My Lords, this is a short but significant Bill. Its core aim is to provide reassurance to people who act in socially beneficial ways, behave in a generally responsible manner, or act selflessly to protect someone in danger by ensuring that the courts recognise their actions and always take that context into account in the event that something goes wrong and they are sued.
The Bill forms part of a much wider programme of measures that the Government have taken forward to tackle unjustified and dubious claims and reduce fears of litigation. That includes transforming no-win no-fee arrangements; banning referral fees paid between lawyers, insurance claims firms and others for profitable claims; and preventing inducements in the form of cash incentives or gifts being offered by claims management companies. The latter provision is in the process of being extended to the legal profession more generally through provisions in the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill currently going through your Lordships’ House.
Before telling the House a little more about the Bill, I should declare a personal interest. During my practice as a barrister before achieving my current position, I frequently represented local authorities, the police, the fire brigade, the NHS, the Medical Defence Union and, on occasion, claimants. I was also a special adviser to the Department for Constitutional Affairs on a report that led to the Compensation Bill.
The Bill aims to achieve its goal by requiring the court, when considering the steps that a person was required to take to meet a standard of care in a claim for negligence or relevant breach of statutory duty, to have regard to three factors.
First, Clause 2 provides that the court must have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members. That will give reassurance not only to voluntary organisations but to individuals who perform acts of kindness or make other helpful contributions to the community. The Government have already taken a range of initiatives to promote volunteering and socially beneficial activity, and we are pleased to say that the number of people volunteering is steadily on the increase. For example, we have part-funded Join In, the Olympic volunteering legacy programme so recently referred to in your Lordships’ House, which has allowed sports clubs to flourish at grass-roots level, providing worthwhile activities for volunteers and aspiring athletes alike. The Step Up to Serve initiative was launched last year by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, and aims to double the number of young people aged between 10 and 20 participating in social action by 2020. We also continue to support the Alzheimer’s Society in recruiting supporters for those suffering from dementia.
Through the promotion of such schemes, we want to build a cohesive and altruistic society, and the Bill will help to further that aim by ensuring that people who want to get involved are not discouraged from socially beneficial action by the fear of being sued. A survey carried out in 2007 by the National Centre for Social Research and the Institute for Voluntary Action Research found that that issue was cited by 47% of those questioned who were currently not volunteering.
That message was confirmed in the important report published following the 2010 election by my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham, Common Sense, Common Safety. Four years ago I made my maiden speech on the publication of that report, an event that will be remembered only by me and possibly my wife. There was also the task force chaired by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts on Unshackling Good Neighbours. During the passage of the Bill through the other place, evidence was provided by the National Council for Voluntary Organisations which showed that this is still a matter of concern for many people, and is a significant factor in deterring those who would otherwise volunteer. I mentioned my noble friend Lord Hodgson. I know that he supports this Bill, for two reasons. First, he referred to it explicitly in his speech on the gracious Speech, and secondly he told me so in person last week. Unfortunately, he is unable to attend because he is abroad.
Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 attempted to address similar issues. It provides that the courts may look at whether requiring particular steps to be taken to meet a standard of care might prevent a desirable activity being carried out to any extent or discourage people from undertaking functions in relation to it. As the evidence from the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and others shows, this appears to have done little to reassure those who still say that worries about liability prevent them getting involved in socially valuable activities. The current Bill goes further than the Compensation Act did by making it a requirement for the courts to take account of the context where someone is acting in a socially beneficial way for the benefit of others.
Secondly, Clause 3 of the Bill requires the court to have regard to whether a person, in carrying out the activity in the course of which the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred, demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others. This represents a change to the law, as case law does not currently require a court to do this. Clause 3 will oblige the court to weigh that factor in the balance when considering a person’s liability for negligence, or breach of a relevant statutory duty. This will reassure organisations, individuals and small businesses who have taken a generally responsible approach to the safety of others during an activity that the law is on their side.
