Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Thursday 17th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I rise with some temerity to disagree with the views expressed from the Benches opposite, but it seems to me, as a matter of principle, that when the Government and the Parliament of the United Kingdom consider how to introduce legislation consistent with a decision of the European Court of Justice, it is the substance of what the Government and the Parliament of the United Kingdom are providing which is important. It should not be necessary, and it would not be a healthy precedent, if Parliament took the view that every time we had to amend our legislation in order to comply with a judgment of the European Court of Justice, it was incumbent upon us to adopt language identical to that found in the judgment. So there is at least the vestige of a point of principle here, and that point of principle leads me to support the view expressed by the Minister.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, I support what has just been said by my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne. I speak not as a judge but as someone who has drafted many skeleton arguments to take before senior courts, and given a phrase such as “strictly necessary”, I would spend my time in preparing a case by looking for authorities decided by the courts in which there was a difference between the terms “necessary” and “strictly necessary”. I have spent some time doing so this morning, and I have failed to find such a case so far—although of course I will defer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, if he can find one for me. Judges are often so much better informed than those who appear before them, and I feel a little as if I am in that situation now.

However, speaking for those of us who are paid, sometimes a great deal of money, to create a difference where none exists between a phrase such as “strictly necessary” and the mere word “necessary”, I would say to the Minister: please avoid tautology. It is expensive, and not terribly helpful.

[Lord West of Spithead]

My Lords, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Howard, is important, and I accept it. There is a danger of raising a precedent here. On a point of clarity for a simple sailor, may I ask: if an amendment is taken today, is there a mechanism within this urgent high-speed way in which we are doing things to get the change back to the Commons to get it sorted out, or are we talking in a vacuum, because nothing has been organised to achieve that?

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I join those who urge my noble friend not to be attracted by the arguments presented this afternoon for reducing the time available for the full consideration of these matters. I also join those who thank him for the assistance we have been given in the letter that was sent this morning to some, and possibly all, of us who are present. I also thank his officials who put up with some pestering telephone calls this morning, certainly from me.

I remind your Lordships that the sunset provision does not provide for revival of this legislation by statutory instrument. The sunset provision ensures that the legislation falls completely on 31 December 2016. We therefore have to allow due and proper time for consideration of these matters.

I join the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, in what he said. I am sure that the House was very pleased to hear that he is a member of the RUSI panel that has been put together with some difficulty and over considerable time at the behest of the Deputy Prime Minister. As I understand it, the panel will consider a substantial amount of evidence, not just from within the United Kingdom. It will be making comparisons with other jurisdictions, and the range of talents on the panel goes right across the disciplines that deal with this issue. We have to allow time for the RUSI panel to do its work.

A number of other reviews are also taking place. Shortening the timescale for the new legislation would undermine the extremely important review of RIPA, which will be a thorough and systematic review of the Act. Let us not forget that completely new legislation has to be in place before the end of 2016. We know in this House that, very properly, that legislation will be the subject of detailed debate. We know that some of my noble friends—I am looking at my noble friend Lord Strasburger who quite properly will be one of those—will put down amendments that will challenge some of the thinking behind the legislation that will be presented. That legislation will take some months to go through this House and we must be ready for it with reviews that have really looked at every issue.

Perhaps I can be forgiven for using a couple of words of Latin, which would probably be deprecated by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, if he were sitting in court. I am pleased to see that he is shaking his head. Perhaps this is the time when we should—

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I come from Scotland where Latin is still spoken by lawyers. We did not adopt the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. I am very happy to listen to Latin words—and perhaps I will understand them as well.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Not so long ago, I went to Cranston’s tea rooms in Glasgow and tried to order some lunch. Plainly it was because Latin was being spoken that I had such difficulty. What I was going to say, using two words of Latin, was that perhaps this is a time when we should festina lente.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Wednesday 16th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, like most noble Lords who have spoken, I support the Second Reading of the Bill on the understanding that its purpose is to preserve evidence of a kind that is currently available to the courts. Indeed, I congratulate the Government on their declared intention to increase the safeguards over the use of communications data, though I shall have something to say about safeguards a little later.

I am concerned that some near-hysterical misinformation has appeared in the media in relation to the use of the data concerned. The canard has been sold—I think that is what you do with canards—wholesale that the Bill is directed mainly, even exclusively, at terrorism. That this is not so is demonstrated by one statistic from the Crown Prosecution Service—my noble friend Lord Macdonald adverted to this—which is that 95% of its serious and organised crime cases include evidence of this kind as part of the proof against the accused, and sometimes it is the crucial proof. There is a necessity to ensure that such crucial evidence remains available and, of course, it is important that service providers know what the law is and where they stand.

All that said, I have three reservations with which I hope the Minister can assist the House. They have grown over the days since the Bill was announced, particularly on reading yesterday’s debate in another place. The first is my concern about the case for urgency. I, too, noticed the observations and reservations of the Constitution Committee, which were published this afternoon. The reasons given by the Home Secretary in the other place on 10 July and yesterday were, I am afraid, far from convincing. I have spent most of the past 15 years trying very hard to disagree with David Davis on almost everything, and he has been trying equally hard to disagree with me, but on this subject I agree with him. I also particularly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who brings to this discussion all his experience of the workings of government. I can see that a shortened period for this legislation might have been necessary, but one day in the Commons and two here just are not sufficient for legislation of this importance. Indeed, with a proper period, the new safeguards could have been included in the Bill and could therefore have been part of a holistic package, as opposed to a less than holy promise. There is absolutely no evidence that I have seen that this Bill could not have been introduced a month ago, and given that we are sitting until, I understand, 30 July, there is no reason why the Bill could not have been given some more days for proper debate in Committee. Indeed, as a veteran of dealing with the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 when I was independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, I remind your Lordships that Ministers who introduce legislation in haste are later left to repent it in panic.

I now turn to my second reservation. Nothing more than a summary of the intended future safeguards is available. That is hardly a reassuring position. As I understand it, there has been precious little consultation about them outside Parliament. Will the Minister tell your Lordships who outside Parliament has been consulted formally on the safeguards? One of the things that were announced yesterday was the abolition of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who is currently the brilliant David Anderson QC. We have heard much entirely justified praise of him in this debate, but he is being abolished. Can we have an explanation of why? Will the Minister please tell the House when Mr Anderson himself was first informed of the intended abolition of his post? How much earlier than yesterday was it? How long was he given to respond to the proposal? What arrangements exist for a full and proper consultation on the proposal to abolish the independent reviewer, who has the advantages just mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws? Why does the Minister believe that the replacement of the independent reviewer with a committee or board will strengthen the scrutiny of issues, subject to limitations that are necessarily dictated by national security?

I turn to my third concern, which is about the terms of reference of the proposed, so-called independent privacy and civil liberties board. The first thing I say to my noble friend is: let us be honest about what this board is. It is the counterterrorism oversight board, and we would do well to adopt the title used in the United States so that it is what it says on the tin, as it were. I ask my noble friend to answer these questions. Was Mr Anderson consulted about the terms of reference for that board, which have been published today? If he was, were any of his comments rejected as part of the terms of reference, and if so, which ones? I am sure that the Minister will have information at his fingertips within minutes. In particular, there is the crucial question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. Will members of the board enjoy developed vetted access to be able fully to scrutinise counterterrorism activity by the services? It is crucial that, if his post is abolished, someone should have that access. It is important to have a positive assurance of that, otherwise what has been announced is a seriously retrograde step in terms of scrutiny.

Mr Anderson, and, indeed, I before him, spent more than 100 days a year up to now as independent reviewer. At the worst time, after 2005, in one year I spent 144 days, I think, as independent reviewer. It was certainly more than 140 days. Will the members of this board be expected to give, and will they be paid for, the 100-plus days per year that independent reviewers of terrorism legislation have given in every single year since 2001? Can we be assured—I speak here of David Anderson, not of myself—that the people on this board will be of such a quality that they are able to scrutinise such matters using their past analytical experience? It is not something you can just walk into out of some other discipline.

