Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Report stage
Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

Report

15:21

Clause 1: Recapitalisation payments

Amendment 1

Moved by

[Lord Livermore]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 18, leave out “another” and insert “a relevant”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my second amendment to Clause 1.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving government Amendment 1, I shall speak also to government Amendment 4. The Government have tabled these amendments after considering the concerns raised in Grand Committee by the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes, Lady Bowles, and Lady Vere, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. I am extremely grateful to all of them for all of the points they have raised.

Reflecting in particular on the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the Government have decided to clarify in the Bill whose expenses can be covered by a recapitalisation payment from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her engagement on this matter since Grand Committee.

The Bill as introduced permitted a recapitalisation payment to cover the expenses that the Bank of England or another person has incurred, or might incur, in connection with the recapitalisation of the firm in resolution. These amendments replace that broad formulation with “relevant person”, then specify that “relevant person” means the Treasury, a bridge bank or an asset management vehicle. They further specify that “bridge bank” and “asset management vehicle” have the meanings given by Sections 12 and 12ZA of the Banking Act 2009 respectively.

In Grand Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, indicated that she had no objection to the Treasury, the Bank of England and its entities having certain expenses covered by the new mechanism, but that this should be specified in the Bill. These amendments tabled by the Government seek to do just that; I hope that she and other noble Lords will be able to support them.

In Grand Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, also asked questions about the specific expenses that would be in scope under the terms of the Bill. On this point, I should be clear that the Government maintain the position set out in Grand Committee: it is important that the Bill is not overly prescriptive, allowing the Bank to respond flexibly when costs arise. I refer to the explanations given in Grand Committee, in the Government’s response to the consultation and in the draft updates to the code of practice of the types of expenses that will be expected to be covered. The Government maintain that it is prudent to ensure that there is broad provision to cover these potential additional costs. Ultimately, it should be borne in mind that the alternative may be for such costs to be met by the taxpayer.

By way of reassurance, I reiterate that, in determining whether to include certain ancillary expenses in its request for funding, the Bank of England is subject to the usual obligations under public law to act in a way that is reasonable and proportionate. In addition, the legislation does not allow the Bank of England or any other person to claim expenses that arise exclusively for preparing for a Bank insolvency. The draft updates to the code of practice also set out that the Government would expect any final report on the use of the mechanism to explain why certain expenses were considered reasonable and necessary.

I hope that the Government’s approach as set out in these amendments addresses the points raised by noble Lords in Grand Committee, and that noble Lords will feel able to accept them. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I spoke in Committee. I draw attention to my interests as included on the register; in particular, I hold shares in a number of banks that could be affected by the contents of this Bill.

I thank the Minister for the comprehensive letters that he wrote to Members who took part in Committee—and, indeed, for the subsequent meeting that he organised. I also thank the Treasury for publishing the draft extra chapter for the code of practice, which has been very helpful to those of us trying to work through the Bill.

I certainly support the two amendments to which the Minister has just spoken, which go some way to limiting the wide power in new Section 214E(2), but I have some further questions for the Minister, building on the comments he has just made. These amendments constrain to whom payments can be made under that new subsection but they do not do anything to constrain the types of expenses that can be incurred. In Committee, I tried to explore what happens if litigation or regulatory actions arise in relation to issues that had occurred prior to the resolution action being taken but which do not emerge until a little later. We did not get very far, so I will spend just a couple of minutes on them here.

I am talking about material litigation or regulatory action. There could be shareholder litigation, which happened after RBS was bailed out by the Treasury. There could also be other kinds of issues that result in both regulatory action and civil litigation, as happened in relation to Libor, for example. Today’s hot issue is vehicle financing commissions, following the Court of Appeal’s decision recently, and no one knows how much it will cost.

Before this Bill, the working assumption was that smaller banks would be placed into the insolvency procedure and that, in that event, the kind of liabilities I am talking about would likely be extinguished as part of the insolvency because there would simply be insufficient money there to pay for them. However, once the recapitalisation power is used, it opens up the possibility that the Bank of England could use the power to raise capital in order to pay for litigation or regulatory costs that had arisen and were crystallising after the recapitalisation event.

The issue of litigation was raised by my noble friend Lord Moylan at Second Reading, and the Minister wrote to him on 21 August. The letter confirmed that litigation costs could well be covered through the use of the recapitalisation power. The Minister expressed this in terms of it being

“a judgement to be taken at the time, noting that the alternative could be to use public funds instead”.

From the perspective of the financial sector, which will be picking up the costs using the power—then doubtless passing them on to their customers—the alternative is using not public funds but the insolvency procedure. If we let the insolvency procedure take its course, at least nine times out of 10, those costs will not be met at all. So, that is the heart of the problem from the financial sector’s point of view.

I have not tabled an amendment on Report because it is very difficult to table one that would cover all eventualities. The redraft of the code of practice does not appear to deal with this issue either, whether in relation to expenses per se—in the terms of the new subsection we are discussing—or in relation to which liabilities the Bank should allow to go into the bridge bank. Today, I am seeking that the Government recognise that this is an issue and that it should be dealt with somehow as part of the code of practice.

I accept, as I have throughout, that there may be public interest reasons for avoiding the bank insolvency procedure, and for settling historical liabilities through the recapitalisation power, but the public interest test is a rather slippery concept and gives no real comfort to those who are expected to pick up the tab. I hope that the Minister will accept that this new power must not become a blank cheque to avoid bank insolvency and to pick up all kinds of costs that would otherwise fall by the wayside. I look forward to hearing what reassurances he can give.

15:30

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for the recent letters and documents he published in relation to the Bill. It was incredibly helpful to have them for the House to scrutinise the Bill properly. I am also grateful for these sensible amendments, which clarify the persons to whom the Bill’s measures apply as they relate to expenses. They are a bit technical, but they are improvements to the Bill and I am particularly pleased that the Minister has listened to concerns from across the House, including from my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Moylan.

I listened with great interest to the points raised by my noble friend Lady Noakes, and I urge the Minister to note what she said. I hope that some of these issues might be resolved in some way, either through the code of practice or by other means, as she seemed to me to make an awful lot of sense. However, on this basis, we support the Government’s amendments.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions today and, as I said previously, in Committee. As I said at the start of this debate, the purpose of the Government’s amendments is to clarify whose expenses may be covered under the mechanism in the Bill. I hope that noble Lords will be able to accept the amendments, and I am grateful to both noble Baronesses for saying that they will.

I will respond to the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. As she said, I wrote previously to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, on this matter. I will briefly repeat some of the points I made to him. In relation to litigation being brought against the authorities themselves, the Bill allows the Bank of England to request that funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme cover expenses that have been incurred by it or by the Treasury, a bridge bank or an asset management vehicle in connection with the recapitalisation or the use of the stabilisation power. This may include litigation costs arising from the recapitalisation or use of the stabilisation power, such as from challenges to decisions made by the authorities.

Any decision to request Financial Services Compensation Scheme funds for these purposes would be a decision for the Bank of England to take, but I stress that, in making this decision, the Bank of England would consider all relevant factors, including the fact that the alternative may be to use public funds. I note what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said on that point. A decision to use insolvency depends on whether the conditions for resolution action are not met. If the conditions for action are met, public funds would be the alternative for covering these costs instead of FSCS funds.

I hope that the points I have made demonstrate that the Government have engaged in good faith with the concerns raised by noble Lords and have sought to address them where it has proved possible to do so. These amendments put beyond doubt which parties’ expenses may be covered by the new mechanism, and I hope that noble Lords will support them.

Amendment 1 agreed.

Amendment 2

Moved by

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 20, at end insert—
“(2A) The Bank of England must not require the scheme manager to make a recapitalisation payment if it has directed the financial institution to maintain an end-state Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) exceeding minimum capital requirements.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to prohibit the use of FSCS funds to recapitalise large financial institutions, defined as those which have reached end-state MREL.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, throughout the passage of this Bill, the issue of the size of the bank for which this new mechanism can be used has attracted significant comment and debate. In a letter to all noble Lords introducing the Bill, the Minister stated: “This Bill enhances the resolution regime to respond to the failure of small banks”. Yet that is not what the Bill does. The regime in the Bill is not restricted to small banks or even to small and medium-sized banks; it can be used for all banks, even the very largest. Despite the letter from the Minister on introduction, the Government have maintained their position that the mechanism should be available for use for the resolution of a bank of any size, including the very largest.

Using this mechanism in those circumstances would be astonishingly costly for banks and their customers, not only in the year in which the levy is first implemented but for many years thereafter, adding to a long-term and significant burden on the banking sector and its consumers. I concede that the Government clarified in a policy statement that the mechanism would be used for the largest banks only in exceptional circumstances, but the mechanism being given a statutory footing by the Bill will only ever be used, on a bank of any size, in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, I take only a small amount of comfort from the published statement.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said in Committee, there is no differentiation in the Bill on bank size. It should be limited by a defined measure. My amendment, supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, seeks to deliver that definition by making it clear that the Bill does not apply to banks that have reached end-state MREL—that is, the very largest banks in the UK. It would mean that only small and medium-sized banks, and those on the MREL glide path, can be supported by the mechanism. I believe that was the Government’s original intention.

My amendment is fairly simple. It does what it says on the tin. I will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say when he comes to wind up.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I add my support to Amendment 2 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere. From the outset of this process, the Bill was intended to cover only small banks. That was made clear in almost the first paragraph of the original consultation. It was then extended and now covers all banks, regardless of size. I thank the Minister for making sure that the draft code of practice was published by the Treasury before Report; it has been incredibly helpful in this process, and we are all very grateful for that. The draft code of practice is clear that the resolution mechanism is designed primarily to support the resolution of small banks and that the Bank of England will not assume use of the new mechanism when setting a preferred resolution strategy of bail-in and the corresponding MREL requirements of a large bank.

