(13 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberNo, not as ever, sometimes we are shoulder to shoulder. However, I congratulate the noble Baroness and I am grateful for her reply. It will deserve reading. I take her point about the term being used in control order legislation but I have written down,
“much the same as prima facie”.
I, for one, would not like to tangle with her over whether there is any significance in the term “much the same”. If anybody reading Hansard who is better qualified than me thinks that one should take issue with,
“much the same as prima facie”,
I will come back to it on Report. As I say, I will read the noble Baroness’s response. I am grateful to her for the detail. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, with particular responsibility for overseeing the Met’s work on security and counterterrorism.
Earlier this week, I went to a meeting with Carie Lamack. Her mother was killed on American Airlines flight 11, which crashed into the World Trade Center 10 years ago. She went on to co-found Families of September 11 and, later, the Global Survivors Network, which brings together survivors of terrorist attacks across the world and their family members. Her testimony is an international reminder about why the fight to combat terrorism is so important. Families are destroyed, individuals are left bereft and the effects last a lifetime.
I am sure that no one in your Lordships' House wants to see repeated the suffering of those terribly injured in the London transport attacks or the grief felt by those bereaved. That is why it is the paramount duty of Governments to protect the security of their citizens, to protect those citizens' right to life and to protect all of us against terrorism.
The problem that government faces is simple to state but not easy to resolve. In essence, it is this: what does the Home Secretary do about those individuals who pose a serious risk to the lives of British citizens but against whom there is insufficient evidence to bring them before a court charged with a terrorist offence? The evidence may not be admissible in British courts or it may rely on material gathered by UK intelligence agencies that would compromise the safety and security of others if it were publicly disclosed, or it is derived from intelligence from overseas agencies provided on the basis that it must not be disclosed. Yet a responsible Home Secretary cannot ignore that those individuals pose a significant risk, cannot turn a blind eye to the threat that is there and cannot fail to take some action to protect the rest of us. To do nothing would be a dereliction of that responsibility to protect the public. Control orders were an attempt to provide us with that protection in the very small number of cases where no other action is possible, and it is a power that has been rarely used, despite the dire warnings that were issued when it was first proposed.
This Bill, however, is nothing more than a shoddy compromise which weakens our security, yet does nothing to satisfy those with concerns about civil liberties. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Howard, has just said, I think that it is a compromise that demonstrates the weakness of the Government as they try to square the circle between the two wings of the coalition, epitomised by a Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister and a Conservative Home Secretary—trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. The current control order regime is not, of course, satisfactory—it is already a compromise. No one has ever seriously tried to pretend that it was satisfactory. However, it was an honest attempt by the previous Government to reach that compromise—to balance the free and liberal tradition of this country with the need for security.
The present Government were formed with an explicit commitment to replace the control order regime. It was a commitment made in the coalition agreement and the Deputy Prime Minister was voluble in his promises about what this would mean, telling us that it would “give people’s freedom back”. However, let us be quite clear. The Bill does not do anything like enough to satisfy those who have reservations about the previous control order regime and its implications for the civil liberties of those subject to that regime. Shami Chakrabarti, the director of Liberty, has said that control orders have simply been rebranded, albeit in a slightly “lower-fat” form, or, as Liberty’s briefing puts it,
“the TPIM regime essentially mirrors the control order system in all of its most offensive elements”.
Indeed, I suspect that the Bill must be something of an embarrassment for those Liberal Democrats who spent so long in this House criticising the previous Government for introducing and using control orders. There is silence today from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who in 2005, when the control order legislation was going through your Lordships’ House, said on behalf of the Liberal Democrats that control orders would constitute,
“a blatant abuse of what we have known as the proper processes of justice”.—[Official Report, 1/3/05; col. 131.]
There is silence today, too, from the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, who also spoke out unequivocally from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. He said:
“The first and fundamental issue, which is central to all the arguments advanced in this debate, is who should be responsible for the decision to make control orders. On these Benches, it is clear that the proposals made in the Bill are not acceptable”.—[Official Report, 1/3/05; col. 206.]
Those issues remain central to the proposed legislation and what we have is the silence of the Lib Dem lambs. I should say that I absolve from the accusation of silence the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, whom we will be hearing from in a moment. In 2005 he was equally trenchant but I have faith that he at least will be consistent when he speaks.
So this Bill does not satisfy—it cannot satisfy—those who feel that the current arrangements are disproportionate, draconian and destructive of our liberties. But, none the less, the Bill does water down the control order regime. It raises the threshold, from reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism to reasonable belief that the individual is or has been involved, before action can be taken. It limits what conditions can be placed on those individuals and, crucially, it removes the power to relocate individuals away from those localities where they may mix and conspire with others.
For those of us who believe that sometimes Governments must take unpalatable measures to protect us, those are crucial changes. They leave us all vulnerable. Let no one pretend that the threat has gone away. The recent arrests of seven individuals—now charged—in Birmingham as the Liberal Democrats gathered there for their conference are a reminder that we must continue to be vigilant against that threat.
The Home Secretary has had to acknowledge how critical all of this is. Within days of taking office and within days of the coalition agreement being signed, she was presented with information that persuaded her—a rational and responsible individual—that despite the coalition rhetoric about control orders and the need for them to be abolished, she should personally approve the imposition on a number of people of precisely the same orders as the Government are now abolishing.
Only in February, after the Government had announced their proposals, the Home Secretary agreed a control order on a British-Nigerian terror suspect who apparently, according to MI5, is a leading figure in a close group of Islamic extremists in north London. He was banned from living in London under the terms of that control order. In May, according to the Guardian, the High Court dismissed an appeal by the man, saying that his removal to an undisclosed address “in a Midlands city” was necessary to protect the public from the “immediate and real” risk of a terrorist-related attack. So, in February, it was necessary to place restrictions on that individual as to where he could live—effectively relocating him from north London to the Midlands, something which would not be possible under this Bill.
If this Bill becomes law, that individual will be free to move back to London in the new year, just weeks before the Olympics, to renew the associations that only a few months ago were deemed by that rational and responsible Home Secretary to be so dangerous that a control order was needed along with the relocation of that individual. I ask the Minister: what will have changed between the time when the Home Secretary approved that order and the time when the individual concerned is to be allowed to move back to London?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but I must ask him the same question as I asked the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 states:
“The Secretary of State may impose restrictions on the individual entering … a specified area”.
The Minister can prevent someone entering London —so what is the noble Lord on about?
I am of course delighted to try to defend the Bill on behalf of the Minister, although I suspect that the Minister will do a very good job of that in a moment. However, my interpretation of the provision is that it is about very specific locations and particular areas—for example the Olympic park, or whatever else it might be. It is not clear that it will permit the prevention of that individual living in the city that had previously been his home. That is the point that needs to be made.
Is not the point that there is an enormous gap between preventing someone entering a particular area, which is what the schedule permits, and requiring them to live in a particular area where the Security Service can maintain constant surveillance of them? That is the difference between the two, is it not?
My Lords, as ever I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Howard, for his helpful intervention. My point is simple. This was a power that previous Home Secretaries and the current Home Secretary found necessary. It is one that the security services and police said was necessary. However, we are now told that the fresh air of the West Midlands conurbation and its bucolic atmosphere have so changed this individual’s personality that he now poses much less of a threat. That is frankly implausible. The reality is that this power was necessary. The present Home Secretary, knowing of the proposal that she would bring before Parliament, chose to exercise the power. The power remains necessary.
Would the noble Lord like to say anything about the development of technology? He may be overlooking the fact that individuals who are subject to these measures will almost undoubtedly be tagged. I do not know much about it, but I am sure that the technology is developing as we speak, and that it is possible to know where people who are tagged are going, and whether they are going where they should not be going. Surely that needs to be taken into account.
As I understand it, people who are subject to control orders are in many instances already tagged. Tagging is a useful technique. Tags can be removed, though the best tags are supposed to tell you if they have been—and I am sure that only the best tags will be purchased for this purpose. However, the problem is the risk of association. If somebody lives in a particular area and it is deemed that the danger of association is there, a tag will not tell you who comes to see that individual. Nor will it tell you where they go in their immediate vicinity, which could be precisely where those associations take place. The point of relocation is to minimise the risk of those associations, or to enable them to be monitored.
Just eight months ago, the rational and responsible Home Secretary, on the information presented to her, felt that the individual concerned was so dangerous that not only did he need to be subject to a control order but he should be relocated miles away from his previous environment. She made the judgment knowing that the Bill would remove that option and tie her hands in future. The rational and responsible Home Secretary made that judgment knowing that however much of a danger the person was thought to be, such an outcome would be taken away. The Minister needs to tell us why the judgment that the Home Secretary made then will no longer apply to this individual when the Bill becomes law.
Perhaps we should not expect the Minister to go through such contortions to provide an explanation. Perhaps all he needs to do is concede that the Home Secretary made that judgment in the interests of our nation's security but that this shabby, tawdry compromise of a Bill would prevent her making the same judgment in future. This compromise is not just between the two wings of an uneasy and unhappy coalition, but a compromise with the nation's security.
I am very glad to hear what the noble Lord has said and I am happy to withdraw any implication that I may have made against what is done in Pakistan and India. However, I never expected to see these powers exercised here. The Secretary of State defends them on the ground that there is no alternative, but there is an alternative. There is another solution and the problem is not almost insoluble, as the right reverend Prelate suggested. The solution lies in covert surveillance. To my knowledge, it is the solution that has been adopted in Germany, for example, and has not been found wanting. Indeed, I believe it to have been adopted in every other western country and it has proved to be successful; control orders have not been relied on. Why should covert surveillance not prove equally successful here?
It may be said that surveillance is more expensive than control orders, and I expect that that is the case. But at least we would have saved the £10 million the Government have spent so far on defending control orders in the courts. In any event, cost should surely not be a consideration when it is the freedom of British subjects which is in issue. It is not as though very large numbers are involved. So far as I know, there have not been more than 12 in any year, as few as eight recently, and not more than 48 in all. Surely we could have found the money, and could still find the money if further resources are going to be made available, to solve this undoubted problem in the way that other countries have solved it; namely, through covert surveillance.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. As someone who has tried to understand the civil liberties arguments about this, perhaps I will be forgiven for asking him to explain to the House why the level of intrusive covert surveillance that would be necessary to provide the reassurance we all seek is somehow a less severe intrusion into someone’s civil liberties than control orders, TPIMs or whatever it might be, where the ground rules are set, explicit and subject to judicial review?
I would have thought that the answer to that question is obvious: under a surveillance regime, a person can live a perfectly ordinary life; under a control order, he cannot. That is the difference.
I have opposed control orders since they were first introduced in 2005 and every year since, and I would certainly oppose them now if I could. But I realise that I would get nowhere. The Official Opposition, which I had hoped might at least still be open to persuasion on this, has said that not only do they support the Bill, but they also actually regard it as being too weak.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness says that it is not true. If that were the case the level of unreported business crime would not be 40 per cent. People would think that it was worth reporting and would be pleased with the outcome. Something different has to happen. People have to feel that they are represented. People feel that they have to be represented by someone whom they have chosen. I hear what has been said by noble Lords from across the House in this debate, but I have to say that democracy is actually about trusting the people to vote for the right person, and trusting the people to understand, which of course they do, that they then have a voice. I have to say that I am disappointed that no one—not once—in this debate has mentioned the need for the people to have a voice, which is what this legislation gives them. I give way to the noble Lord.
I am all in favour of the public having a voice, but what the noble Baroness has so passionately spoken about is the business community. Unless she is advocating a business franchise for the election of police and crime commissioners, that problem will not be solved by this. The reality is that the police service should be consulting the business community and listening to it, but this legislation does not require that because it places no such obligation on them. The only way that you would get that in terms of the noble Baroness’s arguments would be by the creation of a business franchise. I am pleased to see that that is not part of the Government’s proposals.
