European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Thursday 6th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The way to do that is to support the proposal that the Prime Minister has presented to the House, which represents a compromise, ensuring that we leave the EU and respect the referendum decision of the British people, but do so in a way designed to minimise any negative impact on our economy and maximise the opportunities for this country in the future.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I totally concur with what my right hon. Friend said about divided nations, but may I urge him to be cautious about relying too heavily on economic forecasts? We all remember the Treasury, the Bank of England and the International Monetary Fund predicting economic woe by Christmas 2016 if we voted to leave, with talk of 500,000 extra unemployed, a do-it-yourself economic disaster and so on. It got so bad that in the end the Bank of England had to publicly apologise for getting it so wrong. Can we just make sure we keep things in perspective with regard to these economic forecasts?

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because he gives me the opportunity to clarify for the House that these are not economic forecasts; they are modelled scenarios for what might happen in different circumstances. Like all economic modelling, they depend to an enormous extent on the assumptions that are made. The assumptions in this paper are transparent and the assumptions that the Bank of England made are also clear. My hon. Friend has made his point about the modelling that was done in 2016. I can only speak for the Treasury and tell him that a huge amount of work has been done since 2016 to update and upgrade the Treasury’s long-term model. That computable general equilibrium model is the one that has been used.

[Mr Baron]

The one thing that I would suggest to the Chancellor is that the problem with these forecasts is that they do not anticipate a response from the Government to a given set of scenarios. That is one reason why the forecasts in 2016 were so wrong.

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is right. Of course, this work seeks to do something quite different: it looks at five different potential scenarios and ranks them in terms of the impact that they would have. I readily concede that it is more important to look at the ranking than the absolute numbers or ranges of numbers attached to them.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

No, not at this stage, but what I can tell the hon. Gentleman is that in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, facing the opportunities we now do, recruitment of trade specialists, whatever that costs us, is likely to be an investment very well worth making.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Is the Foreign Secretary heartened by the fact that since we voted to leave the EU a number of key countries and economies, including India, China and Australia, have approached the UK regarding furthering trade, and how well that compares with the stalled trade talks that have taken many years between the EU and such countries as the US and Canada?

[Mr Hammond]

Yes, it is a source of some optimism that a number of significant economies around the world have indicated that they would be open to the idea of trade agreements with the UK, and my hon. Friend makes a point that is very obvious but none the less important: that negotiating a trade deal between two countries is always going to be much easier than negotiating a trade deal between one country and 28 countries.

Europe, Human Rights and Keeping People Safe at Home and Abroad

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I am delighted to open this debate, and congratulate the Opposition on selecting this subject. The security of Britain and the British people, our relations with Europe and the promotion of Britain’s values, including human rights, around the world are at the heart of our foreign policy. One year into this Parliament, the challenges we face to our security, prosperity and values have not diminished—if anything, they are growing.

The threat posed by Daesh and its affiliates continues and has now manifested itself in attacks in European cities. The wider instability in the middle east persists, and the Israel-Palestine question is no nearer to a solution. North Korea has demonstrated its determination to flout international law by developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them. Russia demonstrates the same determination through its continued destabilisation of Ukraine and its illegal occupation of Crimea. Tensions are rising in the South China sea. The migration crisis in the eastern and central Mediterranean is presenting new challenges to our near neighbours in Europe. As we approach the referendum in just over four weeks’ time, even the theoretical possibility that Britain might vote to leave the European Union is having a chilling effect on economic growth, and on business and consumer confidence. Wherever we look, our world is becoming more dangerous and uncertain.

Against that hazardous global backdrop, some have argued for retrenchment and withdrawal from a global role as the safest option. But we cannot turn our backs. As a trading nation, with one of the largest and most open economies in the world, our security and prosperity depend upon global stability and order. Some 5 million British nationals live overseas, and millions more travel every year. Our trade depends on the sea lanes and airways that are the arteries of global commerce. International engagement and influence are therefore fundamental to maintaining Britain’s security and prosperity.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend paints a picture of those of us who want to leave the European Union as wanting to retrench. That could not be further from the truth, and I suggest that “Project Fear” is once again going down a very negative path. In leaving, we would have greater freedom to trade and form trade deals with the rest of the world. At the moment we are barred from doing that; as a member of the EU, we cannot form individual international trading agreements.

[Mr Hammond]

Never mind “Project Fear”, what about project paranoia? I was not in any way referring to the exit campaigners, but simply observing that some people have suggested retrenchment. As my hon. Friend has taken me in that direction, I will answer his question. We enjoy free trade with 53 nations by virtue of free trade agreements negotiated by the European Union. Those campaigning for exit tell me that if we were to leave the EU we would rapidly negotiate new free trade agreements, with the EU itself and then with the 53 countries with which that Union has free trade agreements. Our experience in the real world is that these agreements take a lot of time to negotiate—the EU-Canada free trade agreement has been seven years in the negotiating and is still not ratified.

Another small problem that my hon. Friend should think about is that we do not actually have any trade negotiators. We would be seeking to negotiate those 53 plus one trade agreements from scratch, because for the past 40 years, for better or worse, the European Union has negotiated all our trade agreements on our behalf. We do not have civil servants experienced in this field of activity.

Libya

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 19th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

It is very easy to sit on the Opposition Benches hurling stones, but I am afraid that the world is not a neat and tidy place, and we have to deal with the situations that present themselves. The hon. Gentleman talks about the humanitarian work, but I remind him that, when we intervened in Libya in 2011, it was to prevent an imminent genocide in Benghazi and that that successful intervention saved countless thousands of lives. Libya is a rich country, and we should not forget that—$70-odd billion-worth of Libyan assets outside the country are currently frozen by a UN Security Council resolution. This is about getting the Government in place and then releasing those assets so that the Government can function. Libya is not a country that needs humanitarian assistance in the conventional sense. It needs technical support with good governance, and help to get into a position where we can release its assets to it to enable it to function.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the British ambassador. I join him in paying tribute to the work of our ambassador, who is currently based in Tunis. He came with me yesterday to Tripoli and it is his fervent desire, as it is mine and Prime Minister Sarraj’s, to reopen the British embassy in Tripoli as soon as we are able to do so. Unfortunately, the location of our current buildings in Tripoli is in a rather less secure part of town, so I cannot promise that that will be imminent, but we will keep the matter under constant review and do it as soon as we can.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether any training mission to Libya would take place on Libyan soil, and I have to say to him, yet again, that there is no training mission, there is no putative training mission and there has been no request for a training mission. I speak as a former Defence Secretary when I say that, if there is a request for such a mission, the military will clearly want to ensure that it is undertaken with the minimum risk possible to UK personnel. Therefore, their first preference would be to do it here, their next preference would be to do it somewhere in the region and their third preference would be to do it in Libya, if it is safe to do so. I assure him that we will spare no effort in trying to ensure that any support we do give to the Libyans will be delivered in a way that represents the least possible risk to the British forces delivering it.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

There can be no doubt that our intervention in Libya in 2011 has, as some in this House have suggested, been an unmitigated disaster resulting in many thousands of casualties, the establishment of Daesh and a vicious civil war. Looking forward, given that this country is at a tipping point of its involvement with Libya, given developments on the ground, what lessons can we learn?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend, as so often, asserts as fact that there “can be no doubt” on something that is deeply contentious, and I very much take issue with him. The situation in Libya is very difficult and the situation post-2011 was very messy, but countries in many parts of the world do not function as Britain or Switzerland do, and we have to deal with the real situation on the ground. We should look to the future. We should be positive about this potentially affluent country regaining stability and being able, once again, to function as an effective state, allowing the Libyan people to get on with their business. There is a weariness after five years and a growing sense that, if a properly devolved form of government can be established that co-opts the various militias and regional groupings, this can work.

