Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debate19:17 - Division on Amendment 20 - Ayes: 198 / Noes: 200 - Amendment 20 disagreed.
Lord Bridges of Headley
“( ) In section 3C (reviews) after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Where they consider that to do so would contribute to the discharge by the court of directors of any of its oversight functions, the non-executive directors of the Bank (or a majority of them) may arrange—
(a) for a review to be conducted under this section in relation to any matter by a person appointed by those directors, and(b) for the person conducting the review to make one or more reports to the court of directors.””
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the discussions we have had on Bank governance to date. In this group, I would like to bring forward three amendments that respond to those debates: first, to ensure that the non-executives on the court can always initiate performance reviews; secondly, to prevent the court from delegating oversight functions to a sub-set of its members; and, thirdly, to provide clarity on responsibility for the financial stability strategy.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey, Lord Tunnicliffe, and Lord Eatwell, have raised concerns that the transfer of the oversight functions to the court could unintentionally weaken the non-executive majority. Noble Lords have argued that a majority of non-executives might be blocked from initiating a review if the executive was united in opposition and enlisted one or two non-executives to their cause. The first amendment laid by the Government addresses these concerns. The government amendment to Clause 3 ensures that a majority of non-execs can always initiate performance reviews without needing to secure the agreement of a majority of the whole court. If just four non-executive directors want a review, they will be able to initiate it. This will reinforce oversight of the Bank’s activities and provide additional protection against groupthink. The initiators of a review would determine who should carry it out. This could be someone external, or internal, including the Bank’s new Independent Evaluation Office.
At this point, it is worth pointing out a related change that the Bill makes. The 2012 Act required that:
“If the person to be appointed to conduct a performance review is an officer or employee of the Bank, the appointment requires the consent of the Governor of the Bank”.
The Bill removes that condition, so that a majority of the court or a majority of non-executives will be able to appoint an officer or employee of the Bank without needing to secure the Governor’s consent.
Lord Davies of Oldham (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his introduction to this debate. He will not have been at all surprised that one or two penetrating questions have been put forward. I put on the record the assiduous way in which he set out to make changes to the Bill in response to our debates at Second Reading and in Committee. In doing so, he greatly assisted those of us who were able to negotiate with him to see the advantages that could be obtained by moving some way back to the future, as it were, and re-establishing the Bank as it was.
I think that lessons have been learned over recent years. My noble friend will appreciate that the original Bill that came before this House effectively ended the oversight committee and reduced the power of the non-executive directors. The Minister has taken steps to respond to the great concern expressed on all sides of the House on these issues and has brought the non-executives into a position of considerable significance, not least in determining the remuneration of executives’ pay, in which it is important that the non-executives should be in a substantial majority. Also, they have the right to carry out the oversight functions on which we pin such a great deal of emphasis. Therefore, we are grateful to the Minister for the extent to which he has moved.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Eatwell for his insightful contribution. He will know that this is only the first shot at this Bill as far as Parliament is concerned in this noble House. But it will certainly be taken on board in the other place, and it may be thought that it is the other place that ought to deliberate quite significantly on the role and position of the Treasury Select Committee in relationship to the Bank of England. I do not think any of us have thought that either the chairman of the Treasury Select Committee or the committee itself have been backward in coming forward when issues have presented themselves that needed inquiry. Therefore, I think that my noble friend Lord Eatwell can derive from this debate some satisfaction from the fact that there will be an opportunity for that to be debated further.
The House has concentrated on the question of the role of the non-executives. I am grateful to the Minister for having responded to those anxieties and presented amendments that have, to a very large extent, brought the situation back to a position of some significance. However, it was the case that, at Second Reading in particular, there were very great anxieties about the extent to which the government proposals significantly reduced the power of the non-executives, and that we were faced with a Bank in which their role was nothing like the role that they had played in the more recent past. I think that we have, through these amendments, met the wishes of the House. I am grateful to the Minister for having listened to the House and to several representations that we have been able to make. I am also grateful that he has been able to meet significant figures from the Bank—the chairman of the court and the chief executive—to understand the nature of the issues before us. So these amendments are to be commended and we support them.
Lord Bridges of Headley
I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for his kind words. Let me reciprocate by saying that it has been a pleasure having discussions with him, and with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I hope that this constructive spirit is retained all afternoon.
The noble Lord, Lord Myners, made a good point: why are we bothering and why do we need to do this? The point that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, made answered that in large part: it is because there was concern. But specifically, the court’s powers of delegation are limited by paragraph 11 of Schedule 1, and it may not delegate duties and powers that are expressly imposed on the court in legislation unless it has express permission to do so.
This has been a good debate, and I return briefly to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. He asserted that we have gone back to 1997. I would dispute that that is the case. The Government have given the Bank the tools and powers that it needs to deliver its financial stability mandate. In particular, the Bank is now the statutory resolution authority with primary operational responsibility for financial crisis management. On top of that, we have created the FPC as a statutory committee of the Bank with the responsibility for monitoring and mitigating systemic risks for financial stability.
As to why prudential regulations should reside with the Bank, one of the key weaknesses of the tripartite system was a failure of co-ordination between those responsible for overseeing the financial system. We do not want to return to that. As the Chancellor said during the passage of the 2012 Financial Services Act, the Bank of England is the natural home for the microprudential, macroprudential and monetary policy functions because the interconnections are so great between these three critical functions. Having the PRA as part of the Bank also reduces underlap that could be harmful in the event of a crisis.
