Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Monday 10th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have made such points as I think may assist the House in answer to the arguments brought forward in this debate and the arguments presented by the Joint Committee.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I apologise for arriving late at this part of the debate. I did not propose to speak and hold no strong views about this amendment, but I have to rise just to deal with a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He said that judges neither need nor deserve any protection. That is true in general, but I think he has overlooked the fact that certain judges get death threats. There are groups of judges, of which I happen to be one, who during their time as a judge received a number of death threats. In my case they came both from people who could recognise me because they had appeared before me in court and from those, such as Fathers 4 Justice, who not only made death threats against me but, I must tell your Lordships, also threatened to kidnap my dog, which I thought was much more serious than the death threat against me. More serious than the threats that either I or the family court judges receive are those made against judges in terrorist trials. They absolutely need and deserve protection, so I take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Pannick]

I entirely agree that judges deserve all the protection necessary in those circumstances. However, the press and broadcasters are perfectly entitled to publish photographs of the judge who has heard the terrorist trial or any other sensational case. This amendment would have no impact in that respect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I, too, have been burgled and I have absolutely no sympathy with burglars, but this amendment goes too far. I am very concerned about proposed new subsection (5A), under subsection (2) of Amendment 113C, as regards using the words “grossly disproportionate”. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, has just asked, how on earth would one advise a jury—I am glad to say that I was not a criminal lawyer but I did a little crime—that you can be disproportionate but not “grossly disproportionate”?

I share the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it is contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. I believe it is a matter that would end up in Strasbourg if we were not extremely careful. The Government—I can see for the best of intentions—are just going too far.

My recollection about the Martin case, which I read only in the press, is that he was shot in the back, which would be “grossly disproportionate”. Obviously, one could see why he did not get the existing protection that the Lord Chief Justice has given and that is in the standard advice to juries, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, read out. We do not need to go further. To go further will cause real trouble.

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I regret that I cannot support this new clause. I agree entirely with what the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and a number of other practising lawyers have said. I regard this matter as very unsatisfactory. I have not practised as a barrister in recent years but I practised in the past and this proposal is unsatisfactory.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendments 113GZB and 113GC in this group, to which my noble friend Lady Linklater has added her name. These also deal with the term “exceptional” and with the application of the section in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that provides for the court to have regard to the purposes of sentencing, which are listed as:

“the punishment of offenders … the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence) … the reform and rehabilitation of offenders … the protection of the public, and … the making of reparation”.

I do not seek these amendments to exclude punishment from the matters to which the court must have regard and I acknowledge that society must deal with offenders in such a way as to win and retain the confidence both of victims and the general public. However, I cannot extrapolate from the research referred to in the impact assessment that where there is a punitive element, there is less reoffending.

Reading through the impact assessment yesterday, it struck me that the sentences in question, which the impact assessment prays in aid, will have been tailored to the offender by the court. In other words, they will be much more bespoke than it seems we are being asked to agree. Certainly, there is no comparison with a control group. Almost by definition, there cannot be a control group in these circumstances. We are told in the impact assessment that the rationale for intervention is to give tools to sentencers. As we have heard—not only tonight—we already have an extensive toolbox and we are adding to it with the welcome provisions on restorative justice. However, the theory of having certain tools available and their availability in practice may not always be quite the same. Public confidence comes from reducing reoffending and crime overall and we have heard what victims want. At the last stage of the Bill, I referred to research by the Restorative Justice Council and Victim Support, which amounts to victims wanting to be sure that “he does not do it again”.

The impact assessment also acknowledges that because community orders must be,

“proportionate to the offence committed, delivering a clear punitive element to every community order may, in some cases, cause certain requirements to be substituted by punitive ones”.

This worries me greatly. The Government tell us that some requirements may be labelled punitive, but in fact would be rehabilitative or become rehabilitative. The Minister used the example of requiring someone to get up every morning to go to an educational course. By the end of it, that person might have found it was a good thing, so it will have moved from punishment to rehabilitation. As I have said before—and I do not resile from this—I find both the possible substitution and the labelling worrying: for instance, labelling education or mental health treatment as punitive. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has spoken to his amendment, listing the types of community order which may amount to punishment. I depart from others on this because I do not think that saying the punishments “may include” takes us a lot further forward. If it is to send a message to the sentencers, then the new subsection (2A) sends a stronger message, in effect saying that a fine is not a punishment. I realise that we did not focus much on this at the last stage.

Without spending long on this, I very much support Amendment 113GB from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. This expresses what I for one have not been able to articulate previously. At the last stage and on other occasions we have talked a lot about the characteristics of offenders and their circumstances. We know about mental health problems and substance abuse, which so often underlies them. Other noble Lords will have seen a new report from the Criminal Justice Alliance, drawing attention to the mental health treatment requirement and its underuse. That is a pity, because the very prevalence of mental health problems means such an offender is not exceptional. In Committee, the Minister stated that,

“the courts can tailor any of those requirements to ensure that they do not have a disproportionate impact on offenders”.—[Official Report, 13/11/12; col. 1428.]

I do not entirely follow how the “tightly defined threshold”—as he described it—ensures that the requirements do not have “a disproportionate impact”. My logic is too confused even for me, but I did not quite follow the argument.

The Minister also stated:

“Nothing in the Bill seeks to undermine the judgment and flexibility of the judiciary, but it puts rehabilitation as a key objective”.—[Official Report, 13/11/12; col. 1429.]

Surely it must affect the hierarchy of sentencing purposes and principles and therefore affect the court’s flexibility.

The noble and learned Lord referred to using delicate surgery on the clause and his scalpel has excised the word “exceptional”. As an alternative, my term “particular” is drafted in the hope that in presenting the Government with a menu, they might be tempted to choose one of them instead of rejecting everything. It is a little less extreme than complete deletion, but the noble and learned Lord’s point about criteria is, of course, the important one.

My Amendment 113GC also refers to Section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act, to which I have already referred, about purposes of sentencing. At the last stage my noble friend gave an assurance, saying:

“Let us be clear: of course the five principles are intact”.

However, he went on to say,

“why bring legislation if we do not intend to change things?”

Hansard then reports him as saying:

“We do intend to chance things”.—[Official Report, 13/12/12; col. 1432.]

I do not think it meant that.

My noble friend twice said that it was “not the Government's intention” to,

“jeopardise the prospect of rehabilitation”,

or to,

“detract from the court's existing obligation to have regard to the five purposes”.—[Official Report, 13/11/12; col. 1435.]

It may not be the Government’s “intention”, but I fear that the words of the Bill detract from the five purposes and create a hierarchy. They would require the courts to bring a different approach to sentencing and—as I have already said to the Minister outside the Chamber—I hope that at least he can put on the record some further assurance that is firmer than saying it is “not the Government’s intention” and persuade your Lordships that these words do not do what I fear.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I must first apologise for not being present at the beginning of this part of the debate. I cannot see the point of Part 1 of Schedule 16. It really is not necessary. It owes more to the requirement of Government for the perception of the public and the press rather than the reality that a community order is in fact a punishment. I said this at greater length in Committee, so I will not go into it now. A community order is undoubtedly a punishment if it requires somebody to do or not do something, is compellable and the failure or refusal to do it has criminal sanctions. To distinguish between one sort of punishment or another is a really impossible situation. Some punishments will be more severe than others, there is no doubt about that, but the Government are pandering to perception rather than looking at the reality of what the judges and magistrates are doing.