I notice that one of the aims is expressed in the terms of reference, rather oddly, as being to:

“Provide public assurance that the current arrangements ensure”,

satisfactory regard to, “privacy and civil liberties”. May we at least have an assurance that the words “or otherwise” will be added so that the mission is not just to ensure that the Government are doing the right thing, but to be able to state clearly when they may be doing the wrong thing?

Also, can the Minister assure us that the current requirement for an annual review of all sensitive counterterrorism legislation will be part of the terms of reference of this board if the independent reviewer is abolished? That is something that happens now and it has proved peculiarly useful. My suggestion to your Lordships would be that if the Government wish to create this board—and, as I said at the beginning of these comments, I am very much in favour of increased safeguards—alongside that they should continue to have the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and he can usefully chair the board as well. It might involve more than 140 days, but I am sure somebody could be found to do it because it is an extremely interesting and intellectually rewarding task.

I apologise for taking up more than the average time in this debate, but the points I have sought to make are all, in my view, important ones that we could and should include in legislative scrutiny, were we to have a more normal timeframe. In the absence of that, I invite the Minister to respond to the questions I have just raised.

Ibrahim Magag: Disappearance

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Tuesday 8th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I hope that I have just given the noble Lord an indication of the way we think about these matters. It is too soon to say whether lessons can be learnt. The most important thing is to ascertain the whereabouts of this person and to apprehend him.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Will the Minister accept that the fact that Mr Magag did not abscond while subject to a judicially approved relocation order, and that he absconded when that was removed, is in itself clear evidence of the poor decision to remove relocation orders? Will he also acknowledge that nobody absconded while subject to a relocation order, and that there were no absconds at all during the last four and a half years of control orders?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Again, the noble Lord speaks with a great deal of experience on this issue. I note the point that he makes, but I have given my answer and I hope that noble Lords will accept it.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to say a few words on this amendment, mainly because I always listen with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. His knowledge of parliamentary procedure is second to none and he is probably the most skilful of anyone I have observed in what one might call the parliamentary maze. However, I disagree with his proposal that there should be a Select Committee for the following and other reasons.

First, intelligence is not created in a vacuum but for a reason. Sometimes it is found to be created for a reason that proves to be suspect but not necessarily to be followed. It is not completely free of scrutiny; far from it. A little later in the Bill there are references to the Intelligence Services Commissioner. I am bound to say—I said this before when I was independent reviewer of terrorism legislation—that the Government and the security services could give a more coherent and fuller narrative of what they do. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. She started the process in a convincing way of giving at least some narrative that enabled not only the public but, perhaps more importantly, parliamentarians in the first instance to understand why certain things were being done and certain actions taken. It is subject to oversight and it is necessarily subject to confidentiality. Accountability is very important but we have to face up to the fact that full transparency can never be achieved, and indeed should never be achieved for it runs the risk of exposing those who do very difficult tasks for our intelligence service to risks to which we would not wish them to be exposed.

Furthermore, a Select Committee of either the other place or both Houses involves the normal Select Committee procedures. It is very difficult to limit those procedures because Parliament makes its own rules. Those of us such as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, a number of others present and me—derided as we are by some for having been in the House of Commons before coming here—know something that possibly not everyone else knows, which is that Erskine May is not like a legal textbook. The rules of parliamentary procedure are often made up as you go along and one cannot anticipate clearly what they will be. Sometimes the mood of the nation changes those rules. Think back to what happened in London on 7 July 2005 to see the emotion that followed those events and how easy it would have been for parliamentary procedure to have been changed, either to make a Select Committee much more secretive in its approach— inappropriately so perhaps—or to go the other way and open up everything to public scrutiny.

If Members of this House or another place are appointed to Select Committees by the normal route, it exposes much of what is given to them to their staff. The Government should be entitled to look at the ability of the proposed members of a committee to retain and hold to confidential material and the reliability of their staff. The one thing one cannot afford in this area is inadvertent leaks or the innocently meant, but foolish, acts of the unwise.

What the Government propose in this Bill is, in my judgment, appropriate. We have a committee that is accountable but not wholly transparent for perfectly good reasons. It has the capacity to look at secrets in detail but within an appropriate context—as limited, for example, by Clause 2(3), which means that the Prime Minister and the ISC must be satisfied as to the part that anything that might be inquired into plays in any ongoing national security operation.

My judgment, for what it is worth, is that what the Government propose in this Bill creates a prudent and carefully thought-out structure for the proper and rigorous scrutiny of how secret material is dealt with by Her Majesty’s Government. There is a danger that we play into the hands of those who believe that because something is secret there is some kind of ghastly Executive conspiracy going on. That is completely untrue. Of course, mistakes are made; there are people in the secret services who have to delve into the most difficult things that face our society, and they are bound to make mistakes. I hope that occasionally they do make the odd mistake in the protection of the public, because overcaution is not a bad thing if it saves lives—sometimes large numbers of lives. But the menu provided in this Bill allows the proper balance, and I shall, if necessary, not support the noble Lord’s amendment.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

The noble Lord has great experience in these areas, and I take it from the tenor of his argument that he is not advocating a Select Committee approach. He said that he was in favour of what the Government have in the Bill, but since then the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, have produced amendments. What is his view on those?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

At the moment I am dealing with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I listened with great care to my noble friend Lord Henley from the Front Bench, and I am very content with the approach that he has taken. We should wait and see what the Government come up with in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who has great wisdom and experience in these things—I am completely open-minded about that. But I am not happy with the idea that we should have a conventional Select Committee or, even worse, a Select Committee whose rules have been fiddled with for this purpose.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, like many Members I have been greatly impressed by the contribution made by the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Carlile. Both have the gift of being able to articulate their views with awesome clarity and very great force. If one had to, I should find it somewhat difficult to decide which one is correct in this matter. However, in respect of this debate and the earlier Amendments 1 and 2, it seems that everybody’s objectives point very much in the same direction.

In the first instance is the desire for sovereignty and independence for this particular body. By sovereignty one means that it is an organ, extension and delegation of Parliament, to such a degree that, as far as the Bill of Rights is concerned, it would be unchallengeable in the courts. I think that we are all agreed on that matter. At the same time, it has to be independent of the Executive and Prime Minister, which means that it should be, to use a canine expression, the watchdog of Parliament rather than the poodle of the Prime Minister. It is much easier to enunciate that principle than to work it out exactly because, by definition, the Prime Minister and to a large extent the Home Secretary has a constant flow of intelligence information, which will simply not be disseminated generally.

My other point relates to Select Committees. I listened carefully to the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, and believe that the concept of a Select Committee is sufficiently broad and flexible to allow a great deal to be done of the nature suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I would have thought that a Select Committee could always decide whether to sit in public or not and, if so, on exactly what terms. A Select Committee can decide whether a single word of its report is to be published or whether there is to be general publication, subject to sidelining. Sidelining, of course, can be a severe sanction. I will never forget the day, in about 1967, when I was a Member of the House of Commons and that flamboyant and splendid Member of Parliament Tam Dalyell was hauled before the House to answer a serious charge of contempt. It related to a Select Committee that was looking into the affairs of Porton Down, a most delicate situation as we all appreciate. There was an awesome hush; it was almost like a public flogging. There was the miscreant standing ashen-faced at the Bar of the House. It taught me a lesson about the tremendous and terrible jurisdiction that the House of Commons has, if it wishes to use it in a situation like that.

Where do we arrive? First, at a body that is not appointed by the Prime Minister; secondly, a body that is unchallengeable in the courts; and thirdly, a body—possibly a Select Committee—that is able to do its work with the confidence of the public, and yet able to maintain an absolute confidentiality which is so important to its very function.

