Licensing Act 2003 (UEFA Women’s European Football Championship Licensing Hours) Order 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 1st July 2025 Grand Committee

Can we get a little background on the process of assessment? Having a celebration, controlled properly, is a good idea, and I congratulate the Government on doing something on it, but can we get a little more on the criteria? I know the Minister gave us some of the criteria, but could he expand upon the idea behind why we are doing it? This will also apply to the men’s game, but particularly for women’s sports and smaller sports, what are we actually getting out of it? We might be happier doing this, which is something positive, if we knew the criteria and what happens and made sure we are a little more responsive—if anybody pays any attention to what we are saying today; let us face it, we are not exactly mob-handed. Going through this would help, but I am in favour of the order.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument. In the coming weeks, we will be preparing to support our home nations in what will be a proud moment for Britain. The 2025 UEFA European Women’s Championship will be held in Switzerland. I am delighted that, this year, both the England and Wales women’s national teams have qualified for this prestigious moment. For Wales, this monumental occasion will mark the first time they have qualified at the European Women’s Championship. For our defending champions, England, this will be their 10th appearance at the competition. If I may say so, in the spirit of good internation relationships, I wish both teams well, and both are to be congratulated on having the opportunity to appear there.

We must recognise the symbolic significance of historical moments such as this for future generations of female footballers and athletes. Last year, the Football Association reported a 56% increase in the number of women and girls playing football. Between 2020 and 2024 alone, the number of female coaches rose by 88% and the number of referees increased by 113%. That is why it is essential for us to support the statutory instrument introduced today, which proposes a temporary extension of licensing hours across England and Wales should either or both teams progress to the semi-finals or the final.

The extension of the licensing hours comes after overwhelming support from a Home Office consultation. Under the instrument, the normal licensing requirements of submitting a temporary event notice application and the £21 fee to the local authority will not apply. The extension will apply only to the sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises, such as bars and pubs, but will not be applicable to off-trade premises, including supermarkets and off licences.

We must recognise that this occasion is one that can help support local pubs in England and Wales, many of which have faced challenges over recent years, with an unprecedented number of closures. During the Lioness’s 2022 triumph, a peak of 17.4 million viewers tuned into the BBC1 programme, making it the most watched women’s football game on UK television. An additional 5.9 million viewers streamed the game online to watch on the BBC iPlayer and the BBC Sport website and app.

Not only will the extension of licensing hours help boost business for pubs and bars but it will allow them to accommodate the increase in demand during these key tournament dates. Fundamentally, this is an opportunity for us to come together and cheer on our national teams, who have done so much to inspire people across the country. I am sure that both sides of the Committee will agree with the positive benefits of the statutory instrument raised in today’s debate, from inspiring the next generation of footballers to boosting our local businesses. We have lots to celebrate over the coming weeks, and I am sure noble Lords will join me in wishing the very best to both Wales and England for the tournament.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the three noble Lords for their contributions. The noble Lords, Lord Hayward and Lord Addington, have moved the goalposts slightly, in the sense that this was a women’s football order. It has had a full consultation, which has given the support to date that I have mentioned. Noble Lords have made a very compelling case for the Women’s Rugby World Cup based in the United Kingdom to be considered. I will certainly consider those representations, and I will get back to both noble Lords. At the moment, there are no plans in the Home Office for such an order, but that does not mean that we cannot consider it. However, there needs to be a public consultation, because we have to do that. I will have to reflect on whether that would fit in with the timescales for the event that both noble Lords mentioned.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 26th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “designate a civil servant as the” and insert “appoint a”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open this first day of Committee. I will speak also to my Amendments 2, 26 and 27 in this first group. At Second Reading, a number of noble Lords raised the issue that the commander will essentially be a civil servant with co-ordination functions: a commander with nothing to command. I have tabled these amendments and a number of others to seek to rectify the situation and probe the Government’s full intentions for the new role.

Amendment 1 seeks to replace the words

“designate a civil servant as the”

with “appoint a”, thereby specifying that the commander does not have to be a civil servant. Nothing here serves as a critique of the current border security commander, Martin Hewitt, coming as he does from a law enforcement background; rather, it is a critique of the Government’s limited ambition for this new role.

That is not just my view but that of Tony Smith, the former director-general of UK Border Force. He said in evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place that

“the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 27/2/25; col. 40.]

Those were the words of the person whose job it was to lead the agency that polices our borders. As he stated, there are already enough civil servants co-ordinating activities within the Home Office. The Small Boats Operational Command already exists, so can the Minister tell the House how it will work with the commander? How will their roles differ, and what degree of interoperability will exist?

As Tony Smith made very clear to the committee in the other place, if the Government wish to achieve their stated goals, Border Security Command needs to have expanded powers, for example to arrest and detain in the same manner as Border Force, the NCA and Immigration Enforcement. If the powers of the commander and his team remain as they are instituted in this Bill, they will be essentially toothless in their ability to tackle illegal migration. This is a role that, by the Government’s own admission, is meant to help secure our borders, disrupt criminal networks and co-ordinate multiple agencies in the face of complex cross-border threats. Surely, we can all agree that this is not a job for a generalist administrator or a nameless Whitehall official; it demands specialist knowledge, strategic leadership and operational credibility.

Amendments 26 and 27 are essentially consequential. They amend Clause 7, which relates to delegation of the commander’s functions, and Clause 8, which permits the designation of an interim commander. Just as I am concerned by the first clause, I am potentially even more concerned about the possibility of delegation. This commander might be well qualified for the task, but who will he delegate to? As the Bill stands, this will be a civil servant. We must ask whether this is appropriate for the task at hand. My amendment would ensure that only a person of appropriate rank—a similar rank to the commander—would be able to undertake any of the functions bestowed on the commander under the Bill. These amendments would therefore introduce a vital safeguard: that the commander may appoint only a person of appropriate rank and qualifications to fulfil delegated functions, not just anyone who happens to be on the departmental payroll. They would help ensure that we do not fall into the trap of creating yet another abstract, symbolic post—another title without substance, which I am afraid is what the Bill proposes.

I had the pleasure of meeting and spending an evening with the honourable Scott Morrison a few weeks ago. He explained that, when Australia began Operation Sovereign Borders, it instituted a structure that, on the surface at least, appears somewhat similar to this Government’s Border Security Command. Its job was to co-ordinate and lead the 16 agencies that had border security functions. However, there are two crucial differences: first, the Australian system came with far more robust powers than are in this Government’s plan; and, secondly—this is the crucial difference—the Australians appointed a senior military commander, Deputy Chief of Army Major General Angus Campbell, to lead their border security efforts.

This leads on to my Amendment 2, a probing amendment which seeks to gauge the type of background that the Government think most appropriate for the role of commander. I have specified that the commander should be only a former or current officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council—meaning assistant chief constable or above—commander or above in the Metropolitan Police, a senior officer in Border Force or Immigration Enforcement or a senior military officer of at least brigadier-general, commodore or air commodore rank in the Royal Air Force. This amendment would therefore specify that the commander should be a senior police, immigration or military officer, which I believe would put the office on a stronger footing.

If we are serious about this role having teeth and want it to be a powerful, directive position that can genuinely drive change, then the least we can do is to require that the person filling it has the experience to do so effectively. We cannot afford to build this office on vague criteria and wishful thinking. The public deserve confidence that this position is not just another bureaucratic appointment but one that is fit for purpose from day one. I urge the Committee to support this, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I should explain that I have not usurped the position of my noble friend Lord German, who is in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for not being physically on the Front Bench; from this position, I can be propped up.

Although Martin Hewitt has, as the noble Lord, said, a law enforcement and—I believe—Army background, I do not think it is necessary for the commander to have “rank”, to use the term in his Amendment 26. If the border command and the commander prove effective—in other words, if the institution lasts—I hope that the Secretary of State would be imaginative enough to think outside the box of people to whom the rank might be applied and consider those who might usefully carry on the function.

