on track at the moment. At the point of handover from the Fundraising Standards Board, we will take ownership of the code of guidance from the Institute of Fundraising, and the rule book on street and door-to-door collections from the Public Fundraising Association. We are working very closely with both organisations, and I welcome their endorsement of the new regulatory arrangements. At handover, the arrangements for registration—obviously, we want as many charities as possible to sign up to the fundraising regulator, although that will not stop us from investigating those which may not sign up—and for levy payments by the larger fundraising charities will need to be in place.

Our proposals for the fundraising preference service will also be ready. The working group developing those proposals, serviced by the NCVO on our behalf, is already well under way. Let me emphasise that until the point of handover, the 2,000 member charities of the Fundraising Standards Board will need to continue to support that organisation, financially and otherwise, while it retains responsibility for fundraising regulation, until we are absolutely ready to go. We and the Fundraising Standards Board are committed to a seamless transition, which is essential if the purposes of the Bill are to be realised, and we want to inherit its experience and learn from what has worked well.

There is general acceptance, however, that the Fundraising Standards Board was somewhat under -resourced. We will have the levy resources necessary to do the job. We will be independent, with ownership of the code of guidance, and we will not hesitate to apply sanctions where appropriate. We will liaise closely with the Charity Commission, taking full account of its revised fundraising guidance for trustees and, if all else fails, referring to it contentious cases that may breach the guidance.

The Etherington review, the Fundraising Standards Board’s excellent but deeply worrying report on the sad, sad case of Olive Cooke and the recent report from the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the other House have all demonstrated serious shortcomings in the fundraising practices of many larger fundraising charities. That is why this Bill is such an important and timely contribution. The public’s very negative view of this was confirmed last week in the YouGov poll published by the Information Commissioner’s Office.

The British public are as generous as anybody on this earth when it comes to putting their hands in their pockets to help those in need. However, charities cannot take that generosity for granted. There have been serious breaches in terms of the ethical way in which fundraising practices have begun to grow up in this country. We must take steps, which this Bill provides with the creation of this fundraising regulator, to make sure that that generosity is not taken for granted. The fundraising regulator now has a responsibility to the general public and, for the future of charities, to donors and potential donors, not least when they are vulnerable, to ensure that they are protected from undue pressure and unacceptable fundraising practices. That protection will be our first priority and these amendments and the Bill will, we hope, go a long way to ensuring that the public are protected and their generosity not taken for granted.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, as the Minister will recall, I had the privilege of chairing the Joint Committee that conducted pre-legislative examination of what was then called the Protection of Charities Bill. I cast my mind back to a year ago, when our committee was still sitting and considering the terms of our report. It is a pleasure to see some members of my committee in the House this afternoon. It is against that background that I pay my own tribute to the Minister and his Bill team for bringing the Bill to this stage: we are now truly at the last lap. One of our main concerns was that there should be no delay in the legislation we were examining. It is a great pleasure to see that matters have been taken this far forward with the changes made.

The only amendment I wish to comment on—I do not want to arouse too much controversy about this—is Amendment 2. I listened with great care to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, said and I appreciate the concern on the point she mentioned. However, the one feature I stress is that we did not as a committee have the chance to examine Clause 9. As the noble Lord said, that was introduced to the Bill on Report. It is the kind of clause that, speaking for myself, we would have wanted to examine with great care because of not only its implications on the point that the noble Baroness made but also its width. It is completely unqualified. If it had been more precisely targeted, we might have been a little more inclined to support it. I rather suspect that a clause as general as this would impose a very great burden on the Charity Commission. To a large extent, because of the protection of charity law generally, the clause would not be needed. I stress that I speak only for myself but I am relieved, against the background of what I have mentioned and having heard the Minister explain the reasons for it, that this amendment has come forward. I very much support it. My main point in rising to speak at all was to express my thanks and appreciation for the fact that we are now at this stage, in effect bringing the matter to an end.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the Minister on getting his first piece of legislation through to its conclusion. I thank him also for the way in which he took us through the amendments today.

I will concentrate initially on one aspect of these amendments that has not so far been discussed: Amendments 3, 4 and 5, dealing with matters to do with the rehabilitation of offenders. I and other members of the committee had great sympathy with the case made to us by the charity Unlock about the problems that this Bill would pose particularly for charities that specialise in the rehabilitation of offenders. Their great concern was that up to approximately 50,000 people in this country with past convictions would find themselves now unable to take part in the process of being a trustee, even though they had committed those offences some considerable time ago and had managed to rehabilitate themselves. Last week in court there was a ruling on the matter of the severity of minor offences and their duration in relation to people having to make declarations. I rather suspect that, if that judgment is upheld, this legislation will have to be revisited fairly swiftly. I simply draw that to noble Lords’ attention.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 30 and 31, which are amendments to government Amendment 29. In doing so, I remind the House of my involvement in the charity sector and in financial investing. I am grateful to the Minister for government Amendment 29, which I support. I sense that I may be swimming against the tide here, but I hope that he will feel able to reconsider his approach to the text by adding what we have suggested in the amendments tabled in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead.

The Minister’s amendment highlights the need for trustees to consider a social investment in respect of two factors: the charity’s purposes and the financial return. I am sure he is right in that. No financial return is not, in my definition at least, an investment. The missing element in our view is to consider how a social investment fits into the pattern of overall investments and the long-term plan for the charity’s assets as a whole, not just considering the investment in isolation, which I think Amendment 29 seems to imply.

Some might say that prudence and long-term planning are motherhood and apple pie because they are self-evident. However, the Bill is breaking new ground. It invites trustees to engage with a new type and class of investment. These are welcome additions to the investment universe, but they are different from and less regulated than mainstream financial investments. Furthermore, these investments are likely to be presented in different ways, separately, and by different people. I hope that the Minister will agree that, first, the wording we suggest does not place any barriers in the way of social investing, or certainly none that a worthwhile social investment could reasonably object to. Secondly, they provide a context to such investments, and given that this is a new area of investing, a reasonable sense check that trustees should observe when making or considering them.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am in the unusual position of having heard the Minister’s reply before we move our amendments, so I know what he is saying. Perhaps I may say in support of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, to which I have also put my name, that what we are trying to do is refine the exercise which the Minister is himself engaged upon. For myself, I very much welcome government Amendment 29.

The starting point for this is to look back to new Section 292C(2)(c), where the charity trustees are asked to,

“satisfy themselves that it is in the interests of the charity to make the social investment”.

It was because that in itself seemed rather bald that we suggested in Committee that the phraseology should be expanded upon to give further guidance to the charity trustees. The noble Lord has very properly expanded on that, but our point is that it does not go quite far enough. It tells the trustees that they should have regard to the benefit that they expect the social investment to achieve for the charity, stating,

“(by directly furthering the charity’s purposes and achieving a financial return)”.

That is a specific and immediate task; namely, looking at the information and the task before the charity trustees at the moment. The problem may be that if a step is taken today, it may undermine or at least put at risk the assets of the charity in the longer term. It is to try to balance these two things out—the way things seem today as against how they might seem in two or three years’ time—that we are making this additional suggestion.

