Palestine

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Of course this step is not yet fully consummated, but we want to see the formation of a Government who reject violence. If Hamas is to be part of that Government, it must reject violence; that is our position. If that were to go forward on the basis of the rejection of violence, we would see that as a good basis for building further hopes and moves towards serious negotiation. The Fayyad plan, as I have said, is something that we support. It takes us in the right direction towards building Palestinian statehood and getting the negotiations going again, which is central and crucial.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Would the Minister not agree that the tragic events of the weekend on the Syrian, Lebanese and Gazan border are just a taster of what we are in for as long as the vacuum in negotiations continues, and that the situation could get very much worse, given the instability in a number of Arab countries and the possibility that new Governments will be very sensitive to the views of radicals? Will he say what steps the Government are taking to urge the US President, who is to make an important speech on this matter in the next few days, to do something serious with the partners in the quartet to revive the peace process?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

We are urging our allies and friends, including the United States, at all times. However, perhaps the noble Lord will recognise that a clear development in the region is the increasing determination of the surrounding Arab states to play for once a more forward part in these developments. Obviously we are deeply concerned by the events at the weekend, but if one can stand back from such horrors for a moment, it seems that they reinforce the urgent need for the Israeli Government and authorities to begin to move in a positive direction in a very fluid overall situation in the Middle East.

European Union Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, on the need for proportionality and I accept that things will happen that we may not be able to foresee when we are drafting legislation and giving a legal basis to aspects of future decision-making. However, before I speak to Amendment 39B, I should like to say a few words about Amendment 39A.

I welcome the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, of how the Labour Party has moved considerably to advance accountability. It is particularly welcome given that it failed to provide for that in the time that it was in office. I do not often find myself echoing the words of the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, very much, but this afternoon’s discussion on the budget rebate was a very useful one to remind us that even when it was in office it took accountability so lightly that when the budget provisions were changed, as it appeared from today’s discussion—and nobody on the Labour Benches rebutted it—in 2005, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not even agree with that change. Yet it happened.

I turn specifically to Amendment 39A. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, explained what his amendment would do. I have some sympathy with the idea that you would have a level of scrutiny here that should determine what should happen—in other words, that Parliament should take a decision, rather than having a referendum. But my question would be to the noble Lord about his proposed new subsection (4B), which calls for a resolution of each House of Parliament. It is not entirely clear to me what would happen if one House of Parliament approved of holding a referendum but the other did not. Presumably, we would have a situation whereby a Joint Committee could have recommended a referendum and, potentially, the Commons would have agreed with the Joint Committee but perhaps this House would not. I wondered whether he would be able to tell us what would happen, in that case, on Amendment 39B.

In this variation, the review committee takes into account the significance, urgency and national interest at stake in its examination of the draft decision. Both urgency and national interest are, I say to noble Lords opposite, deeply subjective. We thought, with the European financial stability mechanism before us in February, that there was huge urgency in agreeing on what to do, because of the Greece, Ireland and Portugal scenarios. In fact one could argue that there is still considerable urgency, given where Spain—and, potentially, Italy—is. But the fact that other countries may be covered by that by the time the facility comes into being in 2013 suggests that something that one sees as urgent at a particular point in time may as events unfold not be quite as urgent as we thought.

Let me come to a consideration of a national interest. We know that this is notoriously difficult to define in international relations, which is one reason why this concept of national interest, which we all cherish and hold dear, has never been given legal force. I recall when I was a student reading the realist American scholar, Hans Morgenthau, who in 1951 wrote his book In Defense of the National Interest, which was contested throughout the 1950s, during the Cold War, and all through the 1960s, and is contested still today. It has never taken off as an argument that was legally testable in a court of law, so I would be concerned—while I see what the noble Lord means; we know the national interest when we see it. We can touch it; we can feel it; we can smell it. But to define it in legislation would be extremely difficult to do. I therefore suggest some caution about agreeing with the amendment. On Amendment 39B, I ask the noble Lord what he would do if one House went in a different direction from the other.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I would like to speak very briefly in support of this probing amendment, not because I am in total agreement with every detail of it but because I think that it addresses a very serious problem to which I alluded at the end of Second Reading, when I said that the effect of the Bill if passed unamended would be to lock the door and throw the key out of the window. I believe that that is an accurate description of what this Bill will do if not amended. These amendments are a sincere and quite well thought-out attempt to keep the key in the hands of the Government and the majority in both Houses of Parliament to some extent, subject to the reporting of a committee and so on.

I think that this issue should be taken a bit more seriously, frankly, than it is by those on the other side of the House. If the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, will forgive me for saying so, about the piece that she quoted—I hate to have to construe somebody else’s coalition agreement, which has nothing to do with me—the sovereignty issue to which she referred and which she read out is dealt with in Clause 18, not in the clauses that we are discussing now. We will probably have the delights of spending a whole day discussing that next week but it has nothing whatsoever to do with referendums. No one has ever suggested that it should be. The suggestion was that you should inscribe in the Bill some test of what the basis for European law in this country is. Anyway, I suggest that the Government really ought to think about this enormous multiplicity of referendums which are provided for and which cannot be dealt with just by casual remarks such as, “Oh well, don't worry—they won’t ever happen”.

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[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I have always found this argument very curious. To go to QMV requires a unanimous decision by those involved in taking the decision. The suggestion is that a country that is anxious to protect its national interest by blocking the move to QMV should nevertheless vote for QMV and for the power to be overridden by itself. That seems to be a turkeys-for-Christmas argument that does not add up in the real world. To imagine that by the muscle of QMV—I will not call it a sledge-hammer—one is going to get other countries to fall into line with a proposition that we might like to see pushed through is unrealistic. Why should they vote against themselves? That is not the way the pattern is ever going to work. The truth is this—my noble friend Lord Lamont touched on it—that the reason there is a long list of items in Schedule 1—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

The Minister has, with enormous eloquence, destroyed the case for the Single European Act and the single market. I believe he was a member of the Government who negotiated and ratified that. I can accept that there are areas of unanimity that we will never want to allow to be subject to QMV, such as taxation. That is quite clear. We will not allow them to be, and because unanimity is required to move from that, it will not happen. There will not need to be a referendum or anything else. The root-and-branch description he has given of national interest is frankly completely contrary to the facts. The Single European Act, which provided for qualified majority voting in a number of areas of technical barriers to trade, which had been blocked for many years, has been to this country’s interest. The Germans, who voted for the Single European Act, found themselves being voted down on the banking regulation. They willed the use of QMV, and they accepted the consequences. This country has never been put in that position. I do not think we should generalise this argument. There is no dispute that there are areas where any British Government are going to refuse to move from unanimity to QMV.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I do not want to sound critical of the noble Lord, who has had such experience in these things, but I have to ask where he has been because this Bill is about the present and the future. It is not saying that we can unravel the Lisbon treaty or that we should revert from QMV back to unanimity on a vast number of things where there is QMV. This Bill does not take back any competences or powers, although there are people in this House and another place who would like to consider that some of the powers are somewhat out of date in the central situation and should perhaps be revisited. It is not about that at all. This Bill is about further treaty changes and further transfers of power.

Here I agree with my noble friend Lady Williams. I suspect that most people—not the noble Lord, Lord Pearson—think that we are right to be good Europeans and to be effective in the EU, that we have given the European Union enormous powers and that almost anything we want to do can be achieved within those powers and with legislation within the existing competences, but that the case for allowing a further expansion of the powers and competences without consulting people who feel that time and again they have not been consulted is a very weak case. The case for not allowing people is very weak, and the case for allowing them is extremely strong. That is what this Bill is about, so I do not understand the noble Lord’s intervention about the past. It just does not add up.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My noble friend puts the matter with wonderful clarity. The truth is that not only is it not in our interest to remove the locks on so many aspects that the noble Lord finds so difficult but that many member states, not all of them, like us want no such thing as a removal of the veto in so many areas. Indeed, this explains why most of the areas requiring unanimity are in the treaty in the first place, remain in the treaty and are in Clause 6 and Schedule 1.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I have a strong preference for interpreting what I say myself and for not having it interpreted by another Member of the House. The reason I spoke as I did about the past was because the Minister spoke about it himself and expressed very strong views about the total unacceptability of movements from unanimity to QMV and about why it was inconceivable that any country would ever agree to that knowing that it might then be voted down. I gave one or two examples of why that was not inconceivable and why that had actually happened and had been in the British interest.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I am receiving strong hints—correct hints, I think—that not too much more time should be taken up from this Dispatch Box on these matters, and I will leave that debate aside for a moment.

This Bill is about a further expansion of competencies and powers; it is not about unravelling the past, because we are not in a position to do that, although some would like to. It remains unclear to me why the Opposition want more competencies and powers for the European Union; I am very interested that that is now the official position of the Opposition. I am longing to hear how they are going to deploy that and expand on it in the coming weeks and months.

Let me finally turn to Amendment 39B, which states that the committee must have regard to the urgency of the draft decision. Again, this shows a lack of understanding—possibly through my deficiency in being unable to convey how the system actually works, although there are other people in this Chamber who know it much better than I do. As I tried to explain previously on Amendments 16A and 16B, and as my noble friend Lady Falkner rightly said, one could think of few more urgent things than stabilising the eurozone. It still needs doing, of course, yet the use of the simplified revision procedure to enable member states in the euro area to set up the ESM to safeguard the financial and economic stability of the euro area will take 21 months to finalise. It was agreed in March 2011 and approved at the end of 2012. How could anyone consider that to be urgent? I do not understand what the “urgency” word is doing in that amendment.

There are a couple of other weaknesses in this probing amendment, which I suspect the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, who is extremely experienced in these matters, is well aware of. These amendments do not seem to take account of the work of our excellent scrutiny committees. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, thinks they are not paid enough attention. There is always the point that our scrutiny should be more effective, but it does go on and it is conducted with great vigour and assiduity under the leadership of people like the noble Lord, Lord Roper, in the European Union Committee of this House. It is within their gift to make recommendations similar to those prepared by the referendum committee at the time when Parliament came to debate the primary legislation required under Clause 6. It could be done there.

Finally, the amendments do not seem to take into account the need for primary legislation—the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, is reminding us of—in all these situations, which would provide for full parliamentary consideration of the decision in question through the rigour of the legislative process. It is therefore not clear how the provisions for resolutions of Parliament would fit with the requirements earlier in the clause for an Act of Parliament. Nor is it clear what would happen if one House approved the recommendations of the committee and the other House did not. Therefore, there is no need for the additional complications and opportunities for prevarication, because that is what we would get with these amendments, along with delay and opaqueness.

It is surely right that if a future Government really believe that a further transfer of power or competence from the UK to the EU is in the interests of this country, they should not be afraid to make the case to the British people and let them decide. Those who might be in favour of more powers to the EU and those who might be against should have the courage of their convictions—possibly more so than in the past—and be prepared to seek a mandate from the public, not from a small group of Parliament or some external committee. That is why I ask noble Lords to withdraw these amendments.

European Union Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 9th May 2011 Lords Chamber

I find it extraordinary, as do my colleagues, that the kind of thinking behind the Bill is that Britain should somehow be content with this creation of a core Europe of which we are not part, because as any time an institutional issue arises all that our Ministers can say is, “No”, and cannot otherwise indicate support for the proposal. Under the text of this clause we will end up with no ability on the part of Ministers to offer leadership in Europe and no ability to offer leadership at home when institutional issues are under discussion. I hope that my suspicions will be proved wrong and that in fact Ministers will be free to indicate support for measures subject to the requirements of the Bill. Otherwise, it is a denial of the leadership that we all want to see from this country. I beg to move.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I speak in support of the probing nature of this amendment and wish to ask noble Lords on the government Front Bench to give some thought to an aspect that was not precisely raised by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle. It is what I call the chicken-and-egg problem. By definition, there cannot be a decision on these matters which are taken within Lisbon unless the Council takes a unanimous decision. There will not be a decision on which the Government can hold a referendum unless they have agreed to it, so you have a chicken-and-egg problem of a massive kind. What will the Minister do in the Council? Will he say, “My lips are sealed”? In that case, it will go through because it will be considered an abstention and he will have allowed it to go through. This is a bizarre situation and I cannot believe that that is what the Government intend to bring about.

Perhaps the Minister will confirm my understanding that the Government, in giving their agreement to a unanimous decision in the Council on matters that fall within the scope of Lisbon—not changing the treaty by the intergovernmental conference route—they intend that the British Minister will say that he is agreeing to this decision and that the agreement will be formalised only when in some cases our Parliament has approved it by primary legislation, or in others there has been a referendum. However, he will agree to it in the first place, otherwise there will not be a European Union decision that can be put to a referendum and you will find yourself in a fine old tangle. I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify this as I cannot believe that the Government seriously wish to put themselves in a position where they cannot even participate in the debate about a decision in Brussels because, perish the thought, what they say might be interpreted as support. Oh, terrible and fantastic—everyone will fall down at that stage.

