Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I do not want to add much to what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has just said, because he has covered everything. However, I notice that, in a recent letter to us, the Minister mentioned that results were to be paid for after one year. I suspect that this is very welcome to both the voluntary and private sectors, which will be competing for payment. The voluntary sector would find it very difficult to go for longer without payment. However, as the Minister knows, reoffending rates always used to be measured after two years. Indeed, if you follow the reoffending rates after that, you find that they decline over time. Therefore, is it not rather premature to come to a judgment after one year? Could the Minister say whether it is intended that, if an offender goes on to reoffend two or three years after release, the company that has been paid will be expected to make a repayment for reoffending that happened later?

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I was strongly supportive of Amendment 1, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. However, there was a defect in that amendment, which was disclosed by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. Therefore, it seemed sensible, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, appeared to propose at one moment, that he should withdraw that amendment and come back with another version at Third Reading. For some reason—I would be interested to know why—he did not do that, but pressed his amendment to a vote this time. The result was that the amendment was passed and cannot be changed, except by the House of Commons when it goes back there. It would have been much better if we could have decided a better version of Amendment 1 ourselves.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, if your Lordships can bear a third lawyer in a row, I, too, would like to express my support for the amendment. I regret that I was not able to be present at Report stage, but if I had been I should certainly have spoken in favour of the amendment.

The Government’s fundamental concern, as described on Report by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, is that there should be “proper lines of accountability”—a quotation already referred to by my noble and learned friend Lord Phillips. My noble and learned friend and my noble friend have already dealt with that argument effectively, so I shall say no more about it.

The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, also said that he would not revisit the arguments that had been raised historically. It is here that I want to add just a few words, because I was more directly concerned with the terms on which the 2005 Act was passed than either my noble friend or my noble and learned friend. The main argument in favour of setting up the Supreme Court was of course the presence of the Law Lords in this place, which was said to be contrary to the principle of the separation of powers. I never accepted that argument. It seemed to me then, as it seems to me now, that the Law Lords were as independent of the Executive as the members of the Supreme Court are now—neither more nor less.

Whatever the theory of the separation of powers, the reality was that the separation was complete. The back-up argument in those days was based on perception. Although we in Parliament knew very well that the law Lords were independent of the Executive, that was not—so it was said—the perception of the public, or at least of some members of the public. However, there was never any evidence to suggest that that was the perception of the public except, if I remember correctly, a single piece of anecdotal evidence. This led the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth in a most memorable speech—I wish he was in his position to hear me say this—to describe the whole exercise as having been based on,

“the perception of a perception”.—[Official Report, 4/7/07; col. 1094.]

However, here we are—as the saying goes—and we must go on from here.

Having created the Supreme Court at a cost of £100 million, not to mention the huge increase in the annual cost of running it, we must now take it as it is and complete the job. I cannot imagine any provision more likely to create the impression of interference by the Executive in the affairs of the Supreme Court than that the chief executive should be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. If the Lord Chancellor was here, it would be no answer for him to say that in practice he would accept the nomination of a selection committee. The perception is there and, in this case, the reality is there.

I cannot remember whether we discussed Section 48(2) in the Select Committee that sat for many weeks. Nor can I remember why, in the end, we accepted the section as it stands, unless we perhaps had in mind the old style of Lord Chancellor before the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, rather than the new Lord Chancellor as he has become. Whatever thought processes went through our heads, I am now convinced that the section was a mistake, and therefore I am very glad to support the amendment.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I am going to take a rather unusual position on this and say that I am afraid I do not agree with Amendment 3. I was considerably involved in the drafting of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and I had no objection at that time to Sections 48 and 49, which are now objected to in this amendment. The reason why I do not welcome this amendment is that the chief executive is an administrator, not a judge. That being so, I see no serious reason why Lord Chancellors should not continue to be involved in the proceedings of Sections 48 and 49 as they now are. The administration of an issue which involves both those in charge of costs and those in charge of the law needs to recognise the real issues here because of the way in which the funds get to the Supreme Court.