I do not want to speak too long at this point, but the noble Lord picked up the issue of delegation. It struck me—I understand it is not possible to amendment it—that the heading to Clause 7 really does not describe what is in the clause. The clause is right; it spells out where responsibility lies—that is not delegation. The responsibility remains with the commander, and I think that is correct. I do not know whether anyone can pick that up somewhere behind the scenes, at a later point.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who, acting as super sub today, continues to make very valid points on this issue. Let me go to the heart of the amendments, if I may. The group contains various amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron. First, they seek to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander is a civil servant. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and that the commander leads a directorate within the department, it is logical that the role sits within the Civil Service.

This does not mean that the post of Border Security Commander is reserved solely for existing civil servants. Indeed, the current officeholder was recruited externally. Any future recruitment exercises would seek to identify the most suitable candidate, irrespective of their background. Ultimately, they are acting in a Civil Service role, accountable to the Home Secretary. That is the important point, and I hope the noble Lord will reflect on that.

The noble Lord also raised the very important point about the prior experience required to be eligible to be appointed as Border Security Commander. As Members have recognised, the current Border Security Commander served previously as an officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. I do not believe it is prudent to limit the pool of candidates eligible to serve in this important position, and we believe that any future recruitment exercise would have the scope to identify the best talent, without limitation, ensuring that we bring the effectiveness of the role to its maximum potential.

The Government have been very clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for requiring the step change in the UK’s approach to border security—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, addressed. We want to provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, to bring together and provide leadership to all parts of the system, to work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems domestically and internationally. The significance of this role and this work is reflected in the Bill, which puts this office on a statutory footing, for the very reasons that I hope I have outlined. It creates legal requirements on the officeholder in fulfilling their duty.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the issue of the background of an individual. We want to have as wide a pool as possible—I hope that addresses her point.

The commander has already used his post and the associated capabilities to deploy key functions to date across government on the border security system. He has also helped support the Home Secretary in signing a landmark agreement with the Iraqi Government. We have struck a new anti-smuggling action plan with the G7; we are hosting an international summit on organised immigration crime; and we have meetings early next month with colleague nations in the European community to look at how we can work on this issue. Those are important roles and tasks. They add value to the work we are trying to do in very difficult circumstances to smash the criminal gangs and to stem the flow across the channel.

The House can have confidence that those roles being exercised currently will be in future on a statutory basis, and issues to do with reporting and accountability have been set down in law. Therefore, it is not for today, but I hope the noble Lord will reflect on what I have said and, at a later date, not push the amendments to a vote.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords who contributed to this debate.

We have heard the words from the Government Benches about co-ordination, structure and strategic intent, but let us not lose sight of what this role is supposed to be: a commander. That word carries meaning. It is not simply a metaphor or a piece of Civil Service terminology. I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, when she says it is not about rank. Rank implies leadership, authority and the ability to direct. Without that, the title is misleading at best and meaningless at worst.

What we are being offered in the Bill is a model that risks falling flat. The important point is that it risks creating an official with no clear mandate, no operational standing and no public visibility—in short, a co-ordinator with a title that suggests much more than they are empowered to deliver.

If we fail to define this role properly now, we risk embedding a model that lacks clarity, ambition and—crucially—the power to deliver the very outcomes the Government claim to seek. We cannot risk this position becoming yet another layer of the Whitehall machine, held by a nameless bureaucrat with no real responsibilities.

The amendments we have tabled do not ask for the impossible. They do not tie the Secretary of State’s hands. They simply ensure that the commander is someone of appropriate rank, experience and credibility—someone who can command confidence not just within government but with operational partners and the public alike.

We have seen what can be achieved when such roles are taken seriously. I referenced the Australian example earlier, where a senior military figure led a co-ordinated, multi-agency border response, which shows what is possible with the right leadership and mandate.

We can do the same, but we will not get there by default or by quiet delegation within the Home Office. We must decide now whether we want this to be a genuinely powerful and directive post, or just another name in a long line of forgotten titles.

These amendments are a simple safeguard against mediocrity and a clear statement of intent that this House expects better than business as usual. We will look at this as the Bill progresses but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 13, at end insert—
“(5) The Secretary of State must make a statement to Parliament stating that the Secretary of State has designated the person as Commander.(6) The person who has been designated as Commander by the Secretary of State must appear before any Parliamentary committee that invites the person to appear before them.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to extract some more information from the Government about who is going to be entrusted with the position of Border Security Commander. The Bill sets out that the Secretary of State can determine the terms and conditions of a designation as the commander. Our Amendment 3 seeks to tie the Government to publish these terms and conditions once they have been defined.

Crucially, our amendment also clarifies that the Government must define the KPIs that will be used to measure the performance of a commander in their role. This will allow not only the Government but these Houses and the wider public to review how effectively the commander is undertaking these duties.

The Border Security Commander is a big part of the Government’s offering on this question. We need to make sure that the person appointed is delivering a solution to the problem we are discussing, and how the Government are working to define parameters and conditions which will ensure that this is the case. If the Government are convinced that their policy will indeed tackle this issue effectively, I am sure that they will have no hesitation in welcoming the principle of these amendments as an opportunity for them to show the public how well their new policy is working, and to show their ambition in setting high standards for their new commander.

Furthermore, our Amendment 5 to Clause 2 seeks to incorporate greater oversight into the termination process for the Border Security Commander. The Government are creating a role which will be politically sensitive and upon which there will be a great deal of pressure, without necessarily the powers or duties to fulfil these demands. It is a post that demands public trust—and where public trust is concerned, silence is not an option.

To remove someone from that role without any explanation, transparency, accountability or scrutiny risks breeding, confusion, suspicion and the perception that something has gone wrong behind closed doors. That is precisely what undermines confidence in public institutions.

There is also precedent, as we know. When high-profile public officials are dismissed or step down, it is customary—indeed, expected—that a Ministerial Statement is made, and we have seen that with senior civil servants and the heads of public bodies. Unfortunately, the Government have been far too unwilling to come to Parliament to outline the reasons why they have chosen to terminate senior officials. We saw that only recently when the Government ousted the head of the Competition and Markets Authority, Marcus Bokkerink. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade issued a Written Ministerial Statement, but it took an Urgent Question from my honourable friend Andrew Griffiths for a Government Minister to come to the Dispatch Box in the other place to update Parliament. That should not be the case.

On a matter as important as this, we cannot afford to construct roles that can be managed and changed in the dark. We need to appreciate and understand the fact that the public have lost trust in the Government on this, and we need to make sure that the next steps we take command trust and regain the confidence that the public must have in us. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. It is a pleasure to participate in your Lordships’ Committee on this very important Bill.

Noble Lords will be aware that voter salience on the issue of immigration and border control is extremely high, and it is probably the second most important issue, behind the cost of living. That said, the Bill, as currently drafted, does a reasonable job, and we broadly welcome many of its measures, as the Minister will know. He started off as a bruiser, but he is now much more emollient in his reaction and in his Dispatch Box performance, and we agree on many things.

The Bill is very good on the accountability from civil servants, the Home Office and other key stakeholders to Ministers but less strong on that between Ministers and the outside world. When one looks at the level of scrutiny and oversight in, for instance, the Bundestag, the United States Senate or other legislative bodies that are performing a very vital scrutiny and oversight role of the border issue—which is, naturally, a very live issue now in the United States—one will see that there is nothing to lose by us having the opportunity to be open and transparent in seeing what the commander is actually doing.

It is vital that we put in primary legislation the ability of a parliamentary committee to bring the border commander to Parliament to answer questions at least once a year, to measure the efficacy of their policies and whether success is happening in line with what the elected politicians and your Lordships’ House require and to keep that bond of trust with the voters. There is a very low level of trust among the voters of all parties to deal, in the long term, with the issue of border control and the safety and security of the people of this country. It would be a very good idea for the Minister to at least consider that in relation to Amendment 3.

We also need clarity and openness about what the commander is doing. The worst thing about a closed system, where you have accountability only between one part of government and another, is that conspiracy theories and cynicism grow, and people cannot see that the Government are achieving their objectives. It would therefore be very useful to have the explicit terms and conditions to be laid down before Parliament included in Bill. I agree very much with my noble friend on that.