I have to say to the noble Lord that I observed with horror what happened to small businesses in the riots. I would not in any way dismiss the needs of small businesses. They are individuals; they are husband-and-wife teams running small shops and other small businesses up and down the country. One of the other messages that I received quite clearly at the all-party group last week was that these businesses and business organisations are already making plans to talk to people who want to stand as candidates to be police and crime commissioners, because those businesses want them to have a much clearer understanding of what their needs are in terms of law and order. It is not just about their businesses—whether they have had a shop theft or something such as that—but about the whole community in which they operate. They care about what happens on the pavements outside their businesses. They care about the wider community. These are people. These are voters. They need a voice and this legislation will give them that voice.
These reforms are essential to address that democratic deficit in policing, to end the era of central government’s bureaucratic control, to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour and to drive value for money. Chief constables will be liberated to be crime fighters rather than government managers—free to run their own workforces for the first time ever.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has made some valid and important points. I remind the House that the Bill to which we recently gave a formal Third Reading is in fact very different from the one that came from the other place. It is the expectation of most of us that the other place will indicate its dissatisfaction with the major amendment made in Committee by this House. Obviously we must wait and see, but I say this to my noble friend the Minister. The Government will have to look at this Bill again because of that amendment, but because of what has happened over the past three weeks, to which the noble Lord alluded in his speech, surely it is necessary to enact a Bill that truly deals with all the problems, ones that were not foreseen—I blame no one for that—when the Bill was first placed before Parliament. This is a golden opportunity for the Government to come back to us with amendments that recognise that there are areas of policing which are not adequately dealt with in the current Bill. Certain problems have been highlighted in recent days which it is incumbent on Parliament to recognise and adequately to legislate for.
My plea to my noble friend the Minister, who has shown herself to be painstaking, thorough and responsive to the feelings of the House, is that she should talk to the Home Secretary and her other ministerial colleagues with a view to ensuring that when the other place comes back to this House, one would assume either in September or October, we will have before us amendments which deal fully with many of the issues that initially provoked the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, to move her amendment, and that subsequently have built upon that feeling of unease. I do not seek lengthy Divisions this morning, but an assurance that the final shape of the Bill proves to be up to the circumstances that we are now aware of.
My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt someone with such long parliamentary experience, but I would be grateful if he could give the House his guidance. I share with him the objective that, even at this very late stage, the Government should look again at how the proposals they would like to see enacted will work and how they could be improved in the light of the events of the past week or so. But is not the real dilemma for the Government that what will go back to the Commons for consideration are simply those narrow areas of the Bill which have been changed by the decisions of your Lordships’ House? The safeguards that I am sure we all want to see—perhaps with one or two exceptions—will be very difficult for the Government to introduce during the course of ping-pong.
Like the famous Irishman, I would not have started from here. The truth of the matter is that on the very first day in Committee, a major amendment was passed in this House. It is therefore likely that the Government, unless they are going to see their Bill completely torpedoed, will wish to reject that amendment and come back to the House. As we saw earlier this week and last week, when ping-pong is played, there is an opportunity for the Government to insert further amendments. It is not a desirable situation, but the Government are going to want to put back all the provisions for police and crime commissioners that were taken out by the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris. When they do that they will have an opportunity, as I see it, to further refine the Bill in a way that reflects not only the general concerns expressed in this House, but the need to deal with the sort of situations which have disturbed us all so much in recent days.
My Lords, I am delighted to hear that advice. My understanding of the problem is that essentially all that will be sent back to the Commons, apart from the government amendments which will be nodded through, are the three lines from the beginning of the Bill which the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, deleted, and the sole and fairly short clause which was then added. Someone incredibly ingenious needs to insert into those first three lines all the safeguards that Members of your Lordships’ House are seeking. I am delighted that the noble Lord, with all his parliamentary experience, thinks it is possible, but I have to say that I have deep reservations over whether a way can be found of doing it.
In turn, I am delighted to hear that. I am merely making a few remarks in the hope that my noble friend the Minister will discuss this matter to try to make it possible because it is clear that we have an unsatisfactory situation. I believe that it is possible, when the Government decide to disagree with us in that fundamental amendment, for them to make some additional comments, as it were. I hope that that is what will happen.
This is not a situation that I or the noble Lord would have wished to see. The dilemma is that the problems have been compounded by the events of recent days and weeks. The Government have time during the Recess in which to look at this, and I hope that they will be able to do so. Then, when a police and social responsibility Bill goes on to the statute book, it is legislation that is truly adequate for policing in the next quarter of the 21st century. That is because we do not want to be, as the Americans say, continually revisiting this situation over the coming years.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, is quite right, there is an elected mayor; but we are making some changes. PCCs will be elected around the country, and the mayor is elected, but the MPA is still in place, as it always has been, in its current form. The Bill makes some changes to that structure.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. However, the changes that she is introducing will provide less oversight by the mayor and the MOPC than currently exists through the structure with the mayor and the Metropolitan Police Authority.
My Lords, I am sure that I do not need to remind the noble Lord and the House that he is a Home Secretary-appointment to the MPA and, as I understand it, at the moment he is in charge. I am not being personal—I am saying this in general terms—but clearly the current system is not working. We have seen that in the seriousness of what happened in the Met and what is continuing to be investigated there.
Having served 20 years as a Member of Parliament, I raised concerns which I knew were shared by many people. I did so not as a reflection on the individual police force that covered the constituency that I represented; the force worked very hard and there were some very good people in it. Over the years, however, there has been what I can only describe as a public perception of creep, whereby law-abiding people who bring up their children to respect the police and the law have increasingly had an underlying feeling that, at times, the police are not on their side. There are lots of reasons for that and we could have a lot of debate about it. I see the noble Lord nodding. It is something that I have raised with chief officers as a Member of Parliament.
It is a very dangerous thing if what I might call middle England, for want of a better expression, start to believe that the police are not on their side, or that when something happens to them, often for the first time in their lives, as far as law and order is concerned, they do not feel that it is even worth picking up the phone to report it because they have a preconceived idea of what the response will be. That sort of creep—and I can only describe it as creep—is something that concerned me for many years as a Member of Parliament. I know from discussions with others that that is not an isolated case. It is very dangerous if, having had policing by consent for generations, we suddenly have an emerging generation—although it goes across the age spectrum—who do not have that confidence in the police. It is not about individual officers or chief officers but is about the way in which structures have been introduced and developed and about governance. That governance needs to change, and this is the Bill that will change it . I give way again to the noble Baroness.
My Lords, a few minutes ago, the noble Baroness talked about the current system in London not working. By implication, she was suggesting that if the Bill were to pass, the arrangements for the accountability and governance of the police would be stronger in London than they are at the moment. However, in practice, the Government are weakening the arrangements in London. They are providing the Mayor and the MOPC with fewer powers in terms of control and governance over the police service in London, which I assume is not the Government's intention. The purpose of my modest amendment is to require that the MOPC is given the opportunity to interview candidates for appointment as a commander, deputy assistant commissioner or assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. It does not take the final decision away from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; it leaves it there.
On Report, I made my view clear that in an ideal world there should be a joint recommendation on the appointment of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis from the mayor and from the Home Secretary. It would continue to be a royal appointment, a fact that the Government and those former Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police to whom I have spoken feel is important. However, this amendment does not change that. What it does do is to give a significant, though not a decisive, role on appointments slightly below that level, down to the level of commander of the Metropolitan Police, to the MOPC. It would give an opportunity to advise on the basis of having seen the candidates concerned and for that advice then to be considered by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis before a final appointment is made and before the final consultation processes take place.
I am aware that the mayor’s office in London has made very strong representations to the Government. Indeed, as recently as earlier this week—I believe on Monday—the chair of the MPA and London’s deputy mayor for policing wrote to Theresa May, the Home Secretary, with a copy to the Prime Minister in which he reiterated the concerns of the mayor’s office in London:
“The Mayor and I have deep concerns regarding the proposed future lack of MOPC involvement in MPS officer appointments, and conduct matters in addition, according to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act. The Bill will remove the role of the governing body in appointment of all ACPO officers”.
That is as clear a statement as you can find that the new arrangements being proposed by the Government will reduce the mechanisms by which the mayor’s office in London holds the police service accountable. The statement continues:
“As I have communicated to you previously, the Mayor and I feel strongly”.
The Government are saying that in London there will be fewer levers, fewer controls and fewer powers for the system that governs the Metropolitan Police. This is at a time when the Government tell us that they want to strengthen those accountability mechanisms. This is at a time when the Government tell us that the current arrangements are not working in London and by implication they ought to be strengthened. This is a time, incidentally, when there is a Conservative Mayor of London. You would have thought that the Government would have the utmost confidence in that person’s ability to take on those functions in an appropriate way; but no. What the Government are doing is taking away even those very limited powers that currently exist and giving them to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.
I find the approach that is being taken here quite extraordinary. In quieter times, before the events of the last few weeks, the arrangements in London, where there is a directly elected mayor for the whole city, were being held up to us as being the beacon that was guiding this entire piece of legislation; yet now we are being told that those arrangements are inadequate. However, instead of the arrangements and the responsibilities of the mayor’s office being strengthened, they are being weakened by this Bill.
On Report, I challenged the Minister to give me one instance in this Bill where the new structures will have more responsibility than the current structures have over the Metropolitan Police; I received no answer. The reason I received no answer is because there are no such instances. This Bill weakens the governance arrangements in London.
I think we understand, given the national responsibilities currently held by the Metropolitan Police, why the Home Office has to be involved in the appointment of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. I think we understand the historic reasons why it is important that that appointment be a royal one, but in circumstances where every other elected police and crime commissioner will have at least the power of appointment of the chief officer of police—assuming that the Government restore that measure to the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, hinted that they might consider doing. However, in London, even though an assistant commissioner has the equivalent rank to a chief constable outside London, the mayor’s office will have no involvement other than the right to be consulted. I suggest that this is a diminution of the powers which is extremely unfortunate.
I know that one reason the Government have taken this stance is the desire of the outgoing Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis that he should have control over all appointments of his senior team. No one is suggesting that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis should not be able to decide how he wants deploy his senior team, but I question whether it is sensible that those appointments are made simply by that one individual in these circumstances.
During my time on the Metropolitan Police Authority, for four years I chaired every appointments panel for officers above the rank of chief superintendent. In the subsequent seven years, I sat on virtually all the appointments panels for deputy assistant commissioners and above. There have been one or two instances of disagreements between the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the appointments panel of the Metropolitan Police Authority. Usually the Metropolitan Police Authority panel has deferred to the preferences expressed, if they have been expressed clearly, by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis or his representatives. In a number of instances—it is probably inappropriate for me to give any details—that decision has been against the better judgment of the panel of the Metropolitan Police Authority. In those instances, that better judgment has proved to be right and the strongly held view expressed by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis was in fact wrong. Therefore, I do not think it is sensible to have an arrangement whereby you are preventing or not requiring the MOPC to have a direct involvement and to have at least the opportunity to interview the candidates so that there can be a dialogue or a consultation with the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis on the basis of detailed information about the strengths and weaknesses of various candidates. I do not think it is sensible even in the terms of what the Government are doing in trying to have a transparent system where the elected representative of the people is seen to be having a decisive role in the governance of policing. I think the way in which the Bill is drafted is a mistake. Unless it is rectified at this stage, I suspect that we will rue the consequences in the future. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, described his amendment as modest. I have often heard him describe his amendments as modest, although I have not necessarily agreed with him. However, this amendment is about no more than making recommendations. If the Minister is minded to resist, can she explain to the House how that squares with the amendment that we have just made to the Bill about supporting the effective exercise of the functions?
