My Lords, let us hear first from the noble Lord and then from my noble friend.
My Lords, I would like to ask the Government a simple question. What do the Bar Council, the Law Society and the organisations concerned with poverty with regard to legal services have to say? Have the Government taken the trouble to consult these organisations? The noble Lord says that they have. So what is their reply? They remain obdurately opposed to the principles that the Government are putting forward today. I unhesitatingly support the amendment. Pretty well all the speeches in the Committee—whether from the Conservative, Liberal Democrat or these Benches, and on the Cross Benches—have expressed opposition to what the Government are trying to do and support for what the amendment stands for.
I also unhesitatingly support the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. He has spoken very bravely, and has been supported by several noble Lords who share his profession. A bevy of Silks have announced support for the proposition advanced by the amendment. I got involved with legal aid from pretty well the very beginning, because of a very simple notion—I thought it was imperative that ordinary people should be able to advance their cause and, where they are impaired from doing so, they should be supported by the state. That was my view then. The amendment sets out very clearly, within the constraints that are necessarily imposed upon us, the basic principles that we should preserve.
It is vital that individuals should have access to legal services, where their rights are being seriously impaired or are not being properly advanced—subject always to the provisions of the 1999 Act. There is a serious risk that both of these will occur, separately, under the changes to legal aid provision now being contemplated. I am surprised that any person of any sensitivity—and I think that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, would fall into that category—would support such changes. I have always had great admiration for the noble Lord—I do not know why, as he has done his best to impair that decision on my part. It is not a question of party prejudice at all; it is a question of downright decency and that is what I support today.
My Lords, if we could hear from the Liberal Democrats, the Cross Benches and then the Labour Party.
My Lords, many years ago, when Lord Scarman was chairman of the Law Commission, I remember him saying that his cleaning lady came to him one day and asked whether he could help her with a social security problem. He described how it took him three days of combing through the social security legislation before he was able to help her. He told us this story because he was explaining how there was an enormous need for poverty lawyers—the ones who deal with the legal problems of the poor—to be empowered to provide those services. If a Law Lord such as Lord Scarman took three days to do what a law centre could do more quickly, it illustrated the point.
The great virtue of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is its conspicuous moderation and realism. I cannot understand those noble Lords who criticise him for being so moderate and realistic. The real value of his amendment is that it strengthens the hand of the Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary in his dealings with the Treasury. Many years ago when I was Roy Jenkins’s special adviser, I remember that Barbara Castle, a Minister in the then Government, explained why she supported cuts in civil legal aid. She wrote to her colleagues saying that if she had to choose between hospitals and legal services, she would unhesitatingly preserve hospitals. It is that notion that legal services for the poor are a soft target and matter a great deal less culturally and politically than health services which is at the bottom of the problem in my view.
Successive Governments have found it very easy to sabotage civil legal aid since the original Legal Aid and Advice Act was passed. This is not a party political problem; it has pervaded all parties. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, who, unfortunately is not in his place, cut legal aid when he was Lord Chancellor, and followed a long line of Lord Chancellors in doing so. He attacked what he called fat-cat lawyers to justify some of the cuts that he made. When Lord Taylor’s memorial service was held in St Paul’s cathedral, Sir Humphrey Potts, in giving the encomium—I recall that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine, was at the front of the cathedral—made a joke at his expense, saying that he saw that he, in a fit of post-retirement remorse, was attacking fat-cat lawyers. It was a good joke but it illustrated a powerful point. It would be very easy for my noble friend Lord McNally when he replies to make some cynical remarks about his legal friends standing up for the closed shop. However, I am sure that he will not fall into this trap. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, has said, those of us who are here today are not in the platoons of legal services for the poor lawyers who will be most hit by these cuts, along with their clients.
Perhaps the noble Lord could speak first, followed by the noble Baroness.