Finally, this is not an issue about the Labour Government; all Governments fall out with senior officials. It happened under the Blair Government, certainly under the Brown Government, and under the coalition Government. It is not ignoble to think that the person you have appointed no longer has the same priorities and imperatives that they should have in carrying out their role. Therefore, you have to do what they say in HR now and “dis-board” them—the opposite of onboarding and the equivalent of getting rid of them. We could say “giving them a new career trajectory”—let us be charitable. That should be the disinfectant of transparency. Bagehot once said, I think, that openness is needed to see what Governments are actually doing. The Government should therefore explain to the voters why that person did not fit in and was not able to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. That is the essence of Amendment 5.

On that basis, I ask the Minister to think about these things. As I often say, it would not invalidate the central premise of the Bill—it is very good in many respects, especially the first chapter—but it would be certainly improved by accepting the amendments. It would be a very powerful message from this Government and future Governments that they are serious about this topic, they are accountable and they are getting things done on behalf of the people who elected them.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am again grateful to noble Lords for tabling these amendments and for giving us the opportunity to discuss them.

I am slightly disappointed that I have moved from being a bruiser to being emollient—but there we go. I will take that as a potential compliment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. I just remind him that I reserve my right to bruise, if it is needed, but I hope it will not be on these issues.

This group contains various amendments relating to the appointment of the Border Security Commander, again tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron. The key issue in the amendments is about how the Border Security Commander will engage with Parliament. The amendments state:

“The Secretary of State must make a statement to Parliament”


when an individual is designated as the Border Security Commander and to ensure that the Border Security Commander appears before any parliamentary committees when invited, and to make a Statement to Parliament in the event that the designation of the Border Security Commander is terminated, setting out the reasons for that termination.

If and when an individual is designated as the Border Security Commander—as well as the event of their ultimate termination—that would be announced in the usual way for senior officials in the Civil Service. We would make a Statement on that, and there would be the ability for a Private Notice Question or an Urgent Question to be tabled, depending on the House. There would be opportunities for the Government to table WMSs, and for Questions to be asked, on a daily basis in this House and on a regular basis in the House of Commons, about the reasons behind those decisions. The Government will certainly be transparent on these matters.

We also value the role that parliamentary committees play. If requests are made to attend committees, every effort will be made for the border commander to attend. There are already opportunities for officials across the Home Office and other government departments, who are at the level of the border commander, to appear, either independent of Ministers or in support of Ministers on key issues.

The final amendment in the group would require that the terms and conditions of the Border Security Commander and the key performance indicators used to determine their effectiveness are published. I draw the attention of noble Lords to Clause 2, which sets out the terms and conditions of the designation of the Border Security Commander. Although it would not be appropriate to disclose the detailed terms and conditions of an individual civil servant, the Border Security Commander is a director-general-level position in the Home Office and has the terms and conditions in line with that appointment.

The Government have been very clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for leading the required step change in the UK’s approach to border security, providing a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership, and working to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems, both domestically and internationally. The significance of this role and its work is reflected in the Bill, which puts this office on the statutory footing we talked about earlier and creates legal requirements on the officeholder in fulfilling their duties.

The key performance indicators are the ones that the Government are setting themselves. We want to smash the gangs, reduce crossings made on an illegal basis, reduce and speed up asylum claims, and make sure that we reduce the number of hotel accommodations being used. Those are performance indicators which the Government have put in place. The Border Security Commander’s role is to help the Government co-ordinate those activities, with the budget and the staffing that they have, and to help deliver on those objectives. There is transparency and clarity on these issues. I hope that that will reassure the noble Lord on the amendments that he has brought forward.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response. I point out to noble Lords that these amendments are not about creating additional bureaucracy. They are very much about reinforcing something far more fundamental, which is trust—trust in the effectiveness of the new Border Security Commander, trust in the process by which they are appointed, assessed and, if necessary, removed; and trust in the Government’s commitment to openness and transparency on a matter of genuine public concern.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I just ask the noble Lord this question. Does he feel that the Home Secretary in the House of Commons and me, as the Minister in the Lords for the Home Office, would not be held to account for both the appointment and any removal of the Border Security Commander and their performance—by which I mean also the Government’s performance—as regards the issues which are of great concern to both sides of this House? That is where I think we are. This is the place to hold us to account on performance.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I fully accept what the Minister says. He can rest assured that he will be held to account in the House of Lords, and I am sure my friends in the other place will be holding the Home Secretary to account.

The Government have chosen to elevate this role, presenting it as central to their response to illegal migration and cross-border criminality, yet, as it stands, the Bill offers almost no insight into how that role will be structured, what standards of performance will apply, or what transparency will be in place if the arrangements break down. If the Government believe that this new position will be effective, and if they believe in the strength of their policy, then publishing the terms and conditions, setting the key performance indicators and offering transparency around dismissal should be welcome. These amendments would give Ministers the opportunity to prove they are serious about making this role deliver real results.

We cannot tackle this issue with platitudes and meaningless positions. The public need to know what sort of deal they are getting through this Bill. With that, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I confess to being irredeemably urban—or perhaps suburban—but “The Archers” does have a function in reminding us about pig breeding and the sizes of litters. Listening to noble Lords’ comments has made me think of a number of related issues. I think it is found in a number of parts of life that people who commit one type of crime often commit another type of crime as well. We are well aware of the flexibility, if that is the right term, of the smuggling gangs. It is entirely possible that there is some sort of read across, or at least something that we should be being flagged about.

This also made me think about health, because I believe that somebody came back from Morocco with rabies very recently. It particularly made me think about the competition for facilities at ports, certainly at Dover and, I dare say, at others as well. When I was a member of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, it was made quite clear, particularly by the Port of Dover, that the issue of space to undertake immigration controls was a really big issue.

The answer may be for these relationships to be governed by other authorities falling within the category of partner authorities. However, as well as the points that previous speakers have made very powerfully, there are relationships that need to be thought about very carefully, and the competition for resources of all sorts which are raised by these arrangements.

We have Amendment 19 in this group, which probes whether cybersecurity is an element of border security; it is clearly an element of security. GCHQ is not a partner authority in the Bill, so it is not within the functions of Clause 3, nor is there a general duty to co-operate as applies under Clause 5—there are to be special arrangements. I do not have a solution to this, but it is a genuine question about where cybersecurity falls within the responsibilities and how the border commander is to take account of cybersecurity.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 18 seeks to introduce another criterion to the definition of what constitutes a threat to border security. We believe it addresses a crucial and glaringly absent dimension from the definition of threats to border security—harm to the economic interests of the United Kingdom.

As drafted, the clause defines relevant threats as those involving criminality, risk of offence, or harm to persons or property. All that is right and necessary, but to leave out the economic dimension is to ignore one of the most significant consequences of border insecurity in the modern age. Illegal entry, organised immigration crime and abuse of our immigration system come at a cost, not just to public safety or border integrity but of real and measurable economic harm. This includes the burden placed on housing, healthcare and social services, and extends to the impact on wages, labour market distortions, the exploitation of workers and loss of public confidence in our immigration system.

These are some of the effects of illegal immigration which people across this country feel most keenly. We must ensure that we reflect this in our assessment of the threat which illegal immigration poses to us. If individuals are entering the UK unlawfully in ways that undermine legal labour markets, displace lawful employment or distort local economies through illicit practices, surely that is a matter of national interest. Surely that is as much of a threat to border security as any physical or legal risk. If our legal framework cannot even acknowledge that reality, how can it ever be expected to address it? This amendment would ensure that this important consideration is included in the Bill, in recognition of economic harm being one of the most serious effects of this issue.

I take this opportunity to speak to some of the other amendments in this group. Amendments 6 and 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, address an important and often overlooked issue. Illegal meat imports present a genuine risk to our agricultural sector, as we have heard, and affect our food supply chains and public health. The potential introduction of diseases such as African swine fever or foot and mouth through contaminated meat would be catastrophic, economically and environmentally. Biosecurity is a key part of our national security. The Government need to take action to ensure that this threat is addressed.

The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raises a matter that I hope the Government will clear up in their response. Cybersecurity is an important responsibility of the Government. I am not quite sure how it relates to border security and asylum, but this is none the less a probing amendment that I hope that the Government respond to. I share the noble Baroness’s concerns about cybersecurity. We have seen a number of high-profile and extremely damaging cyberattacks in recent months. Ministers will be aware of the urgent need to tackle this. The noble Baroness is right to raise this issue. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will add a couple of points to the excellent points that have been made by previous speakers. My noble friend Lady Hamwee’s point about the opportunism that is evident in the kinds of product that criminals can switch between was well made: they might one day smuggle people and another day smuggle contaminated food products, including meat.