I am in general a strong supporter of the two former judges who have put their names to this amendment and of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but in this case I fail to be able to agree with them as they would clearly like.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, although this may seem to be a technical point to some Members of the House, it is actually a matter of very considerable importance. It is wrong in law and it is constitutionally inappropriate. I am very surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, who is an excellent lawyer, has not picked up either of those points. I have to say that the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, got it wrong, and it is important to get it right. It is important to preserve the separation of the judiciary, and I speak as someone who is not a member of the Supreme Court and was not a member of the Judicial Committee. However, the separation of the judiciary from the Executive is crucial at every level, so to have the chief executive of the Supreme Court answerable to the Lord Chancellor and not to the president of the Supreme Court is, to say the least, an anomaly. Also, rather more seriously, it is incorrect. This needs to be put right, otherwise there really will be a perception that the Lord Chancellor not only controls the finances but controls the person who controls the financing of the Supreme Court. I strongly support this amendment.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Monday 10th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I, too, have been burgled and I have absolutely no sympathy with burglars, but this amendment goes too far. I am very concerned about proposed new subsection (5A), under subsection (2) of Amendment 113C, as regards using the words “grossly disproportionate”. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, has just asked, how on earth would one advise a jury—I am glad to say that I was not a criminal lawyer but I did a little crime—that you can be disproportionate but not “grossly disproportionate”?

I share the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it is contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. I believe it is a matter that would end up in Strasbourg if we were not extremely careful. The Government—I can see for the best of intentions—are just going too far.

My recollection about the Martin case, which I read only in the press, is that he was shot in the back, which would be “grossly disproportionate”. Obviously, one could see why he did not get the existing protection that the Lord Chief Justice has given and that is in the standard advice to juries, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, read out. We do not need to go further. To go further will cause real trouble.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I regret that I cannot support this new clause. I agree entirely with what the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and a number of other practising lawyers have said. I regard this matter as very unsatisfactory. I have not practised as a barrister in recent years but I practised in the past and this proposal is unsatisfactory.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Wednesday 27th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Prashar]

My Lords, I endorse the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I expressed my concerns about this provision in the Bill at Second Reading, so I will not repeat them this afternoon. However, following the Second Reading debate, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, very kindly copied me into the letter he sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, which explains in more detail the Government’s reasoning behind the proposed change. I read it very carefully and I am not convinced by the rationale it advanced. The issue in question is the appropriate involvement and accountability of the Lord Chancellor. In my experience, the current arrangements work fine. If the consideration or rejection of the recommendation is based on clear and sound reasons, this presents no difficulty. Indeed, it helps to concentrate the minds both of the selection panel and the Lord Chancellor. It is very helpful to the parties concerned. Furthermore, the Lord Chancellor has appropriate involvement in the course of the selection process as he is consulted at relevant stages.

Under the proposed changes, the Lord Chancellor might choose to sit on a panel and lose his veto or choose not to sit on the panel in order to retain his veto. On what basis will the Lord Chancellor make that decision? I fear that his decision to sit on the selection panel will raise questions and suspicions which may not be healthy—both for the selection process and for the perception of why the decision has been made. I am therefore concerned both on constitutional and practical grounds. I do not see why we need to disturb the finely crafted balance of accountability and involvement that was arrived at in 2005.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, the role of the Lord Chancellor is very different from that which existed before the 2005 Act came into effect. We have no certainty at all that future Lord Chancellors will take an equivalent role to that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who was an outstandingly strong and determined Lord Chancellor. The role of Lord Chancellor is now entirely different because it is, in effect, as ordinary a role as a Minister of the Government. It is not a role equivalent to that of the Lord Chancellor before the 2005 came into force.

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[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, is it not more difficult for the Lord Chancellor to object to someone publicly rather than to discuss the appointment in a group of which he is a member? Does that not mean, therefore, that if the Minister tries to remove the person, he will do so only if there is very strong evidence to show that it is an unsatisfactory appointment, whereas if he is part of a group, the other members of the group might be more likely to go along with what the Minister says at that point?

[Lord McNally]

I have to say that if I was a member of a body charged with selecting a Lord Chief Justice or a president of the Supreme Court, no Lord Chancellor, however strong willed, would make me change my views unless his arguments were extremely persuasive; and I would expect the same respect for my views. We are not talking about a group of pussycats; we are talking about some very senior figures with great experience. I can see that those who have attended this Committee do not agree, but the simple fact is that we consider that our proposals strike the right balance in providing both the legitimate accountability for the executive in these roles and an independent and transparent process. They take away a political veto and put in its place a transparent involvement in a selection. I have set that out very clearly for the Committee.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Monday 25th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carswell]

My Lords, I support the amendment—

[Lord Goodhart]

I am sorry to interrupt, but it appears that in the order in which these matters are printed, I am the second and final person specifically connected with Clause 18 in this group, and it seems to me that this is the point at which I should be able to state my views on this matter.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall)]

My Lords, I believe that the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has been moved, and the name of the noble Lord is not, I think, on that amendment. However, the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, is on it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Woolf]

My Lords, I spoke on the subject at Second Reading. What I said is on the record and I will not repeat it. However, I am most anxious that it should not be thought, as a consequence of my speaking in succession to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd and Lord Carswell, that retired members of the senior judiciary are against increasing diversity. I stress as forcefully as I can that the contrary is true. I know from the times when I was Chief Justice or held other senior offices that we did everything we could in co-operation with successive Lord Chancellors to improve the position. The message that became clear as a result of our efforts was that achievements would be brought by approaching the matter in stages.

