Sterling: Rise in Yields on 30-year Gilts

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Tuesday 14th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

We absolutely will. I completely agree with the noble Baroness. I met Shevaun Haviland last Thursday and we had a very constructive conversation about the measures that the British Chambers of Commerce wants to see to grow the UK economy, which are exactly the same measures that we want to see. The noble Baroness is absolutely right that growth was one of the biggest failures of the previous Government. We are determined to turn that around, which is why we are going further and faster. We are reforming planning, pensions and skills, all of which will significantly boost growth in the UK economy.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, the House will be aware that this country has an outstanding Chancellor of the Exchequer at the moment. However, will the Minister enlighten me as to what influence she really has on the US treasury bill market, which has shown the same spike as in the UK, or on the market for the euro, which has fallen against the dollar to the same extent as has the pound? Is it not the case that questions from the Opposition Front Bench might have more economic relevance if they reflected some understanding of how global markets actually work?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My noble friend is absolutely right and I echo his comments about the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There are limits to what she can do, but she is absolutely able to focus on the priorities of this Government. As noble Lords will know, this Government inherited a £22 billion black hole in the public finances left by the previous Government. She has taken very difficult decisions to deal with it, every single one of which has been opposed by the party opposite. However, they were the right decisions because we had to repair the public finances and ensure fiscal responsibility. She has set extremely tough fiscal rules—tougher than those of previous Governments—again, opposed by the party opposite. Meeting those fiscal rules is non-negotiable because we will not compromise on economic stability.

National Insurance Contributions (Secondary Class 1 Contributions) Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, forgive me for pointing out that on the Liberal Democrat Benches, the turnout in support of their regret amendment on Monday was less than half their complement. They moved a moved a regret amendment; they made fine speeches about how damaging this Bill will be to charities, hospices and other organisations; and then they also, at the end of the debate, made it clear that they would not give the whole House an opportunity to consider this on the Floor of the House. I do not know what is going on between the Liberal Benches and the Labour Party, but what is clearly going on is some kind of deal—a deal that is against the interests of the people of this country, including many charities, hospices and other organisations.

It is completely wrong to argue that in the Grand Committee this Bill can be subject to similar scrutiny. If it is on the Floor of the House, we can vote on some of the measures that we agreed with the Liberal Democrats need to be considered. We can have proper scrutiny. This is simply an attempt by the Government to hide their embarrassment at the atrocious consequences of this unprecedented national insurance Bill.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, suggested just now that it would not be possible to vote in Grand Committee. He is in error. I know that because I led for the Opposition on an insurance Bill about 12 years ago and there was a vote in the Committee, which the Opposition won. So it is entirely possible for the same process, the same level of scrutiny and the same seriousness to take place in Grand Committee as on the Floor of the House.

[Lord Geddes (Con)]

Perhaps I might comment on the remarks of the noble Lord opposite just now. I have for 25 years had the privilege of being a Deputy Speaker—I forget what the earlier term was—and I can assure him that it is quite clear that Divisions in Grand Committee are not permitted.

National Insurance Contributions (Secondary Class 1 Contributions) Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 6th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, consideration of the Bill poses two serious economic questions. Regrettably, as one might have anticipated, neither was addressed by the noble Baroness speaking from the Front Bench for the Opposition. The first serious question is: should taxes be raised at all? She told us nothing either way. Secondly, if overall taxes are to be raised, should the increase take the form of the changes to employers’ national insurance outlined in the Bill, or should there be increases in other taxes? She said there should be others but told us not what they should be. How might the impact of differing tax strategies be compared? We heard nothing about these two fundamental questions that the House should address with respect to the Bill.

The issue of whether taxation should have been raised in the Budget by £40 billion, of which the national insurance increases contribute a little over half, is a question of overall fiscal balance and of the composition of the expenditure that the taxes are designed to finance. Those who argue that taxes should not have been raised must tell us whether, instead, borrowing should be increased on this scale or whether the expenditure outlined in the Budget should be cut. We can call the increased borrowing option the Liz Truss option and we can call the option of cutting the budget the austerity option. I am sure noble Lords will agree that we have heard enough, and had enough, of both those policies from the previous Government.

As everyone in this House must be aware, the increased expenditure outlined in the Budget is needed to begin the necessary repair of national infrastructure, debilitated after 14 years of persistent Tory neglect. I am aware that the party opposite has some difficulty with the arithmetic required to identify the £22 billion of unfunded commitments that are the result of its recent fiscal incontinence. It displays a strange form of intellectual or psychological denial—perhaps they should take counselling from the OBR.