Daesh: Syria/Iraq

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Wednesday 16th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman, particularly for his comment on the commitment of UK forces to their task. This will be the first meeting of Finance Ministers in the Security Council, and I think that sends a very clear signal about the importance with which we regard the issue. It does not mean that no steps have been taken; many measures have been taken already. Financial sanctions are in place, and a financial flows working group, led by Bahrain, has been operating for a year now, but the fact that Finance Ministers of the key countries in the world are going to New York tomorrow to sit in the forum of the Security Council to pass further sanctions measures is an important symbol of our commitment to shutting down this channel of Daesh’s lifeblood. We regard it as extremely important. We saw, in relation to sanctions on Iran, that getting the financial sanctions right was at least as important as getting the sanctions on flows of physical goods right.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the communications cell. The operation of the cell necessarily encroaches into the area of the secret intelligence agencies’ work, so I cannot give him details of the resources available to it or of the number of people deployed in it, but I can tell him that it is already having a visible and measurable effect on Daesh’s communication channels. He also asked me about deaths resulting from coalition action. Of course, any civilian death is deeply regrettable. I was referring to deaths attributable to RAF action, and I believe that while the House will obviously be concerned about civilian deaths more widely, it will be on the question of RAF-caused civilian casualties that hon. Members will want to focus, and I intend to ensure that the House remains updated if the situation changes in respect of any reports of any RAF-caused civilian casualties.

Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked me about the protocols for investigating civilian casualty reports as the campaign moves on. NATO has well-established protocols for investigating any incidents where CIVCAS are estimated to have occurred or where imagery suggests that there could have been collateral damage to civilian buildings, and it routinely publishes the outcome of those investigations.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Recent discussions with Government officials on a visit to countries in the region confirmed that key questions remain unanswered about the Government’s strategy on combating Daesh, which remains the best-funded terrorist group in history. On the non-military side, why are hard questions not being asked of regional allies about the funding of donations to Daesh from within those countries? When it comes to oil, why are we not asking our regional allies not only to disrupt the flow of stolen oil heading north but to combat the end customers of that oil? Without a market, there can be no cash flow.

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is right. We are focusing on all channels of funding to Daesh. He asserts again that it is receiving funding from within the region, and of course I cannot be certain that there are no channels of funding remaining open to Daesh from the region, but I am confident that none of the Governments in the region either contribute to or condone any such funding. On the question of the flow of oil, he well knows that that oil is being sold into a black market, and I am afraid that black markets are an inevitable consequence of any kind of embargo on the sale of goods. We are doing everything we can to interdict and disrupt the flow of oil and indeed to disrupt the flow of the proceeds of the sale of that oil. He will know that the scale of that production is small and that the means of transport are crude and sometimes even primitive, so it is difficult to disrupt that process to the extent that we would like. Bombing the wellheads so that the stuff cannot be produced in the first place is likely to be the most efficient way to do it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 20th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

21. What progress is being made to ensure that this Parliament, by itself if necessary, can say no to any unwanted EU directives, tax or regulations?

[Mr Hammond]

Part of our reform strategy is to look for a greater role for national Parliaments working together to block unwanted legislation so that we, the people of Europe, cannot have imposed on us by the Commission something that the majority of us do not want. But my hon. Friend knows that it is completely unrealistic to seek an individual national veto in all areas. A European Union of 28 member states with individual national vetoes simply would not work.

Iran: Nuclear Deal

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Wednesday 15th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman has not disappointed me. I shall take that as an endorsement of the diplomatic triumph that we have achieved in Vienna.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

For those of us who have long advocated a greater focus on diplomacy in our dealings with Iran, this agreement is to be very much welcomed, and I congratulate the Foreign Secretary and his team on the part they have played in achieving it. Let us hope that it becomes ever more self-fulfilling in that it will strengthen the hands of the many moderates within Iran. To promote dialogue, what measures will the British Government take to encourage or help British business to realise the potential of the Iranian market, given that planeloads of our competitors have been landing in Tehran for some time?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is right. Clearly, the key thing we need to do is to get our embassy reopened. I have spoken to the Chancellor over the past few days, as we approached the conclusion of this deal, to ensure that the Treasury is engaged in the opportunities that will arise—some quite substantial and early. I think that Iran will want to use some of its unfrozen assets to address some large infrastructure deficits, including in the oil and gas production industry, where the UK is well placed to play a role. The visa regime will be another important part of normalising our relationship with Iran.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 9th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Philip Hammond]

Perhaps for the first time, I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman. The reality is that the alternative to an agreement that will restrict Iran’s development of civil nuclear enrichment capabilities for a period of perhaps 20 years is no deal and a free-for-all. We have got to get this agreement right and we have got to carry the Gulf states and Israel with us, and the meeting at Camp David that the US President hosted with the Gulf Co-operation Council countries was part of a process to reassure allies in the Gulf of our commitment to their security.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

A year ago, the then Foreign Secretary announced the good news that the British embassy in Tehran would reopen, following its closure in 2011. Given that it is still closed, could we have an update on progress?

[Mr Hammond]

Yes. I think I have told the House before that there are two issues that we are trying to deal with in order to reopen the embassy. One is around the visa regime and how we deal with Iranian overstayers in the UK, and the other is around the importation of communications equipment that we need to import, uninspected by the Iranians, in order to be able to safely operate our embassy. Until we have resolved those two issues, we really cannot make progress.

Britain in the World

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 1st June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I will address each of those challenges in turn, but before I do so I will take an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron).

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for giving way; he is being very generous. Given the extent of the refugee crisis that has been unfolding in Lebanon and Jordan since Parliament last met, does he accept that we need to continue as a country, together with others, to properly support those countries when dealing with refugees, because under-resourced and ill-run refugee camps can become a breeding ground for extremists?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I entirely agree with him. The Department for International Development has a very large programme. In fact, it is our largest ever single programme of support in a humanitarian crisis. We are the second largest donor to the Syria-Jordan-Lebanon area, and we will continue to support refugees and displaced persons, and the Governments in the region, as they struggle with the consequences of what is going on.

Iran (Nuclear Talks)

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 25th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

As I have already told the House, we have raised and will continue to raise this case with the Iranians, but they simply do not recognise our locus. The Iranian constitution does not recognise the concept of dual nationality and therefore our protestations are received politely, but without any obvious effect.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The extension of the deadline is the second-best option, but one that is welcome all the same—going the extra mile to try to resolve the impasse could unlock so many thorny problems in the region. May I press the Foreign Secretary for absolute clarity as to the west’s position? He said that he does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or to develop nuclear weapons itself. Is it the west’s position that Iran would be allowed to harness technology and capability to the point of break-out?

[Mr Hammond]

The clear position of the E3 plus 3 is that Iran should be allowed to pursue a peaceful civil nuclear programme, but that safeguards should be in place that prevent Iran from acquiring the capability to develop a nuclear weapon.