The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, concerning the impact on the economic interests of the UK very much ties up with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in particular, and with trying to persuade the Treasury that the costs of foot and mouth, BSE and bird flu are important. You would think that this was self-evident, even to the Treasury. I would like to say that I was surprised at hearing that it was not, but maybe I was not.

You do not have to be a countryman to think that. I admit that you could not get a lot more metropolitan than I am, but like my noble friend I listen to “The Archers” and care about the countryside. It is not true that all of us who live in cities do not care about the countryside, but we must care about biosecurity as consumers, as well as about the impact on farmers. I absolutely support that idea, but I look forward to the Minister’s response on whether it should be part of the functions of border commander. It certainly needs to go much higher—I was going to say “up the food chain”, but that would be a bad pun—up the profile of government priorities to protect the country from biosecurity threats.

There has been a lot of concern about whether post-Brexit controls are being implemented. I am not a world expert, but the can has been kicked down the road time after time on those controls. There is also concern about whether Border Force and port health authorities are being given enough resources to stamp out illegal meat and other contaminated food imports. The Minister’s colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, was given a grilling by the EFRA Select Committee in the other place early last month; I do not know whether there has been any product from its evidence sessions, chaired by my friend in the other place Alistair Carmichael, but that committee is showing how importantly it takes these issues. We have noble Lords with experience of senior government posts in this area—the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey—so I hope the Minister will give us a positive response.

Lastly, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, mentioned the role of trading standards, which has been so underfunded, sadly. We know what pressure council budgets are under. As a consumer, trading standards is not even on my radar, these days. Where do you go if you have a consumer complaint? I have no idea. Was it not batted off to Citizens Advice a long time ago? Anyway, we know about this function: you have the border and then you have the inside the country attention to these matters. Probably we ought to be aware that they all seem to be quite underfunded and a bit fragile in places. We know that there are so many issues that the police are unable to deal with these days, in this whole area.

There is a lot of press coverage of things such as illegal meat imports, so it would be good to hear from the Minister that the Government—not only Defra but across government—understand and will take action on the very real threats that have been raised by the amendments tabled and discussed in this group.

Child Sexual Exploitation: Casey Report

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott said last week in response to the Government’s previous U-turn on winter fuel payments, we are pleased that the Government have finally listened to the wishes of the British public and agreed to hold a full national inquiry into grooming gangs.

The abhorrence of the crimes committed by these gangs is beyond belief. It is vividly apparent that the victims have repeatedly been let down. The audit by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, lays bare the scale of the institutional failure across the country. I pay tribute to all those survivors who were systematically ignored by authorities for fear of being branded racist. Those who have come forward to whistleblow and share their harrowing stories have demonstrated unbelievable bravery, such as the survivor Fiona Goddard, who was exploited and abused by an Asian grooming gang at the age of 14 when living in care in Bradford. She was led to believe that her abusers cared for her, before they plied her with drugs and continuously raped her. I cannot imagine the horrors experienced by the many thousands of children groomed by these gangs. I am particularly concerned—I raised the matter with the Minister at Questions earlier today—about what steps the Government will take to ensure that the victims are at the centre of their response.

We must be under no illusions. This is not a historic sexual abuse story; these vile crimes are still being perpetrated. Young girls are still, to this very day, being groomed and sexually exploited by gangs, as the report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, makes abundantly clear.

The fact that these gangs continue to operate, with young girls still not being believed and their voices still not being heard, makes it even more difficult to understand why the Government have taken so long to listen to what my right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition has been saying since January. The Conservatives gave the Prime Minister three opportunities in the other place to back a full national inquiry, and Labour Members voted against these measures on all three occasions.

Not only that, but Government Ministers repeatedly opposed such an inquiry. The Secretary of State for Education accused those who called for an inquiry “bandwagon jumpers” who “don’t care about children”. The Leader of the House of Commons claimed that the issue of grooming gangs was a “dog whistle”. The Minister for Safeguarding rejected an appeal by Oldham Council for a national inquiry last October, and in April this year announced just five local inquiries. Indeed, the Minister here said on 22 April, in response to a question that I posed to him, that:

“We could certainly have a national inquiry, as the noble Lord has mentioned, but this Government’s judgment is that we know what the problem is”.—[Official Report, 22/4/25; col. 624.]


Even the Prime Minister himself said that anyone calling for an inquiry was jumping on a far-right bandwagon and repeatedly opposed holding such a national inquiry. He has, of course, now changed his mind once again.

Can the Minister explain why the Government opposed a national inquiry for so long, and why they have now done such a complete about-face on this issue? Surely now is the time for the Government to apologise for repeatedly making false claims about those who have been calling for this national inquiry since January.

I place on record my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, for her no-nonsense, hard-hitting and thorough audit. Her candour and tenacity are exemplary. She has not shied away from highlighting the fact that these child rape gangs were largely comprised of Pakistani men, a point that all too many have previously been scared to make. She also highlights faults in the available datasets. As the report states, the complex organised child abuse dataset includes all child sexual abuse and exploitation that is committed by two or more perpetrators, and this includes familial abuse, child-on-child abuse and institutional abuse. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the true scale of grooming gangs.

There are 12 recommendations presented in the audit. I look forward to hearing the detail of how and when the Government will take them forward.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. I pay tribute to the victims and the whistleblowers from the police and other authorities for their bravery and absolute consistency in continuing to fight for their cause.

I am sorry that the Conservative spokesman has taken the line that he did. I am afraid that from these Benches we have a different standpoint. It was really disappointing on Monday to hear the leader of the Opposition attack the current Government when this applies to Governments of all parties over recent decades, including my own, but especially the Conservative Government who commissioned Professor Jay’s IICSA report, published a response but then did nothing. Surely it is better for all of us to come to this in humility and admit that, time after time, politicians failed to listen. This is not just about parliamentarians; it is about elected mayors, councillors, assemblies and combined authorities too. We did not just fail to listen but we all failed to act.

The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said that now is the time to right wrongs, and that is correct. The victims and the whistleblowers, even when reported in the news and documentaries, have had to listen time and again to promises of action but nothing changing. It is refreshing that the Statement says that the Government will act on all the noble Baroness’s recommendations. But we know that this promise has been made before in response to complex, long-standing and shameful incidents over the years, and I am sure that some still continue. As Professor Jay said in her IICSA report, we lie to ourselves if we think that child sexual abuse and exploitation are not happening now.

We are seeing similar issues with the slowness of the infected blood compensation scheme, the Post Office Horizon compensation scheme and the Windrush scheme. Will your Lordships’ House hear that the inquiry will be set up swiftly and will be fully funded, including support for victims, as has been promised for the other schemes I have just mentioned, but which has not always appeared? Will the inquiry also draw evidence from the previous reports and reviews, so that the evidence it takes will build on what is already known? As I mentioned at Oral Questions, there are two reasons for this. First, it is much less traumatic for the victims and whistleblowers, many of whom have had to give the same evidence many times, each time revictimising them. Secondly, that should ensure a shorter evidence period of the inquiry; as the Statement says, there is an urgent need for action and accountability, whether for the perpetrators or the organisations that did not protect these children when they were raped and groomed, including councils, the police, the judiciary, social workers and more.

Will victims, including whistleblowers, be supported properly, right from the start, and not be revictimised? How long will it take to review the convictions that some of these young people, mainly girls, received, because they were perceived as complicit and able to give consent when they were plainly children? What steps will the Government take, in the light of the noble Baroness’s audit review, to ask councils, the police, the judiciary, social workers and others to review their working practices now? While the inquiry’s future report and recommendations are important, it is evident that there is enough for those organisations to reflect and change their practice now, in light of this audit review.

The Government have promised a form of mandatory reporting, as well as a Bill on the duty of candour, or Hillsborough law. Can the Minister say when we will see them in Parliament? Both are urgent to prevent this happening again in the future.

The recommendations on appropriate data collection and data sharing are also vital and, I am afraid, long overdue. The use of the Smith algorithm in West Yorkshire sounds helpful in identifying people possibly in scope as victims and survivors. Will it be rolled out elsewhere, given West Yorkshire’s positive experience?

