Constitutional Convention

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Thursday 13th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Higgins (Con) (Valedictory Speech)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, on his speech and the Motion he has tabled. He has been fortunate to find time for it. I thank him most sincerely for his extremely kind remarks about me. They are greatly appreciated.

It has been noticeable with the relatively new practice of valedictory speeches that they are often attached to debates that have nothing whatever to do with them, but that is certainly not so in this case. I am here because of the significant constitutional change whereby it was decided that Members of the House of Lords could retire—after centuries and centuries when that was not so. I therefore find myself here today, having reached the conclusion that I ought to retire.

I should make it clear why. I am absolutely convinced, as many others have been, that the House of Lords is too large. The Lord Speaker has initiated a series of actions, including the reports from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, on how it can be reduced and that programme of reduction is now proceeding through various people retiring or by natural causes and so on. I have come to the conclusion that since I have always believed that one’s vote should follow one’s voice and that, if possible, actions should follow one’s vote, I should take action as part of the campaign that has been initiated to reduce the size of the House. That is my only reason for retiring, but I should also say that it would be quite absurd if existing Members decided that they should retire, for the reasons I have given, and we then find the numbers creeping up again. The crucial outstanding point in the report of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, is that once we have reduced the size there should be a cap on that size, regardless of complications with regard to the royal prerogative.

I was first elected to the House of Commons as the Member for Worthing on 15 October 1964. I had not stood before and, despite the assurances of my agent, I was very worried about what the outcome would be; in the event, I was elected with a majority of 18,883. I am glad to say that while that majority somewhat declined since, my former constituency, which was split up, is now represented by two outstanding Members of Parliament: West Worthing by Sir Peter Bottomley, and East Worthing and Shoreham by Mr Tim Loughton. I am happy to say that my former constituents are very fortunate to have such good Members of Parliament and very clever to return them with what are, even now, extremely large majorities.

I served in the Commons from 1964 to 1997— 33 years—and then in your Lordships’ House from 1997 until now, which is 21 years. That is a total of some 54 years and one naturally looks back at some events in that period. One that stands out is the problem with Rhodesia, over which I had some difference of opinion with my constituents culminating in a public meeting of 1,200 people. I do not think that kind of thing happens nowadays but, at all events, that was one problem. Another problem was with the Ugandan Asians. I was in government at that time and we had serious trouble with Mr Idi Amin. Various solutions were proposed, such as that we might have a better relationship with him if we made him a field-marshal in the British Army. That solution was rejected but Ted Heath set up a very small Cabinet committee consisting of Robert Carr, as Home Secretary, Paul Bryan and me to make recommendations. We came out by saying very strongly that the refugees from the crisis in that country should be admitted to this country. That has had considerable economic benefit to this country and it is something of which I am rather proud.

I made my maiden speech in the other place on the plight of old age non-pensioners who had been left out of the original scheme, but nothing happened until I arrived in the Treasury, when I was able to rectify that injustice and make sure that at least they got that part of the pension not covered by national insurance contributions.

Many things in political life are transitory, so one inevitably thinks about what one has done which might pass the test of time. I notice three in particular. One is decimalisation. I was put in charge of it on arrival in the Treasury in 1970. Ian Macleod had advocated a 10 bob unit. Jim Callaghan had argued for a pound unit, on the grounds of the international prestige of the pound, but a few weeks later he devalued the pound, which rather undermined his argument, and I was left with the problem when I arrived at the Treasury. We went ahead with the situation that we inherited and I think, on the whole, it has worked pretty well. Indeed, although the latest coin is very attractive compared with the ones I introduced, the situation has been resolved quite satisfactorily.

More important was the huge taxation reform I brought in with Ian Macleod by abolishing purchase tax and selective employment tax and replacing them with VAT. That has certainly stood the test of time. The basic rate is now double, or rather more, what it was when I introduced it. We went for a single positive rate with zero-rating for essential items so that the tax would not be regressive. The problem with that was that, as I carried the reform through the House of Commons, endless amendments went down stating that this or that item should be zero-rated, but we survived that, with one exception—children’s clothes and shoes. I see that some Members opposite remember that. An amendment had been put down by one of my colleagues to zero-rate it and I stood up to make my usual speech saying that it was a universal, wide-ranging scheme and so on, and then I received a note from the Whip saying, “Do you realise that everyone on this side is at the Royal Garden Party?”, so I succeeded in announcing that there would be a special inquiry into this item, and as a result children’s shoes and clothes are zero-rated, which they would not have been before.

I am conscious of the time. In the Lords I went straight on to the Front Bench when I left the Commons and served there for a period in opposition against Lady Hollis of Heigham, whom we all greatly miss as she recently left us. It is a huge advantage in opposition to have someone against you who knows all about the subject. Indeed, she knew more about the subject than anyone else in the world. It was a very enjoyable period in my political life. I sat on a number of committees, including the Committee on the Speakership, the Committee on the Conventions on the Relationship between the two Houses of Parliament and various other ad hoc committees, which I enjoyed. I have been particularly engaged with the Campaign for an Effective Second Chamber, which was initiated by my noble friend Lord Cormack and supported by my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, both of whom are in their place. I think we are very grateful for the work which that all-party committee has done, which has certainly improved the constitutional changes that have been made. I hope there will be further constitutional changes in future.

I think it is true to say that your Lordships’ House is probably more effective now than it has been at any time in its history. It is making an outstanding contribution, it has taken on a great deal of the legislative burden from the other place—which I do not think is fully appreciated—and, generally speaking, it operates extremely well. It is an extraordinary place. The mass of expertise and experience that your Lordships devote to business of the House is very important. It is also a quite extraordinarily friendly place, which I have greatly appreciated.

In conclusion, I thank very much all the staff of the House—the badge messengers, the staff in the catering department and so on. If I may, I will say how grateful I am for the support I have received throughout from my wife and family. That is very important; one cannot do a good job here or in the Commons without it. I thank noble Lords for the kind remarks that I have received, and I appreciate very much the opportunity to say this today.

