Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Main Page: Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Falconer of Thoroton's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is not a question of sympathy. As the noble Lord well understands, it is a question of not committing a future Government as to how they would respond to this position.
It might help if I clarify that the scope of civil legal aid is set out in the LASPO Act 2012. It provides that civil legal services are to be made available subject to satisfying the means and merits and the matter or type of case being within the scope of the civil legal aid scheme. In order to bring a matter within the scope of the civil legal aid scheme, an amendment to Part 1 of Schedule 1 to LASPO would need to be made. The power to make such an amendment by way of affirmative secondary legislation is already set out in LASPO. It would therefore be unnecessary and not usual practice for separate provision to be made in other primary legislation to provide such a power.
That is the position quite apart from the question of exceptional funding, which is concerned, as I said when we were last in Committee, with matters where it could be said that there was a violation of the convention right or, alternatively, a violation—although I do not think it is relevant—of some provision of EU law. That remains an uncertain provision, but it could potentially be relevant, so that is my answer.
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification saying, in effect, that there is already power to make sure that this is covered so far as legal aid is concerned under existing legislation. Three points are worth making. First, the key point is that anyone in the situation of considering an assisted death should feel that they would have access to proper legal advice so that the application would not appear to be a burden. Secondly, I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, that it is difficult to identify what an individual case might cost and involve. Some cases will involve no opposition, it being completely agreed and clear that this is the right course to take but nevertheless it should still go to the High Court. It would be very helpful to have a lawyer to help the family through that process. Others may involve more. I suspect that most cases would be on the uncontested end of the spectrum, but we have to provide for the other end of the spectrum as well.
I submit that the appropriate course to take would be that this is covered by legal aid. We should also try to build in easy access in hospitals and with doctors so that people know where they can go to get this help. The key thing is that the family should know that if they need legal help they can get it, it can be obtained easily and quickly and if they cannot afford it it will not cost them anything. I agree in principle with the approach that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is taking. I suspect that it will not need an amendment to the Bill.
In this context, it is for the Committee to consider the appropriate term. I decline to go any further.
My Lords, this has been a very impressive debate. I completely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said about it being in the right tone.
I shall make three points. First, I acknowledge the speech by my noble friend Lord Cashman, which was of immense power and immense pain. He made the incredibly important point that in the circumstances in which he found himself, he was very clear about the distinction between assisted dying and suicide. I understand the difficulty and the pain that must have been involved in making that speech. All Members of Committee appreciate that.
Secondly, there are two separate groups in this group of amendments. One group is those amendments which wish to change various bits of the wording of the Bill to refer more often to the word “suicide”. Not one of those points has been pursued in detail except for the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, as regards Clause 4, in which he sought to suggest that the use in the draft Bill of the word “self-administration” was in some way euphemistic. It was not. It was used because a vital brick in the Bill is that the person has to do the last act to himself or herself. They have to do it to make clear that it is not euthanasia. That is why that word is there; it is not in any way intended to be euphemistic.
As regards the other matter, the Title of the Bill—which is the key point in the debate—I have thought very carefully about what the Bill should be called. I am always wary when I think to myself, “What will other people think I mean?”. When I hear noble Lords speculating about what the public may think, I am always rather wary; all we can do is to go by the words.
I have used the phrase “assisted dying” for three reasons. First, it is accurate. The purpose of my Bill as drafted is to:
“Enable competent adults who are terminally ill to be provided at their request with specified assistance to end their own life”.
That is the wording of the Long Title. Nobody in this debate has questioned its accuracy. What is the right way to convey a Long Title in a short title? In my view the right and most accurate way is by using the words “assisted dying”. That is why, after very considerable thought and having discussed it with people—not just people in favour but also lawyers—I wished to convey accurately what the position was.
The second reason is that to call the Bill “the Assisted Suicide Bill” would, as a matter of law, give the wrong impression. The words “assisted suicide” would give the impression that assistance could be given in any category of suicide. The third reason was that touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, who said that those engaged in helping people as regards suicide are very antipathetic to the words “committing suicide”. There is a moral opprobrium attached to it. For those three reasons I decided that the right wording was “assisted dying”. I urge the Committee to accept the Title as it is.
My Lords, my comments would have been most apposite when I tried to intervene earlier. At that point, the noble and learned Lord was quoting from the contribution from my noble friend Lord Mawhinney, who referred to Clause 4. I observe that that clause talks about prescribing,
“medicines for that person to enable that person to end their own life”.