My Lords, I rise with great caution as a lay man in this very legal debate. However, I read the article in today’s Guardian by the Lord Chancellor, in which he spoke of promoting non-adversarial solutions. I therefore invite the Deputy Leader of the House, when he replies, to tell us a little about how that will work out in practice and to what extent those kinds of solutions will compensate for the very large cut that is proposed to be made to the current legal aid budget.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his words. We are very pleased to see the noble Lord, Lord Bach, with us. He very courteously explained to me the personal reasons why he could not be with us earlier, but it is good to see him in his place now.
The debate has taken on some of the aspects of a Second Reading debate and it is none the worse for that. The first amendment allows for such wide-ranging points to be made. I shall not try to reply to them all at this point, as we are at the very start of Committee stage. My noble and learned friend Lord Wallace and I will return to many of the issues, like medical negligence and social welfare, as the Committee stage runs forward.
I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that the official Opposition are not arguing for retaining the status quo. He and the spokesman for the Labour Party in the other place have made it clear that, if they had been in office, faced with the economic situation with which we are faced, they too would have been making cuts. The debate is about where those cuts should be made and with what impact. It is fair for him to look at the impact assessment, and the fact that it lends some ammunition to him is an assurance that it is a very fair impact assessment. The very first question I answered from this Dispatch Box about the Bill related to the fact that if you make budget cuts to a section of government expenditure that is focused mainly on the needy, it is the needy who will find the impact of those cuts. That is true of housing, social welfare, and so on, and that is the reality of a Government who have to cut back on expenditure.
I make no complaint at all about the contributions from lawyers in the debate. If we were debating a fundamental issue about medicine, I would hope that the noble Lord, Lord Winston, and other expert medics in the place would contribute; and if we were talking about defence, I would hope that our generals would contribute. I do not think that there is anything wrong with the fact that a large number of the contributors have come from the legal profession. The daunting thing for me, as a non-lawyer, is the array of talent that is on display from the legal profession. I always remind my colleagues down the corridor that, whenever I stand at this Dispatch Box, I am very conscious that somewhere in the listening audience there are about three former Lord Chancellors and half a dozen former Solicitor-Generals or Attorney-Generals. I have never quite got to grips with the number of QCs that we have in the House of Lords, but there is a goodly number. We have good legal expertise and this debate is, and the Committee stage will be, all the better for it.
It is certainly not my intention to approach this—I am trying to find that barb from my noble friend—with something like tetchy impatience. In fact, over the past few months, I have been watching my noble friend Lord Howe at the Dispatch Box. He will be my model for this Committee stage—a kind of concerned bedside manner.
However, in talking about Committee stage when I was on the Benches opposite, I was on record as saying that if the House divides in Committee, almost invariably one will have to resist. I genuinely want to use Committee stage to listen. I cannot make blanket promises and I certainly, at this stage, cannot start giving a list of concessions. The position of the Government is that the Bill has been delivered from the other place in pristine condition and ready for adoption but, as our system works, we listen to the advisory—
I am not so sure about adoption being that much more difficult these days.
We will listen and we will ponder. I hope that that will be the spirit in which we conduct the debates. It is certainly not, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, suggested, an attempt to turn the clock back. Even when this exercise is finished, no one could dispute that we will have one of the most generous legal aid schemes in the world. My right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor, in his article in the Guardian, which has been quoted a number of times, says:
“Access to justice is a fundamental part of a properly functioning democracy”.
He goes on to make the point that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and a number of others made: “Without legal aid, and”—I emphasise this—
“the dedicated lawyers who deliver it, our system of justice would quite simply collapse”.
That is the starting point.
The noble Lord, Lord McNally, has just cited the idea that we have the most generous legal aid system anywhere in the world, which he said no one would dispute. During the debate, noble Lords have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, myself and others about what Lord Justice Jackson has said about any further cuts in legal aid. He certainly disputes it, as do surely many others.
There is absolutely no logic in what the noble Lord has said, with the utmost possible respect—I think that is what you say to each other when you are insulting one another. Lord Justice Jackson may well have a perfectly reasonable opinion that legal aid should not be cut, but it does not follow that, if it is cut, it will not remain the most generous system in the world. There is a non sequitur in what was said. Lord Justice Jackson says that he does not want the present system cut, which is fair enough but, if the system is cut, it will remain the most generous legal aid system in the world.