Referendums: Parliamentary Democracy

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Thursday 19th July 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Higgins]

That this House takes note of the impact on parliamentary democracy in the United Kingdom of the use of referendums.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, our debates on Brexit have made frequent reference to referendums, but it seemed to me that the time had come to take a rather wider view of this issue. I am glad to see that a number of noble Lords who have added their names to the speakers list today take a similar view. I look forward with great interest to their comments, particularly the maiden speech from my noble friend Lord Pickles. He will give us a more up-to-date perspective on the view of those in the House of Commons on these issues than some of us who moved from the House of Commons to your Lordships’ House a long while ago.

There is certainly no lack of background briefing on this issue. The House of Lords Library has produced a splendid note, and only this month a massive tome, a report of the Independent Commission on Referendums, was published. In addition, there have been reports by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee and the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee of the House of Commons. The latter makes a particular study of the results and the effect of the Brexit referendum.

They all draw a certain amount of attention to the history of referendums in this country since 1975. Referendums were used very successfully by Hitler. Both Churchill and Attlee criticised the idea of them and, notably, Mrs Thatcher described referendums as,

“a splendid weapon for demagogues and dictators”.

While that reflected the immediate context of the time, I think there are still considerable concerns about the way in which referendums affect our democratic system. They are certainly popular with the electorate—perhaps to some extent reflecting the unpopularity of politicians —with the idea that they somehow get a direct feed in, even though in this country I believe we have politicians who are less out of touch with the electorate than in almost any other country in the world because of constituency meetings and so on.

I am concerned that the idea of referendums is constantly referred to as democratic. One can see the arguments in favour of that view but, in fact, it is not what we normally mean by democracy in this country. What we fundamentally believe in, I think, is the idea of representative parliamentary democracy where we elect Members of Parliament and, as Burke pointed out, they then take into account the views of their constituents together with their own judgment on any particular issue. One of the problems with referendums is the extent to which a Member of Parliament or a Member of your Lordships’ House can take into account the views which were expressed. This is somewhat inhibited if a major part of a decision—almost a central part of it—is taken by a referendum. It is noticeable that very few Members of Parliament have stood up and simply said that they reject the decision of this or that referendum.

The crucial issue here is whether the referendum is regarded as binding. I took part at great length in the debates in your Lordships’ House on the referendum Bill. What was clear at that time was that it proposed an advisory referendum, not a binding one. It is clear since then that the Government have regarded it as binding. The effect of that on the extent to which Members of Parliament can express an independent view is obviously very important.

The Prime Minister, soon after the result of the referendum, said very clearly we must “respect” it. Respect is a very interesting word. As far as the last referendum is concerned, there are lots of reasons for not respecting it. It was not a representative democracy, passed by an overwhelming majority of the population. It was a majority of those voting but quite clearly a lot of people did not vote because they realised that they did not fully understand the issues. Therefore, the argument that we must respect it also has to be seen against the background of a campaign that was riddled with lies from beginning to end—not least on the question of the Brexit premium. In addition, there is the recent discovery of the extent to which the finances of the leave campaign might have affected the result. To conclude that we must respect the result is very doubtful.

As far as that is concerned, we have to take into account whether it is binding or not. As I say, it is in danger of undermining rather than helping our democratic system. The report that I referred to from the House of Commons points out that critics of referendums warn that they may undermine parliamentary democracy, particularly so when there is a clear difference of view,

“between … a majority of the public and the majority of parliamentarians”.

It points out that this is probably the situation with the Brexit decision. So this, again, must give us some concern that referendums do not really help the operation of our democratic system—in fact, quite the contrary. I conclude from that that there are some serious problems that we have to face if we are to continue with the use of referendums, and there is a very strong case for the committees of both Houses to look at the issue in great detail.

One thing I am absolutely clear about is that I do not think there is a case for a second referendum on Brexit. We can do without another one, as it would again produce a very confused result. The right course of action at this stage is for Parliament to assert how the pieces of the chaos that have resulted from the referendum, not least in the last few days, can be put right. Parliament really must assert its influence more strongly over the way in which things develop in the present situation. Therefore, the case for referendums becomes increasingly doubtful. At all events, I think that we need to tighten up the rules.

I was surprised to discover in the briefing the existence of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, which I had not previously come across—I may not be alone in that. That could perhaps be amended to cover certain issues. I will always regret that during the passage of the referendum Bill through your Lordships’ House, I did not put down an amendment to cover thresholds for both the turnout and the majority. We might have been in a very different situation today had I done so, but I thought that if I did, it would inevitably make the result of the referendum mandatory rather than advisory. None the less, I think that there is a case to be made, perhaps by the relevant committees, for saying that we should not have any referendum in future without thresholds for the turnout and the majority.

I conclude by saying that we certainly need further study by the committees to sort out the present problems that I have referred to. However, I am also influenced by the fact that I spend a considerable amount of my time in the Netherlands, which has had a rather bad experience with a referendum relating to Ukraine. It has been a real problem for the country, so the political coalition in the Netherlands has decided to introduce a measure to ban, flat out, the use of referendums, including advisory referendums. As I said, the difference between advisory and mandatory referendums is very blurred. As I understand it, this had already gone through the lower House of the Parliament in the Netherlands, but there was then a move to have a referendum against having a ban on referendums. This was obviously rather controversial. The result is that there have been further disputes and the matter has gone to the Supreme Court, which has come to the conclusion that you cannot have a referendum banning the use of referendums. That, as I understand it, is the present situation and we will have to wait to see what any appeal against the Supreme Court decision brings.

That brings out the important point that we should consider to what extent the use of referendums in our country undermines the normal representative parliamentary system, in which we have such faith and which I think is unequalled in the world, not least in protecting minorities. One of the great problems with referendums is that they take no account whatever of minorities. They have been described as the dictatorship of the majority, and I think that that is indeed the position, not least as far as the latest referendum is concerned.