I do not think that makes any sense, and nor do I think necessary the requirement for a referendum that the Government are trying to impose. In a later set of amendments, I will argue that that requirement is excessively imposed. It is not necessary because all those requirements can be retained without preventing the Minister in Brussels behaving in a normal, sensible way—that is, participating in the negotiations. If the British Government think that, basically, it is in our interests for that decision to go ahead, they can say that it can go ahead but that the following national processes then have to ensue. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to clarify the situation.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, for the purposes of this very narrow amendment, we accept that the Minister of the Crown cannot agree anything without a draft decision being approved by an Act of Parliament and the referendum condition being met. That means that in the case provided for in Clause 4 there is a referendum if necessary and the referendum result is positive. Most of us on this side of the House think that that is a monstrous situation to put the country in. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the amendment, we accept that and that the Government will not be able to agree to any of those decisions without a referendum or an Act of Parliament, and in many cases both.

The amendment is designed to question the words “or otherwise support”. That is why I am just as shocked as my noble friend Lord Liddle that the Government cannot accept it. What is the purpose of including “or otherwise support”? Surely, throughout the Bill the Government have been arguing to prevent this country acceding to or being party to any decision on constitutional change, such as the introduction of qualified majority voting, without going over these thresholds of Acts of Parliament and a referendum. The words “or otherwise support”, as in the text, imply that it is an additional restriction. What does that mean? We would like specific answers from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, if he is summing up the debate on the behalf of the Government. Does it mean that a Minister would not be able to say, “I personally support this but I need the agreement of my colleagues before I can go along with it.”? Is the text designed to prevent that sort of conversation taking place? Is it designed to prevent the Minister saying, “The British Government support this, amazingly, but we’ll have to have a referendum because we have imposed this Act on ourselves”? Is that what “or otherwise support” means? Does the Minister want to intervene and perhaps answer my questions?

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

As a hypothetical situation, at that point it would because it would be a change in power and competence. The enhanced co-operation itself would not. That is the distinction. Let me reiterate: a Minister can make very clear that the Government support a decision but that they must also seek the necessary approval of Parliament and the public first. Britain is not alone in this respect. This is the way in which national Governments very often have to proceed.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Now that Minister has dealt with enhanced co-operation, can he go back to the chicken and the egg? It would be quite nice to know how he thinks the Council will conduct itself in taking decisions in this matter. This is nothing whatever to do with absence from the Council, which is a complete red herring. This is about what you do in a matter that requires unanimity. Without unanimity, there is no decision in any of the matters that we are talking about. I think that that is common to the understanding of everyone in the House. How is that unanimity achieved so that the British Government can submit the matter to their Parliament or to the public through a referendum if they have not expressed a view, because then there is no unanimity? There is a serious chicken and egg problem here.

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[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, it is quite difficult in this debate not to get drawn into some sort of Second Reading speech when we have amendments, such as those of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, which basically fillet the whole Bill and seem designed to ensure that it does not have the effect that was originally intended.

I am always amazed when I listen to people supporting these sorts of amendments that they do not seem to realise how totally disillusioned the British people are with our progress as we creep, by grandmother’s footsteps, further and further into an integrated Europe which nobody really wants. I rather liked the analogy of Odysseus being strapped to the mast with wax in his ears, because we should remember that the reason why that happened was so that he would not hear the sirens’ songs and be dashed on the rocks. I hope that our Ministers will be strapped to the mast with wax in their ears because we will otherwise be merely drawn further and further into Europe and into an integration that people in this country do not want. I sincerely hope that we will oppose these amendments, which seem to be designed precisely to remove what the Bill is trying to do, which is to reassure the British people that we will not be drawn any further into Europe by this rather surreptitious process that has been going on under successive Governments for many years now and has led to a great sense of disillusion among the British people.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I shall speak to a number of the amendments in the group which are in my name and support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, got in ahead of me, because he has enabled me to realise that he has neither understood what the amendments are trying to do nor understood what they are not trying to do. So I shall try, since that is the spirit of Committee stage, to say a little bit about them.

I hope that I shall not be totally out of order if I express some regret that so many of these amendments have been bundled together when they are completely contradictory. There are amendments in the group which add more to the list of 56 referendums with which we are threatened and there are amendments, such as those which I support, which subtract. They are not two branches of the same subject; they are two completely contrary views of how to pursue Britain’s national interest in Brussels. However, having said that, I am happy to address all the amendments, particularly those in my name.

The reasons that we have to take seriously the need to reduce the number of subjects on which there might be referendums are numerous. The proponents of the legislation have simply ignored the views of the Constitution Committee of this House. I have not heard a single word from the government Benches answering the committee’s report in which it said that referendums should be used in the EU context only when matters of major constitutional importance are at stake. I shall not go through the whole list in Clause 6 to show which matters are and are not—most are not—covered by that; the euro clearly is, which is why there is no question of trying to suggest there should not be a referendum on that matter. However, that is one reason for shortening the list.

The other is that if you have 56 items—or, as some speakers on later amendments in this group will no doubt urge, more than 56 items—which could trigger referendums, you are chopping at the base of representative parliamentary democracy and the sovereignty of Parliament, because you are handing over huge chunks of it to a different process which does not involve Parliament. That is another reason for cutting down. A further reason for taking this matter seriously, as I hope the Government will, is that given by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. So far, the Government’s response to these criticisms of this great cascade of potential referendums has been totally inadequate. Their response has been what is now described in the argot as “Calm down, dear”. They say, “Don’t worry, it won’t happen. None of these things will happen”. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, said the other day that there will not be all these decisions in Brussels that require referendums; they will all be bundled together into a big package. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out, that is fundamentally against Britain’s interests. I do not wish to accelerate construction of a large institutional package of measures of the sort that was passed in the form of the Single European Act or Maastricht or Lisbon. It is not in our interests to do that, but that is precisely what we will end up doing. Alternatively, and it is really quite serious, we will end up having serial blocking in Brussels, which is what I think some noble Lords opposite would like; that is, when each decision comes forward, the British Minister will block it because they will not want to have a referendum on it, either for opportunistic reasons or for perfectly substantial principled reasons. Together, they will all add up to a situation in which Britain’s good faith will be queried. Our partners will then be propelled either into the large package, which is not in our interest, or into enhanced co-operation. By definition, since we are talking about matters that require unanimity, they will have been brought around the Council table to a point at which 27 of them—or more if there are more members of the Union than now—have said that they are prepared to go ahead and one, Britain, has blocked it. That is the absolute perfect building block for enhanced co-operation—for marginalising ourselves and being completely ineffective. Therefore, I am arguing that we truncate the list of matters on which there should be a referendum.

I now turn to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton. This is certainly not removing the whole meaning of this legislation. No one from these Benches is contesting the completely new innovation; namely, that the Government will submit to a referendum any measure that is negotiated in an intergovernmental conference and results in a new treaty or a treaty amendment reached through intergovernmental conference. That is the meaning of Clause 2. No one is contesting that. No one is contesting the referendum on the euro. Those of us who are moving amendments in this block need to be clear about what we are not doing as well as what we are doing.

Thirdly, we are not challenging the coalition agreement in any way, which merely stated that there would be a referendum on treaty change. No one here is contesting that. It is probably not formally covered by the Salisbury convention, but the Government have a majority in the other place and have the right to have their legislation. However, the Government have added a huge amount to that coalition agreement in this case and these amendments address that. That is why we should take them seriously.

Finally, these amendments do not take us back to the position that this Parliament agreed when it ratified Lisbon. At that time, it subjected these matters—the Article 48(6) matters and the passerelles and so forth—to resolutions in the two Houses but not to primary legislation. In the Bill, the Government are introducing a requirement for primary legislation in all these matters and some others too which are not required for referendum. None of these amendments contests that shift, which is a shift to increased power for the Westminster Parliament in ratifying things agreed in Brussels. That is not being contested.

Those three things that are not being contested are important to understand as well as those things that are being contested, which I argue are also important. I hope that these amendments can be treated seriously and not considered to be wrecking amendments. They are not wrecking amendments. If the Bill is passed with these amendments it would still be a major constitutional innovation in this country. It would still institutionalise the holding of a referendum whenever an intergovernmental treaty were agreed in Brussels.

No one should try to tell those of us who tabled these amendments that we are not accepting the spirit in which the coalition was founded and the spirit in which Parliament conducts its business. The amendments are perfectly legitimate. They would put Britain in a much stronger position in Brussels because Ministers will still have to say, “I can give only political agreement to this unanimity requirement. I cannot give legal agreement to it. Before I can give legal agreement to it I must go back to London and seek an Act of Parliament to enable me to give legal agreement to it”. That is how these amendments will leave the situation.

That is a strong position for a British Minister. But it does not involve a whole cascade of referendums. I believe, along with others, that it is frankly a sick joke to suggest that this will improve Britain's relations with its partners in the European Union. Alas would it were so, but it will not. It will organise a whole series of difficult moments which may well lead to our marginalisation. We all know from last week that that is what referendums are in this country. They are confrontations between two schools of thought. They are bitter and lead to hard feelings.

Anyone who tells me that organising a series of referendums in this country will improve the way that people think of the European Union cannot be stating that with any seriousness of purpose. It cannot be so. We have all known in the history of Britain's membership of the European Union that when we get into a confrontation over European issues, support for Europe drops sharply. When we have a period of relative calm and tranquillity and of reaching agreement in Brussels in a sensible way, sometimes striking compromises, support rises. Please do not tell us that this Bill will improve support for the European Union in this country. It will have the exact opposite effect.

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[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am a bit puzzled by the noble Baroness’s line of questioning over whether those of us who tabled amendments, including myself, understood that point. Of course we understand that it would require, as she read out, a unanimous decision, including the British Government’s decision, to do that. Nobody doubts that; it means to say that there are no circumstances in which we could be forced to take that decision against our will, and nobody is suggesting that we should. I do not really see what the issue at stake is in that matter. It requires unanimity, like everything else in this part of the Bill. The assumption appears to be—and perhaps it is shared by the noble Baroness—that we are legislating for some weak-kneed, limp-wristed British Government of the future, who will simply give everything away and collapse in a heap. I can see noble Lords’ heads nodding—and there you are. You have proved beyond peradventure that you are trying to break one of the rules of the British constitution that one Parliament does not legislate for another.

[Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne]

The point of my remarks is very simple. I believe most profoundly, along with a number of others who support the Bill, that that is exactly the sort of transfer of sovereignty—absolutely au fond the transfer of real sovereignty of the kind that matters most of all to us, which is our defence—which should surely be put in front of the British people. I refer to the making of a common defence and security policy. Let us take Amendment 28A; let us recall that the Council of Ministers and the European Council and the institutions of the European Union in their wisdom can make unanimous decisions without many people being present—not only without ourselves being present but without others who would agree with us and are also members of NATO, for example. So we can have a unanimous decision without core members of NATO being present. Those are common defence and security policy issues. I believe most powerfully that that is the fundamental transfer of real sovereignty, which puts many other things in the pale. It really matters.

I would be aghast if that happened through the mechanism that the Government have put forward in this Bill, which is a good Bill and not a great constitutional Bill as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, suggested. I do not think it is that at all; it is a very good, solid, small and middle-of-the-road Bill, which opens the door for us to speak directly to the British public. I cannot help but feel that if we close the door again, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and his colleagues would recommend, and put down a referendum merely on the euro, which it is extremely unlikely that we will ever join—look at Greece, for a start—and we do not have referenda, it will all be done by Twitter anyway. It will all be done on the web. This mass of knowledge base that the public have will be expressed in another way, and our Parliament will become ever more excluded from what in effect will be the national debate.

My only point is a simple one. The integrity of the Bill is demonstrated by the linkage with the people. The only way in which we as parliamentarians can offer the people a true linkage is by referendum power. I was interested and pleased to see—result or no result—that 42 per cent of the electorate turned out on the referendum last Thursday. People want to express their views. They want to be asked; if they are given the knowledge, they will respond. They are very used to it these days—are not we all, with iPhones and so on? It is most foolish and self-defeating to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, did, that these amendments, which are in many ways contradictory, as I have already pointed out—some going too far and some not going far enough; in that sense they are really wide of the mark in some respects—do not remove the context in which the Bill is based and would not be foolish in terms of Britain’s future.

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[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I rise to address the amendments tabled in my name. As I understand it, Clause 6 addresses areas that are suitable for the requirement of a referendum in two of the ways in which a veto could be given up which are not covered by Clauses 2 to 4. They are, through the other part of the simplified revision procedure using Article 48(7) of TEU, effectively a third type of treaty change, and the six specific cases are dealt with by the passerelle.

