(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I found the travels of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, around the highways and byways of Richmond Park interesting. When this Bill was first thought of, we were thinking it was going to be a Sheffield Hallam one with the NUS bussing in its students. So we have come further south from that early discussion.
Amendment 51 is interesting. As I said earlier, although I think the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, was not in his place at the time, the amendment could answer the queries that I had raised about whether the process is secret or effectively open. It is another way of dealing with that by allowing people to vote against and not just in favour of a recall by-election. It would certainly be a clearer option for electors who know that they have a choice. They can express that choice, having thought about the issue.
It is not, of course, what the Bill proposes so I am not able to offer support for it, particularly as it would negate a by-election simply if 10% voted against. You could have 30% wanting a by-election and 10% against. Under the amendment as drafted, the 10% would trump the 30%, which I am sure would not be a desirable outcome.
With regard to the increase to 20%, what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester was saying was interesting. From that, I might take the other view; if you get the 20% you have lost a fifth of your electorate. Effectively there will be no by-election. After having 20% against them, no one will possibly contest the by-election; so there would be a by-election, but not with the MP there. The purpose of the Bill, as it has been drafted, was that there should be the possibility of a by-election at which the MP refights that seat and tests the issue as to whether, despite whatever they have been found guilty of, they are nevertheless able to represent their constituents. My concern about the 20% is that it undermines the difference between a by-election and a recall petition.
I acknowledge that the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee recommended 20% but I do not think that we should pray that in aid given that it wanted no sight of this Bill whatever. I look forward to the Minister’s comments. The interesting thing is why on earth 10% was chosen and not 5% or 15%. The problem of 20% is that it effectively gets rid of the idea of having a by-election that the MP would fight. In that sense, it goes against the spirit of the Bill.
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate and I have listened carefully and seriously to all the points that have been made. I know I am repeating this point, but it should not be forgotten that for a recall petition to be opened in the first place a Member of Parliament would have had to have committed serious wrongdoing and to have met one of the three conditions in the Bill. All of your Lordships know very well what those three triggers are.
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, raised the concern that a future Parliament might do this or that with other triggers. We obviously cannot bind what another Parliament might wish to do. This Bill before us is about three triggers which involve serious wrongdoing. That is the right balance. That is the point which the other place had come to as well. We believe that reaching the figure of 10% of constituents signing the petition would show a significant level of support for a recall and would trigger a by-election in which the sitting MP could stand.
The noble Lord is invariably fair-minded. Is he really relaxed about and content with arrangements whereby someone could be subject to a petition by 10% of their electors precipitating this trial by ordeal, which would then take the process beyond the eight week period through to a by-election, while it is entirely possible that 90% of their constituents thought that there should not be a by-election and that recall was the wrong thing to do but have no opportunity under the Government’s proposals to express that view?
I understand that, of course, but the whole purpose of the legislation is for the three triggers to be for serious wrongdoing. If a Member of Parliament has been found guilty, convicted or suspended up to the level, it is a view that there should be an opportunity for constituents to decide whether there should be a recall and then, if a certain threshold is reached—noble Lords have made different points about the level of that threshold—there will be a by-election. It will then be for 100% of the electorate to come to a view about what they want to do for their future representation.
Does the Minister accept the very powerful point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester that in reality it is hardly likely that an MP who had been subject to everything that will have occurred in the run-up to the result of the petition would actually want to contest a by-election? Is he not actually being drummed out of Parliament through this process in a way that must leave the Minister deeply uneasy?
My Lords, perhaps I may just add to my point. I take what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, and I can see the argument both ways. I do not think that any political party would support a candidate in those circumstances. Maybe I am misreading this but, given the dynamics of the media, I simply cannot see the reality of a political party supporting the MP in those circumstances.
My Lords, I think this goes to the heart of the issue. If one believes that the three serious triggers for serious wrongdoing that have been set and agreed in the other place are to be adhered to, there would be this opportunity for the electorate in that constituency to have another opportunity. We are obviously at the heart of whether or not there should be legislation. The Government believe, as I think do the opposition Front Bench, that for certain conduct there should be an opportunity for the electorate of that constituency to have their say again on who represents them.
We have almost got to a point where I know that there are noble Lords who are very unhappy about the Bill, but the point is that the Government and the other place feel that there should be triggers whereby recall should take place. It is perfectly respectable for noble Lords to oppose this, but I am afraid that I disagree with the view that there should be no opportunities for recall—hence this Bill.
I am afraid that the Minister misunderstood what I said. The recall provision can be triggered only if one of the three things is invoked—there is no question about that. It then goes to the petitions commissioner—no question about that. However, the Minister and I, and indeed all noble Lords in this place, know that the discussion that takes place during the 20 days or however long it is will not be about the trigger at all. It will not be a discussion about how well or badly the MP has behaved; it will be entirely about political matters not connected in any way with the triggers. That is the dilemma that we are in. I am afraid that the 10% level makes it all too easy for that to take place. It is not a case of saying that there has not been wrongdoing, or that it has not been triggered. The question is: what will be discussed during the 20 days? If there are 20 days from the moment when the matter is referred to the petitions commissioner, the debate will take place entirely outside the Member’s individual behaviour.
I understand that. That is why I say that it comes to a different view and a different impression of whether there should not be a recall because of the issues that the noble Lord outlines. However, I think that there should be opportunities, where there has been serious wrongdoing, for there to be recall. That was in the manifesto pledges of the three main political parties and in the coalition programme. We are getting into a discussion—which I respect entirely—with noble Lords who do not like this Bill, but the point is that the other place, the Government and the Official Opposition are of the view that there should be certain opportunities, with safeguards so that representative democracy is not thwarted; of course we should defend that very strongly.
My Lords, I will continue and I hope that it will then unfold. Obviously there can be moot discussion as to whether it should be 5%, 30% or 40%; all sorts of figures could be suggested. However, if I may outline a bit more, the by-election itself would determine who was the MP; the petition would simply trigger the by-election. So while it could be argued that 10% of constituents signing the petition could mean that 90% of them wanted to keep the MP, if that were indeed the case, they would have a chance to show that at the subsequent by-election.
On average—I think this goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was seeking to wrestle with me about why 10% was chosen and not 15%, 20% or 5%—a constituency has around 70,000 to 75,000 constituents. With a threshold of 10%, around 7,000 to 7,500 signatures would be required to trigger a by-election. That is one of the reasons why the Government came to the view that that was about the right number; it was a serious number of people. Increasing the threshold to 20% would obviously require between 14,000 and 15,000 constituents to sign in order to trigger a by-election. Again, this is a matter of balance, but there was a feeling that raising the level to 20% would make it more onerous for constituents worried about an MP after serious wrongdoing to hold that MP to account.
One can have all sorts of interesting discussions about what the right percentage would be. The Government set out 10% in the coalition programme for government, and that was the figure contained in the draft Bill and which the other place was content with as the correct level at which to set the threshold. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, asked me for a straight answer. Those are the sorts of considerations that came into it.
My Lords, I apologise that I was not here for the earlier part of the debate; I was attending the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. I do not think my noble friend really understands the practical point being made, which is not about the merits of the Bill; it is that if someone finds themselves in a position where they are subject to a petition, they are already dead and their political party will no longer adopt them as a candidate. In those circumstances, they are not going to get elected. So, as was pointed out at an earlier stage in our proceedings, the sensible thing for any Member of Parliament in those circumstances to do, if they still have the support of their party, would be to create a by-election and stand as a by-election candidate.
By creating this procedure, if a Member of Parliament is subject to this procedure and they still have the support of their party, then if the threshold is set at the lower level of 10%, all the people who do not like the Member of Parliament because he is a Tory or whatever will be able to campaign and undermine him. So this does not actually deliver what the Government say they want, which is a procedure that allows the electorate to decide, rather than the party machine or the House of Commons, whether someone should be deprived of their seat in the Commons. It just does not work.
My noble friend is of course entitled to his opinion and has made the point a number of times about whether a party would reselect the candidate. I do not think that any of us can say, and it would depend on every circumstance that came forward. As I say, this is the Bill that is before us, and I think that the three triggers are reasonable. If they were not reasonable I would feel very uncomfortable, but serious wrongdoing is a point—
One point of clarification would help me. The noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, put the case that cars—and quite luxurious ones for that matter—could be used during the course of seeking petitioners. Can the Minister say whether there will be a financial limit on the amount spent for that petitioning purpose? In every other democratic system there is a limit, and a very strict one at that.
I thank the noble Lord for that point. We will come to amendments on precisely those sorts of matters, so I am grateful to him for raising that.
Those are the points on the 10%. I turn to the new clause proposed by my noble friend Lord Hamilton about the counter-recall petition, which would be available for signing alongside the recall petition. That would allow constituents to indicate that they did not want the MP to be recalled from the House of Commons, and for a by-election to be held. The proposed new clause provides that, if the counter-recall petition were to be signed by at least 10% of the constituents, regardless of how many people had signed the recall petition the MP would not be recalled and a by-election would not be held.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, raised the figure of 30%, but I will take it further. If up to 90% of the constituents signed the petition calling for recall, yet only 10% signed the counter-recall petition, despite a much higher percentage and overwhelming public support for the MP’s recall in this case—and I use a hypothetical case to show our concern—a by-election could not be held.
The proposals in the Bill are not for recall on any grounds. Although it is fully understood what those triggers are, a number of noble Lords have brought forward concerns about whether it was on the case of any grounds. These provisions in the Bill are for recall in cases of proven serious wrongdoing; I emphasise that deliberately because those are the triggers that would have to be met. Such is the seriousness of them that all those three triggers—
For the last hour or so, led by the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, everyone has gone on about serious wrongdoing. We are talking about any period of imprisonment. When one appears before a magistrate, they can decide either to say, “Seven days in prison” or “A fine of £500”. It is entirely in the magistrates’ gift to do that. Some magistrates have political views as well, by the way. Someone could be put in prison for seven days instead of being fined £500, and this trigger would take effect. Is that not correct?
The legislation is very clear that if a Member of Parliament were convicted and sent to prison for seven days, they would be deemed to be in breach of criminal law. The point of the legislation is to enable a constituency or the electorate of that constituency to decide by the recall trigger and then by the by-election. The noble Lord is absolutely right: whether the figure is seven days or 11 months, as one knows, after 12 months there would be a disqualification under the Representation of the People Act.
That is an automatic disqualification—I understand and accept that. However, the situation is that the magistrate has discretion as to whether to fine someone or send them to prison. I do not know if the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, has been a magistrate; I have. That could be a political decision, which could decide whether to trigger the recall petition. Therefore if I was sitting in the court and a Conservative Member of Parliament appeared before me, I could say, “I’m not going to fine him £500—that would be pointless. I’m going to send him to prison for seven days and immediately trigger that recall petition”. Is that not correct?
My Lords, I would be surprised if any magistrate did that—I think of the requirements to be a magistrate. The noble Lord was a magistrate. I would be very troubled if a magistrate put themselves in a position where they could be accused of taking a political decision. That would be a very serious accusation of the magistracy to think that it would take a political decision of that sort. I am also concerned about the suggestions about the Standards Committee that we heard. Those are very serious matters.
I will finish this—I am sorry. It would be a very serious accusation to suggest that people in public office who have very serious responsibilities, or those in the courts, were taking political decisions. I would be extremely worried by that. The Bill deals with the situation in which someone is imprisoned for up to 12 months when there is a trigger if someone is convicted. That would be a trigger, but it would not remove the Member of Parliament. If such a case arose, it would be very interesting to think what the nation thought. If it was suggested that a political decision had been taken by a magistrate, that would be a very serious matter.
I have great respect for the Minister, but I am afraid that he is exhibiting a little bit of naivety with regard to that. If he thinks back to some cases in the past, he will see that on occasions decisions have been challenged as being made for less than dispassionate and objective reasons, so that can arise. I am saying that it is very easy for that trigger to be pulled in that kind of instance: a seven-day sentence would initiate it. That is not—as other noble Lords, such as the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, have described it—a very serious wrongdoing. It could happen because of a series of parking or speeding offences, or some other matter. All sorts of things could trigger that—such as getting your wife to say that she was driving your car.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that further contribution. The Bill is about these three triggers. The Government believe that they are the correct triggers for recall. Whether they are for serious wrongdoing or wrongdoing obviously is a matter of opinion; but the Government’s view is that these are three triggers that the other place viewed as being examples and the three triggers for recall.