The first step involved tackling those who were attending law schools in this jurisdiction and ensuring an egalitarian approach there. I am happy to say that if one goes now to the law schools of this country, one finds at least an equal number of women and men studying to become our lawyers and judges of the future.

The next stage is to make sure that any hurdle that can reasonably be removed is removed from the path of those who enter the legal profession. At the moment our task is to ensure that they realise that the opportunities for judicial appointments are greater today than they have ever been. The appointments system that we have will treat applicants on a totally equal basis irrespective of their sex and of any background that they might consider a possible handicap. The judiciary plays its part in ensuring that the message is heard by those entering the legal profession and by those within it.

On the issue raised by the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, to which I put my name, it is no use putting something in legislation that will have no practical effect. I refer to part-time judges for the Supreme Court, because it seems it is here where the argument seems clearest. From my knowledge of those who might seek this judicial appointment, I can conceive of nobody who could not take a full-time appointment to the Supreme Court but might be able to take part-time employment there. Having made that proposition, I point to the nature of the Supreme Court and to its role in our legal system now that it has been established. It is the highest court we have, and it has the heavy responsibility of maintaining the reputation established by generations of Supreme Court judges, who in the past were called Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. The court is looked on internationally as one of the finest law courts that there is, and its decisions are treated with the greatest respect.

We must do two things. First, we must not fall into the trap of using legislation to make gestures. To put into this legislation a provision that refers to part-time Supreme Court judges, for the purpose of trying to give a message to those who might be coming through the system that they should seek to become a Supreme Court judge, would be unrealistic if it implied that someone of mature years—probably 60—who wished to be a Supreme Court judge could apply for the highest pinnacle of our judiciary on any basis other than full-time. If there is to be an educational process, it should take place at a lower level in the system. I urge the Committee not to put into the Bill a provision that will have the effect of offering part-time employment in the Supreme Court when there is no realistic possibility that there will be any candidate for that part-time post who could be appointed in the foreseeable future.

The result will be that people will say, “Look, in 2012 Parliament specifically passed legislation that was intended to make available to a woman the possibility to sit as a part-time Supreme Court judge—but nobody has done that”. It will not happen because there has never been a candidate who could apply to be a Supreme Court judge under present circumstances.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I have proposed the removal from the Bill of Clause 18 and Schedule 12. I make it clear that this is not done to abolish the provisions that are dealt with in Clause 18 and Schedule 12. Instead I intend to enable the Government to provide, in proceedings that are separate from the Bill, a better system for the extremely important issue of judicial appointments. The provisions included in the Bill are inadequate and unsatisfactory.

The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 was of great importance. It modified the functions of the Lord Chancellor. In fact, it not only modified the functions but completely altered them. It created a Supreme Court to replace the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. The constitutional importance of the Act was recognised by those who negotiated it and by many others. I am well aware of this because I was one of the Members of the House of Lords who negotiated the matter in detail. Others included the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who I am very pleased to see in his place and who was then the Lord Chancellor, and the late and greatly missed Conservative Lord Kingsland.

As far as I am aware, the Crime and Courts Bill is the first Bill to make significant amendments to the Constitutional Reform Act. Significant amendments appear first in Clause 18—although all that the clause does is tell us to go and look at Schedule 12, which is tucked away at the back of the Bill. It starts on page 167 and continues to page 201. It starts with the provision that enables any number of judges to be appointed to the Supreme Court provided the judges serving on the court do not permit,

“the full-time equivalent number of judges of the Court at any time to be more than 12”.