I turn to the issue of democratic accountability of the Bank. Since 2012, a number of measures have been introduced that have significantly enhanced the transparency of the Bank, and I will briefly recount some of these. For example, the court is now required to publish minutes of every meeting within six weeks. It has also voluntarily published historical records of court minutes, including those during the financial crisis, and, through this, Parliament and the public now have greater insight into the governance of the Bank and the key decisions made. Similarly, the Bank has introduced measures to enhance the transparency of the Monetary Policy Committee following the recommendations of the Warsh review. Clearly, therefore, the Bank is a more transparent institution than it was in 2012. However, there obviously remains room for further improvements. This Bill builds on those reforms through changes to the Bank’s governance, to its policy committees and to its accountability. However, as I argued previously—and as the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, has argued—this amendment is not necessary.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am impressed by the extensive lack of support for this amendment throughout the House. I say in response to what the Minister has said that, of course, the powers have developed and lessons have been learnt since the financial crisis, but I was referring to the recentralisation of powers rather than some of the extra powers that have resulted from the lessons learnt.
The main argument made against my amendment was that the power exists already. If the power exists already, the amendment does no harm—I have not heard anyone express the view that it does. However, the key reason for the need for my amendment was expressed clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Myners, who asked why conditions requiring members of a board to act were in the Bill at all. They are in the Bill because the action has not been present in the past. It is because of this lack of action that Parliament has lost a degree of confidence in relying just on the actions of the court and has decided that, to ensure appropriate transparency and efficiency in the operations of the court, it may be required to do certain things. That is why the Government have put into the Bill measures instructing the court to behave in particular way and why my amendment is there—because the court has not always responded to the requests of the Treasury Select Committee. It has not, for example, responded to repeated requests to publish a detailed review of its own actions during the financial crisis. My amendment, small in terms of changing circumstances though it might be, would have assisted the development of the democratic accountability of the Bank. However, in the circumstances, given the widespread lack of support around the House, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bridges of Headley
Lord Bridges of Headley
“( ) Paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the Bank of England Act 1998 (matters which may be delegated by court of directors) is amended as follows.
( ) In sub-paragraph (2) after “paragraph” insert—
“(a) include duties and powers conferred on the court of directors by section 9A (financial stability strategy), but(b) except as mentioned in paragraph (a),”( ) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(3) The court of directors retains responsibility for a duty or power which it delegates under this paragraph.””
Lord Bridges of Headley
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I turn to amendments on NAO reviews, which concern Clause 11. One of the objectives of the Bill is to enhance the accountability of the Bank of England, and these clauses, which allow the NAO to conduct value-for-money examinations of the Bank for the first time, are key in that respect.
We have debated these clauses at great length. That is only right, as we set out to define the respective roles of two vital public bodies. I thank those of your Lordships who contributed in Committee and earlier. Although it is invidious to name names, I thank in particular the noble Lords, Lord Bichard, Lord McFall, Lord Davies, Lord Higgins and Lord Young, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Kramer.
Since Committee, officials from the National Audit Office, the Bank of England and the Treasury have been working closely together to reach an agreement on how to address the concerns raised in debate so far.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, the Opposition are of course glad that peace has broken out. As a token of that peace, I say how much I agree with the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which I hope the Minister will address. Both at Second Reading and in Committee, the House was greatly exercised by the potential disagreement and difficulties that attended on the formulation of the Bill at that time, with these two tremendously significant institutions at loggerheads. The situation was not helped by the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, felt unable to contribute to our debate at that stage. We were all very anxious indeed about the position.
I hope that the Minister will answer quite straightforwardly the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins. I do not think that it is a question of whether there will be a publication, but of when. Whether it could be done in time for the process being considered while the Bill goes through the other place is a different matter. That certainly would be a great advantage and it ought to put pressure on the two bodies concerned to ensure that this memorandum of understanding is complete and published in short time.
On the more general issues, all parts of the House were greatly exercised by the position that developed as a result of the publication of the Bill. I am very glad to endorse the fact that peace has broken out, although on this occasion the Opposition did not have much to do with it.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I thank all those who have offered me congratulations, which really should be to those in the Bank, the NAO and the Treasury who have been labouring long and hard on this. I have just been trying to oil the wheels as they go along. I am very nervous about the phrase “Peace in our time”, which one of your Lordships used. I get very nervous when that phrase is used, but I am very pleased with where we got to.
My noble friends Lord Higgins and Lord Young, and the noble Lord, Lord Myners, rightly pressed on the publication of the MoU. I can assure the House that the Government will provide an update on progress as the document develops, before the Bill has passed. Once complete, the MoU will be published and laid in the House Library. I do not want to tempt fate regarding the timing of this. However, as I said in my opening remarks, the process of drafting the MoU has only recently begun. I am sorry to say that I am not, therefore, in a position to share more details on this right now.
My noble friends Lord Higgins and Lady Noakes also raised the issue of what happens if the Bank and the NAO disagree. This amendment removes the court veto over what constitutes policy—the main concern of the House in Committee—and, instead, there is a requirement in the MoU for the NAO and the Bank to agree the process for resolving disputes. I will point out a few things here. It is important to note that much of the work which the NAO carries out across the public sector is governed by the National Audit Act 1983, which does not contain a statutory mechanism for resolving disagreements between the NAO and the number of public bodies it oversees about the scope of its reviews. The NAO works constructively with those bodies to define the scope of its work without the need for codified dispute resolution processes. I therefore hope that, in the vast majority of cases, issues arising between the NAO and the Bank will be resolved without needing recourse to a formal process. However, in the unlikely event that a matter cannot be resolved, the amendment goes further than the National Audit Act by requiring that a formal dispute resolution process is set out as part of the memorandum of understanding. As I said, this will set out in more detail how the NAO and the Bank will act to settle disagreements and how those will be recorded and published, where appropriate.
