Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 3 Report

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Tuesday 14th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start once again by praising the work of our intelligence agencies and those who work for them. They help keep our country safe. As the Home Secretary pointed out in her Statement to the other place, MI5 and the police

“have disrupted 37 late-stage attack plots”—[Official Report, Commons, 6/3/23; col. 41.]

since 2017—plots that no doubt would have cost lives.

However, in a democracy, even the work of our secret services should be open as far as possible to scrutiny and be accountable with, where necessary, difficult questions asked. Such questions have arisen from the Manchester Arena attack and the public inquiry ably chaired by Sir John Saunders.

Before posing some of these questions and comments, I once again express the profound sorrow we all feel at the 22 people who were brutally murdered, the more than 1,000 injured and the many others psychologically damaged. We once again send our heartfelt condolences to all those affected by this barbaric act.

The open volume 3 Saunders report makes a wide range of recommendations. Can the Minister outline how these are going to be taken forward? These are the published ones, but what about the secret reports and recommendations that will be contained in that? Can the Minister confirm to us that the ISC, as a parliamentary scrutiny committee, will be fully informed and involved?

What about the families so tragically and awfully affected? How will they be supported and informed as we move forward?

The Minister will also know that Figen Murray, many of the Manchester Arena survivors and all of us are waiting to know the government timetable on the introduction of the so-called Martyn’s law. What is that timetable, and can the Minister say any more than what was said in the other place, which was, in essence, shortly and in due course? It would be helpful if we had more detail as to when Martyn’s law might be introduced.

Sir John concluded:

“There was a significant missed opportunity to take action that might have prevented the Attack”,


and that there was a failure to act on information and to share information. Is the conclusion that this is due to individual failures of judgment by MI5 officers, or is it part of a wider systemic failure in the security services? Sir John said that others were involved in planning and carrying out the attack. Can we be assured that progress is being made in arresting the others?

The terrorist bomber frequently visited someone who was in prison for terrorism offences. That did not, it seems, trigger any alarm. Are the Government looking at Sir John’s recommendations about changes in approach to visits to terrorist and extremist prisoners?

In the report, we are also told that the bombers used a video online to help them make the device. How is it possible for a video such as that not to be taken down? Will the Online Safety Bill deal with matters such as this?

Concerns were raised about Libya and the Security Service not sufficiently understanding these threats. Has this led, or will it lead, to any change in how we assess and reassess threats—with no fixed view on the hierarchy of such threats but one based on evidence now and as it emerges?

Can the Minister also comment on the fact that some of the families still feel that, because of the secrecy of much of the evidence provided by MI5, they received less information than they wanted? Much of the proceedings was held in camera, which was justified because, if it were not, such evidence would not be made available at all—that is the official explanation. Does the Minister believe that there is a paradox here, because the Manchester Arena inquiry was a public inquiry, yet some of it was not public. That is unlike an inquest, where people can be compelled to attend and give evidence in public. As the Spectator reported in an excellent article, this contrasts with the inquest on 7/7, another terrorist incident, where MI5 officers attended in person, appearing behind a screen and identified by a letter but still able to be cross-examined. Will the Minister look again at the boundaries in public inquiries between necessary secrecy and transparency, and at the use of public inquiries rather than inquests?

We cannot undo the past, as much as we would all like to, but all the victims and all the families deserve as much of the truth as possible. The recommendation of Sir John Saunders’s excellent report should be taken forward, alongside other initiatives such as an independent public advocate, as quickly as possible. The families deserve no less.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I echo the sentiments at the end of the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I too welcome the third volume of the inquiry, and thank Sir John Saunders and his team for all the work they have put in.

We must remember that our thoughts must be with the families, friends and all those affected by this atrocity. Twenty-two innocent people lost their lives, hundreds more were injured, and many thousands are emotionally and physically scarred for the rest of their lives. Those responsible for this terrible, cruel and merciless act are the bomber, his brother, those who radicalised them, and those who provided them with support. We condemn their actions. We must take steps to ensure that everything possible is done to make such a set of acts impossible in future.

The inquiry has shone a light on what must be achieved to do just that. We have to face up to the shortcomings which the inquiry has exposed, no matter how hard a reading they make, and put in place the appropriate safeguards. I welcome the Government’s Statement about how they are going to address these matters, and that they intend to press forward with all the recommendations raised by the inquiry. I will come to the closed chapters in a moment. However, much more detail is needed if this House, the public and, most importantly, those directly impacted by the atrocity are to be satisfied that everything possible is being done.

I have a number of questions for the Minister, and I will try to avoid repeating those of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. First, the inquiry report contains closed chapters and recommendations, so can the Minister tell the House whether the Government have received those closed parts? If they have received them, can he say whether the recommendations within them will be restricted to selected Ministers, or, as I hope, that there can be engagement with the ISC, even if it is in camera, so that there will be an extent of knowledge and understanding of these issues wider than a very small group of people? As long as there is mystery, there will be misunderstanding.

Secondly, on Martyn’s law, I welcome the intention to introduce the legislation. We are promised the legislation “in the spring”. I am told that we are now, officially, “in the spring”, so when will the Government produce the draft legislation for us to scrutinise? I obviously recognise that there is difficulty in introducing the legislation itself because of parliamentary timetabling, but producing the draft legislation, which has been promised, is in the Government’s hands. I will try to help the Minister with the wording “in the spring” by asking: will it be introduced before Easter, before the Coronation, or in the official period called “the summer”?

My third question is on the issue of workforce pressure. One of the things that was quite clear from the inquiry report was that there were staff shortages, particularly in the north-west of England. If the Government intend to follow through on all these recommendations, how do they intend to meet the shortfall in personnel identified by the inquiry?

I turn to the countering extremism strategy. This was declared out of date in 2018 by the relevant commissioner. What steps are the Government taking to revise and publish a new strategy? In that context, are Prevent, Contest and the Shawcross review now being seen together as a whole? When can we expect to see their results being addressed? Will the conclusions be drawn together into a revised countering extremism strategy package, so that all the thoughts about the way forward are contained in a single document?

Finally, the Secretary of State responding in the House of Commons repeatedly said that she wanted to focus on security, not political correctness. I may be slightly dim on this matter, but can the Minister tell us what political correctness she was talking about? In the end, we all share the ambition to ensure that the people who have been most affected by this—the families, the friends and everyone else who has been scarred by this—understand that we will do everything we can to prevent it. I look forward to the Minister’s answers.

Public Order Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 14th March 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

At end insert “and do propose the following amendments to Amendment 1A—

1B: In subsection (1)(a), leave out “more than a minor” and insert “a significant”

1D: In subsection (1)(c), leave out “disruption that is more than minor” and insert “significant disruption””

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister said that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, proposed his amendment for “more than minor” and that was why the Government reintroduced it in the Commons and were supporting it again. Of course, that was lost when it was debated in your Lordships’ House and the Government have inserted “more than minor”—admittedly, with some flowers and curtains around it. I keep saying to noble Lords that it goes to the heart of the debate as to the threshold we wish to set where we start to undermine the right to protest. I still contend that the Government’s “more than minor” threshold is too low. Hence my Motion A1 would insert in subsection (1)(a) “significant” instead of “more than a minor”; in subsection (1)(b), it would leave out

“delay that is more than minor”

and insert “significant delay”, and in subsection (1)(d), it would leave out

“disruption that is more than minor”

and insert “significant disruption”. The point of that is, of course, to raise the threshold.

First, because I think it is important for noble Lords to understand, I want an assurance from the Minister that whatever we decide will be respected by the Government. To refer back to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, Sections 73 and 74 define public nuisance and impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and various sorts of activities, including defining what activity may result in serious disruption. Tucked away in those sections is the power for the Government to change any of that by regulation. I want a categorical assurance from the Minister that, were the Government to lose the amendments before us today, and they may win, and the Bill went back to the other place, or if the amendments that could not be reinserted in the Commons because they had been introduced in the Public Order Bill only in the Lords—namely, what we called the “slow walking” clause and the “reasonable excuse” amendments—were lost, the Government will not seek to overturn the expressed will of this Chamber and, I hope, eventually the will of the other place by using Sections 73 and 74 of that Act, which they could do. I would appreciate that.

The debate today centres on thresholds. At what level should we restrict the right to protest, above the laws that we already have? We already have a number of laws that restrict the right to protest and allow us to deal with protests as they occur. Indeed, many chief constables, including the chief constable of Manchester, have asked why we do not use the existing legislation. Notwithstanding that, the Government have panicked and come forward with the Bill to try to deal with what they perceive as a problem.

To make this real, I spent Sunday afternoon looking at various protests that have taken place around the country that, I contend, with a “more than minor” threshold would under the Bill be something that the police could arrest people for and stop. I ask everybody in this Chamber whether that is what people want, because I contend that it is what the “more than minor” threshold will mean, rather than the “significant” threshold that I am seeking to replace it with.

Let me quickly go through some of these protests that made the headlines, which would be illegal under the Bill. The first is “Protest in Oxford blocks major road in both directions”. I suggest that, before a court, that may not be significant but is more than minor. Next we have a “No HS2” protest. Some people may have more sympathy with that, but lots of protests have taken place with respect to that. “No nuclear power station” protests have taken place in Suffolk. Are they covered by the Bill? They come under “more than minor”, and I contest that offences would be committed under the Bill. East Sussex residents protested outside the housing department at the treatment of a road and blocked access. That is an offence under the Bill, and certainly above the “more than minor” threshold. Next is “Furious parents block road to protest poor enforcement of school street in north London”. I contend that that is an offence under the Bill. In the case of “Wellingborough: Protesters halt tree-felling plans”, they blocked the diggers and the cutters, which is not allowed under the Bill and is certainly more than minor. Two more are angry mothers blocking drivers over school drop-offs and unhappy Trowbridge residents turning out to block tree cutting. Under the Bill, some of these protests would be illegal and the police could potentially have the capacity to arrest.