I ought to make some progress on this. The intention of establishing the recall petition is to allow constituents to hold their Member of Parliament to account. We believe that 10% of constituents is the correct figure. In most cases that would be over 7,000 constituents. Under this Bill, the level of popular support that the Member of Parliament has would be properly tested at the by-election, not through a counter-recall petition.
I am most grateful to noble Lords for this debate. The Government remain of the view that the 10% threshold is the appropriate level, and therefore I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I am very disappointed with my noble friend, because I think that we proved very conclusively how very easy it is to reach this threshold. My other worry is that I suspect that this Bill is just a start for more recall Bills, given that—let us face it—people who believe in the recall of MPs are not remotely satisfied by the Bill and will be coming back with additional ideas of circumstances in which Members of Parliament can be recalled. In the mean time, we will have the 10% threshold locked into the Bill, which will be virtually unchangeable and, as I hope we have proved pretty conclusively, very easy to reach. However, although I am very disappointed with my noble friend, I will of course withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the probing amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Hughes of Woodside raises the important matter of what is said about an MP in a campaign in connection with a recall petition. Many noble Lords who have spoken in our debates on the Bill have expressed concern that MPs who take up causes that are unpopular and then find themselves subject to a recall petition could find that opponents use campaigns or issues that have nothing to do with the issue in question to try to take advantage of the situation. That raises a very important point for your Lordships’ Committee.
My noble friend Lord Hughes was for many years the chair of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, but not so long ago not everyone was so well disposed towards that organisation and its aims. My noble friend made a point by giving examples of issues in his constituency, and I noted his comments about our reputation in the world with regard to the state of our democracy. He went on to make the particular point that there needs to be fairness in the process so that MPs are not allowed to be judged or abused on the positions they take as part of their job of being an MP and which have nothing to do with the actual issue in question. They should be judged on the subject of the recall petition itself. I hope that the noble Lord will respond carefully to the issues that my noble friend raised.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, for his amendment, which intends that in the event of any material being written, spoken or broadcast that is unrelated to the wrongdoing which initiated the recall petition and which is detrimental to the MP, the petition will become null and void.
The Government believe that there are three significant concerns as to why this amendment presents difficulties. Indeed the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, referred to the first, which is the principle of free speech—an issue which of course all of us in this House prize very strongly. I do not think that we should, in effect, severely restrict what individuals, including MPs, constituents and the media, may say or write for a period of eight weeks.
My second concern is the appearance that this amendment gives of particular and special treatment for a Member of Parliament. The noble Lord’s amendment states that it is only material unrelated to the wrongdoing and which is detrimental to the MP that will cause the petition to become null and void. That leaves the clear interpretation that there will be no such consequences to publishing material unrelated to the wrongdoing that is beneficial to the Member of Parliament facing recall. Indeed, while I realise the view of my noble friend Lord Forsyth on the Bill, here he is absolutely right. The third concern is that the proposals would make recall unworkable. Indeed, who would determine whether something is detrimental—and is that even possible?
I say by way of example that it would be impossible to conceive of an eight-minute period, let alone an eight-week period, which could pass without even one example of detrimental material being put into the public domain. The noble Lord’s proposals would make it very difficult for any recall petition to reach its conclusion because it would be quite simple for the supporters of a Member of Parliament to put out negative comments just to secure that outcome. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that I entirely understand and accept his good intentions, but, for the reasons I have outlined, I hope he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Someone once said that the road to hell was paved with good intentions. In my initial remarks, I referred to the fact that this might well be seen as an attack on free speech. I appreciate that point very much indeed. Of course, it has been pointed out that people who use beneficial comments might also be struck out. The difficulty I have is that the recall petition is a kind of trial. If you are on trial for a road traffic offence, for example, extraneous behaviour such as that you got drunk the night before or were drunk during the trial would not be allowed in court because it could influence the result of the trial. Therefore, I am deeply unhappy because that is what, in fact, will happen. However, I do understand the problems.
My noble friend Lord Howarth raised an intriguing point about opinion polls. I had thought of that and was not quite sure how to proceed, but I had in mind that an amendment along the lines of banning opinion polls during the eight-week period might well be an amendment for Report. I am glad he has reminded me of that, and I hope it will be taken up, if not necessarily by me, then by others.
We are in extremely difficult times with this Bill. We are torn between trying to see justice for MPs and giving constituents the opportunity to exercise their rights in relation to their MP. In all the circumstances, I believe that the best thing to do is to withdraw the amendment.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak to Amendments 1, 11, 14, 17 to 19, 21 to 24, 34, 52 and 53. A number of amendments were made to the Bill on Report in the other place, notably introducing a further condition for recall. This third condition triggers recall where there is a conviction for the offence of providing false or misleading information in relation to parliamentary expenses claims under Section 10 of the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, regardless of sentence imposed, so that a fine would trigger recall, as would a sentence of imprisonment.
This new condition was inserted by the House of Commons expressly to reflect the particular relevance to the public’s trust in an MP if they deliberately misuse the expenses system. The vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the amendment tabled by the Opposition Front Bench, with 281 in favour and two against. The amendment that ensures that historic offences are captured would apply also to convictions under the third recall condition.
In passing these amendments, the House of Commons concentrated on passing the most essential of the provisions and did not vote on the necessary consequential and technical amendments that would enable these new measures to work in practice. For this reason, the Government have tabled the necessary consequential and technical amendments to enable the Bill to work as the House of Commons intended. We have consulted with the Opposition to ensure that we are giving effect to precisely what they intended and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for putting her name to these amendments. It is for these reasons that I beg to move.
My Lords, we have undoubtedly had a very wide-ranging and interesting debate, and I think that we have all conceded that, in this first group of amendments, we have gone to the heart of some of the issues that were discussed at Second Reading. It is important to have listened in particular to the experiences of those who have been Members of the other place. After Second Reading I spoke to a noble Lord who was unhappy about the Bill and asked him how he would have felt if he had been in the other place and had heard that we here had gone beyond observing and had objected to how the other place should discipline itself. Not having been in the other place, I therefore come to these matters with some hesitation, but I am also conscious of noble Lords who have had the privilege of being in the other place and of the experience that they bring with it.
I was struck particularly by what the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, said about representative democracy. I said my opening speech at Second Reading that we should seek and ensure that representative democracy is not thwarted by the intentions of this Bill—I have not looked it up, but I know that I mentioned it, because I think that it is something we hold extremely dear. It is very important and it is why the triggers proposed are specifically to do with what has been considered in the other place to be serious wrongdoing. I understand the arguments about mission creep, but this is the Bill that is before us, which is a reflection that things have happened that we hope will never happen again.
I join the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, in hoping that the Bill will be on the statute book and that there is never a trigger for it to be used—but this was in the manifestos of the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrat Party. It is a reflection that things had gone wrong—yes, involving a few people—and were a part of what Members of the other place are now having to live with. The wrongdoing by a few people has affected all too often the trust in one of the most important parts, if not the most important part, of our constitution—a place where the representation of the people and democracy lie.
I understand a lot of what has been said by noble Lords. I was particularly struck—I think my noble friend Lord Finkelstein mentioned this—by what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said about triggering a by-election. What this does—I know the noble Lord knows this—is trigger a recall process. It does not trigger a by-election. If, under the threshold decided, they did not wish to sign up, there would not be a by-election. But in a sense it is an opportunity—and I am intrigued about this—for representative democracy to speak again. Of course, there is nothing to stop the Member of Parliament choosing to stand in the by-election. I drew somewhat different conclusions on trying to keep the balance of representative democracy, but I think that they are terribly important.
Just on that narrow point that there is nothing to stop the Member of Parliament standing in the by-election, is it conceivable that a party leader would sign up that person to be a candidate for the party in those circumstances? If not, that would prevent them standing in a by-election.
My Lords, I did not say at all whether they would stand on their former party ticket, but there is nothing to stop the Member of Parliament standing in their constituency. That is the whole point of the commentary.
On that particular point, perhaps I could ask the Minister about the case—I think it was the Littleborough by-election—where the Labour Member of Parliament was disqualified and prevented from standing again by a court judgment. Have the Government got anything to say about that in the context of this Bill and these amendments?
My understanding is that the gentleman would no longer be disqualified.
I will conclude, because in effect these amendments are technical. They are about implementing the will of the other place and ensuring that all convictions for providing false or misleading information in relation to parliamentary expenses claims under Section 10 of the Parliamentary Standards Act—
I know that the Minister is being patient and reading his resounding conclusion. He mentioned decisions in the other place, and quite rightly and properly treating them with enormous respect. He even gave us the figures—I think he said that the vote on this amendment was 281 to 2. The figures themselves—I put it to the noble Lord gently—tell a bigger story than they apparently present. In my maths, something like 370 Members did not take part in the vote at all. I think we all know part of the reason why that took place in the way that it did. It is because many Members feel very intimidated indeed about making a stance on issues relating to parliamentary expenses. One can understand it with an election just around the corner. Please can we make it almost a rule in Committee that large majorities with even larger numbers of absentees do not necessarily mean the wholehearted support and commitment of the House of Commons?
Well, the obvious rejoinder—I am sure that the noble Lord will take this in the spirit I intend—is that if one looks at the voting numbers and abstentions in a House that is considered by many to be rather too large, one might get an interesting result. So I am not sure that I am fully persuaded, although of course I understand what the noble Lord is seeking to do.
I should conclude, because a lot of the points made by noble Lords have been of a Second Reading variety. My task before your Lordships is to move amendments that we believe are necessary to effect what the House of Commons has sent us. They are, as I say, technical and consequential, but they have given us a good opportunity to open the batting. I know that there will be other amendments where some of the details of some of the points noble Lords have made in their opening remarks can be discussed fully.
I apologise for leaping to my feet too quickly. I was going to say that in over an hour of debate the amendments have found no favour in the Committee, other than from those who added their names to them, and I will not alter that in what I say now. Having heard the name of Bernadette Devlin, I am going to share a secret with the small gathering in this Chamber. I was not actually born blonde. It may surprise noble Lords to hear this, but I looked very much like Bernadette Devlin. When walking around London I was for ever being stopped and I had interesting discussions. It is a long time since that has come to mind.
It is clear that the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, has devoted a great deal to these amendments but, in the words of the last two noble Lords to have spoken, they are, if not dangerous, certainly full of major problems. The amendments would catapult relatively minor misdemeanours well above our legal means of resolving alleged wrongdoings—and that starts with only 500 signatures. I could certainly get that number on a Saturday morning in busy Kentish Town. That would bring an MP not simply to the police, to the DPP or even to a magistrates’ court to see whether there was a case to answer, but up and over all of that to a judge, possibly on the basis of no evidence—simply following an allegation. The allegation would not have to be tested or proved at any level, nor would any suspicions have to be verified. Indeed, the issue could be entirely without merit and without evidence. It could be based on mistaken identity. Moreover, if the complaint against an MP is not criminal, why on earth would it go before a judge-led hearing? I assume it would not be criminal because the amendments state that the hearing would,
“be suspended if any of the matters under consideration are the subject of criminal investigation or criminal proceedings”.
I think that means that we are talking about something which is not even criminal, yet it would go to a higher level than things that would normally go to a magistrates’ court and be tested by a presenter or a prosecutor. I really do not understand why this is being taken to that level. What the amendments will do is up the ante, if you like, of misdemeanours to above the criminal, and straight before not just a single judge but a double-judge hearing. As a former magistrate, I find that quite difficult to understand. We were able to hear many cases of criminal wrongdoing and even indictable offences to see whether there was a case to answer. However, there would be no such filters on this.
There are also big questions which have already been touched on as to rules of evidence, legal representation, hearsay evidence, cross-examination and the disclosure of previous convictions. These are big issues. To bring someone in front of a court—the word “trial” has been used—on the basis of nil evidence is extremely worrying. The amendments would even force witnesses to attend, at the risk of being in contempt of court. As a magistrate, I do not believe that I had the right to do that. This is a heavy sledgehammer to use on what might be a completely unproven allegation, and certainly something of a non-criminal nature which otherwise would be dealt with separately.