This is a very significant alteration to the 2005 Act. There should be no attempt to tuck alterations into the back of a much wider Bill such as this one. It is highly doubtful whether this particular alteration should be adopted at any time, and I agree with the proposal from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, to leave out paragraph 2.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Our problem is that if I talk about the tie break, it is before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has made his points about why the tie break is wrong. The natural sequence of events is that I speak, then the Minister, we do not put a question but go round again, which is perfectly okay in Committee. If everybody is happy, that is the right course that I would envisage. A preliminary point: initially, I thought the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart’s, point was that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 was such an important Act that it could never be amended. I tended to agree with that proposition. As I understand it, and I agree with this, he then went on to say that when a Bill makes a significant constitutional change, it is wrong to put it in the form of a schedule introduced by a section which does not, as it were, preview that it is a major constitutional change. The right way to make major constitutional changes, so that this House—which has a special responsibility in relation to constitutional changes—is aware of what is going on, is by an individual Act of Parliament.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in relation to this because here we are dealing with an important constitutional issue as regards the position of judges. Like the noble Lord, who is a practical and sensible Member of this House, I fear that we are where we are. We are in Committee and it is obvious that we will pass something along the lines of Clause 18 and Schedule 12. Therefore, it is necessary for us to debate the merits of those. But it is extremely important that the Government recognise that where one is dealing with important constitutional issues, it does not in any way inhibit any programme of constitutional change, it just means it is right that it is properly flagged up so that we know where we are.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord. That is exactly the view I have taken today.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in what he says but, as a matter of practicality, I recognise that we have to move on. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, is much loved around the House and a genuine supporter of sensible constitutional change. He was a significant supporter of the Constitutional Reform Bill in that he allowed it to go through in circumstances where it might not otherwise have gone through, so I have a particular personal reason for believing that the noble Lord is a supporter of constitutional change. It would be worth while if he could say something in response to the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart.

We are dealing with three tiers of part-time judge: first, the High Court of England and Wales; secondly, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales; and, thirdly, the Supreme Court, which is part of the UK judiciary. The average age at which persons are appointed to the High Court of England and Wales is between 45 and about 60. In the Chamber tonight, we have two former High Court judges. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, were both appointed at the age of 45, which is at the youngest end of the range.

In appointing women between the ages of 45 and 50, it is extremely likely that they will have caring arrangements. I know that from my own experience as someone at the English Bar and as someone appointing judges. The difficulty for people is in making a choice as to what they put as their priority. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, rightly said, the current attitude is that it is “full on” if you join the High Court and there are no dilutions. The consequence of that in relation to the High Court is that a significant pool of people who would otherwise be willing to be appointed is being lost. I know that from my own experience in appointing judges.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Tuesday 20th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech]

My Lords, I will try not to repeat myself, because I spoke about referral fees last week.

Briefly, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the evil of referral fees is threefold. First, if the law firm can afford to pay a couple of hundred pounds for each case, then it stands to reason that the case could have been handled more cheaply. Secondly, when work goes to a particular firm of solicitors, it encourages that firm not to compete and not to do its job properly because, no matter what, the work will come to it. The case of the miners to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred and which I described last week did not arise directly from referral fees, but one can see the risk. If a firm knows that 23,000 cases will come its way willy-nilly, why should it try very hard? Why should it not take short cuts?

Thirdly, referral fees arrangements deprive the consumer of choice. The argument for referring consumers to a particular firm is that they would not otherwise know where to go. These charitable organisations, to which the noble Lord referred, could do the job just as well by listing a few firms and helping their clients to go to those firms without expecting money to come their way. As far as I can make out from research on the web—I stand to be corrected—on its web page on legal services the Labour Party says that clients who are members of the Labour Party will be referred to a particular firm of solicitors if they have a problem. If one continues to click through the pages, the firm says in very small print, buried deep in the internet, that for every case that comes to it from the Labour Party website several hundred pounds will be paid to the political party.

To make things even worse, referral fees, some of which may well come from legal aid, could be channelled inter alia to a political party. There is no case for referral fees. I encourage the House not to be wooed into any set of exemptions, even where worthwhile charities are concerned, because the bad nature of referral fees spreads throughout the system, regardless of who uses them. I hope that your Lordships will reject this amendment and any similar ones. Now is the time to end the practice of referral fees.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I agree entirely with what the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has just said. Referral fees have for some years been a serious problem in almost all circumstances and have caused a great deal of trouble and unnecessary expense. It is not a case where, as the Labour Party has just proposed, it should be treated just as a matter where two firms are in business. This is a matter that requires to be removed.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, in my youth I appeared for insurers and unions, and I did not pay anybody to get those cases. We competed on quality. The competition was there so that unions and insurers would send their work where they thought that they would get the best service, not where they thought that they would get the largest fee. It is insidious for fees to be paid to purchase cases from any organisation, whether it is a union or even the finest charity. It is not right that unions and charities should fund themselves in this way. The noble Lord has made the case from the point of view of unions and charities being funded. One has to look at it the other way round. Why should firms of solicitors or even barristers’ chambers—I have heard rumours about this—get work on the basis of how much they pay a person referring cases to them? It is a practice which has to stop.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Lords Chamber