The black chasm of economic failure is undeniable and obvious to all. The failure is inherent in the ever-longer NHS waiting lists and a GP service that is virtually non-existent in many parts of the country. The neglect of hospital buildings means that many are now so dilapidated as to constitute a danger to the occupants. The Budget allocates £25 billion over the next two years to start repairing those years of neglect, with £13.6 billion to invest in new buildings, equipment and technology—the largest capital investment in the NHS for over 15 years. Noble Lords of the party opposite should tell us whether they support that investment or not.

To take another example of the result of Tory neglect, consider the report of the Defence Committee in another place. What it describes as the “hollowing out” of Britain’s Armed Forces since 2010 has undermined UK war-fighting resilience. The British Army’s Regular Forces—currently about 75,000 troops—would, we are told, struggle to field even one war-ready division. That is the result of Conservative neglect of our military. The Budget increased defence spending in real terms by £2.9 billion for next year. Of course that is not enough, but it is a start, to begin repairing the damage.

I could go on. There are school buildings that are dangerous, prisoners released early because of insufficient investment in the prisons estate, court buildings in serious disrepair, our roads defined by the number of potholes, and local council budgets cut through and beyond the bone. Underinvestment and neglect of the public sector have been bywords of economic policy for the last 14 years, with capital budgets raided to fund current needs—and there, sitting opposite, is the guilty party. As all serious commentators appreciate, there is no quick fix for these problems, but the Labour Government have made a positive start in the Budget by increasing capital budgets for 2025-26 and onwards. Which of these investments would noble Lords opposite oppose?

We have heard all the standard excuses—the pandemic, Ukraine—but that will not wash when we recognise that, over the 14 Tory years, the UK suffered not only persistent public sector neglect but the lowest rate of private sector business investment in the UK. That is no accident. The cheerleaders of austerity depressed business confidence and their persistent neglect of the public sector—and public sector investment—confirmed those depressed expectations. Living standards stagnated and, without investment, growth in productivity—the fundamental key to improving living standards—was negligible. The only Conservative growth strategy was uncontrolled immigration.

So the first question is: was the budgeted increase in taxation necessary to start the long task of repair? The answer is undoubtedly “Yes, it was”. But now to the second question: was employers’ national insurance the right tax to choose? There is the obvious issue of Labour’s manifesto commitment not to increase the taxation of workers’ income. But, given both the necessity of raising taxation and the Government’s overriding objective of economic growth, let us leave the manifesto commitments aside and focus on the merits of choosing employers’ national insurance.

The key variables to secure increased growth are: efficient use of national resources, a boost to public and private investment and sustained growth of productivity. No one likes tax increases, even essential ones, but the key to investment is the confident expansion of growth of demand in a stable financial environment. The overall fiscal balance in this Budget will increase overall demand with a public sector injection of £24 billion in the next financial year and will ensure financial stability. But what of the impact of employers’ national insurance on the efficient use of resources, business costs and productivity? Here, the detailed economic analysis of the OBR provides us with a firm starting point for debate.

As all noble Lords are aware, the Conservative Government pursued a cheap labour policy, neglecting investment in skills—look what has happened to further education colleges—and relying on mass immigration to meet labour needs. This cheap labour policy de-incentivised labour-saving investment, hitting productivity growth hard. If we examine the impact of the employers’ national insurance rise, we see that the effect is quite the opposite. The OBR, in estimating the impact, assesses that firms will pass on most, but not all, of their higher tax costs to employees. Once the labour market settles down, the OBR estimates that 76% of the total cost is passed on through lower wages—that is called lower costs to business, by the way—leaving 24% of the cost to be borne by employers. Overall, the OBR expects firms to reduce the demand for labour, as we have heard.

These results will have two major advantages. First, as noble Lords are aware, there is a significant labour shortage in the UK at the moment, due in no small part to the large post-Covid withdrawals from the labour force. More efficient use of labour is highly desirable, while the overall fiscal balance will sustain aggregate employment levels. Secondly, an increased cost of labour will encourage firms to look for ways to reduce overall labour costs, economising on a scarce resource and increasing productivity. Combined with new employment rights and a higher minimum wage, the increase in employers’ national insurance will encourage investment in training and equipment, boosting productivity, especially in labour-intensive services where higher productivity is most needed.

Let us compare these outcomes with an alternative, such as increasing employees’ national insurance, or increasing income tax. That would have a direct impact on demand, reducing profitability, and there would be a reduction—probably quite a small one—in the supply of labour. There would be no incentive to increase productivity.