ISIL: Iraq and Syria

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Thursday 16th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

We regret the outbreak of violence in domestic protests in Turkey—something we had hoped we had put behind us—and, as always, we deplore the use of violence in protests and the use of violence by the authorities in dealing with those protests. We make our views known consistently to our Turkish allies.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

May I urge caution on those who advocate increased military intervention, whether in Iraq or Syria? Our track record in understanding the nuances of the region has been poor over the past decade, whether in Iraq in 2003, the disastrous morphing of the mission in Afghanistan in 2006, Libya or, indeed, our differing positions on the Syrian civil war only recently. However, may I turn the Foreign Secretary’s attention to the politics in Baghdad? The layer below the immediate leadership has essentially remained the same, which makes the adoption of a more inclusive form of politics far less likely. That will be an uphill struggle. What are we going to do about it?

[Mr Hammond]

I made specific reference to that in my opening remarks. It is true that Prime Minister al-Abadi faces a significant challenge in persuading those on his own side, including a bloc of Shi’a representatives in Parliament led by former Prime Minister al-Maliki, to acquiesce in what will be some very difficult decisions for the Shi’a community to accept. This moment demands great leadership, and we will offer Prime Minister al-Abadi all the support we can to do that. If I wanted to identify a reason to be optimistic, it would be this: the advance of ISIL earlier this summer has shocked the political elite in Baghdad, as well as the Iranian Government, who hold significant influence over the Shi’a bloc in the Iraqi Parliament. There is awareness in Baghdad that something has to change and that if something is not done, the battle will be lost.

Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and security.

This summer has seen a range and scale of threats to international, and particularly European, stability. If they are not unprecedented, they certainly represent a highly unwelcome escalation from the post-cold war norm. Alongside them, there has been a sharp escalation in the level of homeland security threat. The Prime Minister has made two statements in the past nine days covering those, but the Government believe it is right and proper that Parliament has a fuller opportunity to debate those events, and that the Government have the opportunity to take the pulse of parliamentary opinion on Britain’s response to the challenges we face.

In Syria and Iraq, the advance of the barbaric Islamist terrorist organisation Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant represents not only a severe threat to the stability of the middle east but, through the presence of foreign fighters, some of them British, and the threat of a terror attack against the west, a threat to British national security. In the wider middle east, the recent eruption of violence in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, and the tragic loss of many hundreds of civilian lives, has underlined the need for a lasting settlement to that decades-long source of conflict and human suffering. In eastern Ukraine, the instability and violence fuelled initially by covert Russian sponsorship of illegal armed separatists, and more recently by the active operation of formed military units of the Russian armed forces on sovereign Ukraine territory, have underlined Russia’s rejection of the rules-based international order. In Libya, there has been a sharp deterioration of the security situation. Those multiple challenges reflect an arc of instability, extending from north Africa, through the middle east and along Europe’s eastern border to the Arctic.

Perhaps the most alarming of those developments, because of the clear and immediate risk it poses to UK homeland security, is the rise of the Islamist terror organisation ISIL in Syria and Iraq. In Syria, Assad’s brutal war against his own people has created the conditions for a Sunni extremist group to flourish, and in Iraq, the systematic sectarianism of the previous Government has created a permissive environment in the Sunni heartlands for ISIL to expand. In both countries, ISIL has seized the opportunity to impose its twisted ideology.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that supporting air strikes in Syria is a higher-risk strategy than supporting air strikes in Iraq?

[Mr Hammond]

I agree with my hon. Friend. There is a qualitative difference between any proposition of air strikes in Syria and such an activity in Iraq. The legal, technical and military differences make the proposition of air strikes an order of magnitude more complicated in Syria.

Afghanistan

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 9th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The military, at least, regularly look at decisions that have been taken and consequences that flow from them, as part of their lessons learned process. We should be proud of what we have achieved in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding an individual who has decided that life in the UK looks more attractive than life in Afghanistan, the fact is that for ordinary Afghans life has got enormously better over the past few years.

This country has been in a state of almost constant war for the past 30 or 40 years, and for the first time in most people’s living memory they have the beginnings of a functioning democracy; a rapidly growing, though still fragile, economy; human rights on a scale that they have never seen before; and access to health care, education and transport infrastructure that their parents could never have dreamed of. That is real and tangible progress, and we should be proud of the part we have played in it.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Nevertheless, I put it to the Foreign Secretary that those of us who are critical of our Afghanistan policy point to the mistake made when we allowed the original, narrowly focused objective of defeating al-Qaeda, which we succeeded in doing and could have sustained, to morph into a much broader mission of nation-building, which we have struggled to sustain and which will ultimately result in the Taliban regaining control over large chunks of Afghanistan. What lessons can the Foreign Secretary draw from this episode with regard to our policy in the region generally?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend insists on looking at this with a glass-half-full mentality. Enormous gains have been made in Afghanistan and I simply do not accept that the inevitable outcome of this process is that the Taliban, as he says, will regain control of large areas of territory. I hope that a process of genuine reconciliation between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan will begin as soon as a new Government are in place. If my hon. Friend is inviting me to recognise the risks of mission creep, I promise him that I am up for that. I recognise entirely that when we go into any exercise, political or military, we need to be clear about the objectives we are seeking to achieve and we need to be extremely resistant to the temptation to allow the mission to creep.

Armed Forces Restructuring

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Thursday 23rd January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I can confirm that.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The plan to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists is beset with problems, including more than £50 million wasted on a botched IT system, missed recruitment targets, cancelled reserve courses and a widening capability gap. Given that the previous Secretary of State recently confirmed in this House that the original plan was to hold the regulars in place until the reservists were able to take their place, can this Secretary of State inform the House why and when that plan changed?

[Mr Hammond]

First, my hon. Friend continually asserts, and I continually rebut, the idea that we are trying to replace 20,000 regular soldiers with 30,000 reservists— that is not what we are doing. We are restructuring the regular force; the regular force will be smaller. We will use civilians in a different way from how we have used them in the past. We will use contractors more effectively, learning the lessons, particularly from the US experience of using contractors to support combat operations. We will also use reservists, but it is simply wrong for him to suggest that this is a straightforward swap of 20,000 regulars replaced by 30,000 reservists. That is not how it works.

My hon. Friend knows very well the answer to the second part of his question: there is not the budgetary capacity to maintain the Regular Army at 102,000 while building the reserve to 30,000 by 2018. That simply cannot be done without imposing new and unwanted cuts elsewhere.

IT Systems (Army Recruitment)

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

That is precisely what I am doing. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman should remind himself that the initial gate business case for this project to outsource recruiting was approved in July 2008, so I hope we are not in dispute over the principle.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned an IT debacle. Yes, there are big problems with the IT and I have told the House on repeated occasions that we have IT challenges. There are problems with IT in Government. The hon. Gentleman speaks as if he was not a member of the Government who spent £13 billion on a health computer system that we had to write off and £400 million on a work and pensions computer system that had to be written off.

What we are doing now is gripping this problem and addressing it. That means, in the short term, workarounds and putting additional manpower into the system to provide additional support. Short-term solutions include the new front-end web application, which will go live over the next two weeks, to improve the experience of applicants accessing the platform.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the costs and I can give him some figures. The Capita solution will cost about £47.7 million to produce a full new IT platform. The alternative Atlas IT platform proposal would have cost about £43 million, so the additional cost of the Capita solution is about £4.5 million. He asked about the £15.5 million of sunk cost. Our initial estimate is that about £6.7 million of that represents costs that will have to be written off, but that will be subject to a proper audit process.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the additional cost—the running cost, as it were—of the interim solution that we have put in place. It comprises additional payments that have to be made and the cost of the additional manpower that has been delivered into the system. That is currently running at about £1 million per month. The solution that we have adopted and that we have now approved—going ahead with Capita platform and placing the integration risk back on Capita—is judged to be the quickest way of eliminating that ongoing expenditure and the best way of delivering a permanent solution for the benefit of the Army and the taxpayer.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I again suggest to the Secretary of State that plans to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists will cost much more than the Government envisage, leading to false economies and a waste of taxpayers’ money. Given the tens of millions of pounds already wasted on this IT shambles, will he outline how much more it will cost to put it right? Does this not reinforce the point that the Government should now halt and stop the disbandment of regular units until we are sure that the plan to replace them with reservists is both cost-effective and feasible?