The Minister has said that he is not persuaded, but I wonder whether he would be kind enough to at least think again about whether he might give some little step in our direction to balance out these two things. Long-term management of the assets is obviously essential to the charity if it is to remain alive, and it is to balance out the immediate task with the long-term future that we suggest the wording should be expanded further.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)]

My Lords, before I address this amendment, I thank all those who have debated, scrutinised and kicked the tyres, so to speak, of this Bill, not just in Committee but also during its pre-legislative scrutiny. Although I know there may be points on which some of us may differ, the Bill before your Lordships today has greatly benefited from the wisdom, experience and insight that a number of your Lordships, sitting on all Benches, have brought to the debate. The fact that we have managed to agree on so much reflects the overwhelming wish of this House to ensure that charities continue to have the trust and confidence of the general public.

This group of amendments is focused on providing greater clarity in the Bill, and more modern language. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who has been involved in this Bill since its publication in draft last year, raised these points in Committee.

These amendments address the old-fashioned language of “privy to”, replacing it with a much clearer form of words while maintaining the threshold for intervention at the same level. Being “privy to” something can comprise more than mere knowledge, and includes an element of concurrence, or agreement, as well. We believe that the new formulation captures that.

There are two elements to the new wording: first, that the person,

“knew of the misconduct or mismanagement”;

and, secondly, that they,

“failed to take any reasonable step to oppose it”.

We believe that, together, both elements equate as closely as possible to “privy to” but are much clearer for the lay reader of the legislation. The amendments replace “privy to” throughout the Bill and the Charities Act 2011, except in one place in the Charities Act 2011, in Section 71. Here the context is quite different and privity does not appear to refer to anything more than just knowledge.

I apologise for the late tabling of Amendments 13A, 13B and 13C. I confess that there was an oversight on our part but we decided to table them late because without them we would have left “privy to” in one part of the Bill while addressing it in all others.

These amendments, while relatively minor changes, will improve the clarity of the Bill and make the law more understandable for the lay reader. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister and those who have been advising him for this group of amendments. As the Minister pointed out, it achieves much greater clarity than the rather old-fashioned word “privy”—being used as an adjective—did. It has been replaced by two very important verbs. The value of the clarity is that there are two sides to each of these clauses that one has to consider: the person who is being suspected of having engaged in the prohibited activity; and the commission itself, which has to police the activities of the person. Clarity is needed on both sides and the way in which the clauses have been reworded achieves that.

I congratulate the Minister on finding a better form of words than I think I was able to do—or indeed the Joint Committee was able to do when it was looking at the matter. The formula is much improved. I think I must bear some responsibility for not having searched through the whole Bill and traced all the various places in which “privy” was being used. I think we have now reached finality on that issue and for that, too, I am extremely grateful.

Amendment 1 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, this second group of amendments also responds to a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and I am grateful to him for bringing this to our attention as well.

Amendments 5 and 6 relate to Clause 8, which amends the Charity Commission’s power in Section 85 of the Charities Act 2011 to direct the application of charity property where the person holding it is unwilling to apply the property. The purpose of Clause 8 is to enable the commission to make an effective direction in cases where the person holding the charity property may be willing but is unable to apply it. The most common example of this problem was considered to be where financial institutions hold a charity’s property but are unable to comply with a commission direction to transfer that property because to do so would result in a breach of their contract with the charity.

I am conscious that we have gone back and forth on this issue. Our initial drafting sought to remove any obstacles by allowing the commission’s direction to overcome a contractual obligation owed to the charity. Importantly, Clause 8 continues to provide the specific statutory protection for a financial institution in cases where compliance with a Charity Commission direction in these circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with a charity.

However, we have been made aware that there are other barriers that may make a person unable to comply with a commission direction of this type; for example, a person may be willing in principle to apply a property properly but lack the power to do so. Therefore, our new formulation in Amendment 6 clearly amends Clause 8 to reintroduce “unable” so that it is clear that the commission’s power to direct the application of charity property can be exercised where the person holding the property is either unwilling or unable to transfer it.

Again, this is a relatively modest amendment but it will, I believe, improve the effectiveness and practicality of this provision. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, here again I express my gratitude to the Minister for bringing this amendment forward. He has explained very precisely the value which can be seen in the introduction of the additional word. I know from communications with the Charity Commission that it is delighted that this amendment is being made. As I endeavoured to explain in Committee, the wording in the Bill when it was introduced left it with a problem, which has now been solved. On behalf of the commission, I am extremely grateful.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I offer the same thanks to the Minister for having listened to the arguments and for moving this amendment, which we are happy to agree to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, would have a case but for the fact that the Government are relying on charitable organisations to deal with the housing crisis. We are dealing here with the nub of the issue: the charitable status of organisations that are responsible—or, in many cases, have been given that responsibility—for building homes to house people in areas of stress.

I have spoken twice on this matter in the past month. On the first occasion I read to the House a letter from a Mr Bill Bewley in Keswick, the chairman of Keswick Community Housing Trust, expressing anger and concern on behalf of the trust in Keswick, which comprises an ecumenical gathering of people, including Catholics, Protestants, Quakers, Kings Church, Methodists and others, who all voluntarily, without remuneration, give their time to build houses in Keswick through a local charitable organisation, all motivated by the single objective of helping those in need in the Keswick area. What troubles them is that, having worked in this climate of charity for so long and made that effort, they are now being engaged to build even more in the town, with another project to come on stream in the next year or two, but they will find that they are obliged by law effectively to sell their properties at a subsidised rate.

That brings me to an accompanying issue, which is what happened in the Budget. We were told in the Budget that housing associations are going to be required over the next five years to reduce rents by 1% per annum. If you take into account that requirement, which I understand might apply to the charitable organisations that I am referring to, in conjunction with the provisions that we are talking about today, you can see why we are driving these organisations, comprising people whose only wish is to serve the public, into a position where they have to relinquish their property. That is why I hope that the Minister, who has been given much notice of this issue during the course of previous debates in Committee, will come to the Dispatch Box today and put all our minds at rest.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I absolutely understand the force of the points that have been made by the noble Lord opposite, and particularly the impressive speech from the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, but I wonder whether the mechanism that this amendment seeks to use to solve the social problems that have been talked about is the right one. It would put a duty on the Charity Commission and expresses that duty in the widest possible terms without qualifying the charities being talked about, the nature of the compulsion that they face or what the assets are that are sought to be disposed of. It is not a targeted amendment in the sense of dealing specifically with the point about the right to buy and interference with the assets of charities in the social housing field; it is entirely general.

I have no remit for the Charity Commission, and I am not advocating anything on its behalf on instructions, but one advantage of the procedure that was used before the Bill was introduced into this House was the pre-legislative scrutiny through the Joint Committee. This issue was not raised in the course of the Joint Committee’s proceedings. That is a pity because among those who gave evidence were representatives of the Charity Commission itself, who had an opportunity to comment on the various amendments to the Bill that are being proposed and to suggest improvements, as indeed we are discussing first thing at this stage.

I do not know what the commission’s position is on this clause but I suspect that it would be extremely concerned about being faced with a duty in these very broad terms and its ability, given the resources that it has to deploy right across the charitable sector, to do what the amendment requires. So, without commenting on the underlying substance, I respectfully suggest that this is not the right mechanism, and that the wording of this amendment is certainly far too wide to address the particular problem that has been discussed so far.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I will raise a question in relation to this amendment which has nothing to do, primarily, with the issue that has been raised, and which will come forward in another Bill. One of the problems for charities is that from time to time they are subject to compulsory acquisition. For example, if a charity owns property which is required for a road or something of that sort, the authority that has compulsory powers in relation to that will be able to acquire it. I am not clear that this amendment is consistent with that possibility, because the Charity Commissioners would find it impossible to block a compulsory acquisition if it was made within the terms of the particular statute which authorises the acquisition.