I believe that we should consider all these issues very carefully and I hope that the debate will seek to clarify them further. Given the amount of interest in this issue by way of background papers and so on, this is clearly an appropriate moment for us to consider to what extent we should continue to use referendums and, if we do, in what form. I beg to move.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, time is very tight in this debate, and I respectfully ask all noble Lords to comply with their speaking times.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, I was delighted and surprised to be fortunate in the Motions ballot. I am glad that my choice of subject produced a debate of such exceptional quality, even by your Lordships’ high standards, particularly with two outstanding maiden speeches from my noble friend Lord Pickles and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.

The Minister’s reply is very important. What has come out very clearly is that our experience of referendums, since they started and more recently, shows that there are a great many lessons to be learned and mistakes to be avoided. As my noble friend on the Front Bench just said, it is worth considering all the points made today and then seek to codify them to some extent, so when we next come to consider whether we should have a referendum and how it should be carried though it will be precisely on that rule book.

In that sense, I hope that this will be a memorable debate. I am most grateful for all the kind remarks that colleagues have made about me. I am very glad that this has been a debate that should have value in future, as well as reflecting what has happened in the past.

Motion agreed.

Carillion

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I am trying to find the appropriate information—and I have now found it. It says that it is likely that the majority of pension schemes will transfer into the PPF with a consequential effect on members’ benefits. Pensioners receive 100% compensation and non-pensioners receive 90% of their accrued pension, subject to an overall cap, which is what I think I said in response to an earlier question. If by any chance this briefing is wrong, the person who wrote it will be writing very quickly to the noble Lord. On the broader issue, the Pension Protection Fund is funded by a levy on all pension funds, and I am confident that it has the resources to take on board the liabilities it is likely to inherit from Carillion. The PPF will, of course, get the assets of the scheme, which, at the time of the last audit, were worth £2.267 billion.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, following up the point on pensions, clearly a heavy burden will fall on the Pension Protection Fund. If I understand what my noble friend says, there are a number of individual pension funds involved. What is the position of the trustees of each of those, and will an inquiry be made into the extent to which they have fulfilled their obligations?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

That is a very good question and I hope that whoever has the responsibility for making sure that the trustees do their job—it is probably the Pensions Regulator—takes my noble friend’s question on board. There are 14 separate defined benefit pension schemes involved, which the Carillion group acquired as it expanded. Overall, there is a significant pensions deficit of £523 million as at 2013—some estimates indicate that it is now up to £1.6 billion. Perhaps I could write to my noble friend about the responsibilities of trustees, because I do not want to imply in any way that they have not been conscientious in discharging their responsibilities.

Class 4 National Insurance Contributions

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Wednesday 15th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that we are reluctant to take advice from the Labour Party on promoting harmony between No. 10 and next door. He will recall that Budget measures introduced by the Labour Government subsequently had to be revised. For the Liberal Democrats, the noble Baroness was cautious enough not to mention manifesto commitments—there are certain issues from her party that would be brought to mind.

We have made it absolutely clear that we will make good the fiscal impact of this decision in the Autumn Statement. We are not minded to borrow more, which has sometimes been suggested. However, in response to the serious issue raised by both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, I can give a firm assurance that all the spending commitments made in the Budget will be honoured—on skills, on adult social care and on accident and emergency. We stand by those commitments.

The noble Lord asked about universal credit. There will be no change to the entitlement to universal credit by the self-employed. On the broader issues about the Taylor review, there is an issue here—and the Labour Party has recognised it as an issue; it has a commission looking at the issue. I do not think that it would be right to do what the noble Lord suggested, which is to ditch the Taylor review. It is important that we go ahead with it, but we have ruled out certain responses in how we take it forward. But there is an issue here—a threat to the tax base that we need to address.

The Autumn Budget will make good the deficit, in the normal way, so the hole will be filled, and the Chancellor remains committed to sound finance, reducing the deficit and investing in infrastructure and key public services. Those commitments remain as before.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend will know that the Chancellor’s original proposal was widely welcomed by, for example, a leader in the Financial Times and the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Would he agree that the way in which the doctrine of the manifesto has developed over almost the last century needs further review now? We find ourselves in a situation where a manifesto appears at short notice, is subject to absolutely no consultation with anyone and is not subject to amendment. In those circumstances, it is not surprising that it sometimes contains rather unfortunate proposals. None the less, one must obviously abide by it in general terms—but one must surely take into account changes in circumstances. The result of the referendum means that the Chancellor will be faced with immense problems in this Parliament. Is it not a mistake to continue to tie his hands, and should we at least give him the possibility of not sticking to the manifesto commitment as it was conceived at the time of the election because of these changed circumstances? He ought not to be bound by the triple lock, which is after all a major aspect of fiscal policy, when we are trying to deal with all the problems that a hard or even a soft Brexit may produce.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My noble friend gives some wise advice on the number of commitments in the manifesto. I think that we had 600 in our last manifesto, and I am sure that there are lessons to be learned. But I cannot agree with him that we should ditch our manifesto commitments. Confidence in the political system is not that high and if any party, once elected, were to break its manifesto commitments along the lines that my noble friend has suggested, it would not enhance confidence in the political system at all. So we have to stick within the commitments that we made and find other ways in which to reduce the deficit.

Community Pharmacy

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Monday 17th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

The Government are modernising the pharmacy sector and are investing £112 million to deliver a further 1,500 pharmacies in general practice by 2020. We are ensuring that no area is left without access to community pharmacy due to the pharmacy access scheme, and as the Minister for Community Health and Care announced on 13 October we are also introducing the pharmacy urgent care programme, a pilot scheme which will embed pharmacy into the urgent care pathway by expanding the service already provided by community pharmacies in England for those who need urgent repeat prescriptions and treatment for urgent minor ailments and common conditions. The move means that, in pilot areas, patients who need urgent repeat medicines will be referred from NHS 111 directly to community pharmacies. NHS 111 will develop and evaluate a new approach that will ultimately enable the service to refer patients with urgent minor ailments such as earaches to community pharmacies.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that the link between individuals and the pharmacy can be important, particularly for the elderly and those with long-term illnesses? On the whole, this may well be easier to facilitate in the case of small pharmacies rather than large ones in a larger shop that is engaged in other operations, not to in any way denigrate the important role which those shops may play. Does my noble friend agree that it is important that, in the course of this change, the position of the smaller pharmacies should not be undermined?