So why does the Bill cover large banks? The argument from the Government seems to be along the lines of, “Well, it might be useful to have this flexibility”. That does not seem a very strong argument. As we have heard, larger banks are required to hold additional capital resources, known as MREL, effectively to ensure that they are able to bail themselves out—a process known as bail-in. If the Government are not confident that the MREL regime is sufficient for those larger banks, they should be looking to strengthen that regime rather than extending a measure that is designed specifically for smaller banks whose failure would not create systemic risk, to act as a further insurance policy for the big banks.

I am afraid that unless the Minister can come up with a stronger argument than he has so far, I will be minded to support the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, should she decide to test the opinion of the House.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I add my support to my noble friend’s amendment.

If the power were used on a bank that had already achieved the MREL set for it, that use of the mechanism would raise questions about whether MREL and the minimum capital requirements had been set correctly—and whether there had been a regulatory failure. In either event, the Bank is conflicted, whether through the setting of MREL in its capacity as a resolution authority or through setting capital levels through its PRA arm. I am clear that the Bank should not have the power to cover up regulatory failure, which this unconstrained provision allows. There is no way for the Treasury to stop the Bank using the power other than by using the power of direction that exists but has never been used in the existence of the Bank since nationalisation. Unconstrained powers are unhealthy. That is why I support my noble friend’s amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I concur with what other noble Lords have said about this amendment: that is why I have added my name. It cannot be left as a possibility for any size of bank; if it needs to apply to a larger bank, perhaps the MREL level should have been set higher. We have this rather unusual situation in the UK where we set MREL at a much lower level; it is set at about a quarter of the level of other countries. If there is a nervousness about needing to use it for a bank that is a little bit larger, perhaps some other fundamentals about where MREL is being set are wrong.

The premise of this Bill is based on it being an alternative to insolvency, where that would have been the normal end result. Maybe the compensation scheme would have had to pay out on deposit guarantees and so there is the happy thought that the money could be perhaps put to different use this way round. But the assumption should still be insolvency and we need a public interest test before we go looking at the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. It is already an extraordinary event—so how extraordinary are extraordinary events? I do not think one can layer extra extraordinariness on top of it: there has to be a line somewhere.

We do not know how many dips into the Financial Services Compensation Scheme there are going to be. In insolvency, there is one dip for the deposits that are guaranteed. It does not say that there cannot be multiple dips. There is already the notion that there is this enormous pot of money. Maybe it looks like a bank tax—and everybody hates banks and it is a pot to raid—but it is a very good way to cause more issues within the wider banking sector. Frankly, it is unfair if there are not some bounds somewhere. So I think this is the right one and, if the Minister is not going to incorporate the amendment, which I think would be a jolly good idea, we on these Benches will be supporting the noble Baroness, Lady Vere.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, my colleagues from the Financial Services Regulation Committee are rather confused on two issues; that is very unusual, but they do seem to be. First, there is the idea that somehow, if MREL were exceeded in a financial crisis, that would be a regulatory failure. The only way to prevent such a regulatory failure is to have MREL at 100%; that is to avoid the total failure of the financial system. That would be a disaster for lending in this country. At the moment, MREL is set at levels that are deemed to be a reasonable buffer under circumstances that might reasonably, even in extremis, be expected to occur. As we saw in 2008-09, even events that are deemed to be events that would occur only once in a millennium can occur several times in a week in a severe financial crisis. An MREL which can never be exceeded is 100% and if my colleagues are seeking to impose that on the British financial system, I would be very surprised.

The other point that seems to be neglected—it is why I deem this amendment to be irrelevant—is that my colleagues should recall that, in one of the letters from the Financial Secretary, he pointed out there was a cap on the amount that would be raised from the financial compensation scheme for these purposes. That cap, as I recall, was £2.5 billion. In those circumstances, £2.5 billion would never be sufficient to deal with the collapse of one of the big banks. So the cap itself defines these regulations as fitting only relatively small banks.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I could be helpful at this point. That £2.5 billion is certainly not in the Bill. If that is the argument being made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is it an interesting one but not one that the Government have grasped.

Perhaps I should clarify the issue of the threshold at which MREL kicks in, because that was the point to which my noble friend Lady Bowles referred. The UK demands MREL or bail-in bonds as the mechanism for resolution in the case of the failure of a much smaller bank than in any other country across the globe. The differential between us and everybody else is very large. That, we assume, is why the Government want to keep this mechanism available for banks that have been required to have MREL: they are trying to deal with that small to medium-sized group that, quite frankly, should probably never be in the MREL group in the first place.

15:45

As the noble Lord knows, MREL is very expensive. It restrains banks from growing and upscaling and there is a very strong argument that we have set MREL at exactly the wrong point; it should be for much bigger banks. That was the issue to which my noble friend referred.

I come back to the core of this argument: I do not take the position that the FSCS was ever designed to step in and deal with the failure of a major bank. It would crash our entire financial and banking sector if everyone had to step in and come to the rescue of, say, RBS, Lloyds, NatWest or whatever else. That would not be appropriate.

The noble Lord may be a little like me; I have always been sceptical that MREL would ever be used, because it would have such consequences in its own right. In the end, the resort is to public funds. I am afraid that every Government do not want to own up to that, but they know, in the back of their mind, that if we have an absolutely major crash, only one player will step up—I see the noble Lord is nodding—and that is the taxpayer. Any suggestion that the financial sector should go away and believe that it must consider its FSCS funds as available to rescue one of our major banks is, frankly, entirely inappropriate. That is why this amendment makes such sense.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords, and to my noble friend Lord Eatwell for the points that he made. The scope of firms in relation to which the mechanism can be applied has been a key issue in all our deliberations to date. I am very grateful to noble Lords for their engagement on this topic since Grand Committee.

As I stated then, the Government’s policy intention is for the mechanism provided by the Bill to be used primarily to support the resolution of smaller banks. We have reaffirmed that intention by including it in the updates to the special resolution regime code of practice, drafts of which have now been published and shared with noble Lords. The Bank of England must have regard to the code of practice when exercising its resolution powers, and this is set out in statute.

The Treasury is involved in the exercise of any resolution powers, either by being required to provide a response to consultation or by consent. Nevertheless, the Government maintain that it is right for the Bill to contain some flexibility for the Bank of England to be able to use the mechanism more broadly in some circumstances. That is because firm failures can be unpredictable and there could be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use the mechanism on other firms. To repeat the example I gave in Grand Committee, this may be especially relevant in situations where a small bank has grown but is still in the process of reaching its end-state MREL requirements. Firms in this position would have at least some MREL resources to support recapitalisation, but the new mechanism could be used to meet any remaining shortfall if judged necessary. Without the proposed mechanism, there will be a potential gap in this scenario, creating risks to public funds and financial stability.

There is, of course, a counterargument here that the scope could instead be constrained, such that firms on the glide path to their full MREL requirement remain in scope of the mechanism but firms that have met their end-state MREL are excluded. The Government note that this is the desired intent of the noble Baroness’s amendment and it is an argument that we have considered carefully.

Ultimately, noting what has been set out in the code of practice and the strong expectation that the mechanism will be used on small banks, the Government’s view is that it is still right for the tool to have additional flexibility for unpredictable circumstances. To narrow the scope would constrain the Bank of England’s optionality, particularly where it might be necessary to supplement the resources bailed in with additional capital resources.

I note that these are considered unlikely outcomes, rather than a central case. However, given the uncertainty and unpredictability of a crisis scenario, the Government consider it important to avoid constraining that optionality.

None of the Bank of England’s other stabilisation powers are constrained for use on a specific type of in-scope firm and that the choice of stabilisation option used remains a decision for the Bank of England to take, having considered the resolution conditions and objectives. The Government believe that it is right for a similar approach to be taken in relation to the new mechanism. To be clear, the Government’s clear view remains that this mechanism should be intended for smaller banks and that the Bank of England should not assume the use of this mechanism for larger firms. In that regard, I agree with the noble Baroness on the crux of the issue she is raising. The Government simply do not wish to hard-wire that principle into the Bill.

Since we last debated this issue in Grand Committee, the Bank of England has published a consultation on proposed changes to the MREL regime. These proposals include the removal of the additional MREL requirement associated with the transactional accounts threshold for being set to the transfer strategy, given the availability of FSCS funds under the mechanism in the Bill as an alternative. There are currently only a limited number of firms with a transfer strategy, and firms with such a strategy would typically be expected to have a relatively small balance sheet. As such, the proposed change to the MREL regime is modest, consistent with the policy intention for the Bill mechanism to be intended primarily for smaller banks and it has the additional benefit of seeking to ensure that the MREL regime is proportionate for growing firms.

I reiterate the message delivered in the Written Ministerial Statement I made on the day the Bank of England’s consultation was published. As I have already said, the Government and the Bank of England agree that the Bank should not assume use of the new mechanism when setting a preferred resolution strategy of bail-in and corresponding MREL requirements for larger banks.

Recognising the level of interest rightly expressed in Peers being able to scrutinise the changes to the code of practice before the Bill begins its passage in the other place, the Government published updates of that document on 15 October. Notably, on the issue of scope, these updates to the code of practice explicitly state that the Bank of England will not assume use of the new mechanism when setting a preferred resolution strategy of bail-in and the corresponding MREL requirements for a large bank. Those updates to the code also made it clear that the Bank of England is still expected to abide by the so-called 5% and 8% rules in the case of larger banks.

