Compensation (Claims Management Services) (Amendment) Regulations 2014

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Tuesday 25th November 2014

(9 years, 7 months ago)

Grand Committee
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Moved by
Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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That the Grand Committee do consider the Compensation (Claims Management Services) (Amendment) Regulations 2014.

Relevant document: 8th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments

Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, the regulations before the Committee amend the Compensation (Claims Management Services) Regulations 2006 with regards to the available enforcement tools of the claims management regulator. The regulations provide for the regulator to impose financial penalties on non-compliant regulated claims management companies. The penalties would apply to: breaches of the Conduct of Authorised Person’s Rules; failing to comply with a code of conduct; failing to comply with directions relating to indemnity insurance; failing to comply with directions relating to redress and complaints handling; failing to comply with an information notice from the regulator; and obstructing the execution of a warrant.

The regulations also provide for certain situations in which CMCs will not be able to surrender their authorisation without the consent of the regulator. This is to ensure that a CMC cannot avoid investigation and enforcement action by simply surrendering its authorisation. The new financial penalty power provides an additional deterrent from malpractice within the regulated claims management industry. With this new power, the regulator can look to remove any monetary gain that may have been made by a CMC through non-compliant practices, where possible.

Before setting out further details about the regulations and why the Government are taking this action, I will briefly explain some background with regards to claims management regulation and the need for an additional available sanction in this area. Businesses providing regulated claims management services in England and Wales under the Compensation Act 2006 must be authorised to do so by the regulator, which forms part of the Ministry of Justice.

Claims management regulation covers a range of sectors, most notably the personal injury and financial products and services sectors. There are also a number of lower profile claims sectors, such as employment, criminal injuries, industrial injuries disablement benefit and housing disrepair, which are subject to regulation by the regulator. Once authorised, regulated CMCs are required to comply with certain conditions of authorisation, including adherence to the Conduct of Authorised Persons Rules. Where breaches of the conditions of authorisation are identified, the regulator can take enforcement action, such as the variation of the CMC’s authorisation, by imposing additional conditions or the suspension or cancellation of authorisation in the most serious cases.

These measures form part of a wide package of reforms which I will explain shortly. First, I will set out why they are needed. Bad practices by some regulated CMCs have created poor outcomes for some consumers and businesses, particularly in the area of financial products and services. Current enforcement powers have not deterred some CMCs from carrying out speculative behaviour or engaging in other forms of malpractice. This has led to delays in receiving compensation for some consumers who have legitimate claims and has increased costs for some defendant financial services firms where claims are unsubstantiated. Where a CMC is subject to formal enforcement action, such as the cancellation of authorisation, this can directly affect clients whose cases cannot be progressed by the CMC if its authorisation is removed.

The power to impose financial penalties on non-compliant CMCs does not replace any existing enforcement sanctions but provides an additional, flexible tool that will assist the regulator to carry out its duties even more effectively. This new power therefore acts in the best interests of both consumers and businesses by ensuring that the regulator has a full range of appropriate tools to deter non-compliant behaviour.

A public consultation on the proposed amendments received wide support from the claims management and banking industries as well as those with a general interest in claims management matters. Responses to the consultation suggested that the proposed measures would improve regulation while providing an additional and necessary deterrent from malpractice.

It is important to make clear that, since the start of regulation in 2007, the regulator has utilised its existing powers fully and has done extremely well to stamp out non-compliant behaviour across the claims management industry. The regulator continues to make improvements to the regulated claims market through targeted compliance programmes and enforcement action.

Since April 2013, the regulator has overseen a package of reforms to the regulatory regime. These include: key changes to the conduct rules to ensure that claims are substantiated before being pursued; naming CMCs under investigation and subject to enforcement action online; increased resources and the establishment of a specialist compliance team to tackle non-compliant marketing practices; a ban on CMCs offering financial rewards or similar benefits to potential claimants as an inducement to make a claim; a ban on the payment or receipt of referral fees between CMCs, lawyers, insurers and others; and the appointment of the first two independent non-executive board members to the executive-led claims management regulation board, enabling a greater element of external challenge and continuous improvement.

With that background, I turn to the draft amended regulations before the Committee today. In effect, the order amends the regulations to include provisions regarding: the process that must be followed to impose a financial penalty, which is the same process currently used for the imposition of existing forms of formal enforcement action; the requirements to consider the nature and seriousness of any breach by the regulated CMC and its turnover in determining the amount of the penalty; and the penalty that can be imposed, which will be a maximum of £100,000 for regulated CMCs with a turnover of less than £500,000 and 20% of turnover for regulated CMCs with a turnover of £500,000 or more. It also amends how the regulator can deduct any administration costs incurred in collecting or enforcing the payment of a penalty before the remainder is paid into the Consolidated Fund; how the penalty can be enforced by the regulator as a civil debt, if necessary; and the restriction on the surrender of authorisation by an authorised person without the consent of the regulator.

I am sure that the Committee will agree that the regulator must have the necessary tools to impose a range of appropriate sanctions that deter malpractice and encourage regulatory compliance. The order provides the regulator with additional powers to ensure that a complete range of robust and proportionate enforcement options can be considered as appropriate. I therefore commend the draft regulations and beg to move.

Lord Kennedy of Southwark Portrait Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
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My Lords, I say at the outset that the Opposition very much welcome what is proposed today. Since joining your Lordships’ House in June 2010, I have regularly raised the question of claims management companies and the end of the industry that indulges in bad practice. I also want to start by paying tribute to the work undertaken by the claims management unit at the MoJ, led by Kevin Roussell. It does a really good job with limited resources and the regulations will be another important tool in its box to deal with bad practitioners who rip off consumers and cause unnecessary costs for businesses to which they submit claims.

What is most reprehensible is submitting pointless, vexatious claims to financial services providers with which their client has no record of doing business. That is done as a fishing expedition on the off chance that they may get lucky, with no regard to the cost to the business, the clogging up of the processes in each business and the Financial Ombudsman Service, or to the genuine people who have been ripped off by bad practice in the financial services industry, who will have to wait even longer to have their claim settled.

I must say that I have no problem with the responsible claims management company, which can provide a valuable service to its clients. It can give advice on how to proceed, and as long as its client is aware of the charges to be incurred and is happy to pay them, and the company is properly processing and managing claims, that is fine. Nothing here will concern the responsible claims management company. In the consultation there was broad support for the proposals from all respondents, including the claims management industry, which wants to improve the image of its industry, raise standards and get rid of the rogues.

However, it is important to put on record that CMCs working in this field are dealing with bad practice in the financial services industry. There have been a number of cases in recent years where people have behaved very badly in that industry. I note in the Explanatory Memorandum that the Ministry of Justice does not see a case for consolidation at present. I think that that is probably right. I hope, however, that the department will keep this under review, as things change over time, sometimes very quickly. We may get to the point where the case for consolidation becomes more compelling. If that is the case, the Minister can be assured of support from these Benches. I have no wish to detain the Grand Committee any longer than necessary, and conclude my remarks by again welcoming the proposals.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am grateful for the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, who has indeed several times in your Lordships’ House raised questions about claims management and the more unattractive habits in which they have been prone to indulge. I am also grateful to him for specifically drawing the Committee's attention to the claims management unit and Kevin Roussell, who runs it. I have visited that unit in Burton-on-Trent. It is a small, efficient, extremely dedicated collection of employees who, I think, have made real progress in improving the industry. Although there are some who wonder why we need claims management companies at all, we are increasingly left with fewer, better regulated and better organised claims management companies who provide a service to clients.

I accept the noble Lord’s point that that there is a need to be nimble and alert, and possibly in due course to consolidate. This is an area where the market changes swiftly, and there has to be a swift response—if necessary, a legislative response—to make sure that changes in market do not bring about unacceptable practices. We feel that the changes embodied in the statutory instrument—the new power to impose financial penalties—which are similar to those of regulatory authorities such as the Financial Conduct Authority and the Information Commissioner’s Office, are an additional and useful adjunct to the existing powers. I hope the Committee will agree that they are proportionate and necessary measures, and in those circumstances, I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Motion agreed.

Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL]

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Friday 21st November 2014

(9 years, 7 months ago)

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Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, I begin by congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on skilfully steering this Bill to Committee stage. I thank her very much, too, for communicating with the Government about the amendments and the thinking behind them; we are extremely grateful for that clarification.

The Government’s position was made clear at Second Reading and it would not be helpful to repeat that position at this stage. Since then, the noble Baroness has met my ministerial colleague, Simon Hughes, who has responsibility for this policy and is aware of the Government’s thinking. I will restrict my comments in Committee to one or two brief points about the amendments and leave it very much at that.

The first amendment relates to Clause 1 and the protection of children on divorce, and it is of course convenient to take Clause 6 stand part together with the amendment. Amendment 1 limits what was the repeal of all of Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to subsection (2) of that section, which contains the list of matters to which the court must have regard in deciding how to exercise its ancillary relief powers. This amendment leaves the other provisions of Section 25 in place and, accordingly, restores the court’s duty to give first consideration to children of the family in deciding how to exercise ancillary relief powers, retaining the list of matters to which the court must have regard in making specific financial relief awards in relation to children of the family. The amendment adds considerably to protection for children given in the Bill. As a result of this, the noble Baroness has indicated that she does not wish Clause 6, which contained the previous provision for children in the Bill, to stand part of the Bill. The Government welcome this improvement in protection for children.

Amendment 1 agreed.
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Lord Kennedy of Southwark Portrait Lord Kennedy of Southwark
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My Lords, this is an important technical group of amendments, which follow on from the previous group in clarifying that the provisions of Section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act remains in force and that we are referring only to subsection (2), for all the reasons that noble Lords gave in the previous debate, along with Amendment 3, which again makes it clear that we are referring to the Act in the amended form. The addition and clarification of the 2004 and 2013 Acts, as the noble Baroness advised the House, will clarify that the new law will apply to civil partnerships and same-sex couples, but not to cohabiting couples, who are the subject of a different Bill, to be introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which will have a Second Reading shortly.

The second part of the group removes subsections 5(1) and (2), which deal with the issue of periodical payments, discussed during the Second Reading debate in your Lordships’ House. They seek to address an issue that everyone recognises needs to be looked at; on these Benches we were concerned that there appeared to be a one-size-fits-all approach. In a later group, we will look at amendments that seek to take on board concerns expressed in the Second Reading debate and elsewhere.

Amendments 21, 22 and 26 make clear the divide between lump sum payments and ongoing periodical payments.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I shall speak briefly to this group of amendments. As the noble Baroness said, a number of these are technical or drafting improvements on which I need not detain the House; I have only these brief comments of substance to make.

I acknowledge the noble Baroness’s intention to limit the potential for litigation under this Bill through her amendments. Amendment 20 is consequential to the removal of paragraphs (b) and (d) of Clause 4(7). It removes the provisions on the making of periodical payments and the duration of such periodical payments and the requirement for the court to consider whether a lump sum payment would be sufficient to meet the needs of the person concerned; it also removes the restrictions and duration limits on the court when making orders for periodical payments, for which the existing subsection (1) of Clause 4 provides.

Amendments 21 and 22 remove from Clause 5 references to lump sum payments as an alternative to periodical payments in Clause 5, and Amendment 26 removes a reference to a lump sum order as an alternative to an order for periodical payments. The Government welcome the greater flexibility for payment of periodical sums provided by these amendments.

Amendment 2 agreed.
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Baroness Deech Portrait Baroness Deech
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My Lords, I wish to say simply that of course the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, is right—that is why he is learned and I am just a noble Baroness and not learned. However, my point is that this House has not revisited the principles of financial provision on divorce in more than 40 years, despite all the changes in society and all the things that have happened—the changes in the position of women, women going out to work and the rise in divorce. It is really crucial to do so now because of the removal of legal aid and the need to help those who mediate and arbitrate and give them a starting point. The Government favour mediation yet there has been a decrease in the use of mediation. How can people mediate if they do not know what the starting point is? To mediate means to find a middle way, and therefore we need a parameter. That is why we are trying to clarify this law.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am sure that all noble Lords realise that what the noble Baroness meant by saying that the 1973 Act had not been revisited was that the approach that was set out in that Act has not been changed since that date. Although there have in fact been a considerable number of amendments to the Act, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, pointed out, the overall thrust of the noble Baroness’s point remains the same. Amendment 5 moves, in amended form, the list of financial orders in Clause 2 so that they now form the definition of “relevant financial orders” in Clause 1, which deals with interpretation. This amendment goes with the proposal that Clause 2 does not stand part of the Bill, as the provisions for financial orders would as a result be dealt with elsewhere in the Bill.

The Bill as amended will limit the court to making relevant financial orders only to the extent that a binding prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement did not “deal with the matter”, and only in relation to matrimonial property, as defined by the Bill.

Amendment 5 agreed.
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Lord Kennedy of Southwark Portrait Lord Kennedy of Southwark
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My Lords, this amendment in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Deech and Lady Wilcox, my noble friend Lord Grantchester, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, and the other amendments in the group—namely, Amendments 14, 15, 15A, 16, 18 and 19—deal with matrimonial property, an issue central to the Bill.

The new clause proposed by Amendment 6 is detailed and, as we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble and learned Lord, makes it clear that the split of assets on divorce should be limited to property acquired after marriage by the couple. The family home will be treated as matrimonial but property, gifts and inheritances acquired before the marriage will not be matrimonial or available for sharing.

I very much see the point that without the certainty that the proposed new clause aims to give, couples run the risk of spending vast sums of money fighting over the division of assets and thereby reducing the assets that they are left with. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, to reduce costs we need to make things simpler and clearer for divorcing couples. These are welcome amendments that seek to do just that. I also associate myself with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton of Belgravia, in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for bringing forward the Bill.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, the amendments in this group would provide greater clarity about how the court is to approach the making of orders dividing matrimonial property on divorce. Clarity and a degree of certainty are clearly desirable. Against that, one has to weigh the need for flexibility, with the possibility that flexibility can sometimes bring fairness that certainty precludes. I am very grateful for the way in which the group was introduced by the noble Baroness, and indeed for the elaboration by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe. He explained with great lucidity the attempt to improve upon the Scottish definition to deal with the problems of portfolios and the like, which may change and therefore change their character in legislative terms.

The proposed new clause seeks to define matrimonial property as property acquired “during the marriage”, rather than property owned before the marriage by either party, or property received as a gift during the marriage. Its intention is to clarify the definition of matrimonial property, which, under the terms of the Bill, will be the only property in respect of which financial orders can be made on divorce, except where there is a significant additional contribution by one party, or if the property has increased in value. The noble and learned Lord described what is meant by a significant additional contribution.

Matrimonial property would normally be divided equally between the parties. The Government have concerns over the definition of “matrimonial property” and the rigid equal division of matrimonial property, as the definition may be unfair in many cases: an equal division of property is rarely found in most ancillary relief cases, due to the lack of assets of the family, and the needs of the children and of the family. If the provisions of the Bill were to be taken forward we would need to define matrimonial property extremely carefully to ensure that any division was fair.

Existing provisions for division of property on divorce give the court a wider discretion to divide property and determine who should have which assets, in the context of the needs of the family. That enables the court to seek to achieve fairness in all the circumstances. The Government are not convinced that the certainty that the Bill and these amendments intend to provide would not come at too great a cost in rigidity. Therefore, the Government believe that the definition of matrimonial property in the Bill is problematic and, I fear, continue to have significant reservations about it.

Amendment 14 is in a different category. It would clarify the date on which the net value of the matrimonial property is to be valued. Instead of the “relevant date” described in Clause 4(4), the valuation is to be made on the date of the relevant financial order made by the court. This provides a clear and unequivocal date for the valuation: the date on which the property is divided. Consequentially, Amendment 15 removes the definition of the date at which the matrimonial property is valued in Clause 4(4). That is clearly desirable.

Amendment 17 would insert a new subsection into Clause 4, describing how a lump sum order is to be taken into account on the division of property on divorce. A lump sum payment is to be taken into account as part of the equal sharing of the matrimonial property, irrespective of the assets used to pay the lump sum. The amendment clarifies the position as to how lump sum payments are to be taken into account.

The Government welcome the greater clarity that would be introduced into the Bill, but as I have indicated remain concerned about the lack of flexibility for the court to determine how to divide property on divorce, and about the fact that the provisions in the Bill apply only to matrimonial property, allowing no flexibility for the court to consider what might be fair to the parties of a marriage in particular circumstances. I acknowledge the noble Baroness’s intention, through her amendments, to limit the potential for litigation under the Bill. The Government and all noble Lords are particularly aware of the unsatisfactory nature of the law, in the sense that it can so often lead to protracted disputes.

Amendments 18 and 19 concern Clause 4. They would remove paragraphs (b) and (d) from Clause 4(7), so that, under the Bill, the court would no longer have to take into account the source of funds not derived from the efforts of the parties during the marriage when making an unequal sharing of the matrimonial property—nor would the court have to take into account the nature and use of the matrimonial property in such circumstances.

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Lord Kennedy of Southwark Portrait Lord Kennedy of Southwark
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My Lords, this group of amendments starting with Amendment 7 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Deech and Lady Wilcox, and my noble friend Lord Grantchester are all to Clause 3, which concerns prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements.

I see the arguments made that these agreements, which were not very common a few years ago, are on the increase and can provide certainty to both parties as to the division of assets in the result of a breakdown of the relationship. I recall the comments of the noble Lord, Lord St John of Bletso, when he told us at Second Reading that these agreements had in no way encouraged the breakdown of marriage. Also, the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, spoke about people who had been widowed or divorced and were afraid to marry again where there were assets they wished to protect and who were reluctant to commit again, fearing a potentially financially disadvantaged position at a time of life when starting again would be almost impossible. The noble Lord and other noble Lords spoke about this again today.

The amendments themselves seek to provide further clarity as to what this Bill seeks to do in respect of pre and post-nuptial agreements and build on the comments and points raised both inside and outside your Lordships’ House.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, this has been a useful and instructive debate on this interesting and significant area. There are those who retain great faith in the institution of marriage. The noble Baroness herself said that, and I for one see no tension between thinking that and nevertheless being of the view that it is important there should be some sensible provision about prenuptial agreements. Her student may have been anticipating a trend by suggesting going to a lawyer almost immediately, in the heady days of announcing her engagement. A number of popular songs that suggest going to see the preacher at that juncture may have to be amended to reflect this different approach.

These amendments all relate to this clause. Amendment 9 changes the threshold of the duty of disclosure placed on both parties for the prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement to be binding on both parties. The Bill currently requires that the parties fully disclose their assets before the agreement will be binding on them and this amendment would require only “proper disclosure”.

Amendment 7 corrects the omission of the requirement in the Bill for a prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement to be made in writing. I recall that that point was specifically drawn to the House’s attention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, at Second Reading. As the noble Baroness said, this is an essential prerequisite and a key feature of the recommendations made by the Law Commission.

The intention is clearly to protect people entering into prenuptial agreements by imposing the formality of a written and signed agreement. However, the Government have already indicated that we have reservations about the lack of flexibility in the Bill for the court to override an agreement that is unfair or does not adequately provide for “needs”. This is especially so given that people often enter into a prenuptial agreement at a point when they are not as realistic about events, sadly, as they should be.

The Government has yet to consider the detailed proposals for binding matrimonial property agreements put forward by Law Commission in its report on Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements. We have informed the commission that a final decision on the proposals should be made by the new Government after the election. However, the Government would not seek to oppose this amendment to the Bill.

The requirement under the existing divorce process is for both parties to make,

“full, frank, clear and accurate”,

disclosure of their assets using form E. We have concerns that undefined “proper” disclosure would be open to interpretation and offer scope for possible hiding of assets in a way that the current requirement is designed to avoid.

Amendment 8 amends the formulation of subsection (1) of Clause 3 and, if I have understood it correctly, is intended only to tidy up the drafting and not to change its substantive effect. The amendment seeks to replace the words,

“binding on the parties and is to be given effect unless”,

with “binding on them unless”. However, I believe that normal legislative drafting convention means that the effect would be to omit the crucial word “unless”, which is necessary to apply the conditions set out in paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1).

Amendment 11 inserts a new substantive provision into the clause which sets out the requirements for a prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement to be binding. It does not set a new condition for the agreement to be binding; rather, it provides that only the person who has been disadvantaged can rely upon failure to obtain legal advice or failure to disclose assets as a means to make the agreement non-binding. The Government remain generally concerned about the lack of protection for people entering into binding prenuptial or post-nuptial agreements under the terms proposed in the Bill. These amendments do not appear to improve significantly on the protection offered and are substantially different from the approach recommended by the Law Commission, which would preserve the ability of the court in appropriate cases to override an agreement made between the parties where in the view of the court its terms are manifestly unfair or where they fail to provide adequately for needs. The Government have yet to consider the Law Commission’s detailed proposals. In relation to the Bill we are concerned that leaving prenuptial agreements to be subject to the rules of contractual law around validity and enforceability, and post-nuptial agreements subject to review by the court under the provisions set out in Section 35 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, does not amount to a coherent set of protections.

Amendment 12 would remove the possibility of the Lord Chancellor making rules to specify what constitutes the full disclosure of assets, which is one of the requirements in the Bill for the prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement to be binding. The noble Baroness said that she has been advised that the law in relation to disclosure is sufficiently clear not to need further elaboration. As already noted, the second amendment would alter “full disclosure”, which as she rightly says is well understood, to “proper disclosure”. The Government agree that there are already established principles around disclosure. I understand that the noble Baroness is really concerned with what might be regarded as de minimis omissions from the list, but I do not think that that would in fact cause a difficulty on the existing rules. We are concerned that the use of the term “proper disclosure” could open up some areas of concern.

Baroness Shackleton of Belgravia Portrait Baroness Shackleton of Belgravia
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Would the Minister clarify that he is talking about form E? Form E is an incredibly detailed analysis of someone’s wealth; it could not be fuller than full disclosure. Is the Minister talking about disclosure of that nature, because I think that the amendment is meant to catch disproportionate non-disclosure? Form E is the most comprehensive document known to man. It goes down to the last £500 or number of pairs of cufflinks that a man may own.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am not seeking to suggest that form E is not an extremely thorough document and I am sure that my noble friend is absolutely right on the point. But the amendment seeks to alter the rules from “full disclosure” to “proper disclosure”. If form E is going to be what proper disclosure is, my noble friend may well be right. My point is simply that proper disclosure appears to be a different description. If I have understood her correctly, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said that this was in order to ensure that the whole thing could not be set aside on the basis of a failure to include in the list something that someone had forgotten about or which was so trivial that it did not enter the heads of those entering into it. I understand that that is the aim, but the Government remain concerned that “proper disclosure” could open the door to someone saying, “Well, it was not proper for me to disclose that”. That is my answer to my noble friend.

Finally, Amendment 13 alters the court’s powers when dealing with the division of property on divorce when a prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement is to be treated as binding on the parties so that instead the court can make a financial order as described in amended Clause 1(3). The orders the court can make under the revised clause are an order for a lump sum payment, a property adjustment order, a pension sharing order, a pension compensation sharing order and corresponding provisions of the Civil Partnership Act 2014 and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 in so far as the provisions of the 2013 Act are not already covered by the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as amended by the Bill. This increases the range of orders which can be made. However it still falls some way short of the flexibility that the courts currently have under the 1973 Act and, for the reasons I have already given, the Government still have some concerns about the approach.

Lord Davies of Stamford Portrait Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)
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The noble Lord said that one of the reasons why the Government would introduce the full setting aside of a prenuptial agreement would be “need”. If that is the case, would that not, first, have the potential to open up an area of great ambiguity and uncertainty because “need” would have to be defined very closely? Secondly, would there not be a real risk that “need” could be interpreted by a court as being the right to retain the same standard of living as had been the case when the party had been married, and that might be possible only by drawing on prenuptial, non-matrimonial property? That would undermine the whole purpose and force of the Bill. Will the noble Lord say a few more words about how the Government envisage defining the word “need” in this context?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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The noble Lord makes an important point. What I did say was that the Government had not yet concluded how they proposed to respond to the Law Commission’s recommendations. The Law Commission has said that it considers it appropriate to override an agreement in some cases. I take entirely his point that if, as it were, the court is going to have a free rein to override an agreement simply because it thinks it fairer in the circumstances to come to a different conclusion, that would significantly undermine the degree of certainty which can be obtained by a prenuptial agreement. However, at the heart of what the Government will have to decide on this is to respect all the advantages that one can obtain from having a prenuptial agreement for the reasons that have already been outlined in the debate, yet not making it iniquitous in some circumstances—limited circumstances, I would imagine—where it is manifestly unfair for a party to be restricted by the scope of that agreement.

Baroness Deech Portrait Baroness Deech
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My Lords, I am sure that the Minister will agree that the best should not be the enemy of what is workable and good going forward. I am also sure that the Minister and I are united in the deep concern I have about the unfortunate couples who are wasting their money as they go through the process at the moment. I am willing to try almost anything because this has been a concern of mine for the past 40 years. We need a framework for couples that is more in line with what is tried and tested in New Zealand, Australia, Scotland, North America and Europe. While appreciating that this is an issue in flux and the fact that the legislation I am proposing would still have to go through the Commons, I hope very much that the noble Lord will be open to discussion with me and other concerned parties about how to get exactly the right wording in relation to proper disclosure—I absolutely understand his concerns—and the flexibility that is necessary. I am convinced that we must do this and I believe that the Minister shares that concern.

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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, the amendments deal with Clause 5 and periodical payments. Amendment 23 concerns the power of the court to make orders for periodical payments and extends the duration of those permitted under the Bill from three years to five.

Amendment 24 inserts a new substantive provision into Clause 5(3)(c) and provides a mechanism for the court to extend the duration of a periodical order beyond the five-year maximum under the Bill in circumstances where there is no other means to make provision for a party to the marriage and that party would otherwise be likely to suffer serious financial hardship as a result.

Amendment 25 removes the provision in the Bill which would have provided that any party to the marriage at risk of suffering financial hardship should be awarded only such periodical payments or lump sum as is,

“reasonable to relieve that party of such hardship over a period of three years or such shorter period as the court considers reasonable”.

The noble Baroness has written to me to say that she has listened to the Government’s concerns—as indeed she has said today—that divorcees need sufficient time to adjust to their new circumstances and should not find themselves on benefits because of a lack of maintenance, as it was sometimes referred to.

The proposed amendments would go some way to address concerns held by the Government about the real possibility of hardship, with an economically weaker party to the marriage being forced to live on benefits. That risk needs to be balanced against the understandable desire on the part of many parties to a marriage for a clean break in the event of divorce. We continue to have reservations about the protections under the Bill for ensuring that an economically weaker party to a marriage can successfully complete the transition to financial independence, but we entirely accept the concern that has been well expressed about continuous and over-lengthy reliance on periodical payments, whether it is from footballers or Members of your Lordships’ House.

Amendment 23 agreed.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Tuesday 18th November 2014

(9 years, 7 months ago)

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Lord Walton of Detchant Portrait Lord Walton of Detchant (CB)
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My Lords, I had no intention of speaking on this matter when I came to listen to the debate this afternoon but, as a neurologist—a doctor concerned with damage to the nervous system—I have over the years seen a considerable number of patients who were referred to me for an opinion either by a firm of solicitors or by an insurance company. They sought evidence as to whether there was a case to be made out suggesting that the so-called syndrome resulting from whiplash—the sudden flexing and extension of head and neck following a car accident—represented a genuine disability.

I have great sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, had to say as there is clear evidence in some cases that a whiplash has caused significant damage to the spinal cord or to the ligaments of the neck. This evidence can be identified by a number of medical methods. However, there is also clear evidence that a very large number of individuals referred with that type of injury are not suffering from a significant disability. As the noble Lord said, the “crash for cash” issue has arisen in a considerable number of cases over the last year or two, where it is perfectly clear that the symptoms are feigned and are not generally physically realistic. These attempts to obtain compensation are scams. I am persuaded by what my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, have said. Frankly, I do not believe that this significant issue is properly dealt with by the Bill. Therefore, despite my sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, I feel that I cannot support the amendment.

Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend Lord Hunt for bringing these amendments before the Committee and for his explanation of some of the problems that have beset our legal system and our society more generally. They are problems of which the Government are extremely aware and on which they have taken, and are taking, various steps to try to improve the situation. For example, the compensation culture, such as it is, was certainly fed by the cost incentives identified by Sir Rupert Jackson in his report. The reforms have made the costs of litigation much more controlled and your Lordships approved Part 2 of the LASPO Bill, which has resulted in a much more moderate personal injury claims litigation scene.

Noble Lords will be well aware of the dishonesty that sometimes besets personal injury claims. The Government are bringing forward provisions in the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill whereby, if a claimant is fundamentally dishonest, even if some element of the claim is genuine, he or she will not be able to recover any damages at all. We are also acutely aware of the problems with claims management, referral fees and the like. I am glad to say that claims management firms are reducing in number very considerably as they find this a less profitable field in which to plough their furrow. They are now much better regulated and fines of a considerable order are imposed on them if they act in a way which contravenes the law, so all these measures are going in the right direction.

Furthermore, the Government are setting up a regime to deal with whiplash claims. The noble Lord, Lord Walton, identified the difficulty of diagnosis in whiplash cases, which I think is well acknowledged in the medical profession. Although some people undoubtedly genuinely suffer the consequences of whiplash injuries, these injuries are not easily detectable objectively through scans or the like. Thus there is the temptation for claimants to bring claims, often egged on by third parties. It is often easier for insurance companies to pay out sums of money, even though they know that these claims may well be false, because the cost of fighting them is prohibitive.

All of this is a most unattractive landscape. My noble friend Lord Hunt is quite right to bring all those issues to the attention of the Committee. Before I move on to the amendments I should also say that it was as a result of my noble friend’s contribution to the Compensation Act 2006—to which he referred—regarding the provision on apologies not being an admission of liability that has helpfully altered the conduct of some litigation. Indeed, I can declare an interest, having relied on that section in one case.

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Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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My Lords, I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure the Committee that the amendment is unnecessary. Nothing in the Bill exempts an employer or other person from vicarious liability. I doubt that the Bill as drafted would have any effect on vicarious liability. That is because the scope of the Bill is confined by Clause 1 to claims that “a person” has been negligent or in breach of statutory duty. Clause 1 states that the Bill addresses the steps that the person was required to take to meet a standard of care.

Clauses 2 to 4 are concerned with that person acting for the benefit of society, acting responsibly or acting heroically. I understand that to be concerned with the alleged negligence of the primary defendant. I do not understand it to have any application to a person who has not themselves acted for the benefit of society, responsibly or heroically, but is said to be vicariously liable for someone who has so acted. I hope that the Minister can confirm that my understanding is correct.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, in short, I can confirm what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. Amendment 1 would insert a new subsection at the end of Clause 1, stating that nothing in the Act provides an exemption from vicarious liability to an employer or other person. The Government do not believe that this is necessary. As I endeavoured to explain in my recent letter dealing with points raised by the noble Lord and other Members of the House at Second Reading, while the Bill requires the courts to consider certain factors before reaching a decision about liability, it does not tell the court what conclusion it should reach or prevent a person being found negligent if all the circumstances of the case warrant it. It will not therefore give anyone licence to take unnecessary risks with people’s safety or leave the injured party without a remedy when the defendant has failed to meet the applicable standard of care in all the circumstances of the case.