We also saw the massive protests that took place last July when summer holidays were affected. Thousands of lorry drivers across the country blocked the M4, the M5, the M32 and the A38 in protest at the cost of fuel. My contention is that under the Bill that is more than minor and those protesting against the cost of fuel would be liable to arrest more than they are now. If you are blocking five or six motorways, that is certainly more than minor. What else did I find? Farmers blocked roads in protests; tractors were used in response to falling milk prices. That would not be allowed under the Bill. Blocking a major road is certainly more than minor. There is example after example showing that the Bill puts at risk the rights of people to protest. It puts at risk one of the democratic traditions of our country.

I do not hold with the idea that the Minister seeks to ban protests. That is ridiculous: I have never said that. What I have said is that the Bill unnecessarily restricts the right to protest and unnecessarily causes uncertainty about what is allowed or not. Lowering the threshold would mean that activity that is currently allowable in some of the examples I have given would not be. That is because of the phrase “more than minor”.

I am sure that many noble Lords will wish to comment on that, but all I ask is for noble Lords to reflect that if a tractor turns up, a mother turns up or a group links arms, before anything has happened it could be illegal under the Bill—this is the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. It does not even have to have caused disruption; it simply has to be capable of causing disruption. You can turn up with five tractors and park in a car park, and if the police think you are going to do something, even if you have not done anything, they could stop it because it is capable of causing disruption.

The Government will say, “Of course, this is ridiculous —an overreaction. Stupid nonsense. Why on earth is that going to happen? Our police will not act in that way. Ridiculous. People will be shaking their heads in disbelief that anybody could posit that anything like this would happen in our country.” All I say is: why would you pass legislation that creates the potential and the risk for it to happen?

It is not the way to legislate. Existing laws are appropriate and satisfactory and could be used. They are not being used as effectively as they could be. The Government’s answer to Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion and all that is to seek to pass a totally disproportionate piece of legislation. Through my Motion I am trying to mitigate the impact and effects of that. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, since the noble Lord was kind enough to mention my name, I should perhaps briefly explain the thinking behind the form of words the Government have introduced to this debate.

Before I do, I remind your Lordships of what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said at Third Reading—words that are worth listening to again. He said that

“the debates here and the changes made reflect a genuine attempt to address where the line should be drawn between the right to protest and the right of others to go about their daily lives.”—[Official Report, 21/2/23; cols. 1560-61.]

Those are valuable words and were worth saying again because they encapsulate exactly the dispute between us, which has been conducted with a great level of courtesy, certainly on the other side of the House and, I hope, on my side too, in trying to find a solution to the problem.

The words I chose were designed specifically to deal with the two groups of offences in the Bill, locking on and tunnelling. Those offences differ from the other kinds of protest activities. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has reminded us of a lot of examples of these. The whole purpose of those conducting these activities is to disrupt. That is their method of making their views known. That is quite different from people who assemble with flags, shouting, singing and so on, or who walk in a procession as their method of making their views known. If you make your views known by disrupting, the position is that you cross a line.

That line was identified by the Court of Appeal in the Colston case. It used the words “minor or trivial”. If that kind of activity goes beyond what is minor or trivial, you lose the protection of proportionality available under the European Convention on Human Rights—you have moved to something different—because the activity you are conducting is deliberate and the consequences of what you have done in the exercise of that deliberate decision are properly described as more than minor.

I was looking for a definition of the threshold because I took the view, rightly or wrongly, that when you are dealing with those categories of offences, there is a point—at a fairly early stage, as the Court of Appeal is indicating—where it should be available to the police to stop the activity. Tunnelling, for example, is designed to inflict economic harm on the body that is conducting the railway. We are talking about HS2, which has parliamentary backing. To inflict economic harm should not be allowed to continue for any longer than a minor interference.

Locking on is the same thing. Once it reaches a stage of going beyond minor, the sooner the police are free to take the necessary action, the better. It is their judgment, but the point of my amendment was to identify a threshold. The problem with “significant”, which is a perfectly respectable word for describing a state of affairs, is that it does not define a threshold. It defines a state of affairs. The police need a threshold to be clearly identified, which my words were designed to do.

The problem, and it is part of our debate with each other, is that in legislation we cannot use algorithms or numbers. We are driven to use adjectives, which are quite malleable creatures. They have a shade of meaning, and some people have different views as to what words such as “significant” mean. I would say that once you move beyond “minor” you have reached something that is significant.

That is the point: it is a state of affairs that you have reached, whereas my wording is to identify exactly the stage at which the threshold is crossed. As I said last time, “more” is absolutely crucial. I can well understand that “minor” excites fear and alarms but, with great respect, I do not think that is really justified. “Minor” has to be given full weight. In my submission, it achieves the object that I was trying to achieve and which I think that the Government have now accepted. It is the difference between a state of affairs and a threshold. In the end, that is the crucial point.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, I will touch on government Amendment 17A. I hope noble Lords are wholly satisfied and I appreciate the indications that they are. The Government have accepted the principle of Amendment 17, while adding a clarification. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—and, of course, others—for her not insignificant thanks.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I join others in thanking the Minister for listening, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, for the amendment on journalists. The Government are to be congratulated for moving on that and for responding to people’s very real concerns.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for saying that there is a genuine attempt within this Chamber to deal with what is clearly quite a difficult issue, with genuine differences between people. It has been well argued and well debated. That has never been an issue. There is an issue about where the threshold is but there has never been an issue about the genuine nature of that and I welcome his point.

I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and many other noble Lords practised in the law for my speed course in trying to understand what some aspects of it mean. I think the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, and indeed by the Minister in his response just now, goes to the heart of it. The Minister said—and I have not got this completely right so I hope he will correct me if I am wrong—that in the end there will be an element of subjectivity in the police and the courts.

That is the very point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. If there is an element of subjectivity, if a police officer or Vernon Coaker is walking down the street and you said that something is “significant”, I would see that as more serious than something that is “more than minor”. I cannot argue it with all the case law that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, used. I cannot use the legal terminology that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and many others would use. But I absolutely defy anybody to prove to me that 130,000, or however many there are, police officers across our country would not see “more than minor” as a lower threshold than “significant”. I just do not believe it.

The Minister himself said that there would be subjectivity. Of course, there will be subjectivity, which is why I raised the examples that I did. The Government have panicked. It was outrageous what happened with Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion—and none of us supported the disruption caused by that. Many of us in this Chamber asked why the police were not using the powers on obstruction that they had and quickly sorting it out by using those powers. They should have had the confidence to use them and to know that this Chamber and the other place would be behind them, sorting those protesters out and dealing with the issue in the way it should have been done.

The Government’s response through the Public Order Bill and some of these measures will impact on people who should not be impacted on in any way, especially if you have a definition of “more than minor”. A police officer will go to those people who are driving tractors and protesting about milk, they will go to people slowing lorries down on the motorway because of fuel prices, and they will go to parents blocking roads because of school playgrounds—they absolutely will. If people start getting cross, as they inevitably will, the police will say, “Well, this is more than minor”, and do something about it—rather than what they would do if they had a threshold of “significant”. That will be the practical reality of the legislation that this Government are asking this Chamber to pass, supported by the other place. It is simply not tenable, and simply not good legislation; it will have consequences that the Government do not intend for it.

There was one thing on which I disagreed with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, when he talked about disruption. I have not been on many protests that have not caused disruption, and I suspect that not many noble Lords have been on protests that have not caused some sort of disruption. I do not want to be controversial, but sometimes the point is to cause some disruption—that is the absolute point. I am sure that there are many noble Lords, not just behind me but on other Benches, who have been on demonstrations and protests and have caused disruption. The argument is over whether that is serious disruption—and according to the Bill it has to be serious; well, “more than minor” —whereas I am saying that it should be “significant”. At the end of the day, that is the point of difference between us.

All I say in closing is that the police, in policing the Public Order Act, as it will become, will treat “more than minor” at a much lower level in dealing with protests than they would if “significant” was in the Bill. For me, that trumps any arguments of case law or that the courts will have problems defining it. The courts always have problems defining things, and that is why, in the end, you have courts, because they will use their best judgment to define it—but I would rather they had to define “significant” than “more than minor” in dealing with protests. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, police stop and search is an intrusive power that is used disproportionately against visible minorities. As I said on Report, you are seven times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police if you are black than if you are white if suspicion is required, and 14 times more likely to be stopped and searched if no suspicion is required. The facts show that the police have been targeting black people for stop and search, the overwhelming majority of those stopped and searched having done nothing wrong.

In 2020, 25% of eligible black people in the UK were not registered to vote, compared with 17% of eligible white people. Black people, even more than the population as a whole, have little or no confidence that the political system represents them. Protest is therefore more important to them than the population as a whole. Giving the police powers to stop and search in connection with protests will deter black people from exercising their human rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. We cannot and will not support the inclusion of new stop and search powers for the police in connection with protests for these reasons, whether with or without suspicion.

However, at this stage of the Bill, if this House again insisted on removing stop and search without suspicion from the Bill the other place would have to move. That is something that many noble Lords around the House, for constitutional reasons, would be reluctant to do. I therefore do not intend to test the opinion of the House on my Motion B1.