Amendment 179BZA is consistent with Amendment 179BZB which, thanks to the legal background of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, expands, updates and is to be preferred to Amendment 179BZC. Amendment 179BZD is consistent with Amendment 180 in requiring the Secretary of State to satisfy himself or herself that, at all times, rather than being allowed to languish in their cells sentence plans—including participation in required programmes—have been made for all determinate and indeterminate prisoners. That brings me back to the need for someone to be responsible and accountable to the Secretary of State for ensuring that this happens. I cannot repeat that more strongly or often enough.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I was not involved in criminal law during my practice as a barrister, but I became very interested in IPPs in 2009 because we were then dealing with what became the Coroners and Justice Act. I became particularly concerned at this because Dame Anne Owers, who was then the Chief Inspector of Prisons, together with the Chief Inspector of Probation had written an absolutely devastating report on the defects of IPP. The defects disclosed in the inspector’s report are several. There is a lack of accurate pre-sentence reports on prisoners, which has led to a number of unjustified IPP sentences being imposed on people who should not have had them applied at all. There is a lack of resources for the Parole Board to enable it to determine the fate of prisoners after the prisoners have passed their tariff date. This means that the prisoners may languish for months or even years in prisons where they can not get the training that they require before they can apply for release, so prisoners under IPP are serving what is potentially a life sentence.

There have been some improvements of IPP as a result of amendments made in 2008 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, but those improvements were not enough. By 2009, it was clear in my view that IPP was a disaster. It could work only with a lot more money put into it; if it did not have that money, it was grossly unfair to at least some of the prisoners. The Parole Board does not have the money that it needs and, as matters now stand, it will not for the foreseeable future.

I am going to repeat something that I said in a debate in 2009 because it covers my views now. I said:

“The IPP is wrong in principle and wrong in practice. English courts have a long-standing system of sentencing. Under that system, only the most serious offences can be punished by life imprisonment. It is unnecessary and wrong to impose a de facto life sentence on convictions for an offence which does not carry the life sentence. The IPP is even more wrong in practice. It is wrong because many pre-sentence assessments are inadequate and lead to the imposition of IPPs on those who should not be subject to it. It is wrong because many IPP prisoners, especially in local prisons, have no access to training, without which they cannot get a hearing before a Parole Board panel”.—[Official Report, 28/10/09; col. 1249.]

Little has been done to correct the situation that was so clearly stated by Dame Anne Owers and her colleague. Now we have Clause 117 of the LASPO Bill and some further amendments from the Government. These are not good enough. What would be good enough is Amendments 179ZA and 179ZB in the names of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, which are nearly identical; I hope that they will be merged in time for Report. What the amendments would do has already been explained to your Lordships: they would limit extended sentences only to cases where it had been shown that there was a strong and immediate probability, based on clear and competing evidence, that the prisoner would commit a serious violent or sexual offence.

Indeterminate sentences are deeply unsatisfactory. Amendments 179ZA and 179ZB come more than close enough to this test and I strongly support them. I also strongly support other amendments including Amendment 180, to which I am one of the signatories.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, the real scandal is that IPP sentences have gone on for so long. The previous Government had the chance to do something about them in 2008, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has indicated, when it was already obvious that IPP sentencing was going badly wrong. I remember tabling an amendment at that time to raise the bar and therefore reduce the number of those eligible for IPP sentences. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, was sympathetic but met me only half-way. The Conservatives, I am sorry to say, opposed the amendment. As a result, we have the situation in which we now find ourselves. I entirely share the indignation so well expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. I add only that in my view something must be done, and done soon.

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[Lord Beecham]

I share that view. I had hoped that I had made it clear that I think the previous Government did not invest anything like sufficient resources to fulfil their intentions. The intentions were reasonable but the means to fulfil them were not provided. That has to be acknowledged. However, I am afraid that the present Government are, to an extent, following the same course, if they do not look to avoid repeating the experience of under-resourcing a system that on their own figures is likely to lead to substantial numbers of people being held for a very long period—longer than is necessary for their good or society’s good—although there will always be some people who will have to be held for a long period.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, would it not be more expensive to keep in prison these people who should not be there rather than going through the relatively simple processes that would be required to stop them having to remain on an indeterminate sentence?