What is this misconduct? If it is not a crime and it is not being dealt with by the police, what is it? Is it non-appearance, because people have said that they would not come? Is it about an MP being in Barbados for the past 11 months, although in the current weather I would quite understand if they were over there? What is the nature of bringing Parliament into disrepute? I see no merit at all in these amendments, and the speeches so far probably concur with that. I trust that we will not see them back at the Report stage.
My Lords, yet again we have had a thought-provoking and thorough debate. I acknowledge the work that my noble friend has devoted to this matter. As your Lordships know, the amendments are a modified version of those brought forward in Committee and on Report in the other place. The underlying principle behind involving the public in initiating the recall process for reasons of misconduct did indeed attract some support in the other place. Although I know that I shall not receive the approval of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, it is interesting to see that these amendments were rejected in the other place by 271 votes to 64.
My noble friend’s Amendment 2 would remove the first and second recall conditions yet retain the third. The proposed new clauses create the concept of a parliamentary misconduct hearing, which would involve two judges examining the behaviour of an MP if the hearing received a petition alleging certain forms of misconduct that had been signed by 500 constituents. The parliamentary misconduct hearing would not be required to determine guilt to a criminal standard but rather whether parliamentary misconduct had on the balance of probabilities taken place. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, highlighted this.
Turning to some of the detail of the amendments, the number of petitioners necessary for the parliamentary misconduct hearing to consider the allegation has been proposed at 500. The aim is to give the public some involvement in initiating the process. Of course, if it is alleged that a criminal offence has been committed, it takes only one person to make a complaint for that to be investigated by the police, for instance. Arguably, if the complaint is valid it should be taken forward regardless of the number of complainants. On the other hand, as a test of public will, is the number of 500 constituents perhaps too low? My noble friend has explained in detail the behaviour that the parliamentary misconduct hearing is being asked to judge. I am not going to outline that further, given the time.
Criminal matters, which could include bribery and misconduct in public office, as well as offences relating to parliamentary expenses, would be investigated by the police and adjudicated by the courts. However, my noble friend proposes that criminal convictions and prison sentences should not be a trigger for recall, except for offences regarding parliamentary expenses. The trigger my noble friend proposes is a finding by the hearing that on the balance of probabilities the misconduct took place—a lower standard of proof than that used in criminal cases.
Matters that fall under the Code of Conduct can be examined by the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner, the Standards Committee and the House of Commons, which can order suspension. The proposals in the Bill are that a suspension of more than 10 sitting days could trigger recall. My noble friend’s amendments would not prevent investigation by the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner or the Standards Committee or suspension from the House taking place; they would simply decouple it from recall. So there could be a parallel process of investigation by the commissioner, the committee or the House, and a parliamentary misconduct hearing—all of which, of course, could reach different views.
I turn to parliamentary privilege, which was first raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport. In addition to the proposed parliamentary misconduct hearing set out in these amendments, there are the serious concerns that noble Lords have quite widely expressed vis-à-vis the interaction with parliamentary privilege. For the parliamentary misconduct hearing to have any real effect, it is likely that the judges appointed to determine misconduct would need to question proceedings in Parliament and would need to examine issues that are covered by exclusive cognisance; that is, that Parliament has sole jurisdiction over its own affairs, including standards and discipline. As the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, identified, that would be contrary to the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights; for example, the provisions in the amendments would give a role to the hearing to examine breaches of MPs’ conduct, which would impinge on exclusive cognisance.
It is also proposed that the parliamentary misconduct hearing would be able to look at issues such as cash for questions, attendance in the House and abusing or bringing into disrepute the office of a Member of Parliament—all matters which are to some extent likely to be covered by privilege. The provisions also set out standards for Members of Parliament by defining parliamentary misconduct as non-attendance in a six-month period. However, the amendments are silent on the interaction with parliamentary privilege.
Of course, Parliament does possess the ability to allow a hearing to deal with matters that fall under its exclusive cognisance, and to question proceedings in Parliament. However, if we are to take such a momentous decision, we should be fully aware of what we are doing, and there needs to be an overriding reason to do so. The problem the Government face is not being convinced that either of these conditions has been met. The type of wrongdoing covered by this alternative trigger already triggers a recall petition under the conditions in the Government’s Bill. The triggers in the Government’s Bill, whether noble Lords like the Bill or not, are intended to fit in with the disciplinary and constitutional arrangements of our Parliament.
I turn to the relationship with criminal prosecution. While the amendment contains a provision to allow for the suspension of a hearing in the case of a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings, it may be that these would be initiated only due to testimony in or judgment of the hearing. In the case of alleged criminal misconduct, if the defence had already been rehearsed before a parliamentary misconduct hearing, or the hearing’s finding was considered prejudicial to the MP’s presumption of innocence, it may not be possible for the MP to have a fair trial. The fact that an MP had to answer allegations in a parliamentary misconduct hearing could prevent him or her from facing criminal prosecution for misconduct that amounts to a criminal offence.
I am very conscious that my noble friend has devoted a lot of time and work to putting forward his amendments, given some of the background to why we are where we are. I hope your Lordships will understand that we feel there are very serious matters, which your Lordships and I have endeavoured to outline, that are of sufficient concern that I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his careful response to our probing amendments. Perhaps I should put on record that, as I understand it, as far as both the circumstances to which the noble Lord, Lord Maxton, and my noble friend Lord Forsyth referred are concerned—in one case, the suspension of a Member in the House of Commons—absolutely nothing changes in the Bill as it stands, or in my amendments. It is as it was and would continue to be. In the case of any Member—Minister or not—misleading the House of Commons, there is a very clear process for what then happens. I do not think that is affected by the Bill. It certainly is not affected by my amendments.
There has quite properly been a discussion about the relationship of our set of probing amendments to the Bill of Rights—
Undoubtedly there will be cases and jurisdictions where we would be very content to take that, but there will be others—sadly, probably more around the world—where we would query both the jurisdiction and the sentencing. I do not feel that making it automatic, as this amendment would, should be supported. As has been made clear, Amendment 4 conflicts with the current situation in that, if I have understood it correctly, it would trigger recall following a year’s imprisonment. As my noble friend accepts, that was not its aim; it is a probing amendment. I differ from my noble friends Lord Foulkes and Lord Soley in that they want to keep the decision only with the House of Commons, whereas we have supported the proposal that there are circumstances where it should go to the electorate. Giving the electorate a say following someone’s imprisonment—possibly for a very serious offence—is something that we have supported and continue to support.
The other difficulty that I have with what I understand came from the Scottish Law Society—I am sorry if I offend it by not supporting its amendments—is the idea that if an offence, not a conviction but an offence, was declared beforehand, that will be enough to enable someone to escape the possibility of a recall petition. We could have someone saying before being elected an MP, “Well, it is true that I have been arrested for a bit of a punch-up”. That is declaring the offence. However, the conviction may take place sometime afterwards, by which time we discover that actually he had broken his wife’s arm in three places, kicked in the door, set fire to the carpet and broken her favourite records, but that was all a minor punch-up. I do not think that we would want to excuse someone just because they have said, “Oh, I am in trouble with the law”. The word “offence” is used rather than “conviction”. I do not think that there should be letting off at that stage.
As my noble friend says, these are on the whole probing amendments and useful for that, but I do not think that we should move to allow another jurisdiction automatically to trigger a recall in this country.
My Lords, perhaps before I turn to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, I may speak to the government amendments, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has put her name.
Amendment 15 gives effect to the opposition amendment from the other place. Clause 2 contains further detail to clarify the sentences and orders that would meet the first condition under which an MP would be subject to a recall petition—that is, where an MP has been convicted in the UK of an offence and is sentenced or ordered to be imprisoned or detained and the appeal period has expired without that being overturned.
As introduced in the House of Commons, subsection (1) ensures that offences committed before the MP became an MP can trigger the opening of a recall petition, as long as the conviction and sentencing take place after the day on which the MP became an MP—but only if the offence is committed after the day on which Clause 1 comes into force. That would rule out historic offences triggering a recall.
The House of Commons was clear that it wished historic offences to be caught as well, as long as the conviction took place after the Bill came into force and after the MP became an MP, and voted with that intention, passing an amendment tabled by the Opposition Front Bench in the Commons by 236 votes to 65.
A pair of amendments was tabled to give effect to that intention: a substantive amendment and a paving amendment. Unfortunately, however, only the paving amendment was actually made, which had the effect of deleting the words “the reference” at the start of Clause 2(1) so that it does not now make sense. The substantive amendment was not made, so the Government tabled Amendment 15 to give concrete effect to the will of the House of Commons.
Amendment 20 is a minor and technical change to the definition of “appeal” in Clause 3(6). The amendment is to reflect that the Scotland Act 2012 amended the appeals regime so that certain devolution appeals in Scotland that deal with compatibility with EU or human rights law are dealt with under Section 288AA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, rather than the provisions currently listed in the Bill. Making express reference to this section provides certainty that such appeals would be covered.
Clause 22 is a technical clause which defines the interpretation to be given to key words and phrases in the Bill. Amendment 74 would alter Clause 22 to remove any possible ambiguity about the definition of the word “quashed” in relation to overturning a conviction on appeal by replacing it with a phrase making clear,
“that there is no longer a conviction”,
in relation to the first and third conditions for recall. This would cover the scenario where a sentence is replaced with an absolute or conditional discharge, meaning that it is no longer legally to be considered a conviction, as well as the case where the conviction is directly overturned.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. He rightly said that they were paving amendments, and they are of considerable interest. I was intrigued particularly by Amendment 3, which would mean that if an MP were to be convicted outside the United Kingdom, the MP would also be subject to a recall petition process. As the noble Lord mentioned, the Law Society of Scotland raised that issue. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, referred to a number of the difficulties with such a proposal. Outside the United Kingdom, Parliament has no control over what acts amount to criminal conduct or when custodial sentences are imposed. Therefore, we cannot predict that a recall petition would be appropriate in all circumstances where an MP is given a custodial sentence outside the United Kingdom.
If the noble Lord will display a shade of patience, I shall of course deal with that, but I would like to explore the general position as well.
There is also the practical difficulty of how such a conviction would affect the working of the recall petition process. Under the Bill, the relevant court would notify the Speaker of the conviction and of when the relevant period for appeals had expired. I hope that your Lordships would understand that it would not be possible to put such a duty on a court outside the United Kingdom.
The noble Lord’s wording, “or elsewhere” is intriguing. My understanding is that under the Representation of the People Act 1981, a Member of Parliament sentenced to more than one year in prison is automatically disqualified, whether the MP was found guilty in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. My notes say—underlined—“as long as the Member of Parliament is detained in the United Kingdom or Ireland”. An MP sentenced to more than 12 months but detained anywhere else in the world would not be disqualified but could be suspended from the service of the House, were the House so to decide. I am intrigued by the point that the noble Lord has made. Without promising anything, I will make sure that his point is fully covered.
Given that the Bill is meant to be about enabling the electorate to hold to account Members who have been sentenced for less than a year to restore confidence, surely, as my noble friend has pointed out, we could get a situation where someone had committed a serious assault in, say, France, and had been imprisoned for less than a year, but would remain as a Member of Parliament, whereas someone who had done the same thing in the United Kingdom would not. Would that not open the whole process to ridicule?
Certainly, the process is not intended for ridicule. This is about very serious matters of wrongdoing. That is why I said to the noble Lord that I just want to check absolutely on the points that I have explained about the reasons for the Representation of the People Act 1981 provision. I hope that my noble friend caught my words. I said that if a Member of Parliament were sentenced to more than 12 months but detained anywhere else in the world, they would not be disqualified, but of course the House could suspend them were it so to decide. Without pre-empting anything, my view would probably be that, if a Member of the House of Commons was to commit an extremely serious offence, which involved a considerable custodial sentence, in any country that my noble friend has mentioned, there would obviously be very considerable concern and remedies would need to be sought.
I apologise to my noble friend for pressing him on this. There would indeed be considerable dismay, but the Bill does not provide for that. The argument is that the House may suspend someone who is subject to a custodial sentence of more than a year in another country covers the existing position which says that a Member who has been sentenced to more than a year is automatically disqualified from the House of Commons. This Bill is supposed to deal with serious offences where the sentence may be less than a year, as we have been hearing from my noble friend Lord Finkelstein, who listed a number of very serious offences. The hole in this Bill, which has been pointed out by the Law Society of Scotland and by the noble Lord, is that if it is done overseas it is not covered. That surely makes the whole exercise a little flawed, to say the least.