If the actions of an employer, for example, were risky or careless and they led to an injury, it would be open to the courts to conclude that the factors in the Bill did not outweigh other pertinent factors, such as the size and foreseeability of the risk, the adequacy of training and the extent of the injury, and, as a result, to reach a finding of negligence if appropriate. This will equally be the case where a claim is brought against the employer in respect of the allegedly negligent act or omissions of an employee under the law on vicarious liability. It is important to stress that the Bill is not intended to have any bearing on the rules governing the imposition of vicarious liability, which are well established in law. In the light of this, I can reassure the noble Lord that any suggestion that the Bill would leave injured Armed Forces personnel without a remedy in the civil courts, whether under the law on vicarious liability or otherwise, is misleading. There is nothing in the Bill to prevent a claim being brought against an employer by an injured employee, whether in the Armed Forces, the emergency services or more generally.

Of course, the liability of the Ministry of Defence has recently been the subject of a great deal of litigation, not least in the case of Smith v Ministry of Defence. The noble Lord and the Committee may be aware of the difficult arguments about the scope of so-called battlefield immunity and the relevance of the Human Rights Act. But all those issues, difficult though they are, are nothing to the point in relation to the conventional rules on vicarious liability. For the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, gave in his analysis of the Bill, I can assure the noble Lord—I understand why there is anxiety and I wish to allay that anxiety—that there is no need for anxiety and vicarious liability is not intended to nor will be altered in any way by the provisions of the Bill.

In those circumstances, we respectfully suggest that the provision suggested by the noble Lord is unnecessary, and I hope that I have reassured him sufficiently to feel able to withdraw his amendment.

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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am grateful for the debate and the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. They seem to agree about the Bill, but not about the amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is not enthusiastic about the Compensation Act. I think it is fair to say that he said that in fact he thought the previous Labour Government had nodded, as did Homer, when they brought it in. Therefore the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, relied upon by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would have less to commend them in his view. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the other hand, says that the Compensation Act has been working well.

The view of the Government is that the Labour Party was quite right to identify the issue and to endeavour to reflect the problems that were identified by the committee which eventually decided to report. There followed the Compensation Bill, but it failed to go far enough. A number of other steps have followed, the common law has of course developed as I entirely accept, and here we have a Bill that endeavours to deal with what I have frankly said is a very difficult target to hit. I know that noble Lords feel that it is a target that can be hit by the common law without any statutory intervention.

However, the amendments put forward here come into different categories. I accept that there are similarities between Section 1 of the Compensation Act and Clause 2 of this Bill. The 2006 Act provides that the court may, when determining whether a defendant has taken reasonable care, consider whether a finding of negligence could prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken or discourage others from undertaking functions in connection with such an activity. It does not require the court to enter into such consideration.

However, Clause 2 of SARAH takes a different and firmer approach than the Compensation Act by requiring the courts to consider in every case whether a person was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members. It focuses more firmly on the actions of the defendant in a particular case than on the effect that a finding of negligence might have on others participating in similar activities. For these reasons we consider that Clause 2 of our Bill will provide greater reassurance than the 2006 Act has done to those in the voluntary sector and elsewhere who are still deterred from getting involved in socially valuable activities by worries about liability. I do not suppose that they will have Halsbury’s Laws of England to hand when making these difficult decisions, but their general approach will be affected by the climate and the context in which we live and the way the law reflects that.

The noble Lord says that if we want to compel the courts to consider the type of factors set out in Clauses 2 to 4 of the current Bill, we could have achieved that simply by requiring the courts to consider the points in Section 1 of the Compensation Act. His Amendment 2 would therefore replace the word “may” in that Act with the word “must”. I am not convinced that changing one word in the Compensation Act would have the same impact as our standalone Bill, which has been deliberately designed to be comprehensible to non-lawyers. Indeed, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations mentioned in oral evidence that if the Bill is passed, it could help to publicise that via its volunteering network. As I have said, Clause 2 has a different and clearer focus than Section 1 of the 2006 Act, and I believe that it better addresses the genuine concerns of volunteers and others.

I turn now to Amendments 3, 5 and 9 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Kennedy of Southwark. They would remove the requirement for the courts to consider the factors in the Bill in any case in which they were determined, whether someone was negligent or in breach of a relevant statutory duty. Instead, it would be purely a matter of discretion as to whether they took account of the factors in the Bill. This would revert to the terminology of the Compensation Act, which, as I have said, provides that the courts “may” consider whether a finding of negligence might prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken or discourage people from undertaking functions in connection with such an activity.

In our view, that could unacceptably weaken the Bill. The main point of the Bill is to provide people who are deterred from getting involved with greater reassurance that the courts will always look at the context of their actions before reaching a conclusion on liability. It is our view that the Compensation Act has not done enough to address people’s worries about liability, as recent polls carried out by the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, St John Ambulance and the British Heart Foundation have demonstrated. We are hopeful that the Bill will do more than the Compensation Act did to increase public confidence in the law and increase participation in socially valuable activities. We fear that reverting to the terminology used in the 2006 Act, which as I have indicated the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has reservations about, would not be helpful in this regard. In many cases it may not make much difference whether the word is “must” or “may”, and all will depend on the particular facts of the case.

I accept the strictures about transposing arguments from one Bill to another made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. Enthusiasm probably overtook me in making that analogy, having recently suffered several defeats on the part of the Government in that context. My point, however, remains that there is a difference between the words “must” and “may”, but that difference will depend very much on the context. Judges are well used to having to fight their way through the undergrowth of statutory terminology; sometimes they must do something and sometimes they may do it. They will of course be approaching these cases very much on the facts. We think that in this difficult area the Bill does its best to fulfil the social objective that lies behind it and, with great respect, we do not think that it would be improved by any of these amendments. It is in those circumstances that I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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I am very grateful to the Minister. He said that it is a difficult target to hit, but I suggest that the problem is that you are certainly going to find it difficult to hit a target that does not actually exist. You will find it particularly hard to hit a target if you are not armed with any weapon that is capable of hitting it, even if it did exist.

The Minister’s other point was that the aim here is to produce legislation which is comprehensible to non-lawyers, but it also has to be implemented by the courts. If it is not in a coherent form that sits easily with other legislation, all the Government are going to do is cause confusion which will promote litigation at great expense to non-lawyers. The Minister simply did not address the main concern behind Amendment 2, which is that if the Bill is enacted in its current form, there will be two statutes addressing the same general issue in different language. Before we come back, I ask the Minister and the Bill team to give some thought to whether it is sensible not to address Section 1 of the 2006 Act at all by amending or repealing it in this legislation. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Portrait Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
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My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, which seems a potentially sensible and proportionate addition to the Bill.

In this group, we have a clause stand part debate in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I was wondering if they were going to speak to this because I have an interest in it.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I understand that the noble and learned Lord has decoupled that from the amendment.

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Portrait Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
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In that case, I shall wait until the clause stand part debate and speak on that occasion.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I understand my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s slight surprise. It was a late, though perfectly legitimate, move. Until recently, a number of us thought that whether the clause should stand part was to be debated with the amendment. As it is, we are debating one amendment, Amendment 4 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, which would build on Clause 2 by requiring courts to consider certain factors about the nature of an organisation’s activities when determining whether it had been negligent or in breach of a relevant statutory duty. Where the organisation concerned was a voluntary organisation, the courts would have to consider what resources were available to it; whether there were competing demands on those resources; the level of training that volunteers could be expected to undertake; and how similar organisations would have provided those resources. Where the organisation was state-funded, the court would again have to consider what resources were available to it and whether there were any competing demands on funding. It would also have to consider whether there were specific reasons why funding had been allocated in a certain way and how similar state-funded organisations manage similar activities.

My noble friend was instrumental in tabling amendments to the Compensation Act 2006 during its passage through Parliament and those very much helped to improve the legislation. I am grateful for his constructive suggestions during today’s debate. In this difficult area, it is useful sometimes to think differently from the traditional way in which we have approached claims of this sort. Normally, a judge simply ignores the resources of the defendant as not being relevant. The question is whether there has been a breach of whatever duty of care is impugned by the claim. Many people believe it is relevant, as a matter of justice, to think beyond that. However, the Government do not believe that this amendment is appropriate. As I have explained, the Bill will require the court to consider certain factors to do with the context of a person’s actions before reaching a decision on liability. The Bill does not change the general way in which the courts consider claims of negligence or for breach of statutory duty. They will continue to judge a person’s conduct against that of the ordinary and reasonable man. There are a range of factors that the court already considers in determining whether reasonable care has been taken in a particular case. For example, it looks at the nature of the activity in question and the degree of care required; the gravity of the harm which might be suffered if insufficient care were taken; and the cost of mitigating any risk.

We have not attempted to set out these matters in the Bill; nor do we intend to do so. Such an exercise would add unnecessary length and complexity to what is a clear and—even its critics would accept—concise Bill.

Some noble Lords have already expressed reservations that the current Bill fetters the discretion of the courts by requiring them to consider certain factors about the context of the defendant’s actions. As I have already explained, the Bill does not purport to tell courts how much weight to put on each factor, covered by Clauses 2 to 4, or to prevent them finding negligence where the circumstances of the case warrant it. However, the effect of being too prescriptive—for example, about the type of evidence the courts need to look at when determining whether an organisation was negligent—could introduce new burdens, which we think, on balance, would not be desirable. That being the case, while renewing my tribute to my noble friend’s attempt to add constructive suggestions to the Bill and his insight into this particular area, I respectfully ask him to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Hunt of Wirral Portrait Lord Hunt of Wirral
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My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his support. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that I should like to return to this subject again at a later stage. In the mean time, if he could reflect on the case of Wilkinson v City of York Council, he would understand that I am not seeking to achieve what he described. I seek merely to respond to the words of the Court of Appeal in that case. I will not go into too much detail, but he will see what I mean if I quote just one sentence:

“A judge, it seems to me, should be slow to reject the evidence given by a responsible council official that resources did not permit a more frequent inspection than that which was given”.

The conclusion in that case was that, whereas the question of manpower resources was able to be considered in relation to other sections in the Highways Act, the particular section—Section 58—did not make reference to this shortage of resources as a factor to be taken into account. Therefore, the Court of Appeal concluded that Parliament had not wanted it to be a relevant factor. I therefore hope that the noble Lord will see that I am seeking to meet a particular problem in a specific way.

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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, contend that Clause 2, along with Clauses 3 and 4, should be removed from the Bill for a number of reasons, one of which is that it covers the same ground as the Compensation Act 2006. There is a breadth of criticism of this clause, including that it is not well drafted and that there is insufficient evidence to justify the whole Bill, but in particular this clause. The two are, in a sense, not entirely unconnected.

The question is how we deal in legislative terms with a problem that may not be seen as a problem by those who are skilful in the law. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will navigate his life secure in his knowledge of the law and the likely outcome of any case. His conduct will be so affected. Others are less knowledgeable about the law and much of their conduct is based on an imperfect understanding of what the legal position is and what it might be in the unhappy event, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson says, of finding themselves in court.

Successive bodies, such as the committee of the Department of Constitutional Affairs, which preceded the Compensation Act, found that there was a perception of a compensation culture, as did my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham, in his report Common Sense, Common Safety. Those outside the law would quite confidently assert that there was a compensation culture. Quite what they meant by that would no doubt vary between individuals, but some of the instances cited by my noble friend Lord Hodgson are instructive. He provided evidence based on what his committee heard. This was not a single assertion. It was not based on one person’s experience. It was an accumulation of evidence.

Those in your Lordships’ House who are not lawyers would, I suggest, recognise the very problem that the Bill seeks to confront. My noble friend Lord Hodgson is absolutely right to say that the Bill is not the answer to that problem. It is just one possible answer to that problem. With respect to the fault in the drafting that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said he found, I just wonder whether someone who is not skilled and learned in the law would have much difficulty in understanding what was meant by Clause 2. It conveys that somebody who is potentially to be sued for being in breach of statutory duty or negligence would have their actions, if acting for the benefit of society or any of its members, taken into account. Is that so difficult a concept? I suggest not. It would provide some reassurance.

It is said to be rather unworthy of Parliament that we should be sending a message. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who shows the breadth of his allusions to popular culture and Shakespeare, relies on the Bee Gees. Sending a message is not, of course, the primary purpose of legislation but, as I said at Second Reading, we legislate in a particular context. We do not live in a hermetically sealed Chamber where we do not take into account what people on the outside think and say. We should indeed not be out of step with those who drink at the Dog and Duck, who are aware of the possibility of a compensation culture. If the Bill chimes in common-sense terms with what ordinary people feel—that we have gone too far—then the Bill is providing a useful purpose.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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The Minister is not resiling, is he, from the position that Clauses 2 and 4 do not change the existing law?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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At the moment we are debating Clause 2. I gather that we are to have the delight of a debate on Clause 4 in due course. The position is that, were the Bill to be enacted, a judge would have to have regard to the matters contained in, among others, Clause 2. It has been said, rightly, that judges would normally be expected to pay attention to the matters in Clause 2 in any event, but I suggest that it is sometimes useful for a judge, perhaps faced with a seriously injured claimant, to bear in mind a specific statutory provision when considering what is often an extremely hard task for a judge—to turn down a badly injured person—because the injury was sustained as a result of the act of someone acting for the benefit of society or any of its members. It should not change the law, but it is sometimes useful to put into statutory form what is often difficult to find in the morass of common-law decisions.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, referred to the evidence that was given in Committee in the House of Commons, commented on what my ministerial colleague had said and asked, and pointed to so-called horrific unintended consequences that were not challenged. I am not entirely clear what the horrific unintended consequences were, and although I understand what he meant by saying that they were not challenged, we should be a little careful in drawing an analogy between not challenging something in court, which is often of great significance, and the rather less structured method in which evidence is adduced in committees. None the less, I take his point that the cross-examination was perhaps less than ideal and not particularly illuminating.

I respectfully suggest that there is evidence to support the clause. A survey of volunteering and charitable giving carried out in 2006 and 2007 by the National Centre for Social Research and the Institute for Volunteering Research found that worries about risk and liability were one of the significant reasons cited by 47% of respondents to the survey who volunteered. The National Council for Voluntary Organisations confirmed that these concerns remained a real issue for many voluntary organisations when it gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee following the introduction of the Bill.

In terms of people being deterred from helping others in emergencies, a recent survey, carried out in August 2014 by St John Ambulance, showed that 34% of more than 2,000 adults questioned said that they might be deterred from intervening due to worries about legal repercussions. Evidence also suggests that responsible employers worry about spurious or speculative claims being brought by disgruntled or opportunistic employees. We heard at Second Reading the speech from my noble friend Lord Cotter. Then there is the report by the noble Lord, Lord Young, Common Sense, Common Safety, and the report of the red tape task force under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Hodgson, from whom the Committee has heard today. I submit that there is evidence, of a positive sort, of a perception.

We should not underestimate what acceding to the amendment to remove Clause 2 would do: it would emasculate the Bill. At the moment, it is broadly drafted so it would apply in a wide range of situations where people are acting for the benefit of others, whether they are doing so on a voluntary basis or in a paid capacity. For example, it could include organised charitable activities such as running a village fete or informal, individual activities such as helping an elderly neighbour with their shopping. It could also cover workers such as teachers, doctors and members of the emergency services, who are acting for the benefit of society as part of their jobs.

The clause does not tell the court what conclusion it should reach and will not prevent a person engaged in socially beneficial action being found negligent if the circumstances of the case warrant it. It will be for the court to determine whether a person was acting for the benefit of society and, if so, what weight it should give to that factor in all the circumstances of an individual case. I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, said about trying to frame appropriate legislation in the context of health and safety. It is very difficult to cater for the myriad circumstances that arise. However, the idea is that this will give the courts the maximum flexibility to reach fair and just decisions, while sending a strong signal to give reassurance to the public that they will, in all cases, consider the wider context of the defendant’s actions, prior to reaching a conclusion on liability.

I have already addressed the Committee on the difference between the Compensation Act 2006 and this Bill—the use of the word “may” and the requirement that is contained in this Bill. I do not think the Committee would like me to repeat that. There are, of course, similarities, but the Bill requires the court to consider in every case.

Reassurance is important: we want to encourage volunteering. I am glad to say that volunteering is increasing, but it could increase still further. As my noble friend Lord Hodgson said, it is a desirable trend and it is tragic if people are deterred by the fear of litigation. I do not apologise for saying that this is a difficult target to hit. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, may fire bullets at me all afternoon, but we are trying to identify, through this legislation, matters that it is hoped will reassure, by legislating in a way that is in tune with how the public see the current situation. I respectfully submit that the Bill, which may be unusually short and unusually drafted, in the sense that it uses ordinary language—

Lord Elystan-Morgan Portrait Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)
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My Lords, I am preoccupied by what the Minister said earlier: that the effect of the Bill, essentially, would be to cut through a morass of various decisions in the common law and, thereby, clarify the situation for the assistance of the judge. I think I have paraphrased what he said reasonably well. Could the Minister deal with a technical point? Is there not a presumption in our law that the common law will be changed by statute only where statute makes it clear, beyond peradventure of doubt, that it is changing the common law? In other words, what common law is being changed by this particular clause that was not already dealt with by the 2006 Act? In other words, what specific common law, now extant, is being changed, if at all? If not, can there be any validity to the clause at all?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I do not think that one would find any common law decision the ratio of which was precisely what we find in Clause 2. My point was simply that in deciding a particular case of negligence, judges will, on the whole, have regard to overall principle. There may or may not be another case sufficiently on all fours on the facts to be worth drawing to the attention of the judge. This does not overrule any of those cases, but it provides a clear statutory provision to which the judge could be referred in approaching the facts of a case. There may well be some authority on the facts which could also be provided for the assistance of the court which would not conflict with this provision. That is my answer to the noble Lord.

I submit that this clause should remain part of the Bill and that this Bill serves a useful purpose.

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Earl Attlee Portrait Earl Attlee (Con)
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My Lords, it is well known that I generally support this Bill but I have to confess that I do not have the foggiest clue what Clause 3 is for. It would be much better to have a social action and heroism Bill. If the noble Lord wishes to return to it at a later stage, he will have to amend Clause 5 and the Long Title. A clearer, simpler Bill would send a clearer, simpler message.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My noble friend Lord Attlee would like to make a short Bill shorter. I submit that this particular clause seeks, as does the Bill as a whole, to reassure ordinary, hard-working people that, when something goes wrong and they are sued, the courts will take into account that they have adopted, during the course of an activity,

“a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”.

Most people would understand that expression.

At Second Reading, we heard from my noble friend Lord Cotter how court proceedings can affect the owners of small businesses in particular. Even if they have taken reasonable steps to protect people’s safety, they might be worried about expending the time or resources defending themselves in court and some might prefer to settle claims before they reach that stage. Others will defend themselves in court but we heard from my noble friend Lady Hodgson of Abinger about the psychological effect that this can have on a defendant. She pointed out that, even if the courts reached the right conclusion, the defendant might have gone through the most stressful and distressing time to get there, possibly putting relationships at work and at home under strain.

We hope that Clause 3 will give the owners of small businesses and employers greater confidence to stand up to those who try to bring opportunistic and speculative claims by showing them that the law is on their side. One important theme running through this Bill is that we want to stop people suing at all in cases which do not have any merit, so that a judge never has to decide any case either by referring to cases in negligence nor by virtue of this Bill should it become law.

Clause 3 is not just about protecting small businesses. In previous debates we discussed examples provided by members of the Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service who said that they had been sued by passers-by who tripped over their hoses when they were attending the scene of a blaze. During oral evidence sessions in the other place, Justin Davis Smith, Executive Director of Volunteering and Development at the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, spoke about voluntary organisations which have considered closing or stopping some of their most valuable operations because of worries about being sued. He provided an example of one charity which helped to take elderly people to hospital in the absence of any accessible bus routes. The charity was being sued after a patient slipped and broke her leg getting into a volunteer’s car and this had caused it to consider whether such activities could be continued.

The Government believe that it is right, in cases such as this, to require the courts to take into account the general approach of the defendant to safety during the course of the activity in question. This will reassure organisations that, if something goes wrong in the course of that activity, in spite of their efforts to keep people safe, the courts will always consider the context of their actions. However, the clause will not stop organisations being found negligent, nor, proportionate and just decisions being reached if all the circumstances of the case warrant it.

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Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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I, too, support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I sympathise with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, but the whole point of the law of negligence is that it is for a claimant to establish that the defendant did not act reasonably. Some of the cases cited by the noble Lord would be very unlikely indeed to attract any award of damages against somebody acting reasonably in an emergency situation to help somebody with unfortunate consequences. I cannot see that any such claim would succeed but he is right to differ slightly from the amendment tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. However, the best formulation is that put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I hope the Minister will accept it.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, we have had a very useful debate on this group. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that Clause 4 should be removed from the Bill but has also proposed a specific amendment that would amend the definition of acting heroically, should the clause be retained. The noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Aberdare, and my noble friend Lord Attlee suggested various amendments to the clause, as indeed did my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, who is not in his place.

I will respond to the argument that Clause 4 should be removed and then I will deal with the amendments. As I explained at Second Reading, Clause 4 requires the court to,

“have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting heroically by intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger and without regard to the person’s own safety or other interests”.

Unfortunately, all too often people are unwilling to intervene and step forward in emergencies due to the fear that they might be sued and ordered to pay damages should they attempt to help. This is not to suggest that people do not act spontaneously and positively in such circumstances; many do, assisting others and coming to the aid of distressed individuals without a second thought to their own interests. However, we have heard how other people stand by and do nothing because they feel that it is safer not to get involved and run the risk, however unlikely, of a negligence claim being brought against them. Clause 4 helps to allay these concerns by giving a reassurance to those brave and laudable members of our society that heroic behaviour in emergencies will be taken into account by the courts in the event that a claim for negligence or breach of a relevant statutory duty is brought against them. It will assure those who are in two minds about intervening to assist an individual in distress that doing the right thing is recognised by the law. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that the Compensation Act 2006 covers similar territory but, as I have already explained, we prefer the approach taken in the current Bill for the reasons I have given, and I do not think that it would be helpful if I went over them again.

I now turn to the specific amendments that have been tabled in relation to Clause 4. Amendments 8, 10, 11, 12 and 14 would all amend the wording in the clause which provides clarification as to what is meant by “acting heroically”. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beecham, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, have proposed in Amendment 10 to remove the final words of the clause, which refer to acting,

“without regard to the person’s own safety or other interests.”

I am grateful to them for tabling this amendment because we have been considering this issue carefully following correspondence received from St John Ambulance. I am also mindful of the persuasive points made at Second Reading and again today by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, on that organisation’s behalf. As the noble Lord said, St John Ambulance has indicated that the words,

“acting without regard to one’s own safety”,

conflict with first aid practice, which encourages first aiders to do precisely the opposite; namely, to have regard to whether intervening in an emergency might put themselves or others at risk. Although we think that it is unlikely that the courts would misinterpret the clause in that way, we can understand why St John Ambulance has raised concerns about this issue. If its misgivings can be allayed through the omission of the words in question, that is certainly something we would be willing to consider before Report.

I turn to Amendments 8, 11, 12 and 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, and my noble friend Lord Attlee. I realise they may seek to address the same issue identified by St John Ambulance but, rather than omitting the final 11 words of the clause, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, they suggest an alternative form of words. The noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, has suggested that,

“without regard to the person’s own safety or other interests”,

should be replaced with a requirement that the defendant acted,

“reasonably and with a public-spirited intention”.

Meanwhile, my noble friend Lord Attlee’s amendments seek to replace them with a requirement that the defendant must not have been acting “perversely”. He defines perversely in Amendment 14 as,

“a course of action that a reasonable person … would not take in the circumstances, irrespective of”,

whether that person was putting his own safety at risk. I suspect that both my noble friend and the noble Lord are thinking about situations in which a person intervenes in an emergency and then does something so risky or careless that it makes the position of the injured person even worse. They would not want the Bill to help defendants who have acted in that way. I am grateful for their attempts to improve the clause, which I know are very well intentioned. I have already mentioned in response to the amendment proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beecham, that we would be prepared to look more closely at whether a government amendment along those lines might be desirable. There is certainly a consensus that the final 11 words of the clause are problematic and we will consider the options carefully before Report.

I turn to the final amendment in this group, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt. Amendment 13 would add a further subsection to Clause 4 which would require the courts, when reaching a decision on liability and damages, to consider,

“the circumstances in which the rescuer acted … the eventual outcome and outcome anticipated by the rescuer … and … the risks to which the rescuer was exposed”,

as an effect of his or her actions. I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment, but I believe that the additional wording would add unnecessary complexity to the clause, the purpose of which is to reassure brave members of the public who act heroically by coming to the aid of someone in danger or distress that the courts will take the context of their actions into account in the event of their being sued.

I gratefully decline the invitation offered to me by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to cite examples that would be entirely separate in the various clauses; there is bound to be a degree of overlap—there often is. The scenario that the clause evokes in most people’s imagination is sufficiently clear for it to be worth a clause on its own, but I accept that there will inevitably be instances that might be covered by both clauses. I hope that the undertaking I have given in relation to the final 11 words of the clause, which could either be removed or replaced by a government amendment, will be such that noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this connection will be prepared not to press them.

Criminal Justice and Data Protection (Protocol No. 36) Regulations 2014

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Monday 17th November 2014

(9 years, 7 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Smith of Basildon Portrait Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
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As I rise to speak at 10.45 pm, I am reminded of my former constituent who, as I left the gym one morning, pointed out that, as a member of the House of Lords, I must be semi-retired. Little did he know. The noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, ended on a very important point. We started this debate at 8.56 pm, after a very long Second Reading debate. It was not rocket science for the Government to understand that a number of noble Lords, who have great expertise and knowledge on these issues, might wish to contribute. Your Lordships have been remarkably self-disciplined in keeping the debate so short and precise. We have had numerous debates of this kind in which many—but not all—noble Lords here this evening have taken part. Given the importance of tonight, and the mess the Government made of it last week in the House of Commons, they should have got it right. I am sorry and disappointed at the way the Government have behaved.

The Motion before us tonight is, as we have heard, different from what the Government originally intended. It is right that the Government have changed their proposal after the chaos and criticism of their approach in the other place last week. Parliament should have the right to debate and vote on the opt-in of the 35 measures that the Government have decided are the most important and crucial to national security and public safety, including—but not only—the European arrest warrant. The confusion we saw last week in the House of Commons was caused by the Government undertaking a rather curious and disingenuous procedural sleight of hand by referring to just 11 of the measures and not the full 35, including the European arrest warrant and then, against the Speaker’s ruling, claiming that it did include them. I hope this does not sound pompous—I have never been accused of being pompous and it is not meant to sound like that—but that does not do anything to enhance the reputation and integrity of the Government where Europe is concerned or to give any confidence that the Government can be relied on to put national interest and public security before party-political interest.

The Government have amended the Motion they originally intended to be debated this evening. The new Motion clarifies the fact that your Lordships’ House can support, or indeed oppose, all 35 of the measures, including the EAW. That is very simple and is largely what the Home Secretary and Prime Minister promised. However, I was surprised that the Minister did not mention, earlier in the debate, a point referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. When this House discussed the negotiations regarding the opt-in, we endorsed the 35 measures at that time. This was not the Motion before the House of Commons. I listened with great care to the excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, which I think he made more in sorrow and disappointment than in anger. I have known the noble Lord for a long time. In the first committee I ever served on in Parliament, the noble Lord was leading from his party as the shadow Minister and I was on the government side. We were bringing in the national minimum wage and he was leading a team of very able opposition Back-Benchers against it. Recognising the noble Lord’s experience, I hope that the Minister accepts the amendment, which is very precise and fair in its criticisms.

The noble Lord, Lord Boswell, referred to a letter that he received from the Leader of the House on tonight’s debate. I am sorry that the official Opposition did not receive a copy of that letter. It would have been helpful.

As we have heard, the handling of this issue has been quite appalling. Noble Lords who have taken part and followed these debates closely will recall and no doubt share some of our exasperation as we have tried to extract details from Ministers on the issues being debated. The noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Bates, are the fourth and fifth Ministers whom I have debated this issue with, which started originally with a Statement from the noble Lord, Lord McNally.

I have asked a number of questions since the beginning of this exercise and, ever the optimist, I will raise those again in the hope that I will get some answers. I appreciate that the Government have supplied huge volumes of information but that has not been matched by clarity—a point made by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. Through this whole process, the most helpful documents and information that I have seen—this point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar—were from our own EU Committee. I am grateful to that committee for its briefings in which they were able to talk to lawyers and others with direct experience of these issues. Their experience and advice were equally valuable. This issue requires a great detail and accuracy, yet it has every appearance of a political charade designed to placate anti-European sentiment without full and proper examination of the detail of all its implications. Let us set tonight’s debate in context and be clear about our position in the Labour Party and our commitment to the necessity of fighting crime across boundaries.

The key parts of the EU-wide co-operation that we support and now recognise in the 35 measures are mutual exchange of information in criminal investigations, locating and confiscating the proceeds of crime, criminal record checks, joint cross-border investigations and the European arrest warrant. They are essential crime-fighting tools. This is not some theoretical argument about whether we are pro- or anti-EU co-operation. This debate should only ever have been about hard-nosed, practical measures in the interests of the safety and security of UK citizens. Those of us who made the case for the European arrest warrant welcome the Government’s conversion to its value and importance and the eventual acceptance of the European supervision order which I am sorry was delayed by the Government. It would have been very helpful in making the case for the European arrest warrant had that been brought in earlier.

We have heard examples of problems with the European arrest warrant. The noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, spoke about the important changes that have been made. But equally there are numerous other examples. When Jeremy Forrest left the country with a young schoolgirl, he was brought back within days. That would not have happened prior to the European arrest warrant. There are other cases where terrorists have been brought back to the UK much more quickly than they would have been without the European arrest warrant.

Some of us in your Lordships’ House are old enough to remember the costa del crime, when criminals fled to Spain and were not brought back for months or even years. There is a huge value in the European arrest warrant and I am shocked that so many noble Lords are prepared to take on board a few cases. They do not want to change the European arrest warrant but instead throw the baby out with the bathwater, denying its value to British citizens.

We welcome the Government’s conversion on this issue. We welcome the Government’s acceptance of the value of joint EU investigation teams, the acceptance that crime does not stop at the Channel and that such co-operation is essential. We are now clear about what the Government are proposing we opt back into. I am grateful to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for its 13th report enhancing that clarity. I share its criticisms of the lack of clarity in the Explanatory Memorandum.

The noble Lord, Lord Boswell, made an important point about the 35 measures. Measures proposed previously by the EU Committee beyond those 35 have not been given consideration in full and by Parliament. I can think of one in particular that I would have been interested in considering further—recognition around driving offences. If you talk to people in the streets they will tell you time and again that they do not believe the issues of co-operation on driving offences and disqualification are taken seriously enough.

We understand what we are opting back into, but I seek clarification from the Minister on those issues that the Government are seeking not to opt back into and that we would be permanently excluded from. In terms of numbers there were originally 133 crime, law and order, and policing measures, and the Government wanted to opt back in to 35. An additional seven were replaced and the Government opted in. There was a lot of debate in the press at the time, with the two government parties arguing about the precise number of measures that would be opted out of and opted back into.

For there to be any real value in this process it had to be far more than a tidying-up exercise of jettisoned measures that were defunct, irrelevant or useless. There had to be some meaning to it. It could not just be some kind of academic exercise in clearing up those that could have withered on the vine, a point that my noble friend Lord Davies made. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, was the first Minister to raise these issues in your Lordships’ House. He referred to measures that were obsolete, defunct or simply unused. He wrote that the Government were keeping the wheat and losing the chaff. I asked the noble Lord, Lord McNally, in 2012, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, in 2013 and in 2014, and the noble Lord, Lord Bates, last week for some clarity on what that meant and the value of the measures that the Government want permanently to opt out of. There are three noble Lords here who have experience of this issue. To date, I have received no meaningful answers.