When noble Lords opposite actually come clean and tell us what their alternative proposals might be, they should compare them with the measures in this Bill, which will result in a relatively small increase in business costs, as the OBR points out, a more efficient use of labour and an increase in productivity.

In the face of 14 years of serious underinvestment in the foundations of economic growth—the health of the workforce, education and skills, transport, criminal justice and defence—increased taxation is a regrettable necessity. That the Chancellor has managed both to provide a fiscal boost and to stabilise government finances is to be applauded. That she has, by the measures outlined in this Bill, chosen a taxation strategy that will enhance the efficient use of labour and produce vital increases in productivity deserves not just high praise but the total support of this House.

Autumn Budget 2024

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Monday 11th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, the challenge faced by the Chancellor was to change the economy and to achieve a decent rate of equitable growth after 14 years of economic neglect and rising inequality. The black hole of Conservative economics is there for all to see: crumbling schools, the largest ever waiting list in the NHS, a wrecked criminal justice system, pothole-strewn roads, struggling local authorities and the lowest investment in the G7, with an economy on its knees from the neglect of the public sector and a Conservative Government with no clue as to how to nurture the private sector either.

To face up to this challenge, the Chancellor had to first begin to repair the damage, creating the foundations for the change necessary to achieve the growth that Britain needs—hence the expenditure to repair the health service, refund our education system and sustain public services, and the replacement of the Tory Spring Budget cuts in public sector investment with growth in public sector investment and increased research and development spending. It is noticeable that, in the criticism from the other side, there has not as yet been a single positive proposal as to what they would do instead.

The question then raised is: why the apparently limited impact on growth? After all, the OBR forecasts that growth will tail-off after a couple of years. There are two reasons for that. First, it must be remembered that it is far easier to follow the Conservative Party strategy of providing a short-term sugar rush by boosting consumption while neglecting investment. Secondly, investment is a relatively smaller proportion of GDP, hence it has a lesser impact, and the benefits of investment take time to realise. However, the really important point is that a successful growth strategy will involve major changes that would never be picked up by the OBR’s focus on tax and spend.

As the Chancellor argued in her Mais lecture, the dismal economic performance of the past 14 years derives from

“a failure to deliver the supply side reform needed to equip Britain to compete in a fast changing world”—

hence economic policy must

“begin with getting the institutional framework right”.

Getting the institutional framework right means ensuring that capital flows into new investment, whether in productive capacity, research and development or skills.

Is there anything more dispiriting than the strategies of Britain’s major banks, from which capital flows predominantly into mortgages, bidding up the prices of assets that already exist rather than creating new productive assets? Is there anything more dispiriting than the conclusion earlier this year of the Treasury Select Committee in another place that:

“Confidence amongst small and medium-sized enterprises … in accessing finance has fallen … This is accompanied by increasing de-banking … Unfair banking practices … may have further limited access and suppressed demand”?


This difficult small business environment is disincentivising risk-taking and innovation, and reducing growth. That is why the national wealth fund, incorporating a reinvigorated, proactive British Business Bank, is so important. Financial flows in Britain need to be redirected towards investment in new productive assets in the new industries of the future and in updating the everyday industries that shape our lives. Britain’s financial services industry must follow the wealth fund’s lead.

I offer one example of what can be done. Despite current financial difficulties, it is widely acknowledged that our universities are first-class centres of research. Some have created institutional mechanisms for translating that research into globally successful companies, but every one of our more than 160 universities should have a dynamic business advice and incubation unit, and should have access to the dedicated finance necessary to translate new ideas into new businesses. Those new businesses, like the universities, would then be spread throughout the country.

That is a job for the British Business Bank right now, but we cannot just rely on the public sector to take all the risks. The Chancellor has already indicated that reform of pension funds’ investment strategies is an immediate priority. Further reform of financial services is necessary. Funds must flow to new, real investment, not just to secondary markets. This Budget, by having the courage to identify honestly the true state of affairs and fix the foundations, indicates that the Government’s strategy of reform is on track to succeed.

Budget: Taxes and Borrowing

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I do not agree with that.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lords opposite have some difficulty in understanding the arithmetic of coming through the black hole of £22 billion. Even if they cannot do the arithmetic, they can see that the prisons are full, waiting lists in the NHS are the highest they have ever been, schools are crumbling and there is a lack of police on the streets. It is their failure. Would the Minister agree that that is the core of the failure that this Budget is designed to correct? Is there not one important word missing in statements from the party opposite? That word is “sorry”.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I 100% agree with my noble friend. It is incredibly striking that, in everything we have heard from the party opposite, not once has it apologised for the record we inherited. One of the reasons this is a once in a generation Budget is that we have had to simultaneously repair public finances and rebuild public services. That is why it is such a historic Budget. My noble friend is absolutely right that what we have not heard from those in the party opposite is an alternative. Would they not have repaired the public finances? Would they not have prioritised working people? Would they now cut funding to the NHS and schools?