On the basis that the perfect should not be the enemy of the good, we support Motion B2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which, as he will no doubt explain, would restrict the circumstances in which the police can invoke stop and search without suspicion in relation to protest. We will support the noble Lord should he divide the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak primarily to my Motion B2, which I will move and seek to test the opinion of the House on. In doing so, I very much agree with some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We have arrived at a place where I and, I suspect, many in this Chamber would not wish to be. In other words, frankly, suspicionless stop and search should not be in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

As an amendment to Motion B, at end insert “and do propose the following amendments to the words so restored to the Bill—

6B: Clause 11, page 12, line 17, leave out “inspector” and insert “chief superintendent”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I wish to test the opinion of the House.

National Security Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 13th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all noble Lords across the House for their interest in this Bill and for their valuable contributions and co-operation so far. Debate has been consistently informative and constructive. I am extremely grateful for the diligent approach that noble Lords from across the House have taken to ensuring that this vital legislation has received full scrutiny ahead of returning to the other place.

I am particularly grateful for the positive engagement and support of various noble Lords. From the Benches opposite, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Ponsonby and Lord West; from the Cross Benches, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble Lords, Lord Evans, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile; from the Liberal Democrat Benches, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Marks; and I am also grateful to my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Leigh. I hope all noble Lords will join me in thanking the Bill team, policy teams and legal teams in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice for their hard work in getting the Bill to its current position. They worked phenomenally hard, particularly in relation to FIRS. It is always invidious to single out anyone in particular, but I would very much like to thank the following: Emer Smith from my private office, and Laura Weight, Jack Joseph, Sebastian Graves Read, Grace Bennett, Joe Marshall, Grace Lucas, James Dix and, last but by no means least, Louise Holliday from the Bill team.

I also place on record my thanks to our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, both for their contributions to this Bill’s development and for their enduring work in keeping us all safe every day. It is vital that they have the tools they need to fulfil such a challenging task. The measures in the Bill seek to ensure they are well equipped to tackle the wide range of modern threats that we face in the UK today. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister for his constructive engagement, along with his colleagues, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, and others, including his Bill team. The Bill has had significant changes made to it, showing the way this Chamber can improve legislation. That can happen only when a Minister and the Government listen. All of us, I think, appreciate the way the Minister has engaged and made significant changes to the Bill to improve it. We are all grateful to him for that.

I also pay due respect to the contributions of many noble Lords across the House. I pay my respect to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who we have just heard from on the previous group of amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who I am pleased to see in his place. I think the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Pannick, have been significant and have helped to improve the Bill.

The Minister paid tribute to the intelligence and security services, as we all do, because we all have an interest in the security of our nation. We should note that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, have attended virtually the whole of the proceedings on this Bill. That says everything about the contributions they have made, but also it also sends a signal to the intelligence and security services to know that two former directors-general have spent all their time contributing to the Bill and advising people both in the Chamber and outside of it. That is of huge significance, not only to this Chamber but to our country. They deserve recognition for that.

I also thank my noble friends Lord West and Lady Hayter for their contributions throughout the Bill, which have helped our thinking as well. I thank my noble friend Lord Ponsonby for his—as I often say now—calming support to my more excitable personality. That helps me enormously in more ways than you can imagine. I also thank—I know they are not here—the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Marks, for their input, which helped to improve the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I saw my role in this Bill as representing the research sector to some extent, and I am very conscious—as I am sure the Minister is—of the delicate balance there is between the desirability of close international collaboration and sometimes having to collaborate with those who come from authoritarian countries that are not entirely friendly to us. The representatives of the research sector—the Royal Society and others—look forward to talking with the department about the guidance, which we hope will strike exactly the right balance in this delicate area between what needs to be done and not imposing deliberate bureaucracy.

I am sure that the Minister is aware from what we have seen in Georgia over the last two weeks—where there have been very serious riots against the Government caused by a foreign agents Bill, which is seen as a Russian attempt to gag the Government and the people of Georgia and to block their contact with the western world—that this is a delicate area. It is extremely difficult to get the right balance, and we hope that we have achieved in this House a much better balance than when the Bill was originally drafted.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope the Chamber will indulge me. I forgot to thank Ben Wood, who is our adviser. I apologise to him for that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

While the House is indulging, I also forgot to thank my colleagues, my noble friends Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Davies of Gower, so I would like to place that on record. I also thank my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy at the Ministry of Justice.

Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Wednesday 8th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, here we go again, as the Government launch yet another Bill to deal with their catastrophic failure on asylum. We have record backlogs, claimants waiting sometimes years for claims to be sorted, children lost, and claimants bundled into hotels with no or little local consultation. Last year, a record 45,000 people crossed the channel on small boats, up from four years ago, as convictions for people smugglers have halved. It is a public policy failure.

Just last year, the Nationality and Borders Act was passed. The Home Secretary said:

“Anyone who arrives illegally will be deemed inadmissible and either returned to the country they arrived from or a safe country.”


Can the Minister update us on how that is going? How can it work with no return agreements and the shocking Rwanda plan, as it should be, stuck in the courts? Last year’s Act led to 18,000 people deemed inadmissible because they travelled through safe countries. Without the return agreements, which the Minister never mentioned, can he confirm that just 21 were returned—or if he prefers, 0.1%. The other 99.9% were placed in shocking hotels, or similar, at the cost of £500 million and more boats arriving. It is chaos—chaos with shocking human consequences and potential rises in community tensions.

What is different this time? Where are the return agreements? Where are all those to be detained for 28 days going to be housed? What happens after the 28 days? Let us remember, among those people, there will be torture victims, those fleeing war and persecution, Afghan interpreters and families with children. It is chaos, unworkable, but it gets the Government the cheap headlines they crave—even if it means potentially excluding victims of modern slavery or trafficking. Where are the safe and legal routes that many in this Chamber have been asking for? To take one example, what route exists under the existing rules or under this Bill for Afghan interpreters who fled Afghanistan, and were told by the Government to flee Afghanistan, to avoid capture by the Taliban?

Let us put in place an alternative, one that will no doubt be mocked by those seeking sensationalism. This would include: giving asylum caseworkers the support and help they need to speed up the process, rather than criticising them in emails; putting in place proper new agreements with France, Europe and others, including returns; properly controlled and managed legal routes, such as family reunion and reform of resettlement. What is wrong with competent and sensible public authority? What about the plan to tackle gangs by establishing a cross-border policing unit—why has that not happened? Have we got to the point where, as a people smuggler told Sky News yesterday, three-quarters of the smugglers live in the UK? Is that right? What is the figure? What are the Government doing to arrest and prosecute them?

All of this is being done in a Bill that drives a coach and horses through international law, leading to a potential withdrawal from the ECHR. What does the Minister think one of its architects, Winston Churchill, would think of that? How does the Minister justify the unbelievable statement about the ECHR on the front of the Bill? I have never read something like this on a Bill before:

“I am unable to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Illegal Migration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights, but the Government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.”


That is written on the front of the Bill. It is unbelievable that a British Government should put on the front of a Bill that they should ignore international law and the legal system in this country. This is an absolutely disgraceful disregard for international law.

What will other countries think of us? Are we as a country not about upholding the principle of respecting international law? Is that not one of the things that we campaign for across the world? Of course, we have a difficult issue to deal with around small boats, and we have outlined, as I just did, some sensible ways forward. But it cannot be right to seek to solve this issue through strategies rather than solutions, or by gimmicks, quick headlines and recycling harmful rhetoric. The Bill is not a solution and is not in the finest traditions of our country, which we are all so proud of. It risks making the chaos worse. Is it not true that the only people to blame for that will be the Government themselves, but the people who will suffer are those seeking asylum from horror and tyranny?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I came across an article that said:

“The longer the queue, the worse the administrative confusion, the greater the incentive is for racketeers to target their efforts on Britain. There is a direct link between Government incompetence in managing asylum cases and the surge in applications to stay here.”


This was written in 2000 by William Hague, then the leader of the Conservative Party and now of course the noble Lord, Lord Hague of Richmond. He was criticising the then Labour Government, but, in the ministerial letter we received, referring to plans to

“clear the legacy initial decision asylum backlog by the end of 2023”,

there was a complete failure to acknowledge that this legacy was created by a Tory-run Home Office, which has never got a grip over the last 13 years. Nearly 100,000 people have been waiting for a decision on their asylum claim for over six months—that is four times the number in 2019. We need a minimum service level in the Home Office.

We all want to see an end to dangerous channel crossings, but the Bill and the hullabaloo surrounding it are just more of the same gimmicky gesture politics, not the practical and sustainable solution that is actually needed. The Bill is not only unworkable but illegal and immoral. It treats people as criminals simply for seeking refuge. In the article I quoted from, the noble Lord, Lord Hague, said:

“We believe Britain has a moral as well as a legal duty to welcome here people who are fleeing for their lives.”


That “we” was the Conservative Party 23 years ago. No wonder that even some Tory MPs are now upset at the xenophobic and dehumanising rhetoric and intentions to breach the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights.

In her enthusiasm to make the demonisation of refugees an election selling point, the Home Secretary appears to have broken the Ministerial Code: a fundraising email sent in her name to Conservative Party supporters disgracefully tarred civil servants as part of an “activist blob” that has “blocked” the Government from trying to stop the small boat crossings.