I hope the explanations I have given have been helpful. Throughout the commitments I have given today and in Committee, in publishing draft updates to the code of practice, in the Written Ministerial Statement and in the engagement I have had with noble Lords, I have sought to reassure noble Lords on the question of scope, the primary intention for the mechanism in the Bill and the importance of maintaining flexibility for the Bank of England to act in the public interest. I recognise that I may not have been successful and that strong views remain, but I hope that the noble Baroness may feel able to withdraw her amendment as a result.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, particularly those who have spoken in favour of my amendment. This has been the subject of numerous discussions with the Minister. I listened carefully to what he had to say, and I still cannot quite understand why the Government will not accept this amendment and are unfortunately still using terms such as “It is the strong expectation that it would be used for X, Y, Z-type of bank”, or “It’s primarily for smaller banks”. That does not give me comfort, as we may be storing up significant challenges for the future. Therefore, I am not encouraged by the Minister’s response, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

15:53

Division 1

Ayes: 247

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Conservative: 158
Liberal Democrat: 56
Crossbench: 21
Non-affiliated: 6
Ulster Unionist Party: 2
Plaid Cymru: 2
Green Party: 1
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 125

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Labour: 111
Crossbench: 10
Non-affiliated: 4

16:06

Amendment 3

Moved by

[Lord Sikka]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 22, at end insert—
“(3A) Before exercising the power in subsection (1), the Bank and the scheme manager must assess whether they consider that there should be a clawback of any part of executive remuneration from the previous 12 months.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to address potential moral hazards through requiring the Bank and scheme manager to take directors’ pay and bonuses into consideration when a recapitalisation payment is made.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, a wise man once said that history repeats itself, first as tragedy and secondly as farce. So it is with successive Governments’ obsession with going easy on the banking industry. We are sleepwalking into the next financial crash, but this modest amendment seeks to check some of the moral hazards by imposing personal costs on bank directors through a possible clawback of their remuneration.

History shows that moral hazards give rise to heavy economic and social costs. The secondary banking crash of the mid-1970s forced the state to bail out banks and insurance and property companies. We have had a banking crisis every decade since the 1970s but Governments continue to indulge the City of London. The big bang, the Financial Services Act 1986 and the Banking Act 1987 formalised light-touch regulation. Then came the banking crash of 2007-08. The obedient state dutifully provided £133 billion of cash and £1,029 billion of guarantees to bail out banks. It also provided £895 billion of quantitative easing to support capital markets.

The reforms that were introduced after the crash have been gradually reversed and the race to the bottom is accelerating. The regulators once again have the secondary objective of promoting the growth and competitiveness of the industry. The Bank of England has watered down the capital requirement rules that were meant to shock-proof the banking system from another 2007-08 style crash. Banks would now have to increase their current capital buffers by less than 1% to abide by the Basel 3.1 standards. That is down from the previous proposal for a 3.2% rise last year, as the Government are now more interested in getting the banks to help to promote growth.

Research by my colleagues at Sheffield University shows that between 1995 and 2015 the scandal-ridden finance industry made a negative contribution of £4,500 billion to the UK economy. No questions have been asked about that, and Governments have done their best to conceal the criminal activities of banks. Documents relating to the 1991 closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International are still a state secret. No one has explained why in 2012 the Chancellor and the regulators urged US authorities to go easy on HSBC after it admitted in writing to “criminal conduct”, along with money laundering for criminals. To this day, no Statement about that has been made to Parliament. However, in Committee on the Bill, the Minister urged the House to trust the regulators.

Due to the absence of personal sanctions, there is no urgency for dealing with banking fraud. Thousands of people suffered from frauds at HBOS; these date back to 2003. The Government washed their hands of the matter and left it to Lloyds Bank to investigate its own failures. Dame Linda Dobbs was appointed by Lloyds Bank in 2017 and a report was promised by 2018. To date, no report has been published and no regulator or Minister has inquired into the reasons for the delay or done anything to help the victims of those frauds.

Despite warnings, swathes of banking remain unregulated. The shadow banking system, which is now bigger than retail banking and is enmeshed with the regulated sector, remains unregulated. The cap on bankers’ bonuses has been abolished and bankers are free to be reckless as they pursue personal riches. This Bill ensures that the banks will be bailed out, therefore there are even fewer incentives for the directors to behave in a responsible way. There are virtually no pressure points on directors to curb predatory practices and it takes years to disqualify any company director. Prosecutions for predatory practices are rare and the Government say that the prisons are already full, so we cannot send these people to prison either.

On 5 September, in opposing my amendment during Committee, the Minister said that

“it is a key principle of the resolution regime that natural and legal persons should be made liable under the civil or criminal law in the UK for their responsibility for the failure of the institution. This is delivered by Section 36 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which provides for a criminal offence where a senior manager of a bank has taken a decision which caused the failure of a financial institution”.—[Official Report, 5/9/24; col. GC 41.]

Following that exchange, on 12 September 2024 I tabled a Written Question to the Ministry of Justice. The reply on 23 September said:

“The Ministry of Justice Court Proceedings Database has not recorded any prosecutions under section 36 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 since its introduction”.


There is no pressure on directors; they are not prosecuted —although they may get some honours.

I am not really persuaded that there are sufficient pressure points upon bank directors to curb predatory practices. I urge the Government to accept my modest amendment. The Government can stand up to the banking industry or perhaps, one day, they may well have to pick up the tab from the next banking crash. I beg to move.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for bringing his amendment and for explaining it so well. We on these Benches are concerned that a statutory requirement to make assessment of potential clawbacks of executive pay may simply hinder the efficient use of the recapitalisation mechanism, which of course usually has to be done in a very timely fashion. Having considered his amendment, we feel that it would not be an improvement to the Bill and will not be supporting it.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka replicates the one he tabled in Committee. I hope that my noble friend will therefore forgive me for repeating some of the points that I made when we discussed this amendment then.

Amendment 3 seeks to ensure that the Bank of England and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme consider whether there should be a clawback of executive pay and bonuses from a failed firm before using the new mechanism. Although the bank resolution regime does not set out powers allowing the Bank of England to claw back money from management, it does provide it with an extensive and proportionate set of powers to impose consequences on the management of a failed firm in resolution.

First, we expect that any existing shareholder equity would be cancelled or transferred when a firm is placed into resolution. This ensures that the firm’s owners bear losses, which is an important principle of the resolution regime. In many circumstances, this will affect directors and management who hold shares or other instruments of the failed firm.

16:15

In addition, the Bank of England has the power to remove or vary the contracts of service of the firm’s directors or senior managers. Whether to use this power in a particular case is a judgment for the Bank of England to make. However, as set out in the Government’s code of practice, the Bank of England generally expects to remove senior management considered responsible for the failure of the firm and to appoint new senior management as necessary.

Finally, as reflected in the code of practice, it is a key principle of the resolution regime that natural and legal persons should be made liable under civil or criminal law in the UK for their responsibility for the failure of the institution. This is delivered by Section 36 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which provides for a criminal offence where a senior manager of a bank has taken a decision which caused the failure of a financial institution, if their conduct falls far below what could reasonably be expected of someone in their position.

Overall, this ensures that there are material consequences for senior management when a firm goes into resolution. The Government do not see a strong case to make significant changes beyond these existing requirements, given that this Bill is intended to be a targeted enhancement to the regime and does not in itself justify material changes to conduct regulation.

Furthermore, I note that the noble Lord’s amendment would add a material additional obligation for the Bank of England and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme over a resolution weekend. At such a time, it is likely to be critical for the Bank of England to respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure. However, the noble Lord’s amendment would add a further complex consideration when the authorities’ attention should be focused on the resolution objectives and maintaining financial stability. This may delay or impede effective resolution action. In any case, the information to make an assessment of whether there should be any clawback may not be available at the time when the use of the new mechanism is being contemplated. Such information may come to light only after the resolution has taken place. In addition, there may be ongoing enforcement action, in which case these matters may be best considered as part of that process rather than separately.

The Government are committed to high standards in financial services regulation and recognise their importance in maintaining confidence and trust in the financial system. The senior managers regime supports high standards by ensuring individual accountability for senior individuals within firms and by promoting high standards of conduct and governance. The Prudential Regulation Authority sets rules on remuneration and applies these to medium-sized and large banks, ensuring they are proportionate. The PRA rules include clear requirements for firms to ensure they have policies on malus and clawback in place to align management incentives with that of the bank. However, as the PRA’s CEO Sam Woods set out in a speech on 17 October, it is important to ensure such regulatory requirements remain proportionate. The Government are committed to ensuring the UK’s regulatory framework facilitates growth while continuing to be robust.

I hope these points reassure my noble friend about the structures in place to hold managers of banks to account. On that basis, I respectfully ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for her comments and the Minister for his detailed reply. I am not really persuaded by either of their replies. I feel that this is an important question and there are still no effective checks on the moral hazard created by institutionalised bailouts of the banking sector.

I have made my point and it has gone on the public record. I hope no Government live to regret not accepting this amendment, but given that there is a lack of support, I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

Amendment 4

Moved by

[Lord Livermore]

4: Clause 1, page 1, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) In subsection (2)(b), “relevant person” means—(a) the Treasury,(b) a bridge bank, or(c) an asset management vehicle.(4B) In this section, “bridge bank” and “asset management vehicle” have the meanings given by sections 12 and 12ZA, respectively, of the Banking Act 2009.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my first amendment to Clause 1, clarifies the persons (in addition to the Bank of England) in respect of whose expenses a recapitalisation payment may be made.

Amendment 4 agreed.

Amendment 5

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

5: Clause 1, page 2, line 3, at end insert—
“(6) When the Bank exercises its power in subsection (1), the Bank must make a report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within 28 days of the date of any recapitalisation payment being made.(7) The report must comply with any requirements specified by the Treasury, but must include—(a) the reasons why the Bank decided to make a recapitalisation payment in preference to allowing the financial institution to go into insolvency;(b) a breakdown of the costs referred to in subsection (2);(c) a comparison of the expected recapitalisation payment or payments that will be paid by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, compared with the expected costs to the Scheme in an insolvency process.(8) The Bank must make a further report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within three months of the date of the sale of the institution to a private sector purchaser, or the sale, closure or winding up of the institution or bridge bank, providing such information as the Treasury may require, including the breakdown of the actual recapitalisation payment or payments and the reasons for any differences to the expected costs referred to in subsection (7)(b).(9) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must lay a copy of each report under subsection (7) or (8) before Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that the reasons for decisions of the Bank to follow a resolution process in preference to an insolvency process are explained and the explanation laid before Parliament, both at the time of the decision and once the resolution process has been completed, and that the costs can be compared to what would have been expected if the institution had been placed into insolvency.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this group covers reporting and accountability to Parliament on the use of the resolution mechanism, which was probably the greatest area of discussion in Committee. The Bill gives significant rights to the Bank of England to impose costs on the banking industry. It can only be right, therefore, that the Bank should have to explain the reasons for its decisions and the outcome to both the Treasury and Parliament.