My noble friend Lord Higgins also wisely raised the subject of quantitative easing. In the case of companies of the Bank which are carrying out indemnified activities, such as the asset purchase facility—the Bank’s QE vehicle—new Section 7C, inserted by Clause 10, will apply. In those circumstances, the Treasury has the power to direct the company of the Bank to send its accounts to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who would then be required to conduct a financial audit of the accounts and issue an accompanying report.
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this and to making this process and the agreement possible.
Lord Bridges of Headley
“(3A) An examination under this section is not to be concerned with the merits of—
(a) policy decisions taken by the Financial Policy Committee, the Monetary Policy Committee or the Prudential Regulation Committee;(b) policy decisions taken by a committee or other body within the Bank for the time being having responsibilities for the supervision of payment systems, settlement systems or clearing houses, so far as the decisions relate to that supervision.“(3B) Subject to subsection (3C), an examination under this section is not to be concerned with the merits of policy decisions taken by a committee or other body within the Bank for the time being having responsibilities for the exercise of any of the Bank’s resolution functions, so far as the decisions relate to those functions.
(3C) Where the Bank has exercised relevant resolution functions in relation to a financial institution, subsection (3B) does not prevent an examination under this section being concerned with the merits of policy decisions within that subsection which are relevant to the Bank’s exercise of its resolution functions in relation to that institution (whether or not those policy decisions are also relevant to other financial institutions).
(3D) “Relevant resolution functions” are—
(a) any of the stabilisation powers;(b) any of the Bank’s functions (other than its functions as the Prudential Regulation Authority) under or by virtue of—(i) Part 2 or 3, or section 233, of the Banking Act 2009,(ii) Part 6 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.”
Lord Bridges of Headley
Lord Bridges of Headley
Lord Ashton of Hyde
“Financial Conduct Authority
In Chapter 1 of Part 1A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the Financial Conduct Authority), after section 1J insert— “Recommendations1JA Recommendations by Treasury in connection with general duties
(1) The Treasury may at any time by notice in writing to the FCA make recommendations to the FCA about aspects of the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government to which the FCA should have regard when considering—
(a) how to act in a way which is compatible with its strategic objective,(b) how to advance one or more of its operational objectives,(c) how to discharge the duty in section 1B(4) (duty to promote effective competition in the interests of consumers),(d) the application of the regulatory principles in section 3B, and(e) the matter mentioned in section 1B(5)(b) (importance of taking action to minimise the extent to which it is possible for a business to be used for a purpose connected with financial crime).(2) The Treasury must make recommendations under subsection (1) at least once in each Parliament.
(3) The Treasury must—
(a) publish in such manner as they think fit any notice given under subsection (1), and(b) lay a copy of it before Parliament.””
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, it is only a short while ago that my noble friend Lady Worthington was speaking from the Front Bench, so it is somewhat otiose for me to seek to surpass her eloquence on the crucial issue of climate change, on which she has spoken in this debate and earlier this afternoon following the Statement on the outcome of Paris. The noble Lord, Lord Bourne, also distinguished himself in that discussion, as he did during his work in Paris. I therefore hope that the Minister, who, as my noble friend hinted, comes from a slightly different quarter—the Treasury—will not be any less enthusiastic in his response to Paris, where 195 countries reached agreement on aspects of what needs to be done. Of course, the Government have a little ground to make up after the past six months, when they seemed to many to be pursuing policies counter to the concept of the green and long-term sustainability agenda—but I am sure the Minister will take full opportunity to show his enthusiasm today.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I am sympathetic to the intent of the amendment, and it is important that the Government consider how they can ensure that economic growth is resilient to risks arising from long-term fundamental changes. As the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it is not just about climate change; there are technological and demographic changes, all of which could have significant implications for the global financial system. It is also important for the Government to understand and adopt best practices for the disclosure of climate-related financial risk. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, and she is right to raise this issue. However, as I hope I shall explain, the amendment is unnecessary and I hope noble Lords will agree with me.
The current legislation already provides for the statutory framework for the Financial Policy Committee to consider long-term systemic risks such as those listed in the amendment. Indeed, at its meeting of March 2015, the FPC discussed precisely one of those risks—to financial stability. This is evidence that the FPC considers risks across the breadth of time horizons and will continue to identify long-term as well as more immediate risks. The Bank is also taking action on longer- term systemic risks through other channels. The issue of climate change, for instance, has been added to the Bank’s One Bank Research Agenda. Requiring the Treasury to produce an additional report on sustainability would mean unnecessary duplication of work.
On the topic of admission of securities to growth markets, the UK’s financial markets are obviously crucial to the efficient allocation of capital that supports jobs and growth, including to unquoted companies where the Government allow certain tax exemptions to improve access to the finance necessary for companies to expand. AIM, as the biggest SME growth market in the UK, plays an important role in providing funding opportunities beyond bank finance for unquoted SMEs which cannot fulfil the requirements of the main market at this stage of their life cycle.