Does my noble friend at least accept that we legislate vastly more than any free democracy in the western world? We have between 200 per cent and 400 per cent more statute law than any free state that I have yet discovered.
I have no idea whatever whether that figure is correct. I am not even going to promise to write to my noble friend about that. Yes, I think both members of the coalition came into government determined to legislate less and I am sure that, if and when power changes, any new Government will come into power wanting to legislate less. However, you get into a department and find that it has two or three Bills that it has just been waiting to get on to the statute book, or some campaigning organisation, probably chaired by my noble friend Lord Phillips, has a ready-made Bill to get on to the statute book as soon as possible.
First, perhaps I can deal with the calumny from the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu. I am not a Home Office Minister; I am a Ministry of Justice Minister. We benefit from that subtle division of responsibilities carried out by the previous Administration, which has so benefited government. Just as my noble friend Lord Carlile emphasises the liberalism of his approach, I make no apologies for approaching these matters as a social democrat. I look at these issues through those eyes, including that raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. It is extremely important that in reforming our justice system, we keep rehabilitation in the forefront. It is important to make clear that we will have a vigorous system to prosecute justice and punish offenders. However, if we carry on casually allowing the upward rise of our prison population into six figures, it will be a self-defeating process. Unless we attack the rehabilitation of offenders to stop the horrendous reoffending rates, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has often championed, we will be doomed to be spending increasingly more on punishment in a justice system with no real help to society at large.
This has been a philosophical debate. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, set the tone in a speech which, as my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford pointed out, was wonderful in its rhetoric but brought us to why there was not universal support for the Pannick amendment. It suggested that the Government might have to take some account of the resources available. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, went back to Magna Carta, quoting Lord Bingham and others. I have beside my bed a copy of his The Rule of Law, which is a guide for any lay innocent Justice Minister. We have to accept the fact that Governments and departments have to meet budgets and that they cannot find blank cheques and never have been able to.
I went to see the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, who, sadly, can no longer attend the House and has taken leave of absence. Jeremy Hutchinson is now 96, but was one of the group of lawyers who helped to bring in the 1949 Act. He said rather wistfully, “We thought that we were bringing in a National Health Service for law”. In a way, I can understand that that is a noble aspiration. However, as successive Governments have shown, it is one that must be constrained by the economic realities of the day. Therefore, we are having to make choices—and sometimes hard choices. Perhaps I may again quote my right honourable friend’s article in the Guardian:
“The logic is simple: to determine carefully which types of cases most urgently merit scarce resources, to encourage people to use non-adversarial solutions to their problems where appropriate, and to speed up and simplify court processes where they are not”.
That is the philosophy of the Bill and it is what we are attempting to do. It is unfair when people use language suggesting that we are taking an axe to a whole system of justice. I know from my contact with the Lord Chancellor that that is not his intention.
The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked me about our approach to non-adversarial solutions. As the Lord Chancellor indicated in the Guardian article, we are looking to increase funding for family mediation. The Government are committed to increasing it by £10 million, which would fund an extra 10,000 cases.
I hear the speeches from my own Benches and am always interested when someone like my noble friend Lord Carlile makes an intervention followed by praise for courage from around the House. I draw his attention to the line in George Bernard Shaw’s “Saint Joan”:
“Woe unto me when all men praise me!”.
Actually, I am a little bit old fashioned. I believe that the real courage is in standing up and saying, “I support the Government. I think that this is a very good Bill and I intend to vote for them tonight”.
I am sorry to interrupt and I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I want to help the Minister, I really do. I do not yet understand whether he really disagrees with the principle stated in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The principle stated would replace what is in Clause 1 with what seems to me a platitude but a very important one. I do not hear the Minister say that he thinks it is not the right principle.