Does he agree with me that the worst euphemism here is the use of the word “medicines”?
My Lords, we have had a very interesting debate on the first amendment in this group, which is very limited. I observe that the Bill does not alter the law on suicide. Suicide is not a crime. If your Lordships think about it, if suicide is successful, you cannot prosecute.
It does alter the law on suicide because it gives a specified defence.
It alters the law on assisting suicide, and it will be for the Committee, during the discussion of the amendments that lie ahead, to determine whether it alters that law in an effective and secure way. That is not the issue here. The issue in the first amendment is simply: what is the Bill about? I hope that one of these days your Lordships’ House will consider a Bill on assisted suicide. As many noble Lords have said, that involves a much wider category of issues than this particular issue. We should not pre-empt a possible Bill in which we gave expression to compassion and care for the dying with this very specific Bill, which is about something rather different. I understand the reservations of the proponents of the Bill. They feel that this is an unpleasant word to have in the Bill more prominently, but it also represents the particular purpose of the legislation more accurately, and I wish to test the opinion of the Committee.
My Lords, I do not have anything to add on that particular point.
This has been an excellent debate which has gone to the heart of some of the most difficult parts of the Bill. Why is six months the right period? Of course, we have heard plenty of informed opinion about how difficult it is to make a prognosis of any accuracy. In Amendment 21, a period of six weeks is suggested as a better period. It may be that that enables a clearer prognosis to be given, but it seems extremely short for the various practicalities and safeguards to give the Bill any real meaning. Inevitably, six months is something of a compromise; the question is whether it is a satisfactory compromise. It will not, of course, suit everybody.
It is something of an irony that one of the spurs behind this Bill and our debates is the Supreme Court’s decision in Nicklinson, which was concerned with the desire of two men with locked-in syndrome—an almost totally paralysing but not terminal condition—to request assistance to die. The Committee might like to be reminded that the President, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, commenting in the judgment on the Falconer commission and the six-month period, said:
“That would not assist the applicants”.
I am sure that that is not in dispute. He went on:
“Further, I find it a somewhat unsatisfactory suggestion. Quite apart from the notorious difficulty in assessing life expectancy even for the terminally ill, there seems to me to be significantly more justification in assisting people to die if they have the prospect of living for many years a life that they regarded as valueless, miserable and often painful, than if they have only a few months left to live”.
These are very difficult questions and I look forward to hearing the answer from the noble and learned Lord.
I am again grateful for a very good debate. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, as ever, that this goes to important issues in the debate. I accept the definition given by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, of these issues, which go to the safeguards.
In looking at the safeguards, it is important to put into context the safeguards in the current draft of the Bill: two doctors, independent of each other, certifying that the patient has a terminal illness which they reasonably expect will end their life within the next six months; the two doctors, independent of each other, certifying that the person has made a voluntary decision, that they have the capacity to make that decision and that it is their firm and settled intention that they wish to take their own life in those circumstances; and that decision is not to be given effect without the consent of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice. Those are the safeguards.
Let us look at the proposals in the light of those existing safeguards. First, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, proposes, in effect, that a person must have as one of the doctors a general practitioner with whom he or she has been registered for the last six months—I understand that registration is a concept that only has relevance to a general practitioner. That proposal, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has pointed out, appears not to deal with people in the following circumstances: somebody who, for example, moves to live near their relatives, then gets ill and is not registered for six months; somebody whose general practice, for example one run by a sole practitioner, packs up; or somebody who, for example, has a general practitioner who has a conscientious objection to the use of the provisions of the Bill.
If Parliament were to pass a Bill giving people the right to an assisted death, I venture to suggest that it would be a very odd conclusion that your ability to access that right would depend on the adventitious circumstance of whether, for example, you had moved one month before to be near your son and daughter, as my own stepmother did. That does not seem a sensible basis. However, a very powerful thread in this—which has been mentioned in particular by the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Empey—is the idea of a doctor who does not, as it were, properly consider the merits of an individual case but is, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, available for hire. That is something that I would wish to avoid as much as possible. I venture to suggest that there may be three ways to deal with it.
First, I would expect the medical bodies to produce guidance. That can be given effect to, because a High Court judge would have to be satisfied that an appropriate process had been gone through. In addition to that, I note that, according to Clause 3(7), the independent doctor has to be “suitably qualified” in that he,
“holds such qualification or has such experience in respect of the diagnosis and management of terminal illness as the Secretary of State may specify in regulations”.