Turning to the specific issue of disclosing climate-related financial risks, at the Paris climate change conference the Governor of the Bank, in his capacity as chair of the Financial Stability Board, announced that the FSB is establishing a task force on climate-related financial disclosures—the point the noble Baroness mentioned. This announcement follows the “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon” speech given by Governor Carney at Lloyd’s of London earlier this year. The newly established task force, under the chairmanship of Michael Bloomberg, will develop voluntary, consistent climate-related financial risk disclosures for use by companies in providing information to lenders, insurers, investors and other stakeholders.
It is our firm belief that climate change as a global phenomenon can be tackled most effectively through co-ordinated international action. As the noble Baroness mentioned, to date a lack of co-ordination on the topic of disclosure initiatives has resulted in an estimated 400 different climate-related disclosure schemes. There is a real risk that this inconsistency makes it challenging for investors and other stakeholders to judge climate-related risks effectively.
The Financial Stability Board, as the authoritative forum for considering potential financial stability risks, provides the ideal international setting in which climate-related financial risk disclosures should be discussed, standards agreed and recommendations made. This Government are therefore fully supportive of the work of the FSB task force and have instructed government officials to engage fully in this international debate to ensure that the long-term financial risks associated with climate change are given full consideration.
This amendment requires the reporting of recommendations on standards for the disclosure of climate-related financial risk within 12 months of the coming into force of the Act. Considering that the task force is scheduled to complete its work within a year, this suggested timetable risks pre-empting the work of the task force already under way.
This is not to say, however, that domestic action does not have a role to play in improving climate-related risk disclosure. In fact, regulations made under the Companies Act 2006 already require all quoted companies to report on their greenhouse gas emissions. I submit that between our considerable spending commitments, our stance in international negotiations and our leadership in mobilising the financial system to help combat climate change, the Government are at the very forefront of efforts to understand and address the full range of financial risks that long-term fundamental change, such as climate change, could pose. I therefore, with respect, ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Worthington
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I am not entirely satisfied that this issue has been looked at in sufficient detail by the Treasury. I am grateful to the Minister for his answer in response to the FSB, but in London now we have some of the brightest and best minds in the financial services sector and we can begin to address this problem ahead of our international efforts.
In particular, I am interested in how we are regulating unlisted companies. The Minister is correct to point to the disclosure requirements on listed companies, but we are giving substantial tax incentives to a fairly unregulated part of the financial sector upon which a large part of our economy relies, and more scrutiny is needed on that sector in particular.
However, at this stage, I am happy to withdraw the amendment, and I hope that this debate and this topic of conversation will continue in this House and in the other place. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bridges of Headley
“( ) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.
( ) ”
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, Amendments 17, 18 and 19 make some small technical changes to the Bill. The purpose of Clause 19 is to enable the regulators to include the full range of transitional provision in their rules when they bring in new senior management functions. The clause also gives the Treasury a wider power to make additional provisions in regulations to deal with complicated cases.
Amendments 17 and 18 implement a recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in relation to those regulations. The amendments will ensure that the affirmative resolution procedure applies to any regulations under the new Section 59AB, which make provisions modifying, excluding or applying primary legislation.
Turning to Amendment 19, under the approved persons regime, the regulators have only the power of approval to perform a controlled function or, of course, to reject the application for that approval. The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 gives the regulators the power to make senior management approvals subject to conditions or time limits. Clause 20 makes changes to these provisions to allow time limits as well as conditions to be varied after the initial approval has been given. Amendment 19 corrects an anomaly in these new provisions. The amendment will ensure that, where a regulator wishes to vary an approval on its own initiative, it must consult the other regulator if that regulator gave or varied the approval in question. Without this amendment, the other regulator would have to be consulted if it had given the original approval but not if it had only varied an existing approval. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, as these are technical changes we do nothing but endorse them and comment on the obvious fact that the Minister has not been in post overlong but has shown proper respect for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and has moved with alacrity to enforce its request.
Lord Bridges of Headley
“( ) In section 429(2B) (regulations subject to affirmative procedure) for “contain” substitute “contain—
(a) provision made under section 59AB(2) which modifies, excludes or applies with modifications any provision of primary legislation;(b) ”.”
Lord Bridges of Headley
“( ) after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) Before one regulator varies an approval which was last varied by the other regulator, it must consult the other regulator.””
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, this amendment has led to a very interesting debate. I would like to pick up on what the noble Lord, Lord McFall, said, and remind the House of the context. As he so well knows, and everyone here will remember, seven years ago, the world was engulfed by a financial crisis, triggering a deep recession. It was a crisis caused, in part, by the reckless actions of some bankers and it was a crisis which our regulatory system failed to prevent. Today, we are all still paying the price for it and we are still hearing cases of crimes and misdemeanours in our financial services, as my noble friend Lord Lawson mentioned.
Although a number of banks have paid eye-watering fines for their misdemeanours, it is wholly unacceptable that so few bankers have themselves been held to account for their wrongdoings. The current regime, the approved persons regime,
“has created a largely illusory impression of regulatory control over individuals, while meaningful responsibilities were not in practice attributed to anyone. As a result, there was little realistic prospect of effective enforcement action, even in … the most flagrant cases of failure”.
These are not my words but those of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. The Government are absolutely clear that this has to change.
Our regulatory system needs to be able to hold individuals—I repeat, individuals—and not just banks to account for misconduct or recklessness, a point that the noble Lord, Lord McFall, rightly made in Committee and my noble friend Lord Lawson echoed. More than that, regulation needs to deter misconduct and recklessness in the first place. Good regulation is a spur for good behaviour and, as such, is crucial to driving the cultural change in the industry which we all want.