Justice: Evidence

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Thursday 15th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am sure that the group will want to reflect on the implications of the judgment to which the noble and learned Lord referred in the European Court of Human Rights and to reflect on the remarks of the Lord Chief Justice when he said that the United Kingdom courts should give due weight to decisions from the European Court of Human Rights. However, the noble and learned Lord should recognise that experience in other countries, whether they are bound by the European Court of Human Rights or not, is that using intercept as evidence involves significant operational burdens, and that the review is helping to address those issues by trying to find the right balance between advantage, costs and risks.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Will my noble friend the Minister confirm that the Privy Council review has been looking at a very small number of possible models for admissibility and that the key issues, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said, concern the ECHR, upon which the review might perhaps take note of the recent and very helpful public comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine? Will the Minister try to ensure that, given that all the legwork has actually been done now, an announcement is made within weeks rather than months?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, it is not for me to decide when the Privy Council group should make its decisions. That must be a matter for the group itself. As I stressed at the beginning, there have been changes to the membership of that group, which has complicated matters and slowed things down somewhat. As I said, I am sure that the group will take account of the implications of the judgment in the European Court of Human Rights and of the views expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine.

Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2011

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Thursday 15th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords—

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, this has been a remarkable debate. I only wish that there had been a similar debate in the other place, but there was not. We have heard two former Lord Chancellors taking different views, and two members of the Bishop’s Bench taking opposite views, in the same debate. The remarkable fact is that there has also been substantial common ground in almost all the speeches that have been made. First, this is clearly a highly sensitive issue involving deep matters of principle. Secondly, churches that do not wish to register civil partnerships should not be obliged to do so, but conversely churches that do wish to do so should be allowed to do so. The Government have made a serious attempt in these regulations to put these matters into law. Today’s decision clearly depends on a judgment as to whether, after the proper consultation by the Government, they have succeeded in that aim.

I shall briefly give my own explanation of this. It is clear that, because of the exemption to the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England and the church in Wales, they have been largely satisfied that the safeguards are sufficient for them. It is also clear that there have been learned and weighty opinions on both sides of the argument. Professor Hill has been mentioned, as have Mr O’Neill and Mr Goulding. The advice of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, in his letter of 13 December, states that the lawyers appear to contradict one another.

For me the question is this: is there a doubt that the regulations have properly put into effect the views of the Government? If there is a doubt, is it a fanciful doubt or is it a serious doubt? Is there at the very least an arguable case that the Government have failed to provide adequate safeguards? The lawyers’ different views and the views expressed today suggest that there is a real, not a fanciful, doubt and the churches should not have to defend themselves against possible well resourced litigants.

I note the undertaking given by the Minister in his letter, which I have cited, that if, contrary to his view, there were to be a successful legal challenge, if one were to be brought, there would be an immediate review by government. That is welcome as far it goes, and I hope that in replying the Minister will put in his speech similar, or perhaps even stronger, undertakings. No Government can bind their successors and it is surely far better for the Government to end any possible doubt by taking these regulations back and by showing that there are amendments that close a possible loophole, thus preventing a serious legal challenge being made to them. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has suggested one way in which this should be done. Mr O’Neill has suggested another way. That is the reasonable response which the House should make today.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords—

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[Lord Lexden]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords—

[Lord Dannatt]

My Lords—

[Baroness Verma]

My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, could speak, we could then hear from the Labour Benches.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I was going to defer to my noble friend Lord Lester.

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[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I should say that I am not a learned Lord. Whether I am a noble Lord is another matter.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Just a busy one.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

If there is vexatious litigation, it should be struck out by the court as vexatious and nothing more should be done about it. What I am endeavouring to say—I am not doing very well because I am quoting from a detailed opinion, but I thought the House deserved to have that opinion before it because of the authority that it gives—is that the clarity provision was not necessary because a proper construction of the provisions of the Equality Act makes it absolutely clear that any discrimination claim, either about the provision of services or about the public sector duty, would be doomed to failure.

There is one further point. In the case of Pepper v Hart, the House of Lords in its judicial capacity held that, were there any ambiguity in legislation, one could have regard to the parliamentary record to resolve the ambiguity. Quite apart from Section 13 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to, I have no doubt that, were there any ambiguity—in my view, there is none whatever—then the Supreme Court and the lower courts would have regard to statements made by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, when she was leading for the previous Government, to the assurances given by the former Solicitor-General Vera Baird QC and to the statements that will be given shortly by my noble friend the Minister today. Those statements will all be one way. They will all indicate the true intention of the legislation. Therefore, were there to be any ambiguity, it would be resolved, if it had to be, judicially.

In my view, which is the same as that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, others who have spoken, the Church of England’s legal advisers and others, there is no conceivable doubt that a challenge would be hopeless. If, as a discrimination lawyer with 40 years’ experience, I were asked what my views would be about this, I would say, “You have not got a snowball’s chance in hell”.

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[Lord Collins of Highbury]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords—

[Lord Dannatt]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

My hope is that there will be a positive outcome from today’s debate, an outcome in which this House reasserts the consensus which I referred to at the beginning of my contribution. It is a consensus that respects the right of lesbian and gay people to celebrate their relationships and respects the right of churches and synagogues to undertake civil partnerships, reflecting their commitment to the inherent worth of a loving relationship between two people of the same sex. It respects the right of religious freedom but also my right, as a gay man, to celebrate my relationship with my husband on an equal footing in our civic society.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords—

[Lord Dannatt]

My Lords—

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[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, perhaps I might at this stage respond to some of the comments made around the House. I know that there is a feeling that we have had a learned and full debate and that, after my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew has spoken—I understand he will speak just briefly—at that stage we might invite the Leader of the Opposition to make her winding-up speech.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, if the opinion of the House is tested on this Motion to annul I shall be voting against the proposition of my noble friend Lady O’Cathain. I want to say at the outset of what I hope will be brief remarks that I am sure she knows that I have enormous respect for her. She and I have stood shoulder to shoulder on issues of conscience in this House and will do so again. However, I am bound to say that, in my view, this is about as far from an issue of conscience as we could get. This is a matter of law, essentially.

We have heard from some much more balletic legal minds than mine during the debate. Indeed, your Lordships may be under the impression that the head of the pin is extremely crowded. As my noble and, in some cases, noble and learned friends—and in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, my noble and very busy friend—dance on the head of that pin, you will have observed that there is barely room for the legal books they are using.

All I will say as one of the QCs in your Lordships’ House is that I think the arguments have been very powerfully put before your Lordships by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and I agree with them. I hope that your Lordships are not going to fall into the trap of deciding how to vote if there is a Division on the basis that, because some lawyers disagree, we are all going to throw our hands up in the air and leave it to someone else to decide. Let us never forget that we are in the high court of Parliament. With all the knowledge in this Chamber, I venture that your Lordships are well able to reach a decision on the basis of the arguments that have been presented—and the arguments are absolutely overwhelming.

During my 40-odd years at the Bar I have advised on issues and gone into, for example, the Court of Appeal with what I had thought was a very arguable case, and found myself metaphorically blood-spattered on the floor within minutes, if not seconds. The legal analyses that we have heard in your Lordships’ House have plainly left us with the opinion—the only responsible opinion—that there is no realistic possibility whatever of religious organisations or priests being forced in any way to do anything in this context which is against their conscience.

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[Lord Framlingham]

The noble Lord will appreciate that the debate today has been legalistic—because this is obviously what this Chamber does—but the ramifications outside the Chamber may not be legalistic. On the point that the noble Lord is making about allowing, will he agree that to allow, although it is not to encourage or force on people, can sometimes have that effect. That is my concern having seen that many Acts of Parliament have had effects that we were not aware of. I believe that if we are not careful, this one will bring the kind of pressure to bear on Church of England priests that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn has indicated.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I respectfully but absolutely reject the contention that has just been made. Indeed, it is somewhat similar to the contention made by my noble friend Lord Cormack, who spent a great number of years as a very distinguished Member of another place. He often had to wrestle between his principles and his interests, as all Members of Parliament do, and I doubt that he found it more difficult than any Church of England or other priest or other religious official would find it to stick to his conscience when his conscience told him what was right, particularly when supported by the institution to which he belongs.