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I concur with what other noble Lords have said about this amendment: that is why I have added my name. It cannot be left as a possibility for any size of bank; if it needs to apply to a larger bank, perhaps the MREL level should have been set higher. We have this rather unusual situation in the UK where we set MREL at a much lower level; it is set at about a quarter of the level of other countries. If there is a nervousness about needing to use it for a bank that is a little bit larger, perhaps some other fundamentals about where MREL is being set are wrong.

The premise of this Bill is based on it being an alternative to insolvency, where that would have been the normal end result. Maybe the compensation scheme would have had to pay out on deposit guarantees and so there is the happy thought that the money could be perhaps put to different use this way round. But the assumption should still be insolvency and we need a public interest test before we go looking at the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. It is already an extraordinary event—so how extraordinary are extraordinary events? I do not think one can layer extra extraordinariness on top of it: there has to be a line somewhere.

We do not know how many dips into the Financial Services Compensation Scheme there are going to be. In insolvency, there is one dip for the deposits that are guaranteed. It does not say that there cannot be multiple dips. There is already the notion that there is this enormous pot of money. Maybe it looks like a bank tax—and everybody hates banks and it is a pot to raid—but it is a very good way to cause more issues within the wider banking sector. Frankly, it is unfair if there are not some bounds somewhere. So I think this is the right one and, if the Minister is not going to incorporate the amendment, which I think would be a jolly good idea, we on these Benches will be supporting the noble Baroness, Lady Vere.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, my colleagues from the Financial Services Regulation Committee are rather confused on two issues; that is very unusual, but they do seem to be. First, there is the idea that somehow, if MREL were exceeded in a financial crisis, that would be a regulatory failure. The only way to prevent such a regulatory failure is to have MREL at 100%; that is to avoid the total failure of the financial system. That would be a disaster for lending in this country. At the moment, MREL is set at levels that are deemed to be a reasonable buffer under circumstances that might reasonably, even in extremis, be expected to occur. As we saw in 2008-09, even events that are deemed to be events that would occur only once in a millennium can occur several times in a week in a severe financial crisis. An MREL which can never be exceeded is 100% and if my colleagues are seeking to impose that on the British financial system, I would be very surprised.

The other point that seems to be neglected—it is why I deem this amendment to be irrelevant—is that my colleagues should recall that, in one of the letters from the Financial Secretary, he pointed out there was a cap on the amount that would be raised from the financial compensation scheme for these purposes. That cap, as I recall, was £2.5 billion. In those circumstances, £2.5 billion would never be sufficient to deal with the collapse of one of the big banks. So the cap itself defines these regulations as fitting only relatively small banks.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I could be helpful at this point. That £2.5 billion is certainly not in the Bill. If that is the argument being made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is it an interesting one but not one that the Government have grasped.

Perhaps I should clarify the issue of the threshold at which MREL kicks in, because that was the point to which my noble friend Lady Bowles referred. The UK demands MREL or bail-in bonds as the mechanism for resolution in the case of the failure of a much smaller bank than in any other country across the globe. The differential between us and everybody else is very large. That, we assume, is why the Government want to keep this mechanism available for banks that have been required to have MREL: they are trying to deal with that small to medium-sized group that, quite frankly, should probably never be in the MREL group in the first place.

Fiscal Rules

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

Once again, I address a noble Lord who has far more experience in these matters than I do. I agree with a huge amount of what he says. I think that stability in fiscal rules is incredibly important and that they should not change particularly frequently—perhaps at the point when Governments change. I am tempted to agree with a lot of what he said, but unfortunately the Chancellor will set out the Government’s full fiscal plan, including the precise details about fiscal rules that he asks for, in tomorrow’s Budget, alongside an economic and fiscal forecast produced by the OBR.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, is quite wrong when she suggests that the Chancellor has just announced her change in fiscal rules? They were proposed in her Mais Lecture in February, if one keeps up. Does he also agree that the fiscal rules implemented by Mr Hunt were yet another component of the irresponsible economic policies pursued by the Conservative Government?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I wholeheartedly agree with both points made by my noble friend. Our fiscal rules, as he says, were set out by the Chancellor in her Mais Lecture and set out again in our manifesto. Everything that we have said subsequently is consistent with what we said in our manifesto, and I think that the policy of the Opposition is the reason our country is in the state it is in. It is why growth has been held back and why our critical infrastructure is basically on its knees.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, very briefly, I support the noble Baroness’s amendments. Perhaps I would say that as a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—as one of the majority of us in this Room, I should say, who are members of that committee.