What are the characteristics of such a regulatory regime? It is one in which individuals’ responsibilities are crystal clear. It is one where individuals cannot shirk responsibility for their actions or those of their employees. Tasks may be delegated, but never accountability. A good regime is a regime where ignorance is no excuse. It is a regime where there are strong, simple principles that guide people’s conduct. Above all, it is a regime in which all senior managers understand that if something goes wrong in their team—be it a team of 20 or 20,000 —or on their watch, they will be held individually accountable. That is a good regulatory regime. Are these the features of the current approved persons regime? They are not but they are the hallmarks of the new senior managers regime that we will implement. As the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, eloquently argued, the new regime will be tough and it will help to change the culture across the financial services industry for the better, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, desperately wants.
I am aware that there are concerns that the replacement of the reverse burden of proof with a statutory duty of responsibility will leave us in the same position as under the approved persons regime, where it can be very difficult, as I have said, for the regulators to hold senior management to account. I can reassure your Lordships that this is simply not the case. Let me set out exactly how the new regime will deliver a step change in senior manager accountability. First, the clarity of responsibility which has been so desperately lacking under the approved persons regime will be embedded in the system. This will be achieved in a number of ways.
An application by the firm for approval of a senior manager must be accompanied by a statement of responsibilities setting out what the senior manager will be responsible for managing in the firm. This must be updated if the responsibilities of a senior manager change. That ensures that both regulators and the firm will have the necessary clarity about who is responsible for what, and senior managers will take full ownership of their respective areas of responsibility.
This requirement is bolstered by the regulators’ rules, which require each firm to have, and to submit to the regulators, a “responsibilities map” setting out how responsibility for the business of the firm as a whole is allocated amongst its senior managers. This minimises the risk of any responsibilities falling through the cracks between different senior managers. On top of that, under rules of conduct made by the regulators, it is made clear that a senior manager must take all reasonable steps to ensure that any delegation of their responsibility is to an appropriate person, and they must oversee the discharge of any delegated responsibilities effectively.
Secondly, tough rules will apply to the senior managers. A senior manager can now be found guilty of misconduct if a breach of regulations occurs in the area of the firm’s business for which they are responsible and if they did not take such steps as a person in their position could reasonably be expected to take to prevent it. Crucially, it does not matter whether or not the senior manager is aware of the regulatory breach. Ignorance is no defence. What matters is whether they have taken reasonable steps to prevent the breach. If they have not, they are guilty of misconduct. They will not be able to avoid liability simply because the email trail has gone cold. The regulator will not—I repeat, not—be completely stymied if all conversations and exchanges take place in an environment where there are no minutes, no emails, no memos and no existing trail.
Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, the very fact that there is an absence of such an email trail, and that a senior manager is totally unaware of what is going on in an area of the firm for which they are responsible, may very well suggest that they have been guilty of failing to take reasonable steps to prevent a breach of regulations. This is the new system we are introducing and the Bill before Parliament does not change any of what I have just said. The measures in this Bill do not take us back to the days before the financial crisis.
Noble Lords need not take my word for it. According to Andrew Bailey, deputy governor for Prudential Regulation and chief executive officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority, the introduction of the statutory duty of responsibility, instead of the reverse burden of proof,
“makes little difference to the substance of the new regime. Once introduced, it will be for the regulators (rather than the senior manager) to prove that reasonable steps to prevent regulatory breaches were not taken. This change is one of process, not substance”.
Furthermore, the removal of the reverse burden of proof does not change the penalties which can be applied. If found guilty of misconduct under the statutory duty of responsibility, a senior manager could face an unlimited fine and/or prohibition from working in the industry. All this means that situations where things go wrong because of irresponsible, reckless or negligent management by a senior manager will be less likely to occur in future, because of the strong deterrent effect of the statutory duty of responsibility. If they do occur, the regulators will be much better equipped to take action against senior managers who have mismanaged the firm.
To those who would still like to keep the reverse burden of proof, I would say this. First, Andrew Bailey has highlighted to the Treasury Select Committee in the other place that the way banks are starting to prepare for the introduction of the reverse burden of proof next March is unhelpful. We understand that some of their legal advisers are being asked to prepare checklists, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said, of “reasonable steps” which their senior managers should follow. I would say to the noble Lord that the point about checklists is this: presenting evidence that a template or checklist had been followed could enable the senior manager to meet the burden of proof for the defence, but would leave the regulator to prove that the steps taken were not reasonable.
In practice, the reverse burden of proof would not give the regulator a significant advantage but could sow the seeds of a new tick-box culture. The reverse burden of proof will add no significant weight to the regulators’ powers of enforcement, but instead risks creating a great deal of lucrative work for City lawyers. Secondly, the Government are expanding, as has been said, the senior managers and certification regime so it covers all authorised financial services firms, the majority of which are small. The tick-box culture I have described risks leading to the perverse outcome whereby senior managers in the largest firms are less exposed to legal risk under the reverse burden of proof, thanks to being able to employ the best lawyers and compliance officers.
I have been pressed on why the Government cannot introduce a two-tier system, with the reverse burden of proof applying to deposit takers but not to other firms. First, I have described the potential for detrimental effects on small firms. These issues are also relevant for small deposit-takers—for example, small building societies and credit unions, the latter often relying on volunteers for their staff. This approach would also raise serious issues of cross-sectoral competition. Noble Lords on all sides want a vibrant, innovative financial services industry that offers high-quality, good-value products to consumers. To achieve that, the regulatory system must, as far as possible, deliver a level playing field to support competition.