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I absolutely agree with my noble friend. There is no reason why that should be the case. At the moment, as I am sure he is aware, there are sometimes up to three or four pharmacies on one high street. It is not necessary to say that with these proposals the pharmacies will close, because the majority of them are privately owned, but it is important to try to modernise the system as it is now. The integrated care fund is very much working towards joined-up thinking on this.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 1 to 6. In moving them, I shall speak also to Amendment 12.

In the other place, the Government made small changes to the provisions relating to the National Audit Office’s powers to carry out value-for-money studies of the Bank. As we have discussed in previous debates, these clauses deliver an important increase in the accountability of the Bank and its operations.

The NAO’s new powers are subject to a bespoke policy carve-out, designed to protect the independence of the Bank’s policy decisions. The Government have made two small but important technical changes to ensure that the NAO’s new powers are applied consistently across all areas of the Bank. These changes have been agreed by both the NAO and the Bank.

The original drafting of the Bill did not give the NAO the power to carry out value-for-money reviews of Bank subsidiaries unless they were indemnified by the Government. This was not the Government’s policy intention.

The first change ensures that the NAO is able to carry out value-for-money studies, not only of the Bank itself, but also of all the Bank’s subsidiaries, whether or not they are indemnified by the Government. The amended clauses will also allow the NAO to carry out value-for-money studies of any other company in which the Bank has an interest, but only if that company is indemnified by the Government.

The second change ensures that the policy carve-out applies consistently across all areas of the Bank. Under the previous drafting, the NAO’s powers to review the Bank’s indemnified subsidiaries and other companies came from the National Audit Act 1983. That means that its review of these companies would not be covered by the policy carve-out. The Government have amended the Bill to address this inconsistency.

On Amendment 12, the Government also made a small amendment to the clauses in the Bill relating to the Monetary Policy Committee. The Bill reduces the minimum frequency of MPC meetings from monthly meetings to “at least 8” meetings in every calendar year. The Warsh review assessed that this new timetable,

“strikes the balance between timeliness and probity”,

and brings the MPC into line with other leading central banks, including the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. The amendment made in the other place adjusts the reporting requirements of the MPC to match the new meeting timetable. At the moment, it is required to submit a monthly report and so, without this change, the committee would be obliged to produce reports even when it has not had meetings.

I hope that noble Lords will agree that these are sensible changes, and I commend the amendments to the House.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, I had not realised until now that I am a wild enthusiast for a bespoke policy carve-out. The amendments reflect the considerable extended debates that we have had previously in your Lordships’ House, and I am very glad that they are now effectively implemented by the amendments that we have in front of us. There was a real problem with the relationship between the National Audit Office and the Bank of England. It is very fortunate that that seems to have been resolved now in a way that is satisfactory to both sides.

In a former incarnation, I was much involved in extending powers of the National Audit Office so that it did not merely act as an auditor but could look into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the bodies that it was investigating. I certainly think that there is a strong case for it including the Bank of England in its remit. To clarify one point on this, there are some aspects of the Bank’s operation that really need to be looked at. The present Governor of the Bank of England has taken to issuing forward guidance on interest rates, which I must say has not been an enormous success. Anyone who has followed that advice will almost certainly have lost money, depending on the precise timing. I think that he should consider very carefully whether it is an appropriate approach for the Bank to take—and perhaps the National Audit Office should do so, too.

I am not entirely clear what is covered by the expression “Bank company”. In particular, does it include the body—I have forgotten its name for a second—responsible for managing the enormous quantity of gilts purchased as a result of the quantitative easing operation? Will the National Audit Office have the power to inquire into how that very substantive—indeed, enormous—quantity of gilts is managed?

Overall, however, this is a very welcome change—and I am particularly glad that the Treasury is proposing to finance the operation. As it pointed out in the notes that come with the Bill, it should increase the likelihood of a value-for-money study being undertaken relative to the Bank of England. This change reflects the work that your Lordships did at earlier stages, and is very much to be welcomed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, we support this amendment, but more precisely, we support this amendment with the commitments made in the Chancellor’s letter to the chair of the Treasury Select Committee. We are glad to see moves to buttress the independence of the FCA, and we think the amendment and the commitments will help do that. It is true that the FCA does need some help. In particular, it needs help in ending what is, or appears to be, interference by the Executive.

Recent times have not been happy. There was the early announcement of the non-renewal of Martin Wheatley’s contract; the Chancellor’s public announcement that Tracey McDermott was withdrawing her CEO application, before she had had a chance to tell her own people; and, then, the appointment of Andrew Bailey as CEO without benefit of a proper interview panel. I will not even mention that the search for the hard-to-find Mr Bailey cost £280,000.

To restore belief in its independence and its self-confidence and morale, the FCA needs to have a robustly and operationally independent CEO. We hope that this amendment and the Chancellor’s commitments will make that happen. This amendment and those commitments are of course the result—as the Minister has explained—of negotiations with Mr Tyrie, the chair of the Commons Treasury Select Committee. We would have preferred Mr Tyrie’s original amendment, which simply gave the Treasury Select Committee the power to approve, or not to approve, the appointment of the CEO of the FCA.

The government amendment, of course, does not go nearly that far. It simply says that the already appointed—although, I hope, not contractually bound—CEO must appear before the TSC before taking up his office. By itself, this is pretty feeble stuff. In fact, the important changes are not in this Bill at all; they are contained in the letter from the Chancellor to the chair of the TSC. The letter makes two commitments, as the Minister has explained. The first is that the Chancellor will,

“ensure that appointments to the Chief Executive of the FCA are made in such a way to ensure the TSC is able to hold a hearing, after the appointment is announced but before it is formalised. Should the TSC”,

as the Minister has said,

“recommend in its report that the appointment be put as a motion to the whole House, the government will make time for this motion and respect the decision of the House”.

Secondly, the Chancellor,

“will seek, in a future Bill, to make a change to the legislation governing appointments to the FCA CEO to make the appointee subject to a fixed, renewable 5-year term”.