[Mr Hammond]

Let me deal with the cost point first. The overall programme, the Capita recruiting partnership project, has a budget of about £1.3 billion over a 10-year period. As I have just outlined, the additional cost of the IT platform is estimated to be £47.7 million.

Repeating the question that he has asked many times, my hon. Friend asked whether it is appropriate to replace 20,000 regular soldiers with 30,000 reservists. That is not what we are doing; we are changing the shape of the British Army and we are changing the role of reservists, whom we intend to fill specialist roles and provide resilience in the case of a prolonged future deployment. He makes a regular versus reserve point, but I should be clear with him that the recruiting platform is used for regular and reserve recruitment: it affects both regulars and reservists.

Defence Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

New clause 3 and consequential amendments tabled in my name and those of other hon. Members will, if successful, postpone the implementation of the Government’s reservist plans until their viability and cost-effectiveness have been scrutinised and accepted by Parliament. I should clarify what these amendments are not about, because a number of Aunt Sallys have been proposed by various interested parties. Contrary to some claims and implications, these are not wrecking amendments; they are not designed to scupper, reverse or tear up the Army reserve plans, and they are certainly not an attempt to recreate, or go back to, Victorian-style and size armies. These arguments are Aunt Sallys that do not do the Government’s cause any good.

I also want to make it clear that if these amendments are passed the delay to the Army reserve plans could be kept to an absolute minimum if the Government allowed prompt scrutiny of the report. There is no intention to drag this out or turn it into a campaign that goes on for months and months. The report could be produced the day after the Bill becomes an Act and we could have a debate in this place within weeks. I have to say that the stories that this is scuppering the Army reserve plans or reversing them are very wide of the mark.

[Mr Philip Hammond]

As the House may imagine, my hon. Friend and I have discussed these issues at some length. I think he will acknowledge that while a debate could be held in short order the requirement is for the Government to carry the House at the end of that debate. Will my hon. Friend acknowledge that the Government would have to get that vote through before we could progress with the reserves agenda, and setting out that hurdle today would send a negative signal to the reserves community, which has heard a message of reinvigoration and growth for the future?

[Mr Baron]

I will very directly answer both those questions. I completely agree that the report the Government would submit would be subject to the scrutiny of this House and a vote, but the fact that the Secretary of State seems concerned about that points to a bigger story about the reforms. If the Government are concerned that they might not carry the House as to the logic of their report, I suggest that that shows a weak point. I therefore suggest that the Secretary of State should, perhaps, not pursue that argument for too long, because for the Government not to accept this amendment because they are concerned they might not be able to carry the House tells a bigger story.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baron]

I very much agree. I sometimes think in this place, where there is no shortage of former serving soldiers, that Front Benchers can be a little too sensitive about how stoical troops are. Their job is to get on with it, particularly if they are professional soldiers. They know these debates are taking place, but they get on with the job in hand, because that is what they are paid to do.

[Mr Philip Hammond]

Would my hon. Friend not accept, though, that there is no attempt to avoid scrutiny here? By indicating that I will accept the intention of our hon. Friends’ new clause 1 and legislate to require an annual independent report—not for a limited period, but as a permanent arrangement—we are in effect creating a mechanism whereby annually the House will receive a progress report on the state of the reserves, and I would expect the House to debate that progress report. That will provide the level of scrutiny that he seeks. What we cannot accept is the destabilisation of the programme that introducing an artificial hurdle—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baron]

I completely disagree; it is not grossly unfair at all. In fact, my hon. Friend highlights the fact that we have fundamental problems with the way the system works. If people are having to wait 13 months for computer systems to talk to each other, then that, if anything, reinforces the case that we should be saying, “Let us pause for a moment and properly scrutinise these plans.” That is all we are asking for.

[Mr Philip Hammond]

I have acknowledged in this House recently and shall do so again later that we have challenges in the recruitment pipeline and problems with the IT systems. We cannot wait until next May to deal with them—we are dealing with them now on a daily, weekly basis. The senior management at the Department and the senior leadership of the Army are all over these problems; they cannot wait until next year for my hon. Friend’s pause.

[Mr Baron]

My right hon. Friend is ascribing a victory to me before it has taken place. The bottom line is that the new clause, like the Bill, would not take effect until the Act receives Royal Assent in the spring of next year. If he is as confident as he says that this is all going to work out, then he has until the spring of next year, before the Bill becomes an Act, to work on these problems. So I do not buy that one either, I am afraid—it is a not a particularly strong card to play when the new clause, like the Bill, would not take effect until the Act receives Royal Assent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hammond]

I must make some progress, because I have very little time and I want to leave a couple of minutes for my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury to wind up the debate.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury will not press new clause 2. It is essential that we manage the defence estate as a whole. We are on the brink of completing the appointment of a strategic business partner for the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, which will mean that we have the very best private sector estate management capability to deliver the defence estates programme. That will be to the benefit of the regulars and the reserves.

[Mr Baron]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Hammond]

I will say something about new clause 3 and will then take an intervention from my hon. Friend.

First, I recognise that my hon. Friend is a passionate supporter of the armed forces. It is ironic that today, that passion has manifested itself in an attempt to block or inhibit the growth and reinvigoration of the reserves. I know that that is not what he wants. Indeed, I know that he would like to see more capability across our armed forces, not less. As I have made clear, we have no problem with submitting information to the House for scrutiny. By accepting new clause 1, we will deliver the intention behind subsection (1) of new clause 3. I believe that making it an annual report for annual scrutiny will provide for better scrutiny than what he is proposing.

I cannot accept the halt that is proposed in new clause 3. That would send out a signal now to the thousands of people who are in the reserve forces or are thinking of joining them. The Government have set out their plan and are legislating to deliver it. The Army has embraced the plan wholeheartedly. For Parliament to introduce additional tripwires at this stage would create uncertainty, undermine the message about the roll-out of improved terms and conditions, and cast doubt on our intention to spend the sizeable sum of £1.8 billion that is available to support this agenda. In short, it would make the whole agenda into a political football.

As my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) said in his contribution, the proper way to scrutinise the implementation of this programme is through the established mechanisms of the House—the annual report, Select Committee hearings and the reporting of data—and not by halting the roll-out of the programme. We do not do that elsewhere and we should not do that for our reserve forces.

What I am attempting to do is to ascribe the most transparent of motives to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), but listening to him I could not help detecting just a hint of an undertone of a hidden agenda. Maybe what he wants is not to help us to fix the challenges we face in the reserves agenda, but to find a reason to abandon the project. In his own words, he told the House:

“we could very easily reverse the cuts to the regulars”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hammond]

I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that, although we have not publicised it, we have increased the recruiting cap on units in Northern Ireland to 115% of liability, and the Army will continue to consider increases in liability caps in other parts of the country where recruiting performance is strong. I can go further and tell him that a review is currently under way to look at trade skills available in Northern Ireland. Most of the reserves recruiting is trade skills-specific. If we find that pools of additional trade skills are recruitable, we will consider locating additional units in Northern Ireland to tap into them. We have to be agile and go where the potential recruits are and where the skills we need are.