A reverse burden of proof that applied only to the banking sector would undermine this. For example, both deposit-takers and non-deposit-takers can engage in mortgage advice. A small building society or bank, for which the reverse burden of proof would apply, engaged in direct competition with firms, for which it would not apply, could find it more difficult to attract key members of staff. There could be a particular issue for challenger banks, especially those seeking authorisation for the first time.
Legitimate questions of fairness would also be asked about why senior managers in deposit-takers, particularly small ones, should be subject to the reverse burden of proof while those in firms such as large insurers or investment firms, which may pose greater risks to positive consumer outcomes and market integrity, are not. This approach would also create a great deal of complexity in large groups that contain firms which have deposit-taking permissions and firms that do not.
So, introducing a two-tier regime would introduce unnecessary complexity, when we have a tough, fair and practical alternative—the statutory duty of responsibility —that can be applied consistently to all firms. This is why the Government do not believe it appropriate to retain the reverse burden of proof. Is it needed to prove a senior manager culpable for a misdemeanour? No. Is it needed to clarify responsibilities of individuals in firms? No. Is it needed for the regulator to prosecute a senior manager if the email trail goes cold? No. Is it the silver bullet that will make the individuals who manage our banks responsible for their actions? No.
Instead, as I have explained, the new regime, with its statutory duty of responsibility, is a formidable tool for holding senior managers to account and for changing behaviour and culture in banks and across the entire financial services industry—a change we and the British public so very much want. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, I am conscious that there are two possible tests for deciding when to bring a debate to a conclusion. One is when all arguments have been exhausted, the other when there are no minds left to change. I suspect that the second test is the more acute one, therefore I will be brief.
Many noble Lords have taken part in the debate. In many ways I do not need to answer the points, in that it has been a balanced debate and points have been contested across the House. I am particularly grateful to those noble Lords who agreed with me; I am less enthusiastic about those who disagreed with me. A particular point raised was the matter of human rights. I counter that with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, affirmed that this part of the Bill is compatible with the regime.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for speaking in support of my position and, in particular, for bringing out in how many areas the reverse burden of proof is in our law. It is not common, but it is there in particular cases.
I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on credit unions. In my speech I made the point that we were willing to enter conversations with the Government so that they could come forward at Third Reading with a sensible carve-out from the overall effect. I plead with the noble Lord—he may remember way back when he was in opposition—that we have modest resources. Putting together a series of sensible additions to do the carve-out would not be sensible. We are very happy to agree carve-outs with the Government.
I thank my noble friend Lord Brennan for once again reminding us of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. That is one of the most outstanding pieces of legislation in the British system. Its impact on safety in this country has been phenomenal. I and many managers in this country have laboured under the reverse burden of proof that that Act brings. The reverse burden of proof can be the right thing to do and has proved so in safety. We believe that it would prove so here.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that we have not brought out sufficient justification. He says that it is difficult to prove. No: it has so far proved impossible. I thank my noble friend Lord McFall for reminding him, us and fellow commissioners of how forcefully they supported the reverse burden of proof in their report—I have pulled out extracts but I will not take up the time of the House and read them.
Lord Bridges of Headley
“In subsection (2)(a)—
(a) references to a member, or a survivor of a member, of a pension scheme include a member, or a survivor of a member, of a pension scheme for which the PPF has assumed responsibility under Part 2 of the Pensions Act 2004 or Part 3 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/255 (N.I. 1)), but(b) in relation to such a member or survivor, the reference to the flexible benefits that may be provided is to be read as a reference to the money purchase benefits (within the meaning of that Act or that Order) that may be provided by the PPF by virtue of sections 161 and 170 of that Act or articles 145 and 154 of that Order.(2B) ”
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, this group makes several small pensions amendments, which I shall highlight briefly.
The first amendment is technical in nature and closes an unintended gap in guidance provision, ensuring that people in the Pension Protection Fund—the PPF—are able to access Pension Wise guidance. At present, Pension Wise is able to provide guidance only to a member, or the survivor of a member, of a pension scheme. As the PPF is a compensation fund, not a pension scheme, individuals whose schemes have transferred into the PPF are not able to obtain guidance from Pension Wise.
Where a defined benefit scheme transfers to the PPF, usually following the sponsoring employer becoming insolvent, it is possible that any money purchase benefits which a scheme member has built up, most likely as a top-up to their defined benefit scheme, could also transfer in. The amendment will allow these members to receive guidance on options around what to do with their money purchase benefits. Pension Wise should be available to all who wish, and are able, to take advantage of the pension freedom reforms, and it is right that we are taking action now to ensure that all are treated consistently.
Next is a series of amendments that make changes to Clauses 27, 30 and 32. These ensure that powers currently given to the Treasury will be given instead to the Secretary of State. This is so that when oversight of Pension Wise moves to the Department for Work and Pensions, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions will be able to exercise this power.
I turn finally to the amendment creating a new clause. This amendment is technical in nature and allows appointed representatives of authorised financial advisers to advise on the conversion and transfer of safeguarded benefits, which are the special valuable features of certain pensions, such as defined benefit pensions and pensions with guaranteed annuity rates, for the purposes of the advice safeguard established in Sections 48 and 51 of the Pension Schemes Act 2015.
These amendments to Sections 48 and 51 of the Pension Schemes Act 2015 will amend the definition of “authorised independent adviser” to include appointed representatives. As a result, they will be able to give appropriate independent advice to satisfy the advice safeguard. They will also amend the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Appointed Representatives) Regulations 2001 to the same end. Around two-thirds of financial advisers are appointed representatives who have a special contract to provide services on behalf of their principal, who will be an authorised financial adviser regulated by the FCA. This measure puts the eligibility of appointed representatives to advise on these transactions beyond doubt.
