Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the instigator of that infamous amendment right at the beginning of the Committee stage, I welcome what my noble friend Lord Cormack has said. I want only to make the briefest of interventions on Amendment 3, to which I have added my name. My noble friend is absolutely right to say that more work needs to be done on this Bill in the light of what has happened recently. I urge my noble friend the Minister, having given us some comfort in her amendments today, to take a further step.
I will have a little more to say about recent events and their relevance to this Bill when speaking to a later amendment, but I want to support this amendment for the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. What we seek is to draw out the strength of the panels so that they are able to send a strong message to the public. That is what we want.
My Lords, does my noble friend agree that her amendment, which I certainly would not describe as infamous, was the result of concern in the House that the model being proposed did not contain the strict checks and balances that most of us wish to see? Therefore, picking up the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, it would be entirely proper for the Government to come back on ping-pong with proposals reflecting, beyond Clause 1, the strict checks and balances which led to the original amendment.
I support my noble friend in her comments. The whole point of tabling the amendment was to try to persuade the Government to bring on the strength of the checks and balances. That has not been done, and I cannot imagine what they could come up with at the ping-pong stage. But I hope they do come up with something because it is the strength of those checks and balances that this House, which voted so strongly in favour of my amendment, supported. I therefore urge my noble friend the Minister to see what she can do.
My Lords, there is absolutely no guarantee that PCCs will necessarily be party politicians—although they can be, of course. I think that it would be welcome on all sides of the House to get the best person for the job regardless of party. That is what people have usually looked for in jobs such as this across the public sector. Many people in this House will have had very responsible jobs in public office and I hope that no one in this House would suggest that the only reason why they held those jobs was their party political allegiances. I have to say that this also applies to Members of Parliament—yes, there is a lot of party political cut and thrust, but I hope that all colleagues in this House who have formerly been Members of Parliament would agree with me that once you are elected you represent everyone in your constituency. As a Member of Parliament—apart from when you are actually at the other end of the corridor, and I see a few noble Lords nodding—once the election is over, you put party politics to one side in order to take on your responsibilities for a whole constituency. That applies across the public sector when people are elected or appointed to a post. I would hope that, regardless of party politics, people will step up to the plate to take on a public office of this level of importance.
I turn now to the opposition amendments. Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, seeks to alter the government amendment providing for the panel to exercise its functions in support of the commissioner. Instead, it would give the panel a more direct role in the performance of the force. The Government listened to the concerns of noble Lords across the House in Committee and in meetings which I held outside the Chamber about the panel not doing battle with the commissioner and about the panel having a supportive role in addition to the role set out in the Bill. At Report we tabled an amendment to that effect. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, for speaking to this group of amendments and reminding the House of the oath that constables take, which is at the forefront of their minds. That was so well explained—far better than I could have done—and I am grateful to him.
The Government’s amendment sends out a clear message that we expect the relationship between the PCP and the commissioner to be one in which both parties work towards the mutual aim of providing the best service to the public. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham—who also spoke to it—would substitute the Government’s provision with one where the panel is responsible directly for the performance of the police force. As already discussed during our debates, the Government’s model provides for direct accountability from the chief constable to the police and crime commissioner for the performance of the force. The commissioner is then, in turn, directly accountable to the public. To give the panel the role that noble Lords suggest would confuse these clear lines of accountability.
My Lords, perhaps I may ask the Minister a question on that before she moves on. It may be another way of putting the point that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, has made. I absolutely take the point about the deletion of the words,
“supporting the … exercise of the functions of the police and crime commissioner”.
That is something that I was concerned about myself. Can the Minister tell the House how we can read into the Bill the points about integrity, impartiality and so on which are clearly exercising the House? If they are not expressed in the Bill they may well be implied, either through the implied reference to the oath or through some other mechanism. Perhaps at the end of her speech she will be able to assist us on how we can understand that.
I am grateful to my noble friend because I was about to turn to the amendment that she and my noble friend Lord Shipley tabled.