A number of concerns have been expressed throughout the process, and again today, about how the Bank might use the mechanism. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court, said:

“I can foresee circumstances where the Bank will choose to recapitalise a small bank rather than put it into a bank insolvency process, less because it is in the national interest and more as a way of minimising the reputational damage of regulatory failure”.—[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 914.]


The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said something similar earlier today. The noble Lord and others have pointed out that there is nothing in the Bill that would incentivise the Bank to control the expenses of the process; again, we discussed this to an extent earlier. Those expenses will be picked up by the FSCS, by the wider financial services industry and, ultimately, by the customers of that industry.

As we have just seen, the Government have tabled amendments to clarify that last point, which we have already discussed—but the point remains. Fears, which I share, have been raised that this resolution mechanism could become the default, rather than insolvency. I believe—others share this view, I think—that, in principle, a failing institution should be allowed to fail unless it is in the public interest for it to be bailed out. The draft code attempts to deal with this but the concern remains.

For all these reasons, it is essential that the Bank should have to explain its decisions and that Parliament should have the ability to scrutinise those decisions. For that reason, I have tabled Amendment 5, which would require the Bank to make a report to the Chancellor that must then be laid before Parliament every time a recapitalisation payment is made. The amendment sets out some minimum requirements for what the report should cover, including why the Bank chose to make a recapitalisation payment rather than allowing the institution to go into insolvency; the costs that will be incurred; and how those costs compare to the costs the FSCS would incur in an insolvency situation. It would also require a final report explaining what actually happened—and, if different, why—at the end of the resolution process.

Since I tabled Amendment 5, I am pleased to say that the Government have issued the draft code of practice—for which we are all grateful, as I said—and tabled Amendment 8. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for his constructive approach on this. Given that the two together deal with most of the areas covered by my Amendment 5, I will not push that.

However—there is always a “but” in these things—there is one important omission in the Minister’s Amendment 8. Although it requires the Bank to report within three months of any recapitalisation payment, it does not require a final report on what actually happened at the end of the resolution process. Although the resolution will happen quickly in many cases—the example of Silicon Valley Bank, where it happened over the weekend, is a good one—that may not always be the case. Under these rules, a bank can be put into a bridge bank for up to two years, which can be extended further. We can have multiple recapitalisation periods during that period, so the process can last a number of years. If the Bank reports within three months of each payment, we may never see a report on what actually happened at the end—for example, if the failing institution is put into insolvency two years later.

It is essential that the Chancellor and Parliament have an opportunity to review how the resolution worked out and, most importantly, to ensure that any relevant lessons are learned. So I have tabled Amendment 9, as an amendment to the Minister’s amendment, to cover that point. I think that this may have been the Minister’s intention all along, but I cannot agree with him that his amendment, as drafted, actually achieves this. On the report it requires, his amendment says:

“The Bank must report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about … the exercise of the power to require a recapitalisation payment to be made, and … the stabilisation power and the stabilisation option to which the payment relates”.


Nowhere does it talk about what happened at the end, which could be a number of years later.

I am alive to the concern that we should not have too many potentially repetitive reports, so my amendment would have effect only if the reports published by the Bank, in accordance with the Minister’s amendment, do not cover the final resolution results. I hope that this is not controversial and that the Minister will be able to accept Amendment 9 to his amendment. However, as I say, it is essential that the final outcome of any resolution is made transparent and open to scrutiny.

If the Minister is unwilling to accept my proposal, or accepts the principle but does not like some of the detail—he has mentioned to me that he is not terribly keen on the three-month timeframe—perhaps he could commit to coming back at Third Reading with his own version of the amendment that satisfies the guaranteed requirement to report on the final outcome. He can tweak it as he likes on timing and things—I cannot get too excited about that—but, if he is not prepared either to accept it or to do that, I will be minded, I am afraid, to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 9 when the time comes.

The other amendments in this group relate to notifying the relevant committees of both this House and the other place of the use of the recapitalisation power. The amendments tabled by the Minister, as well as the amendments to his amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, arose from amendments that the noble Baroness put down in Committee. I am pleased that the Government have accepted those amendments. However, all the amendments do is say that the committees must be notified. Those committees need something to look at; it makes it all the more important that we have the reports we are talking about, both on the use of the recapitalisation power and on what finally happens, at the end of the day. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 11 to 13 in this group; they are amendments to the Government’s Amendment 10, to which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has referred. Before I address those amendments, I shall refer briefly to the reporting amendments in this group. I certainly praise the Government for bringing forward their Amendment 8, as well as for beefing up the code of practice on reporting. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that the issue of the final report made by the Bank of England is outstanding; I therefore support his Amendment 9.

On Amendments 10 to 13, I start by thanking the Minister for listening to the case, made in Committee, that parliamentary committees should be notified of the use of the bank recapitalisation power. I had tabled an amendment that named the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House; this was supported in Committee by fellow Members of the latter committee, as noble Lords might imagine. I retabled my amendment for Report—the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, added their names—but the Government then tabled Amendment 10, which was similar in principle to my amendment but drafted using the language of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. That Act did not refer to the Financial Services Regulation Committee for the simple reason that it did not exist at the time—indeed, it was that Act that led to creation of that committee. So, following the helpful meeting that we had with the Minister, I was told that the Government were happy to refer directly to the Financial Services Regulation Committee. They suggested that this be achieved by my tabling amendments to the Government’s amendments. So I hope that, when the Minister gets up to speak to his amendment, he will confirm that he accepts my Amendments 11 to 13.

Noble Lords who have joined the House in the past eight years might be mystified by the reference to the Chairman of Committees in my Amendment 13. Although the House has not used the title since 2016, the post to which we now refer as the Senior Deputy Lord Speaker technically remains the Chairman of Committees. One learns something every day in Parliament.

Let me conclude by saying that I hope the principle of requiring notification to the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and your Lordships’ Financial Services Regulation Committee is now regarded as a precedent for any future creation of significant or unusual powers granted to the Bank of England or any of the other regulators in future. The strength of parliamentary accountability for those bodies, with their massive powers, must always be maintained—and, indeed, enhanced.

16:30

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I think that everything that needs to be said about these amendments has probably already been said. I have added my name where I could; one came in very late, so I could not. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on her diligence in getting the committee name in properly so that everybody knows where to go, with all these hundreds of people who are going to be reading this legislation. Nevertheless, we are an institution, as it were, so it is good to see our name there.

I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on his diligence in hounding to a conclusion the final report, because it is, as he said, very important. In the meeting we had recently, those present from the Bank of England wondered why we might want this and suddenly nodded when I said, “Because otherwise Parliament may never find out what really happened”: that is what it is all about. They might think we do not want to know, many years on, if it is a long period. The sorts of people who sit on these committees do want to know, because we are the ones who have to learn and have to ask the questions, to make sure that it is not going wrong again. It is very important, and I hope the Minister will accept it. If votes are called, these Benches will be supporting the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am enormously grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken today. I too add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for tabling his amendment. This group epitomises what is so good about your Lordships’ House: a lot of movement has happened to date on these issues from the Minister, and we are grateful for his engagement and for the fact that we have been able to get a little further down the road. However, like terriers with very sharp teeth, noble Lords are not quite willing to let it go just yet, and I too support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and of course those of my noble friend Lady Noakes, who has also done a fantastic job in ensuring that the issues she raised, and which most noble Lords agreed with in Committee, come to the fore. Helpfully, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has tabled Amendment 9, which plugs a big gap, and I hope the Minister will accept that and the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, this large group includes a number of the Government’s proposed amendments to the Bill. I begin by responding to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which is intended to ensure that there is transparency about the Bank’s use of the new mechanism. It does this by creating a requirement for the Bank to report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within 28 days on certain matters where a recapitalisation payment is made, and for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay these reports in Parliament.

I assure noble Lords that the Government recognise absolutely the importance of transparency and accountability regarding the new mechanism and appreciate the strength of feeling in the House. The debates at Second Reading and in Committee were helpful and constructive and have informed the Government’s approach. The Government therefore agree that there should be an explicit requirement for the Bank of England to report to the Chancellor when it uses the new mechanism. To that end, government Amendment 8 means that the Bank of England must report to the Chancellor about the use of the mechanism in any circumstances where it is used.

The Government’s amendment outlines two elements to reporting. First, it would require the Bank of England to produce a final report at a time to be specified by the Treasury. This is intended to be a comprehensive account of the use of the new mechanism and to include an assessment of the relative costs to insolvency. Secondly, the amendment would require the Bank to provide an interim report within three months of using the mechanism in the event that a final report has not been provided within that time. This would ensure a prompt initial public justification for the use of the new mechanism, even if further details would follow later.

Government Amendment 14 would require the code of practice to include guidance on what should be included in the reports. Taking these points together, the Government’s approach has a broadly similar intent to that of the noble Lord’s amendment. However, there are some points of detail where the Government have taken a different approach in order to avoid unintended consequences. In particular, while recognising the importance of clear reporting arrangements, the Government believe that it is critical that the timing and content of any reports do not complicate a successful resolution.