The amendment extends eligibility to advise on these transactions only to the appointed representatives of financial advisers. What this will not do is reduce consumer protections or weaken the accountability of financial advisers, or their appointed representatives. Where an appointed representative advises on these transactions, the directly authorised firm, as the principal, takes full responsibility for the quality of the advice and compliance with FCA rules.
The pension freedoms which came into effect in April have given people real freedom and choice in how they access and spend their income at retirement. This amendment will help to ensure that they operate as intended for customers with safeguarded benefits. I beg to move.
Lord Bridges of Headley
Lord Bridges of Headley
“Advice about transferring or otherwise dealing with annuity payments
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 137FB insert—
“137FBA FCA general rules: advice about transferring or otherwise dealing with annuity payments
(1) The FCA must make general rules requiring specified authorised persons to check that an individual—
(a) who has a right to payments under a relevant annuity, and(b) if the Treasury make regulations under subsection (3), who is not an exempt person by virtue of those regulations, has received appropriate advice before transferring or otherwise dealing with the right to those payments.(2) The reference in subsection (1) to a right to payments under a relevant annuity does not include a contingent right to such payments.
(3) The Treasury may by regulations provide that an individual whose financial circumstances meet criteria specified in the regulations is an exempt person for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).
(4) Regulations made under subsection (3) may (amongst other things) specify criteria based on the proportion of the individual’s financial resources that is represented by the payments under the relevant annuity or the value of that annuity.
(5) The rules made by virtue of subsection (1) may include provision—
(a) about what specified authorised persons must do to check that an individual has received appropriate advice for the purposes of those rules;(b) about when the check must be carried out.(6) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “relevant annuity” means an annuity specified (by type, value or otherwise) as a relevant annuity in regulations made by the Treasury;(b) “appropriate advice” means advice specified (by reference to the person giving the advice or otherwise) as appropriate advice in regulations made by the Treasury;(c) “specified authorised person” means an authorised person of a description specified in rules made by virtue of subsection (1).(7) If regulations under subsection (3) or (6)(a) make provision about the value of an annuity, the regulations may also make provision about the basis on which the value of an annuity is to be calculated.”
(3) In section 138F(2) (notification of rules) after “137FB,” insert “137FBA,”.
(4) In section 138I (consultation by the FCA)—
(a) in subsection (6), after paragraph (aa) insert—“(ab) section 137FBA;”;(b) in subsection (10)(a) after “137FB,” insert “137FBA,”.”
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, this amendment introduces an advice requirement for some of those consumers who wish to sell their annuity income streams on the secondary market.
We have already debated the extension of Pension Wise, enabling it to offer guidance for consumers in this market. The Government recognise the importance of protecting all who have a right to receive an income under a relevant annuity, not just the primary annuity holder, and this has been a concern raised by noble Lords previously. That is why we can clarify that we will be making the free and impartial Pension Wise guidance service available to anyone with a relevant interest in a relevant annuity.
Today, the Government are introducing a new measure to ensure that consumers are adequately supported when making the complex decision of whether to sell their annuity income streams. A regular income stream from an annuity is a valuable asset and, for the majority of individuals, it will be in their best interests to keep their annuity. Therefore, it is important that annuity holders understand the value of their income stream and are informed about the options available to them.
The Government have consulted on the steps that should be taken to support consumers with this complex decision. In addition to Pension Wise guidance, we asked whether consumers should be required to take financial advice in order to receive a tailored recommendation to inform their choices. We also asked whether the safeguards in place should vary depending on the value of an annuity to ensure that consumers with lower value annuities do not have to pay disproportionately high costs in order to sell them. There was broad support from both industry and consumer groups for requiring advice above a threshold. The Government have listened and are putting this measure in place through a government amendment to this Bill today.
This proposed new clause will place an obligation on the Financial Conduct Authority to make rules requiring certain authorised firms to check that advice has been received before annuity holders may sell their annuity income stream. The FCA will determine which businesses will be required to make these checks, what the checks will entail and when they will be carried out. We expect that the FCA will be consulting on its proposed rules during 2016.
The threshold for advice, including how it will be calculated, will be set out by government through secondary legislation. The Government will also lay secondary legislation to specify what type of advice individuals must have received. In specifying appropriate financial advice, the Government’s intention is to require advice to be FCA-authorised and regulated. The Government also intend to legislate that all UK buyers in the secondary market for annuities will be FCA-regulated. This will allow the FCA to design specific rules governing the conduct of both financial advisers and buyers in this market, and the Government will work with the FCA to consider any conflicts of interest that may arise between these parties. The Government are engaging with financial advisers and their representative bodies with the aim of ensuring that there will be enough participating advisers to meet consumer demand when the market opens. Within the financial advice market review, the Government are considering how the availability of financial advice can be improved, particularly for those who do not have significant income or wealth. The review is to publish its recommendations by the time of Budget 2016, and the Government will ensure that the financial advice requirement in the secondary annuities market fully reflects the outcomes of this review.
A further power will allow the Treasury to exempt from this advice requirement those individuals whose financial circumstances meet certain criteria. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has recently recommended that this power be affirmative rather than negative, and the Government will respond to the House on this recommendation at the earliest opportunity. The Government will consult on the regulations to be made under all powers afforded by this clause in 2016.