Finally, my noble friend Lord Lester mentioned the decision of the House of Lords as a court in Pepper v Hart. That is the one matter that was omitted earlier and is of very great importance. In the event of somebody being prepared to take the financial risk of bringing what in reality would be a completely hopeless case before the courts, it is beyond peradventure that the statement that we know will be made by my noble friend Lord Henley from the Front Bench today, because we have been given a trail of it, would be cited in court and would be extremely influential in the determination of any ambiguity. I therefore respectfully suggest to your Lordships that we have actually taken a great deal of time today, albeit in a very interesting debate, in discussing something that is really not a problem at all.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, we have heard today some extraordinarily powerful and important speeches. When we were in government, one measure that we were most proud of, rightly I believe, was the Equality Act 2010, which we managed to pass through Parliament just before the general election. We did so with the support of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, then both in opposition. The parties opposite were consistent in their support for the legislation; I thanked them for it then and I thank them for it now, although I am concerned about a few aspects of the Act that are being chipped away. But that is not an issue for today.

When my noble friend Lord Alli moved his amendment and it was adopted by this House during the passage of the Bill, I was not able to fully support him. But I am delighted that his amendment was adopted and has resulted in the regulations before us today. The overriding point about the regulations and the legislative clause in the Act to which they refer is that, as so many noble Lords have said, they are permissive. They permit churches and any other religious premises to enable two people to register as civil partners of each other under the terms of Section 6(3A)(a) of the 2004 Act.

I warmly welcome so many speeches today, but especially the contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Richardson of Calow, who was absolutely right to point out very forcefully that the provisions are permissive. They do not in any way require churches to provide civil partnerships to take place. They do not order them to do so or compel them to do so; they simply make it possible for them to do so should they so wish.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, argues that the proposals are not sufficient to protect faith groups from being compelled to register civil partnerships when it is against their beliefs. The noble Baroness is supported by a number of legal opinions. However, we believe that the legislation itself is clear. Section 202(4) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that the following should be inserted after Section 6(3) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004:

“For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act places an obligation on religious organisations to host civil partnerships if they do not wish to do so”.

That expressly states the point—the wording is clear and the meaning is clear, and we believe that the effect is clear—and so do the regulations in front of us today, which state, in Regulation 2(3), that the following should be inserted into the Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) Regulations 2005:

“Nothing in these Regulations places an obligation on a proprietor or trustee of religious premises to make an application for approval of those premises as a place at which two people may register as civil partners of each other in pursuance of section 6(3A)(a) of the 2004 Act”.

Again, there is clear wording, clear meaning and clear effect.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, has deployed legal opinions that support her view, quite properly, primarily those from Professor Mark Hill QC and Aidan O’Neill QC. But many noble Lords from all Benches have cited a number of different opinions today, and the speech from my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton was masterful and gave a very clear opinion. His responsible views were unequivocal and were supported by many noble Lords throughout the Chamber today.

It was useful and heartening to hear the views expressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, who confirmed that the necessary safeguards are in place according to the Legal Office of the General Synod of the Church of England. I hear of course the differing views expressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn, but I believe that many of the issues raised by the right revered Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn are matters for the General Synod itself, and not for this House or the Houses of Parliament. It is also important to consider a statement from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, which takes a similar view to the Church of England:

“As the regulations require prior consent, the measure can have no impact on Catholic premises. The church welcomes the fact that the Government has made an explicit statement in the draft regulations that nothing in them creates any obligation to make an application for approval. This will help rebut any attempt to mount spurious cases of unlawful discrimination against churches which do not host civil partnerships”.

The Government’s clear view is set out in their summary of responses to their consultation on civil partnerships on religious premises, published last month, and I agree with the view expressed. The noble Lord, Lord Henley, Minister of State at the Home Office, says in a letter this week to Members of your Lordships’ House:

“I must stress that this provision is entirely permissive. We are entirely confident that faith groups will not be forced to host civil partnership registrations if they do not wish to do so”.

He goes further, by indicating further legislation if necessary. The Government’s clarity and confidence, which we as an Opposition share, is supported by the statutory body on discrimination, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which states in its response to the consultation:

“The Commission is also pleased that this provision is voluntary, placing no obligation on religious communities to conduct such ceremonies where this would be against their conscience or religious beliefs”.

We have heard a plethora of legal opinions in this debate, but also the important views of many noble Lords who do not have legal experience. Most importantly, we have heard the views of my noble friend Lord Alli. When he moved the original amendment in your Lordships’ House, he could not have been clearer:

“For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act places an obligation on religious organisations to host civil partnerships if they do not wish to do so”.

He has been equally clear today. These are compelling arguments, and I believe that they are conclusive arguments. There is nothing in the legislation or in these regulations which requires churches to host civil partnerships. The legislation and the regulations associated with it were designed to be permissive and not compulsory; they are written to be permissive and not compulsory; and they are best interpreted as being permissive and not compulsory. Some noble Lords have mentioned fear. Like the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, I believe that we must act in a spirit of mutual respect and generosity.

If the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, should test the opinion of the House today, we on these Benches will be opposing the noble Baroness and supporting the regulations. And yes, we have a Whip on, because we believe it is right to do so. I believe the record of my party, the Labour Party, on equality issues, is second to none, and we intend to maintain it in the Lobbies today if this matter does go to a Division.

The provision to allow, if they so wish, churches to host civil partnerships, is a good provision. The regulations are good regulations, and the original legislation—our own—was good legislation. I urge the House to support the regulations, and to sustain legislation of which this House should be proud in having played its part to get on to the statute book of this country.

Children: Secure Children’s Homes

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Monday 7th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lady Linklater on her ability in presenting, and on securing, this debate on an important and valuable subject. I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Shackleton on her excellent maiden speech. I found it quite moving, coming from the same parental and grandparental background that she does. She may find that that background is a real driver towards contributions on matters on which one feels strongly in this House—where good argument is heard with patience and respect, and where bad argument is rejected with mere politeness. I am sure that she will make a great contribution to our affairs.

I recognise in the speeches that have been made so far, and in some of the briefings that heralded this debate, the statistical soup that can surround this subject about offending children and young people. It points in many different directions but always produces the same unpalatable reduction, which is that we are not succeeding in reforming the activities of children in custody and sending them out quickly into society as people who will not go through the revolving door of custody, time after time. Unfortunately, the picture is of a very fast-revolving door.

The cohort of residents in custody has multiple issues to face up to. They are troubled and we do nothing to deal with that trouble constructively, except in a relatively small number of cases. We have one of the lowest ages of criminal responsibility in the world, yet we have a higher recidivism rate among children than almost anywhere else in the world and, despite having spent many years looking at this subject, I do not quite understand what we are doing wrong. However, I believe that the kind of regime provided in local authority secure children’s homes has been far better designed to reform than anything provided in secure training centres or young offender institutions.

Five and a half years ago I chaired an inquiry for the Howard League for Penal Reform, of which I am currently the president, on the use of restraint, strip-searching and isolation among children in custody. It was not happening in local authority secure children’s homes. It was happening in other institutions. It is still happening in other institutions. The Howard League this year conducted a two-day evidence hearing that I chaired to see what had happened in the five years since the report was produced in 2006. Some good progress had been made; the provisions made for young people in custody have improved the situation, and I share the view that it is good news that far fewer young people are in custody—particularly those between 14 and 16 years of age—than before. Nevertheless, far too much restraint is still being used.

What is it that secure children's homes provided that enabled us to avoid those pitfalls of restraint, strip-searching and isolation? It was a number of qualities. First, they were small; they are small. It is within something that is much more like home that children learn the habits of a home. One of my observations, having visited secure children's homes and other custodial institutions for children and young people, is that most of the young people in them have never enjoyed the sort of home to which my noble friend Lady Shackleton referred movingly in her maiden speech. Putting them into an animalised, brutalised structure contributes to that feeling of dissociation.

