Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debate16:25 - Division on Amendment 7 - Ayes: 257 / Noes: 174 - Amendment 7 agreed.
Lord Bridges of Headley
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)
My Lords, before I address this amendment, I thank all those who have debated, scrutinised and kicked the tyres, so to speak, of this Bill, not just in Committee but also during its pre-legislative scrutiny. Although I know there may be points on which some of us may differ, the Bill before your Lordships today has greatly benefited from the wisdom, experience and insight that a number of your Lordships, sitting on all Benches, have brought to the debate. The fact that we have managed to agree on so much reflects the overwhelming wish of this House to ensure that charities continue to have the trust and confidence of the general public.
This group of amendments is focused on providing greater clarity in the Bill, and more modern language. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who has been involved in this Bill since its publication in draft last year, raised these points in Committee.
These amendments address the old-fashioned language of “privy to”, replacing it with a much clearer form of words while maintaining the threshold for intervention at the same level. Being “privy to” something can comprise more than mere knowledge, and includes an element of concurrence, or agreement, as well. We believe that the new formulation captures that.
There are two elements to the new wording: first, that the person,
“knew of the misconduct or mismanagement”;
and, secondly, that they,
“failed to take any reasonable step to oppose it”.
We believe that, together, both elements equate as closely as possible to “privy to” but are much clearer for the lay reader of the legislation. The amendments replace “privy to” throughout the Bill and the Charities Act 2011, except in one place in the Charities Act 2011, in Section 71. Here the context is quite different and privity does not appear to refer to anything more than just knowledge.
I apologise for the late tabling of Amendments 13A, 13B and 13C. I confess that there was an oversight on our part but we decided to table them late because without them we would have left “privy to” in one part of the Bill while addressing it in all others.
These amendments, while relatively minor changes, will improve the clarity of the Bill and make the law more understandable for the lay reader. I beg to move.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
I am very grateful to the Minister and those who have been advising him for this group of amendments. As the Minister pointed out, it achieves much greater clarity than the rather old-fashioned word “privy”—being used as an adjective—did. It has been replaced by two very important verbs. The value of the clarity is that there are two sides to each of these clauses that one has to consider: the person who is being suspected of having engaged in the prohibited activity; and the commission itself, which has to police the activities of the person. Clarity is needed on both sides and the way in which the clauses have been reworded achieves that.
I congratulate the Minister on finding a better form of words than I think I was able to do—or indeed the Joint Committee was able to do when it was looking at the matter. The formula is much improved. I think I must bear some responsibility for not having searched through the whole Bill and traced all the various places in which “privy” was being used. I think we have now reached finality on that issue and for that, too, I am extremely grateful.
Lord Bridges of Headley
“( ) that a particular person knew of the misconduct or mismanagement and failed to take any reasonable step to oppose it,”
Lord Bridges of Headley
Lord Bridges of Headley
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, this second group of amendments also responds to a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and I am grateful to him for bringing this to our attention as well.
Amendments 5 and 6 relate to Clause 8, which amends the Charity Commission’s power in Section 85 of the Charities Act 2011 to direct the application of charity property where the person holding it is unwilling to apply the property. The purpose of Clause 8 is to enable the commission to make an effective direction in cases where the person holding the charity property may be willing but is unable to apply it. The most common example of this problem was considered to be where financial institutions hold a charity’s property but are unable to comply with a commission direction to transfer that property because to do so would result in a breach of their contract with the charity.
I am conscious that we have gone back and forth on this issue. Our initial drafting sought to remove any obstacles by allowing the commission’s direction to overcome a contractual obligation owed to the charity. Importantly, Clause 8 continues to provide the specific statutory protection for a financial institution in cases where compliance with a Charity Commission direction in these circumstances might constitute a breach of its contract with a charity.
However, we have been made aware that there are other barriers that may make a person unable to comply with a commission direction of this type; for example, a person may be willing in principle to apply a property properly but lack the power to do so. Therefore, our new formulation in Amendment 6 clearly amends Clause 8 to reintroduce “unable” so that it is clear that the commission’s power to direct the application of charity property can be exercised where the person holding the property is either unwilling or unable to transfer it.
Again, this is a relatively modest amendment but it will, I believe, improve the effectiveness and practicality of this provision. I beg to move.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, here again I express my gratitude to the Minister for bringing this amendment forward. He has explained very precisely the value which can be seen in the introduction of the additional word. I know from communications with the Charity Commission that it is delighted that this amendment is being made. As I endeavoured to explain in Committee, the wording in the Bill when it was introduced left it with a problem, which has now been solved. On behalf of the commission, I am extremely grateful.
Lord Bridges of Headley
(00)”) In subsection (1)(a), after “unwilling” insert “or unable”.