The amendments are grouped somewhat strangely in that my Amendments 35A, 35B, 48A and 48B are on one side of the argument and all the others, with the exception of Amendment 40A, are in one way or other seeking to reduce situations where a referendum and Act of Parliament are required. Self-evidently, I do not agree with those amendments.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

It is astonishing how little listening and how much assertion there is in this debate. I spent quite a lot of time trying to say that the amendments in this group that I and others have tabled do not seek to remove the requirement for primary legislation by Parliament when any of these changes are made. I speak very slowly because it is a point that the noble Lord has just contradicted. Indeed, they are designed to remove the referendum requirement, but not the requirement for primary legislation, which is an addition to the existing requirement under the Lisbon ratification.

[Lord Flight]

I thank the noble Lord for his interruption. He enlightens Members of this House as he has done previously. I am well aware that he accepts the Act of Parliament and that it is the referendum to which he is opposed. He obviously lacks faith in the trust of ordinary people and for some reason does not seem to realise that the tool of the referendum is essentially there as a deterrent in order to discourage the EU gathering more power unto itself and the sort of behaviour that we had from the Government who were in power in this country until the most recent general election.

I will, if I may, continue. The amendments in my name cover examples of areas that come to light, on looking at the various territories to which Clause 6 might relate, in which there is indeed scope for power to transfer from the EU without the check of a referendum, and sometimes even without the check of an Act of Parliament. I am quite sure that there are many other areas in which there remains scope for powers to transfer. The point of my two amendments is, above all, that within the range of areas that it might be deemed appropriate to require a referendum, there is balance in the Bill—a whole range of territories that transfer powers but in which referenda are not required.

My amendments relate to two cases. First, as your Lordships will be aware, Article 25 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows the Council to adopt any provisions to strengthen or to add to the rights listed in Article 20(2) of the TFEU. Article 25, which deals with the basic rights of EU citizens, appears to allow a fundamental extension of the scope of EU law. This in effect would alter the list of rights in Article 20(2). Article 25 provisions could well amount to treaty change. Extended rights for EU citizens would transfer power from the UK over whether it accorded such rights to nationals of other EU member states. There is clearly a debate here. Is it appropriate that measures that considerably extend the political rights of non-nationals, because they are members of other EU states, could occur without the agreement of the people living in those states?

The second territory is slightly more complex. Currently the EU is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights. Lisbon introduced Article 6(2) of the TEU, which provides that the EU will accede to the ECHR, and as your Lordships will be aware this is currently being negotiated. The issue here is that any EU law that is modified in response to a finding of non-compatibility with ECHR rights would subsequently be binding on member states, so if the EU accedes to all ECHR rights—and, yes, I am well aware that there has to be unanimity for it so to do and that it has to go through the appropriate procedures in each country—EU legislation could be altered as a result. Therefore, EU accession to the ECHR could result in a transfer of power from the UK to the EU over whether the UK is bound by the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in areas that fall within the wide scope of EU law. So here, again, we have the question as to whether such a transfer is appropriate for a referendum.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again, but I think it would be helpful if he recognised that the provision in Lisbon that enables the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights is in fact a transfer of powers away from the European Union, not towards it from this country, and it is a transfer to an organisation and a set of judicial procedures to which we are already a party. I therefore find it extraordinarily hard to see how the noble Lord manages to weave this into the tapestry of the Government’s excessive—in my view, in any case—desire to subject matters to referendums.

[Lord Flight]

While there is obviously a differentiation between the European Court of Human Rights and the EU, the point I was making was that if there is accession the result could be an important overriding of UK law by the ECHR and decisions taken by the ECHR in due course becoming binding in the law of this land. This is effectively a change and a giving away of power by the UK to the ECHR rather than the EU in terms of its law making.

To conclude, these two amendments are essentially illustrative. As I commented earlier, looking across the total territory, there are many areas where the arrangements surrounding the EU and bodies such as the ECHR continue to cater for powers being taken without the requirement of an Act of Parliament and certainly without the requirement of citizens having a say in it. The argument that this Bill is right over the top in terms of the areas where it requires a referendum is nonsense. Let me assure your Lordships that there are scores of other areas where a transfer of power could occur where no referendum is being provided for.

Contrary to the arguments put by noble Lords from the other side of the House, a reasonable balance has been adopted by this Bill. Those of us who are perhaps on the other side of the argument would make the point that there are many areas which this Bill does not address where we can still see scope for power being transferred.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I know that it is late but will the noble Lord please not say that these amendments are designed to remove the requirement for an Act of Parliament? Not a single amendment being moved tonight requires the removal of the need for an Act of Parliament. The people who are moving these amendments, including myself, accept that the Lisbon treaty procedures of merely requiring resolutions from the two Houses are inadequate and that there needs to be an Act of Parliament when these powers are shifted—if they ever were, and they could be so only with the agreement of the British Government of the day. Therefore, can we please not have the misunderstanding that this is about more than removing a referendum requirement? That is all that these amendments set out to do.

European Union Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)]

My Lords, I begin by welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, to the forefront of the Opposition's concerns about this Bill. I think that he and I exchanged views from the Dispatch Box during the passage of the Lisbon treaty. We covered a great deal of ground then, and I think that we learnt a great deal from that process. Indeed, the British people learnt a great deal from the Lisbon treaty process, as did the whole of Europe. I look forward to lively debates with him in the future.

I have to say in parenthesis that should this Bill become law, the future will not be at all as the noble Lord describes it. The picture of a dribble of referenda on small issues completely misunderstands the way in which the European process works now or will work in the future, whether this Bill is on our statute book or not. I have obviously explained that insufficiently because the message has not got over, but as we continue our debates I hope to be able to make clear that the pattern will not be dissimilar to the pattern of the big treaty packages in the past, the difference being that if they contain matters that might look small but could be highly significant for this nation because they involve a transfer of competence or powers beyond the level of insignificance, that certainly requires consulting the British people. That is a very widespread view which this Government believe is important to satisfy in order to build a better consensus for the European Union than we have today from the British public.

However, that is for other debates: debates that we have already had and debates in the future. On this issue, we have had a very elegant exchange on the two sides of the argument. It is a debate in which the Government’s position is quite clear, as I shall make plain in a few moments. I find that when your Lordships tackle this sort of issue we put up a superb performance and all sorts of aspects are developed that do not necessarily emerge in the pattern of debates in the other place.

The amendments would alter Clause 4 to create an automatic requirement for a referendum in the UK to approve the accession of a new member state to the European Union. As your Lordships know, the UK has never required a referendum on accession treaties in the past, and this Government have been clear that there should be no referendum requirement merely for the accession of any new member state. That was the position also taken by the previous Government, of which the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, was a member. Why is that so? The simple point is this: the accession of a new member state alone does not constitute a transfer of competence or power from the UK to the EU. The transfer of powers or competence to the EU would be from the member state joining the European Union, not from the UK. Of course, there are some effects, possibly including a change in bilateral relations if a country becomes a member of the European Union. No one disputes that, but we are not really talking about effects or impact; we are talking about the transfer of powers and competences.

I apologise if that sounds narrow, but that is the limitation of the provisions of the Bill. Of course, we are aware of the need to avoid providing a loophole in our referendum provisions in case there is a proposal to use an accession treaty to transfer power or competence from member states other than the acceding state. That could occur, so this Bill provides for a clear requirement for a Ministerial Statement to be laid before Parliament about whether an accession treaty constituted a transfer of competence or power from the UK to the EU in accordance with Clause 4. If the Minister decided that such a transfer was proposed, a referendum would then be required, but if there was no such transfer no referendum would be required. I hope that reinforces the point that I was making earlier.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, as the Minister has touched on this point so clearly, will he make it quite categorical that if a Croatian treaty of accession in the next year or two is brought before Parliament and it contains the provisions on Ireland and the Czech Republic that were agreed as part of the ratification process of Lisbon, in which it was stated, by us as well, that they will be included in a future accession treaty, that will not give rise to a referendum requirement?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blackwell]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his clarification. However, he talks about trust, and I have to say to him that the reason why the British people have lost trust in politicians to represent them in Europe is that over many years they have seen politicians stand up and say, “Minor changes. These won’t affect you”, but cumulatively those changes have added up to a huge shift in powers.

These brakes were put in the treaty, which was agreed by Parliament. The noble Lord may not want to remove them this year, but when does he want to do it? If he wants to do it at some time, that would be a substantial weakening of the current treaties. In the spirit of the Bill, which I wholly support, I regard anything that removes a veto or anything akin to one as a major change to the treaty that should not be carried through by Government without the provisions of the Bill requiring that as a major change it should be put to the people in a referendum.

In his speech, the noble Lord attempted to confuse the House by suggesting that the referendum would make it difficult for the UK to use these powers. I should make it clear—the Minister can correct me if I am wrong—that nothing in the Bill requires a referendum for the UK to use, or not to use, the emergency brake. The Bill is entirely silent about the use of Articles 48, 82 and 83. It simply says that if the EU seeks to amend the terms of the treaties under which we can use those emergency brakes, that will require a referendum. Whether or not the use of the emergency brakes itself required a referendum would depend on the substance of the matter that was contemplated being brought forward under those provisions, which would fall under other aspects of the Bill.

Removing the subsection, as the noble Lord is attempting to do, would mean that at some point in time a future Government could give away these vetoes without requiring that to be brought back to the people. That is exactly the kind of action that has led to the loss of trust of people in politicians and, unfortunately, in this Parliament, to protect them in this matter.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am sorry that the noble Lord’s absence from earlier debates has not enabled him to catch up with where this debate has got to. Some of us were attempting to reduce sharply the number of provisions that require a referendum, for a number of reasons that are not the ones that the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, gave but are related, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, to whether or not you believe in representative parliamentary democracy and the powers of Parliament. A number of us who have done so have put forward amendments that would effectively leave in the Bill the strengthening from the ratification of Lisbon powers, which means simply that if these changes were to be made there would need to be a resolution in both Houses, but would leave intact in the Bill a requirement for primary legislation before Britain could agree to that. That would be a strengthening of parliamentary authority in areas such as this, which in any case require unanimity. The idea that there is not a lock there is completely aberrant. What there is not, if you follow the amendments, is a lock plus a referendum, and that is for principled reasons that I have briefly attempted to explain. I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but really and truly the situation is not quite as he suggests. Those of us who are trying to reduce the number of referendums are not trying to weaken the power of Parliament but to strengthen it.

[Lord Blackwell]

I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. Actually, I am fully aware of the nature of these amendments, all of which attempt to undermine the purpose of the Bill, which is to require a referendum if there is a major change to the treaties or a major shift in power. That is a principle that I fully support and which the noble Lord is attempting to undermine.

I hope that there will never be a referendum under the Bill because I hope that no Government will ever seek to transfer further power to the European Union in a way that would require the referendum requirement to be enacted. In hoping that we will never have such a referendum, I probably agree with the noble Lord. However, if we are going to restore the trust of the people of this country in the EU, we have to give them the cast-iron guarantees that the Bill provides and not undermine it in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, seeks to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Waddington]

That is the example that comes to mind. There are three or four of them in the Lisbon treaty, but I do not have that information and, unfortunately, I cannot give it to my noble friend, but I will write to him, if he wants it. There were two or three other occasions; I am not saying that they were earth shattering, but it is alarming that the Select Committee did not spot that new law was being made here. That is the point I am making. It is alarming that new law could be made without holding a referendum, and it is doubly alarming that one of our expert Select Committees in this House did not spot what was happening on that occasion. It should not happen in future.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

As a member of the EU Sub-Committee that was the author of that example, I should enlighten the noble Lord on the process. First, what he has said in the past few minutes is based on an interpretation that is a complete fantasy, whereby if this Government and country are party to an intergovernmental agreement, they can walk out of it when they like. They cannot do that. It is a matter of good faith and the law on treaties, and you cannot do that.

The noble Lord is quite right to say—and the text he read out demonstrates this—that we were perfectly well aware that the CFSP and the ESDP were being shifted from an intergovernmental basis on to a treaty basis. That is what we said in our report, but the key point was that the provisions for taking decisions within the Lisbon treaty in this area require unanimity, and there would be no surrender of powers or competences whatever. I am sorry—I will speak to the amendment in a moment, but I wished to correct that point.

[Lord Waddington]

With the greatest respect to my noble friend, he is in error. There was an intergovernmental agreement. You can say that that gave a competence to the EU, but it could have been withdrawn in a moment by just a communiqué between the member states. The noble Lord is surely not saying that it was a matter of insignificance to transfer an intergovernmental agreement into cast-iron treaty law. He is surely not saying that the report from which I read out made clear to its readers that, in fact, new law was being made on that occasion. The report does not say anything like that. It was certainly not a clear statement that an intergovernmental agreement was being transferred and converted into community treaty law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blackwell]

I said that I had some sympathy with the amendment, and I very much hope that the Minister will be able to reassure me. To my mind, that was an example of a practice coming into effect which could then be claimed was an existing practice that simply needed to be codified. I am not a lawyer, but if something can be done under an existing competence, why does it need to be codified? The EU already has the power to do what it needs. If something is then codified, the danger is that it creates a new base, or ratchets up the base, from which we can then have further ingenious development in practices. I am therefore very nervous about allowing codification of this sort to take place when, if the EU is already doing it, codification does not seem to be needed. I would very much welcome the Minister explaining and perhaps thinking again about whether that exemption is required in the Bill.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I will now argue against the amendment on substance, having dealt with the ancient history to which we were all subjected previously; I do not want to go back on that.