The noble Baroness’s report proposes research into taxi drivers for group-based child sexual exploitation, including online. Unlike the monks, teachers and children’s workers involved in other group child sexual exploitation, taxi drivers are below the regulatory radar, other than the licence for their taxis. So will the Government ensure that statutory standards for taxi drivers will be brought in, to end “out of area” taxis plying their trade in places many miles away, where they are not on the radar of the local authority in which they are trying to work?

Will the Government publish a plan for communication to the wider public? This is a highly sensitive topic for young people, families and communities. In particular, will the Government work with faith groups and community groups? The noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, rightly pointed out during Oral Questions that most Muslims are absolutely horrified by the behaviour of small groups of truly evil men, but it will be important for these communities to understand what they need to do to prevent it from ever happening again.

Child Sexual Abuse and Rape Gangs Inquiry

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. We are trying to do that as quickly as possible. I cannot give a definitive date, but if I say to her that we want to get this started as quickly as possible, I hope she will understand that I am trying to do that. I will report back to this House in due course when that is possible to do.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as has already been alluded to, our foremost priority must be to those who have suffered so badly, to ensure that their voices are not only heard but placed at the centre of our next steps. Justice must be delivered, and it must be delivered swiftly. Can the Minister therefore outline what specific steps the Government are taking to support victims at this stage? In particular, how do they intend to ensure that any investigation is thorough and timely, with particular reference to those in authority who have failed the victims so far, and that the investigation truly reflects the urgency and seriousness that the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, has rightly emphasised?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

One of the key recommendations from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was that we review convictions of victims and look at how victims have experienced the system. We have accepted that recommendation in full, and we will be bringing forward measures in the Crime and Policing Bill very shortly, which is finishing its progress in the other place this very day. It will be with this House, at least for Second Reading, before the Summer Recess, I hope. We will have amendments to that Bill in Committee stage that will deal with victim support.

Police Service

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 11th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is really important that we try to retain police officers in post. Of the people who left in the past 12 months, approximately one-third were those who had reached retirement age and were going anyway. The largest group—48% of those who left the force—were people who had been there under two years. So, contrary to public perception, we are finding that people are retiring—people do retire—but the difficulty is retaining those recruited into the police force.

The noble Baroness makes an extremely important point about needing to ensure that we use that experience seriously to bear down on crime. What I want is to retain individuals who are recruited—it is a costly exercise, recruiting people who then leave after two years—but we also want to manage expectations. Again, trailing the police reform White Paper, those issues are part of the Government’s potential future plans once the White Paper is produced.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

The latest Home Office police workforce statistics report includes data on officer age profiles, and it shows an ageing workforce in which 47% of officers are aged between 41 and 55. Can the Minister update the House on what the Government are doing to stop the haemorrhaging of officers we are seeing on his watch, and what exactly is the department doing to recruit young police officers? I understand that the numbers are now down to 122,000 nationally.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It worries me when the noble Lord says that people are ageing when they are 55—it strikes a cold blow to my heart—but the point he makes is extremely important. We need to ensure that we recruit police officers, and the Government are committed to recruiting an additional 13,000 neighbourhood police officers during this Parliament—3,000 this year. We have put in £1.2 billion of investment this year. As I just said to the noble Baroness on the Liberal Democrat Benches, we need to retain those we recruit, because 72% of the people who leave are leaving within three years and 48% are leaving within two years. That is not a good prospect. We need to retain those people and improve recruitment procedures to do that, but we also need to up the numbers, which the Government are trying to do. We need to ensure that we make effective use of resources, which is what the White Paper will be about. I look forward to the noble Lord’s help and support in achieving those objectives.

Public Order Act 1986: Section 5

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. The Government keep all legislation under review at all times. The very fact that this discussion is taking place on this question means that we have looked at the legislation today and looked at the applicability of certain matters. There is a balance to be made. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 has stood the test of 39 years to date, through a range of protests, a range of measures and a range of Governments. It has stood the test of time.

We keep it under review, but the important principle behind it is that Section 5 of the Public Order Act gives a clear definition of harassment and intimidation. Protest crosses the criminal threshold where it goes into harassment and intimidation. That is why the prosecution was taken in the case to which I believe the noble Baroness referred, and why, in other cases, prosecutions have not been taken.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is vital, of course, that, despite social trends, the law remains consistent and is applied in a way that is fair and even. Concerns about political correctness and what is socially acceptable should not determine how a statute such as Section 5 is applied. Recent protests have seen the law applied unevenly in the opinion of some, and clearly threatening antisemitic slogans have been permitted without question. I therefore ask the Minister what discussions he has had with police forces about the thresholds for using Section 5 of the Public Order Act. Can he guarantee that, following these discussions, the police will be under no doubt as to what is and is not permissible under this threshold?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

What I can give the noble Lord is an assurance that the police will treat all members of the community on an equal basis before the law. Where actions have been taken by any protester—be they antisemitic, anti-Islamic, anti-Christian or anti any faith—if they cross the threshold of potential investigation/prosecution/conviction, that will be taken forward on an equal basis by the police. We keep these matters under discussion all the time. There is in my view no such thing as two-tier policing. The police do a job effectively and they will take action when matters are brought to their attention.

Electric Cycles: Illegal Use on Roads

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the work that the noble Baroness has done on this matter. The Private Members’ Bills that she has brought forward have been very instrumental in raising this issue. It is self-evidently an issue: in the course of the day, none of us will drive or walk around and not see somebody committing an offence that should be taken to court and dealt with. The police have many calls on their time, and they have to be there to see the potential offence and catch the individual at that time. I am very hopeful that the 13,000 extra neighbourhood police officers that this Government are putting in place will be able to help support that enforcement and that action. I remind the noble Baroness that those are 13,000 officers that were not there over the previous 14 years.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, leading on from the Minister’s answer, this is a serious matter, which needs to be addressed by government. I wager that every noble Lord has seen some sort of illegality related to electric cycles, such as speeding violations or people riding them on pavements, and by cyclists, such as running red lights and failing to stop at zebra crossings. In light of this, can I ask the Minister whether the current legal framework around e-cycles and e-scooters is well understood by the public and, indeed, the police? If not, what steps are being taken to address it? Does he consider that sufficient attention is being given by the police to this issue? If not, what is his department doing to remedy it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is important that cyclists particularly understand and know the legislation that appertains to their responsibility in using a bike or e-bike. Going back to the point made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, 324 offences were undertaken and arrests were made in the City of London; over 1,000 were undertaken in the remainder of the Metropolitan Police area, and there were many more across the country at large. For those offences, individuals need to know that, if you go through a traffic light, ride on a pavement or crash into somebody, there is a consequence for you if you are seen by a police officer and brought to account. The new offences will mean that the dangerous behaviour that the noble Lord has mentioned of potential injury or potential death by going across a zebra crossing or going through a red light will face a significant punishment of custodial terms. People—drivers, pedestrians and, dare I say it, cyclists—need to understand that.

National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cryer. I have a high level of sympathy with the points that he raised. Indeed, when we discussed the Iran sanctions regime in Grand Committee, many of those arguments were made and made powerfully. I hope that the Minister will respond to that specific point. I also associate myself with the questions asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. I want to expand on a couple of them and ask some further supplementary questions.

First, I thank the Minister for outlining in clear terms the instruments. There are areas where I agree with him very strongly. The FIR scheme, which was passed as a result of considerable cross-party work, is one that I and my party support. As a veteran of each stage of that Bill, now Act, and all of the discussions there, I am very pleased that the Government are now in a position to bring this scheme into effect. It is an important measure. I thank the officials for their work in putting it together because its importance will rely on the fact that it is both reliable and enforceable; it therefore has to be right. I know that there has previously been some debate around the speed at which the Government are doing it but, from my point of view, it was always about getting it right.

On implementation, it is interesting to see these measures. I will ask a couple of questions relating to them. As the Minister indicated, we previously discussed in the Chamber the announcement that Iran and Russia and their state entities are to be on the first enhanced tier list. I will come to China in a moment. I am content on the publication of information under Sections 65, 68 and 70, as these regulations state, but can the Minister say a bit more about how searchable they will be and how easily accessible they will be on GOV.UK? I know that there will be an online portal. Can the Minister say a little more about that? The value of them will be in how transparent and accessible they are, rather than just being available online, but that is a minor consideration.