The questions are straightforward. I shall have one last shot at this: can I try again? First, how many and which of the measures of around 100 that the Government plan to opt out of permanently are of any value or even apply to the UK? Secondly, how many were being used and in operation prior to the opt-out decision and how many of those that have been permanently opted out of were harmful to the interests of the UK? Some clear answers to those questions would be extremely useful. Can the Minister answer those? Is he about to intervene?

Baroness Smith of Basildon Portrait Baroness Smith of Basildon
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I will be patient—I know that he is just taking notes.

To bring clarity to this debate it would be really helpful to know whether this is a serious policy process to ensure the safety and security of British citizens, or whether it is a numerical exercise carried out for party political reasons and of no real value. One of the noble Lords from UKIP referred to the by-election happening later this week in Rochester. I hope that this debate has played no part in the Government’s decision in what they were seeking to do in opting in and opting out. It has to be a valuable exercise, or it is cosmetic. We need answers.

Finally, can I make a plea to the Government for evidence-based policy-making? Unless I receive an answer tonight that would convince me to the contrary, I believe that in so many ways we seem to have government by numbers. We have seen it in the nonsense of net immigration figures. Success for the Government on net migration reduction would be to have lots of highly qualified professionals leaving the country and a huge reduction in fee-paying students not coming to the country. As far as the Government are concerned that would be a success. What a nonsense.

On the Deregulation Bill and the Government’s policies on regulation, every impact assessment makes it clear that for every new regulation that comes in, two have to go out. Why is there no assessment on the value of what the regulation does? Why are numbers so important here? What magic is there in the figure of 35 regulations to be opted back into without a full assessment of those that are being permanently ditched? In all these contexts, numbers alone are irrelevant. What matters is their value. That is what we need to understand from the Minister tonight. Can he bring clarity to this debate and explain in practical terms, not political ones, the value of this very long exercise, which has no doubt been very expensive?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has been remarkable for the self-discipline exercised by speakers in dealing with complex matters that raise strong feelings on various sides. It is not the first time that we have visited these issues in this House. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, in July the matter was dealt with in some considerable detail.

At the outset, I pay considerable and very well merited tribute to the House of Lords committees, which have scrutinised and re-scrutinised with great rigour the complex mechanism and the pros and cons of the opt-out and the opt-in. If that has not been made sufficiently clear beforehand, I make it clear now. The House is greatly in the debt of those committees, their chairmen and members. The process has been extremely thorough, and the House of Lords, through those committees, has done its job very well.

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Lord Bowness Portrait Lord Bowness
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I hope my noble friend will forgive me for interrupting. My question was whether there was any further parliamentary process. I think I am convinced that it is the end of the road as far as this House is concerned.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My noble friend is, of course, quite right to ask me to qualify that. I should say that there is nothing more for Parliament to do. I understand that there may or may not be a debate in relation to the European arrest warrant in the House of Commons.

I will now deal with what happened in the House of Commons. It forms part of the concern of my noble friend Lord Boswell. I came back from China this weekend, where I had been discussing the rule of law issues which, as my noble friend Lord Lamont said, are very much a matter of priority for this country. On the flight back, I had the opportunity of reading the debate in the House of Commons; it was not an edifying experience. The expectation was that the debate would focus on the European arrest warrant, but that was not one of the measures that required any legislative action, so it was not within the scope of the Motion to approve the statutory instrument.

The Home Secretary, my right honourable friend Theresa May, indicated that the debate could concern itself by “proxy” with the European arrest warrant. The party opposite would have none of this and there ensued a bad-tempered and rather uninformative debate that eventually resulted, after three votes, in the statutory instrument—the subject of the Motion—being approved and the European arrest warrant not being fully debated. This did not reflect well on Parliament. I am glad to say, albeit by an amendment, your Lordships’ House does not have the procedural impediments that the House of Commons has, and all 35 measures, insofar as it was necessary, could be debated and, indeed, have been.

The European arrest warrant has been the subject of debate—

Lord Stoddart of Swindon Portrait Lord Stoddart of Swindon
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The Minister said that the debate became a bad one because of the behaviour of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Surely I am right in believing that the Government were reprimanded by the Speaker, and that is something quite different. It seems to me that he has made an allegation against the Opposition that really is not true.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am certainly not in a position to criticise the Speaker; it would be entirely improper for me to do so. I am entitled to comment on what transpired in the House of Commons. I did not acquit anybody of contributing to what was a thoroughly uninformative debate. The position, as far as the Opposition were concerned, was that the shadow Home Secretary felt that the scope of the debate did not permit her to discuss the European arrest warrant, and that was the view of many in the House of Commons. The Speaker gave the observations that he did, but I do not think that it is appropriate for me to criticise him or not.

The shadow Home Secretary was also asked during the debate whether the party opposite would have exercised the opt-out—and, if so, which measures it would have opted into. Her response was, “Nice try”, so I am not sure that that was a particularly dignified response to what was a serious question.

Baroness Smith of Basildon Portrait Baroness Smith of Basildon
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The Minister is straying somewhat. He is here to explain the behaviour and conduct of the Government—who were, as the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, said, criticised by the Speaker. He seems to want to deflect that criticism on to the Opposition. May I suggest that he returns to his brief and tries to explain how the Government made such an absolute shambles of this whole process?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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It is necessary, I would suggest to the House—and I am about to move on to the European arrest warrant—for those who may not have had the opportunity to read the debate to appreciate what went on. Those who have read it will form their own view as to how helpful it was.

Considerable anxieties have understandably been felt in the past about the European arrest warrant and about particular cases. There is insufficient time, as the House will understand, for me to go into the details of those, but what is important is the fact that the European arrest warrant now has additional safeguards. In one of the more useful contributions to the debate in the other place, the right honourable James Arbuthnot pointed out that there is considerable judicial oversight of the European arrest warrant. Following the changes in the law made by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, a British judge must now consider whether the alleged offence and likely penalty are sufficient to make someone’s extradition proportionate. A British judge must also consider whether measures less coercive than extradition are available to foreign authorities.

As to dual criminality, the European arrest warrant must be refused if all or part of the conduct for which a person is wanted took place in the UK and is not a criminal offence in this country. Furthermore, a decision to charge and try an individual can be questioned by use of video link without the suspect having to leave the United Kingdom. These are all important safeguards which should mitigate some of the anxieties that have been expressed about the unsatisfactory nature of foreign jurisdictions. A large number of people who are not necessarily enthusiasts for the European project have been persuaded that it would be a great mistake to lose the European arrest warrant. I respectfully agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that this is a correct decision.

My noble friend Lord Lamont asked whether it was possible for us to come to a separate, bilateral treaty with other European Union countries—after all, we have extradition agreements with other countries. There is of course the considerable problem of timing, as the House will be aware. Denmark negotiated a separate deal. The deal struck through Protocol 36 means that the United Kingdom has to follow the rules set out. Denmark has its own protocol so could make its own arrangements, but they are not the arrangements that we would want to copy. Every agreement that Denmark has made separately with the EU has required it to submit to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and, in effect, the Danish agreement simply binds Denmark to EU law by another means—which I suspect is not what most who are interested would have in mind. Of course it would be possible, but it would be cumbersome and it would probably be expensive to make such separate agreements. Far more sensible is to have the now tried and improved system of the European arrest warrant that we have.

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Portrait Lord Lamont of Lerwick
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My noble friend did not address the point that I raised in respect of the Government’s safeguard, so called, that extradition should not take place until a decision has been made by a foreign court to prosecute and to try—I drew a distinction between a decision to prosecute and a decision to try. I referred to the numerous delays that took place in the case of Mr Symeou. That was why I suggested that the safeguard was not really a safeguard. My noble friend has not addressed that point.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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We consider that the safeguard should be capable of answering that particular problem. The important issue is whether there is an unnecessary delay. It will be appropriate to look at the particular facts of the case and for the judge responding to the warrant to decide whether he or she is satisfied about the arrangements. That, I suggest, is an answer, and unfortunate cases such as that of Andrew Symeou, which I accept was an egregious example of the European arrest warrant not working satisfactorily, should be avoided.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Portrait Lord Hannay of Chiswick
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Before the Minister moves on from this point, does he not agree that it is perhaps a pity that our debate tonight has not mentioned explicitly one really crucial dimension for this country, which is the Anglo-Irish dimension? It is a very important one. All of us who have taken evidence on this matter are perfectly clear that the European arrest warrant has enabled the depoliticisation of extradition proceedings between the two parts of the island of Ireland. That has been of enormous benefit to both of them. If we were to junk the European arrest warrant, the Irish have no substitute to put in its place because they removed the Council of Europe convention when they transposed the arrest warrant into their legislation. Therefore, we would risk falling back into the worst turmoil of politicised extradition proceedings, often for enormously serious crimes.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, for his intervention. I absolutely agree with his observations. Indeed, moving from the specific to the general, what is really important about the European arrest warrant is that it is not exclusively about Europe. It is a practical matter about criminal justice, acknowledging the fact that crime knows no borders, and that we must have satisfactory arrangements. This is the best way of securing those. Whatever noble Lords’ views—relative enthusiasm or otherwise—for the European project, the arguments seem to be overwhelming now in favour of the European arrest warrant.

Time does not permit me to go into arguments about matters that we have not yet reached a conclusion on; for example, Prüm was mentioned. The United Kingdom will not join Prüm on 1 December. Regarding law enforcement and other member states, I have no observations about the conversation referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. Others have said that it will bring benefits. Agreement has been reached that we will conduct a full business and implementation case and a small-scale pilot. This will consider not only any benefits of Prüm but also the civil liberties protections available. This will be reported to Parliament by way of a Command Paper in September 2015 and the House will then be given a vote on the matter.

Regarding the lateness of bringing this matter to Parliament, I submit to the House that this is the earliest possible opportunity following full agreement of the Council, which was achieved only the week before last when Spain finally dropped its reservation to approve a good deal for Britain and a package of measures vital in the fight against serious crimes. It will not have escaped the notice of the House that it is only nine working days before 1 December 2014, so we cannot afford further delay. For that reason, it is right that we consider, and vote on if necessary, the overall package and the regulation together.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked about a letter written by the Leader of the House. That letter is dated only today. However, it forms part of a communication between the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Boswell. I will make sure that she and all participants in the debate receive a copy of that letter. It explains the process by which this matter has reached the House and attempts to clarify the position. I entirely accept that the debate has come at a rather later hour than any of us would have liked. One of the reasons it was scheduled tonight was to accommodate the EU Committee, but matters went on longer than expected so noble Lords have had to be economical in their observations in relation to the various issues that have arisen.

We have now reached the position—albeit criticisms have been made forcefully and, no doubt, with some considerable justification—where we have completed the process in this House. We have had a number of debates about the merits, which we have answered—

Baroness Smith of Basildon Portrait Baroness Smith of Basildon
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My Lords, can the noble Lord answer the questions that I have posed, which I have posed in all our debates, or can he write to me with his answers, given the time that we have and that he still has not reached my questions?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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Clearly, I do not have time to go through the reasons why we have not opted into all the measures that we have not opted into. The presumption is that we opt in to matters that we consider are in our national interest, and we have given reasons for doing that.

Time is running against me. I entirely accept that matters might have been more expeditiously dealt with, but a number of factors caused delays. The Government have been kept very much up to the mark by your Lordships’ House. I hope that with the explanation that I have been able to give and the letter which has so recently been written, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, will feel inclined to withdraw his amendment to the Motion.

Lord Boswell of Aynho Portrait Lord Boswell of Aynho
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My Lords, at this late hour, perhaps I may briefly distil the debate into three considerations. The first is the remarkable complexity of the issues involved. I noticed that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked about the 11 into 10 problem with the regulations, which was not answered in detail, although the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, referred to it. I answer, in no sense criticising anyone nor intending to wind up on all the points that have been made, that that was the framework directive on freezing orders, and the United Kingdom had already opted in to the post-Lisbon amending legislation, so Protocol 36 no longer applied to the framework. Although the Explanatory Note was slightly—I am sure, unintentionally—misleading on the point, it was true that this had to be transposed into national law but, contrary to the Explanatory Note, it was not among the 35 measures under consideration. I mention that because it is a good example of the complexity of all this.

At the same time, alongside all that complexity, there are some simple practical issues. Are we happy for terrorists to cross the Irish land frontier and not have any recourse to extract them? Are we happy for people to commit crimes across Europe of a very unpleasant nature, often co-ordinated as part of a criminal gang, and for us to have no recourse? Are we happy for the judicial systems to work alongside each other? There is complexity and simplicity.

The Minister has acknowledged that there is considerable concern about the handling failure, which was, frankly, the substance of my amendment. He has been both generous in his comments about the scrutiny that we have carried out and modestly contrite about the failures that may have occurred. This is now the moment to move on, particularly in view of the fact that there is strong but not universal support for the substance of the 35 measures.

In concluding, I should like to say how grateful I am for the support and thoughtfulness that have been expressed in the debate. Collectively, we have made our point and, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Monday 10th November 2014

(9 years, 7 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham (Lab)
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My Lords, I understand that the Minister may accept the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and in that case the noble and learned Lord will have entered the fold, but this time it is the ministerial sheep who will emerge wearing the Woolf’s clothing—and for that I am sure the House will be grateful.

The noble and learned Lord identified some of the potential problems that need clarifying and we look forward to receiving that clarification. I would like to add another issue that was raised in the debate on Report, and that is the possible availability of legal aid for such applications. I dare say that the Minister will confirm that that will at least be considered and that any reference to it will be contained in such a report in due course.

One other matter to touch on is no doubt encompassed within the terms of the amendment. There was an indication at an earlier stage that the Government would possibly be looking to the magistracy as a source of potential recruitment for those who would undertake this responsibility. The matter has aroused some concern. Obviously I am not asking the Minister to give an indication finally one way or the other, but I take it that he would confirm at least that that is not the only possibility that will be looked at—in which case we will await the Government’s response in due course with keen anticipation.

Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for his helpful explanation of the amendment to Clause 8 in his name, and for helpfully setting out the concerns that lie behind it. I understand them, and why the noble and learned Lord seeks to make sure that Parliament is given the opportunity to consider a report by the Secretary of State about how the recall adjudicator model will operate before the provisions can be brought into force. I have no objection to the principle of what his amendment is seeking to achieve and am happy to make a commitment that before the recall adjudicator provisions are brought into force, the Government will produce a report for Parliament on matters such as the recruitment process, qualifications, training and costs.

The amendment of the noble and learned Lord is quite specific on some aspects of what the report must contain. I bear in mind what he said, namely that this should be a minimum, as he saw it; we do not indeed anticipate that it would be restricted entirely to those matters. In particular he is specific about the anticipated costs of the recall adjudicator system compared to the costs of recruiting more Parole Board members and case managers.

While the Government would be happy to provide an analysis of the respective costs and benefits of the new model—and indeed we will be publishing a further impact assessment on this—we would not wish to be tied to including in the report such a direct comparison of the sort prescribed in the amendment. This is a constantly evolving area of work, with the Parole Board itself driving forward changes to its process, and new operating models, and we would want our cost-benefit analysis to have the flexibility to take account of those developments rather than tying ourselves in the legislation to making this very specific cost comparison. But we will provide information as to costs.

However, I accept the point and agree that our report should set out the respective costs of the new process and systems compared to carrying on with the Parole Board model. The Government’s position is that we would have no objection to providing a report on the sort of information that the noble and learned Lord asks for, but until we have had more time to consider exactly what that report should contain and how best to present the information, we would not wish to be constrained by the exact requirements of the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

When the Government introduced the recall adjudicator provisions, I explained that the aim was to introduce greater flexibility in the way that determinate recall sentences are reviewed and to allow the Parole Board to concentrate its resources on indeterminate sentence prisoners. There is a great deal of further work to be done on the detail. The noble and learned Lord was quite right to identify the case of Whiston and the decision of the Supreme Court, which enabled the Government to bring forward this amendment, albeit on Report—but we would not have been able to bring it forward before then because the decision had not been reached. I think that inadvertently the noble and learned Lord suggested that the decision had been reached in 1914. It was a little more recent than that—2014, to be precise—but I am sure nobody misunderstood that. The Government move a little faster than that.

None Portrait A noble Lord
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Sometimes.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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We will operate an analysis of how it will deliver the benefits we envisage in the most cost-effective way. We are committed to undertaking this further development work in a collaborative and open way. It will be vital to get the new model right and to ensure that those with an interest in how this will work, including Parliament, are kept informed and have an opportunity to offer views on what is being proposed.

The fact that the Bill is silent on the precise workings of the recall adjudicator does not mean that the process will be devoid of safeguards. The Bill already makes provision for the Secretary of State to make rules regarding the way in which the recall adjudicators work. These rules will be made by statutory instrument, allowing for further parliamentary scrutiny. Ultimately, the protection of the public remains at the heart of any decision to release—or not to release—a prisoner from custody. That is why we will ensure that there is a robust system of selection and appointment of recall adjudicators. I have already indicated that it is our intention that such appointments would be filled by people with significant criminal justice experience.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, we have certainly not ruled out the possibility of using magistrates. The feasibility of using magistrates is very much a matter for consideration. Of course, they will be magistrates with significant and appropriate experience in criminal justice—not every magistrate—and they would be given rigorous and appropriate training before being allowed to perform the role of recall adjudicator. But there is in the magistracy a great deal of experience, and it would be unwise to rule out the possibility of using appropriately experienced and trained magistrates for that purpose. A solid foundation of knowledge and experience will be complemented by this training, as well as by guidance and oversight by the chief recall adjudicator.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, also asked about legal aid. He effectively asked whether recalled offenders would be denied legal aid under these proposals. The answer is that legal aid will still be available. For once, I can give a satisfactory answer, I think, to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.

The Government are absolutely determined to ensure that all the necessary safeguards are in place before we implement these changes. I hope that this demonstrates to the noble and learned Lord our commitment to ensuring a fair, impartial and robust process for prisoners that does not put the public at risk.

Returning to the final point of the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, which was about costs, he will understand that we are committed to ensuring that the new model is as cost-effective and efficient as possible. There is no question that we will have to achieve overall savings and benefits in the criminal justice system as a whole. It will do this primarily by diverting determinate recall cases away from the Parole Board, processing them in a quicker and less resource-intensive way, and by allowing the board to focus on making inroads into the backlog of indeterminate sentence cases, thereby avoiding delays in hearings and release decisions, which in turn has an impact on prison numbers.

We will, therefore, carry out a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of the new process as part of the development of the model and plan to publish a further impact assessment when that work has been done. The Government are willing to share that analysis as the model is developed, and I have already undertaken to consult the Parole Board as we go along and to provide a report for Parliament. I hope therefore that with the assurance I have given about the Government’s commitment to ensuring that adequate safeguards are in place, to working closely with the Parole Board and to providing Parliament with a report, I can persuade the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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Baroness Williams of Crosby Portrait Baroness Williams of Crosby (LD)
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My Lords, I will make a brief intervention. I very much commend the amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Listowel. Quite simply, the position of 17 year-olds has changed radically since 1984. The proportion of young people staying on in education to 18 or beyond has almost doubled in that time, and many young people continue within their family structures until the age of 18, which was not so much the case in 1984. So it is important that the Government look at this. Schools continue to have responsibility for young people who are at school until the age of 18. It would therefore be rather bitter if that responsibility was recognised as continuing while people are at school, but then ending when they cease to be at school.

There is some very disturbing information about the number of young people who commit self-harm when in detention, as a result, for example, of very serious mental health problems. Without detaining the House of Lords further, it is worth looking at whether the age of 18 is not a more natural bridge to a young person becoming a fully responsible adult than the present age of 17. It might do something to reduce the suffering that some of these young people undergo in detention.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, both in Committee and on Report, there was agreement around the House that this amendment had a great deal to recommend it. It follows the tragic cases of three 17 year-olds who committed suicide following their encounters with the police, to which the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has referred this afternoon. Their families are determined that no other parents should suffer such a loss, and want to see a change in the law so that 17 year-olds are treated as children. I pay particular tribute to the noble Earl for his continued commitment to improving the welfare of young people, and for helping to keep this important issue at the top of the Government’s agenda.

Despite recognising the merit of this amendment, the Government resisted it both in Committee and on Report as they were still reviewing all the remaining pieces of primary legislation which treat 17 year-olds as adults. That review was proactively launched following the High Court’s decision in the case of Hughes Cousins-Chang. That the review was launched is testament to the commitment of the Government to ensuring that young people are protected and treated appropriately while in police custody, ensuring that 17 year-olds have the protection to which they are entitled. My noble friend Lady Williams makes an important point about how 17 year-olds have changed in many ways.

Seventeen year-olds who come into contact with the police are afforded important safeguards by Section 11 of the Children Act 2004. This places the police under an obligation to make arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when exercising their functions, and means that the police have to make arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of 17 year-olds. Additionally, following the amendments to PACE codes of practice C and H as a result of the Hughes Cousins-Chang ruling, children aged under 18 have access to appropriate adults at the police station, whose function is to support them throughout interviews and during procedures such as the taking of fingerprints and samples. A parent or legal guardian must also be informed of their detention. Indeed, it is common for a parent to perform the role of appropriate adult for their child.

On Report, the noble Earl welcomed the news of the internal review. He directly asked the Government if something could be done in this area by Third Reading, although he caveated that by saying, effectively, that he realised that such a change would be unlikely. However I am pleased to inform the House that the Government have listened to his plea and the passionate collective voice of the families of loved ones who are tragically no longer with us. The Government have now concluded their review and have arrived at a very clear conclusion: the provisions in PACE that relate to the treatment of 17 year-olds should be amended as soon as possible so that they are treated as children.

I must point out that this is a very complex area and the Home Office review was very wide-ranging—more so than the amendment that has been tabled today. This means that the amendment only partially affects the change in relation to the treatment of 17 year-olds. However, in the limited time available, this amendment makes the most substantial change, that relating to the overnight detention of children charged and denied bail. The effect of the amendment would be that 17 year-olds, as with 12 to 16 year-old children, must be transferred to suitable local authority accommodation overnight in these circumstances. The amendment has the full backing of the police. The Home Office will work with forces to help them prepare for implementation.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked a question that is perhaps not entirely related to this amendment but he was kind enough to give the Government notice of it. As I understand it, it concerns those acquitted after a trial, whereas the focus of the amendment to which he referred is victims and witnesses. Indeed, a number of statutory protections within the criminal justice system are applicable only to victims and witnesses. The position with an acquitted defendant is that the court retains its inherent powers to order reporting restrictions in the case of defendants where that is necessary to ensure that the administration of justice would not be seriously affected. It has that right. Of course, up to the age of 18 defendants will continue to be subject to the youth reporting restrictions that apply automatically in the youth court and may be applied in other court proceedings. That is the position.

Returning to this amendment and in conclusion, this Government share all noble Lords’ desire to ensure that children are always treated appropriately, including where they are suspected of wrongdoing. If how we treat our prisoners is a measure of how civilised a society is, this must surely apply to how we treat our children when they are in trouble and at their most vulnerable. Therefore, I trust that I have noble Lords’ support in the Government’s decision to seize the opportunity afforded by the Bill and accept the noble Earl’s amendment.

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Moved by
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Moved by
Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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That the Bill do now pass.

Lord Ramsbotham Portrait Lord Ramsbotham (CB)
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I apologise to the Minister for not raising the point that I am now going to mention. However, as it is based on a report that was published only last week, I have only very recently become aware of the position that I wish to raise. When I was the newly appointed Chief Inspector of Prisons, I found that the treatment of and conditions for women prisoners in Holloway was a national disgrace. I was frustrated to learn that current practice for handling inspection reports offered no hope of immediate remedial action, so I fell back on army practice and suspended my inspection for six months, during which period I expected defined action to be taken. I feel the same frustration about the proposal for a secure college contained in Part 2 of the Bill, having learnt that the rules of the House do not allow me to bring forward a Third Reading amendment based on a report that was published only last week, which I believe changes the whole nature of the proposal.

Before the Bill leaves the House, therefore, because the treatment of children is a matter of national importance, I feel that I must make one last appeal to the Government. Before doing so I assure the Minister that nothing I am going to say reflects on the way that he has taken the Bill through the House—during which, all noble Lords, while not necessarily agreeing with him, have admired the skill with which he, as a renowned advocate, has defended his brief, and been assiduous in briefing us, both verbally and in writing, on that brief. However, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Nash, during the passage of the recent education Bill, who was able to accept the case for inclusion of young offenders with special educational needs among those for whom education, health and care delivery must be provided, the noble Lord’s position in regard to any reasoned suggestion of change to the Secretary of State’s pet plan, appears akin to that of the tank commander with whom the Chinese student tried to reason in Tiananmen Square.

Last Tuesday, I took part in the launch of a British Medical Association report, entitled Young Lives Behind Bars: the Health and Human Rights of Children and Young People Detained in the Criminal Justice System. Welcoming it, Norman Lamb MP, Minister of State for Care and Support, wrote:

“The newly established Children and Young People’s Mental Health and Well-Being Taskforce, includes a specific working group on vulnerable children and young people, including young people in contact with the Youth Justice system and will focus on how services can best meet their needs”.

In her foreword, Juliet Lyon, director of the Prison Reform Trust, who has considerable experience of working with young offenders, wrote:

“This timely, authoritative report presents an overview of the complex reasons why children and young people offend, their multiple needs and the challenges they present. It enables practitioners and policy makers to reflect on their work with young people in trouble”.

She went on to say:

“An almost 60 percent reduction in child imprisonment over the last seven years … offers a tremendous opportunity for health and justice professionals to focus on the most vulnerable children and help them to get out of trouble”.

I quote two of the report’s recommendations:

“Practitioners should consider how best to encourage involvement and interaction with healthcare services, in a manner that is appropriate to the needs and concerns of children and young people in custody”,

and:

“Health and wellbeing of children and young people should be seen as concerns for all those working in the secure estate, not just healthcare professionals. To this end, all staff working in the secure estate must be adequately trained and supported in identifying and reporting health concerns”.

I said on Report that the House is being asked to rubberstamp a pet project of the Secretary of State for Justice, without the known agreement of the Cabinet committee appointed to ensure that all departments drive forward the aims of the government’s social justice strategy, key indicator number 3 of which is a reduction in the number of young offenders who go on to reoffend. In addition to ignoring proven national and international good practice, as well as the advice and pleas of countless people with experience of working with young offenders, I now understand that the Secretary of State has ignored the advice of paid consultants such as Deloitte, which recommended smaller establishments on the lines of Diagrama in Spain—the subject of a fascinating article in the Guardian on Saturday entitled “Tough Love”—and current practice in America.

I admit that this is the first I have heard of the children and young people’s mental health and well-being taskforce working group, charged with focusing on the needs of the very children whom the Secretary of State is proposing to detain in his secure college. Far from being children for whom normal education and security provision might be appropriate, these have a multiplicity of mental health and behavioural needs, and their reaction to any regime, let alone one based on the education that almost all have rejected or from which they have been excluded, will be conditioned by the complexity of their problems. Furthermore, the majority are to be uprooted from their family and local social or healthcare workers, whose involvement in their post-release rehabilitation is crucial. A recent conversation with NHS England has caused me to look again at two remarks made about healthcare by the Minister on Report:

“We also have been working closely with NHS England… to test our designs for the secure college pathfinder”,—[Official Report, 22/10/14; col. 660.]

and,

“a … health unit placed strategically in the middle of the design … will be the best way of delivering healthcare uniquely tailored to those individuals”.—[Official Report, 22/10/14; col. 663.]

True, a health unit is now placed strategically in the middle of the design, but it was not there when the Minister briefed us in July, suggesting that working closely with NHS England is a comparatively recent occurrence. What is more, as I am sure he realises, adequate tailoring of the delivery of healthcare appropriate to meet the multiple and complex needs of 320 damaged and vulnerable children requires more than just a strategically placed health unit. NHS England tell me that it is pressing for healthcare, particularly mental health care, to be embedded in the culture of the proposal, requiring confirmed resources, particularly of appropriately trained staff, without whom healthcare, adequately tailored or otherwise, cannot be delivered. But, as the Minister knows, there is an acute shortage of appropriately trained staff in the country, let alone in the middle of Leicestershire.

So the situation appears to be this. On the one hand, we have the Secretary of State for Justice who, without any evidence and in apparent defiance of government strategy as well as vast amounts of expert advice, insists on pressing ahead with his claim that his,

“new form of youth detention accommodation with”,

as yet unspecified,

“innovative education provision at its core … will equip young offenders with the skills, qualifications and self-discipline they need to turn away from crime”,

and believes that,

“it is right to focus on the educational outcomes that the establishment achieves rather than the staff it employs”.

On the other hand, we have the cross-government social justice strategy, a specific working party of the NHS children and young people’s mental health and well-being task force, and the declared opposition of countless experts who know from practical experience how essential trained professional staff are to the development and future well-being of this damaged and vulnerable cohort of children.

I said in Committee that the changed nature of the detained children population, resulting from the Youth Justice Board’s success, gave the Secretary of State ample justification for rethinking this proposal. I fully accept that I failed to persuade the House to vote that he should be required to obtain the approval of both Houses before proceeding with his proposal or to test the opinion of the House on a rethinking amendment. However, I submit that the evidence now available, thanks to the BMA report and the recent involvement of NHS England and the mental health and well-being task force, exposes serious flaws in the well intentioned, education-based secure college proposal, which clearly is not tailored to the characteristics, capabilities and needs of its suggested population.

I realise that that is not something that either the Minister or the Secretary of State can resolve, because of the involvement of the NHS and a Cabinet committee. I therefore ask the Minister that it be referred to the Prime Minister himself, who, I hope, will make a statement in the other place on whether, having examined all the available evidence, he authorises that the proposal should go ahead or that it should be put on hold until it has been rethought.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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My Lords, I certainly endorse the remarks of the noble Lord, who has consistently questioned the detail of the Government’s proposals in respect of secure colleges. I must agree with him that the BMA report, published only last Tuesday, makes for sombre reading. The report emphasises the need for the state,

“to ensure that detained children and young people have access to healthcare that is appropriate for their age and health needs”—

which the EHRC has identified as a critical human rights challenge—given that,

“Custodial detention is the most extreme form of social exclusion that can be imposed by the state”.

That need is likely to be enhanced in the secure college context by the very nature of the institution and its physical remoteness from the family and community whence the offenders have come and to which they will return. After all, the report refers to the average time that offenders will be housed in the college as 85 days, which is not a long period. Clearly, after they move on, there will be a concomitant need for the provision of adequate healthcare and, indeed, educational provision.

It appears, then, that NHS England will have to do more than simply commission healthcare provision within the college. It is welcome that there will be such a physical provision, although the noble Lord has pointed out that, of itself, that will not be enough. NHS England will have to ensure that appropriate provision will be made when the offender returns home, quite conceivably in a different NHS region. How will that work? Will NHS England assume responsibility in a different region, or will it be involved from the outset? How will the commissioning process work, both for the period during which the offender is in the college and afterwards?

What will be the role of the relevant local authorities? Leicestershire, in the first instance, will be the site of the first college. Will the home authority deal with educational and childcare provision on the offender’s return home or return to residential care in the case of looked-after children? Have there been any discussions with local authorities—with Leicestershire in the first instance, which presumably will be able to provide educational and other provision if the project goes ahead within its boundaries—and with the Local Government Association on behalf of other local authorities generally, in respect of the need to follow up when the offender returns home?

The noble Lord has made a robust critique of the proposals this afternoon and throughout the debates on this Bill. When the Bill returns to the House of Commons, it is important that the other place should have a response to the questions that he has raised, the suggestions he has made and those which I have added.