This is all very cumbersome, and one must hope that the prospect of having your merits gently and tactfully debated in the Commons will not put applicants off. However, it is an improvement on the current situation.

There are some questions, though, and I would be grateful if the Minister could respond. Why are these two commitments not on the face of the Bill? Can the Minister confirm that the Chancellor’s commitment to ensure government time for a Treasury Select Committee Motion in the Commons is not binding on him or, more importantly, on his successors? Can the Minister say why the Chancellor will put the fixed term for the CEO into a future Bill but not the Commons vote on a Treasury Select Committee Motion? Will the Minister agree to consider incorporating both these elements into a future Bill? Finally, can the Minister assure us that any future selection process for the CEO of the FCA will involve the proper panel interviews, or at least something more closely resembling due process?

We believe that we need the protections and safeguards in this amendment and in the Chancellor’s letter. We believe that Andrew Bailey is a good choice as CEO and we wish him every success. We believe that both Mr Bailey and the FCA will benefit from less interference from the Executive and we support the amendment.

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, as a former chair of the Liaison Committee in the House of Commons, which co-ordinates the work of the Select Committee system, as well as having been chairman of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee, I very much welcome the proposals put forward by the Government. Of course, there are various qualifications, which have just been mentioned, but I believe that this is a significant step forward and that it will improve the way in which the appointments system works within overall government. Therefore, I think that this is an excellent amendment and I heartily support it.

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, as I understand it, the proposed arrangements effectively give the Treasury Select Committee a sort of negative veto after the event. Why could this not be more straightforward, with senior appointments such as the head of the FCA requiring the approval of the Treasury Select Committee up front?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I can reassure my noble friend, because the date that the regulations have to be brought in is June 2017, so the consultation will take place in the second half of this year. It will be implemented before June 2017. I think that that is pretty clear and there is no question of it being put into the long grass. I have subsequently learned that the consultation will be 12 weeks and it will be after July—so I hope that my noble friend will be reassured by that.

My noble friend Lord Flight basically implied that any enhanced due diligence for all Peers, MPs and MEPs would be ridiculous. The directive and the Financial Action Task Force do not agree. They think that anyone who is an MP should have some form of enhanced due diligence. Of course, there is a huge range that can take place within enhanced due diligence. The point of the amendment and the regulations will be to make sure that there is a true difference. A Back-Bench Peer who may not have the position to influence corrupt acts—although every Peer and MP has access to people, so they are not exactly like every citizen—will have some form of enhanced due diligence, but it should be proportionate. The way that this will be done will ensure that.

The banks are in absolutely no doubt about the Government’s view on this. The Chancellor has personally written to the heads of the large banks, and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury has written to colleagues. Every bank now has a contact person with whom Peers, MPs and MEPs can get in touch if they feel that the enhanced due diligence is too great.

[Lord Higgins]

Before my noble friend comes to his peroration, perhaps I could ask this. All this consultation is taking place against the background of an impending referendum on whether we remain a member of the European Union. Am I wrong in thinking that all this depends on European directives, and that if the vote were to go in favour of our leaving the European Union we would have to look at the whole thing again?

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

Even if that took place, we would be a member of the European Union for at least two years under the arrangements. But this is based on our staying in; if we did not, we would have to look at a great many things in addition to anti-money laundering procedures—and I am not sure that this would even be top of the list.

I am sorry to hear about the problems that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has had with her family—but, as I said, the proportional nature of the enhanced due diligence for politically exposed people will be taken account of. The amendment is a good start and I commend it to the House.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Tuesday 15th December 2015 Lords Chamber

To conclude, in Committee we were rightly asked to find a compromise that is acceptable to the NAO and the Bank. This amendment does that. It strikes the right balance to protect the independence of two vital public bodies. It has been agreed by the NAO and the Bank, and I hope noble Lords will support it. I beg to move.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, it was clear in the earlier stages of the Bill that there was significant conflict between on the one hand the NAO, feeling that its independence had been jeopardised, and on the other the Bank of England, wishing for greater independence than is enjoyed by other bodies being investigated by the NAO. Clearly a great deal of work has been done behind the scenes and all those concerned are to be congratulated on coming up with a compromise which ought to be satisfactory from both points of view.

I have just two points which I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify. First, is the memorandum of understanding referred to in Amendment 9 going to be published? That would be an advantage. Secondly, in relation to proposed new subsection (2)(d), I am not absolutely clear what happens if in fact there is a dispute which “cannot be resolved”. I am not clear on precisely how the matter would then be resolved.

There is one other point which is not absolutely clear. The NAO was very concerned that it would not be able to publish information it obtains, something which previously has been at the discretion of the NAO. Is that point going to be resolved?

Perhaps I may raise one final point. Under government Amendment 7, a number of things are now specifically mentioned as being things that the examination will not be concerned with. I shall take a specific example; namely, the issue of quantitative easing and how that is being implemented. Will the NAO be able to look into whether it regards the way in which that is being dealt with as satisfactory? But, overall, this is a very satisfactory outcome from what was an extremely difficult and perhaps rather tense situation.

Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, is being rather modest about these amendments. I think they are rather good. However, I do not understand why he has proposed amendments to Clauses 9 and 10 but not to new Section 7G introduced by Clause 11, which relates to the main value-for-money study power. Not being limited in the way that these amendments imply would be at least as important to the new powers introduced by Clause 11.

I hope the Minister’s reply is not cursory because this is quite an important point. We do not very often legislate on public audit matters. I can remember doing the Public Audit (Wales) Bill, and there was no restriction on the Comptroller and Auditor-General for Wales reasonably requiring certain information. Reasonable time was in the Bill, but not a requirement to demonstrate that he reasonably required the information. It seems to me that the more you try to constrain an auditor, the more you allow an organisation which is being audited to run rings around that auditor. Having been in the auditing profession, I feel rather strongly that we should not try to restrict auditors but should make it as easy as possible for them to get whatever information they want.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, is always modest, but on this occasion he is excessively so. I agree with my noble friend because the implication of putting the words “reasonable” and “reasonably” in these clauses is that somehow the National Audit Office would act unreasonably, and I do not believe that that is the case. Perhaps the Minister will tell us where else in the legislation governing the National Audit Office such clauses are applied. These are quite unnecessary words. It may well be that, given the more formal auditing functions of the National Audit Office, as against the value-for-money provisions, there might be some occasion when it is necessary to get hold of documents at an unreasonable time. I hope the Minister will respond to this and agree to delete the words which appear in the amendments.