I want to go briefly through some of the other points that have been raised. I want to nail the point my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has made several times in debate and in the media. He says that a 40% or an 80% mobilisation rate is not achievable. We are looking at a maximum mobilisation of between 3,000 and 4,000 reservists at any given time, out of an Army Reserve of 30,000. By my maths, that is significantly below 40% or 80%. During Operation Telic in Iraq, 85% of reservists responded to call out—an 85% mobilisation rate—and Operation Herrick had a 79% mobilisation rate, so I do not quite understand his point.

[Mr Baron]

Will the Secretary of State give way?

[Mr Hammond]

I am sorry, but I have to press on. I also want to deal with—

[Mr Baron]

rose—

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 4th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

T4. Parliament sent a very clear message to the Government—the vote was 92 to nil—not to disband regular units until we were sure that the Army Reserve plan was both viable and cost-effective. What plans do the Government have to enact Parliament’s will?

[Mr Hammond]

As I have said in answer to an earlier question, it is just not possible, within the resource envelope available, to maintain the regular forces at their previous level while also recruiting and building the reserve. Neither would it allow us to restructure the force in the way necessary to deliver the outputs required from Future Force 2020.

Defence Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 16th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I understand that the right hon. Gentleman desires to get to the bottom of this matter—as do we all—but he is right that there is little I can say. An inquiry by Dyfed-Powys police is under way, and when it is complete there will be a service inquiry into the events of last weekend. We will get to the bottom of what happened, and if there are systemic lessons to be learned, we will learn them. I give the right hon. Gentleman an undertaking that once the inquiry is complete, I will report to the House in an appropriate way.

The need to address the public sector structural deficit and the deficit in the defence budget has meant tough decisions and a relentless focus on squeezing more capability out of what remains the world’s fourth largest defence budget.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend talked, quite rightly, about the first duty of government, but he will be aware that some of us on the Government Benches are concerned that misguided Army reserve plans will throw up false economies and unacceptable capability gaps. Given that the present Territorial Army mobilisation rate is 40%, will he explain how we are trying to plug a gap from the loss of 20,000 regular troops with only 30,000 reservists? A 40% figure would suggest that we need nearer 50,000.

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend’s view on this matter is well known. Two weeks ago the Government set out robust proposals in a White Paper, “Future Reserves 2020”. I am confident we will be able to deliver the force we have set out, and that that force will support the level of ambition for deployment set out in the strategic defence and security review 2010.

Reserve Forces

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Wednesday 3rd July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I suggest that the Government have still failed, however, to show that their plans represent value for money or are in the best interests of this country. The fact that further cash incentives have been announced today, that that ex-regular reservists will be on a better scale of pay than brigadiers and that TA numbers have been falling all point to doubt being cast on Government plans—and that is before we consider the issue of capability. Would it not be wise to halt the disbandment of the regular battalions and to stop the loss of 20,000 regular troops until we know for sure that these plans will work?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend returns to a familiar theme—he has suggested that course of action to me on many previous occasions. We are restructuring our armed forces to reflect the threat they will face in the future, as identified in the strategic defence and security review, and to respond to the fiscal challenges we must address if we are to have a stable platform for the proper defence of this country. I am afraid to say to my hon. Friend that although it might be tempting to wish that we had the resources to retain the regular Army at its historic strength while we recruit up to 30,000 trained reserves, we do not have that luxury. I think the Opposition would acknowledge—and have implicitly acknowledged—that reducing the size of the regular Army while increasing the size of the reserves is not without risk but is the best way to manage the resources we have to deliver the military output we require.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

My priority remains the success of operations in Afghanistan. Beyond that, my priorities are to deliver the sustainable transformation of the Ministry of Defence, to maintain budgets in balance and to deliver equipment programmes so that our armed forces can be confident of being properly equipped and trained.

[Mr Baron]

A number of us on the Conservative Benches have reservations about the Government’s reservist policy, including its cost-effectiveness. Given that the MOD’s figures show that the Territorial Army’s mobilisation rate is 40%, which suggests we need 50,000 reservists not 30,000, and that rates of pay for ex-reservists will beat those of a serving brigadier, how confident is the Secretary of State that the £1.8 billion will cover the policy?

[Mr Hammond]

As in many areas, we have to work within the financial constraints presented to us, and we are currently tailoring a package of support for the reserve forces that can be accommodated within the £1.8 billion. I am quite confident that we can do so.

I would like to correct a possible misunderstanding. The top-up to rates of civilian pay has always been available in the system and our proposal is to limit that so that we make sure that we pay only people who have specialist skills what are sometimes very large amounts of money.

Better Defence Acquisition

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 10th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

They will see benefits at two levels and a healthier BAES as a result of this announcement. First, large defence contractors, perhaps counter-intuitively, do not relish the lack of a capable interlocutor in their trading partners. They would welcome our beefing up our capability and having higher-skilled, better-paid project managers on our side of the table, because that would drive genuine efficiencies into the process. At that level, we know that the companies will welcome this announcement. Secondly, on single-source procurement, I am confident that over time by incentivising cost-efficiency we will increase the exportability of British defence products, which are an incredibly important part of our high-tech manufacturing industries and help us to sustain jobs at the very top of the curve.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

These are early days and final decisions are yet to be made, but what indication can the Secretary of State give about the impact of this announcement on jobs at MOD Abbey Wood? Will he ensure that suitable provisions are in place for the employees who may be affected?

[Mr Hammond]

As my hon. Friend knows, the TUPE transfer of an enterprise does not imply any reduction in job numbers at the outset. It is true that a private sector partner taking on a work force of this nature will, over time, look to reconfigure the shape of the work force to make the business as efficient as possible. However, it will have to do that within the constraints of the TUPE regulations, normal employment law and the arrangements that are in place for negotiation with the trade unions.

Army Basing Plan

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 5th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces, who has responsibility for such matters, will be very happy to meet my hon. Friend to talk about those issues.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Having served in Germany twice, I know that this is an important announcement. In welcoming the basing plan, I suggest to the Secretary of State that its success will be contingent in part on the ability of 30,000 royal reservists to plug the gap left by the loss of 20,000 regular troops. Given that some of us have concerns about the cost and recruitment assumptions underlying the reservist plan, is it the Secretary of State’s intention to publish or keep the House regularly updated on the costs of implementing it?

[Mr Hammond]

That is slightly off the beam of the regular Army basing announcement. It is certainly my intention, once the recruiting campaign for reserves gets under way this year, to publish routinely—I think quarterly would be most appropriate—the recruiting data for the reserves. My hon. Friend is right that success in delivering our reserves programme is a crucial part of the Army 2020 plan. I will reflect on his suggestion that the cost of the reserve programme should be published, although I am not so sure it will be that easy to identify and isolate it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 25th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

No. The right hon. Gentleman is simply wrong. The figure of £12.5 billion is from CAAS—the internal cost assessment and assurance service. It was quoted by the National Audit Office and has subsequently been reassessed at £4.4 billion. [Interruption.] No, it was by CAAS and has been reassessed at £4.4 billion. The right hon. Gentleman is simply wrong.