(00)”) ”
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, at the start of the debate, I said that I was delighted at the level of cross-party agreement on so much of this Bill. However, this is clearly one of the very few clauses and amendments on which we differ. I have obviously listened to the speeches that have been made this afternoon and read the debates with other points that have been raised by a number of noble Lords in recent weeks. Clearly, a number of noble Lords feel extremely strongly on this issue. We have heard passionate speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Kerslake, Lord Palmer and Lord Campbell-Savours, to name just three.
While I may disagree with some—and in some cases a little more than some—of what has been said, I obviously respect the arguments that have been made. As has been said by a number of noble Lords, I know that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government will read this debate with not just interest but great care.
Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will not bombard them with statistics or facts to try to underpin the rationale behind the Government’s policy for right to buy—for which, as noble Lords all know, the Government secured a mandate at the general election. Neither, at the risk of aggravating and frustrating noble Lords still further, will I get into the detail of how that policy will work. I regret that I cannot do so and I will not insult noble Lords’ intelligence by trying to pretend that the right-to-buy policy has nothing to do with the charities sector—of course it does. But I ask noble Lords to consider the point has been made by a number of previous speakers—surely the time and place to debate the right-to-buy policy will be when the Housing Bill is before Parliament and the details of that policy are before this House.
Furthermore, many of us agree that although the Bill touches on the issue of other areas of law such as the financing of terrorist organisations, we should not in that case attempt to review counterterrorism legislation in the Bill. So, too, here and now is not the time to debate and decide on housing policy and how it interacts with the charities sector. Furthermore, I know that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford has an open door to any noble Lord who may wish to discuss this with her in the weeks and months ahead.
On the actual amendment, I beg to differ with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. It does not simply state the existing legal position. I will explain why. The law governing charitable assets is rooted in case law. As I am sure many noble Lords will agree, a real difficulty with creating a simple statutory provision for a large area of case law is that it will invariably fail to cover the many complexities that often arise, and it will be exceptionally difficult to find a satisfactory expression that would properly cover the explanation and nuanced analysis that is often afforded in judgments in case law. Moreover, there is a real danger of agreeing to a statutory provision that could give rise to unintended consequences.
The wording in the amendment that charities may not,
“use or dispose of their assets”,
will cover property assets other than land, such as investments. This raises a whole separate issue with the duties that apply to a charity’s assets that are not land.
Furthermore, Charity Commission guidance on the disposal of land makes clear that such disposal must be in the best interests of the charity and in furtherance of the charitable purposes, or for the best price available, rather than be consistent with charitable purposes. These concepts have very different meanings, the latter being much wider in its potential application. Giving the Charity Commission a new and enhanced role in policing the disposal of charity assets is inconsistent with the current aim of helping the commission to focus on its core regulatory responsibilities. Requiring it to ensure that charities are not required to dispose of assets would be more than just an unwelcome distraction for the regulator.
As I mentioned in Committee, there is also the preserved right to buy in relation to housing associations, and the right to acquire. These existing rights could be undermined by this amendment.
I hope that noble Lords will see that the amendment proposed is problematic for a number of reasons. That being said, I repeat: I recognise that there are significant concerns about how the proposed policy to extend right to buy will be applied to charitable housing associations, but I would respectfully reiterate to your Lordships that the time and the place for that debate is the housing Bill. Finally, although we clearly disagree on this issue, I should like to repeat my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for her co-operation on and contribution to many aspects of the Bill. I hope that, on reflection on this point, she will decide not to press the amendment.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that and I thank all speakers who, on the substance, it seems to me, agreed with what we are trying to achieve. The difficulties are over whether this is the right Bill or the right wording, which basically says that the Charity Commission must make sure that,
“independent charities are not compelled to use or dispose of their assets in a way which is inconsistent with their charitable purposes”.
If the wording can be better than that—if it should be something such as the “best interests” of charities, as the Minister says—I will be very content, if the amendment is passed, to work with him at Third Reading to make the wording correct and acceptable to the Charity Commission and to the charity lawyers, who know far more about wording than I do.
On the issue, there are two things that I want to say. The first comes from what the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said. This is a Bill about the protection of charities, and we are trying to protect charitable assets so that the money can be used for what the donors wanted when they bequeathed it. The idea of putting it on to the Charity Commission is that, basically, somebody has to protect charities from being compelled by someone else—not by their charitable trustees—to do something with the money that those who gave it did not intend.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, asked about compulsory purchase for a road. In a sense it is always the public sector that does that; it is nationalisation. The land is taken over so that a road can be built. I said in a meeting with the Minister that it was not normally his party that wanted to nationalise things, so I am interested that over charitable housing that is what the Government want. We are talking about a swathe of housing—not one or two in the way of a new train line—that over time will undoubtedly be held by the private sector.
My second issue is that we are not talking just about housing—albeit that we have heard about the Peabody, Keswick and Sutton housing associations. We are also talking about that wider big society. I used to work in alcohol misuse issues; we ran a lot of social care. It could be our assets, under another Bill, where the Government felt that they wanted to use them in a certain way that we as an independent charity, which had raised the money, did not want to do. We have heard about the National Trust—or indeed, it could be hospitals or hospices.