I see this as working closely alongside the reporting amendments that we discussed on Thursday. When we were talking about the reporting requirements the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, mentioned that it is all very well issuing reports, but not if there is no one to read them. This gives us somebody to read them. It is a fairly light-touch requirement: it is an obligation to notify but does not give any obligation on anybody to do anything with it, unless they feel they need to and that it is important. I hope that this simple measure, alongside the reporting discussions we had last week, will be something that the Minister is minded to accept.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, perhaps I might suggest that it would be wise of the Minister, if I may be so bold, to look warmly on the amendment. Discussions around the accountability issue were a persistent theme in the debates on what is now the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and led as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, to the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House, charged with the responsibility for maintaining parliamentary accountability of financial services regulators. I can assure him that if the Treasury does not accept this amendment, he will become weary of the number of times that it will come back again and again—the reason being simply that the committee feels strongly that its role is now a crucial part of the regulatory framework in the UK and that the reports to the committee effectively establish the groundwork of its role in pursuing the accountability agenda.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Not surprisingly, I too support this amendment. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on her exposition of the genesis of the terms of Section 38 of the 2023 Act. Of course, I am a member of the committee that came as a consequence of that. In her presentation, although not in the amendment—wisely so—she suggested that maybe there would be some hearings and questions, and the possibility that they would be in camera.

I urge the Minister, the Treasury and, indeed, the Bank not to shy away from such suggestions, because it would not be the first time that I have heard mutterings about things being confidential and not wanting to talk about them to parliamentary committees. In Germany, its parliamentary committees can look into the books of the banks and get all kinds of confidential information and—do you know?—it does not leak out. It is quite possible for committees of this House to behave just as well. I put that in as some impetus for how you can get better accountability, oversight and, I suggest, help from the committees, where everybody, ultimately, is pulling in the same direction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I agree with what both previous noble Lords have said. We cannot rely just on the fact that something is going to be revised. It is the same old problem that we have with primary legislation a lot of the time: it lays out something that could be good or bad, but it says, “Trust me, we will get it right when we come to secondary legislation or something else down the track”. That is not satisfactory and, in the absence of some more detail, we have to see something about the code of practice or similar—whatever one calls it—in the Bill, just to make sure that there is an understanding of the direction of travel for the sort of detail that we are asking about.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

I should like to pick up on the request for detail put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I am concerned that the powers that the Bank of England has to act in an emergency, which this would presumably be, should not be constrained to any degree other than that which is absolutely necessary. In other words, we should not load up the code with detail, the reason being that the next crisis will be one that none of us has anticipated. It will be completely different.

If we look at the financial crises that have occurred, the major one in 2007-09 and some minor ones since, they have appeared in completely unexpected directions. The Bank must then have the freedom to adapt its procedures to whatever new challenge arises. I quite understand that we do not want just to say it can do anything it likes, but I feel strongly that we must be very careful about loading the code, and indeed the legislation, with excessive detail.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes about the code of practice because it is important that we have this debate. I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says, but it slightly struck fear into my heart because it is about those circumstances where there is not sufficient guidance or a code of practice. Essentially, this is not necessarily just for the Bank of England; it is for all those stakeholders who will be involved in the other side of a resolution. A lot of people will read the code of practice and internalise it. When it is needed, it will therefore already be in their hearts because they will have read it, so I am not as concerned as the noble Lord is about putting in too much detail. The simple fact is that we have not seen anything, so we do not really know what we are dealing with.

It struck me that in the slight rush to bring forward some legislation to keep Parliament occupied, perhaps, the Government are not providing all the information that the House needs to consider this Bill fully. It is complex, and as noble Lords go through it, it is clear that we are all picking up new nuances that we consider might be of concern in the future. The code of practice makes up an important component of the regime and the Committee is slightly flying blind, having not seen a draft of the changes—not only a draft of what would happen as a result of the Bill, but also potentially to fill gaps that we know are not going to be part of the Bill. We know that the code is potentially the only protection between anybody who uses banks—essentially, the taxpayer—and the Bank being able to perform maximum adaptation to a situation. There has to be something in the middle that stops that happening.