I suggest that this needs to be thought about right now because we had the same situation in connection with the Public Bodies Bill. In Committee on that Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I did a rather bold and perhaps unthinkable thing and I stood on my head about it. The noble Lord made the House divide on my amendment to write a principle at the front of that Bill. We did that at the beginning in Committee, and getting the principle in had a beneficial effect. I am not suggesting that that might be necessary now, but it would help those of us who are loyal to the Government to know whether there is a real disagreement with the statement of principle in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
If my noble friend had a fault—and, my God, that is a dangerous thing even to suggest—it is his impetuosity. I was just coming to the nub of the Pannick amendment, but thought that after a long debate it was reasonable to try to pick up at least some of the points made by noble Lords.
The amendment seeks to place a statutory duty on the Lord Chancellor to secure access within the resources made available and in accordance with the provision in Part 1: the legal services that effectively meet the needs of individuals. We accept that this proposed amendment is very similar to the duty placed on the Legal Services Commission by Section 4(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. We also accept that the duty that the amendment would place on the Lord Chancellor would be qualified by the reference to the duty being subject both to the resources available and to the provisions of Part 1. However, against the backdrop of this Bill, we believe that Amendment 1 is unnecessary. It is central to our proposal for reform that the reforms establish an affordable system while ensuring that no one is denied their fundamental right of access to justice. Legal aid will be a key element in ensuring access to justice in some cases, but in many cases justice can and should be afforded without the assistance of a lawyer funded by the taxpayer. Fundamental rights to access to justice are the subject of international protections such as the European Convention on Human Rights and certain enforceable EU rights, and are protected by this Bill in relation to legal aid through the areas retained in scope in Schedule 1 and through the exceptional funding provision in Clause 9.
The exceptional funding scheme will ensure the protection of an individual’s right to legal aid under the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as those rights to legal aid that are directly enforceable under European Union law. These rights are of fundamental importance, and the Government consider that the Bill adequately protects them. However, we do not consider that any more extensive right to taxpayer assistance by way of legal aid to access to the courts should be established. In light of the way the Bill protects fundamental rights of access to justice, to the extent that the amendment seeks to introduce requirements over and above what is required by, for example, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is not desirable or necessary. To the extent that it would require no more than, for example, Article 6, it is also unnecessary. Clause 1 states that the Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with Part 1 of the Bill. The Lord Chancellor has powers under Clause 2 to make arrangements to meet that duty.
Considerations about the demand for civil legal aid services have not been ignored. Under Clause 10 the Lord Chancellor will make regulations setting out criteria that the director of legal aid casework will be required to consider when making decisions. When settling the criteria, the Lord Chancellor must consider the extent to which the criteria should reflect certain factors. These include the availability of resources to provide the services and the appropriateness of applying such resources to provide the services, having regard to present and likely future demands for civil legal aid services.
In addition, the Lord Chancellor will be required, in carrying out his functions, to protect and promote the public interest and to support the constitutional principle of the rule of law. These considerations are inherent in the Lord Chancellor’s functions as a Minister of the Crown and do not require specific reference here. In addition, the Lord Chancellor will have specific duties under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. We have also been clear in our response to consultation that we will work in conjunction with the Legal Services Commission and its successor executive agency to develop and to put in place a procurement strategy that will reflect the demands and requirements of the new legal aid market.
Having read that out, I appreciate that a large number of noble Lords will want to read Hansard, see what it says and see how it matches. It would be madness for any Minister faced with an amendment tabled by the noble Lords who tabled this amendment simply to dismiss it. I will certainly draw the attention of the Lord Chancellor to the debate.
So far the Minister has not mentioned the conversations that he and the Government have had with the Bar Council, the Law Society and other bodies concerned with this aspect of law. They have been critical of the Government's approach, have they not? In what way?
At one stage I accused Peter Lodder, chairman of the Bar Council, of stalking me, so often did I see him. Of course the Bar Council, the Law Society and various other bodies, including committees of this House, will give an opinion on legislation. We are certainly in conversation on these matters. The noble Lord shakes his head, but when he was a Minister he did not say, “Come in, vested interests, tell me what you want and I will do it”. He listened to them, and where they could convince him he made changes. I assure noble Lords that my honourable and right honourable friends the Ministers in the other place and I have made ourselves constantly available to a wide range of bodies, including professional organisations, and we will continue to do so during the passage of the Bill. No organisation has a rubber stamp on the matter, but we will listen.