I now want to ask a couple of questions with regards to publication. The regulations state that, in terms of one of the exemptions from publication, the Secretary of State will be able to make a decision if a person will have information published about them that is likely to be seriously prejudicial to commercial interests. I would suspect that anybody who does not wish their information to be published, even if they have to do so under threat of prosecution, will state that that information is prejudicial to their commercial interests.

I hope that the Minister is able to say that that is an extremely high bar and it will be very hard to litigate, because what I want to see avoided is anybody who is in a position of seeking to hide the information, having been forced to register it, then having a whole phalanx of lawyers to state what the commercial interests may well be. That will drive a coach and horses through the principle of the transparency of this. I hope the Minister can reassure me on that point.

I will come back to some of the aspects of the exemptions in a moment, but first, on Iran, I am satisfied, as I said in the Chamber in response to the Statement. I hope that the Minister will take very seriously the points raised in the Chamber. It was referenced in the impact assessment of the regulations:

“Iran may introduce reciprocal measures to monitor the overseas activities of the UK government. Persons could be prosecuted if engaged in unregistered arrangements or activity, even if the activity itself is legitimate. There is a potential risk of discrimination and exclusion against the diaspora of Iranians living in the UK”.


What proactive work is being done, given that the Home Office has recognised that there may well be a threat to the diaspora within the UK? How has that community been contacted in advance of the scheme being put into operation, given the fact that the risk has already been identified? I hope that the Government are doing this, because we have already seen—as the Minister is well aware, and as we debated in the Chamber—the reach of the Iranian regime within the UK and the threat to those who have sought asylum from it.

The same will apply to Russia: the same risk assessment was provided for Russia, of course. I should state that I have a slight interest when discussing Russia and Russian sanctions, given that I have been sanctioned. I appreciate that the guidance is being issued, but can the Minister confirm that, for the bodies listed in the regulations, any commercial or legal entities in the UK that are providing services for these entities will equally come under the remit of the Part 1 and 2 bodies in the legislation? There should be no loopholes for UK-based entities providing services for those entities because, as we know, Russia and Iran are expert at seeking to circumvent arrangements that the UK puts in place.

I noticed that the impact assessment, under “Rationale for intervention”, mentions

“certain academic and research activities which are directed by the government of Iran”,

and it is similar for Russia. That leads me on to the exemptions. The Government have identified that “academic and research activities” are a tool that is being used, and they are now bringing forward an exemption for them. I do not understand this, and I hope the Minister can say in very clear terms the rationale behind exempting exactly those areas of activity which the rationale in the regulations cites as reasons for their being brought in. I hope that we will be able to have a bit more clarity when it comes to the exemptions. It is important because we know that these very areas, which include academia, research and the use of sovereign funds, and those that are facilitating the investment and advice of those sovereign funds, are exactly the instruments by which we have seen attempted foreign interference. The area where we have seen that on “an epic scale” is from China.

That leads me to the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, indicated with regard to China. This week, we have been debating the Government’s strategic defence review. It starts with reference to China supporting the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine. We know that the director-general and the former director-general of MI5 have referred on the record to the enormous efforts that the CCP and the Chinese Government have deployed with regard to espionage and attempted espionage in the UK. In October 2023, the director-general went public and said that more than 20,000 people in the UK had been approached covertly by Chinese spies. We know that that pace has accelerated since then, but the Government do not believe it is warranted for China state enterprises or state entities to register their activities under the enhanced tier.

The noble Viscount quite rightly quoted the Secondary Legislation Committee of this House, which drew to our attention the threat posed by China, and the Home Office’s response as to why China is not on the enhanced tier list. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee quoted the Home Office saying, and this may be in the Minister’s notes:

“Countries are considered separately for specification on the enhanced tier and decisions are made based on a robust evidence base”.


I have not seen any evidence base published by the Government as to why China would not be on an enhanced tier, given the “epic scale” of its attempts not only to subvert our institutions but to co-opt them to act in espionage. The director-general of MI5 gave examples of more than 20 instances where China was actively seeking to use UK companies and universities, through investments and learning agreements, to access sensitive information and technology. The Government are proposing to exempt those exact areas from these measures, and I do not know why.

The Minister also referenced the exemption of sovereign wealth funds. This piqued my interest, because I raised this during the passage of Bill. I raised it in January 2023 when I specifically cited the

“sovereign wealth fund of a state, which might or might not be listed on a stock exchange and which may or may not, in effect, be a private sector arm of the interests of a foreign power”.—[Official Report, 11/1/23; col. 1476.]

I sought clarification from the Minister in the previous Government with regard to that, and I was told that sovereign wealth funds would be within the scope of this legislation. I just cannot understand why this Government have changed the assurance that I received from the previous Government, so that sovereign wealth funds will no longer be part of this. The deployment and the investment of sovereign wealth funds and pension funds in key UK infrastructure is of course something that we should focus on, whether or not it is part of the information to be published. I hope very much that Chinese investment, sovereign wealth funds and pension funds, and also the lack of published information for those who will claim some form of commercial sensitivity, will not be used to circumvent what we worked very hard to achieve, which is to prevent the kind of interference that the Government have said they are concerned about. I hope that before we are asked to support these regulations in the Chamber, we are given very clear reassurances, so that my concerns can be assuaged.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, these four draft regulations represent the next step in operationalising the foreign influence registration scheme established under Part 4 of the National Security Act 2023, a piece of legislation introduced by the previous Conservative Government. I am sure that the Minister will be pleased to hear that we support these instruments. They provide essential tools better to protect our national security from covert foreign influence, a matter of the utmost importance.

As the Minister explained, the regulations are designed to enhance transparency, deter malign activity and enable earlier disruption of potentially harmful arrangements directed by hostile states. In an increasingly complex and contested geopolitical environment, this is both necessary and timely.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The noble Lord has obviously made a decision that, even though China is not on the enhanced tier, Confucius institutions, Chinese pension funds and Chinese state funds will now be exempted. I assume that the Conservatives support that.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Indeed—I think I will cover that point as I go along.

Although we support the intent and scope of these measures, scrutiny must not end there. These regulations are not purely technical instruments; they go to the heart of how the UK responds to evolving and increasingly sophisticated state threats. It is in that spirit that I raise three points.

First, the omission of China from the enhanced tier is quite simply a glaring absence. There is now consistent cross-party consensus, reflected in previous debates in both Houses and across the intelligence community, that China poses a systemic and strategic challenge to the United Kingdom. China has targeted Members of this Parliament, launched cyberattacks on UK institutions and engaged in covert activity on British soil. In 2021, it sanctioned two Members of this House and, in 2024, the Government publicly attributed malicious cyber campaigns against MPs and the Electoral Commission to the Chinese state. These are not isolated incidents; they are part of a wider sustained pattern. Given this record, it is difficult to understand why China has not yet been put under the enhanced tier of this scheme.

The Government have stated that they do not comment on individual countries, and that designations are made on a case-by-case basis. However, this is not about speculation but about providing clarity and strategic coherence in our approach to national security. The public and Parliament are entitled to understand the rationale behind such decisions, particularly when the state in question has been repeatedly named by the intelligence community as a principal source of hostile activity. Indeed, the Home Office’s own professional guidance lists Russia, Iran and China as the foremost state-based threats. The director-general of MI5 has echoed this view, as has already been said this afternoon. So why the inconsistency? What message does it send, either to those carrying out covert activities or to our international partners, when a state widely recognised as a threat is excluded from a scheme specifically designed to counter exactly this kind of behaviour? I therefore urge the Government to reconsider this decision, or at the very least to provide a clearer public explanation of their current position.

On enforcement and oversight, effective implementation is vital and registration requirements must be communicated clearly. Guidance must be accessible, and enforcement must be proportionate and consistent across sectors and regions. Can the Minister confirm that the necessary resources are in place to support enforcement, and that compliance will be monitored in a structured and transparent manner? We note that Section 82 of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the scheme’s operation, which is welcome, but can the Minister confirm whether that report will include an assessment of the effectiveness of the current exemptions, and whether further exemptions or additional country designations are under active consideration?