It cannot be fair that such people feel pressured to settle speculative and dubious claims. So as well as giving that reassurance, we hope that this provision will give them greater confidence in resisting such claims and indeed—this is important—will help to deter such claims being brought at all. The clause is broadly drafted to ensure that it is relevant in a wide range of different situations, and will be available to bodies such as small businesses, volunteering organisations, religious groups and social clubs, as well as to individuals.
There has been some criticism that the Bill will undermine the rights of employees. Among these is the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. I can reassure the House that this is not the case. There is nothing in this clause, nor in the Bill more generally, that will prevent somebody who has been injured bringing a claim, or prevent the court finding an employer or any other defendant negligent if the circumstances of the case warrant it. In addition, the focus of the clause is on whether a generally responsible approach was adopted in the course of the activity in which it is alleged the negligence occurred. The requirement to consider whether the defendant’s approach was generally responsible applies to the activity in the course of which the alleged negligence occurred. It will not, therefore, enable a body with a slipshod approach to safety to escape liability, for example, because its general health and safety record would need to be satisfactory over a longer period.
The third main area of the Bill, Clause 4, addresses another key area of concern, and gives reassurance to those brave members of the public who see another person in danger and come to their aid. It does this by requiring the court to have regard to the context of such selfless actions in the event that a claim for negligence or breach of a relevant statutory duty is brought.
Unfortunately, there remains a reluctance among some members of the public to intervene and assist those in danger or distress because they are afraid of being sued should something go wrong. This is illustrated by the fact that 34% of those who responded to a recent survey conducted by St John Ambulance indicated that they were concerned about the legal repercussions of intervening. Clause 4 therefore provides reassurance that heroic behaviour in emergencies will be taken into account by the courts in the event of a claim being brought. I recognise that St John Ambulance has expressed some concern about the wording of Clause 4. I am sure that, if we have the opportunity, we will debate those concerns in more detail in Committee.
In concluding, I reaffirm that the Bill does not seek to confer immunity from civil liability on anyone whose actions fall within its scope. Those who are injured through negligence will continue to have access to legal redress and the Bill will not affect the court’s ability to do justice in an individual case. The Bill ensures that the important matters it deals with are always considered by the courts, alongside all other pertinent factors as appropriate.
I believe that the Bill takes a fair and proportionate approach that will provide valuable reassurance to those who act responsibly in the course of an activity, heroically or more generally for the benefit of society by requiring the courts to take that into account, while ensuring at the same time that those who are genuinely injured through negligence can obtain redress where that is appropriate. I commend the Bill to the House.
Amendment to the Motion
My Lords, this has been a very interesting, entertaining and helpful debate, in which a number of useful points have been raised. As I explained in my opening speech, our core aim in introducing the Bill is to provide reassurance to people who act in a socially beneficial way, behave in a generally responsible manner, or act selflessly to protect someone in danger that the courts will always take the context of their actions into account in the event that something goes wrong and they are sued.
The amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, seeks to prevent the Bill from receiving a Second Reading on the basis of two premises: first, that the subject matter of the Bill is already covered by Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006; and, secondly, that the sole purpose of the Bill is not to make new law but to send a message to the courts, and that that is not a proper use of legislation. The Government do not accept that either premise is correct. As I explained, Clause 3 does change the law—albeit not in a major way—by requiring the courts to have regard to whether a person, in carrying out the activity in the course of which the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred, demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others.
In making that change, we want to ensure that the courts take a slightly broader view of the defendant’s conduct than at present by looking at whether a defendant’s approach to safety during an activity was generally a responsible one, taking into account all that he did or did not do. The court will be obliged to weigh that in the balance when considering the ultimate question of whether the defendant met the required standard of care. While that does not rewrite the law in detail, it is a substantive change. If it were to tip the balance in favour of the defendant in a particular case, then that is a result with which the Government would be happy.