Why is the Bill needed, when the ink is barely dry on the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which was supposed to be the magic solution that would stop the boats? This plan will punish the victims of persecution and human trafficking, but it will do nothing to stop the evil criminal gangs who profit from these small boat crossings. Not only are the majority of men, women and children who cross the channel doing so because they are desperate to escape war, conflict and persecution; most of them are in fact granted the protection they need. Four out of 10 people arriving on boats last year were from just five countries, with an asylum grant rate of over 80%—the Home Office recently decided to fast-track applications from a similar list of countries. How does the plan to deem inadmissible any claims from people who arrive on small boats from countries such as Afghanistan or Syria accord with these facts?

The only way to stop these dangerous crossings is to create safe and legal routes. The Government talk about such routes, but where and what are they? Will the Government commit to granting humanitarian visas to people needing to flee? We are told that the Bill will introduce an annual cap on the number of refugees whom the UK will accept, but how would that work? If the next person arriving is escaping the terrible cruelty of the Taliban or the appalling regime in Iran, will they just be refused? The number of family reunion visas issued in the year to September last year was more than a third down on 2019, so safe routes are in fact being constricted. Will the Minister assure me that the Government will commit to supporting my Refugees (Family Reunion) Bill, which recently passed this House, when it progresses through the other place?

Instead of locking up asylum seekers or forcing them to stay in hotels, will the Government commit to ending their absurd ban on asylum seekers working after they have been waiting months for their claims to be processed? If so, they could pay their way.

We are expected to proceed with a Bill of which the Government themselves say there is more than a 50% chance that it is incompatible with the ECHR. Quite how they can say they

“remain confident that this Bill is compatible with international law”,

when simultaneously believing that it is only 50% likely to be, is a mystery. How can a law actually designed to circumvent human rights possibly be fit for purpose? Lastly, speaking of human rights, can I ask for a list of countries to which people would not be returned?

National Security Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

My Lords, Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000—hereafter referred to as TACT —confers a power on a police officer to arrest a person whom they reasonably suspect to be a terrorist. Under Section 41, officers are able to detain someone before charging or releasing them. The Section 41 detention clock allows them to do so for a maximum period of up to 14 days. It is possible for a person to be arrested under Section 24 of PACE then subsequently rearrested under Section 41 of TACT. This might happen, for example, when information comes to light during the investigation indicating that the offence of which the individual is accused has a terrorist connection. Under the current position, the time spent in detention under Section 24 would, in theory, not be counted towards the initial 48-hour permissible period of detention under Section 41. Though counting this time is, in fact, current operational practice, the Government are clear of the need to codify this practice and ensure that the safeguard continues to apply in all future cases. This is what this amendment does, while aligning the power relating to foreign power threat activity contained in Part 1 of this Bill.

Schedule 5 to TACT contains a power under which an officer of at least the rank of superintendent may, by a written order, give to any constable the authority which may be given by a premises search warrant issued by the court for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. The authorising officer must have reasonable grounds for believing that the case is one of great national emergency and that immediate action is necessary. We are seeking to amend Schedule 5 to TACT to create an ex post factum judicial authorisation safeguard. This will require the police to apply to the court for a warrant in relation to any relevant confidential journalistic material seized during the search that they need to retain for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. In the interests of national security, it is right that confidential material should be accessible in cases where the police can show that the action is necessary, proportionate and satisfies the legal tests in these provisions, while pursuing a terrorist investigation.

However, the Government also recognise that press freedoms are extremely important. Therefore, when such material is seized during a search that has been authorised under this urgent procedure, it is right that a warrant must be sought from a judge for its continued retention, and that an application for retention can be ex post factum, after the search itself has taken place. This approach reflects recent case law and ensures that the provisions provide appropriate protection for journalists. This amendment will also align this aspect of Schedule 5 to TACT with the equivalent urgent premises search power found in Schedule 2 to this Bill.

I turn to Amendment 192, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. This amendment seeks to impose on the Secretary of State a duty to implement the recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Russia. As noble Lords will be aware, the Government published their response to the Russia report on the day the report itself was published, 21 July 2020. Although the report did not itself enumerate specific recommendations, all the recommendations that could be identified in the report were addressed in the government response. A majority of the ISC’s recommendations had already been implemented by the Government before the report was published—for example, those covering co-ordination of HMG’s Russia work, close working with international partners and continued exposition and attribution of malign Russian activity. The then Home Secretary reiterated this in a Statement made to the House on 17 January 2022.

The Government’s response made our approach to tackling the recommendations in the report clear. By introducing effective new tools and powers for the police and security and intelligence agencies, this Bill can rightly be seen as delivering on commitments that the Government made in their response. Noble Lords will also be aware that the Government implement the vast majority of all ISC recommendations. However, there may be occasions when, for reasons including national security, we may not be able to take forward specific recommendations. We do not consider further reporting nor this amendment necessary, given the actions that the Government have already taken in response to the report.

Amendment 193, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to impose a duty on the Prime Minister to update the memorandum of understanding between the Government and the Intelligence and Security Committee to reflect the changes to the Government’s intelligence and security activities as a result of the Bill. Section 3(2) of the Justice and Security Act 2013 already provides for the ISC to make reports

“as it considers appropriate concerning any aspect of its functions”.

That already gives the ISC the ability to report on matters that fall within its remit so far as is consistent with the MoU—for example, to seek to avoid duplicating the work of other committees. Amending the Bill as proposed might be taken to imply that the ISC required explicit legislative nomination to propose changes to the MoU in relation to changes in intelligence and security arrangements brought in by Bills, which is not the case.

I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I am aware that there are concerns about how the now closed tier 1 investor route operated—in particular, concerns that the route was used by those relying on funds that had been illegitimately acquired and those who may have posed a wider risk to the UK’s national security. It was because of those concerns that we committed to a review of visas issued under the route between 2008 and 2015. The Home Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 12 January setting out the findings of that review, including that the review had identified a minority of individuals connected to the tier 1 investor visa route who were potentially at high risk of having obtained wealth through corruption or other illicit financial activity, or being engaged in serious and organised crime.

The Statement of 12 January represents the Government’s substantive response to the commitment to undertake a review and publish our findings. I am aware that some noble Lords would have preferred that the published review had included more information about specific individuals. However, we have had to act responsibly with regard to the UK’s national security. We have sought to strike the right balance between setting out the broad findings of the review and the constraints on disclosing sensitive details, which must be withheld at the request of our operational partners to protect our border, and the vital work of our law enforcement agencies.

I stress that this Government have already acted decisively regarding the risks posed by the tier 1 investor route to the UK’s national security when we closed the route on 17 February 2022. The Government have also been clear that any future visa programme in the investment space must operate on a fundamentally different premise from the previous one, with a far greater focus on skills and impacts, rather than just cash in the bank. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is the first opportunity I have had to join other noble Lords in thanking the Minister for the various significant changes the Government have made to the National Security Bill and the improvement they have brought.

I shall speak to my Amendments 192 and 193. Again, I thank the Minister for his various amendments in this group, which are also an important step forward. I will leave the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, who has signed my Amendment 192, to speak to his Amendment 194.

Amendment 192 deals with the recommendations of the July 2020 ISC Russia report. The Minister has addressed some of those but I have one or two questions to ask him before I turn to Amendment 193, which is the real priority for me in this group. The report highlighted the fragmentation of the various bodies. The Minister has spoken about how the Government seek to address that, but we would all like to know how the supposed co-ordination of the government response to the Russia report is being monitored to ensure that it is taken forward, and that what the Government say about the need for co-ordination to tackle fragmentation is made a reality.

The report highlighted again the prominence of dodgy Russian money in London. The Government will say, quite rightly, that they have at last taken action on that. How is that progress being monitored, so that we know how effective it has been, particularly in light of Ukraine? Similarly, can the Government reassure us that the various threats to democratic processes that the report highlighted are being addressed? I do not intend to press Amendment 192 to a vote—I am really just asking about the progress made since the report was published. As the Minister said, the Government’s response was published on the same day, but the question is how we maintain the progress that we all want to see on the various issues raised.

I will try to be as brief as possible on Amendment 193. The ISC’s annual report, published on 13 December 2022, clearly laid out the need to update the memorandum of understanding. That is what my Amendment 193, on which I will test the opinion of the House, seeks to do: to update the MoU the ISC operates under to reflect the changes made by the Bill and those made over the last few years. The Minister himself referenced the various government departments that now have responsibility for different aspects of security and intelligence, a point I will come to in a moment.

Let us remember that the ISC was set up in 1994 to allow for greater parliamentary oversight of these important matters, while respecting the obvious need for national security—an issue brought into sharp focus by the excellent Saunders report on the horrific Manchester Arena attack. The current MoU is out of date. The commitment made by the Security Minister in 2013 during the passage of the Justice and Security Act—that the MoU is a live document that is easily changed—needs to be honoured.

Who oversees the increasing devolution to policy departments of intelligence and security activities? How can parliamentarians scrutinise those when only ISC members with the necessary security clearance can access classified information? The Select Committees supposedly tasked with these various oversight roles are not suitable for that reason, rather than for any reason of capability. They simply do not have the security clearance to look at classified information.

The following departments and bodies are mentioned in the Saunders recommendations: the Department for Education, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Law Commission, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice—and that is the open part of the report; for obvious reasons, we will not know what is in the closed part. If the ISC oversees all this, as it is perhaps expected to do in light of the recommendations, how will that work with regard to the Department for Education and the various other departments?

Our committee says that the outdated MoU is a real problem, but the Government say it is not. The ISC says it is a problem, but the Government simply dismiss it and say it is not. Can the Minister explain how members of a Select Committee—let us use BEIS as an example—can oversee classified information that informs the work of a body they are responsible for if they cannot see that information? Pages 42 and 43 of the Intelligence and Security Committee annual report lists numerous departments that have various security and intelligence functions they are supposed to oversee, but they will not be able to see the classified information because they do not have the security clearance. The ISC itself cannot oversee this because that is not part of the memorandum of understanding under which it works.