My Lords, I repeat to my noble friend that that is precisely why I said I would be considering and reflecting on what the noble Lord said. I have said it twice now and I hope my noble friend will understand that I said I would make sure that it was absolutely watertight, because we want clarity on the matter. My understanding is that, if a Member of Parliament were to be convicted of an offence in another country, it would, of course, be open to the Standards Committee of the House of Commons to recommend suspension from the service of the House. It would then be for the other place to decide whether and how to act on such a report. In such a situation, the MP could therefore become subject to recall through the second condition. However, I repeat to my noble friend and to your Lordships that I will look at the point he raised to make sure that there are sufficient safeguards in the matter.
Amendment 4 amends the first trigger to capture only sentences of more than one year. My noble friend Lord Forsyth has already made a point on this, but the amendment would have the effect of altering the first recall condition to make an MP subject to the opening of the recall petition process only if the Member of Parliament had been convicted or sentenced to be detained for more than one year. However, as the noble Lord knows, and as has already been discussed, there would be an automatic disqualification under the Representation of the People Act 1981. Under the noble Lord’s proposal, a Member of Parliament sentenced to more than one year’s imprisonment would be both subject to a recall petition process and automatically disqualified. I think that the noble Lord would agree that that would not be what we want from this process.
Amendment 13 removes the provision for historical sentences by removing Clause 2(1). Subsection (1) states that the first recall condition includes an offence committed before the MP became an MP, but does not include an offence committed before the day on which Section 1 comes into force. However, as your Lordships have heard, the Government have tabled Amendment 15 to give effect to the will of the other place, which would mean that offences committed before the Bill comes into force would be caught, as long as the conviction took place after the Bill comes into force and after the MP becomes an MP. Deletion of this subsection would leave it unclear whether an offence committed before the MP became an MP was captured, and offences committed before the Bill comes into force would not be captured. This would have the effect of restricting the number of occasions on which recall could be used and leaves a lack of clarity. The amendment that the noble Lord has put forward clearly goes against the wishes of the other place, to whose Members recall would apply.
Amendment 16 excludes historical offences that were known before the MP became an MP and would enable Clause 2(1)(a) to ensure that offences that had been “disclosed” before the MP became an MP would not be caught by the recall trigger. Again, this amendment has been raised by the Law Society of Scotland, but we are not clear what the word “disclosed” means in this context. If it is to be taken to mean “convicted”, the policy intention of the Government is clear. An MP who was convicted and sentenced before they were elected should not face recall as their constituents will have been able to take account of the conviction in electing them.
There is, of course, the possibility of a person’s criminal record not being publicly known. However, in either case, the Government’s intention is that, where an individual has been convicted and subsequently elected as an MP, the MP will not be subject to recall. Under the Bill, recall will be triggered only where a sitting Member of Parliament is convicted and receives a custodial sentence of 12 months or less. This could be for an offence committed while the person is an MP or beforehand—and, if the government amendments implementing the will of the House of Commons on capturing historic offences are accepted, whether the offence takes place before the Bill comes into force or after.
On the issue of suspended sentences, I refer the noble Lord to Clause 2(2)(a). I am relieved to say that the word “suspended” is in the Bill. I hope that the noble Lord will feel that his paving amendments have been given a hearing on the Front Bench. I will look at the “or elsewhere” but, in the mean time, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Will my noble friend be kind enough to comment on the brief exchange I had with my noble friend Lord Finkelstein? Do the Government regard Members of Parliament as employees? That really is a very important issue.
My Lords, I do not think that I am going to get into an exchange with two noble friends except to say that in my view, we are all servants of the public.
The existing provisions automatically disqualify a Member of Parliament if they have a sentence of more than one year. Does that include suspended sentences?
I may need to look into the provisions of the 1981 Act, because I do not have it in front of me. I will make sure that my noble friend knows.
A thought has just occurred to me that there might be another loophole if someone was sentenced to more than a year, suspended. If that did not create an automatic disqualification, it would also not provide for recall.
I want to make sure there is clarity. I will certainly reflect on what is in Hansard. I do not want to suggest that I am in a position to come back at a further stage because I do not know the answer to this—but I want to consider all that has been said, given the point that the noble Lord made.
I realise that the Minister is constrained not only by messages from the Box but by Ministers in the other place, Ministers higher up and so on—but he has been helpful, and I hope that he will use his helpfulness, eloquence and strength of view in his discussions with his colleagues and say that these anomalies have been raised and that they should be considered. I will ask Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland to look at the comments as well and see if we can reword the amendments for Report to make them fit with what the Minister said and make them more comprehensible. I thank Michael Clancy and the Law Society of Scotland for the great help they have given.
I shall not table further amendments if I know that the Minister is going to come up with some suggestions, so I would be grateful if he would keep in touch with me and other Members of the House in relation to that. In the light of his helpful response, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend Lord Dubs has, as usual, set out eloquently why he has sought to bring the outcome of election court proceedings and the new ones in the Bill more into line. His arguments were echoed by my noble friends Lord Soley and Lord Grocott, and by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. It might indeed seem very odd to a member of the public if an MP imprisoned for a serious drink-drive offence faced only a recall petition and a possible by-election, which he could then contest, whereas a different court—an election court—has the ability to exclude an MP from Parliament altogether, and even to ban that MP from contesting the seat at a by-election.
We therefore welcome this as a probing amendment, partly to give the Government the opportunity to spell out what consideration they have already given to such issues, what discussions they have had with the electoral court, and whether they are satisfied that these two mechanisms have a degree of consistency that is easily explicable both to Members of the other House and to the public. We look forward to hearing the Minister’s views.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his probing amendment and the debate that we have had on it. As he said, his amendment would introduce a further recall trigger where an election court finds a person or persons guilty of illegal practices in respect of a parliamentary election. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, rightly asked what consideration has, and could be, given to this suggestion.
Under the Representation of the People Act 1983 the result of an election can be challenged by any eligible person by lodging a petition with the relevant election court. The election court will first consider whether the MP was fairly returned. If the court, upon hearing the evidence, finds the candidate or other persons guilty of corrupt or illegal practices, it will produce a report. Any report produced will state the names of all persons who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of corrupt or illegal practices, and it will be laid before the Director of Public Prosecutions.
A candidate or other person reported as guilty of corrupt or illegal practice shall not be able to: register as an elector or vote in any local government or parliamentary election held in the United Kingdom; be elected as an MP; or hold any elective office. In the case of a person reported as guilty of a corrupt practice—for example, personation—these incapacities will apply for five years. A person found guilty of an illegal practice—for example, double voting—will be subjected to these incapacities for three years. The incapacities will apply from the date of the report, and the person must vacate any elected seat held.
Under the noble Lord’s amendment, if an election court found that illegal practices by a person or persons had resulted in the election of an MP, but the MP was not found guilty of any offence, this would automatically trigger a recall petition. However, under Section 167 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, an MP would automatically be guilty if his agents were found to have engaged in corrupt or illegal practices during the election, and would therefore have to vacate his seat.
If the noble Lord believes that an MP should not automatically be found guilty because of the actions of others in securing his seat, that would require an amendment to the Representation of the People Act. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, but it is the Government’s view that the system and penalties that we currently have in place under that Act are sufficient. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. I am most grateful for the comments that have been made. Although I cannot promise to bring anything more back, this has been a very interesting debate.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said. I did, in fact, try to distinguish between illegal and corrupt practices to indicate that there was a degree of severity under the term “corrupt” that would apply less to “illegal”. He has merged the two. I am sorry that he will not look at my proposal in a lot of detail. I genuinely believe that there is an issue here, but unless the Minister can be persuaded to think further, I shall have to call a halt—tonight, at any rate—and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Bill fulfils a coalition commitment to deliver a practical recall mechanism to hold MPs to account where they have been found guilty of wrongdoing. The three main parties in their 2010 manifestos committed to establishing such a recall mechanism, and this commitment was again made in the coalition programme for government. Where an MP has been found guilty of serious wrongdoing, the Bill will give constituents their say on whether their MP should remain in office.
The Government have sought to steer a sensible middle course in developing proposals to deliver those intentions. The other place was clear that the Bill should not change the position where MPs act as representatives of their constituents and not as delegates. In this regard, the Bill preserves the ability of MPs to take decisions on difficult policy issues without the fear of losing their seat as a result.
I will remind your Lordships of the progress of the Bill to date. The Government published their White Paper and draft Recall of MPs Bill in 2011, and pre-legislative scrutiny was conducted by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee on those proposals. The committee made some valuable recommendations, the majority of which were accepted and incorporated into the Bill for its introduction. The Government believe that there is a gap in the current disciplinary measures affecting MPs which needs to be filled, which will provide assurance that where an MP has been found guilty of serious wrongdoing they will be held to account.
The Bill has been considered in detail in the other place. That scrutiny included full consideration of the Bill in a Committee of the whole House. It was open to Members to listen to the arguments presented on a range of proposals to modify the Bill. The Government felt it was important that MPs could vote freely on these proposals, as they concern their own conduct and disciplinary arrangements. MPs agreed a number of amendments, and the Bill before this House reflects these changes.
The central tenet of the Bill is that recall petitions must be based on wrongdoing, and that parliamentarians must, in the absence of wrongdoing, be free to express their views on matters of policy without fear of losing their seat. The heart of the Bill relates to the three conditions under which a petition would be opened. On those conditions, the first “trigger” for a recall petition is that an MP is convicted in the UK of an offence and receives a custodial sentence. MPs imprisoned for more than a year are already automatically disqualified from Parliament, but there is no such measure for those who receive a sentence of 12 months or less or a suspended sentence. Therefore, this trigger will fill that gap. As noble Lords will be aware, the imprisonment of an MP is likely to cause constituents to question their faith in that Member of Parliament. Under those circumstances, therefore, it will be up to constituents to sign a petition to decide whether there should be a by-election. As is the case under all three triggers in the Bill, a by-election will be held where at least 10% of constituents sign that petition.
The Bill as introduced to Parliament provided that only those offences committed after the Act came into force would be caught. However, Members of Parliament in the other place voted on a change to allow offences that were committed before the Act came into force to be caught as long as the conviction took place after this time. For the purposes of the Bill, it does not matter whether the offender became a Member of Parliament before or after the offence, only that he or she did so before the relevant conviction.
The second trigger for a recall petition requires that an MP is suspended from the House, following a report from the Standards Committee, for a length of 10 sitting days or more. The length of such a suspension, which is deemed to follow wrongdoing serious enough to warrant a recall petition, was reduced from 21 sitting days following an amendment accepted on Report in the other place. The second trigger has been designed to work alongside the House’s existing disciplinary processes. For this reason, there is no specification of the grounds on which the committee, or the House, should consider a suspension of this length.
The third trigger for a recall petition is a new trigger, the result of an amendment made on Report in the other place. Under this trigger, a recall petition will be opened when an MP is convicted of an offence under Section 10 of the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, where an MP knowingly provides information in relation to parliamentary expenses that is false or misleading. This trigger is similar to the first in that it involves a court finding an MP guilty of an offence. However, in adopting this additional trigger MPs clearly felt that expenses fraud should be treated particularly seriously. Therefore, any conviction under this offence will trigger a recall petition, regardless of whether the sentence imposed involves detention in custody or the issuing of a fine. All three triggers have been developed to work alongside existing arrangements. The Bill as drafted steers a course between the accountability of Members of Parliament and the sovereignty of Parliament in regulating its own affairs.
I turn to the conduct of petitions which will be held when a trigger is activated. The procedures that have been laid out in the Bill have been designed to fit with the high standard rightly expected by the public of an official democratic election in this country. They will be run by the petition officer, the same person who fills the role of returning officer at UK parliamentary elections in the constituency. The signing period will last for eight weeks. If at the end of this period the 10% threshold is met, the MP will lose his or her seat and a by-election will be held. There will be no legal barrier to the Member of Parliament standing in this by-election. I will not set out the process in detail here, but I assure noble Lords that the necessary safeguards have been put in place to ensure that the process is robust, fair and open.