The issue is not just about housing, which is why it is not appropriate to leave it to a housing Bill. We want to state something very simply: where money has been donated to an independent charity for a particular purpose, the trustees must abide by their trustee duty to make sure that the assets are used there. That is something on which this House would like to take a view.
Lord Bridges of Headley
“(a) ”
Lord Bridges of Headley
“Case KP is subject to the notification requirements of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I rise to move this amendment, which is also in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie.
Despite what has just happened, I must start by paying tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for her pursuit of this cause. The very first time I met the noble Baroness, just minutes after my introduction, she highlighted this flaw in the Bill, with great charm but with her characteristic force of conviction. As I have said before, I am in complete agreement with her and other noble Lords in wanting to protect children and vulnerable adults from the risk of abuse in charities.
In Committee, the noble Baroness presented a compelling case for automatic disqualification to extend to sex offenders. I am pleased, therefore, to respond with Amendment 10, which will do just that. I was delighted that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, put their names to this amendment. I think it goes to show the breadth of support for this measure. I just hope that the noble Baroness will not reprimand me for stealing her thunder.
Amendment 10 adds a new case, case K, to the criteria that give rise to automatic disqualification from charity trusteeship and senior management positions. Case K is a person who is subject to the notification requirements in Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, often referred to as being on the sex offender register. Such a person is considered to require monitoring in order to manage the risk of sexual harm they may pose to the public. Our policy rationale is that they are unfit to be in a position of trust, controlling funds held and activities carried out for the public benefit, and should be disqualified from being a charity trustee or being in a senior management role within a charity unless and until they are no longer subject to notification requirements or are granted a waiver from the disqualification by the Charity Commission; for instance, the commission might consider it appropriate to grant a waiver to enable someone to take up a position in a charity that works with ex-offenders.
The unfitness results not just from the fact that it would damage public trust and confidence in charities if someone in that position were able to serve as a trustee or in a senior management role but because people in such roles may well have privileged access to children or vulnerable people, even if the charity is not routinely working with such groups; in other words, its trustees and employees would not necessarily be subject to Disclosure and Barring Service checks. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, gave a good example in Committee of a charity which provides a community hall that is used by Girl Guides or for children’s parties.
As I said in Committee, automatic disqualification of sex offenders does not in any way mean that charities can lower their guard. Charities must still have in place robust policies and procedures to safeguard their beneficiaries, and where charities are undertaking regulated activity they will still need to obtain Disclosure and Barring Service checks. But the amendment will, I am sure, result in greater protection of children and vulnerable adults from risk of abuse in charities. Given the number of historic cases that have come to light across all sectors of society, anything that reduces that risk is to be welcomed. I thank the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their support, and I commend the amendment to the House.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, I have only two things to say: thank you and sorry. The Minister had only just taken off his red gown after being introduced when I got at him about this, and that does need an apology. I also want to thank him for engaging with us on this, for having got exactly the right amendment and for describing it far better than I could. I also think it shows the value of your Lordships’ House that, on an issue such as this that does not divide us politically, we have the same aims of protecting young people and we are able to work together to move this forward. My noble friend and I are very happy to support this amendment.
Lord Bridges of Headley
Lord Bridges of Headley
“Fund-raising
(1) Section 59 of the Charities Act 1992 (prohibition on certain fund-raising without agreement in prescribed form) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (6) for “such requirements” substitute “the requirement in subsection (7) and such other requirements (including any requirements supplementing subsections (7) and (8))”.
(3) After that subsection insert—
“(7) The requirement in this subsection is that the agreement must specify all of the following—
(a) any voluntary scheme for regulating fund-raising, or any voluntary standard of fund-raising, that the professional fund-raiser or commercial participator undertakes to be bound by for the purposes of the agreement; (b) how the professional fund-raiser or commercial participator is to protect vulnerable people and other members of the public from behaviour within subsection (8) in the course of, or in connection with, the activities to which the agreement relates;(c) arrangements enabling the charitable institution to monitor compliance with subsection (1) or (2) by reference to the agreement.(8) The behaviour mentioned in subsection (7)(b) is—
(a) unreasonable intrusion on a person’s privacy;(b) unreasonably persistent approaches for the purpose of soliciting or otherwise procuring money or other property;(c) placing undue pressure on a person to give money or other property.”(4) In the Charities Act 2011, after section 162 insert—
“162A Annual reports: fund-raising standards information
(1) If section 144(2) applies to a financial year of a charity, the annual report in respect of that year must include a statement of each of the following for that year—
(a) the approach taken by the charity to activities by the charity or by any person on behalf of the charity for the purpose of fund-raising, and in particular whether a professional fund-raiser or commercial participator carried on any of those activities;(b) whether the charity or any person acting on behalf of the charity was subject to an undertaking to be bound by any voluntary scheme for regulating fund-raising, or any voluntary standard of fund-raising, in respect of activities on behalf of the charity, and, if so, what scheme or standard;(c) any failure to comply with a scheme or standard mentioned under paragraph (b);(d) whether the charity monitored activities carried on by any person on behalf of the charity for the purpose of fund-raising, and, if so, how it did so;(e) the number of complaints received by the charity or a person acting on its behalf about activities by the charity or by a person on behalf of the charity for the purpose of fund-raising;(f) what the charity has done to protect vulnerable people and other members of the public from behaviour within subsection (2) in the course of, or in connection with, such activities.(2) The behaviour within this subsection is—
(a) unreasonable intrusion on a person’s privacy;(b) unreasonably persistent approaches for the purpose of soliciting or otherwise procuring money or other property on behalf of the charity;(c) placing undue pressure on a person to give money or other property.(3) In this section—
(a) “commercial participator” and “professional fund-raiser” have the meaning given by section 58 of the Charities Act 1992 (control of fund-raising: interpretation);(b) “fund-raising” means soliciting or otherwise procuring money or other property for charitable purposes.(4) Section 58(6) and (7) of the Charities Act 1992 (references to soliciting money etc) apply for the purposes of this section as they apply for the purposes of Part 2 of that Act.””