The committee was told, as I said, that the Government do not feel bound by statements made by the Security Minister to Parliament in 2013. So what weight should we give to any Ministerial Statements the Minister makes if, in a few years’ time, the Government can simply say, “We don’t give any weight to what was said in 2013”? Parliamentary Statements by Ministers of the Crown are supposed to be justifications of policy. We all rely on them. Courts rely on them. Many amendments to this Bill were withdrawn earlier because of what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box and the reassurances he gave, yet the Government are saying that they no longer agree with the 2013 assurances given by then Security Minister, so they will ignore them. We are talking not about policy—I understand how policy works—but about process and the need to update it. As I say, that is very disappointing, to say the least.

--- Later in debate ---

Going on to the tier 1 visa scheme—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Before the noble Lord moves on to a different amendment, can he answer my question? How can Select Committee members, who do not have the necessary security clearance, possibly look at and scrutinise classified material on Parliament’s behalf?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If they do not have the necessary security clearances, they obviously cannot, but, as I said earlier, that is part of the full consideration of the MoU and the various changes to the machinery of government that is currently under way.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

193: After Clause 91, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty to update the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament's memorandum of understanding(1) The Prime Minister must ensure that the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (the “ISC”) under section 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 (the “MoU”) is revised to reflect any changes to the intelligence or security activities of His Majesty’s Government as a result of this Act.(2) Any revisions to the MoU under subsection (1) must be agreed between the Prime Minister and the ISC in accordance with the process set out in section 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013.(3) Any engagement between the Prime Minister and the ISC relating to revisions to the MoU under subsection (1) must commence within the 6-month period beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the ISC’s Memorandum of Understanding is updated to reflect this Act.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

As I indicated, I would like to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Coaker]

195: After Clause 91, insert the following new Clause—
“Proscription of organisations: hostile activity on behalf of another State(1) Within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must publish draft legislation establishing a process for the proscription of actors engaged in hostile activity within the meaning of paragraph 1(5) of Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.(2) Such legislation must have reference to the existing proscription process as governed by section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (proscription).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to propose a new proscription process for actors engaged in hostile activity on behalf of other states.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 195, I will not speak at great length. The amendment requires the Secretary of State to propose a new proscription process for actors engaged in hostile state activity on behalf of other states, or indeed non- state organisations acting for a state or those who may act on their behalf.

I am moving this amendment to enable the Government to deal with any legislative problem in proscribing, among others, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, known as the IRGC. The Government will tell the Chamber and me that existing legislation can deal with it, so it is not a problem. So why is there a delay in proscribing the IRGC? If there is no problem with existing legislation, why are Foreign Office officials questioning, as reported in the Times and many other media outlets, how the IRGC can be defined as a terrorist organisation under existing legislation, given that it is a government agency, unlike most of the other groups on the list? Foreign Office officials are being reported in the media as saying that there is a problem with the legislation. The Home Office is saying—I presume this is what the Minister will say—that there is not. Where has that come from? Why is the Foreign Office briefing the media that the reason it is resisting the proscription of the IRGC is that it is not sure that existing legislation will be adequate to define the IRGC as a terrorist organisation because it is a government agency.

There is a problem here at the heart of government. My Amendment 195 seeks to say to the Government, “Here is a legislative vehicle by which you can plug a gap so that the concerns raised by the Foreign Office can be alleviated”. The Home Office and the Foreign Office cannot both be right. So we should pass the legislation as I have laid it out here. I have read—I was advised that this was the way to give the Government a vehicle to deal with any legislative problem in the proscription of the IRGC, as laid out by the Foreign Office—the various parts of the 2000 Act and the 2019 Schedule in front of me and, as much as I can read and understand them, I will have to take the Foreign Office’s word that it is because it is a government agency that there is a problem.

As I said, something is the matter here. It is the will of Parliament, as expressed time and again in this place and in the other place, that the IRGC should be proscribed, but the Government are unable to do it. Therefore, all of us should pass this amendment to get rid of the legislative barrier that the Foreign Office says stays in the way. I am not a legislative expert, but, if the Foreign Office says there is a problem, if I were in the Home Office, I would pass this amendment and call out the Foreign Office if I wanted to proscribe the IRGC. Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether the Government wish to proscribe the IRGC and whether there is a problem with the Foreign Office. Clearly there is; the Minister will not say there is, but there is.

We have seen an Iranian TV station in the UK forced to shut down because of activity from Iran. Numerous plots have been foiled, thanks to our security services. The noble Lord, Lord Evans, is here, and the noble Baroness, both former heads of MI5, so we thank them. But the Government are prevaricating on the proscription of the IRGC. My amendment, as I said, seeks to help the Home Office in its disagreement with the Foreign Office by allowing the creation of an improved and clearer process for proscribing hostile state actors.

The Government are divided in the face of this worrying issue. The Government will say they are not, so I was looking for evidence to show that they were. What did I find? In Hansard, Bob Blackman MP—not me trying to create trouble in the Lords but a Conservative MP—said:

“Clearly, the threat from the IRGC to people in this country—be they opposition journalists reporting on what is going on in Iran at the moment or UK citizens—is paramount. Foreign Office Ministers have responded to all the urgent questions the Speaker has granted and the debates we have had, but will my right hon. Friend now take the obvious step, which is supported by all political parties in the Chamber, and proscribe the IRGC in its entirety?”


Tom Tugendhat, Minister, Home Office, responds with this direct quote:

“My hon. Friend will know that it is not me”—


I am quoting this—

“he has to persuade in this matter and that there are many areas where I would like to go. I can assure him that the Government are absolutely listening to exactly what he is saying. The Home Secretary and I are as one on this”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/2/23; col. 639.]

I am not a genius at working out what that means, but I think anybody who has been in the other Chamber or in this Chamber and has listened to the debate knows that the National Security Minister is telling Bob Blackman MP that the Home Secretary and he agree that the IRGC should be proscribed, but they have a problem with other parts of government, and those other parts of government are the Foreign Office, which believes that it should keep open communication with Iran and that proscribing the IRGC will cause all sorts of other problems, presumably around the nuclear treaty and so on and so forth.

All I am saying to the Minister is that the Foreign Office is clearly blocking the proscription of the IRGC, which is what the majority of people in this Chamber and the other think should happen, and my amendment seeks to take away from it the excuse it is using: namely, that there is a legislative problem, because the IRGC is a government agency and it would therefore be difficult under existing legislation to define it as a terrorist organisation.

Amendment 195 is extremely important, because it will allow the proscription of the IRGC and will take away from the Foreign Office the excuse that it is using to block that proscription. It is in the national security interests of this country for the IRGC to be proscribed as soon as possible. From what I just quoted, it is obvious that the Government, defined as the Home Office, agree, but the Foreign Office is stopping it. This Chamber has the opportunity, in the vote on my Amendment 195, to take away the excuse that the Foreign Office is using to stop that proscription. I hope that noble Lords will take it.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for bringing this issue to the Chamber on Report. He asked very pertinent questions. If he seeks to test the opinion of the House, we shall abstain on this point, but that is not because we do not wish to hear the Minister’s answer—it is because, if we are reforming the Terrorism Act 2000 and the means by which we proscribe organisations, there are perhaps better places for a full and more fundamental review.

I have been on record as supporting the proscription of the IRGC, and I have said that this should not be done without considering the knock-on effects within Iraq and Lebanon. The Terrorism Act 2000 states that it is the Home Secretary who has the specific power to proscribe, so the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked are valid. If this is a Home Office Minister stating that to the House of Commons and it is the Home Secretary’s decision, what is the process by which government will now make decisions on this? I have also repeatedly called for the proscription of the Wagner Group, which is a non-government organisation but clearly has direct links with the Russian Government.

There are, of course, some grey areas. Before we reached this group, I reviewed the whole list of those proscribed organisations, and we have recently proscribed some that are clearly not linked with a Government but are organisations designed to destabilise that country’s Government. However, over the years, there have been other organisations where the lines are more blurred as to whether they are within the framework of aliases or associated organisations, which can be proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000, even if they are not directly part of the Government of that nation. It is obviously a large step if we proscribe part of a Government, but, in the past, we have seen that, in many areas, it has not been clear who the Government of a country are. Therefore, the statutory tests that are used, and that need to be satisfied, need to be robust.

I have raised the issue of the Wagner Group since 25 April last year, and I have seen it operating with my own eyes in Sudan—some noble Lords have heard me make this case before—and it is palpably the case that its operations are terrorist in purpose and in nature and that they are directly against the national security interests of the United Kingdom and pose a threat to British nationals and our allies. I called for its proscription last year on 25 April, 23 May, 9 June, 7 July, 15 November and 21 December, and on 26 January this year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his response. Of course the Government are carefully considering this. I do not for one moment believe that they are not thinking about or carefully considering it—that would be an insult to the British Government. Of course they are concerned about national security and worried about various issues, including the one before us. That is a given. I have never accused the Government of not being concerned about it, of not considering it, of not deliberating on it, of not thinking about what they should do.

My amendment is saying that there is a real problem at the heart of government because the Foreign Office is blocking what the Home Office wants to do. There was not a word about that from the Minister; not a word about the fact that the Foreign Office is saying, “You cannot use existing legislation because it means that the IRGC”, to use that as an example, “is a government agency and not within the definition of a terrorist organisation under the legislation as drafted”. That is the core of it.

