Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]
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Lord Ashton of Hyde
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 1 to 6.
“(b) the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which a Bank company has used its resources in discharging its functions.”
Lord Bridges of Headley
Moved by
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 7.
“Appointment of Financial Conduct Authority chief executive
In Schedule 1ZA to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the Financial Conduct Authority), after paragraph 2 insert—
“2A(1) The term of office of a person appointed as chief executive under paragraph 2(2)(b) must not begin before—
(a) the person has, in connection with the appointment, appeared before the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons, or
(b) (if earlier) the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the day on which the appointment is made.
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply if the person is appointed as chief executive on an acting basis, pending a further appointment being made.
(3) The reference to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons—
(a) if the name of that Committee is changed, is a reference to that Committee by its new name, and
(b) if the functions of that Committee (or substantially corresponding functions) become functions of a different Committee of the House of Commons, is to be treated as a reference to the Committee by which the functions are exercisable.
(4) Any question arising under sub-paragraph (3) is to be determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.””
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)
My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 7—and on this, too, we have been in listening mode.
This amendment recognises the important role played by the Treasury Select Committee in its scrutiny of the Financial Conduct Authority and appointments to its top job. Through the committee’s programme of pre-commencement hearings it questions appointees to several posts before they start work. After appointees have started, as your Lordships will know, they appear regularly before the committee. The Government welcome this scrutiny of appointees.
Our amendment therefore ensures that the committee always has the chance to scrutinise a newly appointed chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority before they start work. It provides that no one who is appointed as CEO of the FCA can start work until they have appeared before the TSC or three months have passed. This gives the TSC time to call them in, and once it has questioned the appointee in relation to the appointment, he or she can get to work. There is an exception to this if the appointment of a chief executive is made on an acting basis pending a further appointment; for example, where an appointment must be made urgently in response to a sudden vacancy. However, to appoint a permanent CEO, the Government must give the TSC the chance to hold a hearing.
As your Lordships will be aware, my right honourable friend the Chancellor and the chair of the Treasury Select Committee have reached an agreement that further reinforces the committee’s scrutiny role. This is set out in a letter from the Chancellor to the chair of the TSC, which has been published on the TSC’s website. It reads as follows:
“During the passage of the Bank of England and Financial Services Bill, we have considered the role of the Treasury Select Committee … in scrutinising the appointment of the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority … This scrutiny is important and welcome. I will therefore ensure that appointments to the Chief Executive of the FCA are made in such a way to ensure the TSC is able to hold a hearing, after the appointment is announced but before it is formalised. Should the TSC recommend in its report that the appointment be put as a motion to the whole House, the government will make time for this motion and respect the decision of the House. Additionally, I will seek, in a future Bill, to make a change to the legislation governing appointments to the FCA CEO to make the appointee subject to a fixed, renewable 5-year term. This would not apply to Andrew Bailey, who I recently announced as the new head of the FCA, but would first apply to his successor. I believe that these changes will reinforce the Treasury Committee’s important scrutiny role”.
This commitment, combined with this amendment, which ensures that the Treasury Committee always has the opportunity to hold a hearing with an appointee, serves as a strong recognition of the committee’s vital role in scrutinising the FCA and its CEO. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, we support this amendment, but more precisely, we support this amendment with the commitments made in the Chancellor’s letter to the chair of the Treasury Select Committee. We are glad to see moves to buttress the independence of the FCA, and we think the amendment and the commitments will help do that. It is true that the FCA does need some help. In particular, it needs help in ending what is, or appears to be, interference by the Executive.
Recent times have not been happy. There was the early announcement of the non-renewal of Martin Wheatley’s contract; the Chancellor’s public announcement that Tracey McDermott was withdrawing her CEO application, before she had had a chance to tell her own people; and, then, the appointment of Andrew Bailey as CEO without benefit of a proper interview panel. I will not even mention that the search for the hard-to-find Mr Bailey cost £280,000.
To restore belief in its independence and its self-confidence and morale, the FCA needs to have a robustly and operationally independent CEO. We hope that this amendment and the Chancellor’s commitments will make that happen. This amendment and those commitments are of course the result—as the Minister has explained—of negotiations with Mr Tyrie, the chair of the Commons Treasury Select Committee. We would have preferred Mr Tyrie’s original amendment, which simply gave the Treasury Select Committee the power to approve, or not to approve, the appointment of the CEO of the FCA.