Clauses 2, 3 and 4 also require the court to take particular factors into account. While, as I have said, Clause 2 relates to broadly similar territory to that in Section 1 of the Compensation Act, the approach that it takes is different. It requires the court to have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members. The fact that the fear of litigation remains so widespread almost a decade after Section 1 was introduced only goes to suggest that it has been ineffective and that firmer action, such as this, needs to be taken.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said that I had paid scant regard to the Compensation Act in my opening remarks. Let me attempt to make good that omission. In her introduction to the Compensation Bill, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, said:
“The Bill will provide better safeguards for consumers of claims management services and will reassure those concerned about possible litigation that the law of negligence takes the social value of activities into account and that they will not be found liable if they adopt reasonable standards and procedures”.
After dealing with the regulation of claims management services, she went on to say:
“The Bill's provision on negligence reflects recent judgments of the higher courts. It makes clear that when considering a claim in negligence, in deciding what is required to meet the standard of care in particular circumstances, a court is able to consider the wider social value of … the context of which the injury or damage occurred. It provides that the court can have regard to whether requiring particular steps to be taken to meet the standard of care might prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken or might discourage people involved in providing the activity from doing so.
The Bill forms part of a wider programme of work which is being taken forward across government and, in partnership with stakeholders, to tackle perceptions that can lead to a disproportionate fear of litigation and risk averse behaviour, to find ways to discourage and resist bad claims and to improve the system for those with a valid claim for compensation”.—[Official Report, 3/11/05; cols. WS 29-30.]
At Second Reading, the noble Baroness said:
“This Bill is part of a much wider set of initiatives that is being taken forward across government. The Government are determined to tackle practices that stop normal activities taking place because people fear litigation, or have become risk-averse. We want to stop people from being encouraged to bring frivolous or speculative claims for compensation. The provisions in this Bill will help us do that. They will reassure people who are concerned about being sued that, if they adopt reasonable standards and procedures, they will not be found liable”.
Later, she said, referring to Clause 1, that:
“This provision reflects guidance given by the higher courts during a considerable period and renewed in recent cases. It will ensure that not only all courts but also litigants and potential litigants are fully aware of this, and will provide reassurance to the many people and organisations, such as those in the voluntary sector, who are concerned about possible litigation”.—[Official Report, 28/11/05; cols. 81-82.]
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, seemed to imply that the notion of a compensation culture was entirely in the imagination of this Government, but it appears to have featured quite heavily in the imagination of the previous Government.
When I said that the noble Lord had paid scant regard to Section 1, I thought that I would be understood as saying that he did not attempt to say why Section 1 does not cover everything in this Bill. Indeed, what he has just read out makes it clear that it does cover everything in this Bill.
Indeed, but the noble and learned Lord is saying in his amendment that this Bill should not get a Second Reading because the matter is covered by Section 1 of the Compensation Act. I am identifying what lay behind the legislation when it was brought in, what it attempted to do and why, if the noble and learned Lord will bear with me, it failed to do so.
The noble Lord read out the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, in the previous Labour Government. I referred to Greek legend, and I concede entirely that the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, and the previous Labour Government nodded, as did Homer. I would not defend the section of that Act but the noble Lord has to point to any distinction between the effect of that Act and the present Bill.
I am entirely aware of the question that the noble Lord asked and I am attempting to answer it.
Perhaps I may go on to refer to what happened following the passing of that Bill. Was there a fundamental change in the compensation culture? What happened? After the coalition Government came to power, my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham produced his report Common Sense, Common Safety, which was widely applauded by all sides of your Lordships’ House. He observed in his report that there was a growing fear among business owners of having to pay out for even the most unreasonable claims. The fear of business owners and small business owners, referred to by my noble friend Lord Cotter, is a reasonable matter to take into account. My noble friend Lord Young also identified a public misconception that,
“we can be liable for the consequences of any voluntary acts on our part”.
He described this belief as “particularly pernicious” because it might,
“deter people from engaging in organised voluntary activities in the mistaken belief that they can be sued should anything go wrong”.