In philosophy and in content, this has been an extremely useful debate that I will draw to the attention of the Lord Chancellor. When it comes to the crunch, we face a division between the principled approach of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, that access to justice means that we must pay the legal aid bill, whatever it is.
I referred to expenditure that was genuinely necessary to ensure that all our citizens have equal access to justice. I certainly did not endorse any inefficiencies or extravagances in the legal aid system that there might be at the moment.
The point is that that is genuinely what we, too, are trying to do. It is a matter of judgment. In the next month or six weeks, as we take the Bill through the House, we will test those judgments in detail. I hope that in the light of my response, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will withdraw his amendment.
The Minister referred to Article 6 of the convention being the standard. We should bear in mind, as he said, that among the 47 states we have one of the best systems, yet by using Article 6 we are adopting a standard well below common law and anything that we in this country have enjoyed since 1949. Will he reflect on that?
As I said, I reflect on almost anything that my friend says, and it is now in Hansard as well.
My Lords, this has been a lengthy debate that has touched on a large number of very important issues. In responding, perhaps I may briefly take the attention of the Committee back to what we are debating: the terms of Amendment 1. With all due respect to the Minister, I simply cannot understand his objection to the amendment. It is not a matter of legal complexity, it is not a matter of legal expertise, and it is certainly not a matter of philosophy. Surely the amendment identifies in terms that I hope are clear and uncontroversial the aims of the legal aid system in our society. It recognises that the provision of legal aid must be within available resources, so it does not cut across the Minister's understandable desire to save money. There is no question of the amendment requiring a “blank cheque”, which was his phrase in answering criticisms of the Bill. Surely a statement of constitutional principle such as this is absolutely vital at the start of a Bill of this nature.
I suggest to noble Lords that the Government's refusal, through the Minister, to recognise a simple, and I hope uncontroversial, statement of principle in Clause 1 is deeply troubling in what it tells the Committee and the world outside the House about the Government's approach to legal aid and to the more detailed provisions that we will come to debate in Committee.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for that summing up. I was well aware of his own deep concern about social welfare law and I am not surprised by the passion with which he deployed his arguments. I was interested that he talked about advice. Quite often as this Bill goes through we will move between what is advice, what is legal advice and what is taxpayer legally paid advice. It may be that some of the areas of concern are addressed by other means.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, about tribunals, I am advised that upper-tier tribunals are under a duty in accordance with the overriding objective to make sure that cases are dealt with fairly and justly. That includes,
“avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in proceedings”,
and,
“ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully”.
I am also advised that legal aid is not available now under the current system for representation at the Upper Tribunal or on welfare benefit cases, so we are not operating from a basis on which legal aid is as generally available now, as some of the speeches might have indicated.
I might be wrong, but is it not true that legal aid is available for advice for people who attend those tribunals?
The noble Baroness is an expert. She wrote a precursor to 1,620 pages of advice, so I will accept that. We will have plenty of opportunities for correction if either of us is wrong.
When I started as a Minister I started counting the number of times the noble Lord, Lord Newton, and I disagreed, but I have now stopped counting. Nevertheless, my love for him remains totally undiminished and I know of his own concern and expertise in this area. He mentioned the danger of a pincer movement, but a number of proposals that are currently being considered across government should make it easier for people to receive the right provision or entitlement in areas such as welfare, benefits and education. The most notable of these is the universal credit, which will help to reduce the scope of error significantly, as it makes the whole benefits system simpler and easier to understand. The Ministry of Justice is working closely with the Department for Work and Pensions as part of its wider welfare reform programme to improve the quality and effectiveness of initial decision-making in social security applications, considerations within the DWP and the system of subsequent appeals to tribunal. That is another aspect.