The noble Lords, Lord Leigh, Lord Polak, Lord Alton, and others who have spoken are saying that if there is a legislative problem, which the Foreign Office thinks there is, sort it out or come before this Chamber and say, “We do not want to proscribe the IRGC. We do not want to take that sort of action”. It is a perfectly reasonable thing to argue. “We do not want to proscribe the IRGC because we think the better way of sorting this problem out is to maintain open communications with the Iranian regime, to talk to them, to embrace them. We are not going to take any hard action against them because we think that undermines the policy objectives of the British Government.” It is a perfectly reasonable policy position, but I do not think that that is what is going on. I think the Government are having a row. I think there is a clash between the Foreign Office and the Home Office, and I am on the side of the Home Office. The IRGC should be proscribed, and I think that is what the majority of people in this Chamber, and in the other place, think. If so, it is the Government—or part of the Government—who are the problem, and my Amendment 195 gives them a legislative vehicle to sort it out.

What sort of a response is it, on something as serious as this, to say it is a drafting problem and “I did my best with it”? If there is a drafting problem, the Government can accept it and sort it out. They can change it, bringing in their battalions of lawyers, barristers even—I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—to sort it out. I was a teacher; I played football; I was a politician; I am not a lawyer, but that was the best I could do, because I know how important this is. The IRGC is operating within this country, to the extent that MI5 and others are having to foil terrorist plots. It forced a TV station to shut down, and the Government’s reaction to my amendment is to say, “There is a drafting problem with it”. It really is not acceptable.

The noble Lord, Lord Evans, is right in saying that there is a balance to be struck. Well, strike a balance by accepting Amendment 195, sorting the legislation out and allowing the will of this Parliament to be expressed through its directly and properly elected Government. It is saying to the Government that the IRGC is simply and utterly unacceptable. I do not care if the legislation says there is a problem with defining it. It is a terrorist organisation. “No, it is not”, because Schedule 58 to some Act somewhere says it is not. That is ridiculous. It is the tail wagging the dog. The IRGC is causing damage in our society and the Foreign Office is blocking this, according to the Times and other media outlets, because its officials are saying there is a definition problem because it is a government agency.

The noble Lord, Lord Evans, is right that this takes us into new territory. It does, and there are problems, but all I am saying is that it cannot be an excuse for the British Government to say, “We are not going to proscribe the IRGC because the Foreign Office says there is a problem with it being defined as a terrorist organisation when it is a government agency”. What do we say to people? Bring it down from these heady clouds of the House of Lords Chamber. Bring it down to the fact that terrorist plots are having to be foiled by our security services because of its actions. An international Iranian TV station has been forced out of our country: the United Kingdom cannot guarantee the safety of people who work for a TV station, in the face of actions by the IRGC and the people who support it, and the British Government prevaricate on whether to proscribe it. It is unbelievable.

The Government are whipping their Members to vote against that proscription and the Liberal Democrats, for their own reasons, are going to abstain. So, we are going to have people voting against and abstaining on the proscription of a body that poses a very real threat to our country. Good luck with explaining that. Good luck with explaining to people why that is something Parliament should accept and why my amendment should fail. “A drafting error”. “Not properly written”. Goodness me, is that the best we can do? I wish to test the opinion of the House.

National Security Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to say that we very much support Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile; were he to push it to a vote, we would certainly support him in that Division.

I do not want to repeat much of what has been said by my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile, Lord Wallace, Lord Evans and Lord West. However, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, was right to say that, although this is a modest amendment, its consequences are quite serious. There is no doubt that people are concerned about some of the issues that they have read about in the papers around foreign interference in elections and the funding of political parties. One of the things that we often debate in this House is confidence in our democracy and democratic system, including the threats to them and the erosion of that confidence. Sometimes, these may be small steps but they are important ones that can contribute in our trying to do all we can to protect our democracy. People are worried about foreign interference in elections and the integrity of our democratic system.

It is right to point out, as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, did, that, through this Bill, we are requiring significant steps to be taken by businesses, organisations, industry, financial services and all sorts of other bodies to ensure that they conform to certain regulations that protect our national security. It would be right for them to ask, “Why is there one rule for us but another for political parties?” It is quite right that this amendment is supported; I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will seek to test the opinion of the House and that his amendment is supported by the majority of Members, because it is an important step in protecting the integrity of our democracy in the way that noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lady Hayter on the Labour Benches, pointed out.

Having said that, I want to ask one practical question with respect to many of the amendments that the Government have brought forward, which, by and large, we support. I want to deal with Amendment 49, the explanatory statement for which says:

“This amendment adds to the definition of ‘political processes’ the activities of groups such as all party parliamentary groups.”


I understand the bit about all-party groups but the implication there is in “such as”. Are the Government saying that the amendment is relevant to other groups? If so, can the Minister explain that to us?

With that, as I say, I very much support Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, because it is very important.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group.

I will start, if I may, by addressing the question from the noble Lord, Lord West, by repeating something that I said in my opening speech; I think it goes some way to answering him. The majority of what we wish to capture in relation to interference with Parliament will be covered by the effect in Clause 14(1)(b)—the limb relating to public functions—as MPs and other officials in Parliament will be exercising their public functions. It is right that we seek to criminalise activity where, for example, somebody is acting for a foreign power and threatens violence to affect how a person exercises their public functions. I hope that answers his question.

In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about Amendment 49, let me say that he is completely right. The reference to

“the activities of an informal group”

in this amendment is, as I think noble Lords know, designed to capture interference activities in APPGs by foreign powers. We are seeking to capture interference whether or however any person participates in the activities of these informal groups. We expect that to cover MPs and people external to Parliament and government who participate in the actions of such groups, but we also envisage informal groups to include things such as “friends of” groups. The use of the term “acting in that capacity” ensures that we do not capture things such as parliamentary book clubs but instead focus on those caught, such as the 1922 Committee, although they could also be covered by the public functions limb of the test. I hope that clears this up.

I know that Amendment 51 is a duplicate of a previous amendment, now tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. The Government do not believe that this amendment is necessary, I am afraid. I was going to quote myself and say again that UK electoral law already sets out a stringent regime of controls, but I am slightly more reluctant to do so after hearing the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Evans. However, we believe that our regime ensures that only those with a genuine interest in UK elections can make political donations and that political donations are transparent.

I will go into more detail on this point, if I may, because I believe that the noble Lord’s ethical matrix is already in existence. It is already an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly being involved in an arrangement to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. This provides a safeguard against impermissible donations via the back door. Political parties must already report all donations over a certain value to the Electoral Commission; these are then published online for public scrutiny. Political parties are by law required to undertake reasonable steps to verify whether a donor is permissible and obtain their relevant details for the reporting requirements. Donations that do not meet the permissibility tests or are unidentifiable must be reported and returned to the Electoral Commission, which also produces guidance outlining how the recipient of a donation can undertake these checks.

As I say, UK electoral law already sets out a regime of donation and spending controls to safeguard the integrity of our democratic processes, so only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations; they include UK-registered electors, UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities, as well as otherwise eligible donors such as Irish citizens who meet prescribed conditions and can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. Parties and other campaigners are prohibited from accepting donations that are not from a permissible or identifiable donor. The failure to return such a donation either to the donor or, as I just described, to the Electoral Commission within 30 days of receipt is an offence; any such donations must also be reported to the Electoral Commission. The Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.

The transparency of electoral funding is obviously a key cornerstone of the UK’s electoral system. All political parties recognise that third-party campaigners and candidates must record their election spending and report it to the Electoral Commission or their local returning officer; that information is publicly available. For transparency, all donations to political parties and campaigners must be recorded and certain donations must be reported to the Electoral Commission; as I said, these include donations from impermissible donors and donations from the same permissible source that amount to over £7,500 in one calendar year. To ensure transparency, donation reports are published online by the commission for public scrutiny.

To register as an overseas elector, a British citizen has to present ID. However, it is a long-standing principle first introduced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1998 that, if you are eligible to vote for a party in an election, you are also eligible to donate to that party. We believe that overseas electors are important participants in our democracy, but it is only right that they should be able to spend in UK elections in the same way as other UK citizens registered on the electoral roll.

I think that this is a reasonably comprehensive set of rules. There may be some debate as to whether it qualifies as a stringent regime but the fact is that donations to political parties from foreign powers, whether they are made directly or through an intermediary, are illegal. Political parties already have a legal duty to check that all donations they are offered are permissible.

In closing, I very much thank noble Lords for engaging so constructively in this debate. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, not to press his amendment in this group and ask noble Lords to support the Government’s amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I understand that our order of business has been changed today. The Government Whip did not consult our Front Bench and, for those of us who had engagements during the dinner-break business, I think it is a discourtesy not to have at least consulted the Front Benches of other parties about changing the order of business.

That said, I welcome the government’s amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is absolutely right. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, had indicated her hope that there would be government amendment in this area, and I thank the Minister for listening during Committee and for bringing forward these amendments. In Committee, I went to some lengths to outline what domestic procedures are in this area. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, asked something I thought was rather threatening: if she could have a quiet word with me outside the Chamber during the hour for other business we had then. I am glad to say now that I will accept that and bring the Minister with me, because there may be an element of consensus on a more sensible way of dealing with concerns raised about immunity for, potentially, very serious crimes committed overseas.

I am grateful that the domestic practices will now be considered similar to extraterritorial processes, acknowledging that there have been distinct differences. My questions, to some extent, are linked with those raised by the noble Lord, Lord West, on how this will be operated. In Committee, I highlighted the Government’s Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees. I referenced the Ministry of Defence joint doctrine publications, and I highlighted the Security Service guidelines that had been released in a trial, and we now know more about them. There are a number of existing sets of guidance for the Cabinet Office, from the MoD and within the security services themselves on how, as the amendment states,

“arrangements designed to ensure that acts of a member of the service to which a provision of Schedule 4 applies are necessary”.