As your Lordships will know, there are many statutes which authorise compulsory acquisition. However, an important aspect of compulsory acquisition is that the acquiring authority has to pay the full value of what is required. I do not know what the Government’s proposals will be in relation to this other matter, but all I can say at the moment is that the amendment does not seem properly to recognise the possibility of charitable property being acquired by compulsory acquisition under one of the compulsory acquisition statutes. I would be glad if the noble Baroness would deal with that.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 29th June 2015 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

6: Clause 8, page 6, line 38, after “unwilling)” insert—
“(a) in subsection (1)(a) after “unwilling” insert “or unable”;(b) ”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 6 is the sole amendment dealing with Clause 8 of the Bill, which is a comparatively short clause on the “Power to direct property to be applied to another charity”. As it appears in the Bill, Clause 8 makes one amendment to Section 85 of the Charities Act 2011, which is dealing with a different matter from the one that is of concern to me. Amendment 6 seeks to insert two words into Section 85(1)(a) of the 2011 Act so that the phrase,

“persons in possession or control of any property … unwilling to apply it … for the purposes of the charity”,

would also deal with those who say that they are willing to do so but are unable to do so.

The draft Bill, as it appeared before us in the Joint Committee, included the words that I am seeking to insert into Section 85. The description of the draft Bill can be seen in paragraph 141, read with paragraph 142, of the Joint Committee’s report. As paragraph 141 records,

“Clause 7”—

as it was in the draft Bill—

“would amend the 2011 Act to allow the Commission to direct the application of charity property in the event that the person is either ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to do so, rather than just ‘unwilling’ as is currently the case. The explanatory notes to the Bill refer to ‘several cases in which financial institutions holding charity property were contractually unable to transfer it to secure its proper charitable application but would have been willing to do so.’”

In paragraph 142, we go on to say that,

“The evidence received by the Committee was supportive of this provision”,

and the footnote refers to Professor Gareth Morgan, the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. Paragraph 142 continues:

“The Charity Law Association”—

which had made a number of very helpful comments on the wording of the draft Bill—

“did not oppose this change, but questioned whether the meaning of the term ‘unable’ was sufficiently clear and whether banks in such situations were really ‘unable’ to transfer charity money or just ‘unwilling’ to breach a contract to do so”.

Since the current Bill was published, I have had a meeting with William Shawcross of the Charity Commission, who has explained to me that he would much prefer that the words “unwilling or unable” were put in—in other words, that the words “or unable” were restored, as my amendment seeks. He explained that, from time to time, he encounters cases of this kind where a direction is proposed and the response is, “Yes, indeed, we are willing to do this, but for a variety of reasons we are simply not able to do so”. As he put it to me, it would be possible by sleight of hand to fudge the thing a little bit, as it were, and treat unwillingness on such a ground as being within the scope of the section, but he would rather that the section was really upfront about the fact that both situations that he encounters in practice were actually dealt with in the wording of Section 85, so that unwillingness, which certainly occurs and is a source of concern, was dealt with but inability—where the persons involved are perfectly willing to comply with the direction but for various reasons say that they cannot properly do so—was covered as well.

This is a very short point. I am a little puzzled as to why the draft Bill which survived scrutiny by the Joint Committee should have been altered in this way. I hope that the Minister will pay attention to the wishes of the Charity Commission, which would find it useful if the amendment were accepted. I beg to move.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

My Lords, as one who was a member of the Joint Committee under the excellent chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, I share his puzzlement as to why this change has been made to the draft Bill. I have no wish to repeat the words of the noble and learned Lord, but those of us in opposition do not fully understand why such a change should have been made and we invite the Minister to explain that if he can, and to say why, after the Joint Committee recommended acceptance of the draft proposal, and given that, as we have heard, the Charity Commission wants this change, the original wording of the draft Bill should not be reinstated. There is little more to say than that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, will keep my remarks relatively brief, by reason of the conclusion that I have come to as a result of what the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord have said.

The provision corresponding to Clause 8 in the Bill made reference to “unable” in the manner proposed by this amendment. The Charity Commission asked for the change following several cases where financial institutions holding charity property were contractually unable to transfer it to secure its proper charitable application but would have been willing to do so. As the noble and learned Lord said, the Joint Committee which considered the draft Bill supported the provision.

However, as is noted in the report, the Charity Law Association, while it did not oppose the change, questioned whether the meaning of the word “unable” was sufficiently clear and whether banks in such situations were really unable to transfer charity property, or simply unable to breach a contract to do so. Therefore the Joint Committee recommended that the Government consider the inclusion of some form of statutory protection for a financial institution in cases where compliance with a Charity Commission direction in these circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with a charity. The Government therefore followed this recommendation and amended Clause 8 to provide for such statutory protection. Since the clause was aimed at dealing with financial institutions which are contractually unable to transfer property, this statutory protection was considered sufficient and the reference to “unable” was omitted.

The amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, proposes to reinstate the reference to “unable”, as we have heard, and further examples have been provided as to when this would be needed beyond the contractual liabilities of banks. I also note what the noble and learned Lord said about his conversations with the Charity Commission. In light of this, I am happy to give further consideration to the amendment and to return to this on Report.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his remarks. It is worth adding that the wording of Clause 85(1) is quite general—it refers to,

“a person or persons in possession or control of any property”.

It does not confine the provision to banks alone. Although they may be the main aim of the provision, it is more widely cast, so whatever the banks may think is not the end of the story.

I hope that the noble Lord will bring forward something on Report without my finding it necessary to table another amendment to keep the matter alive. For the time being, however, in light of what the Minister has said, which I very much welcome, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns on this point and why she feels this may be a loophole which may be abused by the Charity Commission. Nevertheless, we need to give the Charity Commission additional powers, as the noble Baroness said. It has produced quite extensive guidance on how it proposes to use the power, and I cannot imagine that if the Minister, whoever it was, was to propose a change under subsection (4), the sector would allow it to go by unchallenged. The sector would surely be up in arms if it felt that its independence or its freedom to appoint trustees was being infringed. I accept what the Joint Committee on the legislation said, but we are in danger of unnecessarily trammelling the hands of the Minister. These things will need to be looked at from time to time—for example, who would have thought about terrorist fundraising five or six years ago?—and no doubt there may be other issues in the future that will need to be dealt with.

Will the Minister say whether this is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure or the negative procedure? My ability to support the noble Baroness will depend slightly on his answer to that question.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I shall add a few words based on the Joint Committee’s report. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is right that this is the clause which caused the committee most concern. We have before us, among other things, a very carefully worded memorandum from the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the meat of which is set out at pages 96 to 97 of the Joint Committee’s report. That Delegated Powers Committee draws attention to a number of problems that subsection (4) of new Section 178A gives rise to, including the risk of retrospective legislation bringing in offences that were not in the purview of the section when they were committed, without any provision for what would happen to people who were unaware that this might cause them to be disqualified. The committee considered various other aspects, but overall its conclusion was that subsection (4) of the new section should remain in the Bill.