I am warming to my noble friend Lady Noakes’s suggestion that the Bill should not come into force until the code of practice is finalised, but I sense that that might be a little churlish. The amendment itself is a little anodyne. I think all noble Lords agree that the Government will, of course, make changes to the code of practice, but I would appreciate hearing more information from the Minister about what changes are anticipated—specifically, what will be left out—and the timing for any code of practice because while it remains outstanding, even in draft form, there is a significant lack of clarity.

At Second Reading, the Minister stated that the update will happen in due course. How many times have I used that phrase? I know exactly what it means. It means “when we are sort of ready”. We need to be a bit more ambitious than that. Can the Minister give any further guidance on timing? If he cannot, would it be helpful if I tabled an amendment on Report that required the code of practice to be updated within, say, three months and subject to approval by both Houses? I am happy to do that if it is helpful.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, pointed out, the Minister has referred to these things being addressed in the code of practice. Many of the elements in the reporting are also supposed to be in that code. My concern is that six weeks have now passed since the Minister said “in due course” and the House rises at the end of the week for Conference Recess. I presume that the Treasury is still working, so that would be a further window during which progress on a draft code of practice could be made. Therefore, I very much hope that the Minister can commit to having a draft document available for review before Report stage is scheduled. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I was rather enjoying being characterised as an old-fashioned central banker, until the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, attributed to me to me the idea that selecting from whichever pot would be entirely at will, so to speak. I add my support to what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, just said: in a recapitalisation, shareholders and MREL must clearly be used first, and FSCS money used simply when those pots have been exhausted.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I simply make the same point. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, was absolutely right to summarise the principle which I think all noble Lords on the Committee feel is the purpose of the Bill. There cannot be any circumstances by which there is MREL or whatever it might be left, yet money is going in from FSCS to ensure the resolution of the bank. I cannot see any circumstance in which that would happen—perhaps Treasury officials would be able to think of one—but I think all noble Lords are agreed on the need for some clarity on what would happen.

I appreciated the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I got about 60% of them, so I was really proud of myself; the other 40% went way over my head. I am going to try to understand her points. We are in quite a difficult situation, but the way that she has been so forensic about it has allowed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to state what the principle is. It is about combining those two things—the forensic attitude to “This is what the Bill could say if read in a certain way” versus “Just tell us whether the Bill abides by the very simple principle that basically FSCS money should be a last resort, not there for anybody else, but just to prop up a bank to make sure it gets through to the other side of resolution, for the public interest and no more”.

Budget Responsibility Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

2nd reading & Committee negatived & 3rd reading
Monday 9th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, the OBR was created by George Osborne to

“remove the temptation to fiddle the figures”.

An entirely non-political evaluation of major fiscal measures was certainly a good idea; unfortunately, it has not yet been achieved. The failure to attain political independence may be attributed to two elements that are not dealt with in the Bill yet are essential to its purpose.

First, key inputs to the OBR’s work are the estimates of future spending provided by the Government. We now know that these can be politically manipulated to ensure that fiscal targets seem to be met. As the Institute for Government commented at the time of the Conservative Budget this Spring,

“the figures that Hunt announced … are based on entirely fictitious future spending plans”.

Since the election, we have learned that not only were the Conservatives fiddling the figures that they provided to the OBR, but they were concealing spending plans too. In the light of post-election findings, Mr Hughes confirmed that the OBR was made aware of the extent of pressures on departmental budgets only in late July. Happily, the Financial Secretary has just outlined the measures that are to be taken to verify the data supplied by the Government. These measures are most welcome.

The second key political element undermining the value of the OBR’s current assessments is the current formulation of the charter. The current charter embodies three targets that the OBR is required to assess; unfortunately, none of them is based on sound economics.

First, there is the objective to have public sector net debt—excluding the Bank of England—as a percentage of GDP falling by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period. As the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench just pointed out, this means that whenever the Bank of England sells part of its stock of government debt to the private sector, it automatically tightens the noose around government spending. An important part of monetary policy has damaging consequences for fiscal policy—how foolish is that?

More importantly, the objective treats all government expenditure as having the same economic relevance. A crazy unfunded tax cut is assigned the same economic impact as investment in industrial infrastructure. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer argued in her Mais Lecture while still the shadow Chancellor,

“our fiscal rules differ from the government’s. Their borrowing rule, which targets the overall deficit rather than the current deficit, creates a clear incentive to cut investment that will have long-run benefits … I reject that approach”.

Unfortunately, the next objective, to ensure that public sector net borrowing does not exceed 3% of GDP by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period, is simply a dynamic version of the first objective and is, therefore, subject to the same rejection that the Chancellor has made.