Labour has to decide whether it is going to engage seriously in this debate or not. At last year’s Labour conference, the right hon. Gentleman told his party that it

“must deal with the issues we would if we were in power…No smoke and mirrors, no delay in tough decisions”.

Just two weeks ago, however, he told The Daily Telegraph:

“I’m not going to say we will guarantee to overturn this cut or the other.”

Which is it to be: tough decisions or more ducking and weaving?

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The 2011 independent commission acknowledged the increased cost of collectively training Territorial Army units over their regular brethren when force generation factors were taken into account. Given that the Green Paper makes clear that TA units will be more frequently used, will the Government justify their claim that replacing regular troops with reservists is cost-effective?

[Mr Hammond]

As my hon. Friend knows, we have allocated £1.8 billion over 10 years for additional training, infrastructure and equipment for the reserves to try to rebuild the broken trust that resulted from the previous Government’s slashing of funding for reserve training and equipment. On the economics of using reserves instead of regular forces, it is true that, when deployed on operations, reserves are more expensive than regulars, but, held as a contingency, reserves are significantly lower cost than regular forces. We are simply trying, within the budget envelope available, to create the greatest amount of military capacity it is possible to generate.

Deployment to Mali

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on deployment to Mali.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

On 14 January the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Mark Simmonds), made a statement to the House outlining the UK’s deployment of two C-I7 transport aircraft to provide logistical support to France, as well as a small detachment of technical personnel deployed to Bamako airport to assist with the reception of the C-I7 aircraft. Since that announcement, we have decided to extend our support to the continued provision of one C-I7 in support of the French for a further three months. There are currently about 20 people deployed in Bamako supporting liaison with French forces and, following a French request for additional surveillance support, we have deployed a Sentinel R1 aircraft to Dakar, Senegal, with supporting ground crew and technical support staff of about 70 people.

EU Foreign Ministers agreed on 17 January to establish an EU military training mission to Mali—EUTM—and work is ongoing to scope that mission. Today in Brussels, representatives from EU member states, including the UK, will meet to discuss the individual member state contributions to the mission. The UK is prepared to contribute up to 40 personnel to the EUTM, either in an HQ or training team role. We do not envisage UK personnel fulfilling a force protection role, and it is quite possible that all 40 personnel will not be required, dependent on the contributions from other member states. I can assure the House that we will not allow UK personnel to deploy on any mission until we are satisfied that adequate force protection arrangements are in place.

Today in Addis Ababa the African Union is hosting a donor conference to discuss how the international community can support the African-led intervention force, AFISMA, in delivering the role that the United Nations Security Council has mandated it to fulfil. The UK will today offer £5 million for two new UN funds to support the strengthening of security in Mali, with £3 million directed to AFISMA and £2 million to activity in Mali that facilitates and supports political processes for building stability. The UK is also prepared to offer up to 200 personnel to provide training to troops from Anglophone west African countries contributing to AFISMA, although the numbers required will be dependent upon the requirements of the AFISMA contributing nations. To establish those requirements, we have deployed a small number of advisers to Anglophone west African countries that are likely to contribute to the AFISMA mission, to assess their needs and to gain situational awareness.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers will provide an update to the House on the outcome of the discussions in Brussels and Addis Ababa at the appropriate moment.

[Mr Baron]

I thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question, and thank the Secretary of State for his answer.

British involvement in Mali and the wider region is deepening, and it is clearly in everyone’s interests that we do not allow legitimate Governments to fail, particularly when faced with extremists. It is no secret that I opposed our recent interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, because I fear that one can be drawn into ever-deepening conflicts. Afghanistan illustrated the dangers of being sucked into larger deployments. That mission morphed into something much larger: it changed from a mission to defeat al-Qaeda or deny it the use of Afghanistan to one of nation-building.

Drawing on our lessons in Afghanistan—and, perhaps, on other interventions—will the Government clarify the following points? We need greater clarity on the role of British troops. The Government have said they will not be placed in a combat role, but there are a host of grey areas between combat roles and support roles. What exactly will these advisers do? Will they be involved in logistics or training, or will they advise on strategy? Equally importantly, how will they be protected? Are we deploying troops on the ground to protect these advisers, or are we relying on our French colleagues to provide that protection?

May I also ask the Secretary of State what exactly is the exit strategy? It is very easy to get drawn into these situations, but it is not always clear what the endgame and exit strategy are, and even what the endgame looks like. What are the contingency plans if military progress does not go to plan? Is there talk on the table that we should perhaps be deploying or committing, or be prepared to commit, more troops if the fighting goes badly? At the moment, that is all going well, but the situation can change very quickly.

Finally, what lessons should we learn from United Nations Security Council resolution 2085, which was passed last year and called on local African nations to lead the combat role in defeating these extremists in northern Mali? There was tremendous delay in the implementation of that resolution. What lessons have we learned from that, because we seem to be playing catch-up? On a related but slightly separate issue, what is the international community’s broader strategy on encouraging local forces to play a more proactive role, not only in Mali, but in the wider region, in combating these extremists? These are legitimate questions and the British public and we as a House need to ask them, because there is a real danger of getting drawn into a much larger deployment, particularly if things do not go to plan on the ground.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his questions. First, the UK has a clear interest in the stability of Mali and in ensuring that its territory does not become an ungoverned space available to al-Qaeda and its associates to organise for attacks on the west. Secondly, we have established military co-operation with France, which is an important part of Britain’s strategy for the future, and this situation, along with the Libya campaign, is an opportunity for us to demonstrate the validity of that working relationship with France. The role of British troops, as I set out in my response to the urgent question, is clearly not a combat role, and it will also not extend, as we envisage it at the moment, to a force protection role. We are looking for force protection arrangements to be put in place, probably by the French, but certainly by the European Union in relation to the EU training mission.

My hon. Friend asked me about the exit strategy. France has made it clear that it envisages a short intervention to stabilise the situation on the ground while the African forces from neighbouring countries and the Malian army deploy to sustain the situation in the longer term. We concur with that strategy. I should say, again, that it is not our intention to deploy combat troops; we are very clear about the risks of mission creep and we have defined very carefully the support that we are willing and able to provide to the French and the Malian authorities.

My hon. Friend referred to UN Security Council resolution 2085 and the time delay in deploying African forces. I think it is well known that the intention was to deploy African forces in support of the Malian authorities later this year, but the situation on the ground has become more urgent, hence the decision by the French to intervene. Some of these forces require equipment and some require additional training, and the response time to the mobilisation envisaged by resolution 2085 has perhaps been longer than we would have liked. The lesson we can learn from that is that if we want local forces to be able to deploy and respond to resolutions of this nature, we may have to take a more proactive role in resourcing them to do so.

On the broader strategy for encouraging local forces to tackle extremism, part of our defence posture, set out in the strategic defence and security review 2010, is to devote an increasing proportion of our defence resources to upstream engagement, building capacity in fragile nation states to allow them to deal with early threats to their security, rather than waiting for the situation to degenerate to the point at which it requires outside intervention.

Afghanistan

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The responsibility for protecting Afghan local health services will be primarily for the Afghan police and military, but I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman that we were all shocked by the reminder of the primitiveness of some of the Taliban doctrine, and that they would attack people for providing vaccination against life-threatening diseases. That is the scale of the challenge we are dealing with.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I welcome the statement, but as the Secretary of State knows, some Members of the House have long held the view that we were fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country, as we strayed from the original mission. Will he confirm that ISAF is now conducting non-conditional talks with the Taliban? Until fairly recently, the American position was that they would only talk to the Taliban if the Taliban laid down their arms and accepted the constitution. The Americans were living in never-never land. Has the position on those talks changed?