I would anticipate that the Secretary of State would be able to make in regulations provisions that make it clear that the independent doctor could not be the sort of doctor that the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Empey, and others referred to. If there are better ways of dealing with the doctor for hire situation, I am very willing to hear and discuss them and bring them forward at the next stage, but I am absolutely clear that the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is suggesting it be dealt with is unworkable and unfair and cuts at the heart of the Bill.
I have a serious question for the noble and learned Lord, which I am sure he will answer seriously. The thrust of what I am saying in my amendment, with my noble colleagues who have signed it, is that the gateway that is provided in Clause 2 should be subject to two doctors—doctors who can be shown to have some considerable knowledge of the person’s case. Is he willing to accept that principle?
I do not accept it in the way that the noble Lord has formulated it. I say that there should be two doctors who have properly, on good evidence, considered the case. It may well be that neither of those doctors has been engaged in the long-term or even short-term care of the person. But I would be satisfied with the gateway involving two doctors who have gone through a proper and rigorous process, and I disagree with the noble Lord when he says that they have to have known the person for six months. Indeed, I do not think he is even saying that because registration over a six-month period would not necessarily involve any contact whatever with the general practitioner.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, who has made a helpful response, up to a point. If the Bill were to go further, would he be prepared to enter into discussions on the clear basis that Clause 2 would have to be amended to ensure, first, that there were two doctors involved in that gateway—whatever the gateway is, because we are going to consider another group shortly that is relevant—and, secondly, that it should be shown that at least one of those doctors has had detailed past consideration of the patient’s case? It seems to me that that sort of measure is the only way of ensuring that we do not have a Shipman-type situation.
The first point about the two doctors is dealt with in Clause 3, because the second doctor has to certify that he is content. The noble Lord is getting frightfully agitated. If he looks at Clause 3, he will see that it requires certification by a second, independent doctor.
Secondly, the noble Lord asked whether I would enter into discussions in relation to putting in the Bill that one of the doctors has had to be involved in the care of the patient. No, I would not because I think it is satisfactorily dealt with in the Bill as it stands, for the reasons I have indicated. I will answer the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, first, and then go to the noble Lord, Lord Maginnis.
I am concerned very much about this problem of doctors for hire. Does the noble and learned Lord not agree that there is another way, on top of the ones he has described, of dealing with this problem? If he looks at my Amendment 36, he will see it suggests that no doctor should sign a declaration of this sort more than once every four years. I am intent on establishing the principle; whether it is four years or less, I am perfectly happy to have discussions and hear what other people say. But surely to deal with the problem of doctors for hire you could put a limit on the frequency with which a doctor could sign these declarations. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, who I believe is not here today, has put down another amendment, Amendment 37, which proposes a timescale of very much less—I think that, for one of the doctors, it is once every two months, which I think is far too frequent. I would be perfectly happy on Report to put down another amendment, if the noble and learned Lord would give it a fair wind, which would put a limit—let us say two or three years—on how often a doctor could sign such declarations, which, after all, will be pretty rare events.
I am very happy to discuss with the noble Lord the idea of there being some limit. I have thought carefully about the limit issue. My inclination is against a limit for the following reason: that there might be doctors—for example, those engaged in the treatment of particular sorts of cancer, covering a particularly wide area of the country—for whom, if the Bill is passed, a limitation of the kind that the noble Lord has suggested, whereby somebody could not countersign a declaration if they had signed one in the previous four years, does not sound appropriate. However, I am completely engaged on how one seeks to deal with the issue of doctors for hire. I would be more than happy to discuss it, but I do not want to give a misleading impression. My current thinking is that it would not be a good idea to put a limit on it.
I was to some extent motivated to intervene at this stage because the noble and learned Lord alluded to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, as being “agitated”. I thought, “That’s a word that perhaps the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, would consider”, because it appears that, as we have moved through this debate, he has moved more and more to provision for the exceptional case; for example, if somebody does not have a doctor, or they do not have a doctor for a certain length of time. No good legislation should be brought forward on the basis of extraordinary cases. If those matters arise, the legislation can be amended, but I am very worried that we are arguing a flawed case based on extraordinary circumstances that may arise.
I could not agree more with the approach that underlies what the noble Lord, Lord Maginnis, has said. That is why, although I accept and admire the spirit in which it is offered, I do not think that it is a sensible amendment, because it would lead to so many situations that would then not have been covered by a Bill which, on this hypothesis, had been passed. It would therefore be a very bad idea to accept it. I acknowledge and accept the idea that you should not pass a Bill that then leads to problems, which is exactly what the amendment would do. However, I anticipate that the noble Lord would say that he had the precise reverse in mind.