The government amendment, of course, does not go nearly that far. It simply says that the already appointed—although, I hope, not contractually bound—CEO must appear before the TSC before taking up his office. By itself, this is pretty feeble stuff. In fact, the important changes are not in this Bill at all; they are contained in the letter from the Chancellor to the chair of the TSC. The letter makes two commitments, as the Minister has explained. The first is that the Chancellor will,
“ensure that appointments to the Chief Executive of the FCA are made in such a way to ensure the TSC is able to hold a hearing, after the appointment is announced but before it is formalised. Should the TSC”,
as the Minister has said,
“recommend in its report that the appointment be put as a motion to the whole House, the government will make time for this motion and respect the decision of the House”.
Secondly, the Chancellor,
“will seek, in a future Bill, to make a change to the legislation governing appointments to the FCA CEO to make the appointee subject to a fixed, renewable 5-year term”.
This is all very cumbersome, and one must hope that the prospect of having your merits gently and tactfully debated in the Commons will not put applicants off. However, it is an improvement on the current situation.
There are some questions, though, and I would be grateful if the Minister could respond. Why are these two commitments not on the face of the Bill? Can the Minister confirm that the Chancellor’s commitment to ensure government time for a Treasury Select Committee Motion in the Commons is not binding on him or, more importantly, on his successors? Can the Minister say why the Chancellor will put the fixed term for the CEO into a future Bill but not the Commons vote on a Treasury Select Committee Motion? Will the Minister agree to consider incorporating both these elements into a future Bill? Finally, can the Minister assure us that any future selection process for the CEO of the FCA will involve the proper panel interviews, or at least something more closely resembling due process?
We believe that we need the protections and safeguards in this amendment and in the Chancellor’s letter. We believe that Andrew Bailey is a good choice as CEO and we wish him every success. We believe that both Mr Bailey and the FCA will benefit from less interference from the Executive and we support the amendment.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I am delighted to hear the overall approval and support for the principles and thrust behind this amendment. Let me begin with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, made. He spoke of interference by the Executive, a point he has made before. I will not rehearse the arguments again that the Government made in response to that, but we refuted many of those at the time. In response to the point that this should be made statutory, I simply point out that the commitments we have made have been affirmed by the Chancellor in writing, as I said, and by Ministers in both Houses. As the chair of the Treasury Select Committee himself points out in his letter to the Chancellor, there are several different means, both statutory and, crucially, non-statutory, for bolstering Select Committee scrutiny of appointments. Indeed, non-statutory provisions are the norm. The Cabinet Office and the Liaison Committee keep a list of some 50 appointments subject to pre-appointment hearings with varying arrangements, and the vast majority of those are by agreement.
Moving on, the noble Lord asked when we will bring forward the changes to length of term to make it fixed for five years. We are seeking the earliest opportunity, and the House authorities confirmed that it was not in scope for this stage of the Bill. That is why it is not in this Bill.
My noble friend Lord Flight and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also made a point that I know others have made and which has rumbled around for a long time: whether or not an arrangement such as this should be made for other appointments in government. I know that there is a divergence of views on whether this should be done. The Government have previously set out their concerns about appointments to these posts, such as the ones that have been cited, and will address these in fuller detail in their response to the Treasury Select Committee’s report, which will be published in due course.
As well as looking forward to that response, it is worth reminding your Lordships just how we got here—this picks up on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, just made. We are indeed responding to points raised during the passage of this Bill specifically concerning the appointment of the chief executive of the FCA. That is why the Government’s amendment and the agreement reached between the Chancellor and the chair of the Treasury Select Committee are focused on this particular appointment. I would further argue that this amendment and this agreement sit within the context of a Bill that significantly strengthens the governance, transparency and accountability of the Bank of England. This includes enhancing the accountability of the Bank to Parliament by making the whole Bank subject, for the first time, to NAO value-for-money reviews. I fully understand that the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friend Lord Flight will continue to rumble on. I commend the amendment to the House.
Lord Bridges of Headley
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 8.
“Illegal money lending
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) After Part 20A insert—
“PART 20B
ILLEGAL MONEY LENDING
333S Financial assistance for action against illegal money lending
(1) The Treasury may make grants or loans, or give any other form of financial assistance, to any person for the purpose of taking action against illegal money lending.