I would highlight two challenges with the approach set out in Amendment 5 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. First, the Government believe that requiring an initial report as soon as 28 days after using the mechanism is likely to be too soon. As noble Lords know, the complexity of firm failures mean that they may not always be fully resolved within a short period of time. This is particularly the case when using the bridge bank tool, which is anticipated to be an interim step before an eventual sale. It is possible that a resolution process remains ongoing 28 days following a firm failure. It is therefore important that sufficient time is allowed so that the Bank can focus on its primary function of maintaining financial stability through managing the failure of the firm, before turning to the process of reporting. The Government therefore believe that providing an interim report within three months is a more proportionate approach to take, allowing the Bank more time to ensure that an interim report is as meaningful as possible while still ensuring that the Chancellor and Parliament are updated on use of the mechanism in short order.

This takes me to my second point, which is that disclosing certain information too early in the resolution process, especially information relating to the relative costs of different options such as insolvency, risks complicating a resolution because such information is either incomplete or highly sensitive. Regarding the noble Lord’s proposal to require an initial report to disclose certain costs, it is worth noting that when conducting the resolution conditions assessment, the Bank of England would make an assessment of the costs that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme may incur if the firm was placed into insolvency. However, by virtue of necessity, this would be only an initial assessment based on the information available at the time. It is therefore important that the Bank of England’s assessment of relative costs is reported on only once the resolution is fully complete. This will ensure that the Treasury, Parliament and industry are provided with a comprehensive and accurate account.

In addition, if the firm was in a bridge bank, as it may well be after just 28 days, the early disclosure of this interim financial information could complicate negotiations regarding a sale, especially if it was subsequently revised. It may also be market sensitive and increase speculation about the failed firm during a period of heightened sensitivity. Ultimately, therefore, the Government see risks in requiring the Bank to report too early and in too much detail during a highly unpredictable and sensitive situation. This is in part why the existing reporting provisions within the Banking Act in relation to resolution require reports as soon as reasonably practicable only after a year has passed.

The Government have sought to reconcile these different issues in our proposed amendment, while recognising the important substantive point of principle raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. First, the Government have proposed an interim report to be provided within three months. While it is possible that a resolution process may not have concluded by this point, as the FSCS is likely to levy firms within this timeframe, it seems reasonable to expect the Bank to provide a public justification of the decision to use the new mechanism by this point. I note that, alongside the notification requirement covered in government Amendment 10, which I will turn to shortly, this will ensure that the Treasury and Parliament have a prompt explanation of why resolution has been undertaken.

Secondly, the Government’s amendment means that the Bank of England must provide a separate final report, in the event that this has not already been provided within three months of using the mechanism. This final report is where the Bank would outline its assessment of the relative costs of different options. This reflects the points that I have already made, namely that the Government believe that the key reporting obligation should fall once the resolution process has concluded. This reduces the risk that disclosure frustrates that process and ensures that any report can be meaningful.

To support this approach, the Government have also tabled an amendment requiring guidance on the content of such reports to be included in the code of practice. This will ensure that there is clear public understanding of the key issues that any interim or final report is expected to cover. As I have noted, both interim and final reports would be expected to provide a justification for the use of the mechanism, and as set out in the current draft of the code of practice, the final report would need to set out an assessment of the costs if the firm had entered insolvency. The current draft updates to the code of practice also make clear that the Government expect to require the Bank of England to provide an explanation of why ancillary costs were considered reasonable and prudent.

I am grateful for the helpful engagement that I have had with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who has rightly emphasised the importance of the Bank of England providing a comparison of the expected and actual costs in its final reports. I am happy to reassure the noble Lord that the Government intend to request that the Bank of England include this in final reports and will ensure that the final updates to the code of practice reflect this.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has also tabled Amendment 9 to require the Bank to produce a report three months after the resolved firm has been sold or otherwise closed. I understand that the intent of this similarly reflects a desire to ensure that the Bank of England is compelled to report after a resolution process has fully concluded and provide an assessment of how the expected impacts of its actions compared to the actual events that took place in resolution. The Government of course appreciate the importance of the Bank of England reporting promptly. Reflecting on the noble Lord’s proposal, the Government intend to further update the code of practice to make clear that, where feasible and appropriate, the Treasury would expect the Bank of England to report soon after the sale or closure of the resolved firm.

The Government believe that it would be preferable not to put this expectation into legislation. This reflects the point I have already made: that the Bank of England should be required to provide final reports with the more detailed assessments only at the appropriate moment. While the Government do expect, as I have said, the Bank of England to be in the position to report soon after the end of the resolution process, this cannot always be guaranteed. For example, in the case of selling a firm, it may not have been possible in all cases to complete the full post-resolution independent valuation process within three months of a sale. I believe the Government’s approach still captures the intent of the noble Lord’s amendment, which is to ensure that full reports following the conclusion of a resolution process are presented expediently, with some discretion for the Treasury to ensure that reports are still provided only at the right moment.

I hope that, taken together, the Government’s amendments address the noble Lord’s concerns on both the timing and the content of reports, while retaining the flexibility necessary to avoid unintended consequences. On the specific additional point raised by the noble Lord’s Amendment 9, I agree of course with his intention and I will be happy to update the code of practice to this effect. However, the Government believe it would be preferable not to put this into legislation. I would be happy to consider this matter further and discuss it with my honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, but I cannot give any firm additional commitments at this stage.

Turning to government Amendment 10, on notifying Parliament when using the power, I note that both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the Government tabled similar amendments on the theme of parliamentary scrutiny. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this issue and for her engagement on the matter; I am especially grateful to her for agreeing to withdraw her original amendment. The Government’s amendment reflects the point made by noble Lords in Grand Committee concerning parliamentary notification and the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House as a result of passing the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.

Building on that innovation in parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, the Government’s amendment seeks to harness the role played by that committee, as well as the Treasury Select Committee. It requires the Bank of England to notify the chairs of both committees as soon as reasonably practicable after the new mechanism under the Bill has been used. It includes provisions to future-proof this requirement following use of the new mechanism, such that if the names or functions of those committees change, the requirement for the Bank of England to notify the relevant committees by which those functions are exercisable would still stand.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has rightly argued that the Government’s amendment requires some tweaking, in particular to refer to the Financial Services Regulation Committee in the House of Lords by name. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing this to my attention, and I note her amendments to the Government’s amendment—Amendments 11, 12 and 13—which attempt to address this point. I am of course very happy to agree to those amendments being made.

I hope that the Government’s approach across all the issues debated in this group demonstrates that the issue of accountability to Parliament is being taken seriously, ensuring that there will be transparency in use of the new mechanism. In particular, I hope that the Government’s amendments on the new reporting requirements address the noble Lord’s concerns on both the timing and content of the reports, while retaining the flexibility necessary to avoid unintended consequences. On the basis of these points, I hope noble Lords will be able to support both the Government’s amendments and those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and the Minister for his constructive approach to it. I take on board everything he said about Amendment 5, which is why, as I have already indicated, I do not intend to push it to a vote.

However, I take issue with the Minister’s thinking it is appropriate that the relative costs of the recapitalisation process versus the insolvency process are looked at only after the event, at the very end of the process. It is quite important that we see why the Bank made decision it made at the time it made it, and that it has not reverse-engineered the results and facts to justify what it did. So I am not totally sure that I fully agree with the Minister on that point. Be that as it may, I am not going to push Amendment 5, because Amendment 8, along with the code of practice, covers most of what is needed.

However, as to Amendment 9, I am afraid that I did not hear anything particularly new there. The Minister has confirmed that his intention is that the reporting should cover the final result of the resolution process, which, as I say, could be a number of years later—but that is not what government amendment 8 says. The amendment specifically refers to

“the exercise of the power to”

recapitalise and

“the stabilisation power and stabilisation option to which”

it

“relates”.

It does not refer anywhere to what happens at the end. It is all very well saying that it might go in the code of practice and that there is an expectation that this will happen, but this is a really important issue.

We must know what actually happened, to be able to see how that compares with what we were told was going to happen, and to be able to learn the lessons arising from that. With the best will in the world, it may not be the Minister who is at the Treasury whenever this is used. I absolutely believe and trust that he would do exactly the right thing, but whoever comes next might not. It is important that this is in the Bill.

I am afraid that I intend to divide the House when the time comes, but in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

16:45

Amendment 6

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

6: Clause 1, page 2, line 3, at end insert—
“(6) When discharging its functions in respect of the exercise of recapitalisation payments under this section, the Bank of England must observe the competitiveness and growth objective.(7) The competitiveness and growth objective is facilitating, subject to aligning with relevant international standards—(a) the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom (including in particular the financial services sector), and(b) its growth in the medium to long term.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak principally to Amendment 7 in this group, which has also been signed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Vere and Lady Noakes. Amendment 6 was my first attempt, when I was worried that defined first and secondary objectives were not already specified in connection with resolution. In fact, there are a whole load of objectives that have to be balanced in Section 4 of the Banking Act 2009. However, I then hit upon the formulation of claim 7, to make it agree with how it had been rendered in FiSMA 2000. I am suggesting that this is a secondary objective to all the existing ones, and the formulation is the one with which we are already familiar.

We on these Benches are not always certain of the merits of the competitiveness and growth objective, which is what I am inserting into the Bill here, in respect of the resolution authority. Our concern is that in other places, it might return to too much of the animal spirit that led to the financial crisis, but here, it has a different and particular role. The Bank has to balance all the Section 4 objectives to get the best results, and, in its resolution capacity, it is not really in a situation to be prey to animal spirits.

When it comes to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme as a source of funds, as we have already said, there are no bounds, or at least no written ones. How many dips into it can be made if the first one is not enough? How big can those dips be, compared to what might have been needed to compensate depositors if the Bank had gone bust instead? What happens if there are multiple resolution events in a narrow period of time? For how many years can the extra levy be put on to the banking sector in order to pay back the scheme? As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has said before, how can we be certain that, years later, it is not called upon again in connection with some kind of legal action?

All these things are left open for the Bank of England resolution authority to decide and to do its best on. It will, of course, receive advice from the PRA, which has to consider what is an affordable levy for the industry, but it is receiving advice from a body which has in one sense just failed, and to which it is always close. It is advice that it does not actually have to take, either.