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, suggested that I sometimes describe amendments as modest when they are rather less than that. The reason I described this amendment as modest is that it falls a long way short of what I think is necessary. However, perhaps unlike the Government, I am prepared to compromise on some issues in the Bill, which is why I put forward this amendment. It simply enables the MOPC to interview the candidates and then to make a recommendation to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis before the final decision is taken and the final consultations take place.
The Minister’s response suggested that being jointly involved in appointments would tie the hands of the MOPC in the future and minimise accountability. However, I suggest that she looks again at the terms of the amendment. It does not create a system of joint appointment; it leaves that appointment in the hands of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. It simply enables the MOPC to have an informed dialogue with the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis about the candidates who are being considered. This is about enabling the MOPC to do the office’s job properly and effectively.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Condon, for his support. We never worked together in terms of the Metropolitan Police Authority because he had retired as commissioner before I became involved at that level. However, his points about why this is an important safeguard for the integrity and position of chief officers of police are extremely important, and, again, I would have hoped the Government would have listened to them.
I can only conclude that what we are being told now is that a Conservative-led Government do not trust a Conservative Mayor of London with these powers. I am aware that the popular press—in so far as one can refer to them in that way in these strange days—suggest that there is an air of rivalry between the Prime Minister and the Mayor of London, or perhaps rivalry between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Mayor of London, over the succession to the Prime Minister. I hope that that is not the motivating factor here. I suspect that the reality is that the Government have not thought this through. They claim that the model in London is the model that they want to create elsewhere in the country, but they will weaken the powers of governance of the mayor and the MOPC even below the level that currently exists with the Metropolitan Police Authority and the mayor, a model which the Minister said only a few minutes ago was not working.
As I think that the Government have got this so wrong, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
I will be brief because I know we want to return to Amendment 12 in the previous group. I can assure your Lordships that I do not intend to make a valedictory speech about all the issues we have talked about during the course of this Bill.
However, this Bill is extraordinarily constructed. Where there is a direct route to one of the Government’s objectives, they have gone the long way round to do it. It is almost as if someone walking from your Lordships’ House to the Supreme Court decided to go up Whitehall, via Trafalgar Square, along the Mall and down Birdcage Walk to get there rather than simply crossing Parliament Square. There are two instances of that: first, the strange decision to use the concept of corporation sole as the mechanism for chief officers of police and for police and crime commissioners; and, secondly, the decision to insist on duplicate financial and audit systems, neither of which are necessary to achieve the Government’s objectives. They are simply going the long way round.
As we have discussed repeatedly during the course of this Bill, corporation sole is a medieval construct designed to prevent priests ripping money off the mother church. It has occasionally been used as a construct in terms of public policy in this country, most recently by the Children’s Commissioner. However, in the recent review, the Children’s Commissioner has made clear that the mechanism is unsatisfactory; it does not allow proper governance and is not particularly robust or transparent. Yet this is the mechanism the Government are using in terms of chief officers of police and police and crime commissioners. Frankly, that is a bizarre way of doing it. That also gets to the heart of the problem of this Bill, which is whether there will be adequate governance around the position of police and crime commissioners and whether there will be the adequate checks and balances that I know Liberal Democrat and many Members of your Lordships’ House are so concerned about. It gets to the heart of that principle because it does not facilitate good governance; it is a single individual making decisions alone. That is why it is called a corporation sole.
The second issue concerns having two chief financial officers, both of which will be subject to audit regulations. I have a letter from the Audit Commission which confirms that the Bill requires that both the chief officer of police’s chief financial officer and the chief financial officer of the police and crime commissioner will have to have separate auditors. There will have to be a separate audit opinion on separate financial statements, so the single police fund will be audited twice: once as it passes through the hands of the police and crime commissioner, and again as it passes through the chief finance officer of the chief constable. In fact, in London, it will be audited three times, because it has to pass through the hands of the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority; it then passes to the MOPC, who will have to have a chief financial officer and who will have to be separately audited with a separate audit function; and then it passes to the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.
What a bizarre waste of public money. That is simply because it has not entered the Government's mind to go the shortest distance from one place to another. That is why we have this bizarre construct of corporations sole and chief financial officers. The amendment would require the Government to come back to Parliament with a proper explanation, which can be debated, as to why those bizarre routes have been taken to deliver what they want. That would give Parliament an opportunity to make the Government think again and put more sensible, transparent and accountable systems in place. I beg to move.
I very much support my noble friend's amendment. In the past few weeks, I have struggled hard to master the concept and practice of corporations sole and to understand the Government’s thinking in this area. I know that we were going to have a meeting about it with the Minister. I would have welcomed that so as to be able to tease out the problems and issues. Unfortunately, that could not take place, and I quite understand that.
My problem is that in this area, the Home Office often has a different view from police authority chief executives, the Audit Commission and other bodies. There is a range of views here: there is the Home Office view of how we should do things, and there are other people who have different views. The reason I have a problem with that is that I have many years of experience at national level of sitting on bodies dealing with the Home Office’s suggested way forward. In my experience, the Home Office sometimes gets things wrong—not always, but on occasion. On occasion, the Home Office can be very stubborn in denying that it gets things wrong. Again, I have experience of that. I know that sometimes it can take years for the Home Office to accept that it has made a mistake and put it right. I am not saying that that happens all the time, but it happens.
In that light and in that spirit, I think that we need to pause. This is a very complex area, and I am not clear that the Government have got it right at the moment. My noble friend has put forward a serious argument and I hope that the Government are willing to consider it.
My Lords, before my noble friend decides what he wants to do, as the noble Baroness has rather jumped the gun, perhaps I may respond by saying that I am most grateful for her remarks and for the way in which she has conducted the Bill since taking it over at pretty short notice on the first day of Committee. She has earned the admiration of the whole House for the way in which she has conducted herself. She said that she can take care of herself. Indeed, she can, which is why we had a vote on the first debate.
I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord De Mauley, as well as the Bill team, for the support they have given the noble Baroness. I am also grateful to my noble friends Lord Rosser and Lord Stevenson and to all noble colleagues who have spoken on the Bill.
Before we come to my noble friend, I just say that the Government have an opportunity to pause now. I know that the Prime Minister suggested in his Statement that he is determined to plough on with elected police commissioners, but there is time to reflect. I hope that the Government will take advantage of that time to consider the real concerns about the Bill that have been expressed around the House.
My Lords, it is slightly strange to respond on the amendment after going through the normal courtesies of Bill do now pass. I think that all Members of the House are grateful to the Minister for the way in which she has conducted herself throughout these proceedings, having been given a very difficult, and at times impossible, brief in terms of selling arguments to us. We are conscious that she was thrust into this at a very late stage. If I have expressed myself on occasions with vehemence or even asperity, that has certainly not had anything to do with the noble Baroness but more to do with the difficulty of the brief with which she has been presented.
However—this is the asperity—the response that she gave on my amendment did not really address the key questions. In fact, it addressed two separate points which I did not make. It said that we needed to have corporate status for the PCCs and the chief officers and so on. No one is arguing about whether they should have corporate status; the question is why it should be a corporation sole. This is a particularly strange concept and no one who has had to deal with it seems to think it is terribly satisfactory. It does not lead to transparency or good governance. That is why it seems such a strange way of proceeding.
Similarly, no one is arguing that there should not be a suitably qualified senior financial officer for each chief constable or for the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. The question is why that chief financial officer has to be recognised under the Local Government Finance Act and the Audit Commission Act, thereby creating a panoply of two separate audited accounts. That is what is wrong with the Bill; that is why we are asking for Parliament to be given another opportunity to look at the matter; and it is why, I am afraid, even at this late stage I wish to test the opinion of the House.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberWhile I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, says about a royal commission, we have, since he last raised this, put into place a series of investigations, reviews and reports that I hope will throw light and transparency on to the problems that he has identified as underlying the number of commissioners who have left. We do not know at this stage how deep those investigations will go and what they will show in conclusion, but we want them to be thorough and we believe they are all-embracing.
It may interest the House to know that since the Home Secretary’s Statement in another place just an hour ago the Metropolitan Police Authority has referred four cases to the IPCC. The IPCC is now considering the referrals carefully to determine how they should be taken forward. That is perhaps an indication not just of the seriousness of the investigations before us but of the depth to which they need to go, so although I hear what the noble Lord says about a royal commission, people have now been appointed to carry out these investigations and they should be allowed to carry them through to their conclusion.
My Lords, I declare an interest as a current member of the Metropolitan Police Authority and associate myself with the very positive remarks that the Minister has made about Sir Paul Stephenson and John Yates. However, given what she has just said about the referrals to the IPCC, perhaps she could ponder for a moment what the circumstances of today would have been had the Bill currently before this House been passed.
The Metropolitan Police Authority sub-committee on professional standards met this morning to consider complaints against named officers. It considered those complaints and, as the Minister has just reported to the House, it made recommendations in one instance that an officer be suspended and in other instances that matters now be investigated by the IPCC. Under the Bill which she is steering through this House, that would not happen. Any allegations against individuals would be considered by the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis or the Chief Officer of Police outside—of course the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis has now resigned—who would then decide whether something should be investigated or another officer suspended. Surely the interests of openness and public support for the process demand that there be some independent structure to handle complaints and consideration of whether an inquiry should be opened. That will disappear under this Bill.
Well, my Lords, again, this is a matter that the noble Lord and I have debated at some length during the Committee and Report stages of the Bill. As he will know, we have disagreed over the internal handling of minor complaints within the police force. I have not changed my mind about that, but on more serious matters involving senior officers he will know that it is not simply the case that they will not be investigated independently. Ultimately, there is recourse to the IPCC.
(14 years ago)
Lords ChamberThis is an extremely important issue and not one that we should rush through simply because we are fed up. I am sure that I have just as much stamina as the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, although I am not required to take the whole Bill through this House. We have to consider and debate these issues seriously because, after all, that is the function of this House.
This is a problem of the Government’s own making in that, having decided that police and crime commissioners—and for that matter MOPC in London, although the issues are slightly different—have substantial, individually held powers, the question then comes: what do you do in circumstances when there is a vacancy or someone needs to act while that happens? The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot say, “Actually, it will be okay and we can have a member of the staff of the police and crime commissioner’s office to act in this function”, and at the same time say, “The police and crime commissioners are so important and will be so busy that they have to work full time on these functions”. What are they working full time on?
They are presumably setting direction—I am sure they are not intervening in operational matters because the Government are clear that they will not be doing that. They will be providing guidance on what is regarded as important to the electorate of that policing area. Among their duties will be setting the level of local taxation. There is no other area of British public life when something that impacts on taxation is not decided by people who are elected. If the noble Baroness wants to interrupt and tell me of one that I have not thought of, I would be delighted to receive it. There is no such area.
This is one of the most important decisions and it is one that will matter very much to the public in the area concerned. The task of being an elected politician is to balance what you believe are the important aspirations that you might have for the public service concerned and how much money can readily be raised in taxation. That is an issue that this and previous Governments have struggled with, and those who are actively engaged in local government struggle with it each year. You have to make a judgment and you can make it only if you see both sides of the equation. You see the side of expenditure and you see the side of what it will mean in taxation. Only somebody who is elected will have that perspective of what the public want in terms of services delivered and what they are prepared to buy through taxation. The public are not always single-minded on these matters. We are all aware of those stresses and strains, which is all the more reason why it must be an elected politician who makes that judgment. Only an elected politician with the authority of being elected can strike that balance knowing what the electorate of the area feel.
Before my noble friend sits down, perhaps I might ask whether he has given any thought to the situation of a police officer in the force who has received money from tabloid journalists. Would that be the responsibility of the chief constable or of the commissioner? If it would be the responsibility of the commissioner, how would someone standing in from the panel be able to deal with that?
If such a circumstance were to exist—and clearly this is all very much in our minds at the present time—I suspect that the first people who will recognise the level of public concern that is going to exist are going to be individuals with a personal, direct elected mandate in an area. Under the Government’s model, where you have an elected police and crime commissioner who has not been disqualified, removed from office or incapacitated, then maybe that works and that individual would express concerns.