The Government believe that the Bill strikes the right balance in delivering a sensible and robust recall mechanism that meets the commitment made by the coalition Government at the beginning of this Parliament. As I have described, it has been shaped through pre-legislative scrutiny and by consideration in the other place. The Bill is about the conduct of Members of the other place, and those Members have examined this in detail. We should therefore approach its consideration in this House with sympathy to the debates that have already been had and the conclusions that have been reached.
The Government intend to table largely technical amendments to the Bill in Committee which will give effect to the amendments made in the other place, as tabled by the Opposition. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the changes endorsed in the other place can work effectively. These amendments will be tabled early, which I hope will be of benefit to your Lordships’ consideration of the Bill in Committee. I look forward to the debate, to the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Cooper of Windrush and to the further stages of the Bill in this House.
I am sorry to interrupt, but does the noble Lord mean that the Government will be tabling amendments relating to the 10 days under the second trigger? Will the amendments deal with the 10-day question?
My Lords, my noble friend may be helpful in his concluding remarks, but I think that these are technical amendments which give effect to the amendments agreed in the other place, rather than amendments addressing the noble Lord’s point. Perhaps, by the time of winding up, the precise point that he raises will have been considered.
We should be mindful of the conclusions of the other place in relation to the discipline of its Members. For these reasons, I commend the Bill to the House and I beg to move.
(10 years ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, Clause 87 provides for the Secretary of State to make, by order made by statutory instrument, such provision as is appropriate in consequence of the Act. Subsections (3) and (4) provide for the affirmative procedure to be used for statutory instruments which repeal, revoke or amend any provision of primary legislation. In contrast, the negative procedure is used for other statutory instruments made under this provision, including those which modify primary or subordinate legislation.
Amendments 95 and 96 simply ensure that statutory instruments made pursuant to the power to modify primary legislation are also subject to the affirmative procedure rather than the negative procedure. This is in line with the recommendation made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which stated that if the power to modify were to be retained, it should be subject to the affirmative procedure. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 99 seeks to amend Clause 90, which deals with commencement. Clause 90 provides for the commencement of the different provisions in the Bill, specifying which provisions come into force on the day on which the Act is passed, which provisions come into force two months after that day and which provisions come into force by order.
Amendment 99 has two parts. The substantive element of the first part of the amendment alters the commencement clause to bring certain additional provisions into force on Royal Assent, for example, Clause 31—which rectifies an unintended aspect of the law about tenancy deposits—and Clause 67, which gives HMRC power to disclose information for the purposes of mesothelioma litigation. Each of these has received law officers’ consent for early commencement. Clause 67 is perhaps a particularly good example of where prompt commencement would be beneficial, as it helps the families and dependants of the victims who have died from diffuse mesothelioma.
The second part of the amendment does not bring any legislation into force but activates selected powers to make subordinate legislation by statutory instrument on Royal Assent. This aims to facilitate the making of subordinate legislation, so that progress can be made as quickly as possible. As a result of this amendment, it would be possible to lay statutory instruments very soon after Royal Assent. I emphasise that the usual timeframes and rules about parliamentary scrutiny which apply to subordinate legislation would continue to apply. The clauses included in the second part of the amendment are the provisions relating to health and safety, civil penalties for parking contraventions, child trust funds, driving instructors, agricultural holdings, the provision of passenger rail services and the testing of vehicles, as well as some of the provisions relating to apprenticeships.
Amendment 101 is consequential to Amendment 99, and Amendment 105 is a minor and technical change which makes drafting improvements. I beg to move.
I am sure that the hearts of noble Lords opposite will sink as I rise to address these not very major—although they are not unimportant—amendments. However, I wanted to say that when I started the Bill, I had a very poor opinion of it. Having spent what seems like an endless time in Committee—although it has been only eight sessions, one of which was on the Floor of the House—my substantive view of the Bill is unchanged. I still think it is not the way to deal with much of the legislation we should be doing but I want to put on record how much I have enjoyed the process of being disappointed. The Bill team has been very good at providing material when we have needed it, and I have enjoyed the discussions with noble Lords and Ministers. We have drawn an attentive and often expert audience to some of our debates, if not to all of them, and those who have contributed have done so with the best spirit.
I know that it is customary to give thanks for the work done towards the end of a Bill, but given the way this Bill is organised and structured, the meat of the debate has been in Committee. We have done a very thorough job of going through areas that have sometimes reflected the wildest extremes of government legislation of past decades, which I have always been interested in. I just wanted to put that on the record.
As the noble Lord has raised the issue, it would be appropriate to say that my colleagues and I feel that we have been well served by officials. There is a force for good in the measures, and we seek deregulation where it is seemly. We are grateful for the support that we have had, but there will obviously be issues that we do need to look at. We look forward to discussions with the noble Lord and other noble Lords so that, before Report I hope, there will be general satisfaction about the measures we wish to proceed with.
(10 years ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I think it might be an appropriate moment for the Committee to adjourn.
(10 years ago)
Grand CommitteeIn moving Amendment 43, I shall speak also to Amendments 44, 45, 46 and 102. The amendments make some small changes to the wording of various pieces of road traffic legislation. The aim is to enable and empower NHS ambulance services to respond to medical services and emergencies quickly and effectively. As far back as 1967, there have been statutory provisions which exempt vehicles from various rules contained in road traffic legislation when they are being used by the emergency services for fire, police and ambulance purposes. These provisions apply so that our vital services can reach an emergency in time whenever there is one. Therefore, the exemptions include matters that a member of the public could reasonably expect to be included, such as exemptions from rules relating to speed limits, traffic lights, road signs and the fitting and use of sirens and flashing lights.
The problem that we are faced with is that modern practice and technology has outgrown the current law which mainly uses the term “ambulance”. NHS ambulance services now use what are known as fast response units, including cars and motorbikes, to help provide quick response to the most critically ill patients where time is of the essence. They are also using larger vehicles to transport equipment to major incidents to ensure that clinicians are properly equipped.
These types of responses provide a vital part of NHS emergency healthcare. The definition of “ambulance” and “ambulance purposes” in a recent case concerning the use of blue lights and sirens was limited to those vehicles whose primary use is to convey the sick and disabled and did not include other vehicles such as motorbikes used by paramedics. These amendments provide certainty to NHS fast response teams that they can rely on exemptions from road traffic legislation to facilitate their speedy arrival in a crisis situation. They extend the stated exemptions to cover vehicles used,
“for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service”.
This will then cover all fast response units dispatched by the NHS ambulance services. We will have removed an unnecessary, unfair and dangerous legal block in the work of surely one of our most crucial services.
Amendments 44 and 45 to Schedule 8 are simply consequential. Since the introduction of the Deregulation Bill, some of the legislation amended by Schedule 8 has been modified by subordinate legislation made earlier this year, namely the Combined Authorities (Consequential Amendments) Order 2014 and the West Yorkshire Combined Authority Order 2014. I beg to move.
“an NHS ambulance service | (a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.” |
“(aza) a vehicle used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”. |
“An NHS ambulance service | (a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.” |
I have a question about this new schedule. As noble Lords, including Ministers, will recognise, it is a fairly lengthy addition to the Bill. I can see entirely the argument for the exemption of emergency vehicles carrying out an essential role, and why they need to be absolved from certain legal constraints in order to carry out their duties. However, I have the anxiety that the Government have provided for all bodies related to the National Health Service and vehicles driven on their behalf, in Wales and Scotland and so on—but what about other vehicles which are driven in emergency circumstances? If, for example, an accident occurs at a football ground and a St John Ambulance immediately springs into action, because one is always present, I have no doubt at all that it would seek the help of the nearest hospital. It could well have a vehicle and be able to expedite the matter more effectively. Would the driver be breaking the law if he or she exceeded the limits in seeking to get a trauma patient to hospital as rapidly as possible in a clear emergency, similar to those to which public vehicles respond?
My Lords, the amendments are designed to ensure that the definitions of “ambulance” and the way in which ambulances are used include the new vehicles that might well be used. I think that I will need to write to the noble Lord to make sure that all his points—I will look in Hansard at what he has said—are covered precisely.
I may have some assistance coming my way. These amendments relate, as at the top of Amendment 46, to emergency response by the NHS. They are to ensure that—because of case law, where there has been a particular problem with paramedic motorbikes—this is about an emergency response by the NHS. The noble Lord raises an interesting point, particularly about people going to emergencies. However, this legislation is to ensure that those who come out in response from the NHS are properly protected.
I notice, reading the amendment rather more carefully thanks to the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that paragraph 8(3) of the proposed new schedule talks about,
“a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service”.
In theory, going along the lines of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, anybody who happened to be around with a suitable vehicle could surely be requested by the NHS ambulance service to get on with it and remove the potential patient from the football ground. The noble Lord has a point, but I think that it is covered by this amendment.
My Lords, I understand that in practice this relates to a call which would be from an NHS ambulance only. My officials have speedily passed me a note on this. One may ask why these amendments do not cover, for instance, all private organisations responding to emergencies. Our priority in this legislation is to allow NHS ambulance services to provide emergency responses. Those private organisations which have arrangements with NHS ambulance services to be dispatched by them to emergencies will be covered. Bringing other types of vehicle purposes within speed exemptions is part of a wider piece of work being carried out by the Department for Transport in relation to its commencement of Section 19 of the Road Safety Act 2006. I am most grateful to the noble Lord and my noble friend for their comments which have given me the opportunity to provide clarity—I hope—on the matter.
The noble Lord has certainly clarified the matter. I only hope that if vehicles are brought into use in this way they will act with due promptness, as did the Minister’s officials in providing an answer to a rather tricky question. I apologise for not giving notice of it. However, we wanted to clarify that regular support services which are not National Health services—St John’s Ambulance is the obvious one that springs to mind—would without doubt be covered by the legislation as the Minister described it.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 47, I wish to speak to the other government amendments in this group. Part 2 of Schedule 9 removes the current requirement for the Secretary of State to approve local highway authority permit schemes. A permit scheme allows for better control of works in the street that can cause traffic disruption. That includes works in roads and pavements by utilities and authorities’ own works. The changes would remove only the requirement for the Secretary of State to approve schemes, enabling highway authorities to bring into operation their own schemes to their own timetable by council order.
Government Amendments 47 to 58 to this part are technical in nature and deal with the relationship between the Infrastructure Bill and this Bill. The Infrastructure Bill will create a new strategic highways company and will allow the new arrangements for permit schemes to apply to the strategic highways company as well as local highway authorities. In relation to Part 3 on road humps, this measure essentially removes the Secretary of State’s powers to place road humps on roads he does not control, mainly local authority roads. In practice, this has not been done for some time so this is a tidying-up measure. The powers of Welsh Ministers under this section are retained. However, there are two roads in Wales for which the Secretary of State remains the highway authority, and that is the two Severn crossings. The purpose of Amendments 59 to 61 is to ensure that the changes proposed to Section 90B of the Highways Act 1980 by Schedule 9, Part 3, do not apply to these two roads. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is a long schedule. The Minister will be relieved to hear that we are in broad agreement with it. However, we have some difficulties because some real consequences need to be considered. Our Amendments 61A and 61B would improve the schedule by introducing further transparency into the process of issuing exemption orders. I am concerned about the extent of the Government’s powers to introduce accessibility standards for rail vehicles, established by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. We, in fact, introduced the first set of rail vehicle accessibility regulations in 1998. In 2005, I and one or two other noble Lords who are present in the Room, contributed to updating that Act by making it unlawful to discriminate against disabled people using public transport or transport facilities. We introduced minimum accessibility standards for all new carriages and light rail, and placed a requirement on rail operators to develop a disabled persons protection policy.
We are obviously proud of our record in government, and are concerned that it should be continued in the amendments to the legislation that this Bill represents. All new stock must be compliant with the regulations, and all vehicles that fall under their scope will have to be compliant by 2020. However, we recognise that some heritage systems use vehicles that can never be compliant in these terms, and they deserve exemption. The Government’s proposals would remove the requirement for exemption orders to be made by statutory instrument, thereby reducing the time it takes to issue an exemption.
We appreciate the principle of reducing the time it takes to issue such an exemption, but we are concerned that the Secretary of State’s power to limit exemptions could be undermined. Our amendments seek to ensure that the Secretary of State retains full freedom to impose conditions on exemption orders, such as on length, rather than just issue blanket exemptions. The Department for Work and Pensions figures show that more than one in five people with a disability has experienced difficulty using transport and, on several occasions at Question Time, disabled Peers have indicated that they still face some transport difficulties, not least when the trains are longer than the platforms at some halts, and the train does not stop where the ramp is provided. In any case, fewer than one-fifth of rail stations have full step-free access via lifts or ramps.