The intention of Amendment 13 is for panels to include specific provision in their arrangements for substitutes or deputies where a panel member cannot attend proceedings, and provision for the quorum for a meeting of the panel. This was an issue discussed during Report stage. Your Lordships will recall that during that debate I stated that provision for substitutes or deputies for the panel's vote on the precept and the appointment of the chief constable could be included in the regulations dealing with those specific procedures. We will consider using these powers with partners should we feel that they are necessary, but we start from the position—and I hope that noble Lords will agree—that the authorities around the PCP table are responsible bodies that will take their statutory duties seriously and ensure that their rules and procedures more broadly cover this ground.
As to the veto, we have the power to intervene and regulate on this should we feel it necessary. There is also general provision in the Bill for panels to make their own rules of procedure, including rules on the method of making decisions. That is the mechanism for panels to make their own rules on matters such as a quorum. We start from that point but, none the less, I am happy to say to noble Lords that we will look at this in regulations if it is felt that changes are needed.
My Lords, a few minutes ago, the noble Baroness talked about the current system in London not working. By implication, she was suggesting that if the Bill were to pass, the arrangements for the accountability and governance of the police would be stronger in London than they are at the moment. However, in practice, the Government are weakening the arrangements in London. They are providing the Mayor and the MOPC with fewer powers in terms of control and governance over the police service in London, which I assume is not the Government's intention. The purpose of my modest amendment is to require that the MOPC is given the opportunity to interview candidates for appointment as a commander, deputy assistant commissioner or assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. It does not take the final decision away from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; it leaves it there.
On Report, I made my view clear that in an ideal world there should be a joint recommendation on the appointment of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis from the mayor and from the Home Secretary. It would continue to be a royal appointment, a fact that the Government and those former Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police to whom I have spoken feel is important. However, this amendment does not change that. What it does do is to give a significant, though not a decisive, role on appointments slightly below that level, down to the level of commander of the Metropolitan Police, to the MOPC. It would give an opportunity to advise on the basis of having seen the candidates concerned and for that advice then to be considered by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis before a final appointment is made and before the final consultation processes take place.
I am aware that the mayor’s office in London has made very strong representations to the Government. Indeed, as recently as earlier this week—I believe on Monday—the chair of the MPA and London’s deputy mayor for policing wrote to Theresa May, the Home Secretary, with a copy to the Prime Minister in which he reiterated the concerns of the mayor’s office in London:
“The Mayor and I have deep concerns regarding the proposed future lack of MOPC involvement in MPS officer appointments, and conduct matters in addition, according to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act. The Bill will remove the role of the governing body in appointment of all ACPO officers”.
That is as clear a statement as you can find that the new arrangements being proposed by the Government will reduce the mechanisms by which the mayor’s office in London holds the police service accountable. The statement continues:
“As I have communicated to you previously, the Mayor and I feel strongly”.
The Government are saying that in London there will be fewer levers, fewer controls and fewer powers for the system that governs the Metropolitan Police. This is at a time when the Government tell us that they want to strengthen those accountability mechanisms. This is at a time when the Government tell us that the current arrangements are not working in London and by implication they ought to be strengthened. This is a time, incidentally, when there is a Conservative Mayor of London. You would have thought that the Government would have the utmost confidence in that person’s ability to take on those functions in an appropriate way; but no. What the Government are doing is taking away even those very limited powers that currently exist and giving them to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.
I find the approach that is being taken here quite extraordinary. In quieter times, before the events of the last few weeks, the arrangements in London, where there is a directly elected mayor for the whole city, were being held up to us as being the beacon that was guiding this entire piece of legislation; yet now we are being told that those arrangements are inadequate. However, instead of the arrangements and the responsibilities of the mayor’s office being strengthened, they are being weakened by this Bill.
On Report, I challenged the Minister to give me one instance in this Bill where the new structures will have more responsibility than the current structures have over the Metropolitan Police; I received no answer. The reason I received no answer is because there are no such instances. This Bill weakens the governance arrangements in London.