There is a fascinating article by Daniel Hannan, who I know is of enormous influence within the Conservative Party. He complains, incidentally, that the Government have got the nomenclature wrong; they should not be called police and crime commissioners but should be called sheriffs. He points out that there is a historic British tradition of the local sheriff, who is not the guy with the five or six-pointed star badge, but an ancient, semi-feudal office. The City of London has sheriffs, so it must be all right, because it is the same medieval construct that brought us corporations themselves.
In those circumstances, the directly elected individual —and this again is the point of the Government’s proposals—is going to be the person who will sense that this is something of deep concern to the public and that something should happen. In the circumstances of my noble friend Lord Hunt’s amendment, the point about it is that, rather than have some official who has never had to face an electorate making those judgments and decisions, it would at least be someone with a personal electoral mandate, albeit not for the whole force area, but for a part of it, who would be reflecting the public concern about such matters and taking the appropriate action in those circumstances.
Again, I think the Government’s arguments are flawed and they really need to address what is actually a very serious problem, which would manifest itself most seriously in circumstances where something is seriously going wrong.
My Lords, I will intervene briefly, mainly to support what my noble friend has said.
On the previous intervention, the issue of offers of payment by the media to certain police officers is very much on our minds at the moment. In my view, this issue is not—and never has been—a really central and massive problem, but it has always been there. When I introduced my Freedom and Responsibility of the Press Bill 20-odd years ago, we looked at it then but it has never been dealt with so I would say it should be considered, particularly in the structure that Government are setting up. There will be a temptation for certain police officers to be paid by journalists. Usually, the journalist makes the approach, in my experience, when any offer is made. Journalists will talk about what they do on a confidential basis—“Do not quote me” and so on—but such things are said. Usually, the sums of money are not huge—perhaps £20 for a bit of information and a bit more for another piece of information.
We all have two or three concerns about this Bill, but on this particular aspect there is a danger of what you do if there is an issue of corruption, however small it is overall, and how it is dealt with. I hope that the Minister will deal with that point, which my noble friend made very adequately from the Front Bench, but has just been added to by my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey.
I have Amendment 235A in this group. The noble Baroness spoke about matters which I raised at the previous stage, mentioning a number of criminal areas which do not respect boundaries. This amendment is arguably a little more local, but I have been asked to raise it by Justice, whose concern is exactly what I articulated at the previous stage and what the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, has articulated now. It is concerned that the creation of commissioners could result in what it calls—it is rather a good phrase—a competitive “race to the bottom” on populist law and order policies. It mentions what one might call the “invisible” crimes, such as domestic violence and crimes against vulnerable individuals and members of minority groups, which do not dominate public concern in the way that street crime and anti-social behaviour do.
The Bill deals with offences such as terrorism and organised crime, which require a national policing response. Child neglect has been acknowledged in another part of the Bill, but aggravated crimes against minorities and a whole list of other matters, with which I shall not detain the House, may not be a priority—indeed, it is extremely unlikely—for any commissioner seeking an electoral mandate.
I made the point to Justice that we had already covered some of this ground, to which it responded rather honestly that it was important to make the rhetorical point. Although it is almost half-past nine on perhaps our last day on Report, I shall make the point not very rhetorically, not very eloquently, but in quite a heartfelt manner.
My Lords, I do not think that some of the issues that we are discussing in these amendments are rhetorical matters. My Amendment 239 approaches the issues which my noble friend Lady Henig raised in Amendment 235 from a slightly different perspective.
Some 35 hours ago, I sat listening to the Home Secretary introduce the new CONTEST strategy for the United Kingdom. That document, which pulls together the efforts being made to counter terrorism, is fundamental to the issues that we are talking about here in relation to the national strategic policing requirement.
Of course, this document describes the importance of having a national network feeding in to the counterterrorist effort—if we do not have such a national network, we cannot deliver effective counterterrorist policing. That is why it is so important that the Government have put the strategic policing requirement into the Bill. What makes it difficult for us in your Lordships’ House to consider these matters tonight is that, of course, no one, as far as I am aware—certainly none of your Lordships—has yet seen the strategic policing requirement, or a draft thereof.
My noble friend served with me on the Joint Committee on the national security strategy. Will he help the House and contemplate how the strategic policing requirement might fit in to the national security strategy? Would it be part of it or relate to it in any way? It has certainly not been mentioned, as I am sure my noble friend would agree, in our meetings on the national security Joint Committee.
The Government are trying to square the circle of putting a very high priority on national security—the national security strategy, the creation of the National Security Council—and their policies on police and crime commissioners. Clearly, the potential danger with police and crime commissioners elected with a local mandate to articulate the concerns of local people is that some national priorities will not be given the same priority at local level. Now, I am sure that no sensible police and crime commissioner would say, “I am not interested in anything being done on counterterrorism”, just as no sensible police and crime commissioner would say that they did not want to see anything done on serious crime. However, when there are 41 directly elected individuals, some of whom will fight very fiercely contested local elections, or be facing fiercely contested re-election, the question of whether the same priority is given to national security matters as is given to other matters becomes a real issue.
Because of our particularly slow progress as a House on other matters before we arrived at the Bill tonight—we are making rapid progress compared to the progress earlier—I had the opportunity of listening to a presentation downstairs from Professor Dave Sloggett, a nationally known expert on counterterrorism issues. In a rather chilling 15-minute tour d’horizon, he simply spelt out the sorts of threats that we face, which are contained in the CONTEST strategy, and the context in which that is taking place at the moment. Yes, Osama bin Laden has been killed, but that does not mean that al-Qaeda goes away. We are actually seeing a fragmentation and each of the different affiliates going their own way, each presenting slightly different threats.
We have Gaddafi in Libya, who has made an explicit threat of suicide bombers in European cities; and there is the changing situation in Northern Ireland, where we have just seen two nights of sustained rioting and serious disorder. Again, the fact that that has not impinged significantly on the rest of the country makes it all the more likely that there will be an aspiration for it do so. We have the challenges of the Olympics. In moving her amendment, my noble friend Lady Henig referred to issues around cybercrime, and it is interesting that the CONTEST strategy for the first time refers to the cyberterrorist threat. These are issues in which local police forces have got to play their part; they have got to raise their game. They are not necessarily issues which will immediately emerge as the priority for the elected police and crime commissioner in every part of the country, yet every part of the country is potentially affected.
Let us consider the way in which Roshonara Choudhry self-radicalised herself, dropped out of her university course and, having listened to speeches and read material on the internet, decided that an appropriate thing for her to do to take forward the cause would be to assassinate a British Member of Parliament. She then researched Members of Parliament on TheyWorkForYou.com and purchased two kitchen knives. Fortunately for Stephen Timms, a Member of Parliament in the other place, she decided on the day that it was easier to conceal in her clothing the shorter of the knives. That is an example of the kind of threat we face.
Not so long ago an individual in the south-west of the country seriously injured himself in an attempt to blow up a restaurant in which families with young children were having meals. Again, he was an individual who, as far as we know, was not significantly connected to any of the networks.
It will be the responsibility of local policing, local special branches and local intelligence to pick up on these issues. If you get to a stage where this is seen as not the responsibility of a local police force, your ability to combat these threats will be severely weakened. That is why the strategic policing requirement is so important.
It is also important in the context of serious and organised crime because we all know that if you do not maintain consistent and strong pressure on the issues around serious and organised crime, gradually the quality of community life in all kinds of areas will begin to deteriorate—and yet this will not be an immediate priority for many police and crime commissioners.
The Government have, properly, written into the Bill a strategic policing requirement. However, they have not specified how it will be enforced and how they will make sure that it is met in every force area. My noble friend Lady Henig has tabled an amendment which would require Her Majesty’s Inspectorate to produce a report on an annual basis and lay it before Parliament to assess how the strategic policing requirement is working. My amendment has a different focus; it seeks to consider what happens in each individual force area. It does not specify that the report should be laid before Parliament because sometimes the content of that report in relation to the strength, willingness and effectiveness of local forces in combating terrorism and serious and organised crime would best not be publicly shared.
I know that the Home Office does not want to be top-down on all kinds of issues, but on these issues it needs to be top-down, which is why it has postulated a strategic policing requirement. This will give the Home Secretary a snapshot for each police force area and a national overview, if you take the position that has been put forward by my noble friend Lady Henig, of what is going on and where there may be weaknesses. Whether that will result in a formal intervention by the Home Secretary or a less formal intervention with the chief officer of police and the elected politician who leads those areas applying pressure, I do not think really matters. What is important is that the Home Secretary has that information and has it as a tool. Further, it is important that the locally elected individual—the police and crime commissioner or the MOPC in London—is aware of where they stand in terms of meeting the strategic policing requirement. They may well have a rose-tinted view of what the level of problem is or what needs to be done. This gives them that information and the opportunity to decide. I find it extraordinary that there is nothing in this Bill about monitoring how the strategic policing requirement is to be met, how it is to be achieved and what is to be done about it.
These amendments are put forward in a genuine attempt not just to assist the Government to achieve their objectives, which as you know are constantly at the forefront of our thoughts on this side of the House, but because it is critically and crucially important for the national security of this country and indeed for our ability to deal with serious and organised crime.
My Lords, I hope I will be forgiven for making a short intervention in support of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and indeed in support of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, as to its principle. This Bill is to a great extent about the accountability of the police. The whole purpose of the Government’s policy, which I applaud, is to make the police more accountable to the public. The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, is attempting to do precisely that—to give visible evidence of that accountability to enable the public to judge from a document how accountable the police are in terms of the strategic policing requirement.
The noble Baroness referred to the work of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, which I used to be. The independent reviewer is required to produce at least two reports every year which enable Members of both Houses, who use the reports extensively, and others to judge the performance of the authorities in relation to counterterrorism law. We have an independent reviewer of the relatively new Northern Ireland provisions for what is now public order law in Northern Ireland. This role has been carried out since it was introduced by Mr Robert Whalley. He has been very successful in ensuring that those important parts of the law he reviews in Northern Ireland, which can prove, as we have seen in the past couple of days, very controversial in the context of everyday life, are accounted for in the legislative assembly of Northern Ireland and in this Parliament.
Following the legislation in relation to the UN money-laundering provisions for named terrorist suspects, we introduced recently an independent review which is going to be carried out, as I understand it, by David Anderson QC, who succeeded me as independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. There again, we will have a report which will deal with issues relating to a part of the strategic policing requirement. Those who carry out such roles from time to time have been asked ad hoc to carry out reports which call to account those who have been involved in aspects of counterterrorism and related policing.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has a distinguished and respected record of impartiality. It has been able to secure changes in policing practice around the country by the kindly method of report, constructive criticism and engaging, sometimes, the support of those in both Houses of Parliament. It seems to me that there is nothing to be lost and potentially much to be gained from the transparency of a report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, particularly given the importance of the strategic policing requirement, which has been amply described during this short debate, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Harris.
I take issue with the noble Lord on only one detail. He suggested that it might be difficult to write a report that would be published that engaged with matters of national security that are best left unsaid. I can tell the noble Lord that there are ways of doing this; it can be done. With the co-operation, which is always available, of the security services in particular, there are ways of writing reports that do not damage national security but deal fully with all the principles that need to be discussed.
I therefore believe that this is a constructive proposal and I hope to hear that the Minister will also allow this matter further consideration with a view to something being brought forward at Third Reading.
My Lords, I will do my best to get that information to the House as soon as possible.