The only lever—other than the one suggested in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, a requirement to minimise cost—is to impose the objective of competitiveness, which in this instance means affordability, and for that to be imposed on the resolution authority itself. It is secondary to everything else, so it cannot kick the other objectives into touch in any way; it is just making sure that there is a small reality check about what this does to other banks, especially in the circumstance that this is not the only bank or that this is not the only dip into the fund.

So, this is an instance where the secondary competitiveness and growth objective is relevant, and I hope the Minister can see his way to accepting it. If not, I shall probably seek to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 16 in this group and added my name to Amendment 7, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, just spoke. As she indicated, the two amendments are related in that the imposition of unnecessary costs, which is the target of my Amendment 16, will do nothing to help the financial sector grow, be competitive or, indeed, support the real economy.

I fully supported the growth and competitiveness objectives introduced for the PRA and the FCA in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, and I am very glad that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given her support to those. But I hope that the Government will want to go further and make all regulators, and indeed all other public sector bodies, pay attention to growth and competitiveness. Extending this to other organisations is important, particularly in the financial services universe, as they were not included within the competitiveness and growth objective in the 2023 Act.

One of those omitted at that time—perhaps we should have spotted it during the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act—was the Bank of England in its capacity as a resolution authority. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has had to confine her amendment to the use of the bank recapitalisation power because of the Long Title of the Bill. But the competitiveness and growth objective ought to apply to the Bank as the resolution authority in toto, not simply when it exercises the new bank recapitalisation power but also when, for example, it is setting MREL levels.

My Amendment 16 adds a special resolution objective to the seven already listed in Section 4 of the Banking Act 2009, and it requires the Bank to consider the minimisation of costs borne by the financial sector when the recapitalisation power is used. It is not an absolute requirement, as it would be just one of eight objectives, and it is for the Bank to determine, under the 2009 Act, how to balance those various objectives.

When it is using the power, the Bank is playing with other people’s money. Ultimately, it is the money of those of us who are customers of the banks, because at the end of the day the money that flows through the banks will end up being borne by customers, and it is only right that the Bank should have regard to the minimisation of costs that are ultimately borne by the banks’ customers.

In Committee I tabled an amendment that focused on the costs being borne through the FSCS not exceeding the counterfactual of the bank insolvency procedure to which the Bank should be paying regard in any event. My amendment today is a less complex test and is simply designed to act as a reminder to the Bank that it should treat other people’s money as carefully as it treats its own. If it does that, it should also help to keep the sector competitive and to help it grow. I hope that the Minister will agree that this amendment is right in principle and that it responds to a number of concerns expressed by several respondents during the consultation on the power over the last year or so.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I support both the amendments in the names of the two noble Baronesses who have just spoken. I probably have a slight preference for Amendment 16 on the expenses—it is more direct—but we need something in the Bill that reminds the Bank of England that it is spending other people’s money, and that it needs to do that carefully and with care. These amendments are aimed primarily at that end, so I support them both.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 7 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Noakes and Lady Vere, but I am not as minded to support Amendment 16 for the following reasons. Some in this House will know that I dislike intensely the competitiveness and growth objective that has been attached to the PRA and the FCA. If you were going to set out a pattern to repeat the crash of 2007-08, those two objectives would be essential paving stones on that route, so I do not look to attach that particular amendment to the Bank of England in its overall resolution role in, for example, setting MREL. It should be setting MREL to reduce risk, not to follow the lowest common denominator in the international banking arena.

Ironically, if you take the growth and competitiveness secondary objective and just apply it to recapitalisation, it turns on its head and becomes a risk-reduction tool, because it basically limits the ability of the collapse of one bank to then infect all the other banks within the system. That seems to me to be a risk-reduction strategy, so I am very much in favour of the way in which it has been crafted under Amendment 7. I say that to reassure others in this House who may be afraid that playing fast and loose with the competitiveness and growth agenda is always a risk-increasing agenda rather than a risk-reduction agenda. In this narrow role, it works in the opposite direction.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise briefly to speak to Amendment 7 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and Amendment 16 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes.

On Amendment 7, I will not reiterate the points raised. I deeply appreciated the explanation by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as to how she got to her supportive position. From our perspective, we feel that Amendments 7 is a reasonable objective that would ensure the Bank facilitates the international competitiveness of the UK economy and economic growth in the medium term—that is very clear. It also has the ability to look at the level of risk within the banking sector over the medium term. Given the Government’s stated objective of focusing on economic growth, I am very interested to hear the Minister’s view on these amendments.

Amendment 16 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, which I have signed, seeks to minimise the net costs recouped from the banking sector via this mechanism. Again, it is a very sensibly drafted amendment that would improve the Bill, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by noting that the Government fully understand the concerns raised by noble Lords regarding the objectives the Bank of England should adhere to when taking resolution action.

Amendments 6 and 7 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seek to ensure that the Bank of England considers growth and competitiveness when using the new mechanism, by introducing a new objective that the Bank of England would need to consider. In the case of Amendment 6 this would be alongside the existing special resolution objectives, while in the case of Amendment 7 it would be a secondary objective. This objective would be to facilitate the competitiveness and growth of the UK economy, subject to aligning with relevant international standards.

I appreciate wholly the intent of the noble Baroness’s amendments. The Government have reflected carefully on this issue in the weeks running up to Report. Growth and competitiveness are, of course, fundamental priorities for this Government. The Government are resisting these amendments because, while we understand and appreciate their intent, they would pose challenges within the specific context of this Bill. I intend to make three main points—about the wider context of the Bill; the particular challenges a new objective may pose in the case of the new mechanism; and the steps the Government are taking to ensure that costs to industry are properly considered.

First, I note that the aim of the Bill is to enhance the resolution regime, but in a way that avoids making more fundamental changes to the regime or to the way in which the Bank of England exercises its resolution powers. This reflects a key conclusion from the Government’s consultation, which is that the regime already broadly works well. This was demonstrated by the successful resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK.

As noble Lords are aware, the resolution regime has been developed over a number of years to align with international best practice. The relevant authorities have invested considerable time and energy in contingency planning to use the existing powers within their existing framework of objectives. As it stands, the regime therefore reflects a carefully calibrated judgment about the key priorities that should be considered in what is an emergency, firm-specific failure scenario.

17:00

This takes me to my second point, about the drawbacks of applying an additional objective, whether primary or secondary, for use of the new mechanism. I note that the noble Baroness’s amendments are intended to apply only when the mechanism in the Bill is used and would not apply to the resolution process as a whole. I understand that this reflects a reasonable concern that the mechanism has cost implications for the sector as a whole and seeks to ensure that those are properly considered.

However, the Government’s view is that having a specific additional objective related to the mechanism could impede and complicate the use of the mechanism in a way that would not best serve the public interest. When managing a firm failure and considering use of the new mechanism, the Bank of England will likely need to take a decision at pace in a highly complex and uncertain environment. In practical terms, it may not have the time or the information necessary to make a full assessment of the impact of using the new mechanism on growth and competitiveness. This is normally achieved by a careful process of consultation and deliberation, something that is unlikely to be possible in this scenario. Therefore, having a new obligation, but not necessarily having sufficient time or information to consider it in detail, would likely increase risks to the Bank in using the new mechanism, even if it became quite apparent that it was in the public interest.

At this point I note that this is distinct from the regular policy-making of the PRA and FCA, which do have a secondary growth and competitiveness objective, but one that is applicable only in the context of their general rule-making and policy-making roles. The Government are strongly committed to the broader secondary growth and competitiveness objectives for the financial services regulators and welcome the publication of the FCA’s and PRA’s reports on how they have embedded these objectives.

It would be quite different to say that something akin to the PRA’s and FCA’s secondary growth and competitiveness objective should apply to the Bank of England when taking urgent crisis management action in relation to an individual distressed or failing firm using this specific mechanism. That reflects the different nature of the decisions that the regulators take in the context of their general rule-making and policy-making roles compared with the resolution authority, which has to act quickly and decisively in a crisis, with limited information.

The Government believe that there are likely to be challenges in imposing a new objective when considering the new mechanism as, by its nature, it will reduce the weight placed on the other objectives. A key policy principle behind the new mechanism is that it is not in itself a new resolution strategy; rather, it provides additional optionality to implement existing strategies. In the cases where its use is contemplated, the alternative options could be the use of taxpayer funds or a disruptive insolvency. In that context, the Government continue to believe that the decision to use the new mechanism should be guided by the same objectives and on a consistent basis as all other resolution decisions. If not then the bar to using the mechanism may be implicitly higher than other alternatives. As I have noted before, the Government have set out their clear view that it would be undesirable for any costs in these scenarios to fall on the taxpayer.

Reflecting the points that I have made, adding a broader objective to the regime as a whole is clearly a complex matter that would require consultation with industry, the regulators and others. I therefore suggest that this issue may not be best solved by this Bill.

Finally, I appreciate noble Lords’ broader concerns about the costs of the new mechanism for the financial services sector, which has guided some of our debate on these and similar amendments. For this reason, the Government have, through tabling amendments and publishing draft updates to the code of practice, sought to clarify how the Bank of England would consider these costs when assessing the resolution conditions and to enhance transparency and accountability. As a public authority, the Bank of England is under general public law duties to ensure that, for any decision that it makes, it considers whether the impact on a firm or group of firms is proportionate to the outcome sought. Through their other amendments and the changes to the code, the Government will ensure that the Bank of England is subject to ex post scrutiny of its actions via the reports that it will need to make to the Chancellor. Given that the potential impacts on growth of any resolution action—or the absence of it—will take time to materialise, the Government believe that this form of accountability is likely to be more effective.

As noble Lords will appreciate, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring that the Bank of England can respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure and that any impacts on growth and competitiveness are properly considered. I hope that I have provided a helpful explanation of the Government’s views on this issue, and respectfully ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

I now turn to Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. This amendment seeks to introduce a new objective into the special resolution regime to ensure that costs to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme are minimised when the new mechanism is used. The effect of this amendment would be to require the Bank of England to ensure it draws down as little as possible from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme when deploying the new mechanism.