[Mr Hammond]

I think it would be wrong to characterise the discussions as ISAF discussions. There are discussions that the Afghan Government have indicated a willingness to enter into, which are conditional on an acceptance of the Afghan constitution. That is the position of the Afghan Government. There are also discussions, which have been widely reported, between US officials and Taliban representatives, which do not have the same preconditions attached to them.

Afghanistan (NATO Strategy)

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Tuesday 18th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the change in NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

There has been no change of policy in Afghanistan. As I told the House yesterday, the security of our deployed forces in Afghanistan or anywhere in the world remains a defence priority. The safety of our service personnel is an issue that all in government and in the military chain of command take extremely seriously.

In respect of the international security assistance force fragmentary order issued on Sunday, not for the first time the media have become a little overexcited. It might help the House if I quote a press release issued by the commander of ISAF forces in Kabul this morning. He stated that

“recent media coverage regarding a change in ISAF’s model of Security Force Assistance is not accurate. ISAF remains absolutely committed to partnering with, training, advising and assisting our ANSF”—

Afghan national security forces—

“counterparts. The ISAF SFA model is focused at the battalion level and above, with exceptions approved by senior commanders. Partnering occurs at all levels, from Platoon to Corps. This has not changed.

In response to elevated threat levels resulting from the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ video, ISAF has taken some prudent, but temporary, measures to reduce our profile and vulnerability to civil disturbances or insider attacks…The SFA model is integral to the success of the ANSF, and ISAF will return to normal operations as soon as conditions warrant.”

The commander of ISAF Joint Command has effectively directed a change to the level at which partnering and advising are scrutinised and authorised. Most partnering and advising was already at the kandak, or battalion, level and above. The change does not mean that there will be no partnering below that level. The need for that will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and approved by the regional commanders in theatre.

The regional commander in Regional Command Southwest, where British forces are based, is Major General Mark Gurganus, a US Marine Corps general. He has endorsed the approach currently being taken by the UK-led Taskforce Helmand, including mentoring and partnering at below kandak level. That means that the UK partnering and mentoring operations will continue substantially unchanged by this order. It is normal practice that all elements of our operations are subject to oversight by the chain of command, and operations will continue to evolve and risk assessments will continue to be updated. The ANSF capability for independent operations is, in any case, steadily increasing, and our level of partnering activity on the ground has therefore been steadily decreasing.

The personal safety of our deployed personnel remains a defence priority, and we will take every step necessary to minimise the risk to them. We have always kept the level at which we mentor the ANSF under review and will continue to do so through the process of security transition. British commanders on the ground retain the flexibility to mentor at the appropriate level in consultation with the regional commander. We have a strategic plan that takes us to the end of combat operations in 2014 while strengthening the ANSF to take over security responsibility from us. I have every confidence in the way Com ISAF is executing that plan.

[Mr Baron]

May I thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting the urgent question?

At the very least there is confusion with regard to this issue. A NATO statement has made it clear that joint on-the-ground operations have been suspended until further notice. The decision announced in Afghanistan by General Allen has appeared to take the UK Government by surprise. Only yesterday, in Parliament, the Defence Secretary was rightly defending NATO’s continued work with Afghan troops on the ground. When did the Government know of this decision, and were they consulted on the matter?

This announcement threatens to blow a hole in our stated exit strategy, which is heavily reliant on these joint operations continuing until Afghan forces are able to operate independently and provide their own security following ISAF’s withdrawal. As a soldier myself, I know the real value of mentoring—coaching and training—at ground level, and there is no substitute for that. Anything else above battalion level is very much theory. If these operations are not going to take place at ground level, where does that leave our exit strategy? Will our soldiers be coming home early? The announcement adds to the uncertainty as to whether Afghan forces will have the ability to keep an undefeated Taliban at bay once NATO forces have left.

This, in a way, goes to the very heart of what our mission is in Afghanistan. For those of us who opposed our involvement in Afghanistan, there appears to have been confusion from the start. Al-Qaeda was driven from the country in the early stages. The mission has now morphed into one of nation building, human rights and democracy. Laudable though those aims are, they are very different from our original mission. I suggest that we need to be clear about this. Last week, the International Development Secretary talked of nation building. At the same time, the Defence Secretary, when visiting troops in Afghanistan, talked, rightly in my view, about it being wrong to risk the lives of our troops for nation building when they should only protect our vital national security interests. The importance of that distinction is that nation building requires defeat of the Taliban, whereas protecting our national security interests in preventing al-Qaeda from returning does not necessarily require their defeat, given their differences with al-Qaeda.

What is our mission in Afghanistan? Clarity is required. If we are remaining true to our original mission of eliminating al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, should we not now be doing more to encourage the Americans to conduct non-conditional talks with the Taliban in order to explore possible common ground?

[Mr Hammond]

There were a lot of questions there. First, my hon. Friend talks about consultation with Governments. This is not a strategic initiative; it is a tactical initiative, taken by commanders in theatre, operating within their delegated responsibility. We would not seek to interfere with the military judgment of commanders on the ground.

On information, I can tell my hon. Friend that this FRAGO was issued on Sunday evening. I was told about that during a meeting on Monday, along with information about several other measures that ISAF has taken. No particular significance was attached to it.

My hon. Friend talks about partnering at below kandak level. I should stress to him that US forces have not routinely partnered below kandak level. It has been the practice of the British-led Taskforce Helmand to partner and mentor Afghan units at tolay—company—and even platoon level. That is not a practice used by the Americans, so the impact of the announcement will be far less significant than he suggests. As I made clear in my opening remarks, General Gurganus, Regional Commander of RC Southwest, has this morning confirmed that he is happy for Taskforce Helmand to continue in its current mode of operations. In other words, he has endorsed the risk assessment and management approach that we have been using. We will continue our operations as we were carrying them out last week in Helmand.

My hon. Friend asks, at the more strategic level, about our mission in Afghanistan. I touched on that yesterday, and he knows my position very well: we can ask British forces to place themselves at risk for the defence of Britain’s national interest, and legitimately for no other reason. I am clear that the mission we are carrying out in Afghanistan is to protect Britain’s national security by denying Afghan space to international terrorists. That is our mission, and that is the mission we will complete.

Afghanistan (Force Protection)

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 17th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis. When we end our combat role in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it is likely that it will not be an entirely peaceable country. The point, however, is that ISAF and Afghan national security forces are containing the insurgency and, critically, denying the use of Afghan territory to international terrorists. That is the bottom line for the UK’s national security. If we turn the clock back 10 years, Afghanistan was the principal base for international terrorists who sought ungoverned space from which to plan their attacks on the west.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Last Thursday, in a statement on Afghanistan by the Secretary of State for International Development, the importance of nation building was stressed. When visiting troops in Afghanistan, the Secretary of State for Defence rightly made the point that our troops’ lives should be put in danger not for the sake of nation building, but only to protect British security interests. Which is the Government view? The importance of the distinction is that the first requires defeat of the Taliban, whereas the second does not.