(2) Taking action against illegal money lending includes—
(a) investigating illegal money lending and offences connected with illegal money lending;
(b) prosecuting, or taking other enforcement action in respect of, illegal money lending and offences connected with illegal money lending;
(c) providing education, information and advice about illegal money lending, and providing support to victims of illegal money lending;
(d) undertaking or commissioning research into the effectiveness of activities of the kind described in paragraphs (a) to (c);
(e) providing advice, assistance and support (including financial support) to, and oversight of, persons engaged in activities of the kind described in paragraphs (a) to (c).
(3) A grant, loan or other form of financial assistance under subsection (1) may be made or given on such terms as the Treasury consider appropriate.
(4) “Illegal money lending” means carrying on a regulated activity
within Article 60B of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (S.I. 2001/544) (regulated credit agreements) in circumstances which constitute an authorisation offence.
333T Funding of action against illegal money lending
(1) The Treasury must, from time to time, notify the FCA of the amount of the Treasury’s illegal money lending costs.
(2) The FCA must make rules requiring authorised persons, or any specified class of authorised person, to pay to the FCA specified amounts, or amounts calculated in a specified way, with a view to recovering the amount notified under subsection (1).
(3) The amounts to be paid under the rules may include a component to recover the expenses of the FCA in collecting the payments (“collection costs”).
(4) Before the FCA publishes a draft of the rules it must consult the Treasury.
(5) The rules may be made only with the consent of the Treasury.
(6) The Treasury may notify the FCA of matters that they will take into account when deciding whether or not to give consent for the purposes of subsection (5).
(7) The FCA must have regard to any matters notified under subsection (6) before publishing a draft of rules to be made under this section.
(8) The FCA must pay to the Treasury the amounts that it receives under rules made under this section apart from amounts in respect of its collection costs (which it may keep).
(9) The Treasury must pay into the Consolidated Fund the amounts received by them under subsection (8).
(10) In this section the “Treasury’s illegal money lending costs” means the expenses incurred, or expected to be incurred, by the Treasury—
(a) in connection with providing grants, loans, or other financial assistance to any person (under section 333S or otherwise) for the purpose of taking action against illegal money lending;
(b) in undertaking or commissioning research relating to taking action against illegal money lending.
(11) The Treasury may by regulations amend the definition of the “Treasury’s illegal money lending costs”.
(12) In this section “illegal money lending” and “taking action against illegal money lending” have the same meaning as in section 333S.”
(3) In section 138F (notification of rules), for “or 333R” substitute “, 333R or 333T”.
(4) In section 138I (consultation by FCA)—
(a) in subsection (6), after paragraph (cb) insert—
“(cc) section 333T;”;
(b) in subsection (10)(a), for “or 333R” substitute “, 333R or 333T”.
(5) In section 429(2) (regulations subject to affirmative procedure), for “or 333R” substitute “, 333R or 333T”.
(6) In paragraph 23 of Schedule 1ZA (FCA fees rules)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1) for “and 333R” substitute “, 333R and 333T”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (2ZA)(b) for “section 333R” substitute “sections
333R and 333T”.”
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, this amendment gives the Treasury a power to provide financial assistance to bodies for the purpose of taking action against illegal money lending. It also gives the FCA an obligation to raise a levy, which will apply to consumer credit firms, in order to fund this financial assistance.
Loan sharks prey on some of the most vulnerable people in society, cause untold misery to their victims and have a damaging impact on the communities in which they operate. As well as lending money illegally at high levels of interest without FCA authorisation, loan sharks frequently use blackmail, as well as violence, to intimidate their victims into repaying legally unenforceable debts.
Loan sharks are currently investigated and prosecuted by the England and Wales illegal money lending teams and the Scottish Illegal Money Lending Unit. The cost of the teams is around £4.7 million. While the FCA will consult on precisely how the levy will be apportioned and collected in its annual fees consultation, the cost of the new levy to individual firms in the £200 billion consumer credit market is anticipated to be small.