Next, secure children's homes have high ratios of well trained staff, specialist staff who understand children. It is self-evident that we should deal with children as children, not as criminals, if we are to succeed in reforming them and turning them from children into adults, rather than from child criminals into recidivists. Next, they have education. Secure children's homes, in my view, have a very high standard of education. With that, they combine therapeutic and behavioural provision tailored to children's needs. That provision is not being made adequately in the other parts of the child and youth custodial setting. Therefore, the Government should be looking at more, smaller units, far more like secure children's homes, rather than going in the opposite direction, towards larger institutions, which appears to be policy at present.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

My final point is to emphasise that we are calling on our fellow citizens, whether they be the Home Secretary or judges, to undertake as difficult a judging task as exists in the panoply of judging. I hope that the Government will concur with the amendments.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, in this context, unlike my noble friends and other noble Lords who have spoken, I propose to speak in support of the Government and of the proposals in this part of the Bill. I hesitate to dice with a great historian on matters of history, but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Morgan, that he was a little selective in his expression of the historical context. First, in describing Regulation 18B, perhaps he should have told the House that it was of a completely different character. The way in which it was made meant that the victim or subject knew nothing at all of the reasons why the order was made. The so-called tribunal that heard Regulation 18B cases was completely lacking in transparency of any kind. The great dissenting judgment of that wonderful Welsh judge, Lord Atkin, in Liversidge v Anderson took decades to be accepted as the norm for judicial review. Although Churchill described Regulation 18B and its procedures as,

“in the highest degree odious”,

a phrase that has become celebrated, the fact remains that during Churchill’s prime ministership numerous people—indeed, hundreds of people—were imprisoned as a result of it, and he did not take steps to legislate in favour of that dissenting judgment. Indeed, it was long after he had ceased to be Prime Minister that that happened. I think that the lessons of history as described by the noble Lord are not terribly helpful.

One should also bear in mind that whether we are talking about control orders or the diluted version in TPIMs—admittedly only slightly diluted, apart from the matter that we are going to consider in the next group—they do not involve the incarceration of the individual. They involve some restrictions on the individual’s freedom which I understand most in this House regard as proportionate and reasonable given the requirements of national security.

My noble friend looks as though he wants to intervene, but then he always does. Does he want to?

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

He does. It seems to me that my noble friend’s historic account of Regulation 18B omits to mention that it was prevalent during wartime and that, as soon as that was over, it was repealed.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Which was one of the reasons why it was so unjust, because a very large number of people were made the subject of Regulation 18B and almost none of them had any evidence of any kind whatever against them. When we are dealing with TPIMs or control orders, we have individuals against whom there is very robust intelligence. I do not think my noble friend has had the opportunity to read that intelligence, but had he done so he would undoubtedly be so satisfied, being a reasonable person.

[Lord Morgan]

I do not propose to review the noble Lord’s review of my version of history, but I think it worth pointing out that the ignorance of the evidence against them is precisely one of the problems in this case. The noble Lord rightly says that there is intercept evidence, but it is evidence denied to the person. I agree that the person is not incarcerated but he is seriously restricted.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I do not know whether the noble Lord has studied the effect of the case of AF (No. 3), but if he were so to do, he would find that there is a requirement for the court. Successive Home Secretaries, close to whose department I have worked, have always been assiduous to ensure that there was sufficient material—particularly since AF (No. 3)—so that the individual concerned knew the case he had to meet, at least in gisting terms. I urge the noble Lord to read the Green Paper published today by the Ministry of Justice, Justice and Security, which deals in part with these matters.

I would like to move on to the substance of these amendments. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, called into his argument the requirement for a court to approve a derogating control order under the 2005 Act. In deploying that argument, surely we should remember that, first, there have been no derogating control orders under the 2005 Act; and secondly, had there been a derogating control order, it would have been so dramatic that we would have had to derogate from part of the European Convention on Human Rights. This would have required, in effect, a change to our constitution which plainly ought to be passed through the courts at the earliest possible phase. I am afraid that, with real respect, I reject that argument.

In dismissing deportation applications and deportation decisions that are made daily by Home Secretaries, the noble and learned Lord said that they are made against foreigners so it is less significant, but if he thinks back to the Belmarsh case that was decided at the end of 2004, he will recall that the Judicial Committee of this House, of which he was a most distinguished member at one time, held that discriminating in that way against foreigners was unlawful. Indeed, the so-called Belmarsh provisions were struck down because they were disproportionate and discriminated against foreigners by treating them differently from United Kingdom citizens.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Perhaps I might finish this point before, predictably, the noble and learned Lord stands up. I do understand the distinction he is making. It seems to me, with great respect, somewhat casuistic.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Surely the noble Lord must accept and understand the difference between deporting a British subject and deporting an immigrant. It is obvious.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

What I understand is that a deportation decision can be made by the Home Secretary. The administrative court is considering these cases hour by hour, let alone day by day, often as matters of great urgency. It is considering cases in which people have been imprisoned. Sometimes, very young people are imprisoned in unpleasant circumstances in this country. I do not hear the noble and learned Lord saying that this is an act that should be the subject of approval by a judge. In any event, it would be a practical impossibility because the Upper Tribunal and the administrative court are swamped by more than 10,000 of these cases at present.

I also reflect on much simpler situations. It is suggested that taking a citizen’s freedom away is something that should be determined by a judge in every circumstance. But we even let police constables do it every day of the week. When a police constable arrests a citizen for something as “minor” as, for example, shoplifting, the person may be taken into custody on the fiat of a police constable. When people are charged with serious offences and not bailed, although they are brought before a judge quickly, as is envisaged in this Bill, they are taken off to such unpleasant places as Strangeways or Belmarsh and find themselves in custody until they are brought up fairly summarily before a judge. Although it goes without saying that judges in every instance are very careful in considering such cases, the care they take does not bear comparison with the care that High Court judges give to controlees in control order cases.

We have already mentioned deportation cases. Organisations are proscribed by the Secretary of State, taking the precious freedom of association and membership of groups away from citizens of this country and foreigners without discriminating between them. Decisions are made to invade people’s privacy in what may be an outrageous way by warrants to intercept their telephones as a result of administrative acts. They are not brought before a court. Certainly, retired judges are involved in these decisions but these are not transparent hearings with evidence and tribunals. The subject does not even know that it is happening. In addition, covert surveillance, which can be an appalling invasion of people’s privacy, is performed as an executive act.

It seems to me that there is some confusion here among my noble friends and other noble Lords in their analysis of the roles of different parts of the state apparatus in the conduct of state business. In my judgment, for what little it is worth, the act of making a TPIM or a control order has exactly the character of ministerial responsibility that successive Home Secretaries, some of whom are noted Members of your Lordships’ House, are able to carry out. What follows has exactly the character of judicial scrutiny which judges are extremely well able to carry out and are experienced in carrying out. It seems to me to be a clear part of our constitutional settlement and to fit within it very clearly.

The standard of proof is not an easy question and I do not pretend that there is a perfect answer to it. If one reads through the open judgments in control order cases, one sees that the reasoning of judges in those cases has been very strong. In almost every case, I would venture that in reality the judgment has been made on the balance of probabilities and I would not have a particular difficulty if that was the standard set.

However, there is a danger of underestimating the difference between reasonable grounds to suspect and reasonable grounds to believe. As a judge on the Judicial Committee of this House put it on one occasion: “Reasonable grounds to suspect means I suspect that it may be so, while reasonable grounds to believe means I believe that it is so”. It seems to me that the executive act of a Minister asking the question “Do I believe it to be so?” is a proper standard to set and can be scrutinised carefully by the courts. If the proof of the pudding is ever in the eating in court, that is what has happened with control orders.