The third and final objective is to ensure that expenditure on welfare is contained within a predetermined cap. One of the important operational aspects of economic policy is the value of the automatic stabilisers in the economy: when the economy booms, welfare spending automatically goes down; in a slump, welfare spending automatically goes up. The notion of a cap would emasculate the automatic stabilisers—again, a silly thing to do.

In short, none of the current objectives in the charter makes sound economic sense. It forces the OBR to make forecasts that are simply not relevant for the Government’s stability and growth objectives. It is imperative that the charter is revised prior to the Budget on 30 October. Given the requirement that revisions of the charter must be presented to Parliament 28 days before coming into effect, will the Minister tell us whether we can expect a revised charter to be presented before 1 October?

To conclude, the OBR is a very good idea, as is this Bill, but major operational aspects need urgent correction. I look forward to hearing from the Financial Secretary how these deficiencies are to be dealt with.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as we have heard, this group of amendments, including my Amendment 10, probes the reasons for including all banks in the scope of the Bill, rather than just the smaller banks, as originally envisaged in the consultation that started in January. The first sentence of the consultation was very clear:

“This consultation sets out the government’s intention to enhance and keep up to date the UK’s Special Resolution Regime … providing a new mechanism to facilitate use of certain existing stabilisation powers to manage the failure of small banks”.


But, as we have heard, it is not restricted to small banks. Most of the amendments in this group would remove from the scope of the Bill those banks that are required to hold MREL and would be subject to bail-in procedures using those MREL resources. I think the number of separate but similar amendments that we seem to have is probably down to the fact that this all happened in recess, and we did not have the opportunity to get together. I am sure that if the Minister is not able to satisfy us, we will be able to coalesce around something in common.

It is worth quoting from paragraph 7 of the Explanatory Notes:

“This means taxpayers are exposed if a small bank failure is judged to require resolution action but the firm in question does not possess sufficient MREL resources to provide for recapitalisation, unlike larger banks that do possess these resources”.


If larger banks possess those resources, as they are required to do, why do we need them to be subject to the process envisaged by the Bill? The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, talked about the glide path situation where a bank has not quite got there—yes, I see that point—but for those that are there, does this not imply that we are not confident that the existing MREL scheme is sufficient? If there is a problem with the MREL scheme, surely it would be better to fix that rather than adding a new process on top of it.

So could the noble Lord please clarify under exactly which circumstances he sees the recapitalisation process in the Bill being used for a failing MREL bank? Is there a concern that the MREL resources are insufficient? Other than glide path situations, that is the only logical reason I can see to include big banks in the scope of the Bill.

Secondly, not having the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I do not really understand how the two processes would work together. Is this an either/or situation; is it either a bail-in using MREL resources or a recapitalisation? If that is the case, surely there is a risk that the industry would be required to fund the recapitalisation of banks with large balance sheets instead of the costs being borne by the failed bank’s shareholders and subordinated debt holders. That would create a potential moral hazard. Or is it a combined process where the MREL resources would be used first and, if insufficient, the recapitalisation would follow on top? If that is the case, it implies that there is a concern that the MREL funds are insufficient. The best way forward would be to fix that problem rather than add another process, as I said before.

So could the noble Lord please clearly explain how he sees the two processes working together? I am drawn to the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, of a worked example between now and Report to help us see how that could work. In particular, can he clearly confirm that the recapitalisation process can never be used to reduce the losses of a failing bank’s shareholders or creditors?

In the absence of a strong explanation of why, contrary to the originally stated intention, the scope of the Bill has been extended to larger banks, I would be minded to support amendments on Report that restrict its scope to exclude MREL banks.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 11 also—I think rather neatly—confines the Bill to what are defined as small banks. However, my concern is somewhat different from those voiced by noble Lords until now. It is that the whole approach to the resolution regime suggests that banks fail one at a time and not all together. Anyone who went through the experience of 2007 to 2009 knows that, in a systemic crisis, it is possible for all the banks in the country to be suffering major problems at the same time. In the circumstances of a systemic crisis, I fear that the mechanism proposed in the Bill could be a source of contagion, in the sense that the cost of the collapse of a bank, or of many banks together, would be seen by the market as imposing costs, which are now unbearable, on other parts of the banking sector.

This comes down to two issues—that of contagion and, I am afraid, that of persistent complacency. The Treasury and the Bank of England refuse to face up to the fact that, in the end, it is the taxpayer who will pay in a systemic crisis.

I will deal first with contagion. The levy links the financial failure of a bank or number of banks to the banking sector as a whole. Does this create a contagion effect? It must be remembered that much of contagion is created by the expectation of a cost, not just the reality. Expectation then becomes the parent of reality. It can reasonably be expected that the failure of a small bank would be manageable under the resolution regimes set out by the Bank of England and discussed in this Bill and its explanatory documents.