I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, and particularly for the references that he has made to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, my noble friend Lord Jopling, and me. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, he understandably poured some cold water on the four-year limit, but would he accept that a limit of a reasonable time would help allay the fears that my noble friend Lord Jopling, the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and I all have?
As I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, I am more than happy to talk about it. The example of the cancer specialist or the motor neurone disease specialist makes me instinctively, having considered it quite carefully, against the idea of any limit, but I am more than happy to discuss it.
My Lords, I listened with great care to what the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said. The noble and learned Lord has been very helpful in saying that he will negotiate with people and talk further about this. Could he not think a little more widely, because there is real concern about the medical profession as a whole being involved in this? I am also concerned about the nursing profession and other clinical specialists who could be involved. As I read the Bill, it makes room for that.
Professionalism is such an important element in the work of all those people who work in the NHS. Professionalism is indicated by the values, behaviour and relationships that underpin the trust that the public have in doctors, nurses and other clinicians. One reason why I am against the Bill is that I think it is so damaging to the medical and other professions. I have listened to my noble friend Lord McColl, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and others. The commitment of the people in that service is outstanding. We know that doctors are the most trusted of all the professions. The trust is there because we know the intention of those people in treating us. We know that they come committed to cure, to treat, to alleviate pain and to be compassionate. The Bill goes against that.
Does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, not think that we could be a bit more imaginative? Building on the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which was passed at the previous Committee sitting, could we not have a person appointed by the court to carry the drug, medicine, dose or poison—whatever you want to call it—and actually administer it? If a nurse or a doctor finds that the patient cannot quite administer it, because they are compassionate people, will they not help that person to do it? Are they not then in real danger of cutting across the whole tenet of the Bill?
Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will talk to some of the rest of us. I have tabled amendments to enable that to happen, but we will probably not get to them today. Will he not widen his vision of the Bill to see whether he can protect the medical, nursing and other professions by building on the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to have a person appointed by the court?
I could answer that, but the noble Baroness has tabled a later amendment. I am not at all unsympathetic to what she is saying—although I think that it is adequately dealt with by the Bill—but I do not think that it is appropriate to be taken into that debate when we are dealing with other amendments. I am sorry, but I do not think that that is an intervention to which I should appropriately respond, because other people have made contentions in the course of the debate. With respect, to hive off into the noble Baroness’s later amendment does not seem a sensible way to conduct our business. I am sorry.
I should like clarification from the noble and learned Lord. I think he said that Clause 2 required two practitioners, but on my reading it requires only one. If there is one practitioner and a person is diagnosed with a terminal illness, the terminal illness is, if you like, the gate into everything else in the Bill. That I have a terminal illness allows everything else to follow. If one doctor diagnoses a terminal illness, there is the possibility that that doctor may do so at the behest of relatives. The motives of those relatives may be benign or malign. If the person gets a diagnosis of that kind from a medical specialist, that may change their whole perspective on life. The mere fact that someone has said to them, “You are terminally ill. You are going to die in six months”, when that has not been said before, may lead them to think, “Perhaps I should seek assisted suicide”.
That may be quite an unintended consequence of limiting this, but at least if we have two doctors, in some form or another, as suggested by the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, surely there would be some protection. As I read the Bill as it stands, there is very little protection for the vulnerable person who is lying in bed and seeking some way to find a way through this. Terminal illness and serious pain have a number of effects. One is to cloud judgment and another is to sap the zest for life. That zest, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and others have said, may well be restored by palliative care, which relieves the pain, as the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has said. This is such an unsatisfactory provision that I should like the noble and learned Lord to confirm whether I am right.
I think the noble Baroness is wrong. I thought that I had said Clause 3 but maybe I did not. Clause 3(3) requires two doctors to sign the person’s declaration that the person,
“is terminally ill … has the capacity to make the decision to end their own life; and … has a clear and settled intention to end their life which has been reached voluntarily, on an informed basis and without coercion or duress”.
If I inadvertently said Clause 2, I meant Clause 3 and I apologise. It involves two doctors. We could go into the debate about vulnerability again, but with regard to clarification on whether two doctors are required, I think the Bill is utterly clear.