However, at this stage, I join the noble Lord in expressing our thanks to the Minister who has, as ever, argued the Government’s case with great skill and perhaps conviction—but certainly with great skill. We are grateful to him and to the Bill team for the assistance that they have given. In some respects, the Bill has been improved, but this area remains extremely problematic. I hope that the Minister will be able to persuade his colleagues to look again at the questions and issues that have been raised, in which case he will be entitled to even more gratitude than that which I and others now extend to him.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am, of course, disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, remains concerned about the provisions in the Bill to create secure colleges. With 68% of young people reoffending within a year of leaving custody, the Government have taken the view that it is clear that things must change. As the House knows, secure colleges will put high-quality education at the centre of efforts to rehabilitate young offenders. These provisions in the Bill provide the framework for this approach.

As the noble Lord was good enough to say, the Government have gone to great lengths to engage Peers, stakeholders, practitioners and experts—and, indeed, young offenders themselves—on our plans. Indeed, we are currently consulting on our approach to secure college rules and, in response to concerns voiced in this House, we have amended the Bill to make these rules subject to the affirmative procedure to the extent that they authorise force, which was an area of particular concern.

The noble Lord described my position as being rather like that of a tank commander. I am not sure whether that was a compliment or the opposite. Be that as it may, it would be wrong to suggest that the Government are frozen in a rigid posture in responding to any new knowledge or learning that is available on the best way to treat these particularly vulnerable young people. The report from the BMA published last Tuesday will inform the Government’s approach to this issue and, indeed, to all issues.

Of course, the noble Lord is quite right, as was the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to focus on the health needs of this cohort. The Government have worked closely with NHS England since the inception of the proposal, and I assure the noble Lord and the House that we have a very constructive and well established relationship with the Department of Health and NHS England on youth justice. I should remind the House that NHS England commissions healthcare for young people in custody. During the debates, I attempted to indicate to the House how the provision of healthcare within the secure college should enable its better delivery to these young people—better, we hope, than in the current youth custody estate.

As I say, we continue to develop these plans. We will, of course, bear in mind all advice from whatever source, particularly any new learning that is available. However, we continue to believe that these secure colleges—whatever anxiety may reasonably be expressed about them—will provide an appropriate means of giving education to young people who, sadly, have often lacked any continuity in their education and, at the same time, help them to rehabilitate and to emerge at the end of their sentence with a much better chance of leading useful lives. I hope that I have gone some way to reassure the noble Lord and ask the House to pass the Bill.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I would be grateful if he would comment on the role of local authorities through their children’s services departments, in addition to the health aspect. The two cannot be divided.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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They cannot—but I am not going to comment in detail from the Dispatch Box on those precise roles. Of course, as the noble Lord will be aware, local authorities have statutory functions in relation to all young people in their local authority area. Those duties will continue, depending on the geographical position of the young person—and of course the NHS has its own obligations, wherever that individual may be. If I have any further information to elaborate upon my answer to that question, I will do so in writing.

Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Tuesday 4th November 2014

(9 years, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Moved by
Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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That the Bill be read a second time.

Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, this is a short but significant Bill. Its core aim is to provide reassurance to people who act in socially beneficial ways, behave in a generally responsible manner, or act selflessly to protect someone in danger by ensuring that the courts recognise their actions and always take that context into account in the event that something goes wrong and they are sued.

The Bill forms part of a much wider programme of measures that the Government have taken forward to tackle unjustified and dubious claims and reduce fears of litigation. That includes transforming no-win no-fee arrangements; banning referral fees paid between lawyers, insurance claims firms and others for profitable claims; and preventing inducements in the form of cash incentives or gifts being offered by claims management companies. The latter provision is in the process of being extended to the legal profession more generally through provisions in the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill currently going through your Lordships’ House.

Before telling the House a little more about the Bill, I should declare a personal interest. During my practice as a barrister before achieving my current position, I frequently represented local authorities, the police, the fire brigade, the NHS, the Medical Defence Union and, on occasion, claimants. I was also a special adviser to the Department for Constitutional Affairs on a report that led to the Compensation Bill.

The Bill aims to achieve its goal by requiring the court, when considering the steps that a person was required to take to meet a standard of care in a claim for negligence or relevant breach of statutory duty, to have regard to three factors.

First, Clause 2 provides that the court must have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members. That will give reassurance not only to voluntary organisations but to individuals who perform acts of kindness or make other helpful contributions to the community. The Government have already taken a range of initiatives to promote volunteering and socially beneficial activity, and we are pleased to say that the number of people volunteering is steadily on the increase. For example, we have part-funded Join In, the Olympic volunteering legacy programme so recently referred to in your Lordships’ House, which has allowed sports clubs to flourish at grass-roots level, providing worthwhile activities for volunteers and aspiring athletes alike. The Step Up to Serve initiative was launched last year by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, and aims to double the number of young people aged between 10 and 20 participating in social action by 2020. We also continue to support the Alzheimer’s Society in recruiting supporters for those suffering from dementia.

Through the promotion of such schemes, we want to build a cohesive and altruistic society, and the Bill will help to further that aim by ensuring that people who want to get involved are not discouraged from socially beneficial action by the fear of being sued. A survey carried out in 2007 by the National Centre for Social Research and the Institute for Voluntary Action Research found that that issue was cited by 47% of those questioned who were currently not volunteering.

That message was confirmed in the important report published following the 2010 election by my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham, Common Sense, Common Safety. Four years ago I made my maiden speech on the publication of that report, an event that will be remembered only by me and possibly my wife. There was also the task force chaired by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts on Unshackling Good Neighbours. During the passage of the Bill through the other place, evidence was provided by the National Council for Voluntary Organisations which showed that this is still a matter of concern for many people, and is a significant factor in deterring those who would otherwise volunteer. I mentioned my noble friend Lord Hodgson. I know that he supports this Bill, for two reasons. First, he referred to it explicitly in his speech on the gracious Speech, and secondly he told me so in person last week. Unfortunately, he is unable to attend because he is abroad.

Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 attempted to address similar issues. It provides that the courts may look at whether requiring particular steps to be taken to meet a standard of care might prevent a desirable activity being carried out to any extent or discourage people from undertaking functions in relation to it. As the evidence from the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and others shows, this appears to have done little to reassure those who still say that worries about liability prevent them getting involved in socially valuable activities. The current Bill goes further than the Compensation Act did by making it a requirement for the courts to take account of the context where someone is acting in a socially beneficial way for the benefit of others.

Secondly, Clause 3 of the Bill requires the court to have regard to whether a person, in carrying out the activity in the course of which the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred, demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others. This represents a change to the law, as case law does not currently require a court to do this. Clause 3 will oblige the court to weigh that factor in the balance when considering a person’s liability for negligence, or breach of a relevant statutory duty. This will reassure organisations, individuals and small businesses who have taken a generally responsible approach to the safety of others during an activity that the law is on their side.

It cannot be fair that such people feel pressured to settle speculative and dubious claims. So as well as giving that reassurance, we hope that this provision will give them greater confidence in resisting such claims and indeed—this is important—will help to deter such claims being brought at all. The clause is broadly drafted to ensure that it is relevant in a wide range of different situations, and will be available to bodies such as small businesses, volunteering organisations, religious groups and social clubs, as well as to individuals.

There has been some criticism that the Bill will undermine the rights of employees. Among these is the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. I can reassure the House that this is not the case. There is nothing in this clause, nor in the Bill more generally, that will prevent somebody who has been injured bringing a claim, or prevent the court finding an employer or any other defendant negligent if the circumstances of the case warrant it. In addition, the focus of the clause is on whether a generally responsible approach was adopted in the course of the activity in which it is alleged the negligence occurred. The requirement to consider whether the defendant’s approach was generally responsible applies to the activity in the course of which the alleged negligence occurred. It will not, therefore, enable a body with a slipshod approach to safety to escape liability, for example, because its general health and safety record would need to be satisfactory over a longer period.

The third main area of the Bill, Clause 4, addresses another key area of concern, and gives reassurance to those brave members of the public who see another person in danger and come to their aid. It does this by requiring the court to have regard to the context of such selfless actions in the event that a claim for negligence or breach of a relevant statutory duty is brought.

Unfortunately, there remains a reluctance among some members of the public to intervene and assist those in danger or distress because they are afraid of being sued should something go wrong. This is illustrated by the fact that 34% of those who responded to a recent survey conducted by St John Ambulance indicated that they were concerned about the legal repercussions of intervening. Clause 4 therefore provides reassurance that heroic behaviour in emergencies will be taken into account by the courts in the event of a claim being brought. I recognise that St John Ambulance has expressed some concern about the wording of Clause 4. I am sure that, if we have the opportunity, we will debate those concerns in more detail in Committee.

In concluding, I reaffirm that the Bill does not seek to confer immunity from civil liability on anyone whose actions fall within its scope. Those who are injured through negligence will continue to have access to legal redress and the Bill will not affect the court’s ability to do justice in an individual case. The Bill ensures that the important matters it deals with are always considered by the courts, alongside all other pertinent factors as appropriate.

I believe that the Bill takes a fair and proportionate approach that will provide valuable reassurance to those who act responsibly in the course of an activity, heroically or more generally for the benefit of society by requiring the courts to take that into account, while ensuring at the same time that those who are genuinely injured through negligence can obtain redress where that is appropriate. I commend the Bill to the House.

Amendment to the Motion

Moved by
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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, this has been a very interesting, entertaining and helpful debate, in which a number of useful points have been raised. As I explained in my opening speech, our core aim in introducing the Bill is to provide reassurance to people who act in a socially beneficial way, behave in a generally responsible manner, or act selflessly to protect someone in danger that the courts will always take the context of their actions into account in the event that something goes wrong and they are sued.

The amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, seeks to prevent the Bill from receiving a Second Reading on the basis of two premises: first, that the subject matter of the Bill is already covered by Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006; and, secondly, that the sole purpose of the Bill is not to make new law but to send a message to the courts, and that that is not a proper use of legislation. The Government do not accept that either premise is correct. As I explained, Clause 3 does change the law—albeit not in a major way—by requiring the courts to have regard to whether a person, in carrying out the activity in the course of which the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred, demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others.

In making that change, we want to ensure that the courts take a slightly broader view of the defendant’s conduct than at present by looking at whether a defendant’s approach to safety during an activity was generally a responsible one, taking into account all that he did or did not do. The court will be obliged to weigh that in the balance when considering the ultimate question of whether the defendant met the required standard of care. While that does not rewrite the law in detail, it is a substantive change. If it were to tip the balance in favour of the defendant in a particular case, then that is a result with which the Government would be happy.

Clauses 2, 3 and 4 also require the court to take particular factors into account. While, as I have said, Clause 2 relates to broadly similar territory to that in Section 1 of the Compensation Act, the approach that it takes is different. It requires the court to have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members. The fact that the fear of litigation remains so widespread almost a decade after Section 1 was introduced only goes to suggest that it has been ineffective and that firmer action, such as this, needs to be taken.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said that I had paid scant regard to the Compensation Act in my opening remarks. Let me attempt to make good that omission. In her introduction to the Compensation Bill, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, said:

“The Bill will provide better safeguards for consumers of claims management services and will reassure those concerned about possible litigation that the law of negligence takes the social value of activities into account and that they will not be found liable if they adopt reasonable standards and procedures”.

After dealing with the regulation of claims management services, she went on to say:

“The Bill's provision on negligence reflects recent judgments of the higher courts. It makes clear that when considering a claim in negligence, in deciding what is required to meet the standard of care in particular circumstances, a court is able to consider the wider social value of … the context of which the injury or damage occurred. It provides that the court can have regard to whether requiring particular steps to be taken to meet the standard of care might prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken or might discourage people involved in providing the activity from doing so.

The Bill forms part of a wider programme of work which is being taken forward across government and, in partnership with stakeholders, to tackle perceptions that can lead to a disproportionate fear of litigation and risk averse behaviour, to find ways to discourage and resist bad claims and to improve the system for those with a valid claim for compensation”.—[Official Report, 3/11/05; cols. WS 29-30.]

At Second Reading, the noble Baroness said:

“This Bill is part of a much wider set of initiatives that is being taken forward across government. The Government are determined to tackle practices that stop normal activities taking place because people fear litigation, or have become risk-averse. We want to stop people from being encouraged to bring frivolous or speculative claims for compensation. The provisions in this Bill will help us do that. They will reassure people who are concerned about being sued that, if they adopt reasonable standards and procedures, they will not be found liable”.

Later, she said, referring to Clause 1, that:

“This provision reflects guidance given by the higher courts during a considerable period and renewed in recent cases. It will ensure that not only all courts but also litigants and potential litigants are fully aware of this, and will provide reassurance to the many people and organisations, such as those in the voluntary sector, who are concerned about possible litigation”.—[Official Report, 28/11/05; cols. 81-82.]

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, seemed to imply that the notion of a compensation culture was entirely in the imagination of this Government, but it appears to have featured quite heavily in the imagination of the previous Government.

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Portrait Lord Lloyd of Berwick
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When I said that the noble Lord had paid scant regard to Section 1, I thought that I would be understood as saying that he did not attempt to say why Section 1 does not cover everything in this Bill. Indeed, what he has just read out makes it clear that it does cover everything in this Bill.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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Indeed, but the noble and learned Lord is saying in his amendment that this Bill should not get a Second Reading because the matter is covered by Section 1 of the Compensation Act. I am identifying what lay behind the legislation when it was brought in, what it attempted to do and why, if the noble and learned Lord will bear with me, it failed to do so.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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The noble Lord read out the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, in the previous Labour Government. I referred to Greek legend, and I concede entirely that the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, and the previous Labour Government nodded, as did Homer. I would not defend the section of that Act but the noble Lord has to point to any distinction between the effect of that Act and the present Bill.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am entirely aware of the question that the noble Lord asked and I am attempting to answer it.

Perhaps I may go on to refer to what happened following the passing of that Bill. Was there a fundamental change in the compensation culture? What happened? After the coalition Government came to power, my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham produced his report Common Sense, Common Safety, which was widely applauded by all sides of your Lordships’ House. He observed in his report that there was a growing fear among business owners of having to pay out for even the most unreasonable claims. The fear of business owners and small business owners, referred to by my noble friend Lord Cotter, is a reasonable matter to take into account. My noble friend Lord Young also identified a public misconception that,

“we can be liable for the consequences of any voluntary acts on our part”.

He described this belief as “particularly pernicious” because it might,

“deter people from engaging in organised voluntary activities in the mistaken belief that they can be sued should anything go wrong”.

He recommended that people who seek to do good in our society should not fear litigation as a result of their actions. He said:

“It is important to have clarity around this issue and at some point in the future we should legislate to achieve this if we cannot ensure by other means that people are aware of their legal position when undertaking such acts”.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson, whose report Unshackling Good Neighbours has been referred to, led a task force established by Nick Hurd, the son of my noble friend Lord Hurd, who has spoken on this issue. He may have observed that unfortunately his son did not share his lack of enthusiasm for the Bill when speaking in a brief intervention in the House of Commons. Fortunately, the family of Hodgson was more together than the family of Hurd. My noble friend Lord Hodgson said that the fear of becoming involved in litigation was a major preoccupation that deterred people from volunteering. The task force acknowledged the work of various government departments in producing guidance on health and safety, but argued that it was unlikely to provide volunteers with the general reassurance that they seek. The task force took the view that the Government’s efforts seemed,

“‘to fall short’ of Lord Young’s recommendation to clarify through legislation if necessary that people would not be held liable for any consequences due to well-intentioned voluntary acts on their part”.

The response of Dr Davis Smith in his evidence to the Public Bill Committee was also important. His perspective as the executive director of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations was interesting. He said:

“Parliament has a hugely important role in sending out messages about what is valued in society, and I think that sending out the message that volunteering and community and social action has a hugely beneficial role to play in society—recognising that there are barriers and difficulties that must be addressed—is a really important function that Parliament can play. Even the process of having discussions such as this and getting the debates out as part of the passage of legislation is helpful in raising awareness in society more broadly”.—[Official Report, Commons, Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill Committee, 4/9/14; col. 14.]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, challenge me to say that this Bill effectively adds nothing to the Compensation Act. I respectfully suggest that since the Act we have had an explosion of claims. These have resulted in what I submit to the House is an extremely sensible part of the LASPO Act, which implemented the Jackson reforms and went a considerable way to stopping the explosion of claims by modifying the amount of cost that could be recovered.

We have improved the control of claims management. The question of claims management was touched on in the Compensation Act. It went nothing like far enough. We have reduced the number of claims management companies. We have introduced a successful unit to monitor carefully what claims management companies do. They have halved in number. We now have heavy fines if they transgress in any way. We have introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill, still before your Lordships’ House, provisions that will deter fraudulent claims.

Anyone who watches television or reads newspapers will, I suspect, share with me the feeling of depression and disgust at the vulgar advertising for claims brought, which are often meritless. People resent being telephoned and asked to take part in a fraud, and being told that they have been involved in an accident of which they have no recollection. For those who say that the compensation culture is a mere figment of the Government’s imagination, I say that they are not paying attention to what normal people say.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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Is the noble Lord able to identify what proportion of these claims relates to the provisions of this Bill? What proportion of them relates to claims for compensation for injuries suffered as the result of voluntary activity or heroic action?

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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I will not give details of particular claims. In opening this Second Reading debate I said that this Bill is intended to reassure those who might be reluctant to volunteer. It intends to set out matters that the court is required to take into account when deciding on cases that potentially generate those factors with which the Bill is concerned.

Can we really conclude that the Compensation Act answered the questions posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton? I say “posed”, though the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, disavows her concern. The answer, I fear, is no. What difference is there between the terms of the Compensation Act and the terms of this Bill? One said “may” and the other said “must”. Noble Lords may remember that the difference between “may” and “must” last week caused the House to be divided on more than one occasion, so crucial was it in the interpretation of the particular Bill. Furthermore, the Opposition in the House of Commons thought that it was a sufficiently important difference to table an amendment, removing “must” and inserting “may”. There is a difference, I respectfully submit, between the provisions in this Bill and the provisions in the Compensation Act.

What is not entirely clear—and I accept this on behalf of the Government—is that all Members of your Lordships’ House know the target at which the Bill is aiming. I readily accept, as was apparent from the previous Government, that it is a very difficult target to hit. We do not suggest that judges are routinely getting matters wrong, or that they ignore these factors. However, they will now have to take those into account, and in many cases that will be an unnecessary enjoinder. Clearly, on the face of the statute will be that obligation. This Bill will contribute to an increasing reassurance which I hope the public has and that volunteers have in approaching life, which inevitably has many risks.

This debate has divided roughly—only roughly—between lawyers who are hostile to the Bill and non-lawyers who seem rather more, with exceptions, in favour of it. We, as lawyers, should reflect a little on the occasional disconnect that exists not only between politicians and the public but sometimes between lawyers and the public. Should Parliament be legislating in this fashion at all if it is simply sending a message? I entirely accept what my noble friend Lord Hurd said about the fact that one should be very cautious indeed before legislating simply to send a message. But, on the other hand, I suggest that it would be idle to pretend that part of what we do is not conveying an important message.

One has to think only of the amendment that the Government brought forward, with considerable help from my noble friends on the Liberal Democrat Benches and with support from the Opposition, on the question of revenge porn. It sent a clear message that this House of Lords thoroughly disapproved of that activity. The reality was that the offence was probably captured by other specific criminal offences within the canon of criminal law. So strong was the general feeling that we should identify specifically this behaviour that we sent a message by legislation and made law. What is the Modern Slavery Bill about? Of course, it has important provisions in relation to modern slavery, but is accompanied by all the publicity about what to look for in slavery. Legislation is not always the dry dust of particular words. The context in which we legislate is extremely important.

I was asked many questions during the debate, and I will answer all of them in writing in due course. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not answer them all now. I can reassure a number of those who asked about the emergency services, for example. I hasten to add that we are very keen to encourage first aid, but nothing about this will alter the sensible practice that should be adopted by the emergency services. The law in that respect has been well visited by a number of courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. This will not change that.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in an amusing speech, referred to that well known student of jurisprudence Sybil Fawlty, and expressed the view that the case of Tomlinson, which was the backdrop to the Compensation Act, was a statement of the obvious. Why then, I ask rhetorically, was it necessary for the case to go all the way to the House of Lords, which deals only with difficult matters of law on which there is uncertainty? If the case was so straightforward it should either have been settled immediately or been disposed of without an appeal to the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords. Unfortunately it can be the case that courts take a little time, when faced with appalling accidents which result in serious injury, to come to the—sometimes reluctant—conclusion that they must deny compensation in the face of an apparently deserving claimant.

Much has been said about the need to sometimes take risks. Few were more robust advocates of that approach than my noble friend Lord Attlee. Much of what he said was true: we want people to take sensible risks but we are not encouraging them to do anything or forcing them to volunteer or take part in activities if they do not want to. However, it is a sad fact that people are deterred: they are aware of the risk of compensation and I am sure that most Members of your Lordships’ House agree that this can act as a negative factor in both their ability and their willingness to volunteer. Indeed, it can reduce the enjoyment of life. The Bill’s core purpose is to reassure a wide range of people who should not be deterred from engaging in these activities. I do not accept that it is improper for legislation to have such a purpose. I suggest that it is a proper use of legislation and will provide valuable support for voluntary organisations and small businesses. They can make a contribution to society without being constrained or, at least, being far less constrained by worries about being sued.

Noble and learned Lords will, undoubtedly, examine the provisions of the Bill closely in Committee—if there is one—and on Report. I do not suggest, for a moment, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, is not entitled to take the course he apparently wants, of testing the opinion of the House at Second Reading. The Bill passed through the House of Commons; it received some support—albeit it has been criticised—in your Lordships’ House; it could certainly benefit from examination by those who are experienced in these matters when it proceeds further. However, I hope that he is persuaded that the Bill deserves our consideration. If it is sending a message, it is one that should be heard. It is making a small but important change in the law where there is a need for change. In all those circumstances, I ask him to consider carefully whether it would not be better to withdraw his amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Monday 27th October 2014

(9 years, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Portrait Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
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My Lords, I know that there is always a sigh in this House when a debate is dominated by lawyers. However, I remind the House that sometimes it is lawyers who know the pain that citizens in our country experience, because we represent them, and that this is about the actual lives on which judicial review has an impact. It is always about the person whose business is to be closed down from trading, based on a department’s or a local authority’s decision that they want to challenge, or the person whose mother is in a care home and suddenly finds that it is being moved or closed down, with no consultation as to the impact on her and her family. It may be about the effect on a disabled child of a decision about their schooling. Those things are about real people’s lives and that is why this is not just a constitutional debate of high flown words or complicated legality—it is about the real impact on the lives of ordinary people.

When your Lordships come to vote in our Lobbies, as I am sure you will be asked to do, I say to those of you who are not lawyers that this is really about people’s lives and about the law coming into play to protect citizens. That is why lawyers and organisations such as the Bar Council, the Law Society and Justice—cross-party and no-party organisations—know why the rule of law matters in our nation and our democracy. This is not, I say to the Minister’s noble friend Lord Tebbit, about judges somehow usurping the power of Parliament. This is about justice, fairness and the things that we hold dear, so I say to my colleagues in this House who are not lawyers that this is not a festival of lawyering. It is about ordinary people.

Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, we now turn to Part 4 of the Bill, which has proved to be one of the more contentious areas at Second Reading, in Committee and today. The debate has ranged far and wide and it has been magnificent. We have discussed the constitution of the United States, the merits of the European Union, the Council of Europe, King Charles I, fracking, the Severn barrage and HS2, to name a few topics. I am sure that noble Lords will understand if I do not deal with all of them.

Similarly, there have been speeches of an omnibus nature, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and my noble friend Lord Marks, in the sense that they have covered matters beyond Clause 70. I will deal with those arguments when we come to the relevant groups. We are focusing on Clause 70 at this juncture. The Government have listened with great care to the arguments raised by noble and learned Lords and noble Lords during those debates. I assure my noble friend Lord Cormack that I have listened carefully again this afternoon to the speeches made by a large number of your Lordships. However, we do not resile from our central contentions, which I trust the House will allow me to set out briefly.

First, it is our contention that judicial review, when used properly, is an essential component of the rule of law. It allows individuals and businesses to invite the court to test the lawfulness of public bodies’ actions. Secondly, judicial review as it presently stands is not always perfect. On several occasions, the Government have set out some of the examples of delay and cost which can be caused, such as the challenge to the exhumation licence concerning the mortal remains of King Richard III which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, described as “ludicrous”, despite his own view that York is the more appropriate resting place.

Thirdly, while we have taken some steps, working with the judiciary where appropriate, to rebalance the current approach, such as through the creation of the planning court, some further reform is needed. Noble Lords may be aware that the use of judicial review has increased more than threefold in recent years from around 4,200 in 2000 to around 15,600 in 2013.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, was kind enough during our Committee debates to offer me a copy of De Smith’s Judicial Review, of which he is a distinguished editor. I have to say that he honoured his pledge most generously. I have been in receipt of De Smith and I have done my best to reacquaint myself with its contents. The preface to the seventh and most recent edition reads as follows:

“English administrative law is now one the most celebrated products of our common law and doubtless the fastest developing over the past half century”.

We accept that many judicial reviews will be well founded and brought in good faith, and that much of the growth has been driven by the number of immigration and asylum cases, but it remains a simple fact that a well timed judicial review can delay the implementation of crucial policies or projects for months or even years. Even when decisions are perfectly in line with due process, months can be spent preparing for and defending claims when that time would be better spent taking forward the reforms that the country needs.

The debates have been, perhaps predictably, dominated by those with long experience of the law and, of course, on the government Benches we welcome the expertise which has been brought to bear, even if we do not always welcome the contents of all the speeches. However, there is another side to judicial review—one which pertains to what happens, or does not happen, outside the courtroom as judicial reviews proceed. As they proceed, arguments are made and countered; witness statements are prepared and probed; and fine points of law are weighed and determined. Crucial projects with direct implications for jobs are delayed, perhaps lost.

For example, a judicial review was initiated by a competitor to the proposed development of a supermarket in Skelton, North Yorkshire. That challenge was described by the judge at the earliest possible opportunity as “a hopeless case”. Yet work was delayed for six months. Irrespective of the rights and wrongs of the case itself, is it right that a hopeless judicial review can be used to such effect? The risk of this happening was recognised by that great judge Lord Diplock who, when emphasising the importance of the permission stage in judicial review said:

“The requirement may also prevent administrative action being paralysed by a pending, but possibly spurious, legal challenge”.

I quote from Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses 1982 appeal case 617 at page 643.

It is important that we do not ignore the fact that such cases place a considerable burden on the public purse in terms of the time of judges, lawyers, Ministers and officials. Overall figures are not recorded, and are probably not recordable, but by way of illustration, I can report that the total legal costs of the Richard III case to the Ministry of Justice alone have been put at more than £90,000, none of which is recoverable. Consequently, we make no apology for having taken some sensible steps already, and none for making a few more small but important changes.

Outside your Lordships’ House the debate about these reforms has been rather long on hyperbole. Reference has been made during the debate today, and indeed in Committee, to left-wing causes. Of course, I entirely accept that it is irrelevant whether a cause is left-wing, right-wing or apolitical. What matters is whether the challenge is justified and whether it has merit. However, I have seen it suggested that the Government wish to do away with judicial review altogether and even that these reforms will lead to imprisonment without trial. As I will explain, these fears are entirely ill founded. The Government believe that the roles of Parliament and the courts should exist within a relationship of mutual respect and co-operation. In that context, I should emphasise what the provisions do not do: they do not seek to undermine or fetter judicial discretion; they do not seek to challenge the basis on which judges approach questions of judicial review; and we have not altered legal standing, much as that was open to criticism. That was a response to the consultation paper.

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Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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My Lords, the Opposition will support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It seems to me quite possible, within the framework of that amendment, to proceed along the lines mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, Clauses 71 and 72 are about transparency. They require an applicant for judicial review to provide, with their application, information on funding for their case and that the court considers this information when exercising discretion to order costs. It is important to emphasise that, while permission will not be granted until information has been provided, there is no question of preventing permission if the applicant’s funding is insufficient, and the judiciary continue to have complete discretion in relation to the making of costs orders against third parties disclosed in that information.

Requiring the applicant to provide this information to the court will give the court the information necessary to achieve flexibility in apportioning costs fairly, and to prevent a third party from using a front man or shell company to shield themselves from incurring their share of costs. Your Lordships have heard that there is a potential problem, and although it is not always easy to know what the situation is, this provision should enable the courts to make their decision based on evidence. We say that the judges do not always have all the relevant information available or presented to them, which has the potential to hinder their ability to order costs in a just and equitable manner.

Amendments 157 and 158 would stop the provision of information about financial resources being mandatory, allowing for permission to be granted where no information has been provided but permission is “nevertheless appropriate”—which is undefined. The Government consider this unnecessary, as the clause does not stop permission being granted if insufficient finances are available. It requires only that the court should be provided with an accurate picture. The court still has discretion.

The clauses will not require onerous or invasive information from applicants, and the information requested should always be information that the applicant would have, even if they did not have funding at that stage. The clauses are designed to promote transparency in court proceedings, not to provide for a time-consuming forensic examination of an individual’s financial affairs.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has not moved Amendment 156. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and Amendment 162, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, seek to change when the court should have regard to funding information, and what that information should be. My understanding is that they rely on Clause 71 being removed from the Bill and set out the power for the court to require the applicant to provide certain information about funding when the court is determining, or intends to determine, costs. They also limit the information to sources of funding that are actually available to the applicant, rather than sources that are likely to be available, and rather than looking at the applicant’s ability to fund the judicial review generally, the information would be limited to how the applicant would meet the other side’s costs.

Amendment 161A would mean that those who are likely to fund and drive litigation could escape the appropriate costs liability simply by not promising to provide the support. Amendments 160 and 161 seek to instate a position where the court need not consider financial information provided by the applicant, even if it considers it appropriate. In my view, these amendments are unnecessary and defeat the point of Clause 71 in making sure that the court has clear and transparent information early in proceedings.

The key to Clauses 71 and 72 is they do not create new cost liabilities for claimants, nor does the sufficiency of funding they demonstrate have an impact on the progression of the case. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the courts would not be expected to make an award against a third party who was simply funding the litigation and not seeking substantially to control, influence or benefit from it. I said words to that effect in Committee; I say them again now, and I hope those words will be useful when anyone comes to interpret this provision should it become law. It is clear that the applicable case law requires more than only funding; as in the case law referred to by my noble friend Lord Lester, the person must be seeking to drive the litigation or to benefit from a potential remedy in the case. I should emphasise that.

Under those principles, costs awards are not prescriptive, nor is it our intention that they should be. We are simply allowing the court to make decisions with the appropriate information available to it. For example, the court will not have to make an award against a parent in a school challenge case and would not be expected to do so. We do not agree with Amendment 162 that prospective funding or the ability of company members to provide financial support can be excluded from this consideration, nor do we agree that the court should consider only those who have promised to provide funding. In our view, that creates an easily avoidable threshold.