I would be grateful if the Minister could outline how guidance will be put together that will be for both domestic activities and now those in regard to defence under this part, whether that will be made public, and how it will interact with MoD guidance to address the similar concerns of my noble friend Lord Beith and the noble Lord, Lord West.

We know what MoD joint doctrine says regarding detainees overseas, but we do not know the principles that will apply to these new areas. Therefore, we need clarification on what they will be. I welcome the Government’s move. There needs to be further illustration of how it will be operable, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide that and give an indication of when guidance will be put together and will be published.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a really important debate. Government Amendment 66 is a considerable improvement on what we had before, with respect to Clause 30. We have heard from noble Lords about their belief in that and their pleasure that we now see Amendment 66 before us. As my noble friend Lord West—I will come back to him—the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, and others have mentioned, there are still questions that the Government need to answer. I very much look forward to the Minister’s response, particularly to my noble friend Lord West, who very effectively laid out the fact that although the ISC welcomes the new clause proposed by Amendment 66, there are still some important questions for the Government. It is extremely important that the Government put their answers on the record, so they are there as testimony of what the Government expect of how the new Clause 30—as it will be—will operate.

The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the inclusion of the Armed Forces in this deserves a proper answer from the Minister. It is good to see the Armed Forces Minister here to have heard the noble Lord.

My noble friend Lord West laid before us how we got here, the relationship between the Home Office and the ISC, and the lack of a speedy response to some of the requests, which have led to some of the difficulties we have seen. If people had attended the committee, spoken to the committee and discussed with the committee —even if some of those discussions may have been difficult—some of these problems would have been resolved. Yet we have debate in the other place, debate here, and now it is only on Report that we get to a position where we seem to be on the verge of achieving what we all want.

I go back to a point I find quite astonishing, referring to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s annual report. My noble friend Lord West pointed to the lack of Home Office response. I lay this before each and every one of you: when do noble Lords think was the last time the Prime Minister went along? Do not answer that—there is no need to shout out. It is quite astonishing to read in the annual report that, despite repeated requests, no Prime Minister has been to the Intelligence and Security Committee since 2014. That is absolutely disgraceful. The committee was set up by this Parliament to oversee intelligence and security matters and to receive intelligence at a level we cannot be briefed on—quite rightly—and, despite repeated requests, the Prime Minister has not gone. How can a Prime Minister not go to the committee set up by Parliament to discuss matters of intelligence? I find it incredible.

A few weeks ago, I asked the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, why this has not happened. The Government say, “The Prime Minister has been very busy over the last few weeks”, and he has been; he has been not just to Belfast but to numerous other places, including Parliament, to meet various groups. Why has it not been possible to meet the Intelligence and Security Committee? This is incredibly serious.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I put it to the noble Lord that this is not a formality. The point of the Prime Minister meeting the committee is that it can draw attention to failings or problems that it cannot publicly disclose. The only route by which those failings or problems can be brought to account is by direct contact with the Prime Minister.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I could not agree more with the noble Lord, and that is why it is so incredible that no Prime Minister has discussed that with the committee since 2014. I say this in relation to my noble friend Lord West’s points about the failure of discussion and people’s failure to involve the committee at an early stage. Had that been done, we would have avoided much of the debate and controversy over Clause 30 or, now, government Amendment 66. My noble friend Lord West mentioned this on behalf of the committee, and I mentioned and highlighted yet again the failure of the Prime Minister to meet it since 2014, which is simply and utterly unacceptable. Something needs to be done about it, and the Prime Minister needs to hear this—I know that the Minister will take this forward.

This is a really serious matter. I could not believe it when I read it, and I do not believe that many noble Lords here would either, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, reminded us. According to the report, this was a regular occurrence:

“Since its establishment in 1994, and for 20 years thereafter, the Committee met annually with the Prime Minister to discuss its work”.


But, despite repeated requests for suitable dates, we are yet to receive a response. This is unacceptable, and it is why we get the sort of situation that we had with Clause 30.

Notwithstanding that, I thank the noble Lord the Minister and the Armed Forces Minister for their engagement in bringing forward Amendment 66, which is a considerable improvement on what went before. I note the change from automatic exemption to the reasonableness defence. No doubt the Minister can address the issues and questions that my noble friend Lord West raised on proportionality and other areas. It is important that the point of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is also addressed. With that, we welcome Amendment 66, but we also look forward to the reassurances that my noble friend Lord West seeks on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke in this debate on Clause 30, the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment. Before getting into the detail, I very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord West, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Purvis, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for their amendments tabled in advance of today’s proceedings. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, who have consistently shared their time and expertise with me and my team, across a range of national security matters.

I also extend my gratitude to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which recently took the time to write to the Home Office on this measure and cast a keen and critical eye, with officials, over the Government’s amendment tabled for today. I carefully noted the comments of the noble Lord, Lord West, as did my right honourable friend the Security Minister, who sat on the steps when he made them. I will obviously make sure that we reflect on that internally. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that my noble friend the Leader of the House heard his comments, and I am sure he will reflect them back to the Prime Minister, but I am not responsible for the Prime Minister’s diary, so I cannot go further than that at this point. However, we will return to this subject in group 12, when the ISC MoU will be debated.

The Government’s shift in approach on the SCA amendment reflects our maintained commitment to ensuring that individuals working for UKIC and the Armed Forces are protected when conducting their proper activities in service to this country. The Government’s amendment replaces Clause 30 with a new clause that provides a defence for acts that are offences under Part 2 of the SCA by virtue of the extraterritorial provisions in Schedule 4. This defence would apply to those carrying out the functions of UKIC and the Armed Forces in supporting activities overseas; that is, it will be a defence for a person to show that their act was necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence service or the Armed Forces. I will shortly go into more detail on the Armed Forces, at the behest of my noble friend from the Ministry of Defence, so please bear with me.

As noble Lords will be aware, the current reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA would cover encouraging or assisting crimes domestically. We believe that it is right that this new defence is limited to where UKIC and the Armed Forces are supporting activity overseas. The territorial applicability of this measure is identical to that of the original clause. This is because the acute issue caused by the SCA offences, and therefore justification for this amendment as presented to the ISC, relates to support to key international partners’ activity overseas.

The defence provides UKIC and the Armed Forces with more reassurance than the current reasonableness defence, in that the defence is based around the proper exercise of the functions of UKIC and the Armed Forces, rather than the more subjective requirement of proving “reasonableness”. We must remember that the tasks we ask these individuals to undertake, and the operational arrangements we have with our international partners, are ever more complex.

We still do not think it is appropriate that a potentially junior member of the agency or Armed Forces should be faced with the legal burden of proving that their activities were reasonable. Instead, the new defence imposes an evidential burden of proof on the individual to raise the defence. Once the defence has been raised, the legal burden would be on the prosecution to disprove it. It must be remembered that this amendment does not change the position for an individual who acts outside of those proper functions; they would remain liable for any wrongful acts. I believe that this strikes the right balance of providing appropriate protection while also having a clear route by which there can be proper legal consideration of any potential wrongdoing.

Noble Lords will now see an explicit responsibility on the heads of agencies and the Defence Council to ensure that their respective organisations have in place arrangements designed to ensure that acts of a member of their service that would otherwise be an offence under the SCA by virtue of Schedule 4 are necessary for the proper exercise of their functions. To be clear, that means that an act could not be considered within the “proper” exercise of a function of an intelligence service if it does not comply with the “arrangements” set by the relevant heads or the Defence Council.

In addition, the Government propose that there is ministerial responsibility for these arrangements; that is, the relevant Secretary of State must consider that the arrangements put in place by the heads of agencies and the Defence Council are satisfactory. Nothing in this proposed defence will change the current compliance and oversight arrangements, such as the Fulford principles and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidance, which is monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—

Code of Practice for the Forensic Science Regulator

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Monday 27th February 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, warmly welcome this code of practice. As the Minister so eloquently pointed out, we have one of the best five forensic science services in the world and have made enormous strides in getting forensic science set on a course of absolute science, rather than old wives’ tales or police lore. That is a huge step forward, which this country has been instrumental in taking.

However, it is right to say that there have been several serious miscarriages of justice—I have sat on several of them—where forensic scientists have not behaved with competence or integrity or have gone beyond what they are qualified to speak about. I therefore warmly welcome the work of the two non-statutory regulators, Andrew Rennison and Dr Gillian Tully, and now the statutory regulator, Mr Gary Pugh, in all they have done to try to eliminate the problems that have caused difficulties in such cases.

The noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, has spoken eloquently about accreditation, which is key. Also key is the fact that, within organisations, there must be a senior appointed individual who can be made responsible for lapses that occur. I regard as the most important part of the code the part that sets out standards of impartiality and integrity. As I have said, there have been cases where this has not always been so. Much to my regret, in some cases, there has been a lack of professionalism. One must remember that forensic scientists are often put under a great deal of pressure; standards of integrity to resist pressure, particularly from police officers who are anxious to secure a conviction, are therefore essential. The record of what has happened is well known so I need not go into it.

Secondly, it is important to stress the duty of the court. Thirdly, I very warmly welcome—it may be due to Mr Gary Pugh’s personal integrity and experience—the duty to guard against miscarriages of justice.