Although the Joint Committee discussed this very fully, we reached the same conclusion, which was put in the report. We were content that the order-making power should be available in the form and subject of the procedures that were proposed, but I draw attention to paragraph 208, which contains the recommendation, that,

“when using the power, the Minister should be required to consult fully on whether it is appropriate and proportionate to include an offence within the list of disqualifying offences”.

The process of consultation would be directed to the variety of problems discussed by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report. There is a question as to whether that requirement should be statutory, or whether it is enough that the Minister would be prepared to say that he would be content to follow what the Joint Committee recommended: that he would consult fully on whether it was appropriate and proportionate to include an offence within the list of qualifying offences. I speak only for myself, but if the Minister was prepared to give an assurance of that kind, that would go some way at least to meeting the noble Baroness’s concerns.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a sobering day even to discuss something with the word “terrorism” in it. I note that the House of Commons had a moment of silence at 3.30 pm, which maybe is a lesson for all of us.

On the amendment before us, the Committee will know that we have always been a bit jumpy about Henry VIII powers. However, it is very important to have this provision in the Bill because I did not move Amendment 7, which we dealt with on the first day of Committee last week, when we dealt with our attempt to include people on the sex offenders register on the list of those who are precluded—which, frankly, I take more seriously than someone who has got into a bit of debt and has an IVA. The Minister did not think that that was appropriate, and I hope very much that he is right and that we will not have a trustee who is on the sexual offenders register and then abuses someone, which would show that I was right and he was wrong. I do not want to be in that position, for fairly obvious reasons. However, if we find that the evidence is that we should have added those on the sex offenders register to those who are precluded from being a trustee, unless there is a waiver, this provision would allow the Minister, at that stage, to put right—unless we win the vote on Report—what would be an omission from the Bill.

There is always a problem with retrospective legislation, which would be the same now for people convicted for other things. Therefore, it will be important that the implementation date of any regulation is in good time to notify people so that they do not suddenly find themselves acting as a trustee and putting a charity at risk because of some new provision that then comes in. However, if it was something such as someone being on the sex offenders register, that is a known register and they would be able to be notified pretty easily that they could no longer act as a trustee. As a failsafe, albeit that any new measure should be by the affirmative procedure, we are content to see this power in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the probing questions of my noble friend Lord Watson of Invergowrie. At several stages in our pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, we became anxious about the breadth and vagueness of the powers which it bestows on the Charity Commission. These concerns were reinforced by a letter from the chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Dr Hywel Francis MP, in which he said:

“In the absence of further definition in the Bill itself, or other guidance, such broad and vague language significantly increases the power of the Commission and provides insufficient certainty to both individual trustees and charities about the possible consequences of their conduct”.

At each stage, when we had these concerns, we looked carefully at the evidence and concluded, as noble Lords will see from the report, that the powers were indeed justified in that they were likely to help to increase public trust and confidence in charities.

However, when it came to the inclusion of terrorism offences, as my noble friend has indicated, we received evidence that disturbed us. As noble Lords will know from our report, a number of witnesses expressed concerns over the difficulties presented by terrorism legislation in relation to the operational requirements of NGOs in challenging circumstances overseas. They were particularly concerned about charities operating in dangerous parts of the world for humanitarian purposes. My noble friend referred to the chairman of the Muslim Charities Forum, Dr Hany El-Banna, who told us that he thought counterterrorism legislation was,

“preventing us from having access to the neediest people”.

David Anderson QC, the Government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who has already been referred to, said concepts such as the provision of “indirect support” to terrorist organisations had,

“an impact on humanitarian charities, particularly when working abroad and when working in areas that are under the de facto control of a proscribed or designated group”.

He went on to say that charities operating in these areas ran the risk of falling foul of terrorism law by, for example, delivering relief to a general population which might include individuals or groups designated as terrorists. He suggested that an increased risk could deter charities and their trustees from delivering humanitarian support. Bond, the umbrella group, went on to suggest, in our words, that,

“the withdrawal of banking services exposed donor assets to greater risk because international NGOs had no option other than to use less secure money service bureaux or to carry sums of cash across borders”.

Nothing in what I have said undermines the need to deal with terrorism offences and to address legitimate concerns about the abuse of charitable funds in connection with terrorism. It does, however, raise questions about the uncertainty surrounding the application of terrorism legislation when it comes to charities operating in dangerous circumstances overseas. The pre-legislative scrutiny committee was offered the examples of Australia and New Zealand as places where Governments had addressed this issue and where specific exceptions in law existed to meet this point. We thought that this was worth pursuing, but when we raised it with the Minister for Civil Society, he said it fell outside his remit and was essentially a matter for the Home Office. He went on to say that it could be,

“chasing a problem that does not exist”,

since,

“no one has been prosecuted”.

I do not think that that is good enough. Clearly these charities are expressing real anxieties about the risks they might face and about the chilling effect of this legislation. The difficulties facing these charities are already enormous in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and Somalia, among other places. If it is possible to provide them with greater certainty in pursuing their important work and overcome this worrying and chilling effect, then we should try to do that.

Like my noble friend, I was disappointed with the Government’s response. The Government recognise that there are concerns, but points only to the problems of creating loopholes without even addressing the suggestion that they might look at the examples of Australia and New Zealand to see whether and how those countries have overcome this danger. I ask the Minister to think again and at least to consider whether other countries can provide some inspiration about whether there are ways to provide greater legal certainty.

Finally, the Government have said they will draw to the attention of the Director of Public Prosecutions our recommendation to publish guidance. I hope they will agree to do rather more than that and to put their weight behind the need for guidance to address the current uncertainty, which was revealed in our evidence and which the Government acknowledge.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I draw attention to the last two sentences of paragraph 183 of the Joint Committee’s report, at pages 53 and 54. They refer to an exchange between me and the Minister speaking for the Home Office, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde. I pointed out to him the difficulty faced, according to the evidence we received, by people who are trying to gain access to areas where people are in dire need of food, warm clothing or whatever else when somebody there is, in effect, a gatekeeper and refuses any transit to the areas where these people are without some form of payment.

One would of course support what the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, said as a general rule—one does not want people to pay money to terrorists for any reason—but the New Zealand legislation has addressed the problem by putting in the phrase “without reasonable excuse”. Something of that kind would go some way to addressing this problem, because a hard-edged refusal to contemplate any situation where money is paid by somebody—not to assist terrorist activity but simply to get access for a humanitarian purpose—would seem to be too severe. I would have thought that there is a need for some degree of flexibility, although like everyone else I recognise that this is a very sensitive issue and the last thing one wants to do is encourage terrorism. There is a conflict of two diametrically opposed interests here, and the hard-edged and uncompromising line, as described in the noble Lord’s reply when I put forward my suggestion, is prejudicing those who are in need of humanitarian assistance.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, having also been a member of the Joint Committee, I support the need for flexibility on this. I used the example at Second Reading of the Yazidi women who have been enslaved by ISIS and whom it is allegedly possible to ransom for $10,000. Clearly that money is going if not directly then indirectly to ISIS and these charities are faced with an incredibly difficult decision. On the one hand, morality drives you towards wishing to rescue these wretched women who are in a state of sexual slavery. On the other, there is the danger that if you do it, you may end up being prosecuted for the reasons that we have been discussing. I support the need to find some way through this thicket. Whether it is a DPP statement of guidelines or whatever else, I do not know, but we should not let it just ride through our Committee without having a real go at getting clarity as to how charities can operate, not only for the benefit of the individuals concerned but for the reputation of this country. Our soft-power reputation for making an important contribution to providing humanitarian aid in various parts of the world is important to us, and we need to spend time making sure that we maintain it.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2015 Grand Committee

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, good afternoon. I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, to his first Committee. No doubt he has been briefed extensively and told that these are occasions on which their Lordships are allowed to do absolutely anything they like. I think this is the point of maximum terror for the spokesperson, although I am sure we will treat him gently.