While I appreciate what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve with this amendment, and noting that it takes a different approach from the similar amendment she tabled at Grand Committee, the Government’s view remains that adding such a new objective could complicate matters for the Bank of England in using the new mechanism alongside stabilisation powers. This is for similar reasons to those I already touched on in relation to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, although there are some important differences in this case.

First, it is important to draw a distinction between what is necessary to achieve resolution in the public interest and what may minimise costs for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. The risk is that this amendment could lead the Bank of England to consider drawing down less than may be appropriate to sustain market confidence in the firm in resolution and meet the other special resolution objectives. Further, adding this objective may make it more challenging to meet the resolution conditions when using the new mechanism, which could deter use of the mechanism in the first place, even where it was justified and in the public interest.

Paragraphs 26 to 32 of the draft updates to the code of practice provide a detailed explanation of how the Bank of England would be required to assess the costs to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, including the likely costs in an insolvency counterfactual. It is of course right that the Bank of England should not impose any more costs on the wider banking sector than it needs to in order to meet the special resolution objectives when deploying the new mechanism. However, the Banking Act 2009 requires all the resolution objectives to be balanced as appropriate in each case. This amendment could therefore dilute the other special resolution objectives. This comes into sharpest relief concerning public funds, as these may be the primary source of alternative funding in the absence of the new mechanism.

In considering this matter, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring the Bank of England can respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure and ensuring costs to industry are properly considered. Having considered this, the Government concluded that the existing public interest test and special resolution objectives remained the appropriate framework for deciding whether the mechanism in this Bill could be used.

Adding a specific objective for the Bank of England to ensure the costs to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme are minimised could prevent it taking the most appropriate action to advance its broader resolution objectives. Those objectives include protecting financial stability, certain depositors and public funds. It is right these aims are prioritised at a time of significant risk, and this is part of the reason why the Government have not proposed changes to the broader resolution framework. Of course, as a public authority, the Bank of England would be under an obligation to ensure that any drawdown from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme ought to be sensible and proportionate and in keeping with public law considerations for it to act in a reasonable and proportionate way.

I note at this point that, as set out in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, while highly case-specific, it is expected that the costs to industry from using the new mechanism are likely to be lower than in insolvency.

As I said, I appreciate the intent behind the noble Baroness’s amendment. The Government have reflected on the points raised by her and other noble Lords at Grand Committee regarding scrutiny and transparency of the Bank of England’s actions, with respect to costs to industry. As I have mentioned at previous stages of this Bill, there are a number of important safeguards within the regime to ensure costs to industry are proportionate and affordable. Notably, the Bank of England must consult with the PRA when considering resolution action. The PRA plays an important role in the resolution process by determining what is affordable for the sector to be levied, and it will continue to have this role under the new mechanism. The PRA also has an important primary objective to ensure the safety and soundness of firms, meaning the affordability of any levies is something it would consider very carefully.

We have, of course, debated today the reporting requirements that will be placed on the Bank of England and the expectation that it will disclose the estimated costs to industry of the options considered in the final reports it must provide. The Government believe this approach is the best means to ensure the Bank of England is held to account for its actions and to ensure it demonstrates that any costs to industry that arise are reasonable.

Finally, the Bill includes a clear provision that allows any funds that are not needed in resolution to flow back to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. This means that, in the event the Bank of England draws down more than eventually turns out to be necessary, any excess funds can be returned.

I hope I have provided some explanation to the noble Baroness of the Government’s position on this matter, and I respectfully ask that she not press her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his explanation. I have some sympathy for the position in which he finds himself, which is the usual one with the Bank of England: you cannot touch it or interfere with it, and it is infallible. You cannot occupy its mind with even a tiny other thought, as it might distract it from the resolution that it has in mind. I find that quite concerning.

Yes, we have the code of conduct and other things that are not in the Bill, but we are dealing with something a little different here. It is ruled by a public interest test, but what about the private interest test? You are using private funds to replace public funds, so there is a big difference. Some little corner of the mind of the Bank of England’s resolution authority has to register that point: private funds are replacing public funds—a special tax on the banking sector to help keep its competitors going.

Imagine you started doing this with grocery stores; what would they think about it? It is quite remarkable. It is not using private funds, by agreement, for a deposit guarantee in the public interest—that would be a specific amount that has previously been agreed—it is stretching the piece of elastic when you do not know how long it is and you are not prepared to have another little test. I find that unacceptable. Something is needed there.

I intend to press my Amendment 7 to a vote and to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 6. If the Minister can find a better way of doing that—this is a private interest test to go alongside the public interest test—he might come up with a better amendment, but this was the best that I could find for now, just to put something in the Bill that shows that we acknowledge what we are doing. This is a momentous precedent, and to say that we cannot have something in the Bill that acknowledges that is a very bad state of affairs. Where will it take us next? I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 6.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

Amendment 7

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

7: Clause 1, page 2, line 3, at end insert—
“(6) As a secondary objective to the special resolution objectives in section 4 of the Banking Act 2009, when discharging its functions in respect of the exercise of recapitalisation payments under this section, the Bank of England must observe the competitiveness and growth objective.(7) The competitiveness and growth objective is facilitating, subject to aligning with relevant international standards—(a) the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom, and(b) its growth in the medium to long term.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I wish to test the opinion of the House.

17:13

Division 2

Ayes: 125

---

Liberal Democrat: 57
Conservative: 49
Crossbench: 13
Non-affiliated: 3
Ulster Unionist Party: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 155

---

Labour: 127
Crossbench: 20
Non-affiliated: 6
Plaid Cymru: 2

17:24

Amendment 8

Moved by

[Lord Livermore]

8: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“ReportingIn the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, after section 214E (as inserted by section 1 of this Act) insert—“214EA Recapitalisation payment: report(1) This section applies where the Bank of England requires the scheme manager to make a recapitalisation payment under section 214E.(2) The Bank must report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about—(a) the exercise of the power to require a recapitalisation payment to be made, and(b) the stabilisation power and the stabilisation option to which the payment relates.(3) The report (“the final report”) must—(a) comply with such requirements as to content, and(b) be provided within such period or at such time,as the Treasury may specify.(4) The Bank must provide an interim report if—(a) the period specified under subsection (3)(b)is a period of more than 3 months beginning with the day on which the Bank requires the recapitalisation payment in question (“the first 3 months”), or the time specified under subsection (3)(b)is after the first 3 months, and(b) the Bank does not provide the final report within the first 3 months.(5) An interim report must—(a) comply with such requirements as to content as the Treasury may specify, and(b) be provided within the first 3 months.(6) Subject to subsection (7), the Chancellor of the Exchequer must lay each report, and any interim report, before Parliament.(7) The Chancellor of the Exchequer may omit from the report, and any interim report, any information which the Chancellor of the Exchequer considers it would not be in the public interest to publish.”” Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause imposes a reporting requirement on the Bank of England when it requires a recapitalisation payment to be made.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I beg to move.

Amendment 9 (to Amendment 8)

Tabled by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

9: After inserted subsection (5) insert—
“(5A) Unless already covered by the final report under subsection (3), the Bank must make a further report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within three months of the date of the sale to a private sector purchaser of the financial institution to which the recapitalisation payment relates, or the sale, closure or winding up of the financial institution or bridge bank to which the recapitalisation payment relates, complying with such requirements as to content as the Treasury may specify.”

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have had the opportunity to consider further, based on the discussions that we have had. The Minister made some helpful commitments to discuss the matter further with his boss back at the Treasury and that the issue would be covered in the code of conduct going forward. On that basis, I will not press my amendment.

Amendment 9 (to Amendment 8) not moved.

Amendment 8 agreed.

Amendment 10

Moved by

[Lord Livermore]

10: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Notification to Parliamentary CommitteesIn the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, after section 214EA (as inserted by section (Reporting) of this Act) insert—214EBNotification to Parliamentary Committees(1)Where the Bank of England requires the scheme manager to make a recapitalisation payment under section 214E, the Bank must, as soon as reasonably practicable, notify in writing the chair of each relevant Parliamentary Committee that it has done so.(2)The relevant Parliamentary Committees are—(a)the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons, and(b)the Committee of the House of Lords which—(i)is charged with responsibility by that House for the purposes of this section, and(ii)has notified the Bank that it is a relevant Parliamentary Committee for those purposes.(3)The reference to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons—(a)if the name of that committee is changed, is to be treated as a reference to that committee by its new name, and(b)if the functions of that committee (or substantially corresponding functions) become functions of a different committee, is to be treated as a reference to the committee by which those functions are exercisable.(4)Any question arising under subsection (3) is to be determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”Any question arising under subsection (3) is to be determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.””Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause requires the Bank of England to notify relevant Parliamentary Committees when it requires a recapitalisation payment to be made.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I beg to move.

Amendments 11 to 13 (to Amendment 10)

Moved by

[Baroness Noakes]

11: In inserted subsection (2) leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) the Financial Services Regulation Committee of the House of Lords”

12: In inserted subsection (3), leave out “The reference to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons” and insert “A reference to a committee in subsection (2)”

13: In inserted subsection (4), at end insert “, in relation to committees of the House of Commons, and
(b) the Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords, in relation to committees of the House of Lords.”

Amendments 11 to 13 (to Amendment 10) agreed.

Amendment 10, as amended, agreed.

Amendment 14

Moved by

[Lord Livermore]

14: After Clause 2, insert the following new Clause—
“Code of practiceIn the Banking Act 2009, in section 5 (code of practice), after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The code must include guidance on the contents of a report, and of any interim report, under section 214EA of that Act (recapitalisation payment: report).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause require the Treasury to include, in a code of practice under section 5 of the Banking Act 2009, provision relating to the content of reports about recapitalisation payments.

Amendment 14 agreed.