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I am again grateful to the noble Baroness for tabling her amendments and for bringing this issue to the attention of the House. I will first speak to Amendment 14 tabled in my name.
When this issue was debated only a few weeks ago, I said that three questions needed to be answered: first, whether the standards fundraisers have set themselves are set high enough; secondly, whether the structures for self-regulation are the right ones; and thirdly, whether fundraisers and the charity trustees who oversee them accept the need for change to ensure that donors are treated with honesty, respect and decency. We now know rather more about all three issues, and on all three, more needs to be done to maintain and strengthen public trust in charities—which is a key underlying aim of the entire Bill.
On the first, the news since that debate has been profoundly depressing. The revelations in the Daily Mail did what investigative journalism is supposed to do: shine a light on people who are treating others badly because they think no one is looking. I thank the newspaper for doing that. Of course, the stories in the Mail do not typify the majority of fundraisers, who are in the main thoroughly decent people doing a vital job, be it holding jumble sales, doing fun runs or hosting large charity events. However, allegations of inappropriate pressure being placed on those with dementia and of ludicrously self-serving interpretations of the law on data sharing have rightly angered broad swathes of the community, and many in the charity and fundraising sectors too.
I know that the fundraising sector has tried to respond and that the self-regulatory bodies are working on a number of proposals on issues such as cold calling, data sharing and regularity of contact. In part this has been in response to the challenge laid down by my honourable friend in the other place, the Minister for Civil Society, Rob Wilson, who has been working hard on this matter and has put in place some swift measures to bolster public confidence. He and I—and I think the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—agree that this work needs to continue apace. But the answers the fundraising bodies have so far provided are piecemeal and do not comprise a convincing answer to the second question, which is whether the system as a whole is the right one. Indeed, I think few observers would argue that the system’s response under the stress of the last few weeks has made a compelling case that it is.
I therefore very much welcome the fact that Sir Stuart Etherington has accepted the Minister for Civil Society’s request to chair a cross-party panel to address just this question. I am delighted, too, that my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, have agreed to join that panel. The review will take a root and branch look at what is needed to ensure that we have a system that is fit for purpose and that supports public trust and confidence in charities. Sir Stuart has the licence to be bold and imaginative. His panel has set a brisk pace. It has met once and will report in late September. Its members have our full support.
The response of sector leaders to Sir Stuart’s findings will in part form the answer to the third question, of whether fundraisers and the charity trustees who oversee them accept and fully embrace the need for change. It is now quite clear that the leaders of some of our charities need to take much greater responsibility for the fundraising carried out in their name. We cannot have a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach in the sector, where a charity’s CEO and trustees choose not to attend in any great depth to how their organisation engages the public when fundraising. The CEO’s responsibility for fundraising cannot end with simply demanding that the fundraising director brings the money in while he or she focuses exclusively on the charity’s mission in the field.
Our amendment seeks to address just this point in two ways. First, it would require third-party fundraising organisations, of the sort that featured so heavily in the recent Mail articles, to write their fundraising standards into their contracts with the charities that employ them. That would include how the fundraiser will protect vulnerable people and how the charity will monitor how standards are met. That way, all parties will be clear and upfront about what will be done in the charity’s name, and about their respective responsibilities.
Secondly, the amendment would require charities with incomes over £1 million to set out in their annual reports their approach to fundraising, whether they use paid third-party fundraisers and how they protect the wider public and vulnerable people in particular from undue pressure in their fundraising. Again, the point is to require the leadership of a charity to take responsibility for their fundraising practice and set it out for all to see. We know that this is only part of the picture and it is intended to complement a strengthened self-regulatory system, not to replace it. Furthermore, in keeping with our entire approach, these measures seek to be proportionate and targeted to address the issues as we see them today.