This might well seem the most pedantic amendment that noble Lords have ever seen but we are dealing with charity law, are we not? Let us start as we mean to go on. However, it is a rather important amendment. I want to start the Committee’s deliberations by trying to ensure that, throughout our proceedings, we do not stray into the realms of viewing this legislation simply in terms of the extent to which it adds to the arsenal of weapons at the disposal of the commission and without thinking of the impact that some of these measures can have on trustees.

When some of us undertook the work of the scrutiny committee, under the able chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, we were presented with witnesses who were, by and large, people with professional interests from around the charity world. At times, we rather lost the sense that on the end of this legislation will be individual trustees, the majority of whom we know are perfectly decent and honest. Just a few are not.

On the committee, we considered at some length whether this power to issue a formal warning was really necessary. In the end, we were persuaded that on balance—it was on balance—perhaps the Charity Commission could make fair and good use of it to issue a warning rather than open a statutory inquiry and go through all that that entails. Simply having the power to issue a warning to trustees where it was considered that the actions in which they were engaged presented a fairly low-level risk to the charity or to charities in general is absolutely fine. I agree with that. However, it is still a public warning. It is still something likely to cast a shadow over, if not leave a stain on, a person’s reputation. The majority of trustees hold the commission in very high regard. They take very seriously the actions of the commission. For the majority of trustees the prospect of a public warning would actually be quite difficult for them personally if not professionally.

We deliberated long and hard, and were influenced a great deal by the wisdom of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. He argued that this was meant to be a proportionate response to very minor misdemeanours, albeit recurring ones, and because this is not meant to be a draconian power, we should not allow an appeal mechanism, making the process a bureaucratic nightmare. I agree, but that makes it all the more important that trustees are alerted in good time that they may be the recipients of a warning, giving them a chance to put right their failures. That is what this power is supposed to be about—the prevention of fairly minor misdemeanours.

For that reason, it is important to ensure that people know where and when the warning will be published. It is one thing for a notice to be published on a part of the Charity Commission’s website, where only those of us who are sufficiently intrepid or boring to make our way will find it. It is quite another for it to be published prominently somewhere in a local paper, for example—if local papers still exist—in an area in which the charity operates. That could have quite a profound and damaging effect on the charity’s reputation.

In putting this apparently small and fussy amendment before your Lordships, I am trying to echo the points made by the Charity Law Association which thinks that trustees ought to be given fair notice that they will be subject to this so that they can try to put matters right. If we do that, this power will serve to act in the preventive way that was envisaged rather than being a rather heavy-handed hammer to crack a nut. In that spirit, I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is a great deal that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said with which I agree. Perhaps I can take this opportunity to pay my own tribute to the work that she, along with other Members of your Lordships’ House who are present, did on the committee. There is a great deal of force in her point about the importance of the notice that is being given to trustees as to what the Charity Commission wants to do with regard to publication. However, I have a concern about the removal of the word “how” and the substitution of the words “when and where” for this reason: when you think carefully about what the words really mean, the effect of the amendment is to narrow the amount of the information that is required by the provision. There are other things built into the word “how” which are not there—the manner in which this is to be done, and how often, are two examples. One point that the Charity Law Association raised with us and is in a memorandum it sent to us in connection with the Committee stage of the Bill is the element of publicity itself and whether anonymity is to be given to the trustees who are the subject of the publication. If one restricts the amount of information simply to “where” and “when”, it leaves out the possibility of further inquiry as to the precise way in which this is to be done.

I appreciate the word “how”. After all, a three letter word seems very weak but, if you think about it, it is actually quite a powerful word because it embraces so much within it. If you read that together with what is in subsection (6) which enables people to make representations as to “how”—I repeat the word “how”—the publication is to be done, one can see that it gives scope for a good deal more inquiry.

I have huge respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—I am entirely in sympathy with what she is seeking to do—but I would respectfully suggest that “how” is probably the best word to use. If it is to be replaced by something else, then there would need to be more in it than simply “where” and “when”. I find that a little untidy, which is why I suggest that we leave the word “how” as it is.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness’s amendment. I hoped that she would have inserted those words in addition to “how”, so that it would have been “how”, “when” and “where”.

Before I address the pros and cons, because this is the first time I am speaking in Committee, I want to take this opportunity to let noble Lords know of a potential, tangential interest that I may have in a matter which will come before them at a later stage. It concerns fundraising. The charities report that I produced, which was published in July 2012, has a whole chapter—Chapter 8—devoted to fundraising. It is 17 pages long and makes a number of recommendations, none of which I resile from. In fact, I think many are equally, if not more, appropriate today.

In my non-political life, as can be seen on the register of interests in your Lordships’ House, I am non-executive chairman of a company called Nova Capital Management. Nova is a specialist private equity firm which is focused on what are known as “secondary directs”. This means that Nova purchases groups of companies on behalf of groups of institutional investors—often an unloved and neglected division of a much larger company. Nova provides intensive support for management of the individual companies within the group with a view to achieving improved operating and financial performance which, in due course, is reflected in a superior sale price. I play no part in the day-to-day operation of Nova, let alone of any of the individual companies in the various portfolios.

In December 2011, Nova created a company called CNH Capital Partners to take over a public company called Parseq plc. It has three divisions—two need not concern us at all. The third, Parseq Services, has a series of subsidiaries which provide business processing outsourcing services to banks, local authorities and utility companies from locations stretching from Glasgow to Brighton. In February 2013, seven months after my review was completed, the board of Parseq decided to expand its operations by acquiring a company called Panther Group. This, in turn, has a number of subsidiaries. One of these, Pell & Bales, undertakes telephone fundraising for a number of leading charities, including Christian Aid, RNIB, Cancer Research UK, Barnardo’s, the National Trust and the Royal British Legion.

As a result of the death of Olive Cooke, Pell & Bales has been caught up in the storm over charity fundraising, in particular because an undercover journalist from the Sun was embedded in the business in order to investigate the sector. In its major article of Saturday 6 June, the Sun concluded:

“There is no suggestion Pell & Bales did anything illegal. Indeed, the company is scrupulous in instructing its employees to stick to acceptable practices”.

I understand that the management of Pell & Bales has since reported the Sun to IPSO as a result of what the company believes are breaches of the press guidelines.

As I have explained, my very tangential association with Pell & Bales began six months after I completed my review. There can be no suggestion that it was in any way influenced by that association. Some might argue that I have nothing to declare. I think it best if I explain this position on the first occasion I speak in Committee. This amendment is not about fundraising but I judge that the sooner I lay out the facts and explain my position, the better. In the highly charged atmosphere of cases such as the tragic death of Olive Cooke, truth and accuracy can be early casualties.