We also do not agree that this information should be provided only on the making of an order by the court, as stated in Amendment 159B. There is no reason why the court should not be informed of the parties driving litigation early on in proceedings, as this would enable the judge to make decisions on costs without having to order the parties to provide information. Essentially this amendment seeks to favour the opaque, rather than the transparent. What information an applicant should provide will be set out in court rules. The rules will not require invasive financial information but will require the claimant to be clear about the sources of their funding. It will be perfectly acceptable to update the court if funding does not materialise; that was a point made in Committee and I would like to make that clear. The requirements will not be burdensome for claimants. The Government have on many occasions stated that they wish to see a light-touch approach, and I am sure that any rules will be fair and proportionate to the court’s need for transparency.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made reference to the judiciary’s response. I am sure he has read carefully what it is and I am in no position to contradict it. My understanding was that the judiciary had welcomed transparency, although, having revisited what I said in Committee, I did not seek to rely specifically on that as the only basis for this argument. He may well be right that the comments were directed more at non-parties than in the situation of an applicant. If I inadvertently misled Parliament, I make it absolutely clear that that was not my intention.

The requirement for transparency is wholly understandable and wholly consistent with judges making decisions on the best possible information. The question is: is this going to be chilling? I suggest that it will not be chilling to those who have good reasons for bringing claims and who are, as one would expect, open and frank about what, in financial terms, is driving the challenge.

This has been a useful debate and I hope it has enabled me to be clear about what lies behind Clauses 71 and 72 and to allay any remaining concerns. The Government take the view that these clauses do not take away the judge’s discretion. As is always the case, he or she will make the decision on the basis of the facts of each case. These clauses enable the judge to have better information before exercising the discretion. No judge wants to exercise a discretion in the absence of all the information that could reasonably be made available to them. It is not obvious to me why this is as objectionable as it is said. With that reassurance, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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My Lords, the purpose of Amendments 157, 158, 160 and 161, which are all of a piece, is simply to ensure that the court has a discretion rather than a duty in relation to information about the funding of judicial review. It is very important to be clear in the Bill that the court retains a discretion in relation to these matters. That is what these amendments seek to do in relation to funding issues. I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 157.

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Baroness Campbell of Surbiton Portrait Baroness Campbell of Surbiton (CB)
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My Lords, I wish to add my support for the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Pannick. This provision will, indeed, deter interventions from organisations with limited resources—organisations, as my noble friend Lord Low suggested, that are likely to have the best and most pertinent expertise about the more vulnerable sectors of our society: children, disabled people, elderly people. Judges have publicly recognised the value of specialist knowledge in helping them to make informed decisions, as demonstrated by my examples in Committee. I had the privilege to be involved in interventions in two landmark cases where my organisation and individual knowledge could contribute to the outcome, which everybody heralded as a great success. I know that the Government’s reforms would have deterred me and my organisation from intervening. I believe that cases will be very poor for that.

It is critical that intervention remains readily available and that we do not deter weak charities and individuals who are quite sceptical about getting involved at all. Let us face it, intervening in a High Court case is a scary prospect. I know because I remember I was terrified. Therefore, I believe that these provisions will have a devastating effect, particularly on the community that I know best, disabled people—the very people who need the most support, protection and expert advice, coming from maybe some of the people who know them best and who have themselves experienced what they might have been going through or might go through. Clause 73 cannot be allowed to stand because there will be no interventions of such knowledge and value—interventions that have literally changed the lives of some disabled individuals and interventions that will change the lives of those who come before the courts in the future.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate on interveners. The position is that any person may apply to the court to give evidence or make representations in judicial review proceedings. However, we think it is right that people who intervene in judicial reviews should have a fairer financial stake in the case and do so in a way that does not cause the true parties to the judicial review additional costs.

Clause 73 aims to strengthen the costs rules in relation to third parties who voluntarily apply to join in judicial review cases as interveners. It does this by establishing two presumptions: first, that the court will order an intervener to pay their own costs—that is normally the position now; secondly, that it will order an intervener to pay the reasonable costs that they cause a party to the judicial review to incur by their intervention. However, neither would apply where, in the view of the court, there are exceptional circumstances making it appropriate for that presumption to be rebutted. Neither presumption will apply when the court invites an intervention—and courts do quite often invite interventions. The clause will not affect the judge’s ability to invite whichever interventions, from whichever interveners, he or she sees fit.

The clause has been subject to significant debate and, as I said at Second Reading and in Committee in this place, and as my honourable friend Shailesh Vara said in the other place, the Government wanted to look again at how best to ensure that interveners consider carefully the costs implications of intervening, while not deterring appropriate interventions in appropriate cases, and, as a result, whether any changes to the clause were required. We have taken into account the views expressed in this House and the other place. The Government have listened to the concerns raised in Parliament and by stakeholders but consider that the current clause is right and are not persuaded that amendment is needed. The Government have considered and discussed the clause in some detail. I know that my ministerial colleagues have also discussed it with fellow Peers. I regret to say that we have been unable to agree an alternative formulation. The Government recognise that interveners can add value to a case and we do not want to stop that. However, interventions should be made in the right cases after careful consideration beforehand. That means that interveners should have a fair financial stake in the case.

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Lord Deben Portrait Lord Deben
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My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I am listening very carefully. The tiny bit that I do not understand is why the judge should not have discretion to decide whether the case merits payment of costs or not. The discretion is very bound, because he has to maintain that these are exceptional circumstances. I find that difficult. Why cannot he be given the right to say, “In this case, they ought to pay because they have been in one way or another negligent”, or have overcharged, and in another case that they should not? Why cannot we leave it to the judge? It is his court and he should make the decision.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, of course that is the burden of the argument in favour of the amendment, and that is the current situation. The clause is intended to place a higher burden—we accept that it is a higher burden—on interveners to think carefully about the intervention that they intend to make as to whether it is truly worth while.

Before my noble friend’s intervention, I was stressing that the judge has discretion over both aspects: causation and quantum. The intervention may have caused only a degree of additional costs, rather than the entire costs of the action, which will modify the intervener’s exposure to costs. That will be a matter for the discretion of the judge. Of course, it is ultimately up to the judge to decide what are exceptional cases. Judges have different views as to what constitutes an exceptional case, but ultimately it is for the judge. It is very rare, if at all, that one sees appeals on questions of costs having any success. Amendment 164 would remove both presumptions that the clause creates, replacing it with a general discretion, which my noble friend would like, for the court to award costs either for the intervener against a party or to require the intervener to pay the parties’ costs. That is the status quo.

Clause 73 has been criticised for being too broad and meaning that interveners could be expected to pay costs in any circumstances. Critics have said that that means that an intervener would not be able to intervene in important cases and provide assistance to the court, as the risk of adverse costs is too unclear and potentially too great. Under Clause 73, what amounts to exceptional circumstances will ultimately be set out in court rules. That will provide clarity for an intervener at the point where they are considering whether to intervene on the manner in which they should carry out their intervention or risk costs.

Clause 73 does not mean that in every case where an intervener is involved they will be forced to pay all the costs of all of the parties, but it is right that they have a fairer financial stake. All those with experience will confirm that, just as interveners can add value, they can delay and hinder and make arguments that simply amplify or repeat—

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am grateful to the Minister, and I apologise for intervening at this late stage, but I do not understand from his reply how he can cite cost saving as a justification for giving detailed instructions to the courts about matters that are well within their discretion. Nor do I understand why a different rule should apply to the Supreme Court from that applied in others or in Northern Ireland from that applied in England and Wales.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I think that I have answered my noble friend’s point on the difference between the Supreme Court and the courts at a lower level. On costs, as I said, with this clause we hope to deter inappropriate interventions and also to make interveners think about the scale of their intervention so as to reduce the costs for all parties, whether applicants or respondents, and to ensure that those interventions are relevant and genuinely assist the court.

These clauses apply to judicial review in England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate legal jurisdiction on this question because it is devolved, but of course if they intervene in a court in England and Wales that would be a different matter.

Interveners can also, as I think is accepted, make arguments that go beyond what is necessary. The changes that Clause 73 introduces reflect the Government’s intention of ensuring that they do so in an appropriate manner. We submit that the overall effect of the clause, while not drastic, will reduce the number of cases—and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, says that there are very many cases where interventions take place—in which the taxpayer is expected to shoulder the burden.

That is what Clause 73 does and why the Government, having considered the issues, are of the view that the provision represents a sensible, workable and balanced position that takes proper account of the role of the judiciary, which will remain at the centre of this issue. Therefore, having provided an explanation of the Government’s thinking, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment, and I commend Clause 73 to the House.

Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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I am grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have spoken. This short debate has, I think, illuminated and emphasised just how bizarre Clause 73 is, because there is no dispute that interventions by third parties at all levels of judicial review assist the court by the provision of information. That is simply not in dispute.

There is also no dispute that interventions by third parties are already under the control of the court. They are under the control of the court as to whether they are allowed, on what grounds, and with what consequences on costs, having regard to the issues in the case. It is true, as the Minister says, that there have been more interventions in recent years, but that is only because courts find them helpful and have allowed third parties to intervene. If interveners act inappropriately —and I am not aware of any cases where this has occurred, with the exception of one possible case in the Appellate Committee, which, as it is now the Supreme Court, would not be covered by this provision in any event—the judge has ample power, at present, to order the payment of costs. That point was correctly made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who also rightly referred to the limited scope of the exceptional circumstances provision. The problem is that there is nothing exceptional about interveners assisting the court. That is what they normally do.

When an expert body is deciding whether to intervene and assist the court, it will know, if Clause 73 is enacted in its present form, that there is a strong presumption that it must pay the costs. The inevitable consequence is that it is unlikely to intervene. This will not achieve the Minister’s policy aim of, as he said, deterring inappropriate interventions; it will deter interventions, however helpful they may be to the court.

Clause 73 makes no sense whatever. It makes no sense, with great respect, to speak of a need to make interveners have a financial stake in the proceedings. The court has ample power to penalise them in costs. Amendment 164 will maintain judicial discretion in Clause 73, just as your Lordships have decided that judicial discretion should remain in Clauses 70, 71 and 72. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Monday 27th October 2014

(9 years, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful once again to noble Lords for their contributions—brief but helpful. Your Lordships will understand that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, seek significantly to undermine Clauses 74 and 75. I will begin by reminding the House what the clauses do. They build on case law, in particular the Corner House case, to establish a codified costs capping regime for judicial review proceedings with the aim of governing what we ordinarily refer to as protective costs orders.

The Government’s position, which I made clear throughout Committee, remains clear. We believe that costs protection should be available in appropriate cases but costs capping orders should not be made widely or, indeed, routinely. Alongside Clause 76, to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred, which excludes certain environmental cases from the new regime, these clauses ensure that costs protection is granted only in cases where there are serious issues of the highest public interest that would not be taken forward without an order. It is only in these cases that a public body defendant should have to pay its own costs regardless of whether it wins or loses.

As noble Lords have explained already, part of Amendment 166 would remove the effect of Clause 74(3), which provides that costs capping orders should be made only where permission to proceed to judicial review has been granted. I do not believe this is correct. It would mean that claimants with weak cases would benefit from costs protection even if the court subsequently decides that their case has no merit and that it should not be given permission for judicial review. This would leave the public body paying the costs of dealing with an ex hypothesi unmeritorious case.

As it stands, the clause does not mean that the costs of applying for permission will not be covered by the order. As is the situation now, if made, an order will be able to cover costs incurred prior to the grant of permission. This, I think, is the answer to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described as a particular vice of these provisions. The claimant can, as now, ask the court to make the order as part as the permission application. But we feel that it is right that a claimant should bear the financial risk of bringing a weak claim.

Amendment 166 once again seeks to remove the requirement for the court to be provided with information on funding available, as well as what is likely to be available to a claimant, for use by the court when deciding whether to make a costs capping order, and for court rules to set out what that information should include.

As I have said, it is the Government’s position that a claimant should be required to provide information on how their case will be funded. Under the current regime, and as set out in the Corner House case, courts are required to consider the financial resources of those who request costs capping orders. This is the very essence of why we have costs capping orders, something that we should, of course, replicate in this new regime.

Furthermore, setting out what information is required in court rules will give clarity to applicants about exactly what they need to provide. We cannot prejudge what the rules will say; I am sure noble Lords will be aware that this is a matter for the Civil Procedure Rule Committee. During the course of debates, some doubt seemed to be cast on the independence of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee. With respect, I think that doubt was misplaced. It is a committee chaired by the Master of the Rolls and contains, among others, Lord Justice Richards, all of whom, I am sure, with their experience and independence, will provide rules entirely independent of what the Secretary of State might or might not want. Of course, we expect that the information requested will be proportionate.

I turn to Amendment 167, which seeks to remove the third requirement in subsection (6), which is that an order can be made only if, without an order, it would be reasonable for the claimant to discontinue the judicial review. Again, this was a requirement of the Corner House case, and it is right that this remains. Doing anything other than this would make no sense. It would mean that well resourced claimants, including large companies, would be eligible for a costs capping order provided they could show that, without one, they would discontinue the claim, even though it would be entirely unreasonable for them to do so. This simply cannot be right. Indeed, it would mean they could be granted a costs capping order despite not being eligible under Corner House and the current regime.

Amendments 168 and 173 of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, seek to remove entirely from Clauses 74 and 75 powers afforded to the Lord Chancellor to amend lists of matters within these clauses through statutory instrument. It is the priority of the Government to respond at pace to any future developments. These amendments would simply prevent our doing just that. It may well be that, in future, developments mean that it is considered necessary to make changes to the matters set out in these lists. Of course, as I have said, Parliament will still be able to scrutinise any changes as both powers are subject, not to the negative, but to the affirmative resolution procedure.

Turning now to Clause 75, which sets out in subsection (1) five non-exhaustive factors that the court must consider when deciding whether to make a costs capping order and its terms, Amendment 170 seeks to make it optional for the court to have regard to these factors. With the exception of paragraph (e), these factors are based on the principles taken from the Corner House case, and all five factors are important in ensuring that a costs capping order is not awarded where it is unnecessary, as is the Government’s case.

The courts retain significant discretion, as the clause does not dictate how much weight, if any, should be given to each factor. Furthermore, the list is not exhaustive, so the court may consider any other factors that it considers relevant.

The other amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would amend that list, first, so that the courts would not be required to have regard to whether the applicant might receive funding in the future and, secondly, so that the courts would not have to consider whether someone who might provide future funding would benefit from the judicial review. They would be told to ignore factors which, I respectfully suggest, are relevant. This would mean that the court would not have available to it a full picture of the claimant’s financial position when deciding whether it was appropriate to grant costs protection and, if so, at what level that protection should be set.

It is vital that the courts are made aware of the full financial underpinnings of a claim. This allows the court to assess whether a claim, although notionally brought by a claimant of limited means, is sufficiently well resourced not to require taxpayers’ subsidy by way of costs protection. It also allows the courts to ensure that, if they do make a capping order, the cap is made at the right level. Otherwise, it could result in the taxpayer being asked to pick up the bill for the defendant’s costs when the claimant would in fact have been in a position to pay.

If—and this is an important point—future financial support is not forthcoming, the claimant will be able to inform the court so that it can take the change of circumstances into consideration. We will invite the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to include this safeguard, which may be necessary, in court rules.

On removing the requirement that the court consider the benefit to a potential third-party funder, the Corner House case recognised that a claimant’s private interest in a case is a relevant factor when considering whether to grant a costs capping order. This requirement reflects that principle and the court should consider it as part of the full picture.

The clauses retain the principle that costs are a matter for the judiciary, a theme which has run through our debates today. When considering an application for a costs capping order in an individual case, it will be for the judge to decide whether the particular proceedings are in the public interest, whether an order should be made and, if so, what the terms of that order should be. That represents no change to the current position.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, effectively posed the question, “What’s wrong with the current position?”, and he did not understand there to be many cases concerned. I have asked for further data on this. I have to confess to the House that the Government’s data on costs capping orders are limited, but we have indicative figures from the Treasury Solicitor’s Department which estimate that, between September 2010 and August 2014, it was involved in at least 38 cases where protective costs orders were awarded, of which 14 related to non-environmental cases. However, these figures will not represent all judicial reviews, as the Treasury Solicitor’s Department does not represent all government departments, nor will the figures cover non-governmental defendants such as local authorities, so that the actual number of such orders may be that much higher. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, may be fed up with references to the Richard III case, but a protective costs order was made there and, as he will well know, the Government were unable to recover any money from the claimants because it was a shell company. It was created entirely to pursue the litigation, which turned out to be entirely baseless.

These are unusual orders. They should be made where the judge has as much information as he or she should have in order to be able to make them. Any other provision is simply saying, “The judge shouldn’t take into account matters which most people would think were relevant”. These clauses are to ensure that costs capping orders are made only in cases that genuinely need them—we are talking about public money here—and are set at a level that properly reflects the financial position of the claimant. With that perhaps rather overlong explanation, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments and to agree to Clauses 74 and 75 standing part of the Bill.

Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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I am grateful to the Minister for his detailed explanation, which, far from being overlong, was very helpful, because I see the force of what he says—except in relation to Amendment 166, which addresses the removal of a power in the courts to make a costs capping order at the outset of the proceedings. There is no question of a costs capping order being made routinely, which was the Minister’s concern. These orders are in the discretion of the court. The court will not make such an order unless it is satisfied that the claim is sufficiently well founded to justify such an order.

I do not think it is any answer for the Minister to say that if leave is granted, a costs capping order can then be made. The problem, as the Minister knows, is that if a costs capping order cannot be made at the outset then these public interest claims will be deterred. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, pointed out, Amendment 166 has precisely the same purpose and effect as the three amendments already debated and voted on in your Lordships’ House this afternoon—that is, to retain judicial discretion, in this case as to when it is appropriate to make a costs capping order. In relation to Amendment 166, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
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My Lords, I moved amendments in these terms in Committee and so I will try to be brief, although the area they cover is quite complicated. Clause 76 is in the Bill because the Aarhus convention of 1998, which was ratified by this country in 2005, committed the United Kingdom to ensuring that environmental litigation will be,

“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”.

My amendments are founded on the principle that Parliament has a duty to ensure that this country acts in a way that is compliant with its international obligations.

Clause 76 recognises that the restrictions on costs capping orders as proposed in the Bill have the effect of making environmental litigation prohibitively expensive in any case. That is true ex hypothesi, because in a case where a judge would decide that a costs capping order is needed in order to enable an applicant to pursue the application, it follows that the application, if pursued without such an order, would be prohibitively expensive. It is for that reason that rules of court have already introduced rules limiting costs awards in Aarhus convention judicial review claims to relatively low fixed sums. Those sums are £5,000 against an individual applicant, £10,000 against a corporate applicant and £35,000 against a defendant.

However, the costs capping provisions are not the only provisions of the Bill that would put us in breach of the Aarhus convention: so would the provisions on disclosure of actual and likely financial resources and on the consequential orders for costs based on that information, as disclosed. Those provisions would have the effect that sources of support for judicial review applications would be choked off, making them prohibitively expensive for applicants without means, who would be left without the support of those people deterred from giving such support. The provisions on interveners and on costs capping would also have the effect of making environmental cases prohibitively expensive. Our amendments are therefore directed at broadening Clause 76 to exclude Clauses 71 and 72 on information about resources, and Clause 73 on interveners, for environmental cases as well as the costs capping provisions.

A further difficulty with Clause 76 is that it is permissive only and not mandatory, so that the Lord Chancellor is not required to make any regulations excluding the operation of the restrictions on costs capping. The provision is limited to ensuring that he is entitled to do so, if he chooses. Any such regulations that he chooses to make may also, under Clause 76(2), be as wide or as narrow as he chooses. Regrettably, this Lord Chancellor has given us little confidence that he is concerned to make challenges on judicial review less expensive.

Our amendments would also allow for costs capping orders in any case where the court considers that without such an order, the proceedings are unlikely to be,

“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”,

so as to bring the provisions squarely in line with our obligations under the convention. In our Amendment 174A, subsection (4) of the proposed new clause would introduce an objective test which would,

“prescribe … terms upon which a costs capping order may be made”,

to ensure compliance, once again by using the words of the convention. This is particularly important because the compliance committee established under the Aarhus convention has already found the United Kingdom to be non-compliant in a number of respects. The safe course is to ensure that the statute complies with the convention specifically and that there is a requirement that the regulations and rules of court do the same.

A further problem arises regarding definition. Clause 76(1) says that the definition of environmental cases is those cases which are environmental,

“in the Lord Chancellor’s opinion”.

Amendment 174B, which introduces a definition squarely based on the convention, is intended to address that difficulty and introduce an objective test. I beg to move.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, Clause 76 allows for judicial review claims on issues which relate entirely or partly to the environment to be excluded from the revised costs capping regime established by Clauses 74 and 75. This is to ensure continuing compliance with our obligations under the Aarhus convention and the various European directives which implement it. The requirements include that relevant procedures must not be prohibitively expensive. This is relevant to judicial reviews in certain environmental cases. Consequently, Clause 76 allows for environmental judicial reviews to be excluded from the approach in Clauses 74 and 75.

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Moved by
175: Before Schedule 11, insert the following new Schedule—
“Reporting restrictions: providers of information society servicesChildren and Young Persons Act 1933 (c. 12)1 After Schedule 1 to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 insert—
Schedule 1AProhibition on publication of certain matters: providers of information society servicesDomestic service providers: extension of liability1 (1) This paragraph applies where a service provider is established in England and Wales (a “domestic service provider”).
(2) Section 39 applies to a domestic service provider who—
(a) includes matter in a publication in an EEA state other than the United Kingdom, and(b) does so in the course of providing information society services,as well as to a person who includes matter in a publication in England and Wales.(3) In the case of an offence under section 39, as it applies to a domestic service provider by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) proceedings for the offence may be taken at any place in England and Wales, and (b) the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed at any such place.(4) Nothing in this paragraph affects the operation of paragraphs 3 to 5.
Non-UK service providers: restriction on institution of proceedings2 (1) This paragraph applies where a service provider is established in an EEA state other than the United Kingdom (a “non-UK service provider”).
(2) Proceedings for an offence under section 39 may not be instituted against a non-UK service provider in respect of anything done in the course of the provision of information society services unless the derogation condition is satisfied.
(3) The derogation condition is satisfied where the institution of proceedings—
(a) is necessary for the purposes of the public interest objective,(b) relates to an information society service that prejudices that objective or presents a serious and grave risk of prejudice to that objective, and(c) is proportionate to that objective.(4) “The public interest objective” means the pursuit of public policy.
Exceptions for mere conduits3 (1) A service provider is not capable of being guilty of an offence under section 39 in respect of anything done in the course of providing so much of an information society service as consists in—
(a) the provision of access to a communication network, or(b) the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service,if the condition in sub-paragraph (2) is satisfied.(2) The condition is that the service provider does not—
(a) initiate the transmission,(b) select the recipient of the transmission, or(c) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)—
(a) the provision of access to a communication network, and (b) the transmission of information in a communication network,includes the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted so far as the storage is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network.(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not apply if the information is stored for longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.
Exception for caching4 (1) This paragraph applies where an information society service consists in the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service.
(2) The service provider is not capable of being guilty of an offence under section 39 in respect of the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of information so provided, if—
(a) the storage of the information is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other recipients of the service at their request, and(b) the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is satisfied.(3) The condition is that the service provider—
(a) does not modify the information,(b) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(c) where sub-paragraph (4) applies, expeditiously removes the information or disables access to it. (4) This sub-paragraph applies if the service provider obtains actual knowledge that—
(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.Exception for hosting5 (1) A service provider is not capable of being guilty of an offence under section 39 in respect of anything done in the course of providing so much of an information society service as consists in the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service if sub-paragraph (2) or (3) is satisfied.
(2) This sub-paragraph is satisfied if the service provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it consisted of or included matter whose inclusion in a publication is prohibited by a direction under section 39.
(3) This sub-paragraph is satisfied if, on obtaining such knowledge, the service provider expeditiously removed the information or disabled access to it.
(4) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply if the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or control of the service provider.
Interpretation6 (1) This paragraph applies for the purposes of this Schedule.
(2) “Publication” has the meaning given in section 39.
(3) “Information society services”—
(a) has the meaning given in Article 2(a) of the E-Commerce Directive (which refers to Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations), and(b) is summarised in recital 17 of the E-Commerce Directive as covering “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient of a service”, (4) “Recipient”, in relation to a service, means a person who, for professional ends or otherwise, uses an information society service, in particular for the purposes of seeking information or making it accessible.
(5) “Service provider” means a person providing an information society service.
(6) For the purpose of interpreting references in this Schedule to a service provider who is established in England and Wales or an EEA state—
(a) a service provider is established in England and Wales or in a particular EEA state, if the service provider—(i) effectively pursues an economic activity using a fixed establishment in England and Wales or that EEA state, for an indefinite period, and(ii) is a national of an EEA state or a company or firm mentioned in Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;(b) the presence or use in a particular place of equipment or other technical means of providing an information society service does not, of itself, constitute the establishment of a service provider;(c) where it cannot be determined from which of a number of establishments a given information society service is provided, that service is to be regarded as provided from the establishment at the centre of the service provider‘s activities relating to that service.”Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (c. 23)2 After Schedule 2 to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 insert—
Schedule 2ARestriction of reporting of criminal proceedings for lifetime of witnesses and victims under 18: providers of information society servicesDomestic service providers: extension of liability1 (1) This paragraph applies where a service provider is established in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland (a “domestic service provider”).
(2) Section 49, so far as it relates to a publication falling within subsection (1A)(a) of that section, applies to a domestic service provider who—
(a) includes matter in a publication in an EEA state other than the United Kingdom, and(b) does so in the course of providing information society services,as well as to a person who includes matter in a publication in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland.(3) In the case of an offence under section 49, as it applies to a domestic service provider by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) proceedings for the offence may be taken at any place in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, and(b) the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed at any such place.(4) Section 49, so far as it relates to a publication falling within subsection (1A)(b) of that section, applies to a domestic service provider established in England and Wales who—
(a) includes matter in a publication in an EEA state other than the United Kingdom, and(b) does so in the course of providing information society services,as well as to a person who includes matter in a publication in England and Wales.(5) In the case of an offence under section 49, as it applies to a domestic service provider established in England and Wales by virtue of sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) proceedings for the offence may be taken at any place in England and Wales, and(b) the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed at any such place. (6) Nothing in this paragraph affects the operation of paragraphs 3 to 5.
Non-UK service providers: restriction on institution of proceedings2 (1) This paragraph applies where a service provider is established in an EEA state other than the United Kingdom (a “non-UK service provider”).
(2) Proceedings for an offence under section 49, so far as it relates to a publication that includes matter in contravention of a direction under section 45A(2), may not be instituted against a non-UK service provider in respect of anything done in the course of the provision of information society services unless the derogation condition is satisfied.
(3) The derogation condition is satisfied where the institution of proceedings—
(a) is necessary for the purposes of the public interest objective,(b) relates to an information society service that prejudices that objective or presents a serious and grave risk of prejudice to that objective, and(c) is proportionate to that objective.(4) “The public interest objective” means the pursuit of public policy.
Exceptions for mere conduits3 (1) A service provider is not capable of being guilty of an offence under section 49, so far as it relates to a publication that includes matter in contravention of a direction under section 45A(2), in respect of anything done in the course of providing so much of an information society service as consists in—
(a) the provision of access to a communication network, or(b) the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service,if the condition in sub-paragraph (2) is satisfied.(2) The condition is that the service provider does not—
(a) initiate the transmission,(b) select the recipient of the transmission, or(c) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)—
(a) the provision of access to a communication network, and(b) the transmission of information in a communication network,includes the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted so far as the storage is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network.(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not apply if the information is stored for longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.
Exception for caching4 (1) This paragraph applies where an information society service consists in the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service.
(2) The service provider is not capable of being guilty of an offence under section 49, so far as it relates to a publication that includes matter in contravention of a direction under section 45A(2), in respect of the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of information so provided, if—
(a) the storage of the information is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other recipients of the service at their request, and(b) the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is satisfied.(3) The condition is that the service provider—
(a) does not modify the information,(b) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(c) where sub-paragraph (4) applies, expeditiously removes the information or disables access to it.(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the service provider obtains actual knowledge that—
(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.Exception for hosting5 (1) A service provider is not capable of being guilty of an offence under section 49, so far as it relates to a publication that includes matter in contravention of a direction under section 45A(2), in respect of anything done in the course of providing so much of an information society service as consists in the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service if sub-paragraph (2) or (3) is satisfied.
(2) This sub-paragraph is satisfied if the service provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it consisted of or included matter whose inclusion in a publication is prohibited by a direction under section 45A(2).
(3) This sub-paragraph is satisfied if, on obtaining such knowledge, the service provider expeditiously removed the information or disabled access to it.
(4) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply if the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or control of the service provider.
Interpretation6 (1) This paragraph applies for the purposes of this Schedule.
(2) “Publication” has the meaning given in section 45A.
(3) “Information society services”—
(a) has the meaning given in Article 2(a) of the E-Commerce Directive (which refers to Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations), and(b) is summarised in recital 17 of the E-Commerce Directive as covering “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient of a service”,and “the E-Commerce Directive” means Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce).(4) “Recipient”, in relation to a service, means a person who, for professional ends or otherwise, uses an information society service, in particular for the purposes of seeking information or making it accessible.
(5) “Service provider” means a person providing an information society service.
(6) For the purpose of interpreting references in this Schedule to a service provider who is established in England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland or an EEA state—
(a) a service provider is established in England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland or in a particular EEA state, if the service provider—(i) effectively pursues an economic activity using a fixed establishment in England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland or that EEA state, for an indefinite period, and(ii) is a national of an EEA state or a company or firm mentioned in Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;(b) the presence or use in a particular place of equipment or other technical means of providing an information society service does not, of itself, constitute the establishment of a service provider;(c) where it cannot be determined from which of a number of establishments a given information society service is provided, that service is to be regarded as provided from the establishment at the centre of the service provider‘s activities relating to that service.””
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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, this has been a passionate debate. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in close co-operation with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who, to continue the football analogy, persisted with his tactic of man-marking the Lord Chancellor. The debate was also enhanced by the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell. My noble friend Lord Deben made a number of criticisms of ministerial colleagues for announcements. I must, and will, deal with those. My noble friend Lord Phillips told us about bygone days, when the way legal practices functioned was very different. I have, through my relations, memories of rather a different approach to the law than that which pertains now. Legal aid was certainly commonplace in the provinces then and people were charged what solicitors thought they could afford. We live in a very different era now. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, repeated her concern at the effect of the residence test on some children in some circumstances.

Amendment 180 would bring the new clauses into effect at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which the Act is passed. Amendment 176 seeks to prevent the Government making future changes restricting the availability of legal aid for judicial review through secondary legislation under LASPO. Specifically, the amendment would prevent future changes being made through the powers conferred under Sections 2 and 9 of LASPO. It is important to pause here as there is a danger of confusion. Section 2 deals with remuneration and Section 9 with scope, where these have the effect of imposing further eligibility criteria for legal aid in judicial review cases, or of restricting the scope of legal aid for judicial review. The amendment also seeks to annul any statutory instruments that have previously been made through the powers available under Sections 2 and 9 of LASPO, in so far as they restrict eligibility or scope in relation to judicial review.

As noble Lords will already be aware, remuneration arrangements for civil legal aid cases have recently been amended in regulations made under Section 2 of LASPO so that where an application for judicial review is issued, the legal aid provider will undertake work on the application at financial risk, unless permission is granted or a discretionary payment is made. This point was elegantly made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. There is, of course, a difference between scope and remuneration in this context, and that is a partial answer to the point made by my noble friend Lord Deben. A theme correctly adopted by the Government, throughout the difficult period that has persisted since they came into power, is that limited legal aid resources should be properly targeted, particularly at judicial review cases where they are needed most. The legal aid system is there to command public confidence and credibility. It was in that context that we introduced amendments to the Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations to limit the circumstances in which legal aid providers should receive payment for work carried out on an application for permission.