[Mr Hammond]

I am not sure I agree with the last part of my hon. Friend’s analysis. Building the capacity of the Afghan state is and has been an important part of winning the overall battle. Afghans in Helmand in particular are now enjoying substantially better health, education and transport services, and access to justice, than they enjoyed a couple of years ago. There is lots of evidence to show that that reinforces their tendency to support the Government and diminishes their tendency to support the insurgency. It is clear to me that building the capacity of the Afghan Government is an important part of the overall equation, but our forces are there to protect our national security. That is their principal task and the basis on which we should judge the wisdom of their engagement.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 16th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

12. What account he took of recruitment capability in determining regimental disbandment.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

In selecting infantry battalions for withdrawal, the Army has focused on the major long-term recruiting challenges that it faces in this area. It has looked carefully at historic recruiting performance over a decade, and at demographic projections for the age cohort from which infantry recruits are drawn in the recruiting catchment areas of different regiments. It has also considered regional and national affiliations, the merger and disbandment history of individual battalions, and existing commitments of battalions to future operations. The overriding objective has been to arrive at a solution that delivers a balanced and effective military force and is seen as fair and equitable by those currently serving in the Army.

[Mr Baron]

Although the MOD has not been able to supply the five and 10-year recruitment figures, despite a named-day written parliamentary question tabled the week before last, the three-year figures clearly show that better recruited English battalions, including the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, are being axed in order to save the more poorly recruited Scottish ones. Will the Secretary of State deny that petty politics in relation to the Scottish referendum has influenced decisions?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is repeating an assertion that he made when I made the statement. I sat down afterwards with the Chief of the General Staff and went through his process again to reassure myself that I could say with confidence to my hon. Friend that the assertion he is making is simply not correct. Looked at over a decade, the recruitment figures for the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers speak for themselves. I am happy to have a meeting with him and go through the numbers, if he would like to do so.

Army 2020

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Thursday 5th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

There were shades of the sound of bedpans dropping there. The point is this: the Army has made a decision about which battalions in each affected regiment should be withdrawn from the order of battle, and it has done so against a number of criteria, including their current deployment and any future commitments to Operation Herrick.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I declare an interest, having served with the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. I am very sorry to say that I think the Government are making a very grave error with these decisions. Not only does the decision to cut the Army by a fifth smack of accountants running amok, but the decision to axe the better recruited English battalions, such as 2RRF, at the expense of the more poorly recruited Scottish battalions smacks of a grubby political fix, given the advent of the Scottish referendum. If the Government cannot make the right decision within the MOD budget, will they at least source funds from the ridiculous £1,200 million that we are sending in aid to India?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend will have to take up issues about the allocation of budgets between Departments with the Chancellor the Exchequer, but I can tell him—because his comments appear to be drawn directly from the leaked letter from the colonel of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers—that he is simply wrong to describe the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers as one of the best recruited regiments in the Army. If we look at the position over a 10-year period and at the demographics going forward, along with all the other issues that the Army has set out as criteria to be taken into account, the conclusions are clear.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 11th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Philip Hammond]

Perhaps I should be clear that the remit of the medals review is to look at the process and at the factors that are taken into account when making such decisions. So the review will look at the framework and the basis on which decisions are taken, and it will then be for individual decisions to be reviewed within any new framework that is put in place.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

T3. Defence diplomacy is a key component of Britain’s soft power capability. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that defence diplomacy is therefore at the forefront of our foreign and defence policy, and will the Minister highlight some of the programmes currently being pursued in the MOD?

Afghanistan (Troop Levels)

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Thursday 26th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that question, because I have just written myself a note to remind me to respond to a point made by the hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway. When we talk about not having combat troops in place, that does not mean that the troops who are in Afghanistan will not be permitted to defend themselves should they come under attack. Clearly, when British personnel are deployed in an area where there is danger, they must have the capability to defend themselves. The Afghan national officer training academy is being built within the perimeter of an American facility that will be defended by US troops.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I too pay tribute to our troops, but I continue to have grave doubts about the capability that the Afghan forces will have when ISAF ceases combat operations. What scope is there to drop the preconditions to talks with our enemies, which are unrealistic in many respects, so that we can explore possible common ground, particularly given the fundamental differences between the Taliban and al-Qaeda? I suggest to the Secretary of State that those of us who served in Northern Ireland showed, I hope, that one can talk and fight at the same time.

[Mr Hammond]

I have no doubt about the growing competence, capability and confidence of the Afghan national security forces. They will inevitably fight a different type of campaign after 2014 from that fought by ISAF. I have a high level of confidence in their ability to hold the ground against the insurgents. The UK Government recognise the need for an Afghan-led reconciliation process, but the basis for that must be that the people who are involved renounce the use of violence and agree to pursue their objectives by political means.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 26th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that everything possible is being done. The UK has been in the forefront of the effort progressively to tighten sanctions against Iran. All the evidence suggests that they are beginning to have an impact on the Iranian economy and the Iranian regime. We are also leading supporters of the E3 plus 3 talks, and we are moderately encouraged by Iran’s commitment to resume talking next month, but, of course, the proof will be in the pudding, as we have heard all this before. We hope this is a genuine re-engagement by Iran, but, as I said earlier, we should leave all options on the table.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

In the absence of the appropriate UN Security Council authorisation and the justification of self-defence, does the Secretary of State agree that any attack on Iran, whether by Israel or not, would be an act of aggression and in breach of international law?

[Mr Hammond]

That would depend on the circumstances. For the United Kingdom, a pre-emptive attack would certainly be regarded as illegal.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

T4. Having served with the present commander of British forces in the Falklands, I think the Argentines would be very foolish even to contemplate any sort of military intervention, but does the Secretary of State agree that a strong statement of support from the United States would be helpful?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

Clearly, strong statements of support from any of our allies are always helpful, but the realistic situation, which we have long recognised in this country, is that the defence of the Falkland Islands is a task for which the UK must be prepared and capable of undertaking alone if necessary. We hope that we will have support from others, but that cannot be our planning scenario.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Monday 19th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

T9. The Secretary of State will understand the significance of the fact that only 3% of Afghan security forces are from the Pashtun south, particularly when it comes to how successful our handover will be in 2014. What progress is being made to improve the imbalance in ethnicities before our troops withdraw?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to that continuing issue. The Pashtun percentage in the ANSF is very much higher than 3%, but he is right that Pashtun recruits tend to be northern rather than southern. The ANSF has strategies to address that, and the situation is slowly improving, but it remains one of the important issues that has to be addressed if we are to create a stable and sustainable Afghan Government.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Thursday 27th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Sir Roy McNulty’s suggestion that £1 billion a year could be found refers to 2017-18. It will take some time before we get to that level of achievement, but it must remain our aspiration. In the meantime, the hon. Lady has answered her own question. Overcrowding is a key issue, and if we are to address it we must continue to invest in additional rolling stock and infrastructure on our railways, as we have committed to do. I am afraid that means that the relief that passengers seek will not come in the next couple of years, although it will come.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

3. If he will consider the merits of authorising traffic signals to display only flashing amber aspects in the early hours of the morning to reduce journey times.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Lord Hammond of Runnymede and John Baron

Thursday 2nd December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

No, and I completely reject the analysis. As the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mike Penning), has said, speed cameras are useful additions to the road safety armoury in some locations. It is for local authorities to decide whether they wish to continue with speed camera operation. I hope that they will act responsibly and carefully in making those decisions.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

T5. The Secretary of State is right to consider the introduction of automatic number plate recognition technology at the Dartford crossing to ease congestion. Given that the crossing makes some £45 million a year, would it not be better to consider the effect of how the new technology improves congestion before increasing toll charges to help fund a new crossing?