With that declaration, I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. As I explained, the ideal situation would be to have “when and where” added to “how”. An example is the impact not only on a trustee, but on a charity. The charity might have been given an official warning—or a warning of a warning under new Section 75A(3)—but perhaps I and my fellow trustees do not agree with the commission’s determination. We make representations, but the commission decides not to accept them. Our charity has a significant funder and I want to talk to him or her about this case and give the trustees a view of the issues. Such a conversation or discussion is made much clearer if I know when and where the news of the official warning is to be released—the date, time, methodology and so on. “How” could mean no more detail than by a press release on a date yet to be determined. That would be unfair to the charity, which may be contesting the view and wants to be able to talk to its funder to ensure that its side of the argument is heard, without which the case might go by default.

With respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, I do not entirely take his point because, for a charity trustee, some further clarity in the wording would be a good idea. Therefore, I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s response.

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[Baroness Barker]

I am sorry; I thought that they had been grouped together. I apologise to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I will say a word or two about Amendment 7, which seeks to add a new “case K”, where:

“P has been found guilty of a sexual offence or has been placed on the sex offenders register”.

I will sound a note of caution about this amendment, for a variety of reasons.

The previous cases listed, some of which are the subject of other amendments, deal with incidences of dishonesty, failure to observe court orders and things of that kind. They cast doubt on the probity of the individual managing trust funds and are reasons for thinking that there might be some mismanagement of the funds. Indeed, terrorism is added, for reasons that we all understand. What is being introduced here is something that is not generic to the others, although it deals with an undoubtedly very disturbing social problem, which is people who abuse children, although it is not confined to child abuse, which I will come back to in a moment. There is a question of whether it is right to bring other criminal offences into the automatic disqualification field. One can think of other cases—extreme violence, for example. Crimes of violence are not listed here. There may be other crimes of a kind that society would regard as repugnant, but they are not listed here either. I have some doubt as to whether it is right to put the sexual offences chapter into the automatic disqualification field.

There are other reasons for being concerned about the wording. There are two chapters here. First, there is being found guilty of “a sexual offence”. There is no qualification as to how serious that offence may be. Anything that falls within the broad chapter of sexual offences would be included here, some of which may not require or justify a sentence of imprisonment at all. Then there is “the sex offenders register”. The position is that a person is placed on the sex offendering register as a matter of law if a sentence of 30 months or more is passed. So far so good: you are dealing with the more serious categories to justify being put on that register, but the initial part—conviction for “a sexual offence”—does not include everything.

There is a feature of the register that has been cured by order, but which caused concern in a case on which I sat in the Supreme Court. An 11 year-old boy who had committed a sexual offence—a very serious one, because he was sentenced to more than 30 months’ imprisonment or detention—was placed on the register. As it stood at that time, in 2010, the presence of his name on the register was without limit of time. It is an indefinite feature.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I will resume what I was attempting to say. Before we broke for the vote, I drew attention to the width of the expression “a sexual offence”, which is a cause of some concern. There are a number of points to be made as far as the sex offendering register is concerned. First, it applies to people who have been sentenced to 30 months or more of imprisonment or detention. Secondly, subject to an order that came into force in 2012 and gives a certain power to the chief officer of police, the entry on the register is indefinite, without limit of time.

The case that I was about to mention came before the Supreme Court in 2010 and led eventually to the making of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 2012. It was a case where a child aged 11 was convicted of an offence. It caused real grounds for concern in that the crime he committed meant that he would have had a permanent position on the register. One has to wonder whether somebody who committed an offence of that kind when a teenager and who reached the age of 60, let us say, should really be subject to the automatic disqualification which would flow from this amendment if it were to stand as it is.

I appreciate that the chief officer of police has the power to remove people from the register but I do not know how often that power has actually been exercised. It may be that the Minister can find out from other sources as to the efficacy of the order, but it is a ground for concern that placing on the register has such a powerful effect on the individual. We heard evidence from a body called Unlock. It made the point that there are some people for whom rehabilitation is so important. Contributing to public life by participating in charities, years after an event which happened at a much earlier stage in their life, is something that they would greatly value. There are real grounds for concern about the width of the amendment and its suitability, and whether it really falls into the nature of offences that would justify automatic disqualification.

I raise these issues as a note of caution. I would not go to the point of voting against the amendment if it were pressed to a vote—which, of course, it cannot be in Grand Committee—but these points suggest that the question requires careful consideration before the noble Lord would accept the amendment.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, let me start by echoing what my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts said. We all agree that we must do all we can to ensure that the vulnerable—be they young or old or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, those with dementia—are protected within charities. The question we are grappling with is how best to do so.

The Charity Commission takes safeguarding issues very seriously. Its statement of regulatory approach makes it clear that the abuse of vulnerable beneficiaries is a matter to which the commission will pay particular attention, alongside terrorist abuse of charities and fraud. The Charity Commission’s director of investigations, monitoring and enforcement has said:

“The public relies on trustees to have robust procedures in place so that people working in a charity with access to beneficiaries are suitable to hold those roles”.

Trustees must,

“ensure their charity has appropriate and robust policies and procedures in place to safeguard the charity’s beneficiaries, including a process for recording incidents, concerns and referrals”.

The Charity Commission publishes detailed guidance for charities on their safeguarding responsibilities. It explains the legal requirements for charities working with children and vulnerable groups and how they must safeguard them from harm. It covers what safeguarding involves, what child protection policies and processes should include, and explains the Charity Commission’s role in ensuring that charities follow the law.

The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 established, as your Lordships know, the Disclosure and Barring Service or DBS, which processes criminal records checks and manages the lists of unsuitable people who should not work in regulated activities with children or adults. The DBS decides who is unsuitable to work or volunteer with vulnerable groups. There are two points to stress: it is an offence first, for a barred person to apply for such work, paid or voluntary; and secondly, it is an offence for a charity to employ a barred person in such work. Furthermore, Sections 35 and 36 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 imposed a duty on regulated activity providers and personnel suppliers to provide the DPS with information where there is a risk of harm to a child or vulnerable adult. There is an established policy of reporting abuse directly to the DBS.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I have a point to make on the wording of the amendment, although it is not quite the same as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, thought it might be. It is about Amendment 11, and it is a rather technical point. I am aware that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, who knows much more about drafting trust documents of this kind than I do, may have a different view. The point that troubles me is the phrase,

“who are direct beneficiaries of the charity”.

As I understand it, to qualify as a charity, individuals as such are not direct beneficiaries. That is the creature of a private trust, where a trust is framed to confer a defined benefit on a particular individual. It would meet the noble Baroness’s point if the rather less attractive phrase,

“who are within the objects of the charity”,

was substituted. That would then bring in the point that she is considering people on whom the trustees would focus as possible recipients of benefit. That would be the kind of phrase that I would use myself, but I am conscious that the noble and learned Lord may know more on this than I do, although he is shaking his head. It is a point on wording, which would arise if the Minister was attracted by the amendment.