So far as a one-year TPIM with a two-year limit is concerned, when I was the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation I always supported a two-year limit, and I still do. I see no reason why there should not be a one-year limit with an extension available. That seems to accord with the purpose of control orders or TPIMs. One can reasonably expect that during a one or two-year period, the potential of the individual concerned to be a terrorist is much reduced as a result of the order. However, I do have to say to noble Lords that there are cases where that has not been so, and there would have to be some exceptional provision so that those who, despite a TPIM, continue to be active in terrorism should be subject to a new order if the evidence is available at the end of a two-year period.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

6: Schedule 1, page 22, line 5, at end insert—
“Residence measureA1 (1) The Secretary of State may impose restrictions on the individual in relation to the residence in which the individual resides.
(2) The Secretary of State may, in particular, impose any of the following—
(a) a requirement to reside at a specified residence;(b) a requirement not to allow others to reside at that residence without the permission of the Secretary of State;(c) a requirement, applicable between such hours as are specified, to remain at the specified residence.(3) The specified residence—
(a) may be in any locality in the United Kingdom that appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate;(b) may be a residence provided by or on behalf of the Secretary of State(4) If the specified residence is provided to the individual by or on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State may require the individual to comply with any specified terms of occupancy of that residence (which may be specified by reference to a lease or other document).
(5) A requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(c) must include provision to enable the individual to apply for the permission of the Secretary of State to be away from the specified residence, for the whole or part of any applicable period, on one or more occasions.
(6) The Secretary of State may grant such permission subject to either or both of the following conditions—
(a) the condition that the individual remains overnight at other agreed premises between such hours as the Secretary of State may require;(b) the condition that the individual complies with such other restrictions in relation to the individual’s movements whilst away from the specified residence as may be so required.(7) “Agreed premises” are premises in the United Kingdom which are agreed by the Secretary of State and the individual.
(8) Sub-paragraph (6) is not to be read as limiting—
(a) the generality of sub-paragraph (7) of paragraph 14 (power to impose conditions when granting permission), or(b) the power to impose further conditions under that sub-paragraph in connection with permission granted by virtue of sub-paragraph (5) of this paragraph.(9) In sub-paragraph (7) “applicable period” means a period for which the individual is required to remain at the specified residence by virtue of a restriction imposed under this paragraph.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, in tabling this amendment, I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, who has put his name to it. This group of amendments is about relocation, an issue we discussed at Second Reading. The first sentence of the executive summary of the Justice and Security Green Paper, published today by the Ministry of Justice, is:

“The first duty of government is to safeguard our national security. In delivering this duty, the Government produces and receives sensitive information”.

I do not want to repeat at great length the arguments on relocation presented at Second Reading. I simply want to reiterate that the sensitive information, the security that the Government have received, points to the need, for the time being at least, to continue as part of the main legislation the power to order relocation, used sparingly as it is and subject to the scrutiny of the courts.

I have drafted the amendment so as to keep the existing control order provisions for relocation until after the Olympic Games, choosing a date after 1 January 2013. At that point, it would be open—and I am completely open-minded about this—to the Government to come back to Parliament and to replace the relocation provisions with what is in the Bill, which would remove relocation subject to emergency legislation. All that would be required would be an affirmative resolution of both Houses. There would therefore be a debate in which the Government would pass to each House of Parliament the advice that they have received from the security services, including the sensitive information to which I referred earlier.

I can best make my argument for this group of amendments by asking the Minister a series of questions. First, is it correct that the National Security Council, which is made up of Ministers only, has been advised against the removal of relocation from the list of available powers? If the NSC was so advised, I suspect that the Minister will be driven to confirm that the removal of relocation is not as a result of a debate on the merits but as a result of political considerations founded on the manifestos of the two partners in the coalition. I am as enthusiastic about the coalition as most Liberal Democrats—well, nearly—but I am not enthusiastic about political considerations trumping national security, which is what I fear may have happened.

My second question is: have Her Majesty's Government received any advice from those who are currently operational in MI5, MI6, GCHQ or SO15, the counterterrorism command, that the relocation power has become an unnecessary component of national security for the time being? If they have, perhaps they will tell us what it is and whence it came, because my belief is that the advice will be eccentric and not in the mainstream.

My third question is: does any part of the informed security bodies—those with the information—support the removal of the relocation power before the Olympics and Paralympics, as opposed to after them? In other words, what consideration has been given to the pinch point that will be created by the Games? We should remember in this context that we are talking about the security not only of the Olympic Park and the other venues where Olympic and Paralympic events will take place. One effect of the Games on policing in this country will be that a large number of police officers will be removed from their normal duties up and down the country—dare I say to the Minister, in Cumbria for example? Those officers will find themselves in unfamiliar places in east London, protecting the Olympic Park. Perhaps not in Cumbria but in some of our bigger and more populous resorts during the summer, there will be an increased risk of terrorism events going undetected.

My fourth question, which is connected, is really a rhetorical question. Surely on the basis of the evidence the Government must accept that they would be fulfilling what the Green Paper describes as the first duty of government by retaining relocation until after the Olympics and Paralympics are over.

My fifth question relates to something that was raised at Second Reading: the case of CD and the judgment of Mr Justice Simon. When the CD case was heard earlier this year, did Her Majesty's Government consider it proportionate and in the interests of national security to request a relocation component in CD’s control order? If they did, I come to my final question: have they changed their mind about CD? If they have, why have they done so?

The decision in the case of CD was taken on the basis of arguments presented on behalf of the Government, with special counsel present, after the publication of the counterterrorism review that was independently and very capably scrutinised by my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. If the Government had decided that relocation was no longer necessary, it is surprising that they bothered to make the argument against CD. One should, after all, contrast it with the decision made in relation to Section 44 stop and search, which remained on the statute book long after the Home Secretary made the welcome announcement that it was in effect no longer to be used. I am driven to the conclusion that there was a merits argument in the Home Office about both these issues and that the decision that was taken on the merits was that Section 44 should no longer be used because we did not need it, but the decision that was taken on the merits in relation to relocation and CD was that it should continue to be used because we do need it. All that leads me very reluctantly to the conclusion that the removal of relocation has far less to do with the Government’s first duty than with meeting some arguments that have been made before this Government were formed and in a political context, including a very powerful argument made in a Times article by my noble friend Lord Macdonald before he was a Member of this House.

What I would ask the Minister to do is merely to confirm at this stage, because we will return to this later, that the Government are considering this matter and are now considering it on its merits. I beg to move.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and have added my name to his amendment. I really hope that the Minister will give this earnest consideration. He will know that I am highly critical of the Bill that he brings before us. It is clear that the exclusion provisions within control orders have proved to be highly effective. The evidence given by the deputy assistant commissioner to the Public Bill Committee in the other place was quite persuasive on that point. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has already referred to the case that the Home Secretary herself brought forward and argued for the use of such provisions. It is clear that the Government know that they may need these provisions in the future. That is why we have the enhanced TPIMs draft Bill for use if it were ever to be required.

We have the quite extraordinary provision in this Bill that if the enhanced provisions were to be required, and were to be required in the period between the Dissolution of Parliament and the first Queen’s Speech in the next Parliament, the Home Secretary is to be empowered by this Bill to use those provisions. If ever there were an admission that the Government know in their heart that they may need those provisions and, indeed, have used them in their period of office, there is the evidence.

We then come to the second issue that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has alluded to. It is whether it is right or sensible to remove those relocation provisions at the current time. We have the Olympics, and we also have the issue that, in lieu of the exclusion provisions, additional surveillance will have to be undertaken by the police at additional cost, with additional resources and using more people. The noble Lord will know that in the Public Bill Committee in the other place the deputy assistant commissioner expressed some concerns about the length of time that will be required by the police to put those measures into place.

The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, quite brilliantly in my view, gets the Government off the hook for the period between the end of the Olympics and the beginning of 2013. It also says to the Government that, if at that time or beyond it they reach a conclusion that they do not need the exclusion provisions, they can simply bring an order before Parliament. No doubt Parliament would assent to that order, as it does assent to government orders. However, if the Government at that time are not so assured, they already have the provisions on the statute book with the benefit of them having gone through Parliament and being effectively scrutinised rather than using the very unsatisfactory approach of having an emergency Bill in the stocks ready for use.