It is also important that the code goes into detail. There have been serious problems in relation to footwear analysis, DNA and fingerprinting, and it is good to see those now firmly covered by standards. There has also been worry about the way evaluative opinions have been formed. Many experts—not merely forensic experts—stray outside their sphere of expertise and seek to act more as advocates than as independent experts, relying on matters to which the code refers. I am very glad, therefore, that there is a firm steer for evaluative opinions.

The strength of the code can be seen by the fact that it deals with infrequently consulted experts, making it clear that, although they are not subject to accreditation, they must abide the standards of the court. It is surprising to see the spheres in which expert evidence is often needed, and from people who will never have given expert evidence before, or where the court may never have had expert evidence. Therefore I see this as a landmark in trying to make certain that we buttress our outstanding reputation as a nation in forensic science and strengthen that position for the future.

I will ask two questions of the Minister. First, what is to be done to ensure that the code is publicised and enforced? Secondly—I have spoken on this on many occasions—is the Home Office really getting to grips with other issues in forensic science and taking forward the need to keep forensic science ahead of the game, particularly in digital forensics?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl and the noble and learned Lord who have contributed to this important if short debate. They said that this is an extremely important step forward by the Government, and we welcome it as well.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his introduction. I also thank my friend in the other place, Darren Jones MP, and indeed my colleague and noble friend Lord Kennedy, who would be most upset if I did not mention that he was part of the Private Member’s Bill effort which became the Forensic Science Regulator Act in 2001. That was an important step forward and shows how sometimes Private Members’ Bills can make a real difference. As noble Lords realise, the Act required the regulator to produce a statutory code of practice so that all those doing forensic science activities uphold and maintain proper standards, which both the noble Earl and the noble and learned Lord said is so important, and which indeed many forensic scientists do.

This statutory instrument is the new code of practice. It builds upon non-statutory codes of practice and integrates much of their content. Upholding good forensic science standards is absolutely vital to our criminal justice system. The code applies to all those carrying out forensic science activities: individual practitioners, academics, private and public sector organisations, or indeed forensic science units.

With those general comments I have a few questions for the Minister. A report by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services showed that, when it came to digital forensics, the police have not kept pace with the scale of the challenges they face. The report said that, in some cases, they simply did not understand what digital forensics meant. It found, in the words of the inspectorate,

“delays … so egregious that victims were being failed”.

Could the Minister give us any indication of what progress has been made following the recommendations of that report?

The Home Office also considered an impact assessment on the Forensic Science Regulator in 2013, but it has not been updated since. With this new regulator and statutory code, has an internal impact assessment from 2021 been made? There was a deadline of October 2022 for all police laboratories to be accredited. Can the Minister give an update on whether that target was reached?

Plymouth Shootings

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Government for the Statement in Parliament yesterday. In anticipation of what the Minister will say, I thank him in advance for the measured remarks he will no doubt make.

This is a shocking Statement. We should mourn the killing of five innocent people: Maxine Davison, Sophie Martyn—who was a three year-old child—Lee Martyn, Stephen Washington and Kate Shepherd. Two others were wounded. Our thoughts go out once again to the friends and families of the victims and to the whole community in Keyham, the rest of Plymouth and beyond at this shocking incident.

The inquest jurors’ conclusions were damning, as indeed were the findings of the Independent Office for Police Conduct. There was a catastrophic failure at Devon and Cornwall Police in the individual decisions taken and the appalling lack of supervision, training and oversight. What action are the Government taking to ensure that the issues at Devon and Cornwall Police are corrected—although tragically too late for those killed and their families?

After the shocking incident in Dunblane, firearms units were supposed to be given as much training and guidance as possible, yet Devon and Cornwall Police had no formal training for two decades. The firearms licensing supervisor told the court that he had done a two-day training course in 1998 but nothing more until 2020. How on earth did that happen? Is the Minister certain that all firearms licensing units across the country are properly trained and fully up to date with the latest guidance? The last HMICFRS inspection on firearms was eight years ago in 2015. Welcome though it is that the next one is in 2024-25, why is it not happening immediately—particularly in the light of the inquest jury reporting its findings into this horrific incident? Why is there any wait at all?

The childhood and teenage history of the killer, Jake Davison, should have triggered far more questions and expert advice. The mental health marker is finally being introduced, but why is it in statutory guidance and not a legal duty? Is the Minister aware of calls by the new chief constable of Devon and Cornwall Police for legislation on firearms licensing? Do the Government agree with that?

The perpetrator, Jake Davison, was an incel. These malign online influences on young men in particular have been overlooked for too long. In the past year, there were 77 referrals to Prevent for incels and 154 referrals for potentially planning or thinking about a school massacre. Is the Minister aware whether there is a flag on the Prevent systems to notify police if someone referred to Prevent has a gun licence?

It has been reported in the press today that thousands of gun owners have had their licences renewed without fresh vetting because of long backlogs. How big is this backlog nationally and what are the Government doing about it? It was further reported in the Times yesterday that temporary licences of up to 12 months have been approved without enhanced background checks and that several police forces have automatically extended licences rather than go through the laborious process of a five-year renewal because their firearms departments are in disarray. This cannot be right, either for legitimate gun owners or for public protection. Is the Minister aware of the article and, if not, will he look into it? It also includes an estimate by the British Association for Shooting and Conservation that there are some 24,000 new shooters waiting to get their certificates. This is not good, either for legitimate gun owners or public protection. As we saw in the awful events in Plymouth, the firearms licensing system has to function smoothly and effectively to protect us all.

As the Minister in the other place said—and I know our Minister will—we want to act to ensure that our controls on firearms are as robust as possible. The terrible events in Keyham and the equally horrific events in Skye in Scotland remind us all of the need to learn any lessons and act as speedily as possible. Nothing else will do, will it?

Public Order Bill

Lord Coaker Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 21st February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and his Bill team for listening to at least some of the concerns noble Lords have raised, and for the way in which they have responded to them. When similar restrictions on protests were considered by this House in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, the Government were defeated on 14 occasions. This time, the Government were defeated eight times, but that was only because we did not feel there was enough time to vote against other measures that we were very concerned about. However, I thank the Minister and his team. I thank Elizabeth Plummer in the Liberal Democrat Whips’ Office, who has supported me throughout. I thank His Majesty’s loyal Opposition for the constructive way in which noble Lords of the Labour Party have worked together with us to ensure that the democratic right to protest has been maintained.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with some brief remarks. I very much thank the Minister, his colleagues on the Government Front Bench and the Bill team for their help and time during the passage of the Bill—including today’s clarificatory amendments which the Minister brought forward. It is an example of how this can and should be done, even when there are genuine disagreement between us. The briefings and discussions we had helped inform debate and, I hope, have led to better legislation—which is indeed what we all want. I thank the Minister very much for that; it is much appreciated.

I thank my noble friend Lord Ponsonby for his support and important contributions. I say to the Chamber that he brings a calmness to my more excitable character, which is extremely helpful. In thanking him, I also thank our office for its support, and in particular, over the last few weeks, Liz Cronin. I thank many of my noble friends for their contributions to this debate, particularly my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and his colleagues, and I thank him for the remarks he just made. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for the contributions she has made, and a number of Cross-Benchers—including the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who has been mentioned, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others.

To those very senior former judges, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, I say that I very much appreciated my crash course in the law; I hope that I have appeared to know what I am talking about, which is always a start. The interventions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and those of many of the other senior judiciary members who we have here, make a huge contribution to the difficult debates that we have, even where we disagree between ourselves. This is an extremely important Bill and the debate will no doubt continue as it returns to the other place for its consideration of our changes.

I want to emphasise—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, mentioned this—that the debates here and the changes made reflect a genuine attempt to address where the line should be drawn between the right to protest and the right of others to go about their daily lives. It was not about those supporting a law-abiding majority and those putting the rights of protestors first. Across the world, democracy and the right to protest are non-existent or under threat. In our great democracy, tensions arise and anger around protests can sometimes, quite rightly, provoke public outrage. In seeking to deal with that, however, we must not, even inadvertently, damage freedoms that we all cherish.

I hope that the other place will reflect carefully not only on the actual amendments that we have made but on the debates that took place around them. They were debates, yes, on how we deal with the challenges emerging particularly from recent protests but also, crucially, on maintaining the democratic traditions of which we are all so rightly proud.

Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Prostitution

Lord Coaker Excerpts

Tuesday 21st February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think that the noble and learned Baroness is absolutely right; it is something we need to be aware of. Again, a lot of this comes down to reducing demand for sexual services. It is worth point out that the improved guidance has highlighted that Section 53A of the Sexual Offences Act makes it illegal to pay for the sexual services of a prostitute subjected to

“force, threats … or any other form of coercion, or … deception.”

That is a strict liability offence, meaning that it is not a valid defence that the defendant did not know that the prostitute had been subject to force or coercion. That should probably be more widely known.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister has already mentioned the Government’s own report from the University of Bristol published in 2019, which said that “a substantial proportion” of women engaging in sex work did so for financial reasons, with the decision often influenced by

“caring responsibilities, … lack of access to … benefits and support services”,

and lack of access to health services. From the Minister’s responses to previous questions, it is clear that, since 2019, the Government have not done anything—or have they? If so, can he tell us what it is?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as I tried to explain earlier, part of the problem is that the gathering of evidence to support any particular course of action is proving very difficult. The 2019 review conducted by the University of Bristol had the strengthening of the evidence base as one of its remits, which was one of the Select Committee’s recommendations. But the nature of prostitution makes it very difficult to estimate the prevalence accurately, and the research was unable to identify a single estimate. The nature of this work is evolving and changes completely, and has done over time.