A common-sense application to the amendment would lead one to regard it as bizarre. The object appears to be to ensure that if the European Union, with the agreement of the British Government—which is required under unanimity—conducted an act of genuine codification, we would have a jolly referendum about it. All I can say is that if noble Lords really want to go around this country stirring up apathy about the codification of some obscure piece of European law, common sense has flown out of the window.

The amendment is being moved, and support for it being given, on the basis of fear that a British Government will not know enough about the process to distinguish between a real codification and—in the parlance of noble Lords who support the amendment—competence creep. It is not sensible to add to the 56 other matters, to increase the number of referendums on a subject on which it is frankly just not credible that you could have a sensible political campaign involving the whole electorate of this country. I am not in favour of that.

[Lord Waddington]

I hope that the noble Lord will appreciate from the very fact that I am not pursuing the amendment that I use it as an opportunity to point out the severe error committed by members of his Select Committee when it carried out its study into the impact of Lisbon. I hope that he will always bear that in mind in future and that the error will not be repeated.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am afraid that the noble Lord is going to be disappointed.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My Lords, if there are no further comments from your Lordships on this issue, it remains for me to seek to allay the fears of my noble friend Lord Waddington on a matter which is undoubtedly complex. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, remarked earlier, the entire area is complex because the interface between the powers and competences of the European Union and the powers, rights and obligations of the nation state members is vastly complex and, in some senses, is in a somewhat fluid state. Indeed, it is that very fluidity that gives rise to the unease for which I believe there is substantial evidence, and I speak as someone who has been involved for just short of 50 years—even before the UK joined the then European Community—in trying to see that the European Union works in a balanced, effective and beneficial way. Over the past few years, not only in this country but in many countries we have seen an appalling record of declining confidence in, support for and public consensus over the whole construct of the European Union. In my view, the EU has conferred considerable benefits on its members and on the peace and stability of the whole world in the past, and, provided it proceeds in a sensible way with good public support, it will do so in the future in a number of, although not unlimited, areas. This is a perfectly sensible aspiration and one which I think the Bill and its aims reinforce, although I realise that that is not understood or accepted by noble Lords opposite.

The amendment would remove the provision setting out that future treaty changes which serve to codify practice under the treaties, in relation to the previous exercise of an existing competence, should not in principle require a referendum. My noble friend is concerned, as he says Members in the other place were during debates on the Bill, that codification could be used as a vehicle for transferring power or competence from the UK to the EU and that this provision might provide a loophole to allow such a transfer under a future treaty change without a referendum. If a treaty change is merely a codification of the previous practice of existing competence and nothing else in that treaty would fall within Clause 4(1) of the Bill, the Government do not think that a referendum should be required and the matter would proceed on that basis. Genuine codification—I emphasise “genuine”—is not a transfer of power or competence. The EU competence in question already exists and the EU has already acted to that effect. Even if the UK did not agree to codify existing practice by means of a treaty amendment, the EU would be able to continue to act within the relevant existing competence. Therefore, in effect there would be no point in attempting to go down another path because the EU would already be doing what it was doing within the existing competence.

An example of a treaty change which we would consider to be codification would be the introduction of a separate legal base for action previously taken to provide macro-financial assistance to some third countries. Article 352 of the TFEU, which we all know well, was used in April 2004 to provide macro-financial assistance to Albania. It was then used a further seven times to provide macro-financial assistance in a similar way to other countries. When the Lisbon treaty came along, it codified this use by providing a separate legislative base under Articles 212 and 213 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which cover economic, financial and technical co-operation with third countries.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, I speak against these amendments. Amendment 23B assumes that the EU single market is a good thing for this country. That is a common misconception among the political class upon which I should like to cast a little doubt. This is a big and detailed subject and I recommend that any serious student should consult the briefing notes on the globalbritain.org website, which demolish the whole myth of the EU's economic usefulness and that of its single market.

The background point, which is not generally understood, is that the single market is more than a free trade area, it is a customs union. This means that a single customs barrier surrounds all the countries in the Union, whose international tariffs and trading arrangements are negotiated and decided centrally by the European Commission. In a free trade area, on the other hand, the countries concerned enjoy free trade among each other, but they remain able to make their own tariff arrangements with countries outside that area. They have their own seats on the World Trade Organisation and they are also able to make their own domestic law in areas such as working time, health and safety at work, part-time workers and so on.

So a country does not need to belong to the EU to enjoy free trade with it. According to a recent government Answer to me, the EU and its single market already have free trade agreements with some 63 countries outside the EU and are on their way to having similar agreements with another 75 countries, or roughly 80 per cent of the other countries in the world. It is perhaps worth noting that both Switzerland and Norway, not in the EU or its single market, both export more per capita to the single market than we do; Switzerland three times as much and Norway five times.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but I fear that he is in danger of misleading the House fairly elaborately in this matter. He is talking about three things, not two: the first is a free trade area, the second is a customs union and the third is the single market. Norway, he has just stated categorically, is not part of the single market. I am afraid that he is in error. It is part of the single market, and it applies single market legislation by receiving fax messages from Brussels telling it what it has to do. The members of the European economic area are in the single market but are not in a customs union. However, I am not totally sure that this line of argument is going to get us very far—but it would be useful.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

I do not want to delay the House, but that is why I made the distinction between a customs union and a free trade area.

The worst aspect of our membership of the EU single market is its sheer cost. Like their predecessors, this Government are determined to avoid an official cost-benefit analysis, and so we are left with the eight analyses that have been produced since the turn of the century, four of which are pretty much official, and which put the cost of our single market membership at anything between 4 per cent and 10 per cent of GDP. Indeed, the highest cost estimate came in 2005 from the Treasury itself in a paper entitled Global Europe: Full-Employment Europe under the signature of Mr Gordon Brown when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer. It put the cost of EU regulation at 6 per cent of GDP and of EU protectionism at 7 per cent. In March 2006, the French Conseil d'Analyse Economique, which is attached to their Prime Minister’s office, found that France had gained nothing from the single market or, indeed, the euro. In June 2006, the Swiss Government published their finding that joining the EU and its single market would be nine times more expensive than staying with their current sectoral free trade agreements with Brussels. Later in 2006, the EU Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, Mr Günter Verheugen, said that EU regulation was costing its members some €600 billion a year, or around 6 per cent of GDP at the time.

One of the troubles with being in the single market is that this EU overregulation, whatever it costs, applies to the whole of our economy, not just to the 9 per cent that trades with clients in the rest of the EU. So the 11 per cent of our GDP that goes in trade with the rest of the world and the 80 per cent that stays in our domestic economy—91 per cent of our GDP—has to carry the burdens of Brussels’s overregulation. There are, of course, those who fear that were we to leave the EU and its single market our trade would somehow suffer and that, to quote the propaganda, 3 million jobs would be lost. The truth appears to be the opposite: trade would expand and jobs would be created. It is, of course, true that we have 3 million jobs exporting goods and services to clients in the EU, but they have 4.5 million jobs exporting goods and services to us. We are, in fact, the EU’s largest client. Would the French stop selling us their wine or the Germans their cars just because we had left the single market and were no longer bossed around by Brussels? Of course not. There are also the points that the World Trade Organisation would prevent any form of retaliation were we to leave and that the EU’s average external tariff is now below 1 per cent. Our trade is going up faster with the rest of the world than with the EU, both inwards and outwards. Our exports to the EU single market are declining. The single market is sclerotic and overregulated and its demographic trend is against it. It is the “Titanic”.

It is also hard to think of any other customs unions along the lines of the EU. There was the Soviet Union, and there may be something similar in the Caribbean, but nowhere else. Mercosur in South America does not count because its members are free to agree their trading relationships with non-members. Can the Government advise us of any other customs unions like the EU? If not, does that not suggest that it may not be such a great idea?

As to Amendment 23F, I do not think we need the EU getting more involved in financial regulation. Commissioner Barnier has openly said that he does not favour what he calls the Anglo-Saxon model, and we have yet to feel the damage done to the City of London and its ability to pay tax by the new EU supervisory bodies. When the movers of the amendment say that they do not want it to interfere with the UK’s general approach to financial regulation, I ask whether they have Monsieur Barnier’s agreement? The deed is done. Overall financial supervision has passed to Brussels. No provisions in this Bill will prevent that.

As to Amendment 23H, I fear that those of us who come from the Eurorealistic perspective would rather that the unelected Commission did not continue to negotiate on our behalf in a new global trade round. As the world’s fifth-largest economy, we would rather do it for ourselves.

Finally, is it not really grotesque that an organisation that has so dismally failed to look after the vast sums entrusted to it by the taxpayers of Europe should have its powers strengthened, or made more effective, as the amendments have it? More will certainly mean even worse, and I oppose the amendments.

European Union Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taverne]

My Lords, the previous two speakers eloquently demonstrated the importance of these amendments. They made a passionate plea for a much more sensible and enlightened policy towards Europe. I will deal with one particular aspect: Amendment 23F and the banking crisis.

There are two aspects to the current financial crisis in Europe: sovereign debt and bank liquidity. Many continental banks are undercapitalised. They need more rigorous stress tests as a basis for recapitalisation. National regulation and supervision have failed. We need a special EU-wide resolution regime. We need new, more effective European regulation. If we have that, it will of course give new powers to Brussels and that, as I understand it, would trigger a referendum. The question arises: what sort of question would be posed in a referendum dealing with bank regulation?

Leaving that aside, it will mean that in the course of negotiations taking place in Europe, when negotiators are being very careful and thinking that they can achieve something without triggering a referendum in Denmark or Ireland, or an adverse ruling of the German constitutional court, our negotiators will have to have regard to the fact that there will have to be a referendum. They will be inhibited and looking over their shoulders: they will be negotiating with their hands behind their back. Since this will be an obstacle to reaching a very important area of agreement, the likelihood is that we will be bypassed.

Already we are being bypassed in many important respects. While John Major wanted to be outside the eurozone in a multipolar Europe, it seems that Mr Cameron has more or less accepted that there will be a small but very powerful unit in Europe. We will find that being in the outside lane of a much less congenial Europe is not a particularly effective experience for very important aspects of our economy. I have heard Treasury officials saying that we are now in the same position as Latvia, asking what agreements are being reached in rooms where the important people are meeting.

A story was told at a conference I went to about an occasion when Gordon Brown insisted on being present with eurozone Ministers. They said that they would meet him, but the press outside were speculating on how long he would last: would he be out in five minutes? In fact, that was precisely what happened: after hearing him for five minutes, they thanked him, said that they must now have their private meeting and asked him to leave. He could not face the press after five minutes, so he stayed in the lavatory for half an hour.

It is not very dignified to be outside the corridors of power. This, however, will be much worse. Obviously there were problems about joining the eurozone, but the regulation of banks will affect the City profoundly, and it will be another case where we are likely to be bypassed.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I will address Amendments 23C, 23D and 23E, as did the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who gave us a brilliant illustration of why flexibility in this area is not only desirable but necessary.

I have, off and on, had quite a few dealings with the issue of energy in the European Union, and I have to say that we have got it comprehensively wrong. In the 1970s we fought desperately—of course, Mr Tony Benn was the Minister at the time—to avoid the European Union having any responsibility in this field whatever in case it stole our oil, which it was never going to be able to do because European law is perfectly clear on that point, and so we prevented any policy emerging then. Then, when the Single European Act was passed, we allowed—I agree that by then we were not favouring it—energy to be kept out of the single market at that stage because of the objections of the French and the Germans, and that was a disastrous mistake. Now, when we have discovered that we are not one of the three major oil and gas producers in the world, we have discovered, surprisingly, that we could do with a common energy policy, but it is quite difficult to get; and, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, has said, it is in an area of shared competence. So it may very well be that, sometime in the not too distant future, we will want to support some changes that will give more powers to Brussels in the area of energy security, competition, interconnectors and all these things; yet here we are subjecting all that to a referendum requirement under which the no campaign would no doubt say yet again, “This is the European Union coming to take all our North Sea oil”, and so on. The result may very well be negative because that campaign would be very emotive. Heaven knows what the Scots would think about it—quite a lot, I should think.

I do really feel that this illustrates the case for flexibility—and the same is true on climate change. It is rather clear that the European Union will struggle under its current institutional arrangements to find a way forward through the next 30, 40 or 50 years on climate change. Things are going to be very different. Crises are going to emerge and Europe is going to have to find a response to them. Some of those responses may involve new powers for the Union as a whole. And yet again, this will be made extraordinarily difficult by the provisions of the Bill.