He recommended that people who seek to do good in our society should not fear litigation as a result of their actions. He said:
“It is important to have clarity around this issue and at some point in the future we should legislate to achieve this if we cannot ensure by other means that people are aware of their legal position when undertaking such acts”.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson, whose report Unshackling Good Neighbours has been referred to, led a task force established by Nick Hurd, the son of my noble friend Lord Hurd, who has spoken on this issue. He may have observed that unfortunately his son did not share his lack of enthusiasm for the Bill when speaking in a brief intervention in the House of Commons. Fortunately, the family of Hodgson was more together than the family of Hurd. My noble friend Lord Hodgson said that the fear of becoming involved in litigation was a major preoccupation that deterred people from volunteering. The task force acknowledged the work of various government departments in producing guidance on health and safety, but argued that it was unlikely to provide volunteers with the general reassurance that they seek. The task force took the view that the Government’s efforts seemed,
“‘to fall short’ of Lord Young’s recommendation to clarify through legislation if necessary that people would not be held liable for any consequences due to well-intentioned voluntary acts on their part”.
The response of Dr Davis Smith in his evidence to the Public Bill Committee was also important. His perspective as the executive director of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations was interesting. He said:
“Parliament has a hugely important role in sending out messages about what is valued in society, and I think that sending out the message that volunteering and community and social action has a hugely beneficial role to play in society—recognising that there are barriers and difficulties that must be addressed—is a really important function that Parliament can play. Even the process of having discussions such as this and getting the debates out as part of the passage of legislation is helpful in raising awareness in society more broadly”.—[Official Report, Commons, Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill Committee, 4/9/14; col. 14.]
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, challenge me to say that this Bill effectively adds nothing to the Compensation Act. I respectfully suggest that since the Act we have had an explosion of claims. These have resulted in what I submit to the House is an extremely sensible part of the LASPO Act, which implemented the Jackson reforms and went a considerable way to stopping the explosion of claims by modifying the amount of cost that could be recovered.
We have improved the control of claims management. The question of claims management was touched on in the Compensation Act. It went nothing like far enough. We have reduced the number of claims management companies. We have introduced a successful unit to monitor carefully what claims management companies do. They have halved in number. We now have heavy fines if they transgress in any way. We have introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill, still before your Lordships’ House, provisions that will deter fraudulent claims.
Anyone who watches television or reads newspapers will, I suspect, share with me the feeling of depression and disgust at the vulgar advertising for claims brought, which are often meritless. People resent being telephoned and asked to take part in a fraud, and being told that they have been involved in an accident of which they have no recollection. For those who say that the compensation culture is a mere figment of the Government’s imagination, I say that they are not paying attention to what normal people say.
Is the noble Lord able to identify what proportion of these claims relates to the provisions of this Bill? What proportion of them relates to claims for compensation for injuries suffered as the result of voluntary activity or heroic action?
I will not give details of particular claims. In opening this Second Reading debate I said that this Bill is intended to reassure those who might be reluctant to volunteer. It intends to set out matters that the court is required to take into account when deciding on cases that potentially generate those factors with which the Bill is concerned.
Can we really conclude that the Compensation Act answered the questions posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton? I say “posed”, though the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, disavows her concern. The answer, I fear, is no. What difference is there between the terms of the Compensation Act and the terms of this Bill? One said “may” and the other said “must”. Noble Lords may remember that the difference between “may” and “must” last week caused the House to be divided on more than one occasion, so crucial was it in the interpretation of the particular Bill. Furthermore, the Opposition in the House of Commons thought that it was a sufficiently important difference to table an amendment, removing “must” and inserting “may”. There is a difference, I respectfully submit, between the provisions in this Bill and the provisions in the Compensation Act.