It may be helpful if I explain that our figures suggest that there are a significant number of unmeritorious cases—751 in 2012 and 2013 alone—which receive public funding but where permission is refused. Therefore, they have apparently satisfied the Legal Aid Agency that there is sufficient to justify legal aid. In fact, on the old test, they have failed to surmount the rather low hurdle of permission. This change was introduced to incentivise providers to consider more carefully whether to commence judicial review proceedings and hesitate before commencing claims that are unlikely to receive permission. In genuinely meritorious cases, the provider is still paid because the case is granted permission, the case concludes prior to permission and their costs are paid by the defendant, or, where the case concludes prior to permission and they cannot get costs, the provider can apply to the Legal Aid Agency for discretionary payment. Unfortunately, I do not think that my noble friend Lord Deben was able to be present when we had a lengthy debate on these issues, and the question of legal aid for judicial review and its limits in relation to remuneration and scope was debated.

Remuneration continues to be paid in the usual way for the earlier stages of a case to investigate the prospects and strength of a claim and to engage in pre-action correspondence aimed at avoiding proceedings under the pre-action protocol brought in by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who is in his place, to discourage proceedings where the matter could be sorted out through an exchange of letters pursuant to the protocol.

I should stress that the regulations made under Section 2 of LASPO do not affect the availability of civil legal aid to individuals, the scope of civil legal aid for judicial review or the eligibility of applicants for legal aid in judicial review proceedings. Where a client is in receipt of legal aid, he or she will remain so for the life of the case unless it is withdrawn for other reasons. These changes relate only to the remuneration of legal aid providers. To put it more simply, it is the lawyer who loses out. The client does not lose legal aid.

As the amendment seeks to prevent the Government using Sections 2 or 9 of LASPO to impose further eligibility criteria for receipt of civil legal aid or to restrict the scope of legal aid, the amendment would therefore not achieve what appears to be the intended effect of, among other things, annulling the recent amendments I have referred to on remuneration. The amendment would however have the consequence of preventing the Government imposing additional eligibility criteria or restricting the scope of legal aid for judicial review, other than through primary legislation. It would also annul previous amendments debated and passed by Parliament in relation to the scope of legal aid for judicial review.

The form of legislation and level of parliamentary scrutiny to which provisions in relation to the remuneration of providers, and the eligibility for and scope of civil legal aid, are subject was considered only recently by Parliament during the passage of LASPO. We continue to believe that the level of parliamentary scrutiny is appropriate.

Perhaps I may remind the House about what happened during the passage of the LASPO Bill. Parliament was assured that the scope of judicial review would not be amended, which is entirely correct, but we do not accept that the proposals we are discussing are inconsistent with LASPO. In other words, the issue of bad faith, which is effectively alleged by my noble friend, simply does not arise. LASPO contains a very clear power to amend the scope of civil legal aid, as per Section 9, to which I referred earlier. There is no exception for judicial review.

Therefore, it is wrong to say that LASPO was enacted on the basis that the scope of legal aid would never be amended to create some sort of estoppel, as my noble friend seems to suggest.

Lord Deben Portrait Lord Deben
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My noble friend will entirely solve my problem if he can say absolutely directly that nothing that the then Lord Chancellor said is in any way inconsistent with what we are now doing. In other words, what Kenneth Clarke said as Lord Chancellor, and what he promised, are entirely carried through and there is no contradiction whatever. In that case, I have no problems at all and will be happy to support him, but that is what we want to know.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am sorry that my noble friend is not satisfied with the explanation that I have been rather laboriously making—which is that it all depends on the difference between scope and remuneration. The scope of legal aid has not been altered; we are simply talking about an amendment to remuneration at one stage of the process—a particular regulation which was considered in Committee. It was the subject of a debate on these matters. Admittedly there was opposition to it on the basis that this could stifle people from bringing judicial review, but it was not then suggested that there was some violent inconsistency between the LASPO Bill and what was said during its passage, and the change pursuant to Section 9. Now, however, it is being suggested that there is some bad faith on the part of the Government.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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Did the Minister really say that the application of a residence test does not—

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am not talking about the residence test at all. I shall come to that shortly, but it is a different issue. Noble Lords are perfectly entitled to ask me questions about it at that stage. I am talking about the suggestion that—regardless of the residence test, which is a separate issue that I shall come to later —the provisions on legal aid for judicial review in some way breach an undertaking that was given to Parliament. That seems to be the burden of what is being suggested.

The power to make changes in the future should not be unnecessarily constrained as proposed. Any changes made to scope, under Section 9, and eligibility, under Section 11, are subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring full parliamentary debate as appropriate. I am sorry that the affirmative procedure is not considered to be as satisfactory as primary legislation. Nevertheless, it remains a proper way to bring such matters before Parliament.

As I said in Committee, making such changes by primary legislation would be a cumbersome process and a disproportionate use of this House’s time. It would stop the Government of the day making necessary changes without primary legislation, even where change was necessary to ensure that the provisions remained up to date. The House may possibly remember—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, may well remember—that during the passage of the previous Bill, certain noble Lords, of whom I was one, were anxious that the power should include both improving and increasing the scope of legal aid, if it was considered appropriate, and that became part of the LASPO Act.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury Portrait Lord Phillips of Sudbury
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I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but does he not accept that the procedure of dealing with changes via statutory instrument offers no protection whatever? There is no power to amend a statutory instrument; one can only reject it. I simply ask my noble friend: when did this House last reject a statutory instrument?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am unable to answer that specifically. I am afraid that I do not know. I accept that there is a difference in the process, and I am sure that rejection is very rare indeed. However, that does not mean that a statutory instrument is not scrutinised. It is scrutinised, but there just happens to be a different method of scrutinising it—as my noble friend knows only too well.

Furthermore, there is no basis on which to distinguish judicial review from other, equally important, matters for which civil legal aid is available by necessitating primary legislation for such amendments. The approach envisaged by LASPO remains appropriate and effective, ensuring that any restrictions—indeed, any changes to eligibility or scope—whether technical or major, will get the scrutiny they require, but this should not necessitate primary legislation.

Finally, the amendment would have the serious effect of annulling any previous instruments made under Sections 2 or 9 of LASPO that restrict eligibility for, or scope of legal aid for, judicial review, including the provisions of an order debated and approved by Parliament in 2013 to ensure that the exclusions relating to judicial review agreed at the time of LASPO function as Parliament intended. Noble Lords will recall that the relevant amendment made under the 2013 order, which made it clear that legal aid for judicial review is governed by paragraph 19 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to LASPO—and not any other provision—passed without opposition. The effect of the noble Lords’ amendment would be to annul the provisions for judicial review within the 2013 order, undermining the intention of Parliament.

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Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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I am very grateful to the Minister. As I mentioned in opening this short debate, Amendment 176 raises an issue of considerable constitutional importance. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for explaining so clearly and powerfully the nature and the importance of the constitutional issues.

As far as I am concerned, the constitutional issue is very plain: whether Ministers should be able to reduce legal aid for judicial review by the use of LASPO powers. Despite emphasising when the LASPO Bill was being debated that the scope of legal aid for judicial review was not being altered, the regulations certainly have reduced the scope of legal aid for judicial review. There is now no legal aid until leave to move is granted, other than in exceptional cases.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am very grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but does he accept that there is a distinction between the scope of legal aid and the remuneration of one stage of that scope? Legal aid can be available. Whether the lawyer is paid, in the case of an unsuccessful application for permission, does not remove the individual’s essential right to legal aid.

Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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If you give an assurance that the scope of legal aid for judicial review is not being reduced or altered by LASPO, it seems that then introducing regulations which provide that there will be no remuneration for legal aid unless and until leave to move is granted and that there will be no remuneration for legal aid in residence regulations—although I appreciate they have been quashed—is indeed tantamount to reducing the scope of legal aid for judicial review. There is no point in saying that we are protecting legal aid as to scope for judicial review if you do not pay lawyers for providing the legal advice and assistance. That is what legal aid is about. So, with great respect, I do not accept the distinction between scope and remuneration. That simply will not wash, in my respectful submission.

Tonight I am not concerned with inviting the House to consider the merits or otherwise of the Government’s policies. We will all have our own view on the merits of the policy and whether legal aid is too wide or not wide enough. My concern is the constitutional one of whether it is appropriate to amend this important area of the law by secondary legislation in the light of the assurances we were given and when, I suggest, but for those assurances the Government would have had even more difficulty than in fact they had in getting the LASPO Bill through this House.

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Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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My Lords, it will come as no surprise to noble Lords that I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the observations that both he and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, have made. It was interesting to reflect on the defence that the Minister made in Committee on these matters. He said:

“In particular, there is the sense, expressed by a number of noble Lords, that this particular Secretary of State and Lord Chancellor does not have sufficient regard for the rule of law and, essentially, there is a lack of confidence that he will exercise his powers in a way that Parliament would find satisfactory”.—[Official Report, 30/7/14; col. 1670.]

I think that summed up the position very well, not merely of your Lordships’ House but of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and many other bodies, not least the Divisional Court in the case about which we have heard and which is currently the subject on appeal.

The Minister, on that occasion, and in dealing with virtually the same amendment as that which we are now debating, described the situation created by the Bill—Clause 73—as “a pretty commonplace provision”. He said that,

“it is commonplace because noble Lords might like to know that Section 149 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 contains”,—[Official Report, 30/7/14; col. 1670.]

a similar provision, as does Section 53 of the Pensions Act 2014, and Section 20 of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014.

It is perhaps not surprising that that should be the case, given that it is precisely the same Government who have enacted all those measures. Whether there are antecedents under previous Governments, I do not know. Even if there were, the crucial point is that judicial review relates to the fundamental rights of the citizen. These other matters, important as they are—the noble Lord referred to other items of legislation last time—may well be significant, but there can be nothing more significant than the application of the rule of law and access to justice to test whether decisions have been made lawfully. That is an absolutely fundamental right. Even if there were precedents in respect of other legislation, that does not for a moment justify their extension to this very sensitive and important area.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, has demolished any case for the robustness of the affirmative procedure as a process that allows effective scrutiny, and other noble Lords are, of course, aware of the limitations of the affirmative procedure. It is simply impermissible to frame legislation in such a way that the Secretary of State could act by secondary legislation without in any way defining what it might be, how far it might go, who might be affected and what it would do to the core principle we have debated for much of today about the right of the citizen to protection against unlawful decision-making by the Executive in any form—not merely the Government but other forms of executive agency. That strikes me as a very poor argument indeed.

The Minister is no doubt unable to depart from the stance that he has hitherto adopted. I, frankly, cannot believe that his heart is in it, whatever he will say at the Dispatch Box. It is a blot on the Government’s bona fides in this area to proceed with legislation in this form. Clearly, there is no way we can take it further tonight, but I hope that the Minister will report back to the Secretary of State and encourage him to redeem his reputation.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, the final speeches at this stage of our scrutiny of the Bill have very much echoed what was said in Committee. As I explained then, it is often necessary to give full effect to the provisions of an Act by making further provision in secondary legislation. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, acknowledged as much in his remarks in that debate. However, he and other noble Lords questioned, as they seek again to do in Amendment 178, the inclusion of a power to make supplementary provision.

Concern was expressed in Committee that the drafting would permit the power to be exercised to make provision about anything which the Lord Chancellor considered fell within the scope of the general area or subject matter of the Bill. This evening, the focus has been on judicial review. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, rightly stressed its importance and that of the independence of the judiciary. Of course I entirely accept that, and I hope that nothing I have said during the course of our debates has sought in any way to undermine those core principles of our system. However, Clause 79 refers to any provision of the Bill. As noble Lords will be aware, that is a final provision to deal with all the various provisions, which cover quite a wide field, it has to be said. Our debates have ranged over many areas of law and many provisions.

Lord Woolf Portrait Lord Woolf
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I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Is he suggesting that Clause 79(1) would not as a matter of practice be applied in the case of Part 4?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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No, I am simply saying that it is not exclusively directed at Part 4. It is to do with any provision in the Bill; it is a general provision for implementation. It would include it, but it would include anything else that came within the scope of Clause 79.

I explained in Committee the narrow construction given to such powers. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that this was an extraordinary provision. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, however, acknowledged that it found its way into other Acts of Parliament—apparently without demur from the Opposition, including the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which, as the noble Lord will appreciate, was before this Government came to power. The suggestion that it is somehow the Conservatives or this Conservative-led coalition who have form for introducing such provisions is simply not correct. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act and the Offender Rehabilitation Act contain powers to make supplementary as well as consequential and incidental provision. There are recent similar examples within the responsibility of other departments. Those cannot be levelled against the Lord Chancellor, who has been demonised in our debates. They include the Pensions Act, the Local Audit and Accountability Act and the Infrastructure Bill currently before Parliament.

Since Committee, we have considered carefully whether it would be sufficient to rely on that part of the power which is undisturbed by the amendment. Of course, the power is quite wide even without the supplementary provision. It is right to acknowledge, as I did in Committee, that there is a degree of overlap between the various concepts used and adjectives deployed. The fact that the existing powers agreed by Parliament included the power to make supplementary provision suggests that the overlap is not complete. For that reason, we think that the right course is not to amend the provision—with the reassurance as to the possible use of the power, which I mentioned. In other words, this will not be construed as giving any Minister the opportunity to make provisions which are not in the Bill—what he might have liked to have been in the Bill in retrospect—but construed very much in the way that such provisions are customarily construed.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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In that event, is the noble Lord prepared to say that the supplementary power will not be applied to the judicial review provisions of the Bill?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am not going to give any such undertaking from the Dispatch Box. It will be construed as a matter of statutory construction, and Parliament will view it if there is a change, but I am not going to limit any future Minister or future Parliament on what they want to do in any part of this legislation. This is a standard measure which the noble Lord’s colleague on the Labour Benches, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, though harshly critical of almost every provision in the Bill, said was absolutely standard in all legislation. He contrasted this with other provisions in the Bill which he found more offensive. He is unfortunately not in his place today to expand on his views.

Noble Lords have been concerned that such powers could be used unchecked. I accept, of course, that it can be difficult to determine whether a particular instrument falls within the power under which it is made, but that is the function of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments—which, as I am sure noble Lords will agree, is assiduous in reviewing secondary legislation, and, as part of its remit, specifically considers whether the power to make an instrument is wide enough to cover all that is in it.

I turn now to Amendment 179, which seeks to remove the power for any implementing provision to amend primary or secondary legislation in any way whatever, whether it falls within the category of “supplementary” or within any of the other categories mentioned in Clause 78. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, previously expressed some concerns about the meaning of this provision. In particular he asked why the drafting referred to both the repeal and revocation of legislation and why Clause 79(5) applied only to repeals but not revocations. I am happy to provide clarification on that score. Proper drafting practice is to refer to the repeal of primary legislation but to the revocation of secondary legislation. There is no practical difference between the two. Subsection (5) refers to repeals and not revocations because that provision is only about the enhanced parliamentary scrutiny for instruments which amend or repeal primary legislation, which I alluded to in Committee.

As I explained before, the removal of this provision from the legislation would be a serious constraint on the implementation of the Bill. It would, for example, prevent consequential amendments being made to primary legislation for provisions which have, despite the department’s best efforts, been missed. It may also impede the consequential amendment of existing secondary legislation, something which it is not normally appropriate to do in the Bill itself. Without such amendments it may not be possible to bring provisions of the Bill into force.

Amendments to existing legislation can of course only be made if they fall within the scope of the power. That means that they can only be made for the purpose of implementing what is already in the Bill. I would remind the House that any instrument which amended primary legislation would require approval both in your Lordships’ House and in the other place. I hope that the reassurance that I have already given about that will also go some way to alleviating concerns about the commonplace power in subsection(2), without which it may not be possible to properly give effect to parliamentary intentions.

I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Deben feels that there has been a lack of transparency in the way that the Government have approached this Bill, if that was what he was suggesting. I have endeavoured to assist the House in Committee and on Report. I am sorry that he, as a supporter, feels that we have not assisted him or the House sufficiently. It is a matter which I very much regret and I hope that it is not a view shared around the House by supporters of the Government. I hope that, with the further reassurance that I have given in this respect, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Pannick Portrait Lord Pannick
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I am again grateful to the Minister. It is not much comfort that Clause 79 applies to a number of subjects, including judicial review, and that it is not the only subject of this odd clause. Nor is it much of an argument that provisions of this sort can be found in some other pieces of legislation. Perhaps we have not as a House adequately addressed the issues when those Bills came before us. That is no reason for not doing so now. Nor, if I may say so, am I much reassured by the Minister’s reliance on the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, in Committee. That is perhaps not the strongest point that the Minister has made during our debates tonight, although I recognise that the hour is late and some account can be taken of that. For my part, I still do not understand why the word supplementary is needed in this Bill.

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Moved by
181: Clause 81, page 75, line 13, leave out “This Part comes” and insert “Section (Appeals from the Court of Protection) and this Part come”
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Moved by
182: Clause 81, page 75, line 13, at end insert—
“( ) Paragraphs 23 to 25 of Schedule (Mutual recognition of driving disqualification in UK and Republic of Ireland), and section (Mutual recognition of driving disqualification in UK and Republic of Ireland)(6)(b) so far as it relates to those paragraphs, come into force on the day on which this Act is passed.”
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Moved by
183: Clause 82, page 75, line 23, leave out “and (3)” and insert “to (3A)”
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Moved by
188: In the Title, line 5, after “drivers;” insert “to create an offence of disclosing private sexual photographs or films with intent to cause distress;”

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Wednesday 22nd October 2014

(9 years, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham (Lab)
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My Lords, this amendment is an appetiser for the main course that awaits us in the form of secure colleges, about which we will hear a good deal.

Secure children’s homes care for some of the most damaged children, necessitating intensive and, it has to be said, expensive care. The numbers have been reduced in recent years. There are now 138 places in secure children’s homes. In Committee, I suggested adding them to the facilities that might be provided by the Secretary of State alongside existing young offender institutions and secure training colleges and the secure colleges that the Bill seeks to establish.

In his reply, the Minister explained the failure to include secure children’s homes, on the list, on the basis that local authorities had the power to provide such homes, and the Secretary of State does not and never has had that power. He went on to say that it is for local authorities to provide sufficient places as are required in secure children’s homes, and we think it right that they retain responsibility for this.

However, the amendment does not require the Secretary of State to provide secure children’s homes; it gives him the power to do so. In any event, it is surely desirable that such provision is seen as part of a range of different facilities. Given the pressure on local authority budgets and the concerns that secure colleges, if they are to be included under this legislation, might reduce the demand for such places, it is surely reasonable for the Secretary of State to have some involvement—potential, if not immediately actual—with this part of what should be seen as essentially one service aimed at providing for these children of varying degrees of vulnerability and difficulty, albeit in different ways.

I hope the noble Lord will acknowledge that this is meant to be a constructive amendment, which does not impose a duty but opens up the possibility of having a whole-system approach to this group of young people. I beg to move.

Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, this has been a short debate about the place of secure children’s homes in the youth custodial estate. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, it is something of an appetiser for what I know is to come during the course of this afternoon and evening.

I recognise on behalf of the Government that much good work is done in secure children’s homes, and that they often accommodate some of the most vulnerable young people in custody. The Government are clear that we will continue to provide separate specialist accommodation for those who need it. We have also made clear that, while we believe the secure college model could cater for the majority of young people in custody—that is, a secure college rather than a secure children’s home—it will not be suitable for 10 and 11 year-olds or for some young people with the most acute needs or vulnerability.

This year, we have demonstrated our commitment by continuing to provide places in secure children’s homes by entering new contracts with nine homes to provide 138 places. I know that many noble Lords will have observed the decline in the number of places in secure children’s homes that the Government contract, but that, as was acknowledged on Monday in your Lordships’ House, reflects a substantial and welcome reduction in the number of young people in custody overall in recent years.

The current arrangement is that the Secretary of State may provide places in young offender institutions and secure training centres; the Bill seeks to give him the power also to provide secure colleges. In addition, he has the ability to enter into contracts for the provision of youth detention accommodation in secure children’s homes. Amendment 107 would change this by giving the Secretary of State the power to provide secure children’s homes directly. The power to provide these homes rests with local authorities, not the Secretary of State, and we think it right that this should remain the position. Secure children’s homes are created by different legislation with the purpose of ensuring that there is provision for children whose welfare needs are so acute that a court decides they must be accommodated securely. Meeting the needs of this particular group of children is the important distinction between secure children’s homes and other forms of custodial provision.

The Secretary of State has a duty to ensure that there are sufficient places in youth detention accommodation for young people remanded in or sentenced to custody, and in discharging this duty he continues to contract places in secure children’s homes for those young people who require them. We think that that is the right arrangement, rather than the Secretary of State providing secure children’s homes, which are intended to serve a greater purpose than simply accommodating convicted or remanded young people.

I recognise the concern about the future of secure children’s homes and we will no doubt come back to that when we consider the substantial group of amendments that follows this debate. The Government are clear that there continues to be a place for them in the youth custodial estate, but we consider that the position is adequately catered for by the current arrangements. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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My Lords, as I hinted when moving the amendment, I shall not divide the House on this issue. However, the Minister overlooks a key element in the case that I put, which is that local authority budgets are extremely hard pressed and it will be increasingly difficult for them to sustain the level of investment needed in this provision. Having said that, I shall not press the amendment, but I invite the Government, or perhaps the Minister, to talk to the Department for Education and the Department for Communities and Local Government about the financial implications of continuing provision in, I think, only nine local authority areas now, for which funding is under great pressure. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on these amendments and to all those in the Chamber and beyond who have engaged with and helped to shape our proposals for secure colleges. It has been said during the debate that our proposals are rushed and ill thought out, and that there has been a failure to engage.

We have made considerable efforts to engage with a wide range of stakeholders and experts right the way through, from the gestation of this idea to bringing legislation before Parliament and developing plans for a pathfinder secure college. In our Transforming Youth Custody consultation, published in February 2013, the Government engaged with a wide range of organisations in the education, custody and voluntary sectors. Uniquely, we asked them to submit outline proposals for how a secure college might tackle the problems of poor education and reoffending outcomes. What I think there is complete agreement on in your Lordships’ House is that there is far too high an instance of reoffending by young offenders and that education is insufficiently catered for within the secure youth estate.

Those responses directly informed the Government’s response to the consultation, published in January this year. After the Bill was introduced in this House, I hosted an open event in July to outline our proposals, to share our latest plans for the design of the pathfinder secure college—the clue is in the name: pathfinder—and to listen to the views of those with interests and expertise in this area. Peers were assisted by iPads that gave a design and indication of the precise configuration of the secure college and how the various parts would work together. It proved a fruitful exercise, I believe, and the discussion that day with Peers led to substantial changes to our design for the pathfinder secure college.

Following that meeting, we secured additional land for the site, increasing its size by two acres and extending the range of sporting facilities and outdoor space. We also reconfigured the layout of the site to ensure that groups of the more vulnerable young offenders, whom we had already planned to accommodate separately, could access education and health facilities via a different route from older children at the site and would have separate sporting facilities. I was pleased to share those revised plans at yet another open meeting with Peers last week.

Noble Lords will also be aware that, following my commitment in Committee, last week the Government published a public consultation on our plans for secure college rules. It is a substantial document with a considerable amount of detail. I hope that those noble Lords who have felt it appropriate to comment on the inadequacy of the consultation will at least take the trouble to read carefully this consultation and realise the amount of detail that has been provided in order to come to the right final conclusion as to the rules.

The secure college rules set out the proposed policies which will inform those rules, and in respect of the use of force—clearly a matter of considerable importance to the House—set out draft indicative rules to facilitate greater scrutiny of our proposals. Noble Lords will also be aware that the Government have brought forward an amendment to make rules authorising the use of force subject to the affirmative, rather than the negative, procedure.

Throughout the process, Ministers have written to and met with a wide range of stakeholders to keep them apprised of our plans. Only yesterday the Prisons Minister, Andrew Selous, met a range of children’s charities and groups with an interest in youth justice. We also have been working closely with NHS England, the Department for Education and experts in education and custodial provision to test our designs for the secure college pathfinder. Our revised plans are now publicly available and are being scrutinised by Blaby District Council as part of the planning application for the pathfinder.

I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will recognise that considerable efforts have been gone into and opportunities provided for the views of others to inform our thinking. I have to say I was very disappointed to hear the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, whom the House of course greatly respects on this area, suggest in Committee that, notwithstanding our engagement, it was,

“both unreasonable and irresponsible of the Government to expect Parliament to rubber-stamp it until it knows more”.—[Official Report, 23/7/14; col. 1173]

The Ministry of Justice and my officials have worked extremely hard to provide information about secure colleges. There were also lengthy debates in the House of Commons. I hope noble Lords have had a chance to see them. I have read all of them. A great deal of detail was provided at that stage and then in your Lordships’ House in the lengthy Committee stage. The Government have attempted to give answers to all the various points that have been given to them. It is, therefore, with great disappointment, that we are accused of being in contempt of Parliament.

I will now turn to the amendments. They cover the use of force, secure college rules and the powers of the Secretary of State to contract out the running of secure colleges. I will start by addressing the amendment on the use of force, as this is relevant to the government amendment in respect of the secure college rules. Amendment 121 seeks to restrict the circumstances in which a custody officer may be authorised to use force in a secure college. I am aware that a similar amendment was recommended in the recent report on the Bill by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. While the Government share the view that force must only ever be used as a last resort, and that only the minimum force required should be used, we believe it is right that force be available in a wider range of circumstances than the amendment permits.

In addition to preventing harm, we believe that force must also be available to prevent escape, to prevent damage to property and for the purpose of maintaining good order and discipline. I recognise that it is the final category which has attracted most debate. During a constructive debate in Committee, I set out the Government’s view that custody officers in secure colleges should be able to use force for the purpose of maintaining good order and discipline, but that this use would be subject to stringent controls.

In our consultation document on our plans for secure college rules, we have gone into a great deal of detail about our approach to the use of force. I am glad that my noble friend Lord Marks made reference to the instances given on page 23 of that document of particular examples which he, I think, accepted were instances where there would, in exceptional circumstances, have to be force used in circumstances where one would not normally want it to be used.

We have clarified that force, in these circumstances, may be used only where a young person poses a risk to maintaining a safe and stable environment and where there is also a risk to the safety or welfare of the young person against whom the restraint is used or that of another young person. We have set out examples in the document of the types of circumstances in which we believe the use of force for these purposes would be justified. We are clear that force can never be used as a punishment.

The consultation document makes clear our position that the use of force for good order and discipline would be authorised only to the extent that it was strictly necessary and proportionate; that only authorised restraint techniques could be applied; that the use of pain-inducing techniques for reasons of maintaining good order and discipline will be prohibited; that only the minimum restraint necessary for the shortest possible time must be used; that the young person’s dignity and physical integrity must be respected at all times; and that the best interests of the young person against whom the force is used must be a primary consideration. We have also set out safeguards and procedures to be followed before, during and after any use of restraint for maintaining a safe and stable environment.

The Government recognise the sensitivity and importance of provisions relating to the use of force with young people. That is why we are consulting publicly and in great detail, and we will consider the responses that we receive. However, for the reasons that I have set out, we do not agree with the restrictions that the amendment would place on the circumstances in which force could be used in secure colleges.

As a further commitment to ensuring scrutiny of our proposals on the use of force, we are bringing forward an amendment to the process for approving secure college rules. In its third report of the Session, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that if the Bill is to enable secure college rules to authorise the use of force for the purpose of ensuring good order and discipline, then such rules should, to the extent that they authorise, be subject to the affirmative procedure. We have accepted that recommendation and brought forward Amendment 122.

This amendment will make the entire first set of secure college rules subject to the affirmative procedure, as they will contain provisions authorising the use of force. This will give Parliament additional oversight of the secure college rules, although I cannot agree to Amendment 111, which would require the rules always to be subject to the affirmative procedure—a requirement which does not apply to prison or young offender institution rules, for example.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I ascribed the wrong number to the schedule to which I referred earlier. It is Schedule 6 which is about the use of force. The Minister has referred to a number of instances which are certainly in that schedule, but he did not refer to paragraph 8(b), which talks about the use of force being permissible,

“to prevent, or detect and report on, the commission or attempted commission by them”—

that is, prisoners—

“of other unlawful acts”.

That seems an extremely wide definition. Nor did the Minister refer to paragraph 9, which relates to use of force in connection with searches.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I could go through the entire section, which is very lengthy, and deal with all the various aspects seriatim, but I am not sure that that would be a particularly useful process at Report stage, given that I am sure that all those who have been listening to this debate will have had the chance to see the entire detail of the relevant section of the secure college rules. I think that I have summarised fairly the Government’s approach in the rules. I also referred to those two specific examples to which reference was made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. There have been discussions at the various meetings that we have had. So I would rather not be tied down to specific examples of when force should be used. We believe that the structure is there. We are of course listening to the consultation carefully and we encourage all those who are concerned, of whom there are many in your Lordships’ House, to take part in that consultation to assist us further in arriving at a satisfactory position, which I am sure we will be able to do.

The publication of the Government’s consultation will also reassure the noble Lords and noble Baroness who tabled Amendment 108 that we will certainly make secure college rules before such an institution opens. These rules will be essential to ensuring that young people are detained safely and securely in these colleges, and that they are educated and rehabilitated effectively. However, I strongly believe that this does not need to be placed in the Bill.

It is in the context of creating secure college rules that I turn to Amendments 120A and 120B, which would set out in primary legislation the conditions governing the authorisation of the use of force. I welcome the noble Lord’s amendment, which adopts much of the approach taken in the consultation document. However, I believe that this is a case for the rules rather than for primary legislation. I have provided assurances on how they will come into effect.

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Lord Ramsbotham Portrait Lord Ramsbotham
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My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his careful, thoughtful and wide-ranging response. I know that I speak for everyone in the House in saying that we agree with him both that we need to reduce the dreadful record of reoffending in our young offender establishments and that what is presently provided is not satisfactory and has not been for a long time.

I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, is in his place; I would have expected the Minister to have paid tribute to the Youth Justice Board, which has been principally responsible for the reduction of the numbers, and in fact has been a remarkable example of good leadership and carefully researched innovation ever since it was formed.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am very grateful to the noble Lord; he is quite right to reproach me for not giving credit to my noble friend Lord McNally, and I am very happy to do so.

Lord Ramsbotham Portrait Lord Ramsbotham
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Having said that and witnessed the Minister’s customary graciousness, I agree with him that there has been an enormous amount of engagement and effort by officials and others to engage with people, but that engagement has been not about if the secure college will be established but when. We therefore still know nothing about what is to be done, who is to do it and how much it is to cost. I have quoted a number of times in this House the two definitions of the word “affordability”: first, can you afford it, and, secondly, can you afford to give up what you have to give up in order to afford it? Bearing in mind the current situation, financial and otherwise, I wonder whether it is worth spending the amount of money on this unproven and uncosted pilot when it could be diverted now to doing better by all the young people about whom we have been talking.

I accept that we are talking about a pathfinder and that the affirmative procedure for the rules is being proposed. However, the affirmative procedure will come only after the Bill has become law. Everyone knows that an affirmative procedure that comes after that has no clout anywhere—and certainly not with this.

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate for the wide and thoughtful contributions that they made. The one that perhaps struck me most was from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who reflected on the fact that we all know and love people of the same age group as those whom we are talking about, whose interests are currently not well served by the country. Therefore, the country must have a very clear say in what happens to them.