I am not saying that these particular amendments are the last words in wisdom on this particular issue, but I do really think that the Government ought to be taking this a bit more seriously. We have not had a single serious response from the Government since we began this Committee stage on any point that has been raised. I am waiting now for the response to this debate to have, for the first time, a serious response to the substance, because we have not had it so far. Those are issues of major importance. I think that if the Government were to go away and reflect on this now, they would see the wisdom, at the very least, of truncating the list of issues on which there need to be referendums.

[Lord Empey]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. A lot has been talked this evening about energy. Maybe I am missing something, but any of the energy sources that we will need for our future security will come from outside the European Union. In other words, they will be merely transmitted through the European Union, and that will largely be down to the authorities in each country, including planners, as to whether they will allow these things to pass through.

I was involved in a gas pipeline that transmitted from the United Kingdom to the Irish Republic and from the different parts of the United Kingdom to the Irish Republic directly. The European Union contributed financially towards it, because it could be done under a whole range of headings—infrastructure, the cohesion fund, economic development, climate change issues, carbon reduction. There are many mechanisms already in existence. I may be wrong on this, but I feel that the energy example is not necessarily the most relevant.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am afraid to say that I believe that the noble Lord is wrong on this. He has used a particular example of which he has very great experience. It is extremely interesting for the House to hear that example, but it is not very typical. It does not deal at all with the issue, for example, of whether it might be in the interests of the European Union in the not distant future to give a negotiating mandate to a body—whether it is the Commission or the presidency or whatever it is—to negotiate for energy supplies from outside the European Union, particularly gas, and to negotiate as a single unit. That would require new powers. It is as simple as that, and is, I am afraid to say, nothing whatever to do with building a pipeline between Ireland and Northern Ireland, interesting and important though that was.

I think there is serious matter in the energy field, the climate change field and the pollution field to reflect on here and a need for greater flexibility. I plead with the Government that we do not have the preprandial/postprandial schizophrenia that we have had in recent Committee stages in which in one session we are told that we need not worry about this enormous number of referendums because none of them will ever take place and we will stop anything happening in Brussels that will cause them to take place and then immediately afterwards we are told that we need not worry because the European Union does not work that way, and there will be a big package and we will all be able to find some nice sugar-plums in it for ourselves. I thought that was where we came in and decided that that was nothing that we wished to encourage in future. I think the Government need to make up their mind whether they are trying to lock the door and throw the key away, which is what this Bill does, and the consequences of that are pretty damaging for this country, or whether they are trying to propel the European Union towards another big institutional package, which I do not believe to be in the interests of this country. I would like to hear a response on Amendments 23C, 23D and 23E.

[Lord Willoughby de Broke]

My Lords, on the issue of climate change, the subject of the amendment that we are supposed to be talking about, several hours ago the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said that Amendment 21 was the most useless, superfluous amendment that he had come across during the hours of Committee stage. I believe that Amendment 23C actually takes the palm as the most useless and redundant amendment we have had. The idea that the European Union is effective in climate change is frankly laughable. Let me remind your Lordships that our policy on emissions is guided entirely by the EU and we have to have 20 per cent of our energy from renewables by 2020. Of course, there is not the remotest chance of achieving that, and in the past couple of years, that aspiration—that dream—has begun to collide with reality.

Just to give your Lordships a little information on that, I shall repeat what was said in two sets of figures from two separate reports over the degree of delusion that surrounds the wish of our Government in Brussels and their subsidiary here in Westminster that the centrepiece of our energy policy should be to build ever more windmills. The report that drew most attention was from a Scottish environmental charity that focused on the fact that last year, despite our building ever more wind farms, the lack of wind meant that they operated on average at only 21 per cent of capacity, and that was during the period of highest demand. Several times when demand was at its highest the contribution of wind to our electricity supply was virtually zero.

I do not know why, but less attention was given to an interesting report put out by our Department of Energy and Climate Change showing that the 3,168 turbines that we have built at a cost of billions of pounds contributed on average less than the output of one large coal-fired power station. From the DECC figure, it is possible to work out that for this derisory contribution we paid through our electricity bills a subsidy of nearly £1.2 billion on top of the price of electricity itself. In return for getting 3 per cent, roughly, of our energy, nearly 7 per cent of our bills are paid in subsidies for these completely useless wind farms, and that will go up as years go on because we have committed to this 20 per cent from renewables by 2020. That report dealt with last year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Willoughby de Broke]

The noble Lord says, “happily we are going to close down”. I hope that he has got a generator in his house so that he can watch his television and read his books because with wind power that simply will not happen. Nuclear of course is a different matter, but let us not get into that debate right now.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I merely want to congratulate the noble Lord on having raised the issue of gas storage, which is a subject close to my heart. I ask him to recognise that the best way to improve the level of gas storage in Europe would be to impose a minimum gas storage obligation through the European Union.

[Lord Willoughby de Broke]

Surely it could be up to the nation member states to impose their own minimum gas storage obligation. Why do we have to do it through the European Union? It is perfectly ridiculous. This unhealthy EU obsession, which is what it is—I am very sorry that the previous Government and this Government seem to have signed up to it—of using wind power to keep our lights on is one of the most damaging fantasies of our time. I oppose the amendment and I hope that it will be dealt with accordingly.

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[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was good enough to mention me in his few remarks and to accuse me of what I think was the impossible and most undesirable dream of the United Kingdom being altogether free of the European Union in all these matters. He is of course correct. However, he then mentioned the common fisheries policy as though that has to be solved by the European Union and as though the EU will not solve the acknowledged disaster which the policy is, environmentally and in every other way, if it is prevented from doing so. Surely, from our point of view, as I have mentioned before, the answer is terribly simple. We simply leave the European common fisheries policy and take back our international waters. Seventy five per cent of the fish which swim in European waters all the year round swim in waters that used to belong entirely to the United Kingdom before we made the mistake of joining the European Union. We then manage our own waters, re-establish our fish stocks and let out any surplus to foreigners.

On energy, the noble Lord again believes that the European Union is essential to solve our energy problems but, surely—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am afraid that the noble Lord is yet again misleading the House. The waters did not belong to Britain before we joined the European Union. We had 12-mile limits in those days and the areas beyond those limits were high seas. The decision to go out to 250 miles was taken by the European Union collectively when we were a member.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

Yes, but we should not have gone along with that decision because we should not have been in the policy in the first place. I therefore insist that most of the fish which swim now in European waters and are fished by European boats used to belong to us and they could and should belong to us again. I do not wish to detain the House—

--- Later in debate ---

As I think the architects of Lisbon hoped, a new treaty may arise in the longer-term future, but that is some way ahead. It may be five or 10 years away. It could be a very big package indeed designed to adjust the European Union to the new international landscape, just as my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary is seeking, through his speeches in the network world in which we are now operating, to adjust the position of the United Kingdom and the whole European Union stance in relation to Asia, Latin America, the emerging powers and Africa. The rising, looming power of China probably needs adjusting for as well. I would not rule out the need for a treaty five or 10 years ahead. When that treaty comes, it will contain many issues that involve extensions of competence. It might even contain issues that involve the retreat of competence, but the extensions of competence will be there. Extensions and transfers of power will probably be there, and that treaty, in the view of the coalition and of 84 per cent of the British people, will require a referendum. That is what some—I admit, not all—of us argued for over the Lisbon treaty. That is what the Government agreed to over the constitution for Europe, which was the predecessor of the Lisbon treaty, and that is what most people in the United Kingdom want to be reassured about. To make certain that that happens, we must have an admittedly elaborate and complex set of arrangements to ensure that all kinds of transfers of power and competence do not creep under the radar or take place without proper transparency and consultation of the British people after the necessary parliamentary Acts have been passed.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but no one, as far as I know, has tabled an amendment to Clause 2. It states that if there is a major new constitutional package there will have to be a referendum. No one has argued about that—not one person. What we are all arguing about is whether you need this cascade of Clauses 3, 4, 5 and 6 that block off the non-intergovernmental conference treaty big-package route. Honestly, I ask the noble Lord not to answer the wrong question. All the amendments relate to this cascade of referendums for matters that are dealt with within the Lisbon treaty.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The noble Lord, who is very skilled in these matters, knows that he is putting the question upside down. It is dangerous to halt a cascade, because you may have to divert it, and the cascade that the Bill is designed to halt is the cascade of small competence and power transfers that have been going on over the years in many areas and have caused a lot of people to fear that competence creep—I am sorry to repeat that unfortunate term—and power creep are continuing all the time, allegedly under parliamentary control, but somehow without proper public discussion, and certainly without the consent of the people.

The referendum-lock device is precisely to ensure that when the big transfers of competence and power come, they are in a clear package. The noble Lord said that that was the wrong thing to talk about, but that is the way that it will happen, like the Lisbon treaty, and the country will be invited, because of the many items that will involve competence transfer, to have a referendum on them. That is precisely my point. There will be no cascade because, if the Bill works effectively, which I think it will, the great changes needed in the 2020s and 2030s in the European Union, as it adjusts to new conditions, will have to be treated in a substantial treaty that must and will automatically trigger a referendum. That is entirely right and it will offend only those who, like my noble friend Lord Deben, do not like referenda at all. However, for most people, including 84 per cent of the country, or their children, that will be the right way to proceed. It should ensure that some degree of trust, reconnection and support for the great European cause is resurrected. At present that support is fading away very fast. It is draining away in Finland, Hungary, to some extent in Poland and in many other countries. I am not sure that even in Germany these matters carry the popularity and support needed for the kind of reforms we want to see in Europe.

This is a very serious matter. I do not say that this Bill alone will do the job of reconnection—of course it will not. We need leadership, articulation and an understanding that giving more and more powers to the centre is an outdated 20th century idea and that the more you accumulate powers at the centre, the more you get public disaffection and remoteness. That must be understood. It must be understood that in this networked age, you do not need centralisation to carry out effective powers. Once that is understood, we will begin to get shapes in the European Union that relate to and connect with the people, as the Laeken declaration pleaded for almost a decade ago. That is why I believe that these exemptions will increase mistrust and take Europe back, rather than forward to the 21st century adjustment needed in the information age, and why I therefore plead with the noble Lord and his colleagues to withdraw the amendment.

EU and NATO: Peace in Europe

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 28th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The Libya issue is going a bit further than this Question, but the Americans are playing an active part, as we know, in a whole range of areas in trying to bring some stability to a divided Libya. Other members of NATO are in constant dialogue and have been asked whether they will contribute. It is true that not every member of NATO is involved. There is the particular question of Turkey, which has not so far played a hard-power part in the NATO operation. At least this is a core of members in NATO and it is under NATO organisation as a whole, so it is working.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Does the Minister not agree that conducting a beauty contest of the sort posed by the Question is a futile exercise and that what we really need to be focusing on is how NATO and the EU can work together and co-operate in areas where they are both involved, of which there are quite a lot in the Balkans and north Africa? Will he say something about the progress of the remit that was given to the High Representative, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, and to the Secretary-General of NATO at the NATO conference last year to report by this spring on how the problems that have arisen about co-operation between the two can be eased?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The short answer is that foreign ministers, including our own Secretary of State, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, and NATO leaders are on the case. There is pressure to try to make progress and overcome the particular problems that arose over the Cyprus-related issue of Turkey, with which the noble Lord is extremely familiar, which have slowed down the integration and co-operation. Even so, in areas such as the West Balkans, where Eurofor and KFOR are operating, they have worked very closely together, so at a practical level there has been progress but on the bigger issues, which tend to be the visible ones, I agree that it has been slow progress for precisely the reason I mentioned.

Government Departments: Soft Power

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 28th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, holding a debate on how this country should best marshal and make use of its soft-power assets is surely essential at a time when our hard-power assets are tightly stretched and, I would argue, underfunded to fulfil the tasks that were set out in last October’s strategy review. However, that debate on hard power is not for today. What is surely not in doubt is that, over the years ahead, we will need to rely more on our soft-power assets and learn to put them to better use if we are to sustain the capacity to protect and further our interests worldwide. I therefore welcome the initiative taken by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, to hold this debate, all the more so as I know from personal experience how hard she worked when a Minister to improve co-ordination on conflict issues between the MoD, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DfID —I do not mean conflict between those three departments, although in the past it has been known to occur.