I know, too, that the noble Baroness’s amendments are intended to ensure a well-regulated system, bringing in the valuable funds that serve beneficiaries while protecting the interests of the public who give that money. Clearly, the adequacy of the existing self-regulatory system—the elements of it and how they combine together—must be looked at afresh but state regulation is far from a panacea. We firmly believe that Sir Stuart’s panel should be given the chance to succeed and self-regulation to succeed with it. My concern is that the amendment pre-empts the review and in effect moves straight to statutory regulation, even as it cements one part of the existing self-regulatory landscape in place. I suggest we await Sir Stuart’s findings before we invest so heavily in the FRSB. As the noble Baroness said in Committee, the FRSB’s self-regulation system has so far “failed to work”.
As for the reserve power, that remains at Ministers’ disposal should self-regulation be found to be unworkable. However, I do not believe that we are yet at that point—I repeat, yet. Furthermore, statutory agencies such as the Information Commissioner and the Charity Commission are already permitted to intervene where there are serious abuses. I know that the former is investigating the GoGen allegations and has very significant sanctions at his disposal should serious wrongdoing be proved. I therefore continue to hope that the jolt the fundraising and charity sectors received in the last few weeks and the action we are taking will usher in an era of greater awareness and responsibility for fundraising within the sector.
I hope that on reflection the noble Baroness will not press her amendments. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Watson and Lord Wallace, the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, and my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Leigh for their contributions on this issue. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this new amendment in such detail and making time available to explain its purpose to Members in meetings. I preface my remarks by returning to an observation I made at Second Reading about the alacrity with which some matters have been attended to. This is one of those occasions on which there is a great deal of haste which is perhaps not warranted and may not be helpful in trying to get to the root of the problem.
While the Minister wishes to commend the Daily Mail for its attention to this issue, I simply wish that the Daily Mail would turn its attention to the activities of many of the financial institutions of this country, not least the banks, in their treatment of people with Alzheimer’s and other vulnerable adults. If it were to do that, it would rise in my estimation—not a difficult thing, I have to say. But if it genuinely cares about people who are vulnerable, rather than just wishing to have a go at charities, it will continue its campaign and look at the issue in a much wider way.
That said, everybody in the charity sector understands that there is a problem—and the charitable sector has sought for some considerable time to deal with this issue. It has been a long-standing problem. I remember when I started working with charities 25 years ago, we were not dealing with the internet and there was not so much direct marketing, but there was direct marketing, and still the same complaints happened, although perhaps not to such a degree. I do not know whether noble Lords heard the Information Commissioner, Christopher Graham, on the “Today” programme a couple of weeks ago, addressing this exact issue. He was quite clear; he said that we did not need further legislation—that we have the legislation that we need.
The key issue is about the multiple use of donor lists by charities. We need to make sure that all charities are fully observant of existing data protection laws. We do not need the legislation. That said, the Government are to be commended on what they propose in this amendment. At the very least, it will cause the charitable sector to think long and hard about the regulation and guidance, which is what will really matter to charities’ daily activities. We should be in no doubt that charities have the right to continue to try to raise money, and they need to do so. It is not a question of whether they should—it is just how.
The Minister would expect on his first outing that an amendment of this nature would be subject to a number of queries and criticisms in your Lordships’ House. I would focus noble Lords’ attention on new subsection (8) in Section 59 of the Charities Act 1992, as proposed in the amendment. It talks about,
“unreasonable intrusion on a person’s privacy … unreasonably persistent approaches for the purpose of soliciting or otherwise procuring money or other property”,
and,
“placing undue pressure on a person to give money or other property”.
That is fine—but who decides what the definitions are, and who decides whether the activities of a charity have been unreasonable or have placed “undue pressure” on someone? When it has been decided that a charity has acted inappropriately, who is responsible for administering what sanctions to a charity that is found to be deficient?
A further point that I would like the Minister to address is how having this legislation would help a member of the public to understand what they should do were they to be on the receiving end of “undue pressure”, or if they knew of somebody else on the receiving end of such pressure. How would they know what to do?
I draw noble Lords’ attention to subsection (1)(e) of new Section 162A of the Charities Act 2011, as proposed in the amendment. It deals with the annual reports on fundraising standards that charities are supposed to bring forward under this legislation. They have to talk about,
“the number of complaints received by the charity or a person acting on its behalf about activities by the charity or by a person on behalf of the charity for the purpose of fundraising”.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, before I turn to the wording of this amendment, I say that in Committee the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, had to hear about the horrendous experience that Barclays Bank had just put my uncle though; he has Alzheimer’s. In response to her comments, I have today tabled a Question for Short Debate about how banks deal with vulnerable clients, so perhaps we can move together on that.
Unfortunately, other than on that, I take a different view on the amendments the Government have tabled. I thank the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. They are significant, and we warmly welcome them and the work set in hand with the committee he mentioned, whose recommendations we anticipate the second week in September. Looking round at the members, they will keep to that deadline, I am sure.