I understand that the secure college pilot is to be rigorously evaluated and will open in 2017. I will return to NHS England and healthcare provision in the next group because I do not think we have had full coverage of it. My feeling is that the Government appear hell-bent on pushing this through, but I do not think that it is the right approach. I am not proposing to divide the House on this amendment, but I give notice that I will do so on Amendment 111, which specifically mentions the approval by Parliament of the rules before they are adopted. I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

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Baroness Howarth of Breckland Portrait Baroness Howarth of Breckland
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My Lords, most of the arguments about girls on this site have been clearly made, so I want to make a quite different point rather than repeat the ones that have been made.

I have looked carefully at both sets of plans for this site. Were one not to accommodate girls and young boys at the far end of the site, the flexibility one would have—maybe for the pathfinder to succeed—would be far greater than one would have with the complication, described by my colleagues throughout this debate, of confining girls who will be claustrophobic, adding to their difficulties. The young boys will simply learn from being on that site all the bravado that comes with it. If one wanted this proposal to succeed at all, one could instead have more space and better capacity provision. The Minister knows I am not in favour of this proposal but I know that it is the wish of those who have visited some of the other establishments to do something better. As I said, one could do even better by using that part of the site to make sure that the pathfinder succeeds.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on these amendments, which are important, although they focus on two narrow but, I understand, critical aspects of these proposed secure colleges.

Dealing first with girls and those aged under 15, Amendments 109 and 117A seek to exclude girls and under-15s from secure colleges, or to prevent girls being accommodated on the same site as boys. I entirely recognise that there is understandable caution about the risks involved in allowing girls and under-15s to be placed in a new type of secure establishment, where the majority of young people will be boys between the ages of 15 and 17. I also recognise the importance of secure colleges being able to address the particular educational, health and emotional needs of these undoubtedly very vulnerable young people.

Let me assure noble Lords that we have gone to considerable lengths in our designs for the secure college to ensure that the younger and more vulnerable groups could be accommodated in separate small units. As my noble friend Lord Carlile told the House, following a meeting in July we made changes to the plans to enlarge the site by two acres, and to ensure that the younger and more vulnerable people have their own sports and recreational facilities. This is not merely tunnels—as he describes it—but separate facilities and separate access routes to the main education and healthcare building. In this way, it will be possible to deliver a distinct regime that caters to these more vulnerable boys and girls. In our consultation on our plans, we have also proposed a rule requiring girls to be accommodated separately from boys. I referred to that consultation earlier this afternoon.

However, I should make clear to the House that no final decisions have been taken on who will be accommodated in the secure college pathfinder. This will be determined in light of the analysis of the make-up of the youth custodial population ahead of the pathfinder opening in 2017. I also gave a commitment in Committee that girls and under-15s will not be placed in the pathfinder from its opening, and that any decision to introduce them would be carefully phased. While I entirely recognise the concerns that lie behind these amendments, I believe that the risks can be sensitively and safely managed. This already happens in secure training centres and secure children’s homes, where boys and girls of different ages are accommodated on the same site.

There have been references to the numbers in the youth custodial estate. I can assist the House by saying that at the moment there are 16 girls in secure children’s homes, and 20 girls in secure training centres. That is a total of 36. There are 25 under-15s in secure children’s homes, and 13 in secure training centres, giving a total of 38. In one of the secure children’s homes there are 24 boys and one girl, so we are not talking about a large number.

We are anxious not to preclude, as a matter of strict law, the possibility of admitting to the secure college girls or those aged under 15. However, the House will know that the Youth Justice Board takes the decisions on where young people who are sentenced or remanded into custody are to be placed. These decisions are taken by specially trained staff and informed by detailed advice from the youth offending teams who have been working with the young people. The Youth Justice Board’s placement decisions are based on the individual needs of a young person. They take into account the whole range of factors that you would expect, such as age, gender, vulnerability, location, offence and any previous history. There is a very nuanced assessment before children are even considered appropriate for the secure college. However, the amendment would absolutely prevent it.

Lord Carlile of Berriew Portrait Lord Carlile of Berriew
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I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I accept everything he has said about it not being for the Government to determine who goes to which institution. However, surely he can tell us whether he expects or anticipates any girls being sent to this institution.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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As I said a little earlier, we do not expect this to happen, certainly in the short term. However, we do not want to write into the legislation that it should never happen. This is because, as noble Lords will appreciate, not all 14-year old boys are the same, physically, mentally or in their needs. This is also so with girls. I do not anticipate that this is likely to happen in the short term, but this amendment would completely prevent it happening. Yet there are instances of girls and boys actually deriving benefit from each other’s company.

Lord Carlile of Berriew Portrait Lord Carlile of Berriew
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I apologise for intervening once more. I promise not to do so again, at least in this speech. Does this mean that, although my noble friend is not able to anticipate whether any girls will be placed in this pathfinder college, nevertheless the Government have decided to build a building to accommodate girls, which may lie empty for the next 25 years?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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No, the answer is that by their secure college the Government are trying to provide a college which is sufficiently flexible to allow them to cope with whatever the demands are. Of course, it is impossible to predict precisely the age or the gender of those who will find themselves sent to a secure college, or to whatever the appropriate custodial institution may be. The answer is to set up a college which has the provision for a separate accommodation if that is appropriate.

It appears that we are somewhat damned if we do and damned if we do not. We were criticised for not having a separate accommodation for girls and young men, and we are now being criticised for having it and not using it. I hope that there will be some acknowledgment that we have made considerable efforts to try to find an appropriate way of housing them, should it be appropriate for them to be sent there.

Amendment 110 seeks to place a duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for adequate specialist provision to meet health and well-being needs in a secure college, and to make sufficient places available in a secure children’s home. Amendment 117B would impose a number of welfare requirements on secure colleges. These amendments go to the heart of which matters should be for primary legislation, which should be in secondary legislation and which are to be delivered through contractual arrangements. Some of the requirements in Amendment 117B relate to areas of fundamental importance—such as safeguarding, education, health and well-being, staff training and visits—and as such are matters that, rightly, we will address in the secure college rules.

Similarly, Amendment 110 would require the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure that secure colleges have adequate specialist provision in place to address young people’s health and well-being, and to ensure that sufficient places are available in a secure children’s home. The responsibility for commissioning health and well-being services, including specialist provision, for young people in a secure college will rest with NHS England. As noble Lords will be aware, this is in line with the arrangements currently in place for the existing secure estate.

Similarly, it is local authorities, not the Secretary of State, which are responsible for providing sufficient places in secure children’s homes. The Youth Justice Board recently agreed contracts with nine secure children’s homes. As I have previously indicated, we remain committed to ensuring that specialist separate accommodation will be available for the youngest and most vulnerable offenders. NHS England will assess the healthcare needs of all those detained in secure colleges, and commission services appropriate to meet their assessed needs. In doing so, NHS England applies the intercollegiate healthcare standards for children and young people in secure settings which were developed by the royal medical colleges at the invitation of the Youth Justice Board.

As we indicated in the recently published consultation on our plans for the rules, the role secure colleges play in healthcare is to provide the right environment where healthcare professionals can carry out their responsibilities for the care and well-being of young people. We therefore propose that the rules should include a requirement to ensure that a young person has safe and timely access to health services in a secure college. I hope that that goes some way towards reassuring the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, who is understandably concerned about the quite complex care needs that these young people will have.

As I said in answer to an earlier debate, the design of the healthcare facilities has been developed in collaboration with NHS England, which was consulted at that stage. Indeed, it was NHS England which advised us to amend our plans in order to bring the healthcare provision within the main educational block. NHS England assisted in the consultation and the way that the college is to be configured. Not only will this reduce the disruption to education when young people need to attend health appointments, but it will also help to normalise access to healthcare for a group of young people who, as I am sure that the noble Baroness and others will be aware, have not always had regular contact with a GP or with the specialist services they require. In some senses, it is hoped that they will be better off here than they might be in the community in terms of access to healthcare.

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Lord Ramsbotham Portrait Lord Ramsbotham
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Will the noble Lord exclude Clayfields from that, where the reconviction rate is 18% and costs are £185,000 a year?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am perfectly happy to accept the costs from the noble Lord. As regards the offending rate, one needs to look over a long period. He tells me those rates but I have not had a chance to see those specific rates or for how long a period. However, I am sure that there are variations within the secure college estate. It would cost around £100 million each year to do what seems to be suggested, which is not a viable solution. It is, as we know, easy to forget the deficit, but this Government do not do so.

Although the secure college pathfinder will have a capacity of 320, the site is composed of seven distinct accommodation buildings, with some broken down into smaller living units. Young people can be accommodated in distinct groups, a sense of community can be fostered in each, and the younger and more vulnerable groups can be kept separately if that is considered appropriate. Our plans demonstrate that big does not mean imposing and impersonal. The size will enable a breadth of services and opportunities to be offered.

It is a consequence of the welcome and significant reduction in the number of young people in custody that there are fewer custodial establishments and that some young people inevitably will be detained further from home. This is not a new problem and, for the reasons I have outlined, a network of small, local facilities is not, sadly, a viable alternative. However, distance from home remains one of the factors taken into account by the Youth Justice Board when placing young people in custody. I am sure that that will be very much a factor. Furthermore, there will be visits as well as technology.

I recognise what lies behind these amendments. I acknowledge the very real concern of noble Lords about young people, whether they are under-15s, girls or more widely, but we genuinely believe that we have sufficient flexibility in the system. We do not think that these requirements should find themselves into law. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I shall be brief. If the proposal goes ahead, which it might, we will end up with two groups of about 40 young people, boys and girls, from all over the country, in one central location and in an establishment where the vast majority of young offenders, as we have heard from the chief inspector, will be extremely vulnerable and very difficult. The whole atmosphere of the place cannot be compartmentalised in the way in which the noble Lord describes. It is not a satisfactory outcome and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by
112: Before Schedule 5, insert the following new Schedule—
ScheduleMutual recognition of driving disqualification in UK and Republic of IrelandPart 1Further provisionCrime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (c. 32)1 Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (EU Convention on driving disqualifications) is amended as follows.
2 (1) Section 54 (road traffic offences in UK: application of section 55) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2)—
(a) in paragraph (a), after “Schedule 3” insert “or Part 1 of Schedule 3A”, and(b) in paragraph (b), for “that Schedule” substitute “Schedule 3 or Part 2 of Schedule 3A”.(3) For subsection (3) substitute—
“(3) The minimum period is—
(a) for an offence mentioned in Part 2 of Schedule 3 in relation to which the Secretary of State has by regulations specified a period of less than six months, that period;(b) for an offence mentioned in Part 2 of Schedule 3A in relation to which the Department has by regulations specified a period of less than six months, that period;(c) for any other offence, a period of six months.”(4) After that subsection insert—
“(3A) When determining whether the period of disqualification in respect of an offence mentioned in Part 2 of Schedule 3 is not less than the minimum period, an extension period imposed under any of the following is to be disregarded—
(a) section 35A or 35C of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988;(b) section 248D of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995;(c) section 147A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.(3B) When determining whether the period of disqualification in respect of an offence mentioned in Part 2 of Schedule 3A is not less than the minimum period, an extension period imposed under any of the following is to be disregarded—
(a) Article 8A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1980 (S.I. 1980/704 (N.I. 6));(b) Article 40A of the Road Traffic Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/1320 (N.I. 10));(c) Article 91A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1216 (N.I. 1)).”(5) After subsection (5) insert—
“(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule 3.
(7) The Department may by regulations amend Schedule 3A.”
3 (1) Section 55 (duty to give notice to foreign authorities of driving disqualification of a non-UK resident) is amended as follows.
(2) For the heading substitute “Duty to give notice to Republic of Ireland of UK driving disqualification”.
(3) In subsection (1), for “the State in which the offender is normally resident” substitute “the Republic of Ireland”.
(4) In subsection (2)(f), for “the convention on driving disqualifications” substitute “the specified agreement on driving disqualifications”.
(5) In subsection (9)—
(a) in paragraph (b), for “the State mentioned in subsection (1)” substitute “the Republic of Ireland”, and(b) for “the convention on driving disqualifications” substitute “the specified agreement on driving disqualifications”.4 For the italic heading before section 56 substitute “Road traffic offences in Republic of Ireland”.
5 (1) Section 56 (road traffic offences in Republic of Ireland: application of section 57) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) The driving disqualification condition is met—
(a) in relation to an offence mentioned in Part 1 of Schedule 3B, if the offender is disqualified in the Republic of Ireland as a result of the offence; (b) in relation to an offence mentioned in Part 2 of that Schedule, if the offender is disqualified in the Republic of Ireland for a period not less than the minimum period as a result of the offence.”(3) In subsection (3)—
(a) for “a State” substitute “the Republic of Ireland”,(b) for “in that State” substitute “there”, and(c) for “the law of that State” substitute “the law of the Republic of Ireland”.(4) For subsection (4) substitute—
“(4) The minimum period is—
(a) for an offence in relation to which the Secretary of State has by regulations specified a period of less than six months, that period;(b) for any other offence, a period of six months.”(5) Omit subsection (5).
(6) In subsection (6), for “the part of the United Kingdom in which the offender is normally resident” substitute “the relevant part of the United Kingdom”.
(7) After that subsection insert—
“(6A) In subsection (6), “the relevant part of the United Kingdom” means—
(a) where the offender was normally resident in the United Kingdom when convicted, the part of the United Kingdom in which the offender was normally resident at that time;(b) where the offender was not normally resident in the United Kingdom when convicted but held a Great Britain licence or a Northern Ireland licence, the part of the United Kingdom in which the offender was last normally resident before conviction.”(8) Omit subsection (7).
(9) In subsection (8)—
(a) for “treating” substitute “about when”,(b) after the first “United Kingdom” insert “are to be treated for the purposes of this section”, and(c) for “a member state other than the United Kingdom” substitute “the Republic of Ireland”.(10) After subsection (9) insert—
“(10) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule 3B.”
6 (1) Section 57 (recognition in United Kingdom of foreign driving disqualification) is amended as follows.
(2) In the heading, for “foreign” substitute “Republic of Ireland”.
(3) In the following provisions, for “the foreign disqualification” substitute “the Republic of Ireland disqualification”—
(a) subsection (1)(a);(b) subsection (2) (in both places);(c) subsection (4)(b);(d) subsection (5)(b);(e) subsection (6);(f) subsection (8) (in both places).(4) In subsection (1)(a) and (b), for “one month” substitute “three months”.
(5) In subsection (2)(b), for “the State in which the offender was convicted” substitute “the Republic of Ireland”.
(6) In subsection (3)—
(a) for “a State” substitute “the Republic of Ireland”, and(b) for “in that State” substitute “there”.7 In section 58(1)(a) and (b) (notice under section 57), for “the foreign disqualification” substitute “the Republic of Ireland disqualification”.
8 (1) Section 63 (production of licence: Great Britain) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (4), for “the competent authority of the relevant State” substitute “the competent authority of the Republic of Ireland or the Department”.
(3) Omit subsection (5).
9 (1) Section 64 (production of licence: Northern Ireland) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (4), for “the competent authority of the relevant State” substitute “the competent authority of the Republic of Ireland or the Secretary of State”.
(3) Omit subsection (5).
10 In section 65(3) (production of licence: Community licence holders), for the words from “the same” to the end substitute “the Republic of Ireland”.
11 In section 68 (endorsement of licence: Great Britain), for subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) This section applies where a person who—
(a) is normally resident in Great Britain, or(b) is not normally resident in Great Britain but holds a Great Britain licence,is disqualified by virtue of section 57.”12 In section 69 (endorsement of licence: Northern Ireland), for subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) This section applies where a person who—
(a) is normally resident in Northern Ireland, or(b) is not normally resident in Northern Ireland but holds a Northern Ireland licence,is disqualified by virtue of section 57.”13 In section 70(1) (duty of appropriate Minister to inform competent authority)—
(a) for “any State” substitute “the Republic of Ireland”, and(b) for “the convention on driving disqualifications” substitute “the specified agreement on driving disqualifications”.14 (1) Section 72 (regulations: Great Britain) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2), at the end insert “, subject to subsection (2A)”.
(3) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 54(6), 56(10) or 71A may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
15 (1) Section 73 (regulations: Northern Ireland) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2), at the end insert “, subject to subsection (2A)”.
(3) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) Regulations made under section 54(7) may not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the Northern Ireland Assembly.”
16 (1) Section 74(1) (interpretation) is amended as follows.
(2) For the definition of “central authority” substitute—
““central authority” means an authority designated by the Republic of Ireland as a central authority for the purposes of the specified agreement on driving disqualifications;”.(3) For the definition of “competent authority” substitute—
““competent authority” means an authority which is a competent authority in relation to the Republic of Ireland for the purposes of the specified agreement on driving disqualifications;”.(4) Omit the definition of “the convention on driving disqualifications”.
(5) In the definition of “disqualified”, after “and” insert “, except in section 71A,”.
(6) Omit the definition of “foreign disqualification”.
(7) At the end insert—
““Republic of Ireland disqualification” means the disqualification mentioned in section 56;“Republic of Ireland licence” means a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under the law of the Republic of Ireland, including a learner permit.”17 In section 74(2) (interpretation of references to disqualification for life), for “foreign disqualification” substitute “Republic of Ireland disqualification”.
18 In section 74, at the end insert—
“(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, an individual is normally resident in, or in a part of, the United Kingdom, in Great Britain, in Northern Ireland or in the Republic of Ireland if his or her normal residence, as defined in Article 12 of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20th December 2006 on driving licences, is there.”
19 (1) Schedule 3 (offences for the purposes of section 54) is amended as follows.
(2) In the heading, at the end insert “: Great Britain”.
(3) In paragraph 1, for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) “Driver” has the same meaning as in the Road Traffic Act 1988.”(4) In paragraph 2, omit “or Article 43(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 (S.I. 1997/276 (N.I. 2))”.
(5) In paragraph 3—
(a) omit “or Articles of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995”,(b) in sub-paragraph (a), omit “or Article 9”,(c) in sub-paragraph (b), omit “or Article 10”,(d) in sub-paragraph (c), omit “or Article 12”,(e) in sub-paragraph (d), omit “or Article 14”,(f) in sub-paragraph (e), omit “or Article 15”,(g) in sub-paragraph (f), omit “or Article 16”,(h) in sub-paragraph (g), omit “or Article 17”, and(i) in sub-paragraph (h), omit “or Article 18”.(6) In paragraph 5, omit “or Article 167(1) of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1))”.
(7) In paragraph 6, omit “or Article 175(2) of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981”.
(8) In paragraph 7(a), omit “or Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Road Traffic Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/1320 (N.I. 10))”.
20 After Schedule 3 insert—
Schedule 3AOffences for the purposes of section 54: Northern IrelandPart 1Offences where order of disqualification for a minimum period unnecessary1 (1) Manslaughter by the driver of a motor vehicle.
(2) “Driver” has the same meaning as in Article 2(2) of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (S.I. 1995/2994 (N.I. 18)).
2 An offence under Article 168A(1)(c) of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)) (driving while disqualified).
3 An offence under Article 175(2) of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1)) (failing to stop after accident and give particulars or report of accident).
4 An offence under any of the following Articles of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (S.I. 1995/2994 (N.I. 18))—
(a) Article 9 (causing death or grievous bodily injury by dangerous driving),(b) Article 10 (dangerous driving),(c) Article 11A (causing death or grievous bodily injury by careless or inconsiderate driving),(d) Article 12 (careless, and inconsiderate, driving),(e) Article 12B (causing death or grievous bodily injury by driving: unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured drivers), (f) Article 14 (causing death or grievous bodily injury by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs),(g) Article 15 (driving, or being in charge, when under the influence of drink or drugs),(h) Article 16 (driving, or being in charge, of a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration above prescribed limit),(i) Article 17 (failing to provide a specimen of breath for a breath test), or(j) Article 18 (failing to provide a specimen for analysis or laboratory test).5 An offence under Article 43(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 (S.I. 1997/276 (N.I. 2)) (exceeding speed limit).
Part 2Offences where order of disqualification for a minimum period necessary6 An offence which—
(a) is mentioned in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Road Traffic Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/1320 (N.I. 10)), but(b) is not an offence mentioned in Part 1 of this Schedule.”21 After Schedule 3A insert—
Schedule 3BOffences for the purposes of section 56: Republic of IrelandPart 1Offences where order of disqualification for a minimum period unnecessary1 An offence arising from—
(a) reckless or dangerous driving, whether or not resulting in death, injury or serious risk,(b) wilful failure to carry out the obligations placed on drivers after being involved in road accidents,(c) driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or other substances affecting or diminishing the mental and physical abilities of a driver,(d) refusal to submit to alcohol and drug tests,(e) driving a vehicle faster than the permitted speed, or(f) driving a vehicle while disqualified.Part 2Offences where order of disqualification for a minimum period necessary2 An offence arising from conduct which is a road traffic offence that is not mentioned in Part 1 of this Schedule.”
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (c. 25)22 In Schedule 21 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (consequential amendments), omit paragraph 93 (uncommenced amendment of section 54 of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003).
Part 2Transition from EU Convention to new agreementTransitional period23 In this Part of this Schedule, “the transitional period” means the period—
(a) beginning with 1 December 2014, and(b) ending with the day before the first day on which—(i) section (Mutual recognition of driving disqualification in UK and Republic of Ireland)(2) to (5) are in force,(ii) the Secretary of State has specified an agreement under section 71A of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”), and(iii) that agreement has entered into force.Disapplication of duties and powers to give notices during the transitional period24 During the transitional period, the Secretary of State and the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland—
(a) are not required to give a notice under section 55 of the 2003 Act (duty to give notice to foreign authorities of driving disqualification of a non-UK resident),(b) are not required or permitted to give a notice under section 57 of the 2003 Act (recognition in United Kingdom of foreign driving disqualification), and(c) are not required to give reasons under section 70(3) of the 2003 Act (duty to give reasons for not giving a notice under section 57).25 Paragraphs 23 and 24 are to be treated as having come into force on 1 December 2014.
Application of duties and powers to give notices after the transitional period26 After the end of the transitional period, the Secretary of State and the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland—
(a) are required to give a notice under section 55 of the 2003 Act (duty to give notice to foreign authorities of driving disqualification of a non-UK resident),(b) are required or permitted to give a notice under section 57 of the 2003 Act (recognition in United Kingdom of foreign driving disqualification), and(c) are required to give reasons under section 70(3) of the 2003 Act (duty to give reasons for not giving a notice under section 57), only in a case in which the offence referred to in section 54(1) or 56(1) of the 2003 Act was committed after the end of the transitional period.Saving for pre-1 December 2014 cases27 The amendments made by section (Mutual recognition of driving disqualification in UK and Republic of Ireland) and Part 1 of this Schedule do not have effect in relation to a case in which a notice was given to an offender under section 57 of the 2003 Act before 1 December 2014.”
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Moved by
114: Schedule 5, page 95, line 1, after “In” insert “the English language text of”
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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments relating to the contracting out of secure colleges. I recognise that at the heart of these amendments is an appetite to know more about the Government’s plans for the secure college pathfinder, which is to open in 2017, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, accurately said. Notwithstanding this understandable curiosity, I am concerned that the effect of these amendments would be to limit substantially the ability of the Secretary of State to secure both innovation and value for money from prospective operators of secure colleges.

The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, quite rightly described some of the educational challenges that will exist in relation to this cohort of young people. Of course, they exist now, albeit in different custodial establishments. There is nothing new about the challenge; the question is how you meet the challenge.

Amendment 118 proposes that the selection criteria for secure college operators should be set out in regulations, and that these regulations should be debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament. Noble Lords are aware of our desire to invite innovation in the provision of services to educate and rehabilitate young offenders in secure colleges, and in our view this amendment would undermine that ambition.

Similarly, Amendment 119 proposes a statutory limit of five years on the life of a contract for the operation of a secure college. Again, this would constrain providers in their ability to deliver efficiencies and improved outcomes, potentially undermining the very goals secure colleges seek to achieve. Of course, the Government are ever mindful of expense and this limitation would run counter, we suggest, to the interests of obtaining a satisfactory contractual relationship. It is important to stress that no such constraints apply to the Secretary of State’s powers to commission any other form of custodial provision, and we do not believe that they are appropriate here.

Our intention is to launch a competition next year for an operator of the pathfinder secure college. We will set out our expectations of providers in an operating specification and we will inform bidders of the criteria against which they and their proposals will be evaluated. We will then enter into a period of dialogue with bidders. The dialogue process will be a critical phase of the competition as it will allow us to refine our specification in light of the types of innovation suggested by bidders. I do not want to repeat what is already in the consultation rules that noble Lords will have seen but noble Lords will be aware of what we seek to achieve in terms of blocks of education.

In some areas of secure college provision, such as those identified for inclusion in the rules, the Government will want to clearly specify their requirements; in others, however, we will want to create a degree of flexibility for the experience and expertise of bidders to propose new ways of delivering services and improving outcomes for young offenders. I am sure that all noble Lords would agree that we need to improve those existing outcomes. Requiring the criteria by which an operator will be selected to be set out in secondary legislation would, I fear, both delay and hamper the established processes for procuring services that meet the Government’s expectations.

I hope it reassures noble Lords that we are working closely with the Youth Justice Board as we plan for the opening of the pathfinder secure college in 2017. Its expertise in commissioning custodial services for young people will directly inform both the operating specification issued to the market and the criteria by which successful bidders are to be identified.

To answer the question that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, effectively posed—how will you assess the bids for the operation of the pathfinder secure college?—we will use a structured and objective evaluation process to identify the most economically advantageous tender. It will involve separate evaluation of the quality of the solutions and price; it will be conducted by a range of personnel with relevant experience—as I indicated, the YJB and the MoJ have extensive experience of objectively and robustly assessing operational service bids—and bids that fail to meet the prescribed minimum acceptable threshold level of the evaluation will be put aside and not considered further.

I understand why the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, would seek more detail than I am giving him but I hope that by outlining the process, and by the words I have used to describe it, he will understand why the Government are unable to accept his amendment. I hope he is reassured about the process by which secure college operators will be selected and will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by
122: Schedule 6, page 103, line 6, at end insert—
“Prison Act 1952 (c. 52)27A In section 52 of the Prison Act 1952 (exercise of power to make rules etc), after subsection (3) insert—
“(4) A statutory instrument containing rules under section 47 or 47A is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament, subject to subsection (5).
(5) A statutory instrument containing rules under section 47 that (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) authorise a secure college custody officer performing custodial duties at a secure college to use reasonable force, or(b) otherwise make a substantive change to the circumstances in which such an officer is authorised to do so,may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament. (6) In subsection (5), “secure college custody officer” has the same meaning as in Schedule 6 to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2014.”
Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c. 80)27B Omit section 66(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (exercise of powers to make rules under sections 47 and 47A of the Prison Act 1952).”

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts
Wednesday 22nd October 2014

(9 years, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Faulks Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to all those who contributed to this debate on these complex issues involving the conflict between a free press, the public’s right to know and the natural desire we have to protect young people from publicity to make sure that they do not suffer for life for any sins they committed in their youth. In acknowledging everyone’s contribution, perhaps I may single out the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who I think, although I may be wrong, is making his debut from the Opposition Front Bench. Noble Lords are shaking their heads and I understand that he is not. Therefore, my congratulations are late but none the less sincere.

Amendment 139 provides the criminal courts with a discretionary power to order reporting restrictions that last for the lifetime of a victim or witness in criminal proceedings who is under the age of 18 at the time those proceedings commence. Amendments 140, 141, 175, 183 and 184 widen the scope of reporting restrictions applying specifically to under-18s from print and broadcast media to include online content as well. Amendment 139 tracks the circumstances in which a lifelong reporting restriction may be available to an adult witness. The criminal courts are therefore given an additional statutory discretion to order lifelong protection for victims and witnesses under the age of 18 to secure their best evidence or co-operation. However, if it is not reasonable or proportionate to make use of this power, the court may continue to rely on the existing youth reporting restrictions available to children and young people.

As these amendments have been tabled in response to the High Court judgment and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, bringing it to our attention in Committee, consultation with the Scottish Government is ongoing and the government amendments are not intended to change the situation in Scotland. Some further technical amendments may be required at Third Reading in respect of territorial extent.

The issue of criminal investigations is covered by Amendment 122AA, which is tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks. This amendment seeks to commence Section 44 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. It is similar to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in Committee. On previous occasions, I explained to your Lordships that, given the significant restriction that Section 44 potentially imposes on freedom of the press and the possibility that its aims might be achievable through other means, it was determined by the then Government in 1999 that Section 44 should be commenced in relation to victims and witnesses only after both Houses have been given the opportunity to debate the issue again.

I fear that I must repeat what I said in Committee. The Government do not believe that this is the right time to consider commencing Section 44 in light of the significant changes to independent press self-regulation that we have introduced. The Privy Council granted a royal charter that has been sealed. The Government believe that that is the best way to ensure that independent press self-regulation operates successfully and that we should give this new approach a chance to succeed. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Marks does not have much confidence in this. Furthermore, we have some misgivings about Section 44 as drafted, as it imposes restrictions on the press that are so broad as to be potentially impractical.

However, I reassure my noble friend that it is unnecessary to amend Section 44 in order to extend it to online content as we believe that it already covers such media. Section 44 adopts a definition of “publication” that is wide enough to include online content. I will explain this further in dealing with the final set of government amendments and, in due course, I will ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

In respect of online content and youth reporting restrictions, Amendments 140, 141, 175, 183 and 184 widen the scope of reporting restrictions applying specifically to under-18s. Through these amendments, and by commencing Section 45 and the relevant parts of Section 48 of the YJCE Act 1999, restrictions will also be applicable to online content. The Government intend to commence the relevant provisions of the 1999 Act when the amendments to this Bill come into force.

Youth reporting restrictions will rely on an existing statutory definition of publication, which includes any speech, writing, relevant programme or other communication in whatever form, which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public, but does not include an indictment or other document prepared for use in particular legal proceedings. By using this definition of publication we will broaden the scope of youth reporting restrictions to create consistency with other reporting restrictions already on the statute book, such as those that apply to adult witnesses and victims of sexual offences. It would also be in line with the definition used in Section 2(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which the Law Commission recently concluded was,

“wide enough to cover the content of new media and probably in the future too”.

The Government agree with that interpretation and have therefore adopted the same definition of publication when extending the scope of youth reporting restrictions to online content. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that the purpose of his Amendment 123 has been met—and I would therefore ask him not to press it.

During the course of the debate there was some reference to whether there was any justification for the distinction between victims and witnesses and defendants. There are a number of statutory protections within the criminal justice system that are applicable only to victims and witnesses. One example is Section 46 of the YJCE Act 1999, which provides for the possibility of lifetime reporting restrictions for adult witnesses. The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act provides for automatic reporting restrictions for victims of sexual offences. Similar statutory powers are not available for defendants.

I respectfully agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said about the position of someone who is 17 and then becomes 18. He asked why there should be a difference so that if someone is 17 they have lifetime anonymity. Of course, there are remedies available. If your Lordships accept the Government’s amendments, it is argued that the current position reflects a fair balance between the various considerations that apply in this field. More clarity may be needed in this area of concern, which we will be considering.

I understand that Impress, the second potential self-regulator, is currently appointing its board. We would respectfully suggest that these are matters for the industry and not for government. I also understand that David Wolfe QC has been appointed chair of the independent Recognition Panel and that the board appointment process is also under way. This is a matter for the Commissioner for Public Appointments and not for government. Therefore, for the moment the Government have done all that they need to do.

Earl of Listowel Portrait The Earl of Listowel
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My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his reply. I note the emphasis he puts on the charter and the institution that is set in place to improve the way in which the media control themselves. From what he said, I take it that he has an open mind to a certain extent. These are new developments. The charter is a new thing. He will keep looking at it to see if it provides sufficient protection for young people. I am grateful for that open-mindedness.