My first general point is that no amount of better co-ordination, highly desirable though that co-ordination certainly is, can compensate for serious reductions in the resources available to the soft-power assets that are being co-ordinated. My second general point is that you need to co-ordinate not only over the use of soft power but over the allocation of resources to your instruments of soft power. Of that upstream co-ordination, there has been very little trace under either of the previous two Governments. First, under the previous Government, discretionary spending on conflict issues was slashed following the fall in the value of sterling in 2008. Then a number of the FCO’s scholarship programmes—the Marshall scholarships, the Chevening scholarships and the Commonwealth scholarships—were squeezed to ease pressure on the FCO budget. Then large cuts were imposed on the BBC World Service, to which many noble Lords have referred, including on the Arabic service and the Middle Eastern outreach of the World Service English programmes, just when the events in the Middle East pointed towards a need for increased, not decreased, funding, although I admit that that decision was taken before the events of what is called the Arab spring. If that is co-ordination, it was pretty well concealed. We surely need a better, more holistic approach than that.

I make no apology for concentrating heavily, as a number of other noble Lords have done, on one particular soft-power asset, the BBC World Service, which has been described, correctly in my view, in a really excellent recent report by the Foreign Affairs Committee of another place as a jewel in the crown of these assets. No one reading that report, as I did a couple of days ago, could do so without a sinking feeling that the Government have stumbled into an ill-judged and excessive cut to the World Service— 16 per cent over the next four years—without any very clear idea of the implications, above all in the Middle East.

I have two specific points to put to the Minister to which I hope he will be able to reply in responding to the debate. First, when this House debated the matter on 11 February, I and others raised the issue of the need for more, not fewer, resources for the Middle East and Arabic broadcasts. I suggested then—a suggestion that has been taken up in more detail in the Foreign Affairs Committee report to which I referred—that if DfID were to fund in some way the developmental work that the BBC already does, which has been certified as being of the value of something like £25 million a year, resources could be released without any net additional cost to the FCO budget. I wonder where matters now stand on that issue. I had a rather helpful response to a question I asked of the Secretary of State for International Development when he most impressively addressed the Cross-Benchers yesterday, and I hope that the noble Lord will be able to take that forward. Above all, when the Government respond to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report, I hope that there will be something precise there. Surely it is time to move beyond the rather vaguely helpful remarks of the Foreign Secretary when he gave evidence to the committee.

Secondly, a wider issue about the World Service is the governance arrangements once the BBC becomes responsible for funding the World Service from the licence fee in 2014. Here again, a careful reading of that Foreign Affairs Committee report does not, frankly, inspire a lot of confidence. The decision to switch funding responsibility to the BBC was taken at the very last moment in a singularly back-of-the-envelope way. The Government’s response to queries about the future governance and how one can be sure that the priorities will not be leeched away by the needs of the BBC’s domestic services now sounds awfully like flying on a wing and a prayer. The case for a new covenant between the Government and the BBC Trust—this is what has been put forward by the Foreign Affairs Committee—seems a genuinely good idea. I hope the Minister can say that the Government broadly accept it and will work up such a covenant so that we do not have a kind of death of a thousand cuts for the World Service in 2014.

I now turn from the BBC to the issue of discretionary spending on conflict issues. The irony here is that just as we in this country have begun to achieve a degree of co-ordination in this area—which is admired and is being emulated by other countries—we have in many cases cut the resources for the programmes that we were supporting. We are withdrawing support for example in places such as the Caucasus, where such soft-power assets are really very important. Last October’s strategic review had some reasonably encouraging things to say about this sort of discretionary spending on conflict issues and about the need to do more for failing and failed states, and I wonder whether the Minister could give us some specifics about how we are approaching that now after the strategic review. Are there more than just warm words in that review?

Finally, we are debating how we in Britain are co-ordinating the use of our soft-power assets. However, here, as with hard power, we are surely in the years ahead going to need to work much more in concert with other like-minded countries in the European Union, NATO, the Commonwealth and at the United Nations if we are to maximise the impact of our soft power. I give two examples from the past. First, UN peacekeeping was virtually invented by a great British UN official, Brian Urquhart. That is a massive soft-power development over the years, which has brought peace and stability to many countries that were failed or failing states. The European Union is another example. The enlargement of the European Union has seen the most massive deployment of soft-power assets—far greater than the United States, with all its hard-power assets, has been able to deploy—and it has brought tremendous benefits, both in southern Europe and in central and eastern Europe. These multilateral institutions, of which we are members—and often very, very important members—are a really crucial part of our soft-power effort.

Of course some of our soft-power assets, such as the World Service and the British Council, are more specific to us, but there are many others in conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building on which we need to work together. I wonder what plans the Government have for strengthening that wider co-ordination of effort so that we can make less go further and help to marshal the multiplier soft-power effect that these big international organisations can have.

If I have struck a rather critical note in this debate it is because so much needs to be done and because some course corrections are sorely needed. However, given some flexibility in application, this country could achieve a tremendous amount—it is already doing so but it could achieve far more. These soft-power assets of ours are hugely valuable and are far more valuable than the soft-power assets of practically any other country in the world, so do let us make the most of them.

European Union Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Waddington]

Undoubtedly, history has shown that it is extremely difficult to give the people the role to which they feel that they are entitled through our parliamentary structure. That is an additional argument that, in certain circumstances, there ought to be referendums.

I mentioned our Government having let the people down, but I must also point out that sometimes the EU itself has not enhanced its reputation for fair dealing. The reintroduction of the working time directive as a health and safety measure to destroy Britain's opt-out from the social chapter was, some might say, barefaced cheating. It was certainly most extraordinary behaviour. The misuse of Article 308 was a disgrace. Is not what happened with Article 308 a complete answer to the argument, which has been advanced time and time again on the other side of the House, that there is no need for referendums in Article 48(6) cases because it is not supposed to be used to increase a competence conferred by the treaty? What on earth is to stop the Commission and the Council of Ministers determining that something does not increase competence when it clearly does? That is precisely what the Commission and the Council did with Article 308, which was supposed to be used to further the common market but was used for all sorts of extraordinary things, such as giving aid to Mongolia.

Some noble Lords say that they are against referendums as a matter of principle because they are an affront to parliamentary democracy. I see their point.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

The noble Lord was waxing eloquent on Article 308. Can he confirm that the Government of which he was a member voted—as was required, because it required unanimity—for any number of measures under Article 308?

[Lord Waddington]

The noble Lord is entirely right, which proves the point that there ought to be referendums in such circumstances to stop Governments behaving in that way.

As I said, some noble Lords say that they are against referendums as a matter of principle, but it is a pathetic argument in the context of the EU. We elect MPs to use the powers that they have inherited. We certainly do not elect them to give those powers away. I find it interesting that all those who go on about being against referendums as a matter of principle turn out to be Europhiles who, at the time of Lisbon, knew that a referendum would result in an emphatic no and would mean a pause in the constant leaching of power from Westminster to Brussels.

Some say that the Bill will make it very difficult for Governments. They may favour a proposal but stop short of embracing it because that would mean a referendum they might lose. That gives me no sleepless nights. It does not frighten me one little bit. The whole trouble is that while most Europhiles protest that they do not want us to lose our independence as a nation, every step we take involving a sacrifice of sovereignty brings us closer to that end. So reluctance by Ministers to sign away any more of our powers would be a very welcome development.

The wording of the first group of amendments supports my assertion that those attacking the Bill do not accept that there is any real problem to be addressed. If in the circumstances listed in Clause 4(1), and not just in the circumstances listed in paragraphs (i) and (j) in this group of amendments, a Minister could argue that the effect of a particular decision on the UK would be insignificant, and you would be giving the Minister far too much wriggle room and far too great an opportunity to avoid a referendum. There could be repeats of what happened over Lisbon rather than the rebuilding of trust that is the object of this exercise.

I cannot for one moment support these amendments, and I fear that almost every amendment on the Marshalled List at present is designed to blunt the instrument that has quite rightly been put before Parliament by this Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I speak in support of this amendment, though I support more drastic surgery in terms of reducing the number of areas in which a referendum would be required. This amendment, however, goes in the right direction. In supporting it, I make two points, which arise from what the noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Waddington, said.

The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, made an extremely important point, which has been overlooked so far, but which is integral to my own approach and some of the amendments I have put down for later debate. It is not suggested that we should go back to the status quo ante, to the situation prevailing under this House and the other place’s ratification of Lisbon, a situation where these decisions should be endorsable purely by a resolution of both Houses. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said in his introduction that his amendments accepted that it would go back to primary legislation. The position of Parliament in approving these matters would be strengthened over the present situation. That is, frankly, a very important point. I hope that the Government will take due account of that. There is an acceptance among a number of us—and that is true of amendments of a more drastic kind that I have tabled and which we will debate later—that we should not just be going back to the Lisbon provisions, but should be going back to Lisbon plus.

The second point relates to points made by the noble Lord, Lord Waddington. As one of those who are moving amendments, I do not contest the analysis that the Government have made, namely that support for the European Union in this country has been losing ground and that there is often dissatisfaction with measures taken in Brussels. It would be quite stupid to deny that. What I, and probably some others who are moving amendments, contest is whether a whole list of referendums on matters of highly technical, and some might say trivial, interest would actually help to deal with that situation. My own view—and I would be interested to hear anybody contesting this—is that it would actually make it worse. If we went around the country trying to persuade our compatriots why they should vote in a referendum on whether or not additional advocates-general should be created by qualified majority voting, or whatever, they would think we were certifiable. Certifiable or not, the reason I am supporting these amendments, and moving my own amendments, is not because I dispute the analysis, but because I dispute the prescription.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, it is a sad fact that this legislation is needed because successive Governments have let down the people of this country in failing to protect our national interests—particularly the last Government.

A sensible balance has been achieved in this Bill. There are as many items that do not require referenda as those that do require referenda. A reasonable, practical and sensible balance has been achieved. This amendment is about waiving the referendum in cases of urgency and national interest. I am not quite sure what that means, but it occurs to me that we are right now living at a time when several European countries are in dire financial straits, largely as a result of being uncompetitive, having adopted the common currency. I can just see a financial crisis coming up in due course in Europe and the classic argument being put that, in the interests of urgency and in protecting us from some of the contagion, there is an urgent need for the introduction of far greater collective decisions on matters fiscal and economic. This would be the ultimate objective of achieving a European state with fiscal and economic powers. Should this, as has been suggested, slip by under one of the three different new powers that we have for introducing measures without referenda if it qualifies as being in the national interest out of urgency? No, the Bill has struck a sensible balance, as I have said, and putting up a whole list of new potential excuses that should remove the need for referenda is merely ducking the issue and trying to weaken the impact of the Bill.

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[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, that is not the point. The point is that it will not be the British Government or this Parliament that makes the decisions covered by these amendments; Brussels will go on doing it.

It is partly this situation, together with the fact that Brussels pays almost no attention to what our Select Committees and Parliament manage to say when they are not being completely ignored, that has led me to suggest that perhaps we do not need quite the number of Select Committees that we have, although that is perhaps a debate for another day.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am not quite sure of the relevance of this discussion to the amendment that we are debating. The noble Lord does not reveal how much of this is double-counting. He has given a number for the Commons and a number for the Lords, but perhaps he could enlighten us as to how many are for the same measure. Secondly, he gave figures for 2010, which was a general election year here. During that lengthy election period, the House of Commons in particular did not have a European Scrutiny Committee. It has always been recognised that there are overrides during such a period. Thirdly, I wish that the noble Lord would recognise that the scrutiny reserve is a matter for consideration between the two Houses of this Parliament and the Government. It is not a matter for the European institutions and it never has been. That has always been clear. It would therefore be good if we could get back to discussing the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, the noble Lord is trying to ameliorate an intolerable situation. It is a fact that the scrutiny reserve is a promise given by the Government of the day to Parliament that has been broken more than 500 times in the past five years. Therefore, it will not be the British Government who make the decisions covered by Amendment 16B, but Brussels—as it always has been. No British Government can therefore be trusted to decide on these issues, as set out in the amendments, because Brussels will simply go ahead, even if the British Government of the day could be trusted. If necessary, as the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, reminded us, the Commission will simply bring forward the EU’s new powers under treaty clauses that were not designed for that purpose. However, that has never stopped the Commission, as I also pointed out in our Committee proceedings on 5 April at col. 1640.

In conclusion, and without wishing to go anywhere near making a Second Reading speech, a number of noble Lords today—the noble Lords, Lord Risby and Lord Hannay, among others—as well as the Minister in Committee and at Second Reading, lamented the disconnect, as they put it, between the British people and their Government and the European Union. I should like to put to the Minister a point that I have not yet put to him; I should be grateful if he would answer it either on this occasion or at some future point in our proceedings.

The reason for the disconnect between the British people and the European Union—and, indeed, the Finnish people and the European Union, and a growing number of people in France, Germany and elsewhere—is that the big idea that gave birth to the project of European integration, honourable though it was at the time after the last war, has, in fact, gone horribly wrong. I need hardly remind the Minister of what that big idea was. It was that the nation states, with their unreliable democracies, had been responsible for the carnage of two world wars and the long history of bloodshed in Europe. Those nation states, therefore, had to be emasculated and diluted into a new form of supranational government run by technocrats. That is where the Commission gets its monopoly to propose in secret all our European legislation. That is where COREPER comes in. That is why the Council votes in secret on what is becoming the majority of our law, if that is not the case already. Surely that is what has gone wrong. Until we address it, realise and confess that the whole project has failed—not just the currency, which has clearly failed—and get out of it as soon as possible, we are all barking up the wrong tree.