It is absolutely right that industry meets the modest costs of funding the teams—all participants in the consumer credit market benefit from their enforcement work. The teams ensure that the consumer credit market remains legitimate and credible by keeping illegal money lenders out of it. The amendment will ensure that the funding that the illegal money lending teams need to continue their crucial work is put on a sustainable, long-term footing. I beg to move.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interest as chair of the National Trading Standards board and welcome this government amendment to put the funding of the illegal money lending teams on a stable footing. As the Minister said, the teams do an enormous amount of extremely important and valuable work. A recent prosecution dealt with an individual who was charging those unfortunates whom he was offering allegedly to help interest rates of 400,000% per annum. Figures I have for England and Wales show that the work of the illegal money lending teams has led to the writing-off of debts in excess of £55 million. So the work is value for money and extremely important. It is quite right that the funding of these teams should now be put on a long-term, sustainable footing and it is entirely proper that the legitimate part of the lending industry should make sure that those who operate illegally and prey on people who are in a state of considerable distress are dealt with appropriately.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, while we support the amendment, my colleagues in the other place made a strong argument which I want to rehearse now. Of course, we agree that it is right that there should be stable funding for operations against money lenders who take advantage of their position, but, as my noble friend Lord Harris indicated, loan sharks at their worst can levy the most extortionate charges on the people who come within their purview. We would have preferred a levy not on the industry but from general taxation, because our anxiety is that those at the bottom end of the market, who have the most ruthless operational relationship with the public, will pass on these costs by taking even more money from those who are vulnerable to them. We accept the amendment and of course will not contest it, but we would rather the levy came out of general taxation than being an impost, which we know some in the industry will pass on to others.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I again thank noble Lords for their support in principle for much of this amendment; in particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for his comments given his experience in this area.
Clearly, we disagree with what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said about why this is not being funded by taxation. As I said in my opening remarks, the current cost of the enforcement regime is around £4.7 million. Consequently, the costs to individual firms in the £200 billion consumer credit market is anticipated to be small. Therefore, it is unlikely that they will be passed on down the chain. With that in mind, I hope the amendment will be agreed.
Lord Bridges of Headley
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 10.
“Early exit pension charges
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 137FBA (as inserted by section 30) insert—
“137FBB FCA general rules: early exit pension charges
(1) The FCA must make general rules prohibiting authorised persons from—
(a) imposing specified early exit charges on members of relevant pension schemes, and
(b) including in relevant pension schemes provision for the imposition of specified early exit charges on members of such schemes.
(2) The rules must be made with a view to securing, so far as is reasonably possible, an appropriate degree of protection for members of relevant pension schemes against early exit charges being a deterrent on taking, converting or transferring benefits under the schemes.
(3) The rules may specify early exit charges by reference to charges of a specified class or description, or by reference to charges which exceed a specified amount.
(4) The rules made by virtue of subsection (1)(a) must prohibit the imposition of the charges after those rules come into force, whether the relevant pension scheme was established before or after those rules (or this section) came into force.
(5) In relation to a charge which is imposed, or provision for the imposition of a charge which is included in a pension scheme, in contravention of the rules, the rules may (amongst other things)—
(a) provide for the obligation to pay the charge to be unenforceable or unenforceable to a specified extent;
(b) provide for the recovery of amounts paid in respect of the charge;
(c) provide for the payment of compensation for any losses incurred as a result of paying amounts in respect of the charge.
(6) Subject to subsection (8) an early exit charge, in relation to a member of a pension scheme, is a charge which—
(a) is imposed under the scheme when a member who has reached normal minimum pension age takes the action mentioned in subsection (7), but
(b) is only imposed, or only imposed to that extent, if the member takes that action before the member’s expected retirement date.
(7) The action is the member taking benefits under the scheme, converting benefits under the scheme into different benefits or transferring benefits under the scheme to another pension scheme.
(8) The Treasury may by regulations specify matters that are not to be treated as early exit charges for the purposes of this section.
(9) For the purposes of this section—
“charge”, in relation to a member of a pension scheme, includes a reduction in the value of the member’s benefits under the scheme;
“expected retirement date”, in relation to a member of a pension scheme, means the date determined by, or in accordance with, the scheme as the date on which the member’s benefits under the scheme are expected to be taken;
“normal minimum pension age” has the same meaning as in section 279(1) of the Finance Act 2004;
“relevant pension scheme” has the same meaning as in section 137FB;
and a reference to benefits includes all or any part of those benefits.”
(3) In section 138E(3) (contravention of rules which may make transaction void or unenforceable)—
(a) omit the “or” at the end of paragraph (a);
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert “or
(c) rules made by the FCA under section 137FBB.””
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, Commons Amendment 10 places a duty on the Financial Conduct Authority to cap early exit charges that act as a deterrent to people accessing their pensions early under the new pension freedoms. The Government took the step of introducing this amendment in Committee in the Commons following detailed evidence-gathering exercises that showed the extent of consumer detriment caused by early exit charges and the imperative to act quickly in order to limit this.