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I was a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards which looked at the word “reasonable” and concluded that it is a lawyer’s word. If it is a lawyer’s word, it costs a lot of money, and if it costs a lot of money, it can obscure the truth. Let us get rid of it and invest the authority in the Comptroller and Auditor-General which will save everyone time and money.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Higgins]

I am having a slight problem with Amendment 14. It seems, effectively, simply to put back again the lines which the noble Lord seeks to leave out. That is to say, in each case it seems to say that the Comptroller will not question the merits of the policy objectives of the Bank.

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

I did not quite pick up on the noble Lord’s point.

[Lord Higgins]

I will try again. Amendment 14 says,

“leave out from ‘section’ to end of line 28”,

which is concerned with the question of whether the Comptroller can question the merits of the policy objectives of the Bank, and which effectively says, “No; the NAO can’t”. However, Amendment 14, which I may have totally misunderstood, seems effectively to put it back in the same way, except with the addition of the words,

“including in relation to monetary policy”.

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

In fact, the Comptroller and Auditor-General made it clear to me that he does not want to question the merits of the policy of the Bank, so if there is a misunderstanding there, we should sort it out, particularly when it comes to Report. However, that is certainly not the case, and he would not want to do that.

Amendment 18 deletes a provision which would apply Section 353A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which would restrict the ability of the Comptroller and Auditor-General fully and openly. As the Government have said on many other occasions, transparency is an essential ingredient of accountability. These amendments seek to ensure that the Bank is subject to a level of transparency necessary to ensure its proper management of its resources. Parliament and the taxpayers have the right to expect nothing less.

An article in the Financial Times at the weekend said that, globally today, central banks exercise unparalleled power and independence. Willem Buiter used to come before the Select Committee quite regularly and was a former member of the policy committee. He is now the chief economist at Citi and stated that presently, central banks,

“are punching well above their weight … This could lead to a backlash and to central banks losing their operational independence, even where this independence makes sense—in the design and conduct of monetary policy”.

When the former Governor King came before the Treasury Select Committee, which I chaired, he was very clear both in formal and informal settings that the integrity and credibility of the bank is essential if society is to have confidence in its monetary policy decisions. That being the case, the Bank should not be marking its own exam paper. It should be honest in its intentions and transparent in its actions, and it cannot tie the hands of the Comptroller and Auditor-General with the court holding a power of veto. In the short and even the long term, that does not serve the best intentions of the Bank or society. In that spirit, I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, I support the amendments. I was deeply shocked to see that the Government proposed to give the Bank of England a veto over whether the Comptroller and Auditor-General could undertake a particular value-for-money study. I have believed for a long time that it has been an anomaly that the Bank of England has not been within the remit of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. I do not believe that any public body, however great and however independent, should be able to stand on that greatness and independence and say, “I do not want the National Audit Office or the Comptroller and Auditor-General to examine what I have been doing”. Public audit can be effective only when it is unfettered, and the concept of fettering the Comptroller and Auditor-General is, frankly, unacceptable.

[Lord Higgins]

My Lords, first, I express regret that I was not able to speak at Second Reading. I was preoccupied with the European Union Referendum Bill and other matters. However, I am certainly deeply concerned, as are other noble Lords, about the situation that now seems to have developed in the relationship between the Bank of England and the National Audit Office. I am sure that my noble friend was right in saying a moment or two ago that this ought to be resolved on Report. If necessary, that is what we will need to do.

I have a long history of involvement in this matter. I was much involved—this shows how long ago it was—when it was first suggested that the National Audit Office should carry out value-for-money investigations. However, it is very important to ensure that the NAO remains completely independent. I share the view expressed a moment ago that it would be wholly wrong for the NAO to have to get the permission of the people being investigated to carry out a review. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for explaining what I did not previously understand about the relationship between the amendment and the words being left out. I now understand the point that she made, which was extremely subtle, if I may say so.

Having said that, I am a little puzzled. I chaired the Treasury Select Committee for a decade or so and was succeeded by the noble Lord, Lord McFall. I was also a long-standing member of the Public Accounts Commission, which I chaired for some time. It is extremely important that we preserve the position of the NAO, and, as I said, I agree with those who say that it ought not to have to seek permission to carry out reviews.

I am just a little doubtful about what is meant by “policy”. This may turn out to be a rather fine line. For example, at the moment it seems to be the policy of the Bank, and indeed the governor, to give forward guidance on interest rates. That certainly needs inquiry as far as value for money is concerned, because the forecasts have been extraordinarily wrong on a number of occasions and a lot of people—for example, those renewing their mortgages—may have suffered considerably. In passing, I hope that the governor will reconsider whether that is an appropriate policy and perhaps no longer give forward guidance on interest rates.

The other points in relation to this matter have been made at Second Reading and in today’s debate. This is something that we have to resolve. We have to make sure that the relationship between the two bodies is maintained, otherwise the Comptroller and Auditor-General, very understandably, will have to think personally—the office of Comptroller and Auditor-General has always been a very personal one—about whether he can really operate in a situation where his independence is being questioned.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, it is always nice to start off with some sympathy for my position from the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken and made some very thoughtful contributions. I start by letting your Lordships know that detailed discussions are ongoing between the Bank, the NAO and the Treasury to find a way forward on this issue that all sides find acceptable. These discussions have not yet concluded but I hope to be able to update the Committee before Report.

I should like to set out the Government’s position and will address the amendments and the stand part debate relating to Clause 11 in one fell swoop. However, before I continue, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bichard. He met me last week and talked me through the amendments that he had hoped to table for today. I thank him for engaging so constructively and I very much hope that that dialogue with me can continue, even if he is unable to contribute to this debate in Committee.