I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Henley, might be sympathetic to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. It is meant to be a constructive response to current circumstances. I certainly think that it warrants due consideration.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick]

I am coming to that, but let us at the outset recognise the impact of a relocation measure. If one is going to adopt a measure or power of this sort, one needs to recognise the striking impact that it has on the spouse and the children. A measure that amounts to internal exile of a person needs a compelling justification.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I know that the noble Lord eats legal authorities for breakfast, probably literally sometimes. I would just like him to give his comments on the cogent judgment and reasoning of Mr Justice Simon in CD, the case to which I referred, in which the judge took the matters the noble Lord has just mentioned into account and reached a considered conclusion. Does he say that the judge reached the wrong conclusion, giving undue proportion to some of the factors he was weighing?

[Lord Pannick]

Of course, the learned judge was considering the exercise of the powers that are contained under the control order regime. The Committee and the House have to consider what is a fair balance—this is the test that the Minister rightly has repeatedly propounded—between national security and the liberty of the individual.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I promise not to intervene on the noble Lord’s speech again but he is ducking the question. Does he not accept that Mr Justice Simon in that case, having weighed up the facts, came to the conclusion that the safety of the state and of the public was better protected by relocation and that it was proportionate to the interests of CD? If so, should we not keep the situation as it was then?

[Lord Pannick]

The noble Lord can intervene as many times as he likes. I welcome his interventions. My answer to his point is twofold. We can always add more and more intrusive measures and protect ourselves more effectively from the perspective of national security. The question is: what is a fair balance? I am assuming that the Government, not just concerned about a particular individual case but looking at these issues as a whole, have concluded that relocation would undermine the fair balance because of its particularly intrusive nature and that the combination of the measures contained in the TPIM and the surveillance measures that can always be imposed on an individual who is not relocated will effectively protect the public. It is true that there is a financial cost, which is the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Does the noble Lord wish to add to that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, one is always very careful when one speaks on these matters with a Treasury Minister sitting at one’s side. However, I can give an assurance to my noble friend that we have agreed extra resources for the Security Service over the next four-year period.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his careful answer to this short debate. I regret that he has not answered any of my six questions and I invite him to write to me with answers to each of those quite specific questions. I regard the emergency legislation model provided in the Bill as a deeply dysfunctional form of legislation. It will be very difficult to bring into force, involving parliamentary debates that are almost impossible to construct in a way that is neither in contempt of court nor breaks the sub judice rule.

I of course welcome surveillance, whether over a short or long period, being enhanced by the provision of extra personnel and additional technical facilities. However, I say to the Minister, to my noble friend Lady Hamwee and to the House that it is much more easily said than done operationally. Many of the individuals against whom this kind of surveillance is deployed are very intuitive about surveillance provisions and often live in places where it is virtually impossible for the police to deploy the full range of surveillance facilities. That is one of the reasons why relocation has been a useful and proportionate measure.

However, at this stage it would not be right to press the matter to a Division—I have the perhaps over-optimistic feeling that common sense at some stage will prevail—and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, with the purpose of returning to this matter at a later stage.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I speak in support of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As the lawyers here who are familiar with disclosure issues involving national security will be aware, there are a number of areas in which there has been a great deal of satellite litigation in cases on the issue of disclosure. I suggest to the Minister that a sound principle could be established here.

I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, might agree that it is a principle that could be extended to resolve some of the other issues on disclosure that have arisen in cases such as Norwich Pharmacal, Carnduff v Rock—another civil case—the Tariq case and, of course, that of Binyam Mohamed, in which different issues about the level of disclosure that should be permitted have arisen in different contexts. One of those issues relates to the control principle: the control that a foreign intelligence agency exerts over intelligence material available in the United Kingdom. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, agrees that reducing all those principles to statutory form would be of great assistance and would provide something that gets us lawyers out of work but increases certainty—that is, legal certainty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

The issue is that to this individual, being in prison is more acceptable than being in his place of residence under a control order, with the restrictions imposed by the system. I am sure that the noble Lord has heard, from people who had been under control orders that were quashed, the impact they had on them and their families. The interference with anything that any of us would recognise as a normal life has been literally intolerable. That is the point I make to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I applaud and support the sentiment behind my noble friend's amendment, but I suggest that it is not only unnecessary but would replace a considerable amount of flexibility with something rather less. On the case history that she has just recounted, I say that nobody has been arrested and charged with breach of a control order for failing to turn up at a police station once, an hour late. In every case, there has been an immense degree of tolerance before anyone has been charged. It is only after a very serious breach, or persistent and repeated breaches, that people are charged.

Nor do I recognise the credibility of the account my noble friend was given. When I was the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, on a relatively small number of occasions—but several—I was able to visit controlees in their own homes, alone, one to one. On some occasions I visited them in homes to which they had been relocated. The notion of a state-appointed psychiatrist, however independent, turning up unsolicited at their home would have been no more comforting than One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. It is a pretty bad idea.

I ask the Minister to confirm that the following occurs and will occur. First, where there is any suspicion or indication of the poor mental health of the controlee or of any member of his or her family, medical facilities will be put in place, including, if necessary, psychiatrists and psychologists, to deal with the problem; and that such facilities will be flexible and will be provided at the cost of the Home Office. Secondly, will the Minister confirm that the Control Order Review Group has met regularly ever since control orders were brought in, that it includes various people involved in scrutinising and observing the person concerned, and that it has always discussed such issues where they have arisen? Will he further confirm that under TPIMs, some kind of review group—I hope it will not be called TPIMsORG —will continue to meet and carry out that function? There is no evidence whatever that controlees have been treated improperly in the way that my noble friend set out.

On one occasion I suggested to the Home Office that there were some difficulties from time to time in giving controlees a single point of contact—perhaps a local police officer—who was aware of the situation and whom they could telephone if they had a problem. I believe that that has been put right, that they do all have someone to contact, and that sympathetic consideration is given to all difficulties of the kind that my noble friend has in mind.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, my noble friend has been consistent over the years in her concern about the impact of control order obligations on individuals and on their health, in particular on their mental health. My first point is that TPIM notices are intentionally more limited in nature than those that can be imposed under control orders. We will no longer have lengthy curfews, compulsory relocation to another part of the country and total bans on communication equipment. Therefore, whatever the result, one would hope that the effect on individuals would be less than under control orders.

Despite the limitations that should significantly reduce the impact on individuals subject to TPIMs, I appreciate that my noble friend remains concerned about these issues. I agree with my noble friend Lord Carlile that the amendment does not achieve what it sets out to do. The noble Lord put a series of questions to me about the current position and about what will be the position. He asked whether medical facilities would be provided by the Home Office for those with poor mental health. He then asked about the Control Order Review Group, and about whether something would follow it. He could not quite bring himself to work out the acronym, but no doubt something can be put in place that will have a similar role. I am sure that my noble friend asked those questions in a rhetorical manner and that he knows the answer certainly to the first two questions. Such things will be provided by the Home Office: CORG exists; and we will certainly consider something suitable to replace it in due course.

Although I cannot accept my noble friend’s amendments, I say that the Bill, together with the relevant control order case law and the duty of the Secretary of State to act within convention rights, already ensures that the Secretary of State will give the appropriate consideration to the impact of the measures on the individual and on their family, including the impact on their mental health, both before imposing a TPIM notice and during the year or however long it remains in force. With that, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Wednesday 5th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

In answering the question asked by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, perhaps my noble friend would be mindful of the power in the United States to impose executive witness detention, never mind executive suspect detention. He might also be mindful of the arbitrary powers used in a number of other countries, for example, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, to detain people without any proper legal process and of the power, for example, in France, to charge people with association de malfaiteurs, something we are probably all doing in this House this afternoon, and then hold them in custody for months and months, quietly releasing them without charge.

[Lord Howard of Lympne]

I hope that my noble friend in that intervention has not exhausted the number of examples of that kind that I am sure he is able to give to illuminate the House. The truth is, I suspect, that if one conducted an extensive examination of the way in which other countries have faced up to this dilemma, one would find that the measures contained in the Bill are less draconian than those that exist virtually anywhere else in the world.