As I said, it is part of the intention of this Bill to build in some constructive tensions between the local and the national. We all understand that policing is a constant dialogue between local, regional and national, although I suggest to the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that things have changed a great deal in the last 20 or 30 years. Certainly when I was a candidate in Manchester many years ago, there was a small Special Branch that dealt with the IRA, but there were not the cross-cutting collaborative units that we now see across the north of England—drugs units, organised crime units and counterterrorism units, which are now part of the network in which our police forces co-operate with each other. My perspective on policing is a West Yorkshire one, but the Yorkshire Post, the Bradford Telegraph & Argus and the local radio stations do not simply focus on local crime, partly because local and national issues, such as parades by the English Defence League and drugs heists in which the drugs have just been imported from some other country, are very much part of the local scene. Therefore I think that the widespread fears suggested by the noble Baroness may be exaggerated.
Clause 80 sets out the strategic policing requirement, which is an update of the Police Act 1996, as noble Lords have said. That strategic policing requirement is now being extensively consulted on by the Secretary of State, ACPO, the Association of Police Authorities, the Metropolitan Police service and others. Clearly that is going to be a major part—
My Lords, while I am fascinated to hear that this consultation is taking place, on the last occasion on which I saw representatives of the Association of Chief Police Officers—I believe it was last week—they had not yet seen a draft of this document, so I am slightly bemused by that. Parliament has to see it. We cannot understand what the balance is going to be between the local and the national unless we can see that document, even in draft state, and understand it.
My Lords, Clause 80 sets out in some detail the principles of the strategic policing requirement. It is there in the Bill. There is a question of how much detail we want to write in to the Bill, but Clause 80 sets out the fundamentals of that requirement. Clause 96 adds to that the backstop power for the Secretary of State to intervene if, in her opinion, local police forces are not paying sufficient attention to the strategic policing requirement.
I add that “have regard to” is not, as has been suggested, a weak statement. It is a commonly used phrase for a strong and appropriate duty, which places an obligation on the chief officer and the PCC to comply with the strategic policing requirement. In policing terms, the duty to have regard has previously applied, for example, to codes of practice that have been used to implement a national intelligence model across all 43 police forces in England and Wales, to codify the use of police firearms and to ensure compliance with the IPCC statutory guidance on handling police complaints, which suggests that this is a widely used and strong duty.
The Minister says that this is intended to be a strong requirement. Clause 80, which he referred to, says,
“must, from time to time, issue a document”.
What I am trying to clarify is: how can we see what the impact of that strong requirement is unless we know what the Government's intentions are for the document's contents? That is not asking to have the wording of the strategic policing requirement written into the Bill. The Bill already says that there will be such a document, but none of us have seen one. The Minister has talked about consultations but as far as I am aware—I wait to be corrected—last week no full-touch document had been circulated for comments, despite the expectations set out in here.
I promise to get back to the noble Lord as soon as possible with an update of where we now are on that. I stress that it is normal practice to pass legislation without all the details of the regulations being tied up before that Act is passed, because ongoing negotiations about how the regulations will be carried through are often under way. I am assured that negotiations and consultations on the strategic policing requirement are well under way.
The Minister talks about regulations but I did not actually think that the strategic policing requirement was going to be put in regulations. I thought it was simply going to be a document. There have been plenty of occasions when the document has been so pivotal that Parliament has been advised of what the content of regulations will be. Draft regulations have been circulated so that people can understand what their scope is. As I understand it, this is regarded as one of the central planks in determining what is local and what is national. I believe that Parliament should therefore see this document in draft form before we can move forward.
I promise to get back to the noble Lord with a situation report, certainly by the time we come to Third Reading. On Clause 96, I am also informed that the backstop power available to the Secretary of State to intervene where forces are not having sufficient regard to national priorities has never been used. It is there as a backstop power but police forces, chief constables and police authorities have necessarily recognised that there is a thread between neighbourhood policing and local, regional and national priorities. The neighbourhood police groups which I have been out with in Leeds and Bradford are also looking at potentially vulnerable individuals, at people who may be radicalised and at areas where drugs are being dealt or supplied. That feeds into a national intelligence chain and is part of what we all understand as policing.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, stressed the importance of criminal activities which, in some cases, do not respect boundaries. She also talked about the invisible crimes of domestic violence, vulnerable adults, child neglect and aggravated crimes against minorities. Again, I have sat in on MAPPA groups—multi-agency areas—where police are working with other local social services and non-governmental organisations, precisely to look at those invisible crimes. Part of the way in which attention is drawn to these crimes is by local voluntary organisations working with police and other agencies at the local level. In the nature of these cases, much domestic violence and child neglect is essentially local. Those elements which are not local—child trafficking, sexual abuse, online sexual exploitation—are dealt with now increasingly by the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre and other forms of collaboration between local police forces and national agencies, which indeed will feed into the national crime agency when that is developed. Again, in this case there is not a tension but a thread between local violence, local disorder, local abuse, and those more limited elements in which children are trafficked or abused and the internet is used for these purposes. I can assure the noble Baroness that this does not need to be written again into the Bill. Having said that, I hope that I have given sufficient assurance to those who tabled these amendments to enable them not to press them.
Surely the Minister will know from the debate that we have had on the European Bill that many noble Lords in this House talk of little else.
Before Minister comes back on this, I say that this is not just about whether or not this is a document published for Parliament; it is about ensuring that there is a focus on the strategic policing requirement. That is something which the Government have not yet conceded. While I am on my feet, and to prevent me getting up again, can he tell us what he actually means by a situation report? Does that mean that when we get to Third Reading which, as far as I am aware, is still only a few days away, we will have in front of us some idea as to what this document will look like?
My Lords, I had not promised to give the detail of the strategic policing requirement, which is currently under negotiation. I am happy to give noble Lords a situation report on where negotiations stand regarding the definition of the strategic policing requirement. That is the most that I can do.
(14 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in answering I speak to Government Amendments 103 and 192 and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who in his characteristic way spoke with enthusiasm to Amendment 103. We note the views of the Local Government Association, which stated that achieving a reduction from three-quarters to two-thirds was one of its top five priorities at Report; the Government have met that condition.
I recall that when a directly elected mayor for London was introduced many argued that the London Assembly would be toothless, and not provided with sufficient bodies to check the mayor. I think the noble Lords would recognise that because of process and its relationship with the mayor, and in spite of not having enormous powers to check the mayor, the London Assembly has involved itself in a process in which the necessary dialogue between the two has continued remarkably well. Schedule 5 to the Bill sets out—
My Lords, I hesitate to intervene but the noble Lord goads me into it. The point is that the London Assembly has never been able to exercise its power in respect of the budget, which requires a two-thirds majority. That is not because London Assembly members feel they have been previously involved enough in the budget process, it is simply the arithmetic. A threshold of two-thirds is already very high.
My Lords, with the leave of the House, perhaps I may say that from my experience the power of the London Assembly is best exercised in conjunction with the press, and today of all days I am not sure that I would want to be saying that any sphere of Government should depend too much on the press.
My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendments 106 and 116, and I want to add my voice briefly to that of the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. I am concerned that we really do not have the proposals about the composition of panels right at the moment.
In the first place, I feel very uncomfortable about all the powers of mandation for the Secretary of State in this section, and I am rather inclined to agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that mandation is perhaps the wrong response to the problems that have arisen in relation to panels. It does not sit well with the direction we have all agreed is necessary about strengthening the role of panels to have this juxtaposed with greater central powers to determine how those panels are to be made up.
I am also very concerned about getting the political balance right, and I agree that in being unclear which objective is most important in reaching the balanced appointment objective in relation to panel membership these issues will be fudged, and we will end up with little balance at all. In my time as chair of a police authority and a member of the Association of Police Authorities, we spent many hours working precisely on getting this particular problem sorted out, and indeed we now have a much better system within police authorities than is proposed in this Bill.
I have other questions on this point. How will we know what considerations have been included locally—I stress locally—in reaching the balanced appointment objective? Who is going to check this? What powers exist to do anything about it if it is not balanced? I am very concerned about diversity among panel members. It is important that panels should try to reflect the populations they serve, otherwise the public, and particularly those sections of the public that are usually excluded, will question whether their representatives understand the issues that matter to them. This is especially important in the policing context if we take into account all the experiences, from Brixton onwards, that have taught us that it is vital to give people a voice in how they are policed.
In this regard, the Government’s proposal that there should be more co-opted members is helpful, but I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that it is unlikely to improve diversity if these additional co-optees are local authority members, as seems to be proposed. We certainly found that in our own police authorities. There is a danger that this will simply be perceived as jobs for the boys—or, for that matter, for the girls—so the government amendment, although welcome, should go further and provide for more independent co-opted members.
My Lords, I am slightly puzzled by the Government’s stance on the question of political balance as far as these panels are concerned. When I was first elected to a local council in the 1970s, it was the customary practice that authorities with a majority for one party or another made sure that they packed the committees. That was the norm whether the authority was Conservative controlled or Labour controlled and, for all I know, it was the same in Liberal-controlled authorities. The Conservative Administration under Margaret Thatcher took the view—on this instance, they were right—that it was better that committees of local authorities, and subsidiary and external bodies to which local authorities appointed, should reflect the appropriate political balance, to reflect the wishes of the electorate.
In constructing these panels, the Government seem to be setting that aside. Why, in the Bill, are they repudiating the legacy of the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher? Why are they so opposed to having proper political balance to reflect the different strengths of the political parties in particular areas as far as policing and crime panels are concerned? This is precisely an area in which the Government should want to ensure that there is political balance rather than perhaps leading to one-party domination of the way the panels operate.
My Lords, I follow my noble friend on that particular point about political balance. As currently constituted, police authorities are constituted in a way that reflects the political balance in the area that is affected, whether they are metropolitan areas or single-area county police authorities. I do not understand how the Government propose that political balance should be achieved, if at all, on the basis of the Bill.
I moved an amendment in Committee about using the LGA model, which is well accepted across political groups—including the independent group—in the Local Government Association for achieving a balance within the LGA’s internal bodies and its appointments to external bodies that reflects the strength of the different political groups across the whole country. It should be perfectly possible to import that principle into appointments to these panels, at the level of the new structures which are to be created. If it is not done in that way, how is the objective to be achieved—assuming that the Government share that objective? If the Minister is not in a position to explain that at the moment, perhaps it is something that can be further discussed before Third Reading. I am sure that her noble friend Lady Eaton, who is not in her place, will be happy to enlighten her about the consensual approach that we have achieved in the Local Government Association since it was formed around this particular issue.
I welcome the slight movement that the Government have made on potentially increasing the size of the panels, although I noticed that the Secretary of State will be required to approve the numbers. That seems yet another unnecessary intervention. It should perhaps be subject to a minimum requirement but it should be left to the panel to determine. I am glad that it looks, on the face of it, as though we will be doing a little better than the homeopathic dosage of independent or co-opted members that the Bill in its present form provides for. Again, some assurance about how this might work would be very welcome, because the issue of balance is not confined, as other noble Lords have made clear today and on previous occasions, to issues of politics; there is also the geographical issue.
My noble friend Lord Hunt from the great city of Birmingham would not, I think, be content if Birmingham, with its 1 million population, was to have but one member on the West Midlands Police Authority, which might very well be all it would be entitled to, given the number of authorities that would be involved in that organisation. Birmingham would have a population three or four times the size of some of the other metropolitan districts and there are also county areas involved, as well as all the districts in those county areas to be represented. For Birmingham to be represented by one individual, particularly if it ends up with the misfortune of an elected mayor who would be required to serve in that capacity, would be extremely unsatisfactory.
Of course, when it comes to party-political balance, it is quite conceivable that, as already happens in a number of places, the elected mayor does not reflect the politics of the council involved. So, again, you could have an anomalous position, particularly in a large authority, of an elected mayor of a different party, or no party at all, being the sole political voice in that authority, whereas control of the authority may be in different hands, or, certainly, the balance may very well be different.
