European Union Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Flight
Main Page: Lord Flight (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Flight's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(13 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI will be delighted to. I will come in a moment to a discussion of various elements such as passerelle clauses, which I hope will cover this point.
Clause 6 sets out which passerelles would automatically trigger a referendum if powers or competences were moved from the UK to the EU. We touched, for example, on the matter of defence. This reflects the reality for us that EU member states have different relationships with third countries and different foreign policy priorities. For example, the UK has particularly strong relationships with interests in the Commonwealth. It would be wrong to give the EU the ability to prevent us developing these relationships. I am sure that that is perfectly logical, and it is covered in Article 31(3).
I turn to measures on working conditions and social security. Noble Lords will know that QMV already applies to many decisions concerning the health and safety of workers, working conditions, informing and consulting workers, combating social exclusion, modernising social protection systems, as well as to decisions in areas such as the European social fund. However, there are important things left for unanimity; for example, social security and the social protection of workers, the protection of workers when their employment contract is terminated, et cetera. These things can have a huge impact on the life of an individual nation and the businesses that add to the prosperity of that nation. Any move to QMV could jeopardise independent national decisions on that score. If we look at environmental matters, for example, they are mostly covered by QMV, but there are others that are still subject to unanimity. We would, of course, like to retain national control of what is left on the environment where there is a fiscal element attached to them: town and country planning; the management of water resources or the availability of those resources or land use; and, of course, the choice of energy resources and the general structure of the energy supply. These are very important for people at an individual level, a community level and a national level.
So, as we look at this debate and hear the discussion, I find it rather perplexing that our currency alone seems to have a critical aspect for our relationship with the EU. I think it is misplaced. There are all these other areas of vital concern to our national interest which concern people in terms of our relationship with the European Union. Coming back to my original point, it is precisely because we want to defuse the difficulties that have arisen in terms of public opinion and the public’s attitude to the European Union with a totally pragmatic Government—that has been obvious in the past year—that this Bill is in place. If we have red lines, they have to be very clear and very red. The amendments would make the Bill incoherent and make the public very suspicious and alienated. That is exactly what this Bill seeks to avoid.
My Lords, I rise to address the amendments tabled in my name. As I understand it, Clause 6 addresses areas that are suitable for the requirement of a referendum in two of the ways in which a veto could be given up which are not covered by Clauses 2 to 4. They are, through the other part of the simplified revision procedure using Article 48(7) of TEU, effectively a third type of treaty change, and the six specific cases are dealt with by the passerelle.
The amendments are grouped somewhat strangely in that my Amendments 35A, 35B, 48A and 48B are on one side of the argument and all the others, with the exception of Amendment 40A, are in one way or other seeking to reduce situations where a referendum and Act of Parliament are required. Self-evidently, I do not agree with those amendments.
It is astonishing how little listening and how much assertion there is in this debate. I spent quite a lot of time trying to say that the amendments in this group that I and others have tabled do not seek to remove the requirement for primary legislation by Parliament when any of these changes are made. I speak very slowly because it is a point that the noble Lord has just contradicted. Indeed, they are designed to remove the referendum requirement, but not the requirement for primary legislation, which is an addition to the existing requirement under the Lisbon ratification.
I thank the noble Lord for his interruption. He enlightens Members of this House as he has done previously. I am well aware that he accepts the Act of Parliament and that it is the referendum to which he is opposed. He obviously lacks faith in the trust of ordinary people and for some reason does not seem to realise that the tool of the referendum is essentially there as a deterrent in order to discourage the EU gathering more power unto itself and the sort of behaviour that we had from the Government who were in power in this country until the most recent general election.
I will, if I may, continue. The amendments in my name cover examples of areas that come to light, on looking at the various territories to which Clause 6 might relate, in which there is indeed scope for power to transfer from the EU without the check of a referendum, and sometimes even without the check of an Act of Parliament. I am quite sure that there are many other areas in which there remains scope for powers to transfer. The point of my two amendments is, above all, that within the range of areas that it might be deemed appropriate to require a referendum, there is balance in the Bill—a whole range of territories that transfer powers but in which referenda are not required.
My amendments relate to two cases. First, as your Lordships will be aware, Article 25 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows the Council to adopt any provisions to strengthen or to add to the rights listed in Article 20(2) of the TFEU. Article 25, which deals with the basic rights of EU citizens, appears to allow a fundamental extension of the scope of EU law. This in effect would alter the list of rights in Article 20(2). Article 25 provisions could well amount to treaty change. Extended rights for EU citizens would transfer power from the UK over whether it accorded such rights to nationals of other EU member states. There is clearly a debate here. Is it appropriate that measures that considerably extend the political rights of non-nationals, because they are members of other EU states, could occur without the agreement of the people living in those states?
The second territory is slightly more complex. Currently the EU is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights. Lisbon introduced Article 6(2) of the TEU, which provides that the EU will accede to the ECHR, and as your Lordships will be aware this is currently being negotiated. The issue here is that any EU law that is modified in response to a finding of non-compatibility with ECHR rights would subsequently be binding on member states, so if the EU accedes to all ECHR rights—and, yes, I am well aware that there has to be unanimity for it so to do and that it has to go through the appropriate procedures in each country—EU legislation could be altered as a result. Therefore, EU accession to the ECHR could result in a transfer of power from the UK to the EU over whether the UK is bound by the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in areas that fall within the wide scope of EU law. So here, again, we have the question as to whether such a transfer is appropriate for a referendum.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again, but I think it would be helpful if he recognised that the provision in Lisbon that enables the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights is in fact a transfer of powers away from the European Union, not towards it from this country, and it is a transfer to an organisation and a set of judicial procedures to which we are already a party. I therefore find it extraordinarily hard to see how the noble Lord manages to weave this into the tapestry of the Government’s excessive—in my view, in any case—desire to subject matters to referendums.