As I said, I believe that the Government have struck the right balance, with one not insignificant exception. When I gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee, I said that in my personal view the Bill would be better if it contained the relocation provisions, and I do not resile from that view. I believe that the relocation provisions would make it easier for the Security Service to carry out its responsibilities and would enhance the protection of the public. On that single point, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, but for the rest of it, I believe that the Government have struck the right balance and that the Bill should be supported.

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[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

If my noble friend does not mind my saying so, I am not sure that the example that he posits is one that I recollect from my period as DPP. Let us imagine the situation that would exist here: presumably the police or the Security Service would have in their possession something like an intercept that could not be used—for example, a suspect having a conversation with another individual about a plan to place a bomb on the Tube. With respect, that is not the end of an investigation; it is the beginning of one. The investigation that then takes place is into that individual, into the plan as described in the phone call, into the individual he has spoken to and into the associates of all.

The noble Lord will know from his time as Home Secretary that the sorts of powers and abilities that the law enforcement authorities in this country have, which we will not go into here, are considerable and significant. I do not recognise a situation in which a law enforcement investigation stops simply because the deeply incriminating material that you have until that time is the only material that you have and you do not anticipate discovering more.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

But my noble friend Lord Howard did not suggest that. Does not my noble friend Lord Macdonald, from his distinguished period of service as Director of Public Prosecutions, not recollect that cases were brought to him in which at that time there was no further prospect of a successful investigation? That is the question that my noble friend Lord Howard is asking. If that is the case, perhaps my noble friend Lord Macdonald would just tell us that the consequence of his view is that, if a TPIM exists after that time, it should cease.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

Of course one recognises that if an investigation, using all the powers available to the investigating authorities, has continued for a period of time and turned up nothing, under this scheme the TPIM will come to an end—but TPIMs are intended to be time-limited in any event. Under the terms of the Bill, TPIMs will come to an end after two years, so we are not talking about an open-ended system of restrictions. My point is that a system of restrictions applied to criminal investigations is not only more likely to be constitutional and develop broader public support than the system that is currently proposed, but such a system would have attached to it conditions that actively encourage and assist investigation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, it is always interesting to follow the noble Lord, Lord Desai, in debate. He has not disappointed us; he has used his usual capacity to place a cat among the pigeons.

I should start by declaring an interest. Although I ceased to be the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in February this year, I still hold two positions relating to security in Northern Ireland.

I, too, welcome my noble friend Lord Henley to his ministerial place. I look forward to working with him on this important Bill and other significant issues. I know that he will agree with everyone who has said that we shall all miss his predecessor, my noble friend Lady Browning. She will be a hard act to follow, and we wish her the fullest of health as soon as possible.

I approach this debate by reiterating the Burkean party conference mantra of the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Clegg: we should do not what is merely easy; we should do what is right. That mantra has a particular resonance in relation to at least one aspect of this Bill: the question of relocation. I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Reid, who was a distinguished Home Secretary, talking about representations from constituents. I can tell the House that in my nine and a quarter years as independent reviewer, I received but a handful of letters or e-mails from private citizens about control orders. They did not appear to raise particular public interest.

I believe that the Government were absolutely right as a new Government to carry out a review of counterterrorism law, practice and policy. I congratulate them on many of the conclusions reached in the counterterrorism review. The two-year limit on TPIMs is something for which I long argued in relation to control orders. Raising the standard of proof is the right thing to do. Indeed, if we look at all the judgments in the cases, they all reached the highest standard of proof which is now to be included. Giving people who are subject to these orders mobile phones and some form of electronic media is the correct recognition of their rights.

I listened to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Goodhart with enormous respect. I think that my view is with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt: the nature of an order such as this is an executive act and the nature of review or appeal is a judicial act. If I may cite the example of deportation orders, there are at least two people in the House today who have made large numbers of deportation orders as an executive act and they have been robustly reviewed and appealed before the courts. That is a perfectly conventional and correct procedure.

I am a little worried by the fact that my party entered government with an almost visceral opposition to any specialty legislation in connection with terrorism if there was any suspicion of an adjustment of human rights assumptions and norms against the interests of any individuals that might affect their freedom of action. Of course, since entering government, Ministers have seen the evidence, and the result of that evidence is seen to a great extent in the Bill.

Nobody has yet mentioned the context in which this matter is being debated, and I remind the House of the threat level that was changed downwards by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre—JTAC, which is an independent body for this purpose—on 11 July this year. The threat level was changed on that day from severe to substantial. What does “substantial” mean? I do not believe this to be in dispute between any parties in this House. The threat level “substantial” means that a terrorist attack remains a strong possibility and may occur without warning. It means what it says. Further, the impending and very welcome Olympic and Paralympic Games mean that the threat level is most unlikely to be reduced until after those great festivals are over.

What does the threat mean to the public whom the Government have a first duty to represent and protect? It means that there is a strong possibility—remember those words—of a single or multiple suicide bombing attack occurring entirely unpredictably, with consequent death and injury on at least the scale of the events in London in July 2005. I remind your Lordships that in the 7/7 attacks, not only were 52 people murdered by terrorists, but more than 770 people were injured, some extremely seriously. Further, it is worrying that violent jihadist terrorism techniques have become more varied since 2005, including the technique—if that be the right word—of massacre by the use of automatic weapons, as in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 and as elsewhere more recently.

I have heard, and I think we have heard in this House, repeated suggestions that control orders breach the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights. I invite the Minister to confirm that that issue has been litigated and that control orders have been held to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. I ask the House to lay to rest what I regard as the canard of non-compliance. What we have in this Bill is close to control orders, with one material element removed: the power to order relocation of the individual in question.

I am a little puzzled by the title of the Bill and the emphasis on investigation. There is an implication that this is something new, and it has been perpetuated by my noble friend Lord Macdonald. It is not. Investigation and prosecution have always been the aim before a control order was issued and as it continued. I have attended on a number of occasions a committee called the control orders review group—CORG—which is a multidisciplinary committee that sits in the Home Office and considers every control order in detail, regularly, person by person, with the police officers and others dealing with that controlee present at the meeting. Investigation is continuous. A control order or a TPIM is a tool to be used when for the time being investigation and prosecution can go no further. I apprehend that my noble friend, during his distinguished period as DPP, will have been consulted about such cases and on that basis. The whole basis was that at that time investigation could not be brought to fruition. Of course, the CORG process means that at a further time it will be considered, and it is. The Crown Prosecution Service’s admirable terrorism group, created by my noble friend to a very high quality, does exactly that.

The noble Lord, Lord Freeman, spoke from his business perspective—I believe that he is, or was, chairman of one of the leading technology companies—about the technology that is now available. Of course we should welcome and use the technology. The Government have a responsibility that they do not always exercise—this applies not to any particular Government—to use the latest technology that will make fewer TPIMs or control orders necessary. However, technology is not necessarily the answer. Greater resources are welcome, but they are not necessarily the answer. We have been told that there will be higher levels of surveillance, but the reality is that you have to have somewhere to carry out surveillance from, and it is not always possible in relation to intelligence counterintuitive controlees.

I agree with the table issued this morning by Liberty confirming the high degree of similarity between control orders and TPIMs, and I welcome the similarities. My noble friend Lord Macdonald mentioned that there have been absconds. There have been, but perhaps he should have mentioned that there has been none in the past five years and that the techniques of securing that there are no absconds have improved dramatically, not least through the use of better technology.

With my experience from the beginning of control orders until early this year, I wonder why we are troubling to replace a functioning system with another that has almost entirely the same arms, body and legs, but I agree with my noble friend Lord Howard that, as I have already intimated, some of the changes are welcome. However, there is one leg missing from the Bill, and for now, in my view, it gives this legislation a distinct limp. It is the continuing power to order relocation, subject, of course, to the usual court procedures. On the evidence available, I am persuaded firmly—I choose my words carefully—to the view that it would be negligent to remove relocation from the main provisions. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and other noble Lords, have already referred to the open judgment given by Mr Justice Simon on 20 May 2011 in the case of CD and in other cases. In the CD case, a very detailed and succinct factual judgment was given by the learned judge. We have already been reminded that he said that the relocation obligation is a necessary and proportionate measure to protect the public