In addition to those issues of party-political and geographical balance, issues of ethnicity and gender need to be reflected and are difficult to derive, and the provision for co-opted members ought to be a way of proceeding with that. While it may not be possible in the Bill to prescribe how that should be done, it would be very welcome to hear the Minister say for the record that it would be expected that efforts would be made to reflect those considerations about diversity of ethnicity and gender in particular—there may be others—which are sensitive and important. We have a range of issues, of course, affecting minority communities in some parts of the country and, in general, issues such as domestic violence are clearly ones in which a gender balance is required.
It would be very helpful to have a clear steer on that from the Minister on the record, if not in the Bill, so I hope that she will be amenable to answering some of the points that noble Lords have raised and are about to raise—I see the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, straining at the leash to join the debate.
(14 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendments 257 to 267, which are remarkably similar to the Minister’s amendments except that they refer to PCCs and MOPC rather than to the “policing body”, which is perhaps a more elegant formulation.
I seek clarity as to the Government’s intentions for all this. The Government have brought quite a number of these problems on themselves. At the end of last week, I spoke to a senior lawyer employed by a police service who described the Bill as being “inherently contradictory” because of the confusion about what it is trying to achieve. While I welcome the Minister’s proposals in her amendments—which will allow for a two-stage transfer because it will require a two-stage transfer to sort out exactly what the details, the most sensible disposition of staff and the most appropriate way of doing it are going to be—this is a problem that the Government, policing bodies and the police service did not need to have. I cannot understand what is gained by chief officers of police employing all their staff. What extra ability does it give them, apart from a great deal of hassle and potential problems, over having direction and control of those staff? That is a point that the Minister will no doubt explain.
I want to understand exactly what the Government’s amendments do. I assume that the new amendments that the Minister is introducing are intended to maintain the status quo from the commencement of the Bill until the second transfer scheme is effective. I would be grateful if she could confirm that. There is an interesting anomaly if you have a two-stage process. During the first stage, before the second stage kicks into action, there is presumably the potential for the chief officer of police to employ new staff directly subsequent to the first transfer scheme, and this would then create two classes of police staff. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us whether having two classes of police staff, because there is a two-stage transfer agreement, is intentional and whether she wishes to return to this at Third Reading. I am also not clear whether there is a deadline by which the second-stage transfer should take place. My own view is that the complexities of this mean that it may take a considerable period of negotiation to reach a mutual agreement for staff to be transferred to the chief officer of police, and it is better that those discussions take place at a leisurely pace to allow all the relevant interests to be consulted and involved.
I have one additional question. Will the Minister say whether the transfers under Schedule 15 are going to be legally effective under Scottish law as well as the law in England and Wales? As I understand it, a number of police authorities around the country hold land in Scotland, so these transfers are important.
My final point—again, I would be grateful for the Minister’s explanation—is that, as I understand it, her amendments to Clauses 19 and 20, which were agreed on the first day of Report, will mean that the police and crime commissioner or the MOPC in London will not be able to delegate either to the chief constable or to the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis any of that body’s staff. They would not be able to delegate to the chief officer of police to arrange a function—the PCC or the MOPC will have to engage the chief officer formally to carry out some functions rather than simply delegate them.
I have seen a letter—rather, I have been provided with a letter; there is no question of it having been “seen” because it was leaked to me or anything like that—from the right honourable Nick Herbert, Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice, to the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, a “Dear Paul and Tim” letter, which tries to set out the Government’s policy. However, it leaves me even more confused as a result. He says:
“On delegation, I have said from the outset that I want the office of the PCC/MOPC and the office of the Chief Officer to be clearly distinct so as to enable proper accountability and a clear division of responsibilities. Preventing the PCC/MOPC from delegating to the Chief Officer is an important part of this”.
Will the Minister tell us why that is so important, because delegation is a very clear statement?
Nick Herbert goes on to say:
“This means that should a PCC/MOPC want a Police Force to carry out some functions, he or she will have to formally engage the Chief Officer to do so, rather than simply delegate it. This will help clarify roles and responsibilities, which I do not believe is the case under the current system”.
I dispute that. Will the Minister explain to us very clearly the distinction between delegation and formal engagement? What is the process that underpins formal engagement? Is it a contract or a memorandum of understanding? What exactly is envisaged? I suspect that the Government are creating a new bureaucracy, further uncertainty and further duplication.
My Lords, we do not disagree with the principle behind the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, that the PCC or the MOPC should be able to make their own decisions about transfers. However, the government amendments will maintain the status quo—the noble Lord asked about that, and that is the intention—and provide stability in the transitional phase by providing that all staff and assets transfer from police authorities to PCCs or the MOPC initially. They then enable the PCCs and the MOPC to write transfer orders to transfer staff to the chief constable or commissioner.
Perhaps I could begin by addressing first the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Amendment 264A would mean that a police authority could transfer staff only to the police force; no member of the police authority staff could be transferred to the PCC or the MOPC. As a preliminary point, the Bill provides for the police staff to be employed by the chief officer of police, not the police force, which does not exist as a separate entity capable of employing staff. Noble Lords whose names have been put to these amendments might like to make the police force the employer rather than the chief officer, but no amendment has been tabled to achieve that. Obviously, I can answer only to amendments that have actually been tabled.
To clarify the separate roles of the PCC or the MOPC on the one hand and the chief officer on the other, and to ensure that each can carry out his or her functions independently, it is essential that each employs his or her own staff. As such, the Bill must allow for staff to be transferred to the PCC and to the MOPC; it does not direct that that happens, but it allows for the best decisions to be made locally.
Amendment 109A would give police and crime panels a role in reviewing PCCs’ human resources policy. This would already fall under the existing general powers of panels to scrutinise PCCs. I do not think that the way forward taken by these amendments would achieve the sort of protection needed, but I make a commitment to the House that I will consider the matter further. Perhaps this can be returned to in the other place, given the late stage of this Bill. I therefore ask that the amendments are not pressed to a vote.
I will now speak to the government amendments and answer some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, who asked why delegation was necessary. It is exactly as the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice says; if the PCC wants to ask the chief constable to do something, he or she will need to commission it formally—they cannot just order the PCC to do it.
I am trying to understand how the process that is being described will differ from delegation, which is not the same as simply ordering—it is a process. How is that going to change when you do not have delegation but instead have this commissioning process?
I guarantee to write to the noble Lord about this, but the principle behind it is that it is very clear to the public who is responsible for what. The process that will be employed is more detailed than I have information for tonight, but I shall write to him specifically on the issue of process that he has raised.
The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, would allow PCCs and the MOPC, as well as police authorities, to make transfer schemes to transfer staff and assets. I completely appreciate the position that the noble Lord is coming from. The Government have been working closely with police forces and authorities on how the transitional arrangements should operate.
Many are concerned about whether there is enough time in which to write transfer schemes ahead of the introduction of PCCs and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. They have also expressed concerns about trying to second-guess what staffing a PCC may want when they come into office. As such, it is eminently sensible, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, suggests, to allow PCCs and the MOPC to write transfer schemes. However, government Amendments 256B to 267M in this group simplify matters even further. They simply maintain the status quo for a period, with all police authority staff and assets transferring initially to PCCs and the MOPC. This will enable transfer schemes to be written by PCCs and the MOPC in slower time. I hope that the noble Lord will look at my proposed amendments and agree that they achieve the same end, and I hope on that basis that he will agree to withdraw his amendment and support the government amendments.
The noble Lord also asked about Scotland. I understand why he asked that. Government Amendments 309ZB and 309ZD extend the territorial extent of Schedule 15, so that transfers under that schedule are legally effective under Scots law as well as in England and Wales.
Government Amendments 256A and 267P to 267Q enable the continued employment of chief officers of police. There has been a lot of discussion on this matter, but, finally, Amendment 267N ensures that accounting and audit arrangements can be put in place for police authorities and the PCC or the MOPC in respect of the financial year when the transition takes place. I realise from the interest that the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, has taken in this in particular that these are important matters. We want to get it right, and I will promise to write to him on matters of process and update him on where we are.
I was referring only to the chief executive protections for discussion in another place.
My Lords, I realise that we are stretching the rules of Report, but this is important. Presumably when the matter goes to the other place, we can receive back from them only amendments that relate to amendments passed by your Lordships' House. That will produce a very narrow range of areas. Areas on which there is no amendment from your Lordships' House will not be covered. I make this plea for the fourth time that it would be in the Government’s interests to postpone Third Reading on this Bill to 5 September. It would lose them only one parliamentary day, but it would enable the Home Office, the Minister’s officials and colleagues around the House to spend a little bit more time getting the details right. It would also give the Minister the opportunity to come back on some of these detailed points.
My Lords, I have suddenly realised that some days ago I moved an amendment, did I not, about statutory protection for chief executives, and withdrew it because the noble Baroness would not give me any assurances on this. Does this not rule out any changes? I am puzzled because I did move this amendment and, as I recall, it was rejected.
(14 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 201 to 205. I share with the Government a desire to strengthen and improve police accountability. That is what I understood the Bill to be all about. I have to say that, during your Lordships’ consideration of the Bill, I have slowly realised that the Bill will weaken the accountability of the police to the public. In fact, some changes made in the Bill remove the levers that police authorities currently have to ensure that the police service in their area is accountable. There will be fewer powers and fewer levers for the police and crime commissioners and the MOPC in London as a result of this Bill.
Indeed, the diminution of police accountability in London is even worse than in the rest of the country. First, London will not have the benefit of an individual who is directly elected to be responsible for policing. We will not have the visible answerability of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and his senior officers to public forums. The police authority will disappear, as will the expectation that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis will appear there. There will be a special meeting of members of the Metropolitan Police Authority on Thursday to question the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis about the latest issues and allegations concerning phone hacking and related matters. That public answerability of the police will disappear because all that the Government are substituting for that is the right to invite by the London Assembly, which is of course a current right. All that will disappear as a consequence of the Government’s Bill.
We are also now being told that in practice the Mayor of London and the MOPC will have no say in the selection of the most senior police officers in the London areas, which is why I have tabled this series of amendments. Certainly the Mayor of London and the MOPC will have less influence than they do at present. I find that extraordinary. This Government have told us that they want to strengthen police accountability. Why then have they diminished it, really very substantially as far as London is concerned? No senior officer, in fact no officer at all, of the Metropolitan Police will be appointed on the say-so or otherwise of the Mayor of London or the MOPC. That will simply not exist. The Minister is looking baffled, but that is the reality of the legislation that is being proposed.
The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis will be appointed by Her Majesty the Queen on the advice of the Home Secretary, and the Home Secretary is required merely to “have regard” to the recommendations of the MOPC. That is not a very strong power, given that the whole basis of this Bill is supposed to be that the directly elected individual should be able to appoint the most senior police officer in their area. At present, because the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis is a royal appointment, there is a joint interview between the Home Secretary and the Mayor of London to determine the nature of the recommendation that is made. Fortunately, when this structure has been tested, the Mayor of London and the Home Secretary have agreed on that recommendation. It is not quite clear what would happen if they did not agree, but the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis must have the confidence of the Home Secretary and the Mayor of London or the MOPC in the future. This Bill does not provide for such a strength in that purpose. There is no expectation of a joint interview. There is no expectation that the Mayor of London and the MOPC will have any right other than to make recommendations to which the Home Secretary will have regard. That is a very weak involvement.
Thus begins a declining scale of involvement of the Mayor of London and the MOPC. For the Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, the Home Secretary is required only “to consider” representations from the MOPC. That is not even “have regard” to; it is “to consider” representations. For assistant commissioners, deputy assistant commissioners and commanders, all chief officer ranks outside London, the most that is expected is a consultation process. That is why this Bill is so weak on accountability in the London area. That is why this Bill takes away from the Mayor of London even his current responsibilities in relation to senior police officers in the force.