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[Lord Howell of Guildford]

If the noble Lord casts his mind back to the Lisbon treaty and the previous treaties, he will recall that some of them tend to turn up in the great package treaties that emerge from the European Union from time to time. They emerged at the time of Lisbon and caused so many of the agonies and concerns, the consequence of which we are now debating. I forget the number of issues of this kind that were in the Lisbon treaty, but the answer is almost certainly a considerable number.

Now I want—I will give way again, but I have to say that I am trying to help the Committee and guide it through. I will give way once more, but after that I think I am entitled within the custom of the House to be rather reluctant to yield to constant interventions on things I am just about to say anyway.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am most grateful to the Minister, and I will certainly not intervene in his speech again. Like the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, earlier in the debate, the Minister has taken us down this road that there will not be all these minor referendums provided for in the Bill because the habit of the European Union is to group all these things together in a major grouping.

I would plead with the Government not to go down that road of reasoning. Most of us, even those of us moving these amendments, believe it is not in the interest in the European Union or this country to have any major package of institutional reform in the period ahead, yet here the Government are using an argument that is inciting people in the other member states to go in that direction—they can read Hansard too. All they will see is that the noble Lord and his colleague are saying, “Do not worry, none of these mini-referendums will take place; it will all come together in a big package”. I ask that the Government not pursue that line because there is no difference between the two sides of this argument. Nobody wishes to argue—I certainly do not—for pushing towards a new major institutional package, but the Minister is making it impossible to avoid one.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My Lords, I fear that that is a good example of taking part of an argument, which I wish to develop much more fully, and giving it a particular boost. That is just one of a whole series of reasons why there will not be referenda over trivia and over small issues, which will come out separately, and why these matters simply will not arise. I could straight away give a long list of other reasons why it will never happen. Where there is no transfer of power or competence anyway, there will not be a referendum. There are plenty of powers already, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has said. Where it does not apply to the UK, there will be not be a referendum; as with the current treaty change going through. Where there are accession treaties, there will be no referendum—not in this country anyway. Where there is codification under existing competencies there will be no referendum. Where there are significant tests—we have yet to debate that in full—there will be no referendum. So there are five other reasons, as well as the question of the package, why we will look at these things in a mature and rounded way.

It is really quite pointless citing one issue and trying to project it to be the explanation of the whole situation. When you look at the whole situation it is perfectly clear that there will not be a whole series of tiny referenda on complicated issues that people will not want to vote for. That applies to almost everything that has been mentioned in this debate, including—I would love to dilate on it but it is probably out of order—the whole question of the European public prosecutor’s office, on which the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, is a great expert. We are going to debate that in Clause 6. Certainly it is one of many issues that may well come up, but the chances of it coming up as a separate issue as part of a treaty change, to which the Government would then agree and that other nations would all agree to, are very remote indeed—in fact, I would say, non-existent.

At this stage, it might be worth going over some of the essential points from the lengthy debate we had at the start of the Committee stage on the role of Article 48(6) of the Treaty on European Union and the rationale for Clause 3, which I mentioned in an exchange with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, a little while back. There are two types of treaty change. This does not seem to be totally understood. I will try my best to remind your Lordships what they are. There is the ordinary pattern which requires an intergovernmental conference and the simplified type of treaty change which does not require an IGC. Both of them result in an amendment to the treaty and so both should be treated in the same way.

It is not right as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said in the earlier debates that the whole point of the passerelle is to dispense with the paraphernalia of treaty change. It is not true. It has the same elaborate systems of treaty change through the simplified revision procedure as does the ordinary revision procedure. People simply will not understand that because one method of treaty change is being used a referendum would be required yet if the same treaty changes—in this case dealing with powers rather than competencies—were being proposed and agreed under the other type of treaty change, then it would not be required. It is just that kind of incoherent approach which will go against the Bill’s aims—they may be disputed by noble Lords opposite but they are our aims—of regaining some of the trust of the British electorate and seeking to reconnect them. It would leave people completely baffled—it would certainly leave many of the experts baffled—and not enlightened at all.

European Union Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 5th April 2011 Lords Chamber

Of course, it would be open to Parliament, when considering a Bill, to say that all or part of that Bill should come into force only when approved by referendum. That is what we did on the Bill concerning the referendum on the voting system. However, what cannot be done within the constitution is to say that Parliament can require a future Bill to be made conditional on support in a referendum. That is a condition which must be decided only by Parliament when it considers that Bill. That must certainly be true for future Parliaments; in my view, it is absolutely clear that there is no way in which much of the legislation here can remain beyond the life of this Parliament. I further believe that it is probably also true that future Bills introduced in the present Parliament cannot be required to bring with them an agreement from a referendum. We need to deal with this issue much more thoroughly than we have done so far.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I support my noble friend's amendment. It is the practice in this House to start a Committee stage with an extremely abstruse point and this is certainly extremely abstruse. However, I argue that it is the tip of a rather large iceberg which is the overload of the list of things that have to be subjected to referenda set out in the rest of the Bill. This is the kind of entrée for that and it is absolutely right that we should have a serious debate about it now and not just treat it as a minor and abstruse matter.

The inclusion of decisions taken under Article 48(6) is a very clear symptom of a disease which seemed to be caught by the Government when they sat down to draft this Bill. Instead of opting for a very simple Bill, which would have subjected actual treaty changes to a referendum requirement—changes either to the Treaty on European Union or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—they included a large mass of other material, including Article 48(6). That is likely to multiply by quite a lot the damaging effect that this Bill, if enacted, would have. I hope that the Government will think again about the inclusion of these issues within the scope of the Bill and thus be willing to look kindly on this amendment.

One relevant point is that when this House ratified the Lisbon treaty and conveyed our instrument of ratification, which helped, along with the other 26, to bring it into force, we approved a whole series of ways of implementing Lisbon, of which the Article 48(6) issue is one very small part. We deposited our instrument of ratification and Lisbon came into force and the coalition Government accepted that. However, I think that the Government need to pause for a minute to think about whether we are really acting in good faith when we alter the means by which we will deal with these decisions somewhere along the line and introduce a different method of doing so. Noble Lords will gather that this argument does not apply at all to a decision to have a referendum on a change to the treaty. There would be no question of bad faith about that. I think that we would be quite wrong to do so, but if we wish to subject a future treaty change, a change to the Treaty on European Union or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to a referendum requirement, that is absolutely our own business. We can decide that and cannot be accused of bad faith.

However, when we start tinkering with the way in which we shall approve items that are, as it were, subcontracted under Lisbon to the Council acting by unanimity, and impose new requirements which were not there when we deposited the instrument of ratification, we are taking real risks with that intangible concept—but one which is important within the European Union—which is the confidence that every member state has in the good faith of the other member states.

I say that not because I have thought of that problem off the top of my head, but because it was brought to the attention of the committee set up in the other place to scrutinise European legislation, when it held an inquiry into the sovereignty issue, by the now retired director-general of legal services to the Council Secretariat, a man of extraordinary brilliance who gave successive British Governments massively good and helpful advice on many occasions. In his testimony, which is on the record for anyone to read in the proceedings of Mr Cash's committee, he very delicately said that if the British Government systematically involve themselves in subjecting decisions taken under Lisbon to a referendum requirement, at some stage there is a real risk that the issue of good faith will be raised.

I hope that the Government will look very carefully at this matter and see that we need to cut away a good deal of the areas listed for requirement—among them, most particularly, the one we are discussing now.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved with such charming and disarming modesty by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. Only someone with a highland title could be so disarming and modest as well as eloquent in moving such an amendment.

I speak with reluctance because I was waiting to see who was going to spring up to defend the Bill and speak against the amendment. As my noble friend Lord Kinnock says from a sedentary position, “There won't be many of them”. I have been trying to find out over the past few days and weeks who is behind the Bill, who is the architect of it, who is the genesis of it, who is pushing it, who is keen to see it go through. I even had a conversation with the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, and he certainly did not claim any responsibility for the Bill. At Second Reading, we had a number of contributions, almost none of them in favour of the Bill. Even those who were in favour were somewhat embarrassed and reluctant.

I wonder why we are taking up so much time in this House and in Parliament when there are so many other things that should be occupying our attention. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, made a very eloquent Shakespearian beginning to his speech. If I can get a little bit of Shakespeare right, it made me think:

“Why should we, in the compass of a pale,

Keep law and form and due proportion …

When our sea-walled garden, the whole land,

Is full of weeds, her fairest flowers choked up,

Her fruit-trees all unpruned”.

A lot of things are happening outside in our land, this sea-walled garden, that need our attention, but we are being asked to spend so much time on this, it is really quite unbelievable.

I did not speak on Second Reading because I was at my first meeting of the European Union Select Committee. Excellent work is being done there scrutinising legislation that comes from the European Union. It is generally acknowledged that this House, in this Parliament, in this country scrutinises European legislation better than any other house of any other parliament in the European Union, something of which we should be proud. That makes it even more ridiculous that we are being asked to consider this Bill.

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[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I just want to help the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, if I can. Yes, pretty well all the accession treaties do not transfer powers to Brussels, and there have been quite a lot of them.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Another example is that, in the protocol to the treaty of Lisbon, there is a provision giving power to national parliaments to be able to refer to the Luxembourg court issues where the national parliament considers that the principle of proportionality is being breached by legislative proposals emanating from Brussels. That is an example of where the treaty of Lisbon enhances the powers of national parliaments.

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[Lord Stoddart of Swindon]

I am glad that the noble Lord has clarified that because I well remember that when the Lisbon treaty was going through the House of Commons an amendment was moved by the Liberal Democrats to the effect that we should have a referendum on whether we should stay in or get out of the European Union. If I am not mistaken, the Liberal Democrats walked out of a Sitting of Parliament on that very issue. Therefore, we have to get this into perspective. I know that some people are against referendums.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

The noble Lord raised two issues that he will recognise, after listening to the debate, are not very apposite. First, it is slightly ironic that he is nailing himself to the mast of the Conservative manifesto. Still, I suppose that there have been stranger bedfellows. The point that we are discussing in the amendment moved by my noble friend is about an article in the treaty that precludes the transfer of powers. The noble Lord’s argument is therefore irrelevant. Secondly, the noble Lord joined together everyone who spoke in favour of the amendment as people who are resisting the giving of powers to Parliament or a referendum. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, but I am, as regards the amendments that I shall move, entirely content to give more powers to Parliament in this matter than were given at the ratification of the Lisbon treaty. There is no question of some of us opposing the giving of powers to Parliament. The difficulty is over giving powers through a referendum on matters that are pretty trivial and, frankly, on which it will be very difficult to carry out a reasonable consultation.

[Lord Stoddart of Swindon]

I hear what the noble Lord says. His career and mine have been perfectly different. I am in favour of a certain number of referendums on very important issues. He says that the Bill will allow referendums on trivialities. I do not see that in the Bill at all and I am quite sure that any referendums would be on major matters that would involve the transfer of significant powers to the European Union.

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[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Can he tell us whether any other member state has a referendum requirement for an Article 48(6) decision? I believe that the answer is no, but I am sure that the Government will be better informed than I am. Perhaps he would also note that the example he gave about the ability to fine by the European Court of Justice was in a treaty revision. That treaty revision would fall under a quite separate provision of this Bill, which we have not yet discussed but which we will come on to discuss, and will have nothing whatever to do with Article 48(6). Therefore, it merely reinforces the argument that the Article 48(6) reference is otiose.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I was just about to make points on the question raised. It would have been reasonable—I would not put it higher than that—for the noble Lord, whose wisdom I respect, to have allowed me to go ahead with what I was saying rather than interrupt me to say something that I was about to say and so lengthen the whole business: we have already been on this debate for two and a quarter hours. I plead with your Lordships that if we could just restrain ourselves a little we would make some progress.

I was turning to the important point about what other countries do when they are trying to get through treaty changes. That seemed to be absent from the attitude of many of the understandable critics among your Lordships about what is going on in the European Union. We heard speeches at Second Reading and in this debate implying that we were stepping out alone and marginalising Britain, that this was a completely different pattern and that we would cause the fury of other European member states. Incidentally, I am not sure that I can answer fully the noble Lord’s perfectly justifiable question on the consultations we have had and at what level with our European partners but I can assure noble Lords that all our posts in Europe have been fully briefed on this and have discussed it with their opposite numbers.