I was grateful for what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said. He referred to 17 and a half and 18 year-olds and that it seemed unfair to distinguish so much between the two when there was such a small gap. My response might be: can we not be generous to children? They are still children until the age of 18: can we not err on the side of generosity towards them? I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by
124: Before Clause 44, insert the following new Clause—
“Time limit for bringing certain criminal proceedingsOffence of making improper use of public electronic communications network
(1) In section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 (improper use of public electronic communications network), at the end insert—
“(5) An information or complaint relating to an offence under this section may be tried by a magistrates’ court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland if it is laid or made—
(a) before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the day on which the offence was committed, and(b) before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which evidence comes to the knowledge of the prosecutor which the prosecutor considers sufficient to justify proceedings.(6) Summary proceedings for an offence under this section may be commenced in Scotland—
(a) before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the day on which the offence was committed, and(b) before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which evidence comes to the knowledge of the prosecutor which the prosecutor considers sufficient to justify proceedings,and section 136(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (date when proceedings deemed to be commenced) applies for the purposes of this subsection as it applies for the purposes of that section.(7) A certificate of a prosecutor as to the date on which evidence described in subsection (5)(b) or (6)(b) came to his or her knowledge is conclusive evidence of that fact.”
(2) The amendment made by this section applies only in relation to an offence committed on or after the day on which it comes into force.”
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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am grateful for the speeches made by my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in this group of amendments concerning the criminal courts charge. There was lengthy debate in Committee, and I responded at some length, so I hope they will not consider it any disrespect to their arguments if I summarise the Government’s position fairly briefly.

The question of discretion has arisen once more. My noble friend Lord Marks seeks to vary his original suggestion by fettering the discretion somewhat but nevertheless importing a degree of discretion, as was discussed at length. It is the Government’s position that that is inappropriate.

The point was made in Committee and this evening that many noble Lords consider the charge unfair in the case of poor offenders. The Government believe that it is right that all adult offenders, whatever their means, pay towards the cost of running the courts, alleviating the burden on the taxpayer. I know that noble Lords who are concerned about this area will have seen the figures published on the website before Committee stage about the charges by band. They are quite modest, but it is nevertheless hoped that they will reflect some compensation to the country for defendants who use the courts because they have committed offences. As I said previously, offenders can apply to vary payment rates if their financial circumstances change. In addition, offenders who comply with their payment terms and who do not reoffend can have their charge remitted after a specified period. The imposition of this charge is not designed to be a punishment, so confusing it with the various discretionary powers that the court has rather misses the point.

Amendment 125D would stipulate that the charge cannot exceed the amount specified by the Lord Chancellor in the regulations. The Bill is drafted so that a charge to be paid is of an amount specified by the Lord Chancellor, so I am sure that my noble friend Lord Marks will agree that this leaves no room for charges exceeding the amount specified to be imposed, which should mean that the amendment is unnecessary.

Amendment 126A would omit the requirement for a specified period of time to have passed before the court charge debt can be written off. If accepted, it would provide the court with wide discretion to remit the charge early, as and when it sees fit. The clause as it currently stands has the benefit of allowing a court to remit the charge where the offender has taken all reasonable steps to pay and does not reoffend. This is a powerful incentive for offenders to repay the charge and refrain from reoffending, ensuring that a specified period is a fundamental feature of the remission provisions—a key aspect of this policy which I hope the House will not overlook.

Amendment 125E seeks to specify that where a charge can be remitted it can include the remission of interest. I respectfully point out to my noble friend Lord Marks that Clause 42 gives the magistrates’ court power to remit the charge under particular circumstances. It is intended that this provision be used where an offender has paid accordingly and has not gone on to reoffend. It can also be remitted where the debt is unenforceable.

New Section 21D(4) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, inserted by Clause 46, makes it clear that interest payable under the regulations is to be treated as part of the charge. It therefore follows that any remission of the charge would comprise the whole debt, including the interest. I hope that reassures the House that the Government have carefully considered this provision and will satisfy my noble friend such that he might not press his amendment.

I stress, however, that this is a novel scheme and the Government have already agreed to review the policy after three years. Of course, we will monitor its impact closely until then. The Lord Chancellor must repeal the provisions if he considers it appropriate, having regard to that review. I am sure that the noble Lord will agree that this further safeguard demonstrates the Government’s commitment to getting this right.

I turn finally to the Criminal Procedure Rules and the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Beecham, which seek to widen the conditions that must be met for the courts charge to be remitted. The amendments would broaden the court’s power to such an extent that the charge could be remitted also in cases specified in those rules.

The effect of the amendments would be to confer on the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee a jurisdictional power by enabling it to set rules concerning substantive legal matters and by giving it a significant level of discretion to prescribe the circumstances in which the charge could be remitted. This would of course contravene the Government’s position that it is an administrative charge.

If I understand the noble Lord’s arguments correctly, he is seeking to afford the committee the power to determine the instances in which the criminal court charges might be remitted, although he does not give a clear indication as to which cases would be specified in the rules to which discretion may be applied.

The Bill as it stands already allows for the courts to cancel the charge, as I have indicated, but we submit that it is inappropriate to use these rules as a means to set the criteria for remission. I am sure noble Lords are aware that the function of the Criminal Procedure Rules is to govern the practice and procedure of the criminal courts. The responsibility of the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee is to make those rules. With great respect, this amendment would afford that committee a power beyond its current jurisdiction. The choice of criteria for remission should be one for Parliament itself. I fear I cannot agree that it is appropriate for this power to be attributed to the committee.

I understand the noble Lord’s concern about the impact of the charge on particular offenders whom he encounters in his capacity as a magistrate. The Government are aware of that risk and are monitoring any adverse impacts. I also confirm what the noble Lord said about his discussion with my officials in relation to Section 135 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. I hope that I have satisfied the noble Lord and that he will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
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My Lords, I will of course seek leave to withdraw the amendment in a moment. Very briefly, the point of tabling further amendments on Report, following the debate in Committee, which move slightly towards the Government’s position, was in the hope that the Government might have considered the debate and moved towards our position. So I make no apology for repeating the position that I took in Committee.

I also want to make it clear that I think all of us in this House agree with the general principles stated by my noble friend that there is a very strong case for ordering defendants who can pay a criminal courts charge on conviction so to pay it. Our concern is with those who plainly cannot pay it or cannot pay all of it. I entirely accept and appreciate the support of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for my position. However, I am not sure that the traditional punishment meted out to those who are drunk and brought before the magistrates’ court of £1 or a day—that kind of formulation of giving a period of custody in default of payment right at the outset—will mitigate the mischief at which my amendments are aimed.

I shall also simply say two further things. First, the point of my Amendment 125D and the words “no greater than” is to make sure that the amount specified in the regulations is the maximum that can be charged, but that the court would have the power to impose a lesser charge. I believe that the amendment, if implemented, would have achieved that end.

Finally, I suspect that when it comes to the review of the operation of this charge in three years’ time, Parliament and the Government may well find that the procedure for remitting the charge and having hearings as to whether or not a charge should be cancelled at a later date is unduly unwieldy, cumbersome and expensive. With those observations, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am most grateful to all those who have spoken in the debate. This is not, I readily concede, a straightforward provision. Our debates both in Committee and on Report have been illuminating. The stance taken by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, tonight is somewhat different from that which he took in Committee—but I commend him on his mental agility in that regard. Of course, the fact that his arguments have somewhat changed—

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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My Lords, will the Minister take it from me that I can count?

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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The noble Lord’s arguments do not deserve lesser consideration for their recent arrival in our debate. He asked, for instance, why personal injuries, rather than other fields, should be singled out for attention. The answer is simply this. Of course fraud has a role in the law of contract, the law of property and other areas of the law. But this is a provision to deal with a particular mischief, of which we are all aware in one form or another. Unfortunately, the explosion of claims, with dishonest claims and people calling others to invite them to participate in dishonest claims, has become widespread, and the Government are responding in a variety of different ways, including by regulating claims management companies—I am glad to see the reduction in the number of such companies—and by introducing this provision.

Amendment 128 was tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, to whom the House listens very carefully on all things, but perhaps particularly in areas such as this. It would extend the scope of Clause 49 to cover claims for items linked to the personal injury claim. As he has indicated, this could typically include items such as damage to property and the cost of credit hire. The effect of the amendment would be that where the court was satisfied that the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest, its order would dismiss any such related elements, as well as the claim for personal injury—when, for example, a claim for personal injury is used as a vehicle for other fraud.

I understand precisely what my noble friend says, and I have considerable sympathy for what lies behind the amendment, which is to make the clause as strong a deterrent as possible. However, after careful consideration by my officials and myself, I believe, on balance, that it would unnecessarily complicate the clause, and could have unintended consequences that would not be desirable.

The types of loss that would be caught by the amendment arise primarily in motor accident claims, and in practice payments for such losses are generally made up front by the claimant’s insurer, and are then recovered by them from the defendant’s insurer in the event that negligence is admitted or proved. This means that the amendment could affect subrogated rights between insurers, and could operate to the disadvantage of the claimant’s insurer, who would find it much more difficult to recover such sums. That might in turn have the undesirable consequence of making insurers less inclined to make payments in respect of this kind of loss to genuine victims of accidents for whom, for example, the rapid replacement of a vehicle could be essential.

The complexity of the law on subrogated rights means that the potential for this type of unintended consequence would be high. In any event, I do not consider the amendment necessary. The existing focus of the clause on personal injury claims avoids complexities of this nature, and ensures that the core matter in relation to which the claimant has actually been dishonest, and where the main scope for dishonest behaviour arises—the personal injury claim—will be dismissed whenever the court considers it appropriate. We are confident that this should provide a sufficiently powerful deterrent to discourage claimants from seeking to bring fraudulent and exaggerated claims, and believe that the amendment could on balance run the risk of creating uncertainty in the law and would make the clause unnecessarily complex in practice.

On Amendment 128A, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said that it would be more appropriate to have not the civil standard of proof but the criminal standard of proof. I think that he refers—if not explicitly, implicitly—to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on this, which based its recommendation on the view that the inclusion of the relevant measure is indicative of the quasi-criminal nature of the sanction imposed by the dismissal of the claim. The Government strongly disagree that that is the case. Subsection (7) simply ensures that the order for dismissal can be taken into account by a court hearing any proceedings against the claimant in relation to the same dishonest behaviour, whether they be civil or criminal proceedings for contempt or a criminal prosecution. This is to ensure that the claimant is dealt with fairly and that any punishment imposed in those proceedings is proportionate given the overall effect of the consequences of the claimant’s dishonest behaviour upon him or her. This approach is also reflected in other aspects of the clause—in particular, subsection (5) in relation to costs sanctions.

As we have set out in the ECHR memorandum accompanying the Bill, we consider that the adoption of a civil standard of proof can be fully justified. The sanction of deprivation of property involved in the dismissal of the claim would occur in the context of civil proceedings in relation to civil compensation, proceedings which are brought by the claimant, not the state. No criminal conviction could arise from the dismissal process itself, and it does not involve anything that could be said to be a criminal charge. We consider that the analogy drawn in the ECHR memorandum with the approach of the European Court of Human Rights and the domestic courts to confiscation proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, in which a civil standard of proof has been upheld, is a valid one, and that the adoption of the civil standard of proof in Clause 49 is both fair and appropriate.

Amendments 128B, 128C, 128D, 128E, 130A and 130B tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks are similar but not identical to those tabled by him in Committee, save that the court is given a discretion to reduce the award of damages rather than dismiss the claim entirely, or, it would seem, take no action at all, in circumstances where the genuine part of the award is £25,000 or more. We do not believe that it is appropriate to impose a financial limit of this nature. I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said about this. Although the widening of the court’s discretion not to dismiss the claim is of a lesser extent to that which the noble Lord previously suggested, the amendments would still weaken the effect of the clause and interfere with its effective operation by imposing what is inevitably an arbitrary dividing line.

As I explained in Committee, the sanction imposed by this clause—the denial of compensation—is a serious one, and will be imposed only where the claimant’s dishonest behaviour goes to the heart of the claim. If the court, having heard all the evidence, is satisfied that that is the case, I believe that it is right that it should be required to dismiss the entire claim unless doing so would cause substantial injustice to the claimant. People who behave in such a way should not be able to get compensation regardless, whatever the amount involved.

The amount of compensation which the claimant would otherwise have been awarded, and the proportion of the overall claim which that represents, will, of course, be matters that the court may wish to take into consideration in deciding whether the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest and, if so, whether its discretion not to dismiss the claim should be exercised. Where the effect on the claimant might be particularly harsh or unfair on the facts of the case, the substantial injustice test will provide sufficient protection. The addition of a further discretion simply waters down the deterrent effect of this provision.

On Amendment 129, during the debate in Committee some uncertainty was expressed about the policy intention underlying subsection (5) of Clause 49, and whether the existing drafting of the subsection clearly and accurately captured that intention. In the light of those concerns, we have tabled government Amendment 129, which clarifies the position by replacing the existing subsection with a new subsection. This provides that when assessing costs in the proceedings, a court which dismisses a claim because of the claimant’s fundamental dishonesty must deduct the amount of damages that it would have awarded to the claimant from the amount of costs which it would otherwise order the claimant to pay in respect of the defendant’s costs. The intention underlying this provision is, as I have previously explained, to ensure that claimants are not excessively sanctioned by both losing the genuine element of the award of damages and having to pay the defendant’s costs without any credit for what the defendant has saved by avoiding payment of the genuine element of the award. I should add that one of the main intentions behind this provision is to deter people from bringing these claims at all, or at least deter them from being dishonest when advancing them.

Beyond that, it is not our intention to interfere more generally with the court’s discretion on whether to make a costs order and, if so, in what terms. We believe that the court should be able to make whatever orders it considers appropriate. In many cases the court will doubtless decide to award the defendant’s costs in full, apart from the sum deducted under this subsection. However, in some cases, it may decide only to award the defendant some of its costs in circumstances where it considers that certain costs have been unnecessarily incurred—for example, where the defendant had spent money pursuing an irrelevant issue.

Amendment 129 preserves the court’s discretion to do this, or indeed to decide, in the circumstances of a particular case, to make no award of costs at all. We believe that it is important for a provision on this issue to remain in the clause to ensure that it operates in a fair and proportionate way, and I am therefore—although I do not think my noble friend is pursuing it with any vigour—unable to accept Amendment 128F, which would remove it altogether.

My noble friend Lord Hunt has indicated that he remains concerned that Amendment 129, the government amendment, may still create some confusion, and has proposed Amendment 130 instead. While I share my noble friend’s concern to ensure that the provision is as clear as possible, on careful consideration, we do not believe that his fears about our amendment are justified.

In particular, I should point out that, even if the actual assessment of the amount of costs payable is undertaken by a different judge or officer at a later date, as would normally be the case in a detailed assessment of costs, assessment is still being undertaken by the same court that has dismissed the claim, and so the requirement to deduct the amount recorded in subsection (4) from the ultimate costs “bill” that the claimant may have to pay applies regardless of the point of time at which, or judge by which, the costs payable are determined. I am also concerned that my noble friend’s amendment simply restates the existing law confirming the discretion of the court to award costs. On balance, we feel that it is unnecessary to restate this in legislation, and it might be taken to imply that this was not already the position, or that special rules regarding the court’s discretion as to costs are required in these cases. That would be contrary to the policy, which is not intended to make any changes to the rules on costs themselves.

On reflection, I consider that government Amendment 129 makes it amply clear that if the court decides to order costs against the claimant, it must deduct the amount of the damages it would have awarded but for the effect of Clause 49, so that the claimant has to pay whatever costs, if any, that are ordered net of that amount. I believe that the Government’s amendment clarifies this policy intention in a way that removes any ambiguity that might have arisen from the previous text of the subsection. However, I remain extremely grateful to my noble friend for drawing that to the attention of the House. I am sorry that I detained the House a little longer than might be desirable at this time but these are complex provisions, and it may be helpful if I provide a little detail about this.

I conclude by dealing with the question of where parts of a claim may be involved. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out a possible ambiguity. It may be that this is what he has in mind. I shall answer the question: why does the court have a discretion not to dismiss the claim when the claimant would suffer a substantial injustice? We believe that an element of discretion is necessary because difficult cases may arise where depriving the claimant entirely of damages may cause substantial injustice. This might be the case, for example, where a claimant had genuinely been very seriously injured through another person’s negligence, perhaps requiring substantial ongoing future care and support as a result, but stupidly colluded in a bogus minor injury claim by a family member in relation to the same accident. We do not, however, think there is any need to amend the provisions. We think that judges will be able to work with these provisions and that the Government’s intention and, I hope, that of noble Lords from all around the House, will be achieved by these important provisions. I hope that all noble Lords who have tabled amendments will agree to withdraw or not move them.

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Moved by
129: Clause 49, page 48, line 26, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“( ) When assessing costs in the proceedings, a court which dismisses a claim under this section must deduct the amount recorded in accordance with subsection (4) from the amount which it would otherwise order the claimant to pay in respect of costs incurred by the defendant.”
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Moved by
131: Clause 50, page 49, line 10, at end insert “or is treated as doing so under subsection (3A)”
Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I am grateful once again to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral for raising this issue in Committee. During that debate, I indicated that we would consider his amendment further. There has been widespread support for the ban on offering inducements to bring personal injury claims in Clauses 50 to 52, but I am concerned to make this as effective as possible. Having reflected over the summer—I have been given a great deal on which to reflect over the course of the Bill—I agree with my noble friend that we should seek to prevent regulated persons avoiding the ban by offering an inducement through third parties.

The noble Lord’s amendment was prompted by a concern that it is now increasingly common for solicitors to operate as part of larger groups of companies, or to have subsidiary or linked companies offering services alongside them. Those subsidiary or linked companies are not always regulated, and it would be relatively easy for, say, a solicitor simply to route an inducement through an unregulated company, thus avoiding the ban.

For the avoidance of doubt, I add that we do not wish to regulate third parties, only to prevent regulated persons from avoiding the ban by offering an inducement via an unregulated subsidiary or a linked business or individual. I believe that this amendment is a proportionate means of making the necessary ban on inducements more effective, and I beg to move.

Lord Hunt of Wirral Portrait Lord Hunt of Wirral
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I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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I am afraid I cannot beat the brevity of that. I would like a little guidance from the Minister about the nature of the regulation. Can he give any indication of how effective whatever the regulatory body is—I confess that I do not know which it is—in overseeing this practice? I am entirely with the Government in wishing to ensure that such practices are limited as much as possible, for precisely the reasons that were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and with which we all concur: the promulgation of false claims, which is wrong in itself and, of course, a drain on the economy generally. I am not clear what the regulatory system currently is, or how effective it is. While supporting the Government’s intentions in the amendment, it would be helpful to have an impression of that.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am happy to write to the noble Lord with as much detail as we have. In the mean time, I can tell him and the House that anecdotal evidence shows that the practice is more prevalent among solicitors than non-regulated persons. However, once there is a ban in place preventing legal services providers from offering an incentive to issue claims, there is a possibility that non-regulated persons offering inducements to issue claims with legal services providers will be used as a way around the ban.

As to what types of third party rather than regulated persons might offer a benefit, these are likely to be but not restricted to those working in what are described as “first notification of loss teams”. The teams are used by insurers and are the central point that clients contact when they wish to make a claim on their insurance policy. The intention is to ban any inducement which encourages or might have the effect of encouraging a person to make a claim or seek advice about making a claim, including so-called welcome payments, free gifts and cash advances.

The noble Lord will know that there is far too much by way of unsolicited phone calls going on in relation to personal injury claims, which is another matter we take seriously. It is a complex issue that requires action on a number of fronts, both legislative and non-legislative. We have taken a number of measures as set out in our nuisance calls action plan of 30 March. I can give the website address if necessary. It includes increasing the fines that Ofcom can issue from £50,000 to £2 million, enabling the Information Commissioner’s Office to issue fines of up to £500,000, and providing simple and consistent information to consumers on preventive action that they can take and how they can complain about unsolicited phone calls via Ofcom.

If the noble Lord is having particular difficulty with being asked to make fraudulent claims, which I am sure we have all encountered, he may wish to know that he can register with the Telephone Preference Service, which should result in his avoiding such claims. I hope that that provides some further information, but I undertake to give more information in due course.

Lord Beecham Portrait Lord Beecham
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I thank the noble Lord for providing further information, but it is not terribly helpful because the Telephone Preference Service seems to be totally useless. Apart from anything else, it does not seem to work with a BlackBerry these days. It is quite extraordinary. Having appreciated that regulated persons include members of my profession and that of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I am sure that he will agree that it is a very sad commentary on the current state of what was a profession and is now increasingly descending, if I may put it that way, into a rather unscrupulous business —which is a matter I think we would both deplore.

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Moved by
132: Clause 50, page 49, line 18, leave out “by a regulated person”
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Moved by
136: Clause 51, page 50, line 9, after second “person” insert “or is treated as having done so under section 50(3A)”
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Moved by
137: Clause 52, page 50, line 33, after “The” insert “Chartered”
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Moved by
138: Before Clause 54, insert the following new Clause—
“Appeals from the Court of Protection
(1) Section 53 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (rights of appeal from the Court of Protection) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) Court of Protection Rules may provide that, where a decision of the court is made by a specified description of person, an appeal from the decision lies to a specified description of judge of the court and not to the Court of Appeal.”
(3) Omit subsection (3).
(4) In subsection (4)(d), omit “higher”.”
Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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My Lords, I shall speak to three amendments tabled in my name on behalf of the Government. We have the pleasure of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in the Chamber in respect of these amendments and I thank him for his patience for remaining for so long. Amendments 138 and 181 seek to rectify an omission in relation to appeals from decisions at lower levels in the Court of Protection, which was not addressed when the range of judicial officeholders able to sit as judges of the Court of Protection was expanded in the Crime and Courts Act 2013.

The need for the amendment does not only arise from, but has been starkly highlighted by, the decision of the Supreme Court in what has become known as the Cheshire West case. That decision required a radical reassessment of cases in which it may now be considered that a person who lacks mental capacity to consent to care arrangements is deprived of liberty as a result of those arrangements, so that the authorisation of the court is required for such a deprivation of liberty.

As a result, it is predicted that there will be a significant increase in the number of cases coming before the Court of Protection for declarations authorising deprivation of liberty in cases where, prior to Cheshire West, no such authorisation was considered necessary. It is considered that the figure may well be in excess of 28,000 additional applications annually. To deal with this increase in workload, deputy district judges and judges from other jurisdictions are being deployed to the Court of Protection for the first time. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 allowed for this wider range of judges to deal with Court of Protection cases but did not address the question of appeals.

The current provision in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 governing the route of appeal from decisions in the Court of Protection allows for decisions of specified judges to lie to a higher judge in the Court of Protection rather than directly to the Court of Appeal. However, the judges specified are limited to district judges and circuit judges, and the provision does not cover decisions of any of the wider range of judicial officeholders now able to sit as judges of the Court of Protection. The Crime and Courts Act omitted to amend it to align with that wider range. Without this amendment, appeals from decisions of judges in that wider range—even though they are decisions of the same sort as those of a district judge at present, for example—would have to go to the Court of Appeal, thereby increasing workload in the appeal court. This amendment makes good the omission.

The judges whose decisions may be appealed within the Court of Protection and the higher judges to whom appeal against those decisions will lie within the Court of Protection will, as now, be specified in Rules of Court, namely the Court of Protection Rules. This will prevent the Court of Appeal being unnecessarily burdened by a significant increase in cases and allow the Court of Protection the flexibility to deal with resources efficiently. This, in turn, will reduce delays and the need for cases to be transferred to a different court. It will also provide greater consistency in how appeals are managed across other jurisdictions.

Members of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005—I should declare an interest as having been a member of that committee for some time—were given written notice of this proposed amendment which was made available in early August to allow time for consideration.

Amendment 142 would have the effect of allowing the President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to make written representations to Parliament about the Supreme Court and its jurisdiction in the same way as the Lord Chief Justice of any part of the United Kingdom can do already under Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales has used the provision under Section 5 to lay before Parliament his annual report, which highlights his accountability for oversight of the judiciary in England and Wales. This amendment would give the President of the Supreme Court the same avenue to raise similar matters to Parliament. The proposed amendments were initially tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and I am grateful to him for bringing this matter to our attention. The Government have considered and reflected further on the implications of this proposal and agree that the change is justified,

Amendment 143 was also tabled in Committee by the noble Lord. This amendment would have the effect of allowing the United Kingdom Supreme Court the flexibility to appoint judges to the Supplementary Panel within two years of their retirement, provided that they are under the age of 75. At present, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to identify particular skills or expertise which might be of use in the future—particularly without knowledge of future workloads. This makes it difficult to identify which qualifying judges should be added to the Supplementary Panel before they retire from full-time judicial office. The amendment provides greater flexibility in this respect.

These are minor but sensible amendments which I hope the House will agree to. I beg to move.

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Lord Hope of Craighead Portrait Lord Hope of Craighead
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My Lords, I take this opportunity to say a few words about Amendments 142 and 143, which have been spoken to by the Minister. First, I thank him for his kind words. Secondly, I thank the Government for bringing these amendments forward. As the Minister has explained, I brought forward amendments in almost exactly the same terms in Committee. At that point it was necessary for the Government to provide support because I did not imagine that if this went to a vote, it would carry much weight because of the technical nature of the two points that are dealt with. I am therefore extremely grateful to the Minister and his team for picking up these points, and I know that the President of the Supreme Court is, too.

I will mention two particular points about Amendment 142. The first is that it was necessary to obtain the agreement of the Lord Chief Justices of England and Wales and Northern Ireland and their equivalent in Scotland, the Lord President. That agreement has been confirmed and the proposed amendment has the support of all the senior judges involved. Secondly, the wording that I proposed in Committee was the agreed wording, and I made the point that it was very necessary to try to stick as closely as possible to those words if the Government were to bring forward an amendment on Report. I am grateful to the Government for doing exactly that, and therefore we can be certain that what is being proposed now has the support of all the judges concerned.

Lord Faulks Portrait Lord Faulks
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I am very grateful, first, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, who was himself an extremely distinguished chairman of the post-legislative scrutiny committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005. I thank him for his valuable remarks about the appeal process, based on his experience and his recognition of the particular difficulties to which these cases can give rise. I certainly undertake to ensure that his remarks will be passed on to the rule committee through the channels that are available to me, and I thank him for that.

Similarly, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his acknowledgement of the Government’s co-operation and entire acceptance of his suggested drafting, and I thank him as well for securing the support of all the senior judges for what is now a satisfactory state of affairs.

Amendment 138 agreed.
Moved by
139: After Clause 68, insert the following new Clause—
“Reporting restrictionsLifetime reporting restrictions in criminal proceedings for witnesses and victims under 18
(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 45 (power to restrict reporting of criminal proceedings involving persons under 18) insert—
“45A Power to restrict reporting of criminal proceedings for lifetime of witnesses and victims under 18
(1) This section applies in relation to—
(a) any criminal proceedings in any court (other than a service court) in England and Wales, and(b) any proceedings (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) in any service court.(2) The court may make a direction (“a reporting direction”) that no matter relating to a person mentioned in subsection (3) shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as being concerned in the proceedings.
(3) A reporting direction may be made only in respect of a person who is under the age of 18 when the proceedings commence and who is—
(a) a witness, other than an accused, in the proceedings;(b) a person against whom the offence, which is the subject of the proceedings, is alleged to have been committed.(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), matters relating to a person in respect of whom the reporting direction is made include—
(a) the person’s name,(b) the person’s address,(c) the identity of any school or other educational establishment attended by the person,(d) the identity of any place of work of the person, and(e) any still or moving picture of the person.(5) The court may make a reporting direction in respect of a person only if it is satisfied that—
(a) the quality of any evidence given by the person, or(b) the level of co-operation given by the person to any party to the proceedings in connection with that party’s preparation of its case,is likely to be diminished by reason of fear or distress on the part of the person in connection with being identified by members of the public as a person concerned in the proceedings.(6) In determining whether subsection (5) is satisfied, the court must in particular take into account—
(a) the nature and alleged circumstances of the offence to which the proceedings relate;(b) the age of the person;(c) such of the following as appear to the court to be relevant—(i) the social and cultural background and ethnic origins of the person,(ii) the domestic, educational and employment circumstances of the person, and(iii) any religious beliefs or political opinions of the person;(d) any behaviour towards the person on the part of—(i) an accused,(ii) members of the family or associates of an accused, or(iii) any other person who is likely to be an accused or a witness in the proceedings.(7) In determining that question the court must in addition consider any views expressed—
(a) by the person in respect of whom the reporting restriction may be made, and(b) where that person is under the age of 16, by an appropriate person other than an accused.(8) In determining whether to make a reporting direction in respect of a person, the court must have regard to—
(a) the welfare of that person,(b) whether it would be in the interests of justice to make the direction, and (c) the public interest in avoiding the imposition of a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the reporting of the proceedings.(9) A reporting direction may be revoked by the court or an appellate court.
(10) The court or an appellate court may by direction (“an excepting direction”) dispense, to any extent specified in the excepting direction, with the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction.
(11) The court or an appellate court may only make an excepting direction if—
(a) it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so, or(b) it is satisfied that—(i) the effect of the reporting direction is to impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the reporting of the proceedings, and(ii) it is in the public interest to remove or relax that restriction.(12) No excepting direction shall be given under subsection (11)(b) by reason only of the fact that the proceedings have been determined in any way or have been abandoned.
(13) In determining whether to make an excepting direction in respect of a person, the court or the appellate court must have regard to the welfare of that person.
(14) An excepting direction—
(a) may be given at the time the reporting direction is given or subsequently, and(b) may be varied or revoked by the court or an appellate court.(15) For the purposes of this section—
(a) criminal proceedings in a court other than a service court commence when proceedings are instituted for the purposes of Part 1 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, in accordance with section 15(2) of that Act;(b) proceedings in a service court commence when the charge is brought under section 122 of the Armed Forces Act 2006. (16) In this section—
(a) “appellate court”, in relation to any proceedings in a court, means a court dealing with an appeal (including an appeal by way of case stated) arising out of the proceedings or with any further appeal;(b) “appropriate person” has the same meaning as in section 50;(c) references to the quality of evidence given by a person are to its quality in terms of completeness, coherence and accuracy (and for this purpose “coherence” refers to a person’s ability in giving evidence to give answers which address the questions put to the person and can be understood both individually and collectively);(d) references to the preparation of the case of a party to any proceedings include, where the party is the prosecution, the carrying out of investigations into any offence at any time charged in the proceedings.”(3) In section 49 (offences under Chapter 4)—
(a) after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) This section also applies—
(a) in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, if a publication includes any matter in contravention of a direction under section 45A(2) made by a service court;(b) in England and Wales, if a publication includes any matter in contravention of a direction under section 45A(2) made by a court other than a service court.”, and(b) at the end insert—“(7) Schedule 2A makes special provision in connection with the operation of this section, so far as it relates to a publication that includes matter in contravention of a direction under section 45A(2), in relation to persons providing information society services.”
(4) In section 50 (defences)—
(a) after subsection (6) insert—“(6A) Where—
(a) a person is charged with an offence under section 49, and(b) the offence relates to the inclusion of any matter in a publication in contravention of a direction under section 45A(2),it shall be a defence, unless subsection (6B) or (8) applies, to prove that the person in relation to whom the direction was given had given written consent to the inclusion of that matter in the publication.(6B) Written consent is not a defence by virtue of subsection (6A) if the person was under the age of 18 at the time the consent was given.”, and
(b) in subsection (8), after “defence” insert “by virtue of subsections (5) to (7)”.”