Amendment 15

Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

15: After Clause 2, insert the following new Clause—
“Treatment of recapitalisation payments on a winding up(1) In section 215 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (rights of the scheme in insolvency), after subsection (2A), insert—“(2AB) Any recapitalisation payment made by the scheme manager under section 214E in respect of a bank, building society or investment firm is to be treated, in the event of such bank, building society or investment firm or associated bridge bank being wound up, as a debt due to the scheme manager from that bank, building society or (as the case may be) investment firm.”(2) In Schedule 6 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (categories of preferential debts), after paragraph 15AA, insert—“15AB Any debt owed by the debtor to the scheme manager of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under section 215(2AB) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates a mechanism that would allow the FSCS to recover its money in preference to creditors who would otherwise have no right to be bailed out. This mirrors the existing treatment of stabilisation payments made by the FSCS in Clause 215 (2A) of FSMA 2000.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we come to the end of this process; I am sure everyone will be relieved. I rise to speak to my Amendment 15, which is a somewhat technical and perhaps even slightly nerdy amendment, but it deals with an important wrinkle within this Bill.

When a failing bank is recapitalised under this Bill, the money is paid, by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, partly to the Bank of England to cover the costs of the Bank and other parties, and the rest is then injected, as equity, into the failing bank by the Bank of England. In the case of the Bank putting the failing institution into a bridge bank, the recapitalisation is intended to cover the likely costs of the bridge bank for a full year. This has some quite important unintended consequences.

To give a simple example, if it is expected that the bridge bank will be sold quickly, but this does not happen for some reason, and, shortly afterwards, the Bank of England decides to put it into insolvency, it would still have a year’s worth of Financial Services Compensation Scheme money injected into it. We could then have a situation where that money gets used to pay off the liabilities of the bridge bank; these would be liabilities that, had it gone into insolvency in the first place, would not, and should not, have been paid.

This has two consequences. First, creditors who would otherwise have received nothing may get paid out just because of the recapitalisation. That is not the intention of this Bill, but it is the consequence. Secondly, it becomes highly unlikely, if not impossible, that the FSCS could ever recover any of its money in such a situation; it would be last in line to receive the money, after everyone else has been paid off, because its money would have been turned into the equity of the bank. Again, that does not feel right.

Clause 2 sets out that the Bank of England must reimburse any part of any recapitalisation payment that is not needed to cover the costs and expenses of the resolution. However, what I have just explained means that in reality Clause 2 is, in effect, redundant. There is no realistic chance, as it is structured, that any money could ever be recovered for the FSCS. It would go to pay off the creditors who should not otherwise have been paid off.

17:30

My Amendment 15 would fix that problem but, after discussions with the Minister and others, I am persuaded that there are complications. It is important that the bridge bank—the failed institution that is being recapitalised—should be able to obtain money from elsewhere. Giving the FSCS preferential treatment in such situations could make it more difficult to get further money, although I think that could be dealt with by changing the order in which things get repaid.

There is also the question of the tail. In my amendment as drafted, that would stay on the books of the failed institution for ever, even if two years later it was bought by another bank. Again, I believe that could be fixed, but fixing those things could become very complicated. So I am not going to press Amendment 15, but I hope the Minister will keep this problem in mind and keep it under review.

There is a potential solution, which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to in the first group. In a sense, we have gone full circle. When a failing institution is transferred to a bridge bank, the default position should be that only the assets and the business of the bank—along with only very clearly defined liabilities, such as the protected deposits—are transferred to the bridge bank, and not the equity of the failing institution. That would define and limit the creditors that could be repaid out of the FSCS money in my example, and would make it much more likely that some money in that example might be recouped for the FSCS. A transfer of the equity of a failing institution into a bridge bank should happen only if there are very clear and exceptional reasons for doing so, with the implications for the FSCS of doing so being very clearly recognised.

That approach would have the additional advantage of dealing with the question of unexpected costs, such as legal actions—the point made earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—taken against the failing institution. If only the business and assets were transferred, that would reduce the risk of such actions and increase the certainty of the outcome of the resolution. That could be achieved in the code of practice.

I am not going to press my amendment but I hope the Minister recognises that there is a genuine issue here, will keep it under review and will consider amending the code of practice in that respect. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment but I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will not be pressing it because, as he explained, there are difficulties with it.

I pay tribute to the noble Lord for chasing this issue down because it is a very real issue that could arise in certain defined circumstances, as he explained. I am not convinced that the solution of simply transferring assets into the bridge bank actually works. The complexities of a bank mean that you have liabilities—that is how you fund yourself from market sources—and in practice it may well be difficult. I hope the Government will take this away and find a way of minimising the likelihood that that ever happens, whether in the code of practice or otherwise, in discussion with the Bank of England.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the point that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has been making is significant and crucial in shaping the way in which the Bank of England approaches the resolution of banks when they fail.

Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I think there is a potential path of looking at the sale of the assets rather than the sale of the equity. That is the normal practice that one would follow in order not to transfer liabilities over to the new recovering entity. I fully understand all the complexities, and I hope the Minister will take this up with the Bank of England in his discussions. It requires a lot more work but it could get us out of some very nasty traps in future, and it will be more likely to do so if there has been thought beforehand rather than it being a reaction in a situation of emergency.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I wholeheartedly support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in his work in this area. Over the course of our scrutiny of the Bill, we have had some happy and quite nerdy discussions around this amendment. It is clear to me that it is a complicated situation. There is clearly an issue to be solved, but unfortunately the issue may not be exactly the same for each case of resolution that one might be addressing, so it needs further thought.

I am pleased that we will not be voting on this, but I impress upon the Minister that if there is something we can do in this area, whether that be in the code of practice or by other mechanisms, it is important. It is unconscionable to me that, because a particular entity goes down the route of resolution rather than insolvency, certain creditors could be significantly better off. That cannot happen and we must do something about it.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, seeks to give the Financial Services Compensation Scheme rights with respect to the recapitalisation payment, in the event that the firm in resolution is subsequently placed into insolvency or wound up, by then requiring it to be treated as a debt. It also seeks to grant the Financial Services Compensation Scheme super-preferred status in the creditor hierarchy with respect to that debt, enabling it to recover that claim in an insolvency process before other unsecured creditors, uncovered depositors and shareholders.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for the constructive engagement that I have had with him on this matter prior to this debate, and I am especially grateful for his time and expertise on it. I assure him that my officials and I have spent considerable time considering the concerns that he raises, and I shall set out the Government’s position.

The Government’s concern about the amendment is that it could frustrate the primary intention of the Bill to achieve recapitalisation in a way that restores financial stability and, as such, could potentially result in the resolution failing. The Government’s view is that the amendment could create uncertainty as to how such a payment would be perceived by the market when a firm was operating, rather than only in the unlikely circumstance of the firm winding up.

The effect of the amendment would be to create a shadow claim on the recapitalisation. Potential purchasers, investors and unsecured lenders to the firm would be aware that in the event of insolvency a new debt would materialise above them in the creditor hierarchy. Indeed, the shadow claim would follow the firm in perpetuity for as long as it was a going concern, even after the resolution was complete and the firm had been sold to a buyer.

It would also follow the firm even where the original shareholders and creditors were no longer involved with the business, creating a series of risks. That raises a number of potential issues. First, it could inhibit the sale of the firm in resolution. While the insolvency position would not be a primary consideration for potential buyers, it would naturally be part of the potential purchaser’s due diligence to understand the risk to its investment in a subsequent failure. That risk may be substantially greater with the existence of this debt, which may in turn impact potential interest in purchasing the firm and any purchase price.

Secondly, both while the firm was in the bridge bank and once it had been sold, current and potential future creditors and investors in the firm could be deterred from investing in and engaging with the firm for similar reasons. That would frustrate a key goal of the resolution, which is to maintain continuity. For example, uncovered depositors would have an additional incentive to withdraw deposits as they may perceive a potential risk to the seniority of their claim in insolvency. Thirdly, it could potentially undermine restoring market confidence in the resolved firm.

As a result of the issues that I have outlined, the amendment could make it more expensive to run the firm, putting it at a competitive disadvantage. It may perpetuate the circumstances that the resolution is intended to address; namely, uncertainty around how and to whom potential future losses would fall. It may also make it difficult to secure the agreement of directors, who may not be comfortable running a firm under such a shadow while it was in a bridge bank.

In addition, existing legislation means that instruments may currently be classified only as common equity tier 1, the highest form of capital, if they are not subject to any arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that enhances the seniority of claims in insolvency or liquidation. The noble Lord’s amendment would mean that a capital injection arising from a recapitalisation payment under the Bill may not count as the highest form of capital, as it creates a seniorised claim for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in the event of a subsequent insolvency. That brings into doubt whether it would have the desired effect of restoring market confidence in the firm.

Overall, the effect of granting the Financial Services Compensation Scheme a super-preferred claim over the recapitalisation payment, even if only at the point of insolvency, would be to increase the risk of the resolution not achieving its objectives. Therefore, while the Government absolutely understand the noble Lord’s concerns, we have concluded, for the reasons I have outlined, that the amendment may end up doing more harm than good.

I appreciate that this is a matter that the noble Lord feels extremely strongly about, but I hope this explanation has provided some clarity over the risks attached to the amendment and that as a result he feels able to withdraw it.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this short debate. It is a fairly nerdy and technical subject, and the Minister has just described very well why it is a complicated situation. I am sorry that he was unable to say that the Government would keep it under review —to keep an eye on the situation—because there is a problem. This process could lead to creditors being preferred unreasonably over the FSCS money in some circumstances, and that is not desirable. It comes back to some of the moral hazard points that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, made earlier as well, albeit in a different context, so I am sorry that the Minister was unable to say anything on that front.

I agree with the Minister that it is complicated and that there probably are unintended consequences to my amendment. I again urge him to keep this under review and to look at whether anything might be done on it under the code of conduct. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 15 withdrawn.

Clause 4: Amendments to the Banking Act 2009

Amendment 16 not moved.