Today’s debate coincides with the Government’s publication of their response to the March 2015 call for evidence on the creation of a secondary market for annuities. This sets out the wider set of proposals around, and the next steps for, the implementation of the secondary market. The response gives further detail on how the market will operate, including tax considerations as well as further details on the consumer support framework, part of which the Government are legislating for in this Bill. Your Lordships will no doubt be minded to consider the wider policy in today’s discussion, and your views on these proposals are welcomed. I beg to move.
Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register of interests, in particular my membership of the board of the Pensions Advisory Service. I am also on the Delegated Powers Committee.
There is no pre-existing secondary annuity market which can inform an assessment of whether it would be a well-functioning market, what the key risks are or what is an appropriate level of consumer protection. I have had little time to digest the Government’s response to the consultation on this market, published today, but up to 5 million people could participate in this market—although interestingly, the Pensions Minister and the Economic Secretary both advise that for the vast majority of customers, selling an annuity will not be the best decision. There is a real tension in the policy on this secondary market. The Government have to ensure a robust consumer protection regime consistent with their asserted view, which I do not disagree with, that the right decision for most people is to retain their annuity. At the same time, an effective market needs a sufficient level of demand from consumers to sell their annuities and a sufficiently wide range of purchasers. These two requirements do not sit easily with each other.
While it is welcome that the Government are taking further steps through their Amendment 25 to protect the consumer, I have real concerns about the sufficiency of those protections. The Government will now also allow the original issuers to buy back annuities. This will be allowed only indirectly when facilitated through a regulated intermediary, such as a broker or financial adviser—presumably to enhance consumer prospects of a better deal—although annuity providers can still buy back low-value annuities directly. That raises several issues. What will be the threshold at which direct buyback of low-value annuities will be allowed? How will this be measured—by income stream, by income stream in relation to the individual’s financial resources or by the annuity’s value on the secondary market? Indirect buyback through an intermediary will mean an extra layer of costs for consumers, paying in effect for their own protection. How will the Government control those costs?
As individuals will be required to take advice, how will the Government ensure that advisers are willing to provide advice at a reasonable charge, particularly to those with modest value annuities? This is a problem under the required advice regime for individuals transferring defined benefit assets to defined contribution arrangements, so similar problems are certain to arise in a secondary annuity market. Will sufficient brokers enter that market to enable a fair price? Allowing buyback, directly or indirectly, must increase the risk of consumer inertia as individuals choose to stay with their original provider, notwithstanding any advice that they receive, heralding a weak demand size which is already so common in the pensions and annuities market. The Government intend to bring forward legislation to create a further regulated activity for buying back an annuity. What is the timetable for that legislation and will we have time to consider it properly?
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, I am not here to pile Pelion upon Ossa. I counted that at least 12 questions of considerable complexity have been addressed to the Minister, and all of them are important. My two noble friends have of course reflected the considerable anxieties on this side with regard to the position with pensions, particularly for secondary annuities. I hope the Minister will do his level best to respond to real questions that need to be addressed, which would also minimise the amount of time we will need to spend at Third Reading on the issue.
Lord Bridges of Headley
I start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for sparing the time to meet me and officials last week. I will also say now that I apologise for the timing on these things. I will not try to give a “dog ate my homework” excuse—these things are sometimes just unfortunate—and I heed what the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, has to say about the timing of the report. I make no commitments right now about Third Reading, but I am happy to meet both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and will answer a number of the points that have been raised. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, some were pretty technical, so I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I do not cover them all, in which case I will write as soon as I possibly can with detailed answers.
To start, the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, spoke of the tension in the policy. All I would say in response is that many of the responses to the consultation welcomed the proposal to extend the pension freedoms to those who had already bought an annuity. As the Government have always made clear, for many people, an annuity, which provides a guaranteed income for life, will remain the right choice. However, the Government believe that there is no reason why they should impose barriers that prevent individuals being free to make their own decision about what to do with their annuity rights, purchased with the money they have saved throughout their working life.
Lord Bridges of Headley
“Independent advice on conversions and transfers of pension benefits: appointed representatives
(1) The Pension Schemes Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 48(8) (independent advice in respect of conversions and transfers: Great Britain), in paragraph (a) of the definition of “authorised independent adviser”, after “Secretary of State,” insert “or is acting as an appointed representative (within the meaning given by section 39(2) of that Act) in relation to a regulated activity so specified,”.
(3) In section 51(8) (independent advice in respect of conversions and transfers: Northern Ireland), in paragraph (a) of the definition of “authorised independent adviser”, after “Northern Ireland,” insert “or is acting as an appointed representative (within the meaning given by section 39(2) of that Act) in relation to a regulated activity so specified,”.
(4) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Appointed Representatives) Regulations 2001 (S.I. 2001/1217) are amended as follows.
(5) In regulation 2(1) (descriptions of business for which appointed representatives are exempt) after sub-paragraph (cca) insert—
“(ccb) an activity of the kind specified by article 53E of that Order (advising on conversion or transfer of pension benefits);”.(6) In regulation 3 (requirements applying to contracts between authorised persons and appointed representatives) after paragraph (3G) insert—
“(3GA) A representative is also to be treated as representing other counterparties for the purposes of paragraph (1) where the representative gives advice (in circumstances constituting the carrying on of an activity of the kind specified by article 53E of that Order) on behalf of other counterparties.”(7) The amendments made by subsections (4) to (6) do not affect the power to make further subordinate legislation amending or revoking the amended regulations.”