I just want to understand which clause we are debating. I thought we were debating Clause 2, which refers to a registered practitioner. As I said, I know that there are other safeguards that the noble and learned Lord is trying to write into the Bill, but the reality is that the realisation of this clause in a person’s life may have significant unintended consequences. I simply wanted to ask the noble and learned Lord whether there is one doctor in Clause 2 or two.
It is obviously my fault for not properly explaining this. As I understand the noble Baroness’s point, she is asking whether only one doctor has to decide whether the person is terminally ill.
No, I am talking about the point at which we open the gate and make the Bill apply. I know that in subsequent situations the process develops. I think that one of the weaknesses of the Bill is that the processes are kind of confused. At this stage of the Bill, though, is there one doctor who will say to the person, “You are terminally ill, with six months to live”, so that all other discussions can then take place and you can move towards seeking the declarations and that sort of thing? I just thought it might be helpful to be clear in my mind what we are talking about.
That is a fair point. The process is that one doctor says the person is terminally ill. The patient declares that they want to take their own life and then the second doctor has to confirm both the terminal illness and the firm and settled intention, voluntariness and capacity. I am not quite sure what further point the noble Baroness is making. She is right that Clause 2 refers to the initial doctor and Clause 3 refers to the second, but the process involves two doctors. I can take it no further than that, I am afraid.
The next point that was raised about the safeguard was the suggestion that we reduce the period from six months to six weeks. I completely accept that there are uncertainties from time to time about diagnosis. A judgment has to be made as to whether someone is terminally ill and may be reasonably expected to die within six months. I do not believe that that is an impossible task for a doctor to embark upon. As the Minister said, a judgment has to be made on what the right period is. I anticipate that the mood of the Committee is that six weeks is much too short. As a matter of judgment, six months feels right after hearing considerable evidence in the commission, and it also feels right having heard the debate just now.
The fact that diagnoses and predicting the length of time that you have to live are difficult—they are difficult whether the amount of time is six weeks or six months—does not lead me to believe that the Bill should not go forward, or that we should vacate the field in giving people that right. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, said, in this area we are not dealing with certainty. The question is whether, in the absence of certainty—and no provision can give certainty—we should be saying that because you cannot have certainty you cannot have the Bill. In my view, the right conclusion is that even though you cannot have certainty—everybody agrees with that—you should nevertheless have the Bill. Having listened very carefully to the choice between six weeks and six months, and obviously having considered something in between, six months appears to be right in relation to this.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for having finally got on to the timeframe issue and for his acknowledgement that, on a balance of probabilities, things are more likely to be accurate within a shorter timeframe than at six months. Does he accept that it might be worth considering uncoupling the time in which the discussions can occur from the time within which the prognosis indicates that it is eligible for the lethal drugs to be taken to the patient? That was the question that I asked the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and on which the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, came in, but the noble and learned Lord has not answered that question at all.
I apologise to the House for taking so long to get on to the point about six months versus six weeks. I very carefully considered whether one should say that, once you have a diagnosis of six months to live, you should be able to have the discussions but only be able to take the drugs within six weeks. I am strongly against that.
If I may finish, the reason I am against it is that once the diagnosis is given by the doctors, there is a process that will take a considerable time, and that once the court has approved the process and said that somebody should do it, it should be for them to decide when they do it. It would be an unsatisfactory and, I suspect, an unenforceable process to have to go back and get a doctor to say that you have six weeks or less to live. I thought carefully about that point before it was raised. It is not referred to in any amendment and I assumed that nobody had properly considered it. I am against it.
If I may come back on that, does the noble and learned Lord recognise that those discussions are currently being had with patients, day in and day out, up and down the country? It is not as if the Bill, as some noble Lords implied, would be the way in which people start talking about their dying because it should be a routine part of clinical practice, as laid out in the GMC guidance. However, I do not think that he has yet answered my question on whether there would be merit in uncoupling those discussions and that process from the time at which the drugs were delivered. If I hear him right, he is saying that when you are in that zone of complete uncertainty and could toss a coin on it—you might die within six months or, as the noble Lord, Lord McColl, said, within three years; indeed, in the case of some of my patients you might die within 10 years, as it happens—the fact that the doctor has mistakenly said that he believes you are terminally ill would suddenly give the message that you should be considering having an assisted suicide. That would probably start to trigger these discussions. That is the danger in not uncoupling them.
I thought that I had answered the question but I will answer it again. A doctor has concluded that he or she reasonably believes that you have six months or less to live; another doctor has confirmed the diagnosis; and the courts have concluded that it is an appropriate case for an assisted death. Thereafter, my view—I should be clear about this—is that you should be entitled to have an assisted death as prescribed by the Bill. I am therefore against the decoupling of the beginning of the process from the time at which the drug could be taken.