I begin by emphasising that by extending, for the first time, the NAO’s ability to conduct value-for-money reviews of the Bank, the Bill will deliver a significant increase in the transparency and accountability of the Bank to the public and Parliament. The Government are strongly of the view that enhancing the accountability of the Bank of England is in the public interest but it is also in the Bank’s interest—strengthening public trust in the Bank will only add to its credibility.

The issue of how the Bank uses public resources is long running, as my noble friend Lord Higgins said. There has been debate on it ever since the Bank was nationalised in 1946. While researching this debate, I came across correspondence on this issue from my grandfather, who happened to be a Permanent Secretary at the Treasury in 1946 and during the 1950s. So something in the Bridges genes means that we have to deal with these things, although I do not know quite know what that is.

Since the 1950s, the relationship between the Bank and the Government has clearly evolved. Now, we regard the independence of the central bank as critical to our economic security and prosperity. As the noble Lord, Lord McFall, said, independence has been an issue of debate not just here but elsewhere. As Ben Bernanke, a previous chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, said:

“A broad consensus has emerged among policymakers, academics, and other informed observers around the world that the goals of monetary policy should be established by the political authorities, but that the conduct of monetary policy in pursuit of those goals should be free from political control”.

As a number of your Lordships have said, today the Bank of England occupies unique territory in the foundation of the UK economy, and policy decisions by the Bank are of vital importance to everyone. To deliver its mandate effectively, it is essential that the Bank’s independent status is preserved.

The NAO also plays a vital role as Parliament’s auditor. Its own independence is crucial to ensuring that there is effective review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector and for maximising public accountability. Parliament, and in particular the Public Accounts Committee, relies on the work of the NAO to scrutinise properly the value for money of taxpayer-funded activities. It is therefore important that the NAO be allowed to do its work in as unfettered a way as possible.

[Lord Higgins]

The Minister referred to the PAC. On the whole, we seem to be rather short of any input from the PAC, although it is, crucially, using the results of the NAO studies. Would the Minister at least consult them as to whether they have any views on the debate that we are considering now? The PAC has a very definite interest.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My noble friend makes a good point and I will be happy to mull it over.

Turing to the Bill, a number of your Lordships expressed concern that the provisions in Clause 11 fetter the independence of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. As your Lordships know, this view is shared by the NAO. Others, including the Bank, have been concerned to ensure that the proposals do not undermine the role of court and infringe upon the vital independence of our central bank. The position put forward in this Bill is therefore one of compromise, as my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham eloquently pointed out. It is a unique arrangement that seeks to strike a balance and protect the independence of two vital public bodies that, unsurprisingly, approach this issue from very different vantage points.

There are two main areas where the arrangements set out in the Bill are different from those that are typically put in place between the NAO and its counterparties. In both cases, the purpose of these special arrangements is to protect the operational independence of the Bank’s policy-making.

First, a bespoke carve-out has been designed to ensure that the Bank’s policy functions are out of the scope of the NAO’s value-for-money reviews. This reflects the differences between the policy objectives of the central bank versus those of a government department. I will turn to this issue in more detail when we come to specific amendments.

Secondly, we have designed the process to unlock disagreements between the Bank and the NAO over what constitutes policy. This is particularly important given the complexity of the Bank’s functions, which makes drawing this distinction especially challenging. To be clear, the process is this: if the court is of the opinion that an NAO review is seeking to examine policy, the court must notify the Comptroller and Auditor-General of its concerns. If, following consultation, the court is still of this opinion, the Comptroller must not proceed with the examination of that area. The Bill also requires that any such disagreement be made public to ensure transparency and to facilitate public and parliamentary scrutiny.

The arrangements set out in Clause 11 seek to increase the accountability of the Bank, while protecting its independent status and recognising the complex nature of its activities. I believe that the proposals are effective and transparent, but this is, as we know, a complicated area. This is why discussions between the Bank, the NAO and the Treasury are ongoing.

I will now turn to the tabled amendments. Amendments 14 and 16 seek to replicate the language of the National Audit Act 1983. It is well understood that the NAO is bound not to consider the merits of the policy objectives of any body with which it engages, but the Government believe this language to be difficult to apply in this specific instance. This is because, as a number your Lordships have said, the Bank of England has a unique role in the United Kingdom economy. The intent of the Bill is to convey the same meaning as set out in the National Audit Act 1983 but phrased in a way that is more applicable in the context of the Bank. Indeed, the policy carve-out is very similar to that which currently applies in the case of NAO oversight of the PRA. The Government do not believe, therefore, that this confuses or obfuscates the boundaries of the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s oversight.

Amendment 15 seeks to remove the requirement that the Comptroller and Auditor-General consult with the court of the Bank before the NAO initiates a value-for-money study. I understand that such consultation is standard practice and consistent with the normal manner in which the NAO goes about its work. The reason why it is particularly important here is due to the role that this Bill establishes for the court of the Bank in determining what constitutes policy. New section 7E in Clause 11 provides that the court may inform the Comptroller and Auditor-General if it considers that a proposed value-for-money study is concerned with the merits of the Bank’s general policy in pursuing its objectives. Consistent with this, the Bill provides that the court must be consulted prior to the initiation of any value-for-money study that the NAO wishes to carry out.

Amendment 17 is concerned with what happens when there is disagreement between the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the court. Clause 11 provides that, should the court continue to be of the opinion that an element of the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s review constitutes policy, the Comptroller and Auditor-General will be unable to proceed with the examination in relation to that policy, and will be unable to include the results of the examination which relate to that policy in any report produced. However, in order to provide the appropriate balance and to protect the role of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, where there is an unresolved disagreement, the nature of this disagreement must be published. This again will open up any disagreements to full parliamentary scrutiny.

A number of your Lordships referred to precedent. I do not believe that this sets a precedent for the NAO. The Bank of England is truly unique, in that no other organisation can claim to be the central bank of the UK or to play such a critical role in our economic prosperity and security.