[Viscount Eccles (Con)]

I shall add a thought. I think that we are talking about charities that are deliberately set up to benefit children and added-in vulnerable people, but may I move to museums for a minute? I refer to a registered museum that allows children under 16 to enter free, for example. Let us say that somebody gets into a fracas, one child hits another and somebody else enters in. Widening the responsibilities of the Charity Commission and the trustees of that museum as the amendments propose is completely unrealistic. If there are remedies to be sought, they should be sought under another piece of legislation and not under charity law. We have already had reference to the chilling effect on people volunteering to be trustees if they see that the responsibilities are made so wide and so difficult to adhere to. We really have to be careful. The Minister referred to the limited resources of the Charity Commission. Under existing circumstances, it is not likely that those resources will be added to, to any great degree, at least for a while. We need to be very careful about what responsibilities we place on the Charity Commission and trustees under this proposed legislation.

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

4: Clause 3, page 2, line 39, leave out “privy to” and insert “participated in”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I shall speak also to Amendment 9 which is in my name and is grouped with Amendment 4. The amendment takes out the words “privy to” in the two places to which these amendments refer and inserts the words “participated in”. This is really a discussion about the use of language. The background can be narrated by referring to paragraph 122 of the committee’s report, in which we mentioned that a number of witnesses expressed concerns about the wording of this clause. Among the phrases referred to are “privy to the misconduct or management” and “facilitated it”, which we decided did not require further comment.

However, we picked up “privy”, which had been drawn to our attention by, as footnote 157 states, four charities: Bond, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Muslim Charities Forum and NCVO, which all expressed concern about the wording. “Privy” is a curious word and really rather antique. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary one of the definitions is,

“sharing in the secret of a person’s plans”.

I am not quite sure what that means in this context. The other possible meaning is,

“a person having a part or an interest in an action, matter or thing”,

which perhaps comes closer to what the draftsman has in mind.

When we were trying to find an equivalent formula, we suggested, in paragraph 125 of our report, “aware of”, but there may be more in it than that. There may be something more active than simply knowledge, which is why I am now suggesting “participated”, which is actually doing something to assist the act of misconduct or whatever it is. Either way, I suggest that “privy” already looks antique, and if this Bill is going to survive for a number of years, it will become increasingly so. It may be in the spirit of the present Government, as expressed by Mr Gove yesterday, to try to modernise and clarify language, and here is an opportunity to try to do the same thing. I offer the words “participated in” as an alternative to what we put into the report, but the basic suggestion is that something should be done to clarify what “privy” means.

This is an important clause because it deals with a situation where these very important powers may be exercised. Not only does the Charity Commission need to know what it should be driving at but the people against whom the powers are being exercised are entitled to know as well. I beg to move.

[Lord Scott of Foscote]

I entirely support the amendments proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope for the reasons he has given. As he said, in the Oxford dictionary there are two alternative definitions of the expression “privy to” and neither would be appropriate in this part of the Bill. On,

“sharing in the secret of a person’s plans”,

I suppose that spouses share in the secrets of the plans of their partners, but that does not make them people who ought to be subject to the provisions of this Bill. The other meaning is,

“a person having a part or an interest in an action, matter or thing”.

“Interest” is not appropriate. The substituted words suggested by my noble and learned friend—“participated in”—seem much better and should be accepted.

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Furthermore, the term “privy to”, as I am sure the Committee knows, is already used in Section 79 of the 2011 Act in relation to trustee removal and Section 178 of that Act in relation to trustee disqualification. Any alternative formulation would need to work in the context of those provisions as well. On that basis, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his very helpful reply. I take the point that we are talking about thresholds. The problem is that the word “privy” could be read as meaning “aware”, which is a low threshold. It could be read differently to mean “participating”, I suggest, which is a somewhat higher threshold, although perhaps not the highest conceivable one. I understand the Minister to be saying that he will look again at this with a view to seeing whether it could be more clearly expressed to avoid doubt.

Of course I understand the point that within the 2011 Act the word “privy” appears, which I suppose might mean that I should have asked for more amendments to be put in at each point where the phrase occurs and I had not done my homework sufficiently to find them all. That would be a rather laborious exercise. However, there is an opportunity here to try to remove the doubt as to where exactly the threshold should be placed but, on the basis of what I understand the Minister to say, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I was sorry not to be able to take part in the Second Reading debate on the Bill, particularly as I was fortunate enough to serve under the excellent chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee. I declare my interests as chair of a charity, International Students House, as a member of the councils of two universities—UCL and Nottingham Trent—and as a member of the advisory council of NCVO.

As a member of the committee, I want to comment briefly on this amendment. I certainly do not want to repeat the points made by the noble Baroness. However, it was quite clear that we felt that, in the course of a statutory inquiry, the commission should not be limited to evidence of misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the specific charity subject to such an inquiry. One discussion we had was around the Cup Trust, where the promoters of the scheme had a history of using charities in tax schemes.

However, we felt that the provisions of this part of the Bill were very broadly drawn since what is damaging to public trust and confidence in charities is obviously an open and potentially very subjective test. We shared the concerns of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which expressed its anxiety about the breadth of this provision. We also shared the concerns of NCVO and several other witnesses—as the noble Baroness said—about the risks associated with this power and its lack of clarity. In particular, I know that NCVO was concerned that, in the absence of guidance, trustees and charities will be uncertain about the possible consequences of their conduct in relation to matters that will probably not have anything to do with the management or administration of the charity. I am very conscious of the points made by so many noble Lords about the reaction of trustees to the chilling effect of some of the commission’s powers. We are very unclear about the impact those powers will have.

As I said, I want to speak on this only briefly. I do not wish to exclude the reference to conduct not associated with charitable activities because that is very important. I hope the Government will look again at this. They said they would. They have not included any reference to this in the Bill, so I hope they will look again and be more explicit about the constraints on this apparently unlimited power.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I just add a word to what the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick of Undercliffe, said by drawing attention to two paragraphs in our report—paragraphs 120 and 121. In paragraph 120, we refer to evidence from the Charity Law Association. It told us that, in its view,

“the wording of this power was ‘very wide’ and that it had concerns about how conduct would be deemed relevant for consideration by the Commission”,

if it was given that very wide power. In paragraph 121, we referred to the Muslim Charities Forum—this is on page 41 of the report—which expressed a concern that,

“the provision would allow the Commission to pass judgment on the political views of charity trustees, potentially infringing upon freedom of association and expression”.

A particular concern—and we quote from its evidence—was that trustees might, in a personal capacity,

“express support for Palestinian Statehood, speak out against the crack-down on Freedom of Association in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, or merely voice their anger at aspects of Western foreign policy”.

That could all,

“potentially fall under the net of supporting terrorism and/or extremism”.

It would then fall within the very broad description which is given in the two paragraphs to which these amendments refer.

I have to confess that we did not make any specific recommendation in our report. However, in paragraph 124, we state:

“we share the concerns of the JCHR and other witnesses about the risks associated with the power and its lack of clarity”.