I have therefore tabled a series of amendments that would mean that the Home Secretary’s recommendation had to be agreed with the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in respect of the commissioner and deputy commissioner and that no person should be appointed as an assistant commissioner, a deputy assistant commissioner or a commander without the consent of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. I know that the Government wish to put chief officers of police in the driving seat for this process. This series of amendments would not alter it—it says that the MOPC should have to give consent. That is a pretty minimalist requirement and expectation if you really believe the Government’s own rhetoric that this Bill is about strengthening accountability and empowering the directly elected representative of the people to have responsibility for the police service in their area. I find it bizarre that the Government, having made such a song and dance about how this Bill is all about strengthening police accountability, are going to leave London, and for that matter the rest of the country, with less influence over policing. I beg to move.
My Lords, is it in order to ask the Minister a question? The speakers list for today gives an estimated time of rising of 11 pm and it is now after 10.05 pm. However, it says that the target is to be confirmed. We have not had it confirmed. As Amendment 242 is tabled in my name, and we are now at Amendment 200, can the Minister enlighten me as to whether we intend to take it tonight?
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, offered a picture of a golden age of policing accountability in London that is about to disappear. I was under the impression that under current arrangements the Metropolitan Police Authority has no power to compel the commissioner to appear before it but has the right to invite the commissioner to appear before it, as its successor body will have under the Bill.
The Minister is confusing the Metropolitan Police Authority and the London Assembly, which at present has no power to compel; it has the power to invite, and that is all that the Government are offering the London Assembly and its policing panel. That was merely by way of an introduction to my more significant remarks. But I think that the Minister is confused.
I still hold to my view that the noble Lord is exaggerating enormously the difference between where we are now and where we will be.
The Minister is misunderstanding the point. At present, the visible answerability of the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis is to the Metropolitan Police Authority. Those meetings take place once a month. In the case of the current month, there will probably be an additional meeting in which the commissioner will answer questions in public to the body to which he is accountable on issues concerning the controversies of which we are all aware about phone hacking. That will disappear, and all that the Government are offering in its place is the right to invite by the London Assembly panel.
I take the noble Lord’s point, but these amendments are primarily concerned with the question of appointment. The noble Lord’s amendments are concerned to shift the balance of authority in terms of appointments, with senior appointments between the Secretary of State and MOPC and for other appointments to strengthen the power of the MOPC. My understanding is that the mayor will be able to make recommendations to the Secretary of State, but the national and international responsibilities of the Metropolitan Police are such that the Bill proposes that the final decision should be taken by the Secretary of State on the appointment of the commissioner and the deputy commissioner. The mayor will have the right to make recommendations, which will of course be taken fully into account. That is the whole purpose of the phrase “to have regard”; we envisage a dialogue and a process, but not one that can lead to deadlock between the two authorities, because of the particular national and international responsibilities of the Metropolitan Police.
In terms of other appointments below that of deputy commissioner, the Bill as a whole clings to the idea of the operational independence of the police. It will be the right of the chief constable or of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in this case to make other appointments. These of course will be made in consultation with the MOPC and there will also be external supervision, but the principle will be one of police independence; a clear line of responsibility from the commissioner and the deputy commissioner will then follow for other appointments within the force.
The noble Lord wishes to have the MOPC in the central position; we are putting the MOPC in the position of scrutiny and accountability and not in one of control. That is not dissimilar to the current position. He is asking for a much stronger position for the MOPC than has been the case in the past—
Can you tell me why it is stronger? What element have you strengthened in this Bill? Give me one example of an element in which you have strengthened the role of the MOPC compared with the existing police authority.
The noble Lord misunderstands me. I said you are asking for a much stronger position for the MOPC than there was even under the previous regime. That is the point I am making.
At present the Metropolitan Police Authority appoints all officers between the ranks of assistant commissioner and commander. That disappears and the MOPC has no role other than to be consulted. The current position for the appointment of the commissioner and the deputy commissioner is that there are joint interviews; there is nothing in this Bill which allows that to continue.
I stand corrected but I hold to the principle which runs through this Bill—that of the independence of the police in terms of command and senior appointment and the international and national role of the Metropolitan Police as an exception in this regard. This is why the Bill is written in this form. On that basis I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I have to say that I do not think the Minister has addressed the central problem. What he is actually doing for the most prominent directly elected individual in the country is reducing that individual’s responsibility for the police service in that area. The Bill removes from the mayor and the MOPC the powers that currently exist. That means that in future the Mayor of London will have less influence over the Metropolitan Police than he and the MPA currently have. That is an extraordinary reversal of what this Bill seems to be about.
I find it extraordinary that the Minister’s response has not addressed that central question. Of course, the Metropolitan Police has a national and international function, which is why, exceptionally, it should be a joint appointment rather than simply the appointment of the mayor’s office. That is the concession that ought to be made as far as the national and international functions are concerned. I fail to see why assistant commissioners, who rank as chief officers of police everywhere else in the country, are not part of the responsibility of the mayor’s office. The Government are diminishing the authority of the mayor in respect of policing in London, and that runs directly counter to the Government’s own rhetoric as to what this Bill is about.
I urge the Government to consider this in the few remaining days that we have left for the consideration of this Bill. On the basis that I am sure they will wish to do so, and to receive further representations from the Mayor of London on this point, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I support the amendment for a number of reasons. First, the Bill is amazingly silent on transitional arrangements. In the immediate aftermath of the vote on the first day in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised with a degree of interruption and noises off—from me, I appreciate—the question of the transitional arrangements that should be in force before a new system is put in place. I would not go as far as those who reorganised London government in the 1960s where there was one year of shadow operation. But I note that there were several months of shadow operation when the new arrangements in London for the Assembly and the mayor took effect. All the Bill provides for in terms of a transition period is seven days—seven calendar days, one week—for transition from one system of governance to another. That seems strikingly short to me, under any set of circumstances. However, that is the smallest and most insignificant of reasons for supporting this amendment.
My admiration for the Home Secretary grows every day, because of the bravery she shows. In Sir Humphrey Appleby terms, the decisions she is taking on policing are extremely brave. Currently, in policing, there is a most extraordinary agenda of change. There are substantial budget reductions, starting with the current year, and moving through next year and the rest of the CSR period. Major changes are proposed for the terms and conditions of police officers, which will at least cause a degree of stress, uncertainty and confusion, if not downright anger from many police officers. Changes are proposed in the pensions of police officers, which are also causing a substantial degree of distress, concern and anger. That is all happening at the same time as other parts of the public sector are withdrawing various functions from their activities so that more will be expected of the police force.
At the same time, we have the challenge of the Olympics, which is probably the largest policing challenge that has ever been faced in this country, comparing a modern Olympiad with the last time that London hosted the Olympics, in 1948. There is the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee. Wedged in that very short interval between the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games is the Notting Hill Carnival, Europe’s largest street festival, involving major policing resources. In the midst of all this, our brave Home Secretary is proposing that we change the governance arrangements for policing in London and the rest of the country.
In supporting this amendment I am not trying to frustrate the Government’s intention. I am simply trying to point out that there are major risks in doing this on that timetable, with one week’s transition. That is all that is envisaged for the rest of the country and it is very unclear when the transition in London might take place. All of that will occur, at a time when all of these other things are going on.
I know that our brave Home Secretary has taken the decision to reduce the security alert status, which is always a brave decision for any Home Secretary because that supposes that you know of everything that might be just around the corner. However, the security situation is that there is a very serious terrorist threat against the Olympic Games. There are enormous public order and security challenges. It is not just al-Qaeda and its affiliates that we should be concerned about. Because of the global interest in the Olympic Games—with an estimated several billion people watching the opening ceremony on television around the world—this is an opportunity for any organisation anywhere in the world, pursuing its local objectives, to get publicity on a global scale. The threat is enormous, and in the midst of it our brave Home Secretary plans to change the governance arrangements for policing.
The amendment is very modest. It does not frustrate the Government's objectives. It merely says, “At least get the Olympic and Paralympic Games out of the way before you make this change”. Is there any need for further distraction under the circumstances? Is there any need for that degree of disruption? Is it not better to wait for a few short months, which will have the added benefit of allowing a sensible period of transition to the new governance arrangements? I urge noble Lords to support the amendment.
My Lords, my recollection of the transition/shadow period for the Greater London Authority was that it was very short and clearly not long enough, but that is not the point I will make tonight.
I sometimes think that, faced with a difficult decision, it is wise to ask oneself, “How will I feel, looking back in six months or a year, if I did or did not do something?”. In this situation, if the Government postpone the changes in London, they will be able to look back a year and a half from now and say, “Phew, that went okay. What damage did we do by not making the changes? Well, none really. What damage have we suffered? Maybe a little to our egos, but does that matter?”. How much better to be in that situation if there has been a problem, which may or may not be related to the changes in governance, than to be told by the noble Lord opposite or my noble friend behind me, “Well, we did warn you”, and for the world to say, “You were warned”.
I do not see a problem if the Government make what is hardly even a concession but more a slight shift in thinking. The balance is between very little on the one hand, and possibly nothing but possibly something catastrophic on the other.
(14 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, has the opportunity to move his manuscript Amendment 15A, I need to give the House some procedural advice as Leader of the House—it is a very rare occurrence but one that I need to do. I have to inform the House that the Clerk of Public Bills has written to advise me that this amendment is inadmissible and that the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, has tabled it against the advice of the clerks. Paragraph 8.56 of the Companion provides that in such rare circumstances it is for me to ask the House to endorse the opinion of the Public Bill Office, and I readily do so.
I suspect that most Members of the House will not have had an opportunity to consider the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Harris. It reads:
“Page 3, line 14, at beginning insert ‘Subject to section 159(2A)’”.
The Public Bill Office advises me and the House that the amendment is about commencement, not the subject of the clause itself—namely, the Mayor of London’s Office for Policing and Crime. The reason the noble Lord, Lord Harris, may have been tempted to attempt this procedural manoeuvre is clear: he is seeking to advance a vote on the commencement of the London provisions of this Bill. That is a matter of political tactics, but tactics, or the policy, are not why I rise to address the House this afternoon. I wish only to deal with a matter of procedure.
The clerks have advised that this amendment is inadmissible under the Companion and I invite the House not to allow the noble Lord, Lord Harris, to move his manuscript Amendment 15A. The difficulty is of course compounded because the amendment is a manuscript amendment. The Companion also provides that,
“the disadvantages and inconvenience attaching to the moving of manuscript amendments on Report are even greater than at Committee stage”.
I have to agree that this is not how we should go about our business. In short, the PBO has advised the House that this first amendment is inadmissible and I invite the House to agree. However, I reassure the House and the noble Lord that he will have every opportunity to speak to the issue he wishes to raise in the proper place when Clause 159 is debated. I therefore invite the noble Lord, Lord Harris, not to move his amendment. If he chooses to do so, and the Companion does not prevent him doing so, the amendment is in the hands of the House.
My Lords, if it is in order, I would like to respond to what the Leader of the House has said. It is very difficult sometimes to determine why particular amendments are moved in a particular way and at a particular time. There were a number of reasons for my seeking the indulgence of the House to put forward this manuscript amendment at this time. The first is the question of relevance. There is a specific proposal at the moment that the implementation and creation of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime should proceed in advance of that for the rest of the country and should take place in October 2011, rather than October 2012. Therefore, my manuscript amendment is designed to make clear that preparations, some of which will be costly, should not go forward at this time.
The second reason I felt it necessary to bring forward the amendment in this way was that I had anticipated that there would be an amendment, either from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who moved such an amendment in Committee, or from the Government, about the transitional arrangements for the introduction of the Mayor’s Office, and, indeed, of the offices for policing and crime commissioners. A detailed look over the weekend made it clear that such transitional details were not being put before the House and therefore I thought that it was important that we have this opportunity.