Evidence from the FCA found that there is a small but significant cohort of people in contract-based pension schemes for whom early exit charges were posing a real barrier to accessing the freedoms. The FCA found that some 670,000 people over 55 in such schemes face an early exit charge, and for 66,000—almost one in 10—this charge would exceed 10% of the value of their pension pot. In some cases these charges would be high enough to make it uneconomic for an individual to access their pension flexibly, while in others, the presence of an early exit charge may have acted to discourage individuals from accessing their pension when it could have been the best thing to do in their circumstances.
It is therefore clear that the Government’s objective of ensuring that everyone who is eligible can access their pension savings flexibly is not being met and that action is needed to ensure that all consumers are able to make use of the freedoms. In order to ensure that the cap benefits current consumers who are eligible to use the freedoms now, subsection (4) of this clause provides that any cap will apply equally in relation to existing arrangements, as well as those entered into in the future. The decision to introduce a measure which will have retrospective effect in this way is not one that the Government have taken lightly; we recognise industry concerns about the way this cap will affect existing contractual agreements.
However, the Government’s view is that this action is warranted to ensure that individuals are not deterred from accessing their pension flexibly because of contractual terms they entered into long before the freedoms were introduced. These people would not have been in a position to make an informed decision about potential early exit charges when they signed up. Even some pension providers have conceded that industry practices have moved on and that the introduction of the pension freedoms means that these charges pose a much more significant barrier now than when they were agreed.
To be clear, this measure is about ensuring that consumers are adequately protected against early exit charges being imposed at a level so high as to deter them from accessing their pension early under the pension freedoms. This clause is not about determining the fairness of these, or other existing contractual terms and conditions more generally. That is a separate, wider issue which this Government have recently addressed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015, legislation which the FCA has the power to enforce against the firms it regulates.
It is important to consider the nature of the contractual terms affected through this measure. The Economic Secretary made it clear when introducing this clause in the other place that terms providing for market value reductions should not be subject to the cap on early exit charges. Subsection (8) of this clause gives the Treasury a power to introduce secondary legislation to provide for this exclusion to the FCA’s duty. FCA rules already place rules on how firms may apply a market value reduction, and the cap on early exit charges will not add to or modify these rules. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the level of any cap is fairly set, the FCA will determine the precise level of the cap, following further public consultation and cost-benefit analysis. The FCA will be setting out its next steps in this process shortly, with a view to implementing this cap before the end of March 2017.
This clause gives the FCA the flexibility to apply different rules to different classes or descriptions of charges if it finds that the evidence demands this, but the Government’s expectation is that any FCA cap or prohibition will apply equally for all those consumers accessing their pension aged 55 and above, up to their expected retirement date, rather than being set at different levels for different age groups. Although data collected by the Pensions Regulator suggest that early exit charges are less prevalent in trust-based pension schemes, we will also act to ensure that all members, regardless of scheme, are protected from excessive early exit charges, and the DWP and the Pensions Regulator will work alongside the FCA as they develop the design and level of the cap for contract-based pension schemes to ensure that this is possible.
The pension freedoms have given consumers much greater freedom of choice in the financial decisions they make at retirement. Commons Amendment 10 will provide important protections to consumers in contract-based pension schemes, ensuring that they are not deterred from using the pensions freedoms by excessive early exit charges. I beg to move.
Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I take this opportunity to thank the Minister for meeting my noble friend Lord McKenzie and me to discuss this amendment in detail. I am most grateful for that. As has been said, the amendment places a new duty on the FCA to make rules to prohibit or cap early exit charges that act as a deterrent to people accessing their savings under the new freedoms. This amendment is particularly interesting for two reasons. Unusually, it introduces legislation with retrospective effect on existing contracts and a new deterrent regime in addition to the existing fairness regime in financial conduct regulation—in effect, charges must not be at a level that deters people from accessing their savings.
The Government believe the legislation needs retrospective effect because of the need to protect existing and future consumers, and—more interestingly, when one reads the detail of their proposals—that fairness should not be determined solely by reference to whether or not it was fair to include a term in a pension contract a decade or decades ago, but that it has to be looked at against how unfair contracts legislation has evolved since those contracts were entered into, and through the new lens of the recent pension freedom reforms, all of which arguments I agree with. But given that the Government have taken the decision through this amendment to enable retrospective changes to existing pension contracts and recovery of amounts paid or payment of compensation for charges made in contravention of the new FCA rules coming into force in March 2017, and that the pension freedoms, which provide the new lens for looking at fairness, were introduced in April 2015, I cannot understand why the consumer protection in the new FCA duty does not apply with effect from April 2015. Why is it necessary to wait until March 2017 when the FCA rules are implemented—a full two years after the pension freedoms were introduced—before consumers are protected by the provisions on fair access to savings?