[Lord Beecham]

Indeed, but the Government have, as I understand it, no real plans to deal with the 3,000 people who are still held on indeterminate sentences. My whole point is that just as the previous Government did not invest in this sufficiently, this Government are in danger of doing the same. Across your Lordships’ House there would be a view that this investment would repay itself in financial terms as well as in social terms.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Monday 16th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 23 and 27, which are very much on the same lines as the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I find it absolutely astonishing that the Government should, in Clause 8, have an arrangement whereby they can delete legal aid but they cannot bring it back. It is particularly astonishing because a number of judges who know what they are talking about—two Supreme Court judges who have been judges in the Family Division and the present president of the Family Division—all say that this is a false economy. I very well understand that it is absolutely necessary to cut the legal aid bill. However, if the Government cut it in the wrong way, as I suggest they are doing and as I shall say in the debate on later amendments, they cannot put it back if it requires primary legislation.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has already said, the whole purpose of these amendments is not to destroy the Bill but to allow the Government, or indeed a subsequent Government, a degree of flexibility so that they do not have to use primary legislation to achieve their purpose. Therefore, I very much support all the amendments in this group.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I entirely agree with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. At present, as has already been pointed out, the Bill authorises the Lord Chancellor to omit the services under Schedule 1 but it does not permit him to extend his powers by adding to the services in Schedule 1. Any extension of the power would therefore require primary legislation. By contrast, the deletion of existing services would, under Clause 132(5), require only the affirmative procedure, which is quicker, simpler and cheaper than primary legislation.

From long service on the Delegated Powers Committee, I am satisfied that it would be acceptable to use the affirmative procedure to use Clause 8(2) to delete services that now exist under Schedule 1. We should recognise that as desirable. From that, it follows that we should make it as easy as possible to reconstruct the provisions that have been cut and that ought to be restored when the financial situation permits. That would be done most swiftly by including in the Bill the ability to introduce powers to add new services by the affirmative procedure, as well as a power to remove existing services. That will cost nothing today but it will help to satisfy those of us who accept that some reduction is needed now but who do not want it to continue when the reduction is needed no longer. In some years to come, that will be the case.

Therefore, if we are to go ahead with the Government’s proposal, it is essential to add to it the requirement that the Government accept that in the future, when it is possible on economic grounds to do so, existing provisions can be added and not just deleted by the affirmative procedure in both Houses.

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[Baroness Turner of Camden]

My Lords, I support Amendment 28. I have received a number of briefing letters from all sorts of organisations in connection with this Bill. One of the most frequent issues is clinical negligence, which the Government propose to remove from the scope of legal aid entirely. A few cases may fall within the exceptional funding test, but that could have massive impacts on some of the most serious cases of clinical negligence, particularly those involving very badly injured children. I understand that significant numbers of parents already receive support from legal aid around clinical negligence on behalf of their children.

The Government’s stated intention, however, is that those cases should be brought on a conditional fee—the no-win no-fee basis. That is not the right way in which to handle such cases, as they often need extensive medical reports, running into thousands of pounds, just to establish whether there is a case. They often have to be held in abeyance to try to assess the long-term consequences for a child. In those circumstances, I am advised that it is not commercially practical to run such cases on a no-win no-fee basis. That is the view of organisations that have made representations, such as the Bar Council and the Law Society.

The Government’s proposed solution of allowing the recovery of insurance premiums related to the costs of disbursements has been widely criticised as not being terribly workable. I also understand that the Government claim that up to 100 per cent of some types of legal aid proceedings will be brought back into legal aid by means of the exceptional funding test. However, the test is deliberately narrowly drawn and its legal and practical implications remain completely unknown.

I support Amendment 28 because it spells out in detail exactly what is meant by clinical negligence proceedings. It seems to me that the Government should take this issue very seriously, particularly in view of the representations that have been made right across the board from all kinds of organisations that really know what they are talking about because they are involved in the day-to-day application of the law in this area. Will the Government please consider what they are proposing with regard to clinical negligence? In my view, it is highly unpopular with organisations that know what they are talking about and with the many people who have had experience of trying to raise issues on behalf of injured children, particularly those injured as a result of clinical negligence.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, at the beginning of the debate was both thorough and persuasive. There is nothing that I wish—or would be able—to add to the basis of his arguments. It is widely believed, and I am one of the believers, that post-accident insurance premiums have been an unsatisfactory element of legal aid in the past. It is therefore very undesirable that that should be continued specifically through Clause 45. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, made it clear that Amendment 25 is highly preferable to the Government’s Clause 45. I hope, therefore, that the Government will see fit to accept that conclusion.

[Baroness Eaton]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 36A, which deals with the position of children in medical negligence cases. I am not a lawyer and so I speak with some trepidation, having heard so many noble Lords who are experts in the field of legal matters.