What is not entirely clear—and I accept this on behalf of the Government—is that all Members of your Lordships’ House know the target at which the Bill is aiming. I readily accept, as was apparent from the previous Government, that it is a very difficult target to hit. We do not suggest that judges are routinely getting matters wrong, or that they ignore these factors. However, they will now have to take those into account, and in many cases that will be an unnecessary enjoinder. Clearly, on the face of the statute will be that obligation. This Bill will contribute to an increasing reassurance which I hope the public has and that volunteers have in approaching life, which inevitably has many risks.
This debate has divided roughly—only roughly—between lawyers who are hostile to the Bill and non-lawyers who seem rather more, with exceptions, in favour of it. We, as lawyers, should reflect a little on the occasional disconnect that exists not only between politicians and the public but sometimes between lawyers and the public. Should Parliament be legislating in this fashion at all if it is simply sending a message? I entirely accept what my noble friend Lord Hurd said about the fact that one should be very cautious indeed before legislating simply to send a message. But, on the other hand, I suggest that it would be idle to pretend that part of what we do is not conveying an important message.
One has to think only of the amendment that the Government brought forward, with considerable help from my noble friends on the Liberal Democrat Benches and with support from the Opposition, on the question of revenge porn. It sent a clear message that this House of Lords thoroughly disapproved of that activity. The reality was that the offence was probably captured by other specific criminal offences within the canon of criminal law. So strong was the general feeling that we should identify specifically this behaviour that we sent a message by legislation and made law. What is the Modern Slavery Bill about? Of course, it has important provisions in relation to modern slavery, but is accompanied by all the publicity about what to look for in slavery. Legislation is not always the dry dust of particular words. The context in which we legislate is extremely important.
I was asked many questions during the debate, and I will answer all of them in writing in due course. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not answer them all now. I can reassure a number of those who asked about the emergency services, for example. I hasten to add that we are very keen to encourage first aid, but nothing about this will alter the sensible practice that should be adopted by the emergency services. The law in that respect has been well visited by a number of courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. This will not change that.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in an amusing speech, referred to that well known student of jurisprudence Sybil Fawlty, and expressed the view that the case of Tomlinson, which was the backdrop to the Compensation Act, was a statement of the obvious. Why then, I ask rhetorically, was it necessary for the case to go all the way to the House of Lords, which deals only with difficult matters of law on which there is uncertainty? If the case was so straightforward it should either have been settled immediately or been disposed of without an appeal to the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords. Unfortunately it can be the case that courts take a little time, when faced with appalling accidents which result in serious injury, to come to the—sometimes reluctant—conclusion that they must deny compensation in the face of an apparently deserving claimant.
Much has been said about the need to sometimes take risks. Few were more robust advocates of that approach than my noble friend Lord Attlee. Much of what he said was true: we want people to take sensible risks but we are not encouraging them to do anything or forcing them to volunteer or take part in activities if they do not want to. However, it is a sad fact that people are deterred: they are aware of the risk of compensation and I am sure that most Members of your Lordships’ House agree that this can act as a negative factor in both their ability and their willingness to volunteer. Indeed, it can reduce the enjoyment of life. The Bill’s core purpose is to reassure a wide range of people who should not be deterred from engaging in these activities. I do not accept that it is improper for legislation to have such a purpose. I suggest that it is a proper use of legislation and will provide valuable support for voluntary organisations and small businesses. They can make a contribution to society without being constrained or, at least, being far less constrained by worries about being sued.
Noble and learned Lords will, undoubtedly, examine the provisions of the Bill closely in Committee—if there is one—and on Report. I do not suggest, for a moment, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, is not entitled to take the course he apparently wants, of testing the opinion of the House at Second Reading. The Bill passed through the House of Commons; it received some support—albeit it has been criticised—in your Lordships’ House; it could certainly benefit from examination by those who are experienced in these matters when it proceeds further. However, I hope that he is persuaded that the Bill deserves our consideration. If it is sending a message, it is one that should be heard. It is making a small but important change in the law where there is a need for change. In all those circumstances, I ask him to consider carefully whether it would not be better to withdraw his amendment.