The House of Commons Transport Committee suggested last year that the department involved disability organisations and charities in prioritising stations for improvements in a future “access for all” programme. Ministers dismissed the views of disabled people by saying that that those organisations’ involvement would add little value.
In the context of our amendment, as we live longer, increasing numbers of us will be living with some kind of disability. It is therefore essential to adapt the public transport system and ensure that it fits the needs of disabled people. Amendment 61B requires the Secretary of State to,
“produce a report detailing the nature”,
of any exemptions issued,
“including the conditions or restrictions made as part of that order”,
and to publicise it.
Currently there are no requirements to publish any details when exemptions are issued; only the statutory instrument itself is published. How will this shift from a statutory instrument to an administrative regime make the documents more accessible and the process more open for a wider range of UK citizens? I do not say that they will not be—I am not accusing the Government of causing a deterioration in the position—but I seek some reassurance from the Minister that this has been fully considered in this fairly lengthy amendment to the schedule.
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord for his broad agreement on Part 7. I agree that we are dealing with some lengthy paperwork. We have made much progress in making rail vehicles more accessible to disabled people since accessibility standards were introduced in 1998—and rightly so. More than 8,100 rail vehicles now meet modern accessibility requirements, and the law requires all rail vehicles to be accessible by 2020. However, it is occasionally not appropriate, or proportionate, for those access standards to apply fully, so the Secretary of State retains the right to exempt specified vehicles from all, or parts, of them.
Originally, all such exemptions were made by statutory instrument. However, in 2008, the domestic rail vehicle accessibility regime covering mainline trains was replaced by an EU regime, whereby exemptions are issued administratively. As a result of implementation of the EU regime for mainline trains, the number of vehicles which remained within the scope of the domestic regime was reduced to just over one-quarter of those originally covered. These are the vehicles which are still subject to the use of statutory instruments for exemptions. Such vehicles include trams, underground, metro, airport people movers and even brand new vehicles for use on heritage railways. That brings the domestic regime more in line with the European regime, which the majority of vehicles are subject to, and is more proportionate than the current situation whereby, if sought, exemptions for the hundreds of trains serving Gatwick, Stansted and Birmingham airport stations would be subject to an administrative process, while any for the 17 small vehicles shuttling passengers between terminals would remain subject to a process involving statutory instruments.
I highlight to the Committee the fact that the vast majority of responses from stakeholders to the Government’s public consultation were in favour of these proposals. In particular, the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee, the Government’s statutory adviser on the transport needs of disabled people, was involved as the proposals were developed and is strongly in favour of these changes. In this respect I am also pleased to note that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is now of the view that these proposals have merits and finds the arguments for consistency with the European regime compelling.
The practical effect of this measure will be to shorten the period between when an application is made and the outcome is given, so reducing uncertainty for the rail industry. It will also reduce the resources required within government to handle each application. I emphasise that it will not reduce in any way the strength of argument that any applicant will need to make to justify an exemption; no exemptions will be granted in future that would not have been granted under the existing arrangements. I also assure the Committee that we will continue to consult the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee, and others as necessary, on the merits of each application. The final decision on whether to grant an exemption will remain with Ministers, and the Government will continue to report annually to Parliament on the use of the exemption powers over the last year. This will allow Parliament to call Ministers to account if they feel that the powers have been used excessively or inappropriately.
Given the overwhelming support from stakeholders that this proposal received, we believe that this reform makes sense. Proceeding with this proposal will mean that applicants for exemption receive a decision sooner, so reducing uncertainty for them, and will reduce administrative burdens on government, but without lessening protection for disabled passengers, or reducing transparency on the use of exemption powers. That is why we have concerns about the noble Lord’s first amendment.
Turning to the noble Lord’s second amendment, the Government recognise that members of the public and Parliament will wish to know that the Secretary of State has used his powers to grant exemptions from the rail vehicle accessibility regulations. That is important. However, this amendment is unnecessary as transparency is already provided through two new routes, both of which will continue. First, the Equality Act 2010 already requires the Secretary of State to make an annual report to Parliament on the use of exemption powers. The Secretary of State will continue to report annually to Parliament on those exemption powers. This will enable Parliament to call Ministers to account. Furthermore, the department already publishes on its website details of applications received for exemptions, the outcome of consultation on the merits of each application and the outcome, including the exemption order itself, if granted.
I assure the Committee that the Government’s intention is that openness must continue. Although I understand the position that the noble Lord has taken, it is for those reasons that we feel his amendments are not necessary.
My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Davies, decides what to do with this amendment—indeed he does not have much option in Grand Committee—would my noble friend go back to the draftsmen about the proposed new subsection (7) inserted into the Equality Bill by Schedule 9? The Bill provides that,
“such an order is as capable of being amended or revoked as an order made by statutory instrument”.
From my experience on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, I know that a statutory instrument can amend or revoke another one and regularly does, but the way this clause is worded suggests that the statutory instrument itself can be amended. To my mind, only a super-affirmative procedure can be amended in that way. I do not expect my noble friend to answer this now, but if he could get this looked that, I would be extremely grateful.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend. His experience is invaluable and I will certainly discuss this with officials so that we can come to a mutually satisfactory conclusion.
As ever, the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, is to be congratulated on his eagle eye. We shall see that the Minister gives a satisfactory reply. I listened carefully to the Minister and was grateful for his remarks, which were reassuring. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s acceptance of the position was enough for me, so I assure the Committee that when the time comes I will not move my amendment.
My Lords, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his amendment, and all who spoke in this debate. I think the word “minefield” was used by one of my noble friends; there may be some more extreme language.
I will explain why Clause 38 is, in the Government’s view, important. New Section 78A to be inserted in the Traffic Management Act 2004 will allow for regulations to be made, the effect of which will prevent local authorities from issuing parking tickets in the post based solely on the evidence of CCTV cameras. Once the regulations are in place, traffic wardens will need either to affix tickets physically to the vehicle, or hand the ticket to the person who appears to be in charge of the vehicle, so that drivers are made aware of an alleged parking contravention at the time. This might be an appropriate time to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, about what the phrase,
“begun to prepare a ticket”,
means. My understanding is that it is the point at which the traffic warden begins to prepare the ticket in a physical sense. I hope that that is helpful; that is my understanding of the matter.
The Government accept that sole reliance on CCTV evidence in enforcing on-street parking regulations is suitable in certain circumstances, and will therefore set out in secondary legislation four exemptions where CCTV will continue to be used: bus lanes, bus stops, red routes and around schools. My noble friend Lord Tope mentioned this in particular about schools. I can well understand this because I have had direct experience of it in the past 10 days. Noble Lords of a political persuasion may have gone down to Rochester. I was there in a street that had a school, and one of the issues that was raised was parking.
The description in the draft regulations of what constitutes “around schools” follows that used elsewhere in DfT legislation. There is nothing to prevent local authorities using traffic wardens to enforce in other areas. I should, however, like to look into that in a little bit more detail.
I should be grateful if my noble friend would look into it. With deference to my noble friend the former leader of Kensington and Chelsea, most local authorities do not have the income from parking that enables them to employ large numbers—I think she referred to armies—of traffic enforcement officers. It is simply not practical to put civil enforcement officers—I think that they are called parking attendants now—outside every primary school throughout that local authority area where there is a parking problem. I am sorry to say that the Minister confirmed my understanding from a quick read of the regulations, that a camera can be used for 10 yards outside the school but if you go further than 10 yards you have got to employ a human being at consequent cost for enforcement. That simply will not happen in most areas. There is neither the money nor the demand to do it. Frankly, it is ludicrous.
Therefore I thank the Minister for his willingness—even, I suspect, his enthusiasm—to look into this and to have it resolved before we get to the next stage of the Bill. I am not sure that he has already noted that by far the strongest opposition to this clause has come from his own side.
My Lords, I am fast becoming aware of that. I do not want to provoke my noble friends, but since local authorities took on responsibility for parking enforcement the income from parking has gone up significantly. Local authority surpluses from parking income have more than doubled from £223 million to £512 million between 1997 and 2010. There are obviously some local authorities that are increasing surpluses—clearly not the local authorities with which my noble friends have been associated or which they may know. I pass those figures on as a matter of record.
The Government believe that these proposals are necessary as a matter of principle. People should be able to see what they are accused of when they return to their vehicle, so that they have the opportunity to examine the area for themselves. It is not reasonable for drivers to receive a ticket in the post up to two weeks after the incident has taken place.
The Government also believe that some local authorities are ignoring operational guidance and using CCTVs in areas in which they should not do so. The Traffic Penalty Tribunal told the Transport Select Committee that adjudicators have found cases where camera enforcement is used as a matter of routine where the strict requirements for use in the guidance do not appear to be present. By bringing forward this legislation the Government are seeking to ensure that parking practices are fairer for people.
What is the difference between getting a ticket through the post as a result of camera activity two weeks after the event and getting a ticket in the post as a result of camera activity two weeks after the event when you are whizzing up the M40 and there has been a police car on one of the bridges?
The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, used the word “whizzing”. I am not sure that anyone could start placing the ticket on a vehicle going at 80 or 90 miles an hour on the motorway. However, I take his point more seriously than perhaps is suggested by making that instant judgment as to why it would not be possible to adhere to these principles for someone going at 80 or 90 miles an hour on the motorway.
Does this not give my noble friend the opportunity to go back to the department to explain why there is unhappiness? It was said that the reason why you cannot affix the notice is that the car is travelling too fast, but there are other reasons, too. In the part of the country from which we both come, a village school may have real problems with people parking in the wrong places. The ideal answer in that distant place, where it is difficult to have someone on duty all the time, may be to have a camera. The idea that Suffolk Coastal District Council or Mid Suffolk District Council is capable of having people standing outside every village school—and many of them have this problem—is not sensible. Is that not the same sort of issue as dealing with people travelling at 60 or 80 miles per hour? There is no other way of doing it, but we have to do it.
My noble friend is always extremely persuasive. Clearly, the record of these discussions will go back to the department.
In his amendments, the noble Lord seeks to place in the Bill the list of exempted areas where local authorities can continue to use CCTV to issue tickets in the post. The department does not think that it would be expedient to set the exemptions in primary legislation. It is conceivable that exemptions could be increased or reduced in the future, so it might be more desirable to include them in secondary legislation. Everyone will have their own view on what is the right balance for the use of CCTV, whether that is in parking, as your Lordships are debating today, or more widely. The Government have given careful consideration to the list of exemptions and, in particular, have reflected the views of those who responded to the consultation.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, also seeks to introduce a requirement for impact assessments to be carried out for the provisions. As I am sure he will know, the Government have been clear in their determination to reduce the impact of rules and regulations on businesses and policymakers. Indeed, the Government’s Better Regulation Framework Manual, which was published in July 2013, states that impact assessments are required only for measures that regulate or deregulate business or concern the regulation of business. This clause applies only to local authorities that carry out parking enforcement, so we believe that no impact assessment is required.
Will the Minister remind me what the criteria are for an equality impact assessment?
I think that I might need a little assistance on that, but I will return to it.
The noble Lord also suggested the insertion of a new clause that would prevent the measures in the Bill from affecting off-street parking. However, the measures in the Bill already apply only to on-street parking, so we consider that the noble Lord’s suggested new clause is not necessary.
I should also reply to my noble friend Lord Bradshaw on the issue of traffic flow. Local authorities will still be able to enforce parking. Indeed, the great majority of authorities do this without the use of CCTV. As I said, in those areas where traffic flow is vital, the Government have provided for CCTV to continue.
I promise to write to the noble Lord about equality impact assessments.
My Lords, this is an important amendment, and we should thank the noble Lord, Lord Tope, for moving it on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Low. As the noble Lord, Lord Tope, said, we all signed up to the Private Member’s Bill, which has stalled at the other end but is due for a Second Reading in January.