The proposals to remove clinical negligence entirely from the scope of legal aid will have an enormous impact on the most serious cases of clinical negligence, especially where catastrophic injuries to children have occurred. A freedom of information request to the Ministry of Justice revealed that in 2009-10, 870 medical negligence cases in the name of children were supported by legal aid. Under the proposals in this Bill, 640 of those cases would no longer be supported by legal aid. Whenever I have raised this as an issue, I have been told—as have many Members—that the Government’s view is that these matters can be dealt with through conditional fee arrangements. We have heard from my noble friends Lord Faulks and Lord Carlile, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, about the complications and why this is likely not to provide a satisfactory response.

Cases that are brought for children are often very long—sometimes complicated matters can last six or seven years—and cases that are not quite so complicated can still last for 34 months and longer. This is a terrible situation for families and parents to consider and contend with. Of the £17 million medical negligence cases funded by legal aid, less than a quarter are children’s cases. I understand that the majority of these involve perinatal injuries. These are particularly difficult cases and success is very uncertain.

When we are talking about the technicalities of legal aid and all that is involved in it, we should remember that clinical negligence cases affect not only the child in question but the parents and the whole family. Having a child myself who was wrongly diagnosed with a psychosomatic illness, which was in fact a very virulent form of bone and tissue cancer, I understand something of the trauma felt by such families. We did not proceed to litigation as the stress of doing so was, we felt, too great for us to cope with. We were an emotionally strong family in the fortunate position of being both strong for each other and able to afford the additional costs that occur to families in such situations. Others are not always so lucky. For families with a number of other children needing parental attention, the difficulty for parents to retain their employment can be a problem. I have seen many situations where the stress on families of looking after such children is so high that it has brought about a breakdown between parents.

The process of litigation with the support of legal aid is traumatic enough, but for a child to be denied that right must add hugely to the burden on the child and the family. I do not believe generally that the state should do things for people that they can do for themselves. I do believe, however, that a civilised society should provide a safety net for the most vulnerable.

I also do not believe in wasting public money or spending it unwisely. As we have heard today, independent research on behalf of the Law Society has found that the knock-on effect of the proposals in this Bill for legal aid in clinical negligence cases will cost almost three times the Ministry of Justice-predicted savings. I hope the Minister will be able to reassure your Lordships that this issue will be reconsidered and that the Ministry of Justice will produce a financial impact assessment so that decisions will be based on sound information.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Tuesday 20th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords—

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords—

[Lord Goldsmith]

I rise to support this amendment for reasons which I will explain—

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, it is the turn of this side, but I wait with pleasure to hear what the noble and learned Lord has to say.

When I started my career as a barrister in the late 1950s, we had started with legal aid for only a few years. Up until then, aid from lawyers to poor people who were prosecuted for criminal offences mostly came from a group of barristers of poor quality who spent their time sitting in the court in the hope of being chosen by the defendant to defend them. Legal aid replaced all that, for civil cases as well as criminal, and we must never get anywhere near the previous situation.

This amendment is one of the most important in the Bill; indeed, it is in many ways the most important. The right of access to justice is a central feature of British justice, as it has been for centuries. We are rightly proud of that. We have over the years achieved the right of access to law. Now that right is under threat. Clause 1(1) is not adequate. This is made clear by the 21st report of the Select Committee of your Lordships' House on the Constitution, published on 17 November. That is a very distinguished committee. The four Members who have put their names to Amendment 1 include two members of that committee, the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Hart. They also include the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice and an outstanding judge of recent times, and, finally, my noble friend Lord Faulks, who is a relatively new Member of your Lordships' House but who has proved his high quality as a lawyer and a politician.

I am aware that in recent years the costs of legal aid have risen too far. This was recognised by Lord Bingham in chapter 8 of his book, The Rule of Law, which has already been mentioned. Steps are being taken by the Government to reduce costs in a justifiable way, but we must make it clear that access to justice is essential and that we cannot set up in this country a legal system which does not provide access to justice to those who cannot afford it out of their own pockets.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, went before me, because I can wholeheartedly agree with the last sentiment that he has expressed—I am not surprised that we share that view.

Before I speak about my hesitation in respect of the amendment, I should declare, because I was unable to take part at Second Reading, that I am a practising lawyer, though not a publicly funded lawyer for a long time. I am also chairman of the Access to Justice Foundation and president of the Bar Pro Bono Unit, two organisations which try to help people who have legal need through the generosity of lawyers who are prepared to do that for free.