The noble Baroness says that these discussions are taking place at the moment. No, they are not; the discussions taking place are about how somebody wishes to die. It does not involve discussions about assisted dying in the context of my Bill because that is not permitted at the moment, so this is dealing with a new situation. My clear answer to her is that I am not in favour of the decoupling. My proposition is that if two doctors certify and the court says yes, once that process has been gone through, it is for the patient to decide the moment he or she takes the drug, and there should not be another process for a doctor to certify that the patient has six weeks or less to live.
I shall deal with the other points raised in this group. First, for reasons I just cannot understand, the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, suggest that where the Bill states,
“reasonably expected to die within six months”,
or less, the word “reasonably” is deleted. That seems unwise. In my view, it is appropriate that a doctor giving such a diagnosis has a proper and reasonable basis for doing so. I am against that change.
In the context of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the noble Baroness suggests we refer to a “licensed” practitioner rather than a “registered” practitioner. Although I do not agree with the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is making appears to me to be a good one. We should discuss, outside the Chamber, the precise language. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, has an amendment that puts the language in a slightly different way. We are all concerned to allow this to be done only by doctors who have the appropriate qualification and are in practice. I am happy to agree an amendment that reflects that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, made a number of powerful submissions in relation to how this affects disabled people. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, responded to them and made it clear that disabled people can have different views about the adequacy or otherwise of the Bill. I was very struck by the reference to “The Theory of Everything” and Stephen Hawking, who is, in fact, in favour of some process of assisted dying.
The underlying anxiety that has been expressed to me by disabled people is that if we pass an assisted dying Bill, we in some way devalue the lives of disabled people and put them more at risk. I do not believe that we devalue disabled people in any way by passing this Bill. I believe it is incredibly important that disabled people have exactly the same options as everybody else when they are terminally ill. I also believe that the safeguards in the Bill are much stronger than the existing safeguards in relation to decisions about treatment. I completely echo the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made: this will not be forced on anybody. It is an option to be asked for, and even when asked for, it can be given effect only when two doctors have certified that it is appropriate and the High Court of Justice has said that it is okay. Having spoken widely to disabled people, I do not believe that it puts them more at risk than the population as a whole. Although I, like everyone else in the Committee, am very moved by what the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, said, I do not accept the criticism that she makes in relation to the Bill.
I think I have dealt with all the main proposals. This has been a very worthwhile debate. The areas where I think further discussions would be of value are in relation to the “doctor for hire” proposition and how we properly identify the qualification required for a doctor. In relation to the other proposals, I am broadly against them.
I shall just explain some of the worries that the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, has.
In a sentence, every time she goes into hospital, they say, “You don’t want to be resuscitated, do you?”. A lot of disabled people have that question put to them. Does the noble and learned Lord think the Bill is going to change that?
I will take that up. With regard to my Bill, if the situation were reached—the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, referred to this—that somebody had very low air and decided to take advantage of my Bill, they would have to get two doctors to approve it and the High Court of Justice would have to say yes. That is a very different situation from the one that the noble Lord describes. My Bill gives much greater protection as regards somebody who is asking for death than the situation that the noble Lord describes. It is for that reason that I cannot understand why he says that my Bill might make it worse.
Can the noble and learned Lord say if he thinks that pressure might be put on some vulnerable people from family members who want to save money?
The Oregon experience is that that does not happen, but the safeguards—two doctors, and the High Court judge approving it—are in my view sufficient to prevent the sort of abuse to which the noble Baroness refers.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for having responded to the question about the qualification of doctors, which is an amendment to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I will make just a couple of points in response. One is that I am glad to see that the noble and learned Lord recognises that the way the Bill is currently drafted is a problem and that you need doctors with experience, but I wonder how he will achieve that. Clause 3(7) requires, rightly, that the doctor holds an appropriate qualification. However, yesterday the Association for Palliative Medicine published the results of its consultation with its members, which had a very high response rate and showed that only 4% of palliative medicine doctors who are licensed to practice are prepared to have any involvement in this process. Therefore if the conscience clause is to have any meaning, it is something to which we need to return, and I welcome the noble and learned Lord’s commitment to engage in discussions over it. We will come to other amendments later, which I have tabled, on how we might solve the problem, but I do not think that we will get to them today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.