The final reason for putting it before the House is that there are, of course, important security issues associated with this. I am slightly bemused about where we are today because I also tabled an amendment on Friday which does not appear either in the list that we received this morning of amendments supplementary to the Second Marshalled List, nor as a manuscript amendment. It seems to have gone into some void in the Public Bill Office, but it, too, was relevant to this point and might have assisted the House had we had it before us. It was also clear from my manuscript amendment that this related to an amendment later on the agenda in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. That, I know—and, of course, she will speak for herself should we get to the point of debating this amendment—is about security of this country during the Olympics period and whether or not the disruption that will be caused in administrative arrangements is sensible at that time.
Those are my reasons for putting forward this amendment and I hope that the House will agree that they are valid reasons, notwithstanding the inconvenience that I am sure it puts the House to. No doubt the noble Lord will wish to respond and I hope that I will then be able to move my amendment.
My Lords, I do not think that there is any quarrel about whether or not these issues can be debated. The decision of the clerks is about where the debate should take place. Perhaps I may read out the advice about the grounds of inadmissibility, which is very clear and simple. In the view of the Public Bill Office the manuscript amendment is not admissible on the grounds that it is not relevant to the clause to which it is tabled. That is the first rule under paragraph 8.59 on page 132 of the Companion.
The manuscript amendment would make Clause 4,
“Subject to section 159(2A)”,
as set out in Amendment 310 to Clause 159, which would affect the commencement of Chapters 1 to 6 of Part 1. In the view of the clerks, this amendment is not relevant to Clause 4 as it affects commencement, which is the subject of Clause 159. In addition, Amendment 310 covers Clauses 1 to 79, several of which have already been debated.
My purpose is simply to bring to the attention of the House the strongest possible and clearest advice of the clerks, which is that this is inadmissible. In parenthesis, I can also tell the noble Lord that a transitional government amendment will be tabled today relating to Schedule 15. It will be debated in its proper place next week. It is up to the House and the noble Lord to decide what he wishes to do with his amendment but the advice from the clerks, and therefore the advice that I give as Leader of the House, is completely clear.
I am grateful to the noble Lord the Leader of the House for that further clarification. I am grateful also to hear that an amendment on transition is being tabled today. I say, in parenthesis, as was the noble Lord’s point, that this demonstrates the problems we have had with this Bill; that is, the late tabling of government amendments and the problems that we have in terms of determining exactly the intention of the Government in terms of various clauses, which is one of the problems that we all face. No doubt we will hear again an apology from the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, about the problems that the Home Office have faced and we will accept it with the usual good grace.
However, the noble Lord has said that this amendment, in the view of the clerks, is irrelevant to where it is placed. It is placed after the line, which states:
“There is to be a body with the name ‘The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime’ for the metropolitan police district”.
The amendment would insert,
“Subject to section 159(2A)”.
The amendment is tabled there because currently detailed work is going on about the early implementation and the introduction of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in the London area. This is in advance of the Bill receiving Royal Assent, with a view to trying to get the implementation from October or shortly thereafter. That is why it is relevant to the place it is in and why I moved it in respect of this line in Chapter 2. It is not irrelevant to that point, which is why I moved it. The clerks may not see the relevance. Perhaps because of the hurried telephone calls that I had while inspecting security arrangements at Heathrow airport this morning, we did not have an opportunity to discuss it in detail. The amendment is about ensuring that we do not press ahead in advance of legislative authority.
May I move the amendment?
My Lords, the proper advice I would give the noble Baroness, who I know is a stickler for such things, is to advise her noble friend not to move the amendment this afternoon, given the very clear advice of the clerks, and to speak to his amendment when it comes up in the proper place later on Report.
My Lords, I hope I have been of service to the House in identifying a lacuna in the Standing Orders. I hope therefore that this will be an opportunity for us to look in detail at some of these difficult procedures. All I was trying to do was to avoid unnecessary duplicate expenditure in advance of legislative authority and to enable the House to debate the security of the nation. However, the Leader of the House has three times at least reiterated the firm advice of the clerks on this point, and I would be foolish to persist beyond that. I assume, however, if I wished to bring forward this self-same amendment at Third Reading there would now be no objection to me so doing.
My Lords, I would have no objection so long as the amendment at Third Reading were written according to the rules.
My Lords, fractionally earlier than I had anticipated, I move Amendment 16, which is in my name. It is a series of amendments—I apologise to the House for their complexity but I have done my best to try to make them as clear as possible—that would enable the people of London at the same time as they elect—
My Lords, please leave the Chamber quietly. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, has waited a long time for this moment. I know we want to listen to him.
My Lords, I waited a long time to move the previous amendment rather than this one. I had anticipated an opportunity during the debate to prepare myself more thoroughly for Amendment 16.
The purpose of this amendment is to enable Londoners to vote, on the same day on which they would elect the Mayor of London, to elect the deputy mayor for policing and crime. The Government have told us that the Bill is about the importance of transparency and more effective clarity about who is responsible for policing. They have said, for everywhere outside London, that there is an advantage to there being direct elections for the person who has responsibility for the governance and oversight of policing. For London, though, they have proposed a completely different construction. There would be no direct election; the Mayor of London would choose an individual to become the deputy mayor, who would have responsibility for policing and crime.
The Government have helpfully tabled some amendments that indicate that in the event of that person not being an elected Member of the London Assembly, there would be a confirmation hearing and the Assembly could veto that appointment by a two-thirds majority. In the event of that person being a Member of the Assembly, the Assembly would have the right to hold a confirmatory hearing but would have no power of veto.
A confirmatory hearing is not the same as direct election, and the only circumstances in which there would be a veto by the democratically elected representatives of all London would be where the mayor of London had appointed an individual who did not hold a democratic mandate in the London Assembly. We are therefore talking about the Mayor of London being able to appoint his poodle or his Rottweiler, whichever model you care to take, to have responsibility for the oversight of policing in the London area.
London has the largest police force in the country with some of the heaviest responsibilities, particularly for counterterrorism and security. However, the Government are saying that, despite it being their objective everywhere else in the country that there is proper governance and clarity, and despite the benefits of direct election of the person with that responsibility, that will not apply in London.
My understanding is that the Government are suggesting this because the responsibility will rest with the Mayor of London. However, the current Mayor of London has discovered that it is not possible to combine the role of being mayor with having personal direct responsibility for the oversight of the Metropolitan Police. That is why, having given a manifesto commitment—I know that the current Mayor of London does not cast aside manifesto commitments lightly—he decided after just a few months that in fact he would not continue to chair the Metropolitan Police Authority and have that personal day-to-day oversight role but would ask one of his London Assembly colleagues to do so.
In circumstances in which the present incumbent is saying, “I cannot combine these duties effectively”, why are the Government saying, “That’s the model that we want to see in the London area”? Why are they saying that it is not necessary in London to have the benefits that we are assured that direct election will bring? That is why I have put forward this group of amendments.
I have also sought to resolve some of the other questions that arise. I have proposed how the electoral system would operate and how, in the event of the deputy mayor being incapacitated and unable to continue his functions, the Mayor of London would act. The simple principle that is most important in these circumstances, though, is that there be direct election, and my understanding was that that was what the Government wanted, and that they believed in the principle of direct election. If it is right for the rest of the country—we are told that the Government are going to reinstate this when the Bill returns to another place—why is it not right for London? What have the Government got against the people of London that they do not believe those people should have the right to elect the person who has responsibility to oversee and be responsible for the governance of policing in the London area? I beg to move.
My Lords, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, would prevent the mayor from holding the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and would instead create an elected deputy mayor for policing and crime to hold that office. Consequential amendments would apply to the deputy mayor similar provisions to those for PCCs in respect of elections and suspensions. While I understand the approach taken by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I set out in Committee the reasons why I do not agree with these amendments.
While it is the Government’s policy to introduce a directly elected police and crime commissioner into every force area in England and Wales outside London, the Government do not intend to introduce a new, elected person to hold the police to account in London for the very simple reason that the whole of London already elects a single person to take responsibility for strategic issues such as policing—the Mayor of London.
While I hear what the noble Lord says, the mayor is in the unique position of having responsibility for a whole force area and, as such, it seems sensible for him to have the overall responsibility for holding the police to account. Under the amendment, both the mayor and the deputy mayor have a direct democratic mandate across a whole force area, although in practice of course they could have different ideas about what should happen. That cannot work and would cause a lot of conflict. It is right and fitting that the mayor takes on the formal responsibility for holding the Metropolitan Police to account, and should in turn be accountable directly to the public for how this is done. However the mayor delegates in this area, the mayor, as with PCCs, is still responsible for the decisions that are taken and, as such, is answerable to the public as an elected representative.
I know that in Committee the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, was concerned about the dilution of the democratic principle, but I stress that this can come only through the mayor himself or herself. The mayor is elected by all Londoners, and he or she alone may hold the mayor’s office under this Bill. As such, the democratic principle is clear in the Bill. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw these amendments, although I know that he believes in them passionately, and support the government amendments that we shall discuss later. I will not go into great detail as we shall come to them later in our deliberations, but I remind the House that the government amendments require confirmation hearings for the position of deputy mayor to be binding where the candidate is not an Assembly Member, in that the Assembly would have the power to veto the appointment by a two-thirds majority.
Any Assembly Member whom the mayor wished to appoint would be subject to a non-binding confirmation, as already set out in the Bill. I hope, therefore, that on reflection the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the way in which she has responded and for reiterating the Government’s position on these points. As I said in my opening remarks, I am grateful for the amendments that have been put forward on confirmation hearings and the deputy mayor’s role. However, a veto power of a two-thirds majority of the London Assembly is not a very powerful mechanism. My experience in four years on the London Assembly—I believe that it was the case for the subsequent seven years—is that the two-thirds majority threshold has never been achieved in matters to do with the budget. It is difficult to see how that would not be the case in these circumstances, where it is likely that the elected Mayor of London will have a sizeable block of members supporting his or her position on most issues. Therefore, although confirmatory hearings are helpful, they are not the same as direct election.
The noble Baroness also argued that the mayor is elected for the whole force area, but one of the problems is that the Mayor of London’s writ is not the same as that of the Metropolitan Police. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, confronted me at a previous stage as he was deeply concerned that I might be trying to undermine the position of the City of London Police. The fact is that the Mayor of London has responsibility for two force areas and is elected not just by the electorate who are served by the Metropolitan Police but by the electorate who are served by the City of London Police. Therefore, the noble Baroness’s arguments do not stand up.
My Lords, when we discussed this in Committee, we established that the City of London and the force area that covers it represents a very small percentage of the electorate living within its parameters.
That indeed is the case. That is why I was almost incredulous that the Government believed that it was sensible that the City of London should have its own separate police force.
I appreciate that the Corporation of London has enormous antiquity and I know about the noble Baroness’s passion for medieval constructs, as we discussed the other evening, and the question of corporation sole. So, given that the Corporation of London is a construct even older than corporation sole, I shall not press that point.
However, on the issue of boundaries, the Government have to be clear about what the situation will be outside London. If the Localism Bill runs its course and the referenda locally produce it, you will have some very powerful directly elected mayors in major cities outside London. I do not believe that the directly elected mayors of the great cities of Manchester and Birmingham will not feel that they should have significant influence on the arrangements for policing in their areas. Of course they will not cover the entire police area, but I do not think that the Government’s proposal simply to have them sitting on the police and crime panel will be sufficient. The Government cannot get away from the fact that you will have conflicts between directly elected mayors and the people responsible for governance. In those circumstances, if that is going to happen outside London, the Government should have the courage of their convictions about the importance of direct elections and allow that to happen in London.
As I understand it, the Government’s vision is that there should be direct elections for these important positions everywhere in the country, but London is missing out. That is unfortunate and extremely unhelpful. I am disappointed that the Government are not prepared to consider and accept the amendment. However, I shall consider carefully what the noble Baroness has said today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.