Finally, I turn to new Section 7H. This does not place any restriction on the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s access to information. Therefore, I do not agree with those who argue that it would restrict the ability of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to examine the Bank fully and openly. This section would be relevant only in narrow circumstances in which the disclosure of certain types of information would be of serious detriment; this includes sensitive information on monetary policy and financial stability, for instance. Both these roles of the Bank are obviously highly market sensitive, and it is straightforward to imagine circumstances in which disclosure of information, even in aggregated form, would undermine financial or economic stability. Section 7H is included in this Bill to protect against such eventualities, while ensuring that the Comptroller and Auditor-General has full access to information held by the Bank. These same limitations apply to the regulators and, indeed, to the external auditors of the Bank. For these reasons, I reject the amendments to Clause 11 and beg that they should not be pressed.

The noble Lord, Lord McFall, raised the issue of the Federal Reserve and its audit. I would like to say briefly that it is important to note that, in the US, the debate is, as I mentioned, far from closed. Indeed, legislators, policymakers and commentators in the US have been engaging for a long while in similar discussions to those that we are having today. Just as in this debate, there are those who want a greater sense of accountability for the central bank and there are those who argue that the sufficient protection of central bank independence is important. Of course, there may be valuable insights to gain through inspecting the accountability frameworks of international central banks. That is something that the Government have done in drafting the legislation, and will continue to do as the Bill develops. But to suggest that there is an easy solution that we can transplant into this system from elsewhere is wrong.

To summarise, the provisions in this clause have rightly attracted a great level of debate. This level of debate is only proper because the provisions concern two incredibly important public bodies, and I expect that we will continue this debate as the Bill progresses. These clauses are an important step in increasing the accountability of the Bank. I ask that this clause stand part of the Bill.

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. He made a point about the Federal Reserve, in respect of which there is a huge amount of engagement in the United States at the moment. Congressional members are knocking it about like mad. The status of the Federal Reserve is more in question than that of the Bank of England—that is accepted here. The point of these amendments is to ensure that the status of the Bank is maintained and that its independence is not questioned. The analogy with the Federal Reserve is a bit off the mark on that issue.

As my noble friend Lord Davies said, the Government are in a pickle. There has to be a lot of consideration before Report. The noble Lord, Lord Young, made a point about facilitating engagement between the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the Bank of England. According to my information, they have met but there is still a gap. To give an example from my own experience, when I was chairman of the Treasury Committee I was approached by the Treasury to ensure that the Bank of England was audited. I said to them, “Do your own business: I am not doing it for you. Engage in it”. I notice that three distinguished former Permanent Secretaries are sat on the Benches. I do not know what you call a trio of Permanent Secretaries, but the noble Lords should not worry: it would have to be something complimentary. My question to the Minister is: are the Treasury the fly in the ointment at this stage?

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said that the Bank of England should be audited and that it can be effective only if it is. We are here to ensure that that effectiveness is maintained. The noble Lord, Lord Higgins, talked about value for money and the NAO being independent. This arrangement could end up in a public squabble between the Bank and the NAO, and that is not going to serve anyone’s interest, particularly when it comes to parliamentary scrutiny. That does not serve the Bill. A lot of thinking needs to be done on this issue. The noble Lord also made a quite radical point about the value for money of forward guidance. The Comptroller and Auditor-General does not want to go near that. He has been very reasonable—I have used that word before—in his ambitions and it is important to see where he comes from on this issue.

The Minister talked about increasing transparency, but where will it increase?

[Lord Higgins]

The Minister has suggested that there was a compromise. It would not appear to be a compromise as far as the release of information is concerned. The Comptroller and Auditor-General appears to take the view that the Government’s position on that issue is unacceptable. Can we be sure that that is not taken as settled? We also need to consider the question of releasing information.

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

There cannot be a compromise when the court has the veto at the end of the day and this has been public. We do not know where this is going to lead. I do not think there is a compromise at this stage.

Thinking off the top of my head—and I am in good company, because the Government are doing the same—given the need to bring people even further together, why can the Comptroller and Auditor-General not engage with the Governor of the Bank of England? Perhaps there could also be some third parties: wise heads such as the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, who has tremendous experience, and the former Permanent Secretaries. Why can they not sit down and say which areas the Comptroller and Auditor-General should have an opportunity to go over? Can we get that wise counsel before Report, so that we do not end up with a squabble? At the moment, there is a big gap between the governor and the Comptroller and Auditor-General that should be narrowed before Report. There is an opportunity to introduce a bit of common sense so that, on Report, we can all agree that the independence of the NAO and the Bank of England are important. Both institutions have a job to do in the best interests of the country, and the authority and integrity of both would thereby be increased. I seek the co-operation of the Minister in achieving a compromise before Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Chilcot Inquiry

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Wednesday 1st July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dykes (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Stowell of Beeston) (Con)]

I am sorry, but the House is calling for the next question, so I think we should move on.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Lord Higgins Excerpts

Wednesday 6th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Norwich]

My Lords, I rise from this Bench in the absence of my friend the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, who cannot be in his place, to follow up a little on what the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, said. I know that your Lordships have sometimes observed that when these Benches are full, the General Synod must be in session and the Bishops are absconding. We sometimes are, of course, but the week after next, the Synod will spend a great deal of time on the new proposals for the consecration of women as bishops, and we are hopeful of progress.

I know that the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury would be glad not to miss consideration on Report of the Banking Reform Bill but will, on this occasion, have to give the General Synod priority. I am sure that your Lordships would not wish him to abscond, as some of us hope to live to see the day when there will be women with us on these Benches. I realise that there are diary clashes for us all, but it would be a great pity if the Archbishop could not play a very full part in our debate here. He would be too modest to say it himself, but I can say it for him: we would be the poorer without his contribution.

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, I think that it would be wrong to suppose that it is only those who have been serving with great diligence on the banking commission who are concerned about this matter. The size of amendments in relation to the size of the Bill is, I think, without precedent. It is a very important matter which should be properly debated on the Floor of the House.