I wanted to make these points to emphasise that there was a strong evidential basis for the concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has expressed. These two references are in addition to those that the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, mentioned in her short speech.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, having served on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, I understand the concerns about the width of this clause, but if we were to accept this amendment, we would go from a very broad power to a very narrow one. As I read it, we have to take into account, first, the effect of a person’s behaviour within the charity about to be inquired into and secondly, the conduct of that person in any other charity. That does not seem satisfactory because there are clearly issues that range more widely. The behaviour of a trustee in general life is an indication of their seriousness. For example, the existence of county court judgments would indicate that their personal financial behaviour may be a bit erratic. It may be that they had been a director of a commercial company which had gone bankrupt and which had been unfavourably commented upon by the companies’ inspectorate. It might even have resulted in them being banned as a company director for a time. These are all issues which the Charity Commission might reasonably take into account when considering a particular situation, if what can be seen as a proven rotten apple is likely to result in damage to the position, reputation, trust and confidence in the charitable sector generally.

While I have some sympathy with the concerns of the noble Baroness, I do not think striking out subsection (3)(b) of new Section 76A is the right answer. It would be too narrow a prism and the Charity Commission would have its hands unduly tied. We must find some better way to sort it out.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken for their excellent contributions and for the kind words spoken about me. Clearly, the pressure is now on for me to live up to your Lordships’ expectations. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, for his speech and for his contribution to the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill. The last few hours confirmed what I said at the start of the debate: your Lordships’ House is indeed a place for quiet but incisive scrutiny. Much more than that, it is a forum in which the voice of our nation’s “little platoons” can be heard. I counted more than 30 charitable organisations being represented by the speakers in this debate.

Taking a step back, it is clear to me that, thanks in very large part to those who spent so long scrutinising these proposals over many months, there is considerable support in this House for the principles that underpin the Bill and most of its measures. Let us not forget why these powers are needed. It was the independent National Audit Office that pointed to,

“gaps in the Commission’s statutory powers which were hampering its ability to regulate effectively”.

In the years since that report was written, many in the charity sector have supported the need for change, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson did again today. These powers need to be carefully balanced, as does the role of the Charity Commission, between being a regulator and an adviser, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said. Here again I pay tribute to and thank the noble and learned Lord—the Usain Bolt of charity law, as we are told to call him—for all he did in making that process so productive and worth while.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, it occurs to me that Usain Bolt suggests that we rather rushed our job. I think Mo Farah might be a better analogy.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

I am brought up short. The noble and learned Lord is quite right: Mo Farah would be much better. Thanks to the noble and learned Lord’s hard work, and the work of so many others in this Chamber, I am pleased but not entirely surprised that rather than wheeling out the wrecking ball for this Bill, your Lordships have simply started to stick little pins into it before the House, to test, to probe and to clarify a little bit more. I very much welcome this, my first experience of legislative acupuncture, an experience I am told will leave me feeling invigorated, refreshed and revitalised.

Turning to address the points made, I hope to cover as many as I can, starting with some of the more detailed comments. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, asked whether we could amend Clause 8 to make it clear that there are other circumstances in which a third party may be unable to comply with the Charity Commission direction. I am sympathetic to this point as we want the provisions to work effectively. We will need to look at this in some more detail before Committee, as we will other words such as “privy”, which I think the noble and learned Lord also mentioned.

My noble friend Lord Lindsay referred to the complementary role that standards and accreditation could play alongside the new powers proposed in the Bill in addressing governance and trustee issues. I agree and I welcome the work being done by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service and the NCVO to explore the potential that standards and accreditation have to offer in the charity sector.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson made a number of incisive points, as one would expect. He asked for the tribunal appeal rights to be consolidated and simplified. While recognising his point, it is important to note that not all Charity Commission decisions are subject to appeal and the existing table of appeal rights provides a useful checklist of what decisions can be appealed and who can appeal them. The Charity Tribunal itself has, I am told, not expressed concerns about it in practice. My noble friend Lord Hodgson also asked for time to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations. I am sorry to say that I cannot give any guarantees, but my noble friend knows that the Government will look favourably on deregulatory and simplification measures.

A number of comments were made about the social investment aspects of the Bill, and I am very encouraged and heartened by the interest that your Lordships paid to this. The noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, for example, made a number of perceptive points about social investment, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I would very much like to meet with both of them to pick their brains, as they clearly have a lot of experience in this sector. I know that the noble Viscount sits on a number of foundations, and it is quite clear from the noble Baroness’s very eloquent speech that she, too, has a lot to offer.

My noble friend Lord Borwick made some very interesting points on the definition of social investment, including a slightly detailed point on mixed-motive investment. I will not detain the House on that point now but I would be delighted to discuss it with him, as I would with my noble friend Lord Bridgeman. As regards the naming of charities, a point which my noble friend Lord Borwick brought up, I simply point out that it is an offence to call yourself a charity if you are not; and as regards charitable income, charities must now declare income from central and local government in their accounts.

I turn to my noble friend Lord Moynihan’s remarks about independent schools, and pay tribute to the extensive and fantastic work that he has done in this area and on sports in general. He made some interesting points about the public benefit test. I would like to make it clear that charities already have to report on their public benefit in their trustees’ annual report. However, I would be happy to meet my noble friend before Committee to discuss the points that he has raised. Likewise, I would like to discuss the public benefit issue with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, who also brought this up in a number of ways.

Perhaps I may turn to some of the substantive points in the Bill itself. Clause 3, as noble Lords will remember, will enable the Charity Commission to take account of other relevant evidence of a person’s conduct in the context of a statutory inquiry into a charity. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the noble Lord, Lord Low, raised concerns about this. I would simply point to several safeguards on this point, and I shall do so quickly. First, there must be a statutory inquiry open and the Charity Commission must be satisfied that there is misconduct or mismanagement linked to the individual in that charity before it can rely on conduct from outside the charity in its decision-making. Secondly, when exercising its powers the commission must provide a statement of reasons which sets out the evidence it relied on in making the decision. This would include any evidence it relied on from outside the charity. Finally, there is a right of appeal to the Charity Tribunal in relation to the exercise of the commission’s compliance and remedial powers, ensuring judicial oversight of the exercise of the power.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the noble Lord, Lord Low, also referred to Clause 7, which contains a power to direct a charity to be wound up. As your Lordships will know, the commission’s usual practice is to restore a charity to health following an inquiry. However, in some very rare cases—and I stress they are rare—it would be more appropriate for any remaining assets to be transferred to another charity. The commission can already do that under existing powers, but now the commission will have the power needed for the shell to be wound up. This power is available only in the context of a statutory inquiry where there is misconduct or mismanagement, or risk to charity property. In addition, the commission must be satisfied that the charity does not operate, or that its purpose could be more effectively promoted if it were to cease to operate, and that the exercise of this power is expedient in the public interest. There is also a requirement for the commission to publish details of a proposed winding-up order and invite representations. A winding-up order can be appealed to the tribunal. So, there are a number of safeguards around that clause too.

Two points were made on Clause 9, which concerns the automatic disqualification powers that the Charity Commission is to be given. The noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Barker, and the noble Lord, Lord Low, among others, raised this point. I am sure that we will discuss this further in Committee. As regards their wish for sex offences to be added to the list, I would simply say that there is an existing regime to ensure the suitability of anyone in a charity with unsupervised access to children and vulnerable adults. Whether they are a trustee, an employee or anyone else, they must all have had a Disclosure and Barring Service check. It would be impractical for the Bill to break down the charities type by type and prescriptively list criteria for automatic disqualification in each case. Charities should be trusted to make their own decisions on how suitable a potential trustee is when recruiting. Where charities fail to take their safeguarding responsibilities seriously, the Charity Commission can and does intervene to take regulatory action.