However, there are two fundamental problems where one could have significant contagion. One would be multiple failures, an issue I will address in a moment. The other is the potential failure of a big bank, because the Bill and the Explanatory Notes explicitly refer these mechanisms to big banks as well as small ones.

I will take the issue of the failure of multiple banks or a big bank. I wrote to the Financial Secretary about this and he very kindly wrote back a very valuable explanation. I presume that his letter has been circulated to the people who took part—no, I see that it has not. Well, I will quote a bit of it, because it seems to reveal the problem that I am identifying. He refers to multiple bank failures, but I would apply the same thing to a big bank failure. He says that there will be levies when the bank fails and adds:

“These levies are subject to an affordability cap”—


I did not know that—

“by the Prudential Regulation Authority based on how much the sector can safely be levied in a given year. This cap is currently set at £1.5 billion. If multiple firm failures resulting in a recapitalisation requirement is under £1.5 billion, the Government would expect the FSCS to borrow from its commercial borrowing facility and be able to safely levy from the banking sector and repay that commercial borrowing within 12 months. However, if the amount exceeds £1.5 billion, or if it is below £1.5 billion and the PRA has determined that the FSCS is unable to raise the levy on affordability grounds, the Government would expect levies to repay any borrowing from the National Loans Fund to be spread out over multiple years”.

But, no, you do not have multiple years in a systemic banking crisis; you have to operate now.

The cap of £1.5 billion is worth comparing with the measures that the Government had to take in 2007-08—Lloyds Bank, £20 billion and NatWest, £45 billion. So the failure of one of those banks could be somewhat above the affordability cap, as set out in the Financial Secretary’s letter to me. Indeed, today, those numbers could be multiplied by a factor of roughly five.

Even when MREL is taken into account, the £1.5 billion cap seems to me to expose the fact that this scheme is not applicable to large banks. For example, if we look at the largest MREL plus required capital, it is that of Barclays, which is 30% of risk weighted assets—the largest of all the major banks. That leaves 70% of risk weighted assets to which the taxpayer is exposed. There would not be a collapse of all of those, but there can be very large numbers very quickly. So the idea that with an affordability cap of £1.5 billion, one could handle the Lloyds Bank situation or the NatWest situation as the Government confronted them in 2007-08 is, it seems to me, fanciful.

This brings me to my final related point. There is a persistent reluctance in all the documents concerning the resolution regime to admit that the resolution of a large bank will always fall on the taxpayer. Given the need for the maintenance of confidence in the banking sector, this persistent reluctance and the pretence that MREL has eliminated the taxpayer from exposure is damaging to confidence. It would be valuable for the Purple Book to make clear that, in extremis, Bagehot’s rule comes into effect, the Bank lends without limit and the Treasury will step in to resolve those banks that are “too big to fail”. My amendment clears away a dangerous ambiguity in the Bill. The threat of multiple small failure will continue to exist, but it takes away the ambiguity that this could be involved in the resolution of a big bank in the circumstances of a systemic crisis similar to that which we have faced in the past.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this weather sounds like the reason I ended up tabling a load of amendments in south-west Scotland: I had nothing better to do for a few days.

Again, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raises a really important point. I have tried to attack it in a different way in Amendment 16, where I look at the recovery of money from shareholders. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I had in mind the sort of scenario where a foreign company sets up a bank in the UK, it does not go very well and it decides just to walk away from it, having perhaps removed all the assets in the meantime. Clearly, it does not seem fair that the costs of sorting that out should fall on the industry or, indeed, the British taxpayer. It would be really interesting to understand how we can ensure that foreign shareholders behave properly and how, when it does go wrong, we can recoup the money from them.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I am somewhat puzzled by the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in this case. Surely, under the Basel accord, the UK regulator is responsible for the regulation of a subsidiary that is legally established in the UK. If “subsidiary” were changed to “branch”, the foreign regulator would indeed be responsible for regulation in that case. It seems to me that this particular amendment would violate the Basel accord to which His Majesty’s Government are committed.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I will just comment that we have seen capital being sucked out of subsidiaries and taken back to the States and have been left with the collapse here. Basel accord or not, there ought to be some kind of mechanism of group support. I wonder whether there has been any international progress on that. What other mechanisms could be used to ensure that those kinds of things do not happen? Ultimately, it is going to be quite difficult to do this unless you somehow put on some extra capital requirements–and then you then start to get into all kinds of international difficulty. Perhaps the Minister could say something about what levers, if any, are available.