Finally, although this scheme is a welcome development, we must acknowledge that it is only one part of a much broader challenge. Hostile states are adapting constantly. Disinformation, cyber interference, economic coercion and influence operations now span multiple domains. Responding effectively demands not just new legal frameworks but a whole of government approach, with sustained investment in resilience, cross-sectoral co-ordination and continued international alignment.

In conclusion, we support these measures, which are necessary, appropriate and overdue, but they must be implemented in a manner that is robust, proportionate and responsive to the evolving nature of state threats—not just today but in the years ahead. We remain concerned about the exclusion of China from the enhanced tier. We urge the Government to keep this matter under close and continuous review, and to act with greater transparency about the strategic direction of our national security posture.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful both to the contributors to this short debate and for the broad support that has been given for the regulations before the Committee. I will try to answer each noble Lord in turn. There might be a bit of overlap, because some of the issues that have been raised do overlap, but I will try to cover the points raised by each noble Lord in turn.

I shall start with my noble friend Lord Stansgate, who mentioned cyber and cyberattacks. I assure him that the security services, the agencies, the Home Office and the UK Government are acutely aware of hostile states potentially undertaking attacks, and of criminal gangs doing the same. Significant work, which my noble friend would not expect me to talk about in public, is ongoing to ensure the safety and security of our citizens. I give him that assurance as a whole.

My noble friend asked in particular about the exemptions for students and the impact on small businesses or small organisations. I will take the latter first. The registration process is designed to be as simple as possible—this touches on a point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. The Home Office anticipates that the process should take a maximum of 30 minutes. We are not expecting small businesses or micro-businesses to register in large numbers if they are in direct relationships with foreign powers, but—again, this goes to a point made by a number of noble Lords—there is comprehensive guidance online to support the registrant and their process, and to support individuals and larger organisations. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating, self-evidently, but we are confident that that will be a relatively simple process from 1 July onwards. Again, I put out the hand of friendship to all noble Lords: if there is feedback downstream on how the scheme operates, from any perspective that is brought to their attention, we would welcome it.

My noble friend Lord Stansgate also asked for clarification on the education exemption. Where someone is in an arrangement with a foreign power and is completing a course in further study, they do not necessarily need to register activities, but it is reasonable to complete the course of education; to uphold the reputation of the provider; to meet the standards of conduct expected by the providers of financial assistance; and to notify any person of personal information. Again, I hope that that is helpful.

My noble friend Lord Stansgate and the noble Lords, Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned China. I may as well hit that point and discuss it at this time. I think that they all know the answer to the question they asked, but I will give it in the phraseology I have to use. Each country is considered on its merits and no decisions have been made. Countries are considered separately for specification and decisions are made on evidence.

On China more broadly, we have been clear as a Government that we are going to take a consistent, long-term, strategic approach to managing the UK’s relations with China. This means co-operating where we can, competing where we need to and challenging robustly where we must, including on areas of national security. However, each country is considered on its merits and no decisions have been made. The regulations before the Committee highlight two specific nations where we believe there is a significant threat—Russia and Iran—which is why we have brought them forward. I hope that helps my noble friend Lord Stansgate on his points.

I am pleased to see my noble friend Lord Cryer continuing his long interest in issues related to Iran. I know that he has raised this in the Chamber on a number of occasions. He asked what happens if there is a failure to register. That will be a criminal offence in the event of an individual’s activities coming to light linked to a registered nation under the regulations before us today and will carry a potential penalty of five years’ imprisonment. That is not for me to judge. That is for the courts to judge and the police to prosecute, but that is certainly part of this issue today.

My noble friend mentioned in particular the impact on parliamentarians. There is no requirement for parliamentarians who are being lobbied to register with the scheme, and that allows the democratic process to continue. He commented on proscription and mentioned Hamas. Hamas is not specified. The regulations would cover anyone in a relationship with the IRGC in Iran but, as ever, for any organisation, at any time, the Government keep under review the question of proscription. At the moment, this is where we are, but we keep everything under review at all times accordingly. As my noble friend will know, the arrests on 17 May of three Iranian nationals who have been charged with offences under the National Security Act show that the Government are consistent. That matter will go before the courts and be determined by the judiciary in due course.

My noble friend also mentioned proxies. Although I have touched on this, I think it is important that I say that it is the person who is in a relationship with the foreign power who has to register. Therefore, those who are proxies are within the scheme, for example, companies acting under the direction of the Russians or the Iranians. If the proxy is not registered, then the person in the UK acting on their behalf could well be committing an offence. Again, it is our intention to ensure that we act in the interests of national security and of the United Kingdom as a whole.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a number of points. Again, I am grateful for his broad support and thank him for that support to date and in getting the legislation in this House in the past. He mentioned commercial interests and asked whether this is a high bar. Let me, I hope, reassure him that the Government’s intention is that it should be a high bar. UK companies providing services to bodies listed will have to register. The exemptions are carefully crafted to ensure that what is out of scope is as narrow as possible, while still fulfilling the scheme’s aim. We have put in place exemptions on sovereign wealth funds, which he talked about. The exemption for sovereign wealth funds is not about prioritising growth over national security as national security remains the first priority of Government, but about ensuring that the scheme remains proportionate. The link between a sovereign wealth fund and a foreign power is inherently transparent, so requiring them to register with the scheme would bring very limited benefits. I hope that answers his point.

Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment, Surrender and Compensation) (England and Wales) Order 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I join the Minister’s expressions of gratefulness towards the family of Ronan Kanda for the way that they have taken forward this campaign. I also thank the Minister and his Home Office team for the really careful way that the order has been drafted. They have considered thoroughly the representations made by members of the antique trade, collectors, historical re-enactment groups and martial art practitioners, when the easiest thing would have been to have a blanket ban on every straight-bladed sword. This would have criminalised people involved in land management, antique collecting, living history and sporting activities. I am therefore very grateful for the care and trouble that the Home Office team have taken.

I am confident that this definition is precise and specific to just these swords, but it is complex in nature and needs to be accompanied by illustrated guidance notes, as was done with zombie knives. A great deal of very well-informed amateur effort is available to help the Home Office compile these notes. Perhaps, given the enthusiasm in some bits of this Government for AI and the progress that they are making, we could equip each constable with an app on their phone that, based on the detailed knowledge that can be provided, the illustrations and other details, would enable instant identification—at least in principle—for police officers, who would not have to receive deep, separate training. Maybe there is something that we can do here to improve enforcement. There is so much complexity in this area that the idea that we are going to train constables in how to recognise whether a knife is within or without this legislation is not practical, but there are ways in which it can be done.

I am delighted that the Government have recognised the importance of historical items by including defences that are identically worded to those in previous legislation. The role of amateur collectors and people who are interested in preserving our history is really important at a time when museums are strapped for cash and resources. That being recognised and supported is enormously appreciated.

I hope that we will—well, I am sure that we will—have an opportunity when the Crime and Policing Bill comes through the House to consider extending this defence consistently across the entire area of historical weapons. There is a set of inconsistencies at the moment, particularly around World War II items, such as the sort of stuff that the SOE used—I declare an interest as someone who is descended from the political head of the SOE. It is really important that this aspect of our history is preserved. There will be an opportunity with that Bill—not, as I say, to extend the idea of the legislation but to extend its ambit—to make sure that what has been done in this order can be extended to weapons of historical significance generally.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by making it clear that we support the order before the Committee. The use of offensive weapons, such as so-called ninja swords, in violent crime is a matter of profound concern, and we recognise the devastating circumstances that led to this legislative action. The tragic death of Ronan Kanda was a heartbreak that no family should have to experience. We pay tribute to his family’s dignified and determined campaign, and acknowledge the Government’s response in bringing forward this measure.

As the Minister outlined, the order makes it an offence to manufacture, sell, import or possess ninja swords, a specific category of bladed weapon characterised by their tanto-style points and multiple cutting edges. It also introduces a surrender and compensation scheme modelled on the previous amnesty for zombie knives and machetes. These are measured and proportionate steps, and we recognise the effort that has gone into ensuring that this is a targeted and carefully drafted order.