I think we understand, given the national responsibilities currently held by the Metropolitan Police, why the Home Office has to be involved in the appointment of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. I think we understand the historic reasons why it is important that that appointment be a royal one, but in circumstances where every other elected police and crime commissioner will have at least the power of appointment of the chief officer of police—assuming that the Government restore that measure to the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, hinted that they might consider doing. However, in London, even though an assistant commissioner has the equivalent rank to a chief constable outside London, the mayor’s office will have no involvement other than the right to be consulted. I suggest that this is a diminution of the powers which is extremely unfortunate.
I know that one reason the Government have taken this stance is the desire of the outgoing Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis that he should have control over all appointments of his senior team. No one is suggesting that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis should not be able to decide how he wants deploy his senior team, but I question whether it is sensible that those appointments are made simply by that one individual in these circumstances.
During my time on the Metropolitan Police Authority, for four years I chaired every appointments panel for officers above the rank of chief superintendent. In the subsequent seven years, I sat on virtually all the appointments panels for deputy assistant commissioners and above. There have been one or two instances of disagreements between the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the appointments panel of the Metropolitan Police Authority. Usually the Metropolitan Police Authority panel has deferred to the preferences expressed, if they have been expressed clearly, by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis or his representatives. In a number of instances—it is probably inappropriate for me to give any details—that decision has been against the better judgment of the panel of the Metropolitan Police Authority. In those instances, that better judgment has proved to be right and the strongly held view expressed by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis was in fact wrong. Therefore, I do not think it is sensible to have an arrangement whereby you are preventing or not requiring the MOPC to have a direct involvement and to have at least the opportunity to interview the candidates so that there can be a dialogue or a consultation with the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis on the basis of detailed information about the strengths and weaknesses of various candidates. I do not think it is sensible even in the terms of what the Government are doing in trying to have a transparent system where the elected representative of the people is seen to be having a decisive role in the governance of policing. I think the way in which the Bill is drafted is a mistake. Unless it is rectified at this stage, I suspect that we will rue the consequences in the future. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, described his amendment as modest. I have often heard him describe his amendments as modest, although I have not necessarily agreed with him. However, this amendment is about no more than making recommendations. If the Minister is minded to resist, can she explain to the House how that squares with the amendment that we have just made to the Bill about supporting the effective exercise of the functions?
My Lords, Amendments 5, 6 and 7 change the powers of the Secretary of State to make secondary legislation in relation to elections. The Bill, as currently drafted, allows provision to be made about the registration of political parties, candidates’ spending limits and spending limits for political parties. Amendments 5 and 6 amend those powers to ensure that the Secretary of State can make provision about all these matters, but can also make provision, as in the case of other elections, in relation to other or third parties who may incur expenditure campaigning for or against a specific candidate or more widely.
Your Lordships will recall that my noble friend Lady Hamwee brought forward amendments in this area on Report, which I committed to consider. I am grateful to my noble friend for raising these important points. Secondary legislation to be made under Clause 59 would have already restricted what candidates and political parties could spend in those elections. Noble Lords will appreciate that the spending of organisations that campaign during elections, but that are not themselves fielding candidates, can greatly affect the result of a poll, even if they are not explicitly supporting a specific candidate. It is important that we are clear that the Bill will allow for that. It is usual in elections for such spend to be regulated and PCP elections should not be an exception. The amendments are necessary to ensure that the powers of the Secretary of State are sufficient to achieve that regulation. I hope that my noble friend Lady Hamwee will agree that they achieve the same end as her amendments on Report. I beg to move.
I am grateful to my noble friend, and I think we should all be grateful to the Electoral Commission, for taking such an eagle-eyed interest in and concern for the Bill. I am perfectly happy to accept that parliamentary counsel’s drafting achieves ends that I could only describe in a narrative kind of way.