I, too, pay tribute to the Cooke family, who had to go through the inquest just last week, but who have been willing to share Olive Cooke’s experience of being bombarded with requests for charitable donations. I also join the Minister in congratulating the Daily Mail—coming from me, it may not like that—on its investigation and campaigning which revealed unacceptable practices, shortfalls in monitoring by the charities themselves and, as the Minister said, the weakness of the current self-regulation model.
It is perhaps odd that we have a regulator which does not regulate one vital bit of charitable activity, which is fundraising. This lies in the hands of a voluntary organisation, the Fundraising Standards Board, which works to a code adopted by the Institute of Fundraising. Three years ago, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, gave it five years to get more into line, and it has not yet done so. The Fundraising Standards Board and the Institute of Fundraising have not done their work particularly well. Interestingly, the code does not outlaw nor even limit cold calling, or even require caller line identification. The Fundraising Standards Board, in addition to signing up only two-thirds of those who ought to belong, does not publicise itself, so no one knows to take complaints there, and it does not monitor compliance, or it would not have to have been Mrs Cooke’s family or the Daily Mail that did that job. Even when it threw out a professional fundraising company, it seems to have taken it back in under another name.
That all lets down the charity sector and the enormous generosity of Britain’s charitable donors. I also believe, as noble Lords will understand from our amendment, that it questions whether self-regulation can work in this sector. Hence our Amendment 16, which would require charities and professional fundraisers to belong to the standards board. We recognise that that would have enormous consequences should they be removed from membership for misbehaviour. The NSPCC, one of the charities let down by the professional fundraisers, itself favours compulsory membership of the Fundraising Standards Board as, in its words, the current self-regulation system is too weak. We also think that it is time that the Charity Commission’s reserve powers were brought into play. I am reassured by the Minister’s words that that can be done fairly quickly if the Minister feels it is necessary. So for the moment we want to put our amendment on hold, as we warmly welcome the Government’s own amendments and we await Sir Stuart Etherington’s report.
Government Amendment 14 achieves a number of things. First, and I hope the family can take the benefit from this, it can indeed be seen as Olive’s law; it will mean that something will be on the statute book as a consequence of her experience. Secondly, it puts into the Bill the essence of a code, describing as unacceptable:
“unreasonable intrusion on a person’s privacy … unreasonably persistent approaches for the purpose of soliciting or otherwise procuring money … placing undue pressure on a person to give money”.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, intimates, the Charity Commission may well have to flesh that out a bit, but having that in the Bill is excellent. It makes it clear that such behaviour is unacceptable with regard to vulnerable people but also, in the Government’s words, to the wider public. We particularly welcome that; it is important. Oxfam’s submission to us, for example, concentrates very much on the vulnerable, especially those with Alzheimer’s. However, we believe that all unethical methods need to be stamped out, regardless of the target, so we welcome the Government’s wording on that.
Thirdly, the Government’s amendment will force large charities to state whether they are members of the FRSB. We hope, along with the Government, that that will shame non-members and their trustees because the trustees have to sign off in their annual reports their approach to fundraising and any complaints received. Boards of trustees will no longer be able to be grateful for the income without asking too many questions, as the Minister said. Importantly, the Government have set up what we think is a pretty powerful group—I am looking around at its members in the Chamber today—and we look forward to it reporting back before Third Reading about whether Amendment 14 will indeed do the trick. We welcome the group, as do the NSPCC and Oxfam, which has also suspended its contract with commercial fundraisers, and we look forward to its recommendations.
Should the group suggest that further amendments are needed, we will be happy to work with the Government to facilitate this. We might therefore want to pursue our amendment or some other at Third Reading, depending on what the Government’s review group advises and the Government’s own response to that. We have yet to be persuaded that membership of the FRSB should not be mandatory, or that the Charity Commission’s reserve powers should not be brought into force. However, we are reassured by the Minister’s words on this.
For the moment, I thank the Minister, and indeed his colleague in the Commons, who found time to meet us to discuss this, and for coming forward with such a good amendment. We will be very happy to support it when it is put to the vote shortly.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Hayter, for their words. As with many other issues that we have discussed and will discuss, this is clearly one where we have clear agreement on both the changes that are necessary and the change that we want to bring about. I stress that the amendments we are looking at today represent a start of measures that are targeted at where we know the real problems have arisen: in fundraising agencies and where charity trustees have failed to ensure proper oversight of their charity’s fundraising practices. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, just said, the review that Sir Stuart is conducting is now under way. If further legislation is needed, we will be able to consider that when the Bill goes to the other place. My honourable friend the Minister for Civil Society, Rob Wilson, has said that he will be happy to discuss the findings and recommendations on a cross-party basis; we will be happy to take that further.