The Minister advised in his letter of 16 March that the Government are introducing this amendment,
“in light of detailed evidence gathering, and an imperative to act quickly in order to limit the extent of consumer detriment caused by early exit charges”.
The Government’s main defence for this two-year gap from April 2015 to March 2017 in protecting consumers is that savers who access savings between these two dates from a scheme whose early exit charges are considered excessive under FCA rules to be implemented in March 2017 cannot have been deterred by those charges and presumably are therefore not in need of retrospective protection. That argument simply does not sit comfortably with the Government’s view that some people are being denied fair access to their savings. It suggests that the new deterrent regime trumps fairness—in effect, if a person accessed their savings they have not been deterred, ergo the early access terms are fair.
There are many reasons why people may access their pension savings during that two-year gap, even though the charges may be excessive. There may be ill health or other compelling personal circumstances that override the deterrent effect. People may not be aware of, or understand, the excessive early exit charges, so do not make their decision on an informed basis. The FCA data reveal that 78% of affected consumers rated their pension provider’s explanation of the exit charge and its level as poor.
In his letter of 16 March, the Minister comments:
“In order to ensure that the provision benefits current consumers who are eligible to use the pension freedoms now … this clause provides that any prohibition or cap imposed by FCA rules applies equally in relation to existing pension contracts, as well as those entered into in future”.
In the light of that statement, it is most unfortunate that the amendment excludes from the protection consumers accessing their savings between April 2015 and March 2017, even though in other circumstances it allows for a retrospective effect.
Lord Bridges of Headley
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. Let me pick up on the final point which was just made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. I heed what he says about getting access to this amendment sooner but I would somewhat refute what he says about the rushed nature of the entire policy. When this problem was first identified the Government took immediate action to address it by embarking, as I have mentioned, on the FCA evidence-gathering exercise. However, I thank in particular the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, for the time that they have spent discussing this clause and amendment with me. I have already committed to write to them shortly to address a number of the very forensic and detailed points that were made to me last week. I will do that as soon as I possibly can.
A number of your Lordships including the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised a valid question about why we are not backdating this measure to 2015, when the pension freedoms came into effect, and not requiring providers to pay back the early exit charges which they received from customers in the period between April 2015 and when the cap comes into effect. I would make two points on this, as already outlined in my remarks. First, the purpose of this measure is not to require the FCA to assess the fairness of the contractual terms of historic pensions. The intent of the measure is to ensure that early exit charges are not imposed at an inappropriate level which deters consumers from accessing their pension early under the pension freedoms. Clearly, those who have decided, or will decide, to access their pension despite an early exit charge have not, or will not, have been deterred by the existence of such a charge.
Secondly, I accept the observation that, once in effect, this cap will obviously benefit some consumers who would not have been deterred by the early exit charge in their contract. However, the Government believe that it is an ordinary consequence of introducing a new measure of this sort that those—in this case, consumers—who take an action before the law comes into force do not benefit from the new law. Moreover, it is right that the Government do not rush to make legislation which has any sort of retrospective effect but that they do so only when there is clear and compelling evidence that it is in the public interest, and then make that retrospection as minimal as possible to ensure that the action is proportionate. That is what I and the Government believe that this clause achieves. It is proportionate and focused on those who greatly need it, and that is why I commend it to the House.
Baroness Drake
Before the Minister finishes, if I may, the defence is given that this is not a fairness regime but a deterrent regime and that there is therefore no evidence of deterrence and no need to make it retrospective. But on the FCA’s own evidence, the knowledge and understanding of these charges is quite poor. It is difficult to be deterred if you do not know that you are being exposed to excessive exit charges. People will not know that they are being exposed to them until the FCA has done its business, which will be by March 2017. It seems a little unfair. At the very least, perhaps the Government should be taking steps to ensure that companies and other agencies make consumers aware that if they wait until March next year, they may get a better deal.
Lord Bridges of Headley
The noble Baroness, as so often, makes a very valid point. This is precisely what the consultation sets out to address. It aims to ensure not just that consumers are properly protected but that they make informed and proper decisions. I will write to the noble Baroness to make these points in more detail.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 11.
Lord Bridges of Headley
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 12.
“( ) In paragraph 14 for “submit a monthly” substitute “, at least 8 times in each calendar year, submit a”.”