A number of people have asked about the impact of particular reforms. It has not always been acknowledged that other government actions might be improving the situation in some of these areas. It is always difficult to give the full impact of any particular measure. As the Lord Chancellor points out in his oft-quoted Guardian article—I did not know there were so many Guardian readers in the House—part of the aim is, to a certain extent, to change attitudes and approaches so that we do not become overly reliant on legalistic solutions. There might well be changes, both beneficial and less beneficial, in the outcomes of some of the things that are going on.
I accept the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and others that appearing before a tribunal is daunting for the lay man. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked me a specific question about the cost of legal aid appeals to the Upper Tribunal on welfare benefit matters. I am advised that at the moment we spend approximately £1 million a year on legal aid for advice and representation on welfare benefit appeals to the Upper Tribunal and higher courts. I will come back to Amendment 2.
Amendment 19 deals with Clause 7, which defines what “legal services” and “civil legal services” mean for the purposes of Part 1. Clause 7 provides an overarching definition, but the specific levels of service—for example, legal help and legal representation—that will be available in any particular case will be set out in regulations made under Clause 10. This approach is based closely on the current model, where Section 4(2) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 describes the types of services that can in principle be funded, and the Legal Services Commission’s funding code criteria set out the precise levels of service that are available in any particular case.
The definition of service in Clause 7 is wide enough to cover the things that one would expect, such as advice from a high street solicitor about a case that a person wishes to bring. I can perhaps assure noble Lords that legal advice and assistance in relation to tribunals is a service that is already encompassed in the description of legal proceedings in Clause 7(1). Indeed, “legal proceedings” is defined in Clause 41 as meaning,
“proceedings before a court or tribunal”.
We rely on this for the provision of services, including advocacy, in, for example, mental health tribunals as set out in paragraph 5 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 or in paragraph 9 of Part 3 of Schedule 1. The definition of legal services in Clause 7 is therefore wide enough to include legal help and indeed advocacy in proceedings before a court or tribunal, and this amendment is unnecessary.
Amendments 2, 29 and 78 all broadly concern appeals to the Upper Tribunal and appellate courts on a point of law. Amendment 2 seeks to make legal aid available in relation to,
“appeals on any point of law in the fields of welfare benefits, employment, debt, housing, immigration, education, and asylum”,
where an individual is in dispute with the state. Amendment 29 seeks to make legal aid, including advocacy, available in social security appeals before the Upper Tribunal and appellate courts. Amendment 78 would add a new paragraph to Schedule 1 and seeks to include appeals on a point of law,
“from the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court”,
within the scope of legal aid.
The categories of law in question include ones such as welfare benefits where tribunals are used. Legally aided representation is not available for most tribunal hearings because tribunals are designed to be user-friendly, without the need for legal representation. Indeed, legal aid is not currently available for legal representation in point-of-law appeals on welfare benefits. Amendments 2 and 29 seek to extend legal aid even beyond its current boundaries by providing legal representation for these Upper Tribunal appeals.
The Government have considered whether funding remains justified for all appeals, regardless of the area of law in which they arise. In the Government’s view, it does not. Under the present scheme, funding is not provided for cases that are not considered a priority for the scheme, such as defamation or business cases, even where these take place in the High Court, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. We consider that the ability of the client to represent their arguments and the importance and complexity of the issues will vary from case to case. The fact that a case is to be heard in a higher court or tribunal does not automatically mean that it will be particularly complex; nor will the forum in which a case is heard outweigh other considerations that determine our priorities for funding.
The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, referred to immigration. Since consultation, we have taken on board some of the concerns raised, including those raised during the passage of the Bill in another place on domestic violence and immigration cases. On the introduction of the Bill, we included in Part 1 of Schedule 1 funding for advice in asylum support cases concerning the provision of accommodation. However, our fundamental position has not changed. It is our view that most immigration cases do not require a lawyer. I should make it clear, however—because some of the points made by noble Lord, Lord Hylton, refer to asylum cases—that asylum cases will remain within scope. I can assure noble Lords that funding is being retained, including for advocacy, for a range of tribunal appeals. These include appeals to the First-tier Tribunal under the Mental Health Act 1983 and appeals to the Upper Tribunal in special educational needs cases. Here, we have focused our limited resources on the highest priority cases.
On the question of appeals to the Supreme Court, we will continue to fund appeals to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court where the area of law to which the appeal relates remains in scope. Again, this will allow for our limited resources to be focused on areas of higher relative priority.
Amendment 2 appears to suggest the requirement of an equality of arms with the state in such cases. The principle of equality of arms is clearly important but is susceptible to misunderstanding. This amendment implies that justice can be done only in a particular case where both parties in proceedings have identical representation. This is not a view supported by the law, or by the experience of many litigants who currently appear before tribunals without the benefit of legally aided representation.
The important question is whether an imbalance in representation gives rise to an obvious unfairness in the proceedings. The case law on Article 6 of the ECHR sets out the circumstances in which legal aid will be required to guard against an obvious unfairness in proceedings. In determining this question, it is necessary to consider all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the rights at stake, the complexity of the law, the capacity of the individual to represent themselves and whether there are alternative means of securing access to justice. In many cases, for example before tribunals, the procedure is relatively straightforward and there are sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that the absence of legal representation on one side does not lead to an unjust outcome.
Clause 9 provides for an exceptional funding scheme that will continue to ensure the protection of an individual’s rights to legal aid under the European Convention on Human Rights as well as the rights to legal aid that are directly enforceable under European Union law. I must emphasise that the threshold here is very high—as the name suggests, they will have to be exceptional cases. However, in cases in which Article 6 of the ECHR is engaged, the exceptional funding scheme will provide an important safety net for those in which an egregr—
Thank you, Cambridge. This is the value of the House of Lords—there is always an expert around to help you. Queens’ College, Cambridge, comes to my aid.
The noble Lord would not have made that mistake if he had not been reading it out.
This is another moment in history. I have been heckled for mispronunciation by the noble Lord, Lord Prescott. I stand corrected. The exceptional funding scheme will provide an important safety net for cases in which an egregious inequality of arms would lead to an obvious and unlawful unfairness in proceedings.
We have had to make difficult choices about legal aid. Our reforms to the scope of the scheme are designed to refocus civil legal aid on the most serious cases in which legal advice and representation is justified. In social welfare law, education and immigration, we are reducing the availability of legal aid; but it will remain for cases with the highest priority, and we will continue to spend £50 million on social welfare law.
As I said in the other debate, I realise that noble Lords will want to study some of the things that I read out at speed while referring and cross-referring to parts of the Bill. I think my noble friend indicated that he will withdraw his amendment, and I hope he will, although I am making no promises of massive change. One of the crunch parts of this Bill as it passes through the House will be whether we rightly judged which areas we are withdrawing from the scope of legal aid. The Lord Chancellor and my colleagues in government are confident that we have made the right decisions, hard as they have been in some cases; so, as I say, I hope that the noble Lord will, at this stage, withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thought I detected in the last few sentences the possibility of some movement in this area, but despite that the final sentence was a killer. I am very disappointed with my noble friend’s response to what I considered to be an overwhelming case. If you cannot get legal aid for the Second-tier Tribunal, the Court of Appeal and above, as of right, we really are in a very parlous position. I assure my noble friend that I shall press him on these matters in the future. I thank all noble Lords for their participation in this debate and say to your Lordships that the state in Amendment 2 is widely defined to include local authorities, government organisations and so on. That is quite well understood when we deal with the concept of equality of arms.
While I listened to my noble friend’s summing up, I was reminded of the one person I know quite well who appeared as a litigant in person in the Divisional Court and won—my noble friend Lady Walmsley. The authority concerned went to appeal, where she was represented by a leading counsel, who is now a High Court judge, and by my son, who is a Queen’s Counsel in his own right, and lost. Fortunately her costs were all paid by the authority concerned. It takes an exceptional person to be able to take a case before a judge as a litigant in person and argue it through. The Government have underestimated just how exceptional that person has to be. For the moment, and subject to what I shall say at a later date, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.