My reason for being hesitant about the amendment is that it does not go as far as the Constitution Committee, of which I am proud to be a member, said it should. There is a qualification of importance in the amendment, which is the reference to available resources. I was concerned that allowing that qualification might allow the damage to be done to the legal aid system and the access to justice that so many people need that we are fighting for.

I recognise the constraints. I also recognise that this was a formulation which the Government of whom I was a part put forward—I was not that happy about it then either, as it happens. However, there is a reason why I shall support the amendment: it is a way of testing what the Government actually believe in. It is a way of testing whether this Government are prepared to sign up, on the basis that there is not a blank cheque, to the principle that the Lord Chancellor has an obligation to secure justice for those who need it and to make sure that it is secured effectively. I do not believe that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has a computer chip in his neck—I hope that I have known him long enough to know that that is not the way he operates—but I shall look forward with interest to two things during this debate. The first is what he says about this amendment. It will be telling in the extreme if he is not able to accept that, even though there will not be a blank cheque and even though it depends on the resources being available, his department should acknowledge a duty to secure that individuals have access to legal services that effectively meet their needs. That is a constitutional principle that the Government should at least support.

Secondly, I will look to see the answers to individual amendments and the issues that arise in relation to particular aspects of the Bill. For example, I am very concerned about welfare, where so much of the resource at the moment is provided not to well paid lawyers, barristers in Chambers or City firms of solicitors, but to legal advice centres. They are agencies that work on a shoestring and depend on legal aid, so much of which will be cut to them. The Government should be judged on the attitude that they take to that—not more fat for the fat cats, but helping the poor people of the country, the vulnerable and the less privileged, and ensuring the rights that it is one of the jobs of this House to provide.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Goodhart Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, in the last year of his life, Lord Bingham—the greatest judge, I believe, of my adult life—wrote and published a short but remarkable book called The Rule of Law. In Chapter 8, he wrote:

“The pressure for reform culminated in the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 … For half a century the legal aid scheme enabled those without means to sue and defend themselves in the courts … But its cost was its undoing. In the years 1988 to 1996/7 expenditure on civil (and also criminal) legal aid rose at a rate substantially in excess of inflation, and was the fastest rising item of government expenditure overall”.

Lord Bingham was, I am afraid, undoubtedly correct, and some reduction of costs here is necessary. On that basis, I start by saying that I agree very strongly with the general principles of my noble friends Lord Hunt of Wirral and Lord Faulks. Of course, we need to keep a no-win no-fee system. The amount involved in this should not be as large as it has been. We cannot justify paying the cost of fees for clients who have no serious chance of winning an action.

Part 1 of the Bill contains changes to the existing law that need to be enacted, but there also are other changes that I do not think should be enacted, particularly those relating to clinical negligence and family violence—although those are not the only ones—where legal rights are plainly necessary and should continue. We should regard a number of provisions introduced in the Bill as, at best, temporary provisions which could be removed when public resources increase. I feel that that is the basis on which we must go ahead. Importantly, that would mean that some legal aid, which is not provided for in the Bill, will continue to be provided. We must also act in a way that will prevent some of these difficulties and some of these seriously unpleasant things, such as the exceptional level of some profits. We also need to deal with the amount of money spent, as far too much has been spent on legal aid in recent years.

Part 3 of the Bill deals with very different issues which I believe should have been dealt with in a separate Bill. However, it is too late for that now. I am most concerned with Chapter 5. I welcome the abolition in Clause 113 of indeterminate or IPP sentences. IPP was a failure from the beginning. It relied on the ability to train prisoners while in prison, and there has been no such ability. There have been many—often justified—complaints, of which I have received a number, about the difficulty of ensuring that prisoners have access to the probation services which are essential for release. It would have been impossible to release many of these prisoners because of the difficulties of administration. IPP should not be allowed to continue for those who are already subject to it and it should be replaced by a fixed time limit. It is absolutely wrong that those subjected to this wholly undesirable sentence of uncertainty should not have a proper degree of certainty about when their time will end.

I am also concerned with Clause 114, which imposes a life sentence for a second listed offence. That is a mandatory sentence and it must be imposed unless the court is satisfied that there are special circumstances. That is perhaps a little better than the Californian custom of two strikes and you’re out, but it is not that much better. The judge will have seen the prisoner under questioning in court and he will have heard the evidence of the witnesses, so I believe that the judge and no one else should decide whether the prisoner should receive a life sentence. That will happen under Clause 115, which empowers the judge to decide whether to impose an extended sentence. Why should that not also apply to the question of life sentences under Clause 114? After all, it is open to the Attorney-General to appeal to the Court of Appeal if the judge has acted wrongly.