While there is obviously a differentiation between the European Court of Human Rights and the EU, the point I was making was that if there is accession the result could be an important overriding of UK law by the ECHR and decisions taken by the ECHR in due course becoming binding in the law of this land. This is effectively a change and a giving away of power by the UK to the ECHR rather than the EU in terms of its law making.
To conclude, these two amendments are essentially illustrative. As I commented earlier, looking across the total territory, there are many areas where the arrangements surrounding the EU and bodies such as the ECHR continue to cater for powers being taken without the requirement of an Act of Parliament and certainly without the requirement of citizens having a say in it. The argument that this Bill is right over the top in terms of the areas where it requires a referendum is nonsense. Let me assure your Lordships that there are scores of other areas where a transfer of power could occur where no referendum is being provided for.
Contrary to the arguments put by noble Lords from the other side of the House, a reasonable balance has been adopted by this Bill. Those of us who are perhaps on the other side of the argument would make the point that there are many areas which this Bill does not address where we can still see scope for power being transferred.
My Lords, I rise to comment on the European public prosecutor, the subject of an amendment by my noble friend Lord Goodhart who is not in his place. The potential establishment of the European public prosecutor finds its origins in concerns about budgetary fraud and the improper diversion of grants and aids. The purpose is to improve co-operation and to co-ordinate legal action among member states. It would potentially involve the establishment of a uniform code of criminal offences of fraud against the EC budget applicable in all member states and a uniform set of procedural rules applicable in investigations. Together that would constitute a so-called corpus juris, which would be enforced by the European public prosecutor’s office. I regard this as a significant potential change as a lawyer, but also not as a lawyer.
It seems that the rationale behind the potential establishment of the EPPO ought on the face of it to attract the support of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it would amount to a substantial change in criminal jurisdiction. The idea of national prosecutors on secondment from the EPPO in the UK is a significant alteration to our system, which provides that it is for the Crown to prosecute criminal offences. Once established, there would inevitably be steps taken to introduce rules which might not sit easily with our common law systems.
Article 86 provides that an EPP,
“shall exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of the Member States”.
This means that we would give up control of a fundamental part of our judicial system; namely, the decision on who can be prosecuted for what and, equally important, the decision not to prosecute in some circumstances. It is now the province of the CPS. The EPP will initially be concerned with only crimes affecting the financial interests of the union, although that definition is likely to prove particularly elusive. However, by a passerelle in the treaty, the powers of the EPP can be extended to cover any serious crime with a cross-border dimension, which gives it a potentially very wide remit. One has to think only of the problems with the European arrest warrant, to which my noble friend Lord Lamont referred, and the definition of serious crimes.
The creation of an EPP has not met with much enthusiasm from our friends on the other side of the House. When the matter was discussed at length in 2002 and 2003, Justice said it thought that a European court of criminal justice would have to be established. The Law Society of England and Wales and the Law Society of Scotland did not think a case had been made out for it. The European Union Committee of your Lordships’ House concluded that a European public prosecutor was not a realistic and practical way forward, stating:
“The benefits of creating another body and in particular an EPP, whose existence and processes could cut across national criminal laws and procedure and which might not be accountable to democratically elected representatives, have yet to be clearly and convincingly demonstrated”.
While even the most ardent Eurosceptic would support all reasonable steps to improve the detection and punishment of fraud in relation to grants and aids, surely this can be better achieved by co-operation between member states in the sharing of information and evidence, and access to information, rather than by the creation of a supranational prosecuting body.
It is suggested that there should be harmonisation of criminal procedures if there is to be an EPP office. The problems with harmonising procedures have been confronted by the courts in this country in the context of the ECHR. For example, Articles 5 and 6 of the convention have had to be interpreted by the courts as to whether they respect or are in total harmony with the right to a fair trial and the right to protect suspects. The courts have had considerable difficulty in the attempt to try to harmonise systems with different origins. It is not impossible that there could be a real conflict between the CPS and its view of what is within its province and the national prosecutor for the European public prosecutor trying to do the same thing.
If a future Government want us to join in with the establishment of a new EPP office, I suggest that the case should be made to Parliament and to the British people. It may not be their everyday obsession, but they should and can be educated, and not just by the Daily Express, about the question of a European public prosecutor. It is an important matter that goes to the fundamentals of justice. This amendment seeks to take away the safeguards that are fundamental to the Bill and to the philosophy underlying it.
My Lords, that may be one explanation. The other may well be that they do not have the courage to do it on all occasions and they are afraid of the kicking that they will get from much of the media if they actually fight the case out. That is very much more likely to happen, I am afraid.
I think it was one of the noble Lord’s colleagues who made the point that it was the Wilson Government who first used the vehicle of the referendum because they were unable to take the decision themselves. I just make the point that as a young person who participated in it at that time I thought that it was absolutely correct. The fact that it may have been born of weak political circumstances was irrelevant. I grew up thinking that it was a crucial constitutional matter and the sort of issue that ordinary people should have a chance to have a direct say in.
I could not agree more with the noble Lord, Lord Flight. I took part in that referendum as a young activist in the Labour Party who believed strongly that we should retain our relationship with Europe. Many of my colleagues were not only in disagreement with me but in pretty hostile disagreement with me. The thing that I remember most about that, apart from the dissent that it opened up—our problem, our party—was that it was a fundamental and critical constitutional issue for the United Kingdom and exactly the sort of thing that I would have believed would be defined as significant in the sense that I have tried to present to your Lordships' House this evening.
My Lords, it is of course entirely true. That is the other conclusion that one should draw from some referenda—that whatever the decision of the British people taken in a sovereign way, it does not stop anybody from coming back on future occasions.