As usual the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made some forensic points on these clauses. I will attempt to answer them now, but if I fail to address them, I will be happy to pick them up with her after we have finished proceedings today. She asked who decides on the definition of “unreasonable”. In the first instance, the charity itself decides in setting the terms of its fundraising agreement, but ultimately the Charity Commission can intervene, using its existing powers, if the charity is not doing enough. That said—and this is an important point—the Charity Commission has already committed to updating its fundraising guidance later this year and will take these new requirements into account when it does so.
The second good question the noble Baroness asked was: what are the sanctions where charities are deficient? Here, it would be for the charity commission to decide where the charity fails to meet its obligations. The third question was: how will a member of the public know what to do if they feel that the charity is not meeting these new requirements? That is an extremely good point, and I can see that Sir Stuart’s review is absolutely key. We need to ensure that we focus on this issue from the point of view not just of the charity but of the public as well. Finally, as regards the number of complaints, that is another good point that we need to return to with Sir Stuart and in guidance, and I will make sure that is reflected by the Charity Commission.
To conclude, these amendments, coupled with the review being undertaken by Sir Stuart Etherington, give us a real opportunity to restore public trust and confidence in charity fundraising where, in the last few weeks, it has been found wanting.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Lea, was obviously frustrated by the approach of the Charity Commission when he tried to register the Dag Hammarskjöld trust, and that his impression of the commission has been informed by and reflects that particular case. I must say that waiting several months for a response to a letter does not seem to be good customer service and I, too, would have been extremely frustrated.
For most charities with standard charitable purposes, the process for registration with the Charity Commission is quick and straightforward. In 2014-15, the commission registered over 4,600 charities. For organisations with purposes that are innovative or do not fall within previously recognised charitable purposes, the process of registration can indeed take longer. The law does not recognise wholly novel charitable purposes, but purposes can still be charitable if they are analogous to or within the spirit of charitable purposes specifically identified in the 2011 Act or if they were charitable purposes recognised by the common law before 1 April 2008. Where people want to register as a charity an organisation which has purposes that may not fall clearly within established categories of charitable purposes, the commission must proceed with caution in assessing whether the organisation really has been established for purposes that are charitable in law.
I turn to the specific issue of the Dag Hammarskjöld trust. I do not know all and every detail of the case and it is right that I should not, as the commission is operationally independent. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Lea, said, I have written to him responding to some of the specific questions he raised in Committee about what the Government knew about the case. I apologise to the noble Lord, but I cannot at this Dispatch Box add to the detail that was in the letter sent to him. I regret that, but I absolutely cannot—it is a very detailed case.
On his amendment—which is really what we are debating—the Charity Commission already reports its performance against principles of best regulatory practice, usually framed in terms of proportionality. It does this in its annual report, in its annual Tackling Abuse and Mismanagement report and in stand-alone case reports. I hope your Lordships will forgive me for not repeating the detailed ways in which it does all this as I set it out in Committee at length. This amendment, by highlighting one particular aspect of Section 16, casts doubt on the extent to which the commission should report on other aspects of its general duties. It is, in that respect, undesirable.
Finally, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Lea, will reconsider the offer from the Charity Commission’s chairman to meet him and discuss this case. I fear that I have not been able to reassure the noble Lord that his amendment is not necessary—although I hope that I have done so. I assure him that his difficulty in trying to register the Dag Hammarskjöld trust was not representative of the norm.
Lord Lea of Crondall
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. On the first point, he clearly does not feel that there is anything amiss with the accountability of the Charity Commission. I think he is hiding behind the phrase “operational matter”. When a matter of this importance is put before the House, and with the detail that I have presented, is it not incumbent on the Cabinet Office or the Minister and his officials to look further into it? In other circumstances or areas, one could call it a miscarriage of justice.
As to the question of co-operation regarding the unfinished business of the United Nations arising from the work of the Hammarskjöld Inquiry Trust, we will now have to await the findings of the Secretary-General as he presses the British and other Governments on their failure, to date, to release all relevant records to the UN. It will then be up to the United Nations, not me, to decide whether to point the finger at anyone.
There is one thing of which I am increasingly certain. Historians will take note of the high likelihood of the existence of a second plane and, similarly, of the high degree of suspicion that there was subsequently a cover-up by certain Governments, not excluding the British Government then and subsequently. In time-honoured words, history will be the judge. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment
Lord Judd (Lab)
My Lords, I spoke at some length on this issue in Committee and will therefore not try the patience of the House on Report by repeating all that. I simply say that, as somebody who has worked in the charitable field for quite a lot of my life—I have been chief executive of more than one charity; I have been an honorary officer and a trustee, and I am currently a trustee of one charity—there is an underlying issue here which is of profound importance.
Charities with great experience of front-line engagement have come to realise that they are sometimes aiding and abetting the problems which exacerbate the difficulties faced by those whom they are trying to help, because they are removing the unpalatable symptoms of what is wrong and disguising what is causing the problem. They have come to see that through the experience of their own work. There are many trustees and many staff in some of what I think everyone would on balance agree are the better, more experienced charities who have come to realise that they simply cannot go on doing this, because they are treating symptoms and settling for that, and that one of the most important things they can do in the service of those whom they seek to help is to advocate their situation and to seek the changes which will overcome the causes of the problems of those who are the victims, and that it would be dishonest to do anything else.