However, we must consider what else is necessary and required beyond this intervention if we are serious about tackling the wider and more complex challenge of knife crime. We must be clear about what the order can and cannot achieve. Banning a specific category of weapon, although entirely sensible, will not address the root cause of knife crime. Tragically, those intent on violence will find other means. We must not fall into the trap of believing that legislation alone—in particular, legislation focused on the design or appearance of a blade—can resolve a problem that is systemic and growing in scale.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 2nd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for opening this debate today. It promises to be both an interesting and informative debate. I look forward to the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Harper, who I had the pleasure of working with at the Department for Transport and who I know will make a considerable contribution to the debates in your Lordships’ House. My noble friend has previous ministerial experience in the area of immigration, and I look forward to his contribution later.

I begin by welcoming the fact that, after years of opposing measures to improve border security and clamp down on illegal migration, the Labour Party has finally realised the importance of greater control over our borders. There are some positive noises coming from the Government’s actions. Clause 41 grants the Secretary of State the ability to detain a person while they are pending a deportation decision. Clause 48 reinterprets the United Kingdom’s construction of Article 33 of the refugee convention to include conviction of an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in the list of offences that constitute particularly serious crimes for which refugees may be removed. This is, of course, right: no person who enters this country and commits a crime, regardless of their method of entry or their status, should be permitted to remain.

Unfortunately, that is where our agreement with the Bill ends. Although, as I have said, the Government have begun to move in the right direction, the Bill does too little, too slowly. It does nothing to deter illegal crossings, it does nothing to expedite the removal of illegal migrants, and it does nothing to reduce the scale of illegal immigration.

On that last point, I am very pleased to see the latest figures from the Office for National Statistics, which show that net migration to the UK for 2024 was 431,000—half the level of the previous year. This is all thanks to the efforts of the previous Conservative Government, as the ONS has acknowledged. Last year, my right honourable friend James Cleverly strengthened the Immigration Rules, raising the minimum income for those on skilled worker visas and family visas, and imposing a limit on the number of foreign students able to bring their dependants. It is clear that Conservative policies have delivered.

Let us look at what this Government have promised and what they have delivered. The 2024 Labour Party manifesto promised to

“turn the page and restore order to the asylum system so that it operates swiftly, firmly, and fairly; and the rules are properly enforced”.

Yet the Government have presided over the highest asylum figures recorded in a single quarter, with 31,276 people claiming asylum between September and December 2024. The number of people being given a grant of protection has increased to 17,477 in quarter 4 of 2024, up from 7,185 in quarter 2 of 2024. They have reversed the progress made by the previous Government in reducing asylum claims.

Not only this but the Government pledged to close all asylum hotels. After the previous Government reduced the number of asylum seekers housed in hotels to 29,585 by 30 June 2024, since the election those numbers have jumped to 38,079 on 31 December 2024, representing a rise of 22.3%. This begs the question: when will they end the use of asylum hotels, as they promised in their manifesto?

We heard time and again during the election, and indeed ever since, that the Government will “smash the gangs”, but it is now evident that this slogan was mere hyperbole. Can the Minister tell me how many gangs have been smashed by the policies of this Government? I look forward to receiving those figures, perhaps in his closing speech.

The Minister was keen to highlight the new role of the Border Security Commander and their counterterrorism-style powers. However, Clause 1(1) states that:

“The Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the Border Security Commander”.


Clauses 3, 4 and 5 state the functions of the commander, the duty to prepare annual reports and the duties of co-operation, and that is it. What the Government have presented us with is simply a redesignated civil servant without the powers to command anything. That extends across the whole Bill.

The Government have talked up this legislation as comprising tough new measures to tackle the people-smuggling gangs, yet they are repealing two pieces of legislation which would have had that exact effect. Clauses 37 and 38 repeal the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 and the Illegal Migration Act 2023. The safety of Rwanda Act, ably taken through your Lordships’ House by my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, would have—had it not been scrapped the day the first flight was due to take off—provided a suitable deterrent to those considering taking the journey across the channel.

The Minister has pointed to the Government’s focus on the people-smuggling gangs which facilitate channel crossings. We agree that those gangs must be pursued, for theirs is a repulsive trade, but it is not enough to simply tackle supply; we must also tackle demand. While there are large numbers of people who are undeterred from paying the traffickers, the trade will continue.

The Rwanda scheme was the deterrent that would have hit that demand for small boat crossings. This built on the work of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for steering through that legislation, which created an obligation for the Home Secretary to remove any person who arrives illegally and prevented illegal entrants claiming asylum.

The previous Conservative Government struck a returns deal with Albania, which meant that the number of illegal arrivals of Albanian nationals fell from 12,658 in 2022 to just 924 in 2023. That is a 93% reduction in Albanian nationals illegally crossing the channel.

If the Government are serious about reducing illegal migration, why remove the deterrents that the Conservative Government legislated for? We can see the effects of the Government’s policies already; noble Lords will have seen the figures over the weekend. On 31 May, 1,194 migrants crossed the channel in small boats—the highest figure for a single day this year. This brings the total number of migrants who have crossed in small boats so far this year to 14,811; that is a 42% increase on the same point last year.

This Bill not only undoes much of that work but fails to provide suitable alternatives. The offence of endangering another during a sea crossing, as created by Clause 18, is unlikely to have any real impact because it can be committed only if a person has already committed an offence under subsections (A1), (B1), (D1) or (E1) of Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971—offences that were inserted into that Act by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which my noble friend the Opposition Chief Whip took through this House. Moreover, Section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 already makes it an offence to assist or facilitate unlawful entry into the United Kingdom—an offence that is punishable by life sentence thanks to the changes made by my noble friend in the Nationality and Borders Act.

Furthermore, the powers contained in Clauses 20, 21 and 23, authorising officers to search, seize and access electronic devices, already exist in Section 15 of and Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act, which the Government are repealing. Would it not make more sense to keep the existing powers, rather than repealing them and replacing them with something that is virtually identical? Of course, they would not have to include these “new” powers if they were not in the same Bill repealing Section 15 of and Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act.

It is apparent that this Bill presents a missed opportunity. Even after this legislation becomes law, activist lawyers will still be able to use the Human Rights Act to bring vexatious claims against the Government to prevent the legitimate removal of those who have abused our immigration system, entered the country illegally and committed criminal offences. The Government should follow our policy of disapplying the Human Rights Act in relation to immigration law, thereby ensuring the timely removal of those with no right to be here. The Government have indicated that they are willing to shift in this direction. The immigration White Paper states that the interpretation of Article 8 of the convention must be reconsidered; even the Attorney-General has indicated that he is open to reinterpreting the convention as well.

This Bill also presents the Government with the opportunity to tighten the conditions for visas and indefinite leave to remain. The Immigration and Visas Bill, presented by my right honourable friend the shadow Home Secretary, would ensure that indefinite leave to remain can be granted only if the applicant’s salary does not fall below £38,700 and if they do not apply for any form of state benefits. Being granted the ability to remain in the UK indefinitely is a privilege, not a right. As such, we believe that those wishing to obtain that privilege should have made a net contribution to our country. Raising the threshold for receiving earned settlement would ensure precisely that. Given the Government’s new-found vim and vigour for more stringent controls of legal migration, I am sure that they will be amenable to such policies.

Let us not forget that reducing the level of net migration to the UK is overwhelmingly backed by the British people. Polling by More in Common has found that 65% of the public believe that immigration should be reduced. I should add that that stretches to supporters of all political parties, given that 57% of Liberal Democrat voters and 49% of Labour voters support cutting immigration. Further, 62% of the public, including 61% of Liberal Democrats and 50% of Labour voters, agree that it is too easy for people to live here illegally. We would all do well to remember that this is the voice of the British public, and it is precisely what they are demanding of their parliamentarians.

This Bill does not deliver what the British people desire or deserve. Where are the powers to prevent vexatious legal challenges being used to thwart legitimate removals? Where are the powers to ensure the deportation of all foreign criminals? Where is the deterrent? Where are the measures to bring down the level of net migration? The answer, of course, is that they are simply not there. These are glaring omissions that could and should be fixed by your Lordships as the Bill progresses. We on these Benches will be seeking to strengthen this Bill to deliver on the British people’s priorities; I hope that the Government will want to follow suit.