My Lords, I want to say a few words in support of this amendment. I find it completely incomprehensible that anyone would think that it was acceptable to put a politically restricted person in charge of making political decisions, which is the effect of the current proposals relating to deputy and acting PCCs in this Bill. Quite apart from the fact that this would give such a person an impossible technical conundrum to resolve—because a politically restricted person must be politically neutral, and therefore cannot by definition make political decisions—it completely undermines the Government’s own arguments about greater public accountability. It is particularly important that an acting PCC must be able to make decisions as if he or she were the PCC. This includes the key decision about what precept to set if the PCC is absent at that particular time of the year. The PCC’s office cannot not make a decision about this, whether or not the PCC is present, because the police service would be missing up to half its funding the following year if this was so. Not for the first time, I have thought that we were creating an Alice in Wonderland world in this Bill—it is all somehow upside-down.
It is clear to me that an acting PCC cannot be politically restricted. That means that an acting PCC cannot be drawn from the members of the PCC’s staff—which bizarrely now include the deputy PCC, although that is another issue. The obvious place to look is therefore among the members of the police and crime panel, and particularly among the elected members of the panel, if we are serious about a commitment to democracy and accountability. This is exactly what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, stipulates, and I am very happy to support it.
My Lords, at the last stage, both the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, and I made rather impromptu suggestions about other possibilities which the Government might look at. Mine was that the commissioner should make the choice, because it seemed to me that there would be a logic in that. I hope that the noble Baroness, who sounded very open to the different possibilities, might be able to respond to the menu that was suggested last time. However, I retain my concern about it being proper that the person who acts up is a person who has been elected. I do not think that the fact that the appointment is made by the panel meets the concerns; it is the object of the appointment that I am concerned about. Indeed, there is almost an irony in suggesting that the appointment is made by the panel—the elected people—as the logic of the Government’s model is that the commissioner is an elected person. I hope that the Minister can help find a way through this.
My Lords, this amendment, as with similar amendments at Report stage, seeks to secure the appointment of an acting PCC from the police and crime panel rather than the PCC staff. I want to make it clear that the Government accept that this is a important area and one that we must get right. I am aware that the Opposition disagree with the Government’s proposals, but I continue to believe that the alternative put forward is not the answer. Our objective is simple—we agree that the acting PCC must be underpinned by a mandate from the people to act. The point is that, true to democratic principles, this mandate must be what the people have voted for in that force area. The opposition amendment would replace one elected mandate—the legitimate one that brought the PCC into power—with another that may be completely different and at odds with that of the PCC.
I accept that a member of the PCC staff does not have a direct mandate. They are there to help deliver the PCC’s police and crime plan. We have ensured that they cannot amend this while doing their caretaker role—this will ensure that the mandate of the PCC and the public’s will is maintained. Maintaining the PCC mandate intact is important—delivering on an elected mandate is what democracy is all about, and there are also practical implications. As I have pointed out at previous stages in the Bill, we do not want another local politician, with possibly a different agenda, to take the reins and take the police force in a different direction. We believe that this is not a good proposal. There is a fundamental difference in our approach to this—we see the acting PCC role as a caretaker role and nothing else; it seems that the Opposition see the acting PCC as more than this. Given the direct mandate of the PCC and the fact that the acting PCC should be a temporary measure, I cannot agree. We cannot hand the office of PCC to somebody who will likely seek to take the force in a different direction without a mandate.
This was debated on Report, when the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, in particular made the point that there are no other examples of an unelected person setting a precept. It is important to note here that the acting PCC is hardly acting completely unchecked. First, the PCP has a veto in this area; and, ultimately, should the precept remain excessive, it will be subject to a referendum.
I will finish on how this is all likely to work in practice—after all, this is what matters. As noble Lords know, the Government introduced an amendment to allow PCCs to establish deputies. In reality, we envisage that the PCP will appoint the deputy as the acting PCC. Given the debate thus far on the need to ensure the PCC has sufficient powers, noble Lords will see that we have left it to the PCP to decide which members of the PCC staff should be appointed in the circumstances and at that time. I believe that this satisfies the democratic need in this area and I ask that the amendment is withdrawn.