Let me just go through some of the immense hurdles, some of which are higher than anything we are proposing here, which many other member states already practise. In Austria, the President must certify that treaty changes are in conformity with the Austrian constitution. If changes are judged to be a revision of the federal constitution, a referendum is required. In Denmark, a referendum is constitutionally required if the treaty transfers competences to the EU and is not voted on by five-sixths of the majority in Parliament. In France, a referendum is required if a treaty change necessitates a constitutional amendment, and incidentally I notice that the French require a referendum on future accession treaties, which of course do not arise in this Bill. That may be to the dismay of some, and we can debate it later. In Ireland, a referendum is required if a treaty is thought to alter the scope and objectives of the European Union, as we know. In Lithuania, a referendum is mandatory according to the constitution if treaty changes involve the partial transfer of competences of government bodies to the institutions of the European Union. In Slovakia, a referendum would be held on a treaty which relinquished sovereignty to the European Union, although there is a rider that the Slovakian constitutional court can also consider the case. Similar referendums may be required in the Czech Republic, Greece and the Netherlands. I suspect that that is not the end of the list because I do not think I have mentioned the German position.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

We have had a technical debate—thank goodness, in a sense. I shall dash back home and get my European Union juriste linguiste dictionary and look at one or two translations of terms, particularly “power” and “competence”. I recall some years ago, in the early discussions on Schengen and British border controls, explaining to a French audience the difference between border checks and border controls, the former being selective and the latter systematic. It was explained to me that the translation into French of “check” is “contrôle” and the translation of “control” is “contrôle”. The subtlety of the English language did not easily play in French. This may be part of what we are getting at here.

The amendment raises some interesting questions about parliamentary sovereignty, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, recognised, and about the evolution of judicial review. I take it as given that ministerial decisions will be made in the first place to Parliament. Noble Lords will be well aware that the Government are taking through, as part of a package that includes this Bill, a number of measures to improve parliamentary scrutiny of new legislation. Ministerial decisions would, therefore, go in the first instance to the scrutiny committees of both Houses and would be examined fully by both Houses.

In the evolution of judicial review, which, as we all recognise, has become a good deal more active in recent years, whereas ministerial judgments are frequently subject to judicial review, judicial review of parliamentary decisions is a great deal more hesitant. The Solicitor-General said in the other place:

“Judicial review has increasingly become part of the legal armoury since the second world war. Ministers, whether of the present Government or the last, are not above the law, and it is for our independent judiciary to arbitrate, through judicial review cases, in disputes between the citizen and the state. The courts apply the laws enacted by Parliament, and Parliament can make, amend and repeal legislation as it thinks fit”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/1/11; col. 691.]

The evolution of judicial review, it seems to me as a non-lawyer, is therefore likely to take a rather different approach to ministerial judgments on executive issues and ministerial Statements, which have been thoroughly scrutinised and accepted by Parliament. I hope that that begins to explain why, in the Government’s opinion, this amendment is not necessary. I have absolutely no doubt that there will be those who will wish to apply for judicial review of all ministerial decisions related to the sharing of powers within the EU. We have seen that already. That is precisely why one of the measures that we are taking to try to rebuild public trust in our engagement with the EU is to propose a strengthening of parliamentary engagement and scrutiny to ensure that the Government are not trying to slip things past people but are being increasingly transparent.

In the case of the judicial review brought by Mr Stuart Wheeler in connection with the treaty of Lisbon, the European Union (Amendment) Bill had received Royal Assent before the judgment of the court had been handed down. The issue was whether the Government should ratify before the process of judicial review had been completed. It is quite clear that a Government would not proceed to ratify a treaty amendment until a process of judicial review had been completed, although I think it unlikely in the extreme in the delicate relationship between our common-law judiciary and a sovereign Parliament—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

The Minister has gone into an interesting point, which I wanted to ask about. The Stuart Wheeler case is relevant because there were attempts by a number of people to suggest that Parliament should suspend the completion of the ratification process until the judgment on the case was reached. The Government of the day declined that, correctly in my view, but the noble Lord is quite right that the deposit of the instrument of ratification took place after the court had ruled. It is not quite that the ratification was not complete; the deposit of the instrument of ratification, which is the last stage, had not happened. Am I taking it from him that the Government’s view will be in future that, if this sort of situation arises, they will not interrupt the parliamentary process of taking a decision on the European Union matter that is before them, so that the only impediment will be to the final deposit of an instrument of ratification and not to the completion of the parliamentary ratification?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the noble Lord is raising a point whose subtlety is close to that with which juristes linguistes deal. My notes say that the Government would not complete ratification until a judicial review challenge had been taken. I have also been suggesting to noble Lords that a stronger parliamentary engagement and oversight in examining a ministerial judgment would make judicial practice in accepting claims for judicial review less likely in the future.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I do not think that we need pursue this matter this evening, but can the Minister be more precise when we come to that point at a later stage in the Bill? It is quite important. If the Government’s attitude is going to be that they will stop the process in Parliament while the legal process is going on, that is a completely different thing from saying that they will not complete the process by depositing an instrument of ratification until that is over. Will he clarify that point at a later stage or in writing?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I am happy to do so. I recognise that there are a number of complex judicial as well as parliamentary sovereignty issues at stake, some of which we will return to later, but I offer that assurance to the noble Lord and I hope that I have answered some of the questions raised by the noble Baroness.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I have scars on my back from the extent clause. I have tried on previous occasions to raise the question of the extent clause and the conditions under which UK legislation applies to the Crown dependencies. This is a very arcane area.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords—

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, it is the custom of the House that two noble Lords should not be standing at the same time. We are in Committee; I wonder if the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, might take his seat.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I’m sorry?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

I would be grateful if the noble Lord took his seat. I appreciate that he is the most courteous of Members of the House and simply did not hear me at that point. When making interventions in Committee, it is a matter of course that one does not need to interrupt a Minister in his or her flow. One is permitted in Committee to allow the Minister to complete an explanation before the next person gets up.

I appreciate that both the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, wish to ask questions. The noble Lord was on his feet first; perhaps the noble and learned Baroness might allow him to ask his further question first.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I am sorry if I transgressed in some way. Strangely enough, I was actually trying to be helpful to the Minister—unusually, so far, in this Committee stage. The answer that he gave is correct. The circumstance that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, refers to is virtually unthinkable since EU law applies to Gibraltar because it is part of the EU, as in our treaty. The idea that you can then legislate for some tiny part of the EU is pretty alien to the way that Europe does its legislation. The Channel Islands and the others are in a completely different situation, as the Minister says, and European law does not apply to them.

I suggest that the Minister does not put Monaco into the same bracket as the French overseas territories. He will not be well received in the casino next time he goes—if he does.

Libya

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Friday 1st April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, it is customary in this House to welcome the holding of a debate on a subject as important as the one that we are discussing today and to thank the initiator of the debate, in this case the Government in the form of the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford. I do so all the more because the noble Lord introduced the debate with an extremely wide-ranging and thoughtful contribution which set us off on the right foot.

I do so, though, feeling that the timing of the debate has been a bit dilatory. We should have had a debate on a matter as significant as the commitment of the Armed Forces of this country to active service at the latest on the same day as the House of Commons, which was 21 March. That we did not shines an uncomfortable light on the relative inflexibility of our procedures in comparison with those in another place. Be that as it may, I believe that I spotted in the Statement of the right honourable gentleman the Foreign Secretary that the Government intend in future to put decisions about the engagement of our Armed Forces on either a conventional or a statutory basis. That surely means that we in this House will need to adapt our procedures accordingly or be completely marginalised. My own view is that we should respect the primacy of the other place, which would mean not taking a vote on the matter here, but that we should ensure that our views are taken into account. That can be done only if we hold a debate no later than any proceedings in the other place. I hope that the Minister can say that these issues will be considered carefully by the Government and that they will revert to the House in due course.

It is striking that, amid all the acres of newsprint that have been devoted to the issue of Libya in the past few weeks, so little reference has been made to the watershed nature of the decision taken by the Security Council in Resolution 1973. Five years ago, the whole membership of the United Nations, all 192 of them, signed up to the principle that, where a regime was unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens, the international community had a responsibility to protect them, if necessary and as a last resort by the use of force. I suppose that I should declare an interest as having been a member of the panel which made the recommendation for that decision to the Secretary-General of the UN, who passed it on to the membership.

Since that time, 2005, there has been much verbal commitment but considerable controversy and absolutely no real action to give effect to the responsibility to protect, if one leaves on one side the rather welcome efforts which the international community made to prevent Kenya slipping into anarchy after its contested elections. Many believed, and quite a few hoped, that the responsibility to protect would remain just so many words on paper—an empty aspiration but not a reality. Well, now Resolution 1973 has given the lie to that, and has done so in the most solemnly legal and legitimising way, in a resolution aimed at protecting the citizens of Libya, who were being grievously repressed by their own ruler. In my view, that resolution is every bit as important a Rubicon to have crossed as was Resolution 678, which authorised the use of force to reverse Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait in 1990. Both will be seen as important landmarks in the post-Cold War history of the UN, of much wider significance than the issues at stake in Iraq or Libya themselves.

Success in the operations which are being undertaken under Resolution 1973 cannot be guaranteed. Many have already spoken in this debate about the challenges we face—the costs, the risks of failure and the risks of stalemate. But it is surely legitimate to ask them, and to ask all those worldwide who have raised their voices in criticism, what alternative they would have favoured. How were they prepared to prevent the inhabitants of Benghazi and other cities in the east of Libya to whom Colonel Gaddafi had promised no mercy? Would they have preferred us to watch and wash our hands of the whole matter—to have stood by, as we did during the Cold War when civilians were slaughtered as, for example, they were in Hama in Syria by President Hafez al-Assad? In my view, great credit is due to our Government and to those other Governments who make up the coalition and voted for Security Council Resolution 1973, and who are now working to implement it.

We should not overlook the wider benefits that could accrue if this operation is successful—the precedent that will be created by making the responsibility to protect a living reality and the deterrent effect that that could have in future on those rulers who might be tempted to oppress and massacre their citizens.

How should we be defining success? Clearly, it is crucial to stick firmly to the mandate that we have to protect as many of the citizens of Libya as we can from the tender mercies of Gaddafi and, on the other hand, to avoid any occupation of the country. If carrying out that mandate imposes constraints on us, they are surely worth accepting as a necessary price for keeping together a wide coalition including, above all, the Arab League. That is the argument against being drawn into loose talk about targeting Gaddafi or speculating on the case for allowing mission creep to bring us towards regime change. Although I am no lawyer, I have had a good deal to do with drafting and interpreting Security Council resolutions, and I find the assertions that Security Council Resolution 1973 in some way overrides or provides a way round the arms embargo on Libya in an earlier resolution fairly dubious and not very convincing.

We should also be doing everything we can to help those Libyans who have escaped from Gaddafi’s grasp to create and build up the institutions of civil society needed to make a market economy, so that in due course they can stand on their own feet and decide their own future in free and fair elections. That is what was done successfully in the Kurdish-populated parts of Iraq in 1991 and thereafter, once the northern no-fly zone had deterred Saddam Hussein from overrunning them. It was underpinned by earmarking a proportion of the resources from Iraq’s oil exports, and it was done without challenging the future territorial integrity of the country. There could surely be a lesson there for Libya and a task for the UN's humanitarian agencies to help the population in those parts of the country where they can work freely and in security. I doubt whether it is wise to look too far ahead at this point at the situation in Libya. It is extraordinarily fluid. I suggest that we need to avoid setting artificial deadlines and agonising too much about exit strategies. The first priority is to implement the mandate which we have.

Of course, there will be lessons to be learnt and conclusions to be drawn—some of them nearer to home—from those events. The role we played at the UN and the role we are playing in Libya is appropriate for a country which is a permanent member of the Security Council and one of the two leading European states in working for international peace and security, but we cannot do that without providing our Armed Forces with the resources they need to do the tasks we ask them to undertake. I fear that in our preoccupation with the need for austerity we may have cut too close to the bone.

We also need to work harder to achieve European solidarity on big decisions in regions which are effectively on our doorstep. I very much regret the German decision to abstain on Resolution 1973, particularly as it was completely unnecessary. The German Government could have supported the resolution while making it clear that their forces would not be involved in any military action. Other members of the Security Council did that. However, it is more important to look ahead and avoid such divisions in future. That is all the more necessary given the clear US preference for working in future as a member of coalitions of a wider kind, not just coalitions of the obedient, as they did in the past.

We Europeans have been calling for such an evolution in US policy for years. We must not flinch from it or criticise it now that it is upon us—however unexpectedly. Europe has an important role to play in these game-changing developments in the wider Middle East, in the economic as well as in the political and military fields. The EU should surely be spearheading a wider international effort to offer assistance to those countries which emerge from autocracy and set themselves on the course of establishing democratic institutions and the rule of law. We should be providing better trade access, encouragement for investment and advice, where it is welcome. I very much hope that the Minister can set out what the Government intend to do to ensure that the EU rises to the occasion in that wider context.