Personally, I find the way in which the law on charity has operated in recent years to be perfectly acceptable, and charities have responded to that very well by recognising that they have a duty to ensure that what they are advocating really does arise out of the experience of what they are doing. That is not just a matter of legal, moral responsibility; it is also one of effectiveness, because if they can be seen to be speaking out of real experience that is a very strong muscle in their campaigning.
However, we have to face the reality that there are those who have never been comfortable with this situation and there have been noises in recent years that people would like to curb the sector. That in my view would be disastrous and totally unacceptable and unfair to those who are really trying on our behalf, sometimes valiantly, courageously and bravely, to do the things that are necessary. From that standpoint, to have it explicitly stated in the Bill has great merit. I am therefore glad to see the amendment here and I hope that the House will find its way to endorsing it.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I have no difficulty at all in accepting the premise of the amendment—and much that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said—which states that charities should be free to campaign where that is an effective means of furthering their charitable aims. Speaking up for their beneficiaries, who may have no voice in the democratic debate, stands long in the tradition of the charitable sector. Yes, it may be uncomfortable for some to hear the hard truths that they are told, but that is democracy at work and freedom of speech in action.
Charities have always campaigned, which is as it should be in a free society, and charity campaigns have brought about much good, opening our eyes to issues others have overlooked, often resulting in beneficial changes to the law. Examples are legion and stretch back over generations, and long may that continue. My objection to the amendment is not therefore that what it says is wrong. Indeed, it is not even seeking to have the right to campaign reflected in law, for it already is enshrined in law, through case law, as the noble Baroness said. My concern is that seeking to compress that case law into an amendment in the Bill is difficult, to say the least, and would be likely to inadvertently shift the boundaries of what is permitted under the law in unanticipated and unhelpful ways.
As well as being fraught with difficulty, such an amendment is unnecessary. The implication of the case law is set out in Charity Commission guidance CC9 and, with very few exceptions, that guidance is well understood and observed. Unlike primary legislation, commission guidance can be updated, with proper consultation, to ensure that it remains congruent with case law and up to speed with developments such as the rise of social media.
The introduction of the Transparency of Lobbying Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act, to which a number of noble Lords referred, has recently made the relationship of the law and lobbying a matter of intense debate, and I can understand why. That Act is part of electoral law, and this is clearly not the time to rehearse that debate. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, was one of many noble Lords who referred to the so-called chilling effect that it might have had at the last election, so I am pleased that my noble friend, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, has explicitly called for evidence from the voluntary sector and from noble Lords in his ongoing review of the third party campaigning rules that were updated by Part 2 of that Act. A clear view of the evidence about what impact the updated rules have, or have not, made in their first year is exactly what is needed on an issue that has aroused such strong feeling. The Charity Commission would obviously need to take account of my noble friend’s findings should it decide to review CC9. If there were any such review, the commission has committed to say so publicly and consult widely and wisely.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lea, the Charity Commission does indeed take action in cases where charities of all political persuasions are seen to have crossed the line. During the last election, a charity that was making a point that could be construed as being supportive of the Conservative Party was pulled up short. I therefore do not think it strictly true to say that it does not take action.
This Government welcome and support the campaigning role of charities, properly regulated and properly understood, and acknowledge the benefit that that brings to wider society. I hope that on that basis, and given what I have said to reassure the noble Baroness, she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Lea of Crondall
The Minister has totally misunderstood the purport of my question, which I will repeat. It is clear that the dividing line about what is political has nothing to do with support for a political party. What the Minister just said is a red herring. Of course, things can be ruled out for direct or indirect support for the Labour Party or the Conservative Party. My point was this. That is not in practice the dividing line drawn by the commission, where party political support is ruled out and other matters are ruled in.
Lord Bridges of Headley
I am sorry if I displease the noble Lord still further this afternoon, but any concerns about inappropriate language or material on the part of a charity should be referred to the Charity Commission, which is the independent regulator and will assess those points on a case-by-case basis. The Charity Commission can and does investigate these sorts of concerns in accordance with its risk framework, which sets these things out. I am sorry if the noble Lord dislikes that answer, but that is it.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Judd, who ran Oxfam, and my noble friend Lady Pitkeathley. If my memory is right, the Cabinet Office made Carers UK charity of the year this year, so I am sure that the Minister will have heard particularly from her on that. The Cabinet Office made a great choice.
I thank the Minister. I very much welcome his endorsement of the premise behind this. He gets what we are about. I welcome what he said about the Government listening carefully to the wise words that we know we will have from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. We await his report. Having on record his acknowledgement of the role that advocacy can play on behalf of those without voices is to be welcomed. We look forward to that report—no pressure there, then—from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.