Under the existing legislation, it is illegal to drive on pavements and footpaths, but there is no specific prohibition against pavement parking. The ambiguity in the law means that most local authorities struggle to enforce restrictions, in contrast to London, which has operated a separate system since 1974. I understand that there are also exemptions in place in Exeter and Worcester. As the campaigning charity, Living Streets, said in written evidence to the Transport Select Committee:
“Inconsiderate parking can cause a major barrier to many vulnerable road users. It is clear that the current legislative situation relying on police enforcement isn’t working”.
Of course, there are some areas where parking on the pavement is unavoidable, and there are other legitimate reasons why it might sometimes be necessary—but all too often parking on the pavement obstructs access to pedestrians, forcing them to navigate busy and dangerous roads instead. Some 74% of adults report being forced to walk on the road because the pavement was being obstructed by cars and other vehicles. For some, pavement parking can effectively extinguish their right of way altogether. I refer to elderly people, people with buggies and those with disabilities. For them, cars that block the pavement can be a serious restriction on their freedom of movement.
I know that the measure proposed today has the support of the Guide Dogs UK, Age UK and several other organisations referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Tope. Banks of parked cars can also force cyclists to swerve into dangerous traffic flows, which can be especially dangerous on narrow roads. Pavements are not designed to bear the weight of cars, as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, just said, let alone heavier goods vehicles; over time, they can become degraded, posing additional challenges for pedestrians and costs for local authorities.
The reality of the problem is not in contention, I suggest. In 2006, the Transport Select Committee said that the then Government,
“must grip the problem of pavement parking once and for all and ensure that it is outlawed throughout the country … rather than relying on the use of individual Traffic Regulation Orders on specific streets and local Acts to impose”,
a fine. Last year, the Transport Select Committee called for reform to end,
“a confusing patchwork approach across the country”,
and for a clarification of the rules for loading and unloading by haulage companies, and action to rectify the long-standing problems over poor signage. It is important that, even as the Government try to move towards allowing more diverse road signs from local authorities, common national standards can be agreed on this issue.
The status quo brings challenges for drivers as well as pedestrians and cyclists. The British Parking Association and the RAC Foundation all support the calls for change. Inappropriately parking vehicles can interfere with traffic flows for other road users, causing jams and congestion, and drivers are often unsure about restrictions—and which, if any, are in place. Given the growth in congestion on many of our roads, these problems are likely to be magnified in the years ahead.
The Government also seem to be in agreement, on the principle at least, that pavement parking is a problem that needs to be addressed. The amendment gives the Minister and the Government ample opportunity to do so. I urge them to take it.
My Lords, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Tope, for speaking to the amendment; I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Low, for tabling it.
The Government recognise entirely the importance of making the local environment convenient, safe and attractive to walk in, and of keeping footways in good order. I do not think anyone could have failed to be struck by all that my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond has said. However, as I think the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, acknowledged, part of the dilemma is that there are indeed some streets where pavement parking may be inevitable, whether to maintain free passage of traffic, to allow loading and unloading or to allow the setting down of passengers in certain situations. I am afraid that I can think of instances when I have parked on a pavement for an elderly relative to get out safely, which I think was legitimate; it was not in London, either. There are therefore issues with a blanket ban, as the amendment is drafted, that are problematic.
Local authorities already have many powers to ban pavement parking; I have a list of them and they are quite considerable. However, I agree with my noble friend Lord Deben on this occasion. Local authorities are in the best position to decide on local parking restrictions and need to consider all road users when taking such decisions. A national ban of the type proposed would require local authorities to remove all existing restrictions, then to review their urban areas for where footway parking should nevertheless still be permitted, consult the community and erect new signage and markings, which would of course impose a burden on local government.
The amendment also proposes banning footway parking but allowing authorities to permit it where desired by a simple resolution. Circumvention of the traffic regulation order process would take away an important protection for the public. This process requires authorities to undertake consultation and advertise the proposals before councillors take final decisions. The Government’s guidance to local authorities makes clear that, during the appraisal of their parking policies, an authority should consider whether pavement parking is problematic in any part of its area. If it is, and is not covered by an existing traffic regulation order, the authority should consider amending the existing order or making a new one. Indeed, my noble friend Lady Kramer wrote to all English traffic authorities on 27 June this year to remind them of their existing, wide-ranging powers to prevent people from parking on the pavement where it is a problem.
Given the significant issues in managing a change of this scale, and the fact that authorities already have comprehensive powers to ban footway parking, I will ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. However, before that, I want to emphasise that I am not asking the noble Lord to do that because the Government do not understand or accept the concerns that have been expressed. Indeed, the Government consulted the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee on this. Although that body favours having no parking on the footway, it recognised that there would need to be exemptions from the national ban and that issues arise from this.
Although I am sure all noble Lords in the Committee will have every sympathy for what is intended, there are issues, which is why I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, those two powerful speeches have made the case that we wish to make from the Front Bench. We also hope to persuade my noble friend Lord Rooker than objecting to the clause itself is in fact a stronger position than his amendment. I hope the speeches have convinced a very significant number of Members of the Committee, perhaps even the Government, to think again, but they have also reduced the length of my speech because all the issues have been more than adequately covered.
I emphasise that the effect of the Government’s legislation would be to downgrade rights that are derived from a duty on the part of the Minister to a mere choice by him, which is the emphatic point that my noble friend Lord Prescott was making. There is an obvious flaw in the Government’s proposals. My noble friend has made his case already but I will show how much we on the Front Bench are concerned about this. It is not clear how the Secretary of State can be expected adequately to assess the existing evidence in order to suspect a miscarriage of justice without investigative help by the very accident investigation branch itself. As my noble friend Lord Prescott has indicated, there are very good reasons why the branch should be reluctant to participate in this. The work will now be undertaken by the branch only if the Secretary of State requests it because he already suspects a miscarriage of justice. That is a long shot in circumstances where he has no or very little evidence before him at that stage. In addition, reinvestigating might unearth difficult truths about the adequacy and focus of previous assessments by officials and the department when making the initial judgment. Any Minister should, of course, be able to process issues without fear or favour, but there is bound to be an inhibition when he is dependent on the department for certain facts.
The justification that Ministers have given for the change is entirely spurious. They have claimed that it is to safeguard the human rights of officers involved in accidents, whose careers could be undermined by an automatic investigation organised by the Minister. It might have that advantage, but it would block off new evidence to support future safety measures and which could tell families what really happened. We know, from the illustrations given today, two things from the “Derbyshire” inquiry. First, the families of those who were lost got to hear what had actually happened 20 years later, as opposed to the original depiction. Secondly, future safety measures were inaugurated by my noble friend in the department as a result of the evidence of why the ship had sunk.
I believe that the clause should be opposed and not stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the Secretary of State is obliged to reopen a formal investigation either if new and important evidence that was not available at the time of the original investigation becomes known, or if there appear to be grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice. For any other circumstances, the Secretary of State has a discretionary power to reopen an investigation. There is no time limitation on the current obligations to reopen a formal investigation. This is surely right and proper where there are grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice, and the Bill most certainly does not seek to change this duty in any way. However, in other cases, the potential value of reopening a formal investigation in terms of enhancing safety for today’s mariners may—and I emphasise may—diminish with the passage of time after the loss of a ship.
The design of ships and their equipment, industry crewing and operating practices, continually change and develop. By the time that new and important evidence is found, these matters may be very different from those that applied at the time of an accident. That is not to say that one can draw a specific time limit on the usefulness of an inquiry. Each case is likely to be unique and should be considered on its own merits. This would be preferable to the current blanket imposition of a duty that may not always be beneficial for maritime safety, which is rightly our priority. Therefore, Clause 40 is drafted to enable the Secretary of State to take a considered view on the likely benefits of reopening a formal investigation in circumstances where new evidence comes to light. To be clear, a formal investigation, the subject of this clause, is very different from the safety investigations undertaken by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch. The noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Prescott, mentioned that. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch’s sole objective is to determine the causes and circumstances of an accident to prevent a recurrence; it does not seek to apportion blame or liability. I re-emphasise that the clause does not affect these safety investigations, nor situations in which new and important evidence is found from accidents that have been subject only to a safety investigation. Of course, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch acts of its own decision.
In contrast, formal and reopened formal investigations are proceedings which, as well as probing the causes of an accident, can apportion liability and blame, censure ships’ officers, or cancel their certificates of competency. There have been four since 1997: a formal investigation into the loss of the “Marchioness”—the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, spoke very powerfully and with great experience of that tragedy—and reopened formal investigations into the “Derbyshire”, “Gaul” and “Trident”. The three reopened formal investigations all related to accidents that occurred prior to the establishment in 1989 of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch. With most accidents since then being subject to safety rather than formal investigations, increasingly any reopened formal investigation would relate to more historic accidents.
Yes, it was the reopening of the inquiry, and it happened 20 or so years after the accident.
I stress that, even if there were no obligation to reopen an inquiry, I would strongly expect one to be called if similar circumstances to the “Derbyshire” applied. Of course, I acknowledge the importance of the reopened investigation into, for instance, the loss of the “Derbyshire” both in terms of providing answers to the bereaved families of those who lost their lives and in contributing to enhanced maritime safety for the benefit of all mariners.
I understand all the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, in tabling this amendment and by the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Oldham and Lord Prescott. I assure your Lordships that any decision on whether to reopen a formal investigation would be taken very seriously, taking into account the views of all interested parties, including, of course, trade unions.
During consideration of this clause in the other place, the then Solicitor-General explained the principles of how the Secretary of State would approach the decision. My honourable friend confirmed that each case for reopening would be considered on its individual merits. Such considerations would include, although they would not be limited to, the likelihood of lessons being learnt that would improve the safety of current marine operations and ship design; the likelihood of being able to identify the true cause or causes of marine accidents where these had been particularly uncertain prior to the evidence being found; and the likelihood of uncovering information that would provide a deeper understanding of the causes of other marine accidents. In short, Clause 40 would allow the Secretary of State to consider the individual circumstances of a formal investigation when new and important evidence was found, taking a rounded view of the best ways to improve maritime safety.
The noble Lord, Lord Prescott, in referring to his experience, expressed concern about the impartiality of the department and the question of fault. Now, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch must undertake impartial investigations and assess evidence, and indeed it could well criticise any department at fault.
On that point, I thank the Minister for his explanation. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch has always had a responsibility to investigate. It did so in the case of the “Marchioness” but the Government would not produce the report.
I think that I may need some advice from behind on that. While I am receiving that, I should mention that the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, referred to what I would describe as “crimes at sea”, which the Government obviously take very seriously.
The Government have promoted guidance on the preservation of evidence at crime scenes with the International Maritime Organization. In our view, these are matters that we must take forward on an international level, with international agreements. I very much understand the points about preservation of evidence and about offering information and understanding to families with loved ones who are in this position.
If I am not given the information now that I hope I might be about to be given, I will be in touch with the noble Lord. However, given all the circumstances, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister very much for giving a response to the last point—I could not expect him to have all the details, but at least he is aware of the problem. However, I still believe it is the right of every British citizen to have an investigation or an inquest—if, for example, their daughter has died. We should surely be entitled to report back to the people and have our Government involved in an inquest, as the Americans are doing. Our Government say, “It happened on a ship registered in the Bahamas”—but the authorities there have not had an inquest, so we should do it. I do not expect the Minister to give an answer, as it is a highly technical point, but perhaps he could just write to me with information from the department as to why we cannot have an inquest on a citizen who has gone missing, whatever the circumstances. The Americans have acted on it, and the least we could do is offer an inquest in which our own police are involved.
Is the Minister going to get back up with the advice he has got?
The advice is not on that particular matter but on another one.
My Lords, I sincerely thank the Minister for his response. This is not an area I have any detailed knowledge of whatever, but I understand that over the years there have been considerable improvements, and heaven forbid there is another big loss. Part of the briefing that I have is about the size of ships. The “Derbyshire” remains the largest UK-registered ship to have been lost at sea—I was unaware of that. It was big, with a gross tonnage of 91,000. As my noble friend said, at the time the bulk carriers accounted for only 7% of the world fleet but for 57% of lost ships, so there was clearly something wrong there that had to be looked at. I find it astonishing that it was found on the sea bed at 4,200 metres. That is an astonishing depth at which to locate and recover a ship.
I will refrain from saying too much about the “Trident”, because with my noble friend here I am trying to cut down my material, but the Minister referred to it. The “Trident” was lost for 35 years. Was there not a sniff at one time that because it had been lost for so long, the cost of reopening the case was considered by some people disproportionate to the potential benefits? Only one recommendation came out of that, while 22 came out of the “Derbyshire”. The Government’s argument—my noble friend raised this because of his detailed knowledge—completely ignores the benefit of emotional closure for the families. The Minister did not refer to that at all, but it is a matter which should be addressed. If there is a sniff about cost here, I would like some further and better particulars before Report. No one is making a cost argument, I am just naturally suspicious and it is a factor that I think has to be considered at the back of our minds.
I am on record as supporting the Bill and am very much in favour of deregulation. The Government do not go far enough sometimes, and the Bill introduces regulation to avoid regulation, so it does bits of both. However, the issue here, unlike other parts of the Bill, is that we know that people have died or have been missing for decades. As a result, we know we have the issue of the families, which should be considered. There are very few cases, as has been said.
Finally, my noble friend is quite right about the discretion of argument. Just looking around the Room, I see former departmental Ministers. I do not know about the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, but there is a difference in the coalition between being Whips and being answerable for other Ministers; I fully accept that. My noble friends Lord Whitty and Lord Prescott and I have been departmental Ministers—I was at a much lower level than my noble friend Lord Prescott—but the issue of discretion is interesting. You are allowed, as a Minister, to choose the colour of your car.
My Lords, I might agree with a number of points that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, made, but I particularly agree that this is a complicated area. The point of this reform is to remove a power from the Digital Economy Act 2010 to make regulations which would allow the court to grant injunctions requiring service providers to block access to specified sites in order to prevent the infringement of copyright. That is the purpose of this reform. There are wider debates about the importance of the creative industries and the Government’s programme to ensure that the creative industries remain part of our economic revival, which is a point that the Government are working on. I want to concentrate on the purpose of this part of the reform.
The Government have no intention of having regulations following the Digital Economy Act because we believe that access can be, and is in practice, blocked through a simpler mechanism via the legislation that the noble Lord mentioned, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The provisions being repealed were inserted because copyright owners were concerned at the time that, although the legislation provided them with a tool to tackle unlawful peer-to-peer file-sharing, it did nothing to help them defend their copyright against sites dedicated to infringement, which were generally operated outside the UK. Copyright owners made a case that the power in Sections 17 and 18 of the Digital Economy Act should be included to enable them to tackle such sites. They were unable to take action against the sites in the UK and found it difficult to pursue them in their home territory. The solution was to provide a mechanism through which copyright owners could apply to the High Court for an injunction requiring internet service providers to block access to identified sites for the internet service providers’ subscribers.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said, following the Digital Economy Act being enacted, the Government asked Ofcom to carry out a review of the efficacy of such site-blocking injunctions, were they to be made. Ofcom concluded that in practice such injunctions were unlikely to be effective, largely due to the time an application would take. This is stating the obvious: very often people will want to ensure that there is a remedy that is as speedy as possible when time is of the essence. In Ofcom’s view, it would be no improvement on the existing Section 97A provisions under the 1988 Act. On that basis, the Government announced that they had no intention of making such regulations under DEA.
Moreover—this is important because the noble Lord also referred to this—copyright owners began to utilise other provisions in Section 97A of the 1988 Act successfully to apply for site-blocking injunctions. This rendered the regulation-making powers in the DEA unnecessary. Such provisions had not been used before since copyright owners were unsure how the court would interpret them and were worried about potentially being left in a worse position.
I want to emphasise that it is absolutely not the intention of this Government to put at risk the health and growth of the creative economy, an area where this country has a real competitive strength. If I were to take a different view with the noble Lord, I think the record of this Government has been extremely strong during a very exciting time of change in this area which is vital to our economic strength and recovery. However, Section 97A of the 1988 Act is now providing remedies for copyright owners and is doing so in an increasingly efficient and economical way. Economy in seeking redress is important. Copyright owners are content that the provisions work and have now used them to block around 40 sites. That being so, and in light of the doubts about the practical usability of the power in the DEA following Ofcom’s review, we believe there is no need for the DEA power.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 13 I will speak to Amendments 24, 51, 55 and 85.
Amendment 13 is fairly simple. It continues the principle of the eldest child succeeding that we have been discussing, but to give the Bill clarity it needs to be made clear that that will happen.
Amendment 24 is different. It covers the point that,
“where a hereditary peerage is without a male heir, that peerage should automatically pass to the incumbent’s oldest surviving daughter upon the incumbent’s death and should thereafter pass to the oldest surviving child regardless of gender”.
What happens in my own case, for instance? Should my son not have an heir, male or female, but my daughter dies before my son, the title should then go to my daughter’s children. If she does not die, and the provisions in the Bill were enacted, that is how it would go. That is complicated, but I think I have the gist of what I am trying to do with that. I am trying to make certain, were we to change the rules, that the eldest daughter will inherit instead of a son, even though the destination is different.
Amendment 51 is the same as Amendment 13, so I do not need to speak to that again. Amendment 55 is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clancarty; I cannot speak to that. It was grouped with this; I might speak to it after he has spoken to it. Amendment 85 is in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, so I will leave him to deal with it before I come back.
My Lords, as a precaution, I thought it might be helpful to refer to the Companion, which indicates that at about 3 pm, it would be customary on a Friday for the House to resume. I just give that forward notice.
My Lords, since there is nobody else wishing to speak, I might as well speak to my Amendment 85, which is grouped with this lot. It seeks to leave out lines 13 and 14 on page 4. These say:
“Future holders of a hereditary peerage or hereditary title may not apply for a special remainder under this section”.
I wondered why we were blocking change for the future; is this just to be a one-off change and then it does not change again? Given the complexity of it all, I can see some families taking a while to get their heads around the whole thing and finding it difficult to work out. It may be that the incumbents are very old or do not want to talk about it, so I could not quite see why it had to be a one generation hit only. I may be reading the whole thing wrongly, but it struck me as I was reading it through. I will probably be told that it does not apply to any section that is useful, but I do not know. That is why I put down Amendment 85: to tease out why we are limiting it to the current generation.
(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support this issue. If you are regulated by the Financial Services Authority you have to mention it. There is a very substantial series of penalties and enforcement procedures if you fail to comply with the authority’s regulations. We need to be clear in our own mind whether this is going to be seen as the kitemark, whether it is going to be permitted as the kitemark and, if it is, how we make sure the kitemark standards are achieved.
My Lords, first I thank the noble Lord for initiating what has been an interesting debate. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that parliamentary images should not be used inappropriately. At present the use of the Crowned Portcullis is governed by the following statement:
“The principal emblem of the House is the Crowned Portcullis. It is a royal badge and its use by the House has been formally authorised by licence granted by Her Majesty the Queen. The designs and symbols of the House should not be used for purposes to which such authentication is inappropriate, or where there is a risk that their use might wrongly be regarded, or represented, as having the authority of the House. The House symbol is primarily used to authenticate communications from Members”.
It is clear that the use of parliamentary images is the prerogative of the House authorities, and for that reason the Government do not wish to intrude on the existing arrangements, although I understand entirely the point that the noble Lord is making.
My Lords, is the Minister saying that the House is in a position to enforce an arrangement whereby the symbol is not used?
My understanding is that, if someone was wrongly using the emblem, following this statement, they would certainly be taken to task for using it inappropriately.
I am sorry, but that does not answer my question. Can the authorities enforce the non-use of it? If the Minister does not know, I understand that, and I am sure that he will find out. However, if the authorities do not have the power to enforce it, my amendment stands.
I think it is important to get chapter and verse for the noble Lord and, indeed, for myself, because I would not want to mislead him in any way. That is the reason the Government, having thought about this particular point, felt that the House authorities should have continued to have the prerogative.
I turn now to the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Martin. Again, it is designed to address the problem he has identified in relation to accredited parliamentary lobby journalists, specifically that some are acting as lobbyists and/or are servicing all-party groups. As my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie observed in his letter to the noble Lord following his intervention in the debate on Second Reading, matters relating to the conduct of accredited lobby journalists and to the administration of all-party groups are the prerogative of the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. I understand, however, that a core requirement of many of the voluntary codes of conduct that lobbyists currently already sign up to require that they do not hold parliamentary passes.
I also understand that, pursuant to a resolution of the other place, holders of photo-identity passes as lobby journalists accredited to the Parliamentary Press Gallery or for parliamentary broadcasting are required to declare relevant interests on the register of journalists’ interests. That register is compiled and maintained by the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. The commissioner also has responsibility for the rules governing all-party groups and hosts the register of groups recognised by Parliament, who their officers are, and information about the source and extent of financial and material assistance received by groups from outside Parliament.
Given the oversight of these matters by the House authorities, I suggest that it would not be appropriate for the Government to legislate quite in the manner that the noble Lord has presented in his well meaning amendment. However, I will consider the points made by both noble Lords on their amendments and I shall certainly clarify the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. In the circumstances I have outlined, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, is the Minister telling me that I have the option of going to the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner if I find it to be the case that someone who is holding a Parliamentary Press Gallery credential is also holding a lobbyist’s credential? Is that what the Minister is saying? I find that difficult to take in because the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner must work within the rules and regulations of the House. He might say to me, “I am sorry, but there has been no breach of the rules. Reporter A can be a lobbyist as well as a journalist”.
My understanding, as I have said and as is set out in the letter the noble Lord has received from my noble friend the Minister, is that pursuant to the resolution, holders of photo-identity passes as lobby journalists accredited to the Parliamentary Press Gallery or for parliamentary broadcasting are required to declare relevant interests on the register of journalists’ interests. The letter also suggested that if the noble Lord had concerns, he should perhaps consider approaching the assistant registrar. However, I would like to take up the point that the noble Lord has posed to me because I want to be absolutely certain that what I am suggesting is correct. I want to clarify it because clearly that is the most important thing of all.
The point is that my noble friend’s amendment would require that they could not do both—they could do only one. The Minister is saying that they can do both as long as they register it. He is not answering the point in my noble friend’s amendment. The answer is, “No, we are not prepared to legislate, we are prepared to carry on allowing journalists to act as lobbyists as well, as long as they register it”. That is not my answer but it is the Minister’s answer and he should be blunt at the Dispatch Box and spell it out in that form.
The prudent thing to do is to reflect on what both noble Lords have said. I will come back to them.
(12 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as may often be the case, your Lordships’ House was wiser than the other place on this issue, and I invite the noble Lord to look at Hansard for 18 March 2009, cols. 257 and 284.
Returning to the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, I too have some concerns. It is important to make sure that there is some form of transparent judicial appeal process in which everyone has confidence, not least because removals can be serious, not just to the individual concerns but more generally. I draw attention to the fact that the implications, not least in terms of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, could mean that a donor is found to be illegitimate because he or she has been removed from the register. There could be considerable consequences from any form of removal. Therefore, although I do not have a strong view about whether the tribunal process would be the right one—doubtless, the Minister’s officials may already be providing reams of advice on the cumbersome problems that could be caused by a new tribunal—will my noble friend consider extending the existing tribunal process that relates to the civil liability issue under the Bill?
I do not have a magic answer to this but surely if there is already a tribunal process under the Bill, perhaps it might be extended to deal with appeals of this sort. That would seem to be a neat way to deal with this issue, and I look forward to hearing whether my noble friend would find that a helpful way forward.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for highlighting the important issue of individuals having a right of appeal if they feel that they have been incorrectly removed from the register. This is similar to an amendment tabled by the Opposition in the other place, and on that occasion Wayne David accepted that there is an appropriate appeals mechanism in place. Indeed, he said he was pleased that the Government’s reassurances were clear.
I therefore confirm that Sections 56 and 57 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 already make provision for appeals against the decisions of registration officers in Great Britain, including decisions to remove electors from the register. Paragraph 17 of Schedule 4 to the Bill makes the necessary amendments to ensure that this continues to apply under the new system. I refer noble Lords in particular to the proposed insertion of new paragraphs (azd) and (aa) into Section 56(1) of the 1983 Act dealing with appeals against decisions under new Section 10ZE.
My apologies to noble Lords for the technicalities involved in that. However, there is provision within the Bill which I hope will reassure the noble and learned Lord and, on that basis, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.
I am not only reassured but moderately crushed by the reference to Mr Wayne David. On that basis, I will withdraw the amendment.