Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Tuesday 20th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

The noble Baroness is an expert. She wrote a precursor to 1,620 pages of advice, so I will accept that. We will have plenty of opportunities for correction if either of us is wrong.

When I started as a Minister I started counting the number of times the noble Lord, Lord Newton, and I disagreed, but I have now stopped counting. Nevertheless, my love for him remains totally undiminished and I know of his own concern and expertise in this area. He mentioned the danger of a pincer movement, but a number of proposals that are currently being considered across government should make it easier for people to receive the right provision or entitlement in areas such as welfare, benefits and education. The most notable of these is the universal credit, which will help to reduce the scope of error significantly, as it makes the whole benefits system simpler and easier to understand. The Ministry of Justice is working closely with the Department for Work and Pensions as part of its wider welfare reform programme to improve the quality and effectiveness of initial decision-making in social security applications, considerations within the DWP and the system of subsequent appeals to tribunal. That is another aspect.

A number of people have asked about the impact of particular reforms. It has not always been acknowledged that other government actions might be improving the situation in some of these areas. It is always difficult to give the full impact of any particular measure. As the Lord Chancellor points out in his oft-quoted Guardian article—I did not know there were so many Guardian readers in the House—part of the aim is, to a certain extent, to change attitudes and approaches so that we do not become overly reliant on legalistic solutions. There might well be changes, both beneficial and less beneficial, in the outcomes of some of the things that are going on.

I accept the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and others that appearing before a tribunal is daunting for the lay man. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked me a specific question about the cost of legal aid appeals to the Upper Tribunal on welfare benefit matters. I am advised that at the moment we spend approximately £1 million a year on legal aid for advice and representation on welfare benefit appeals to the Upper Tribunal and higher courts. I will come back to Amendment 2.

Amendment 19 deals with Clause 7, which defines what “legal services” and “civil legal services” mean for the purposes of Part 1. Clause 7 provides an overarching definition, but the specific levels of service—for example, legal help and legal representation—that will be available in any particular case will be set out in regulations made under Clause 10. This approach is based closely on the current model, where Section 4(2) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 describes the types of services that can in principle be funded, and the Legal Services Commission’s funding code criteria set out the precise levels of service that are available in any particular case.

The definition of service in Clause 7 is wide enough to cover the things that one would expect, such as advice from a high street solicitor about a case that a person wishes to bring. I can perhaps assure noble Lords that legal advice and assistance in relation to tribunals is a service that is already encompassed in the description of legal proceedings in Clause 7(1). Indeed, “legal proceedings” is defined in Clause 41 as meaning,

“proceedings before a court or tribunal”.

We rely on this for the provision of services, including advocacy, in, for example, mental health tribunals as set out in paragraph 5 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 or in paragraph 9 of Part 3 of Schedule 1. The definition of legal services in Clause 7 is therefore wide enough to include legal help and indeed advocacy in proceedings before a court or tribunal, and this amendment is unnecessary.

Amendments 2, 29 and 78 all broadly concern appeals to the Upper Tribunal and appellate courts on a point of law. Amendment 2 seeks to make legal aid available in relation to,

“appeals on any point of law in the fields of welfare benefits, employment, debt, housing, immigration, education, and asylum”,

where an individual is in dispute with the state. Amendment 29 seeks to make legal aid, including advocacy, available in social security appeals before the Upper Tribunal and appellate courts. Amendment 78 would add a new paragraph to Schedule 1 and seeks to include appeals on a point of law,

“from the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court”,

within the scope of legal aid.

The categories of law in question include ones such as welfare benefits where tribunals are used. Legally aided representation is not available for most tribunal hearings because tribunals are designed to be user-friendly, without the need for legal representation. Indeed, legal aid is not currently available for legal representation in point-of-law appeals on welfare benefits. Amendments 2 and 29 seek to extend legal aid even beyond its current boundaries by providing legal representation for these Upper Tribunal appeals.

The Government have considered whether funding remains justified for all appeals, regardless of the area of law in which they arise. In the Government’s view, it does not. Under the present scheme, funding is not provided for cases that are not considered a priority for the scheme, such as defamation or business cases, even where these take place in the High Court, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. We consider that the ability of the client to represent their arguments and the importance and complexity of the issues will vary from case to case. The fact that a case is to be heard in a higher court or tribunal does not automatically mean that it will be particularly complex; nor will the forum in which a case is heard outweigh other considerations that determine our priorities for funding.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, referred to immigration. Since consultation, we have taken on board some of the concerns raised, including those raised during the passage of the Bill in another place on domestic violence and immigration cases. On the introduction of the Bill, we included in Part 1 of Schedule 1 funding for advice in asylum support cases concerning the provision of accommodation. However, our fundamental position has not changed. It is our view that most immigration cases do not require a lawyer. I should make it clear, however—because some of the points made by noble Lord, Lord Hylton, refer to asylum cases—that asylum cases will remain within scope. I can assure noble Lords that funding is being retained, including for advocacy, for a range of tribunal appeals. These include appeals to the First-tier Tribunal under the Mental Health Act 1983 and appeals to the Upper Tribunal in special educational needs cases. Here, we have focused our limited resources on the highest priority cases.

On the question of appeals to the Supreme Court, we will continue to fund appeals to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court where the area of law to which the appeal relates remains in scope. Again, this will allow for our limited resources to be focused on areas of higher relative priority.

Amendment 2 appears to suggest the requirement of an equality of arms with the state in such cases. The principle of equality of arms is clearly important but is susceptible to misunderstanding. This amendment implies that justice can be done only in a particular case where both parties in proceedings have identical representation. This is not a view supported by the law, or by the experience of many litigants who currently appear before tribunals without the benefit of legally aided representation.

The important question is whether an imbalance in representation gives rise to an obvious unfairness in the proceedings. The case law on Article 6 of the ECHR sets out the circumstances in which legal aid will be required to guard against an obvious unfairness in proceedings. In determining this question, it is necessary to consider all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the rights at stake, the complexity of the law, the capacity of the individual to represent themselves and whether there are alternative means of securing access to justice. In many cases, for example before tribunals, the procedure is relatively straightforward and there are sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that the absence of legal representation on one side does not lead to an unjust outcome.

Clause 9 provides for an exceptional funding scheme that will continue to ensure the protection of an individual’s rights to legal aid under the European Convention on Human Rights as well as the rights to legal aid that are directly enforceable under European Union law. I must emphasise that the threshold here is very high—as the name suggests, they will have to be exceptional cases. However, in cases in which Article 6 of the ECHR is engaged, the exceptional funding scheme will provide an important safety net for those in which an egregr—

[Lord Eatwell]

Egregious.

[Lord McNally]

Thank you, Cambridge. This is the value of the House of Lords—there is always an expert around to help you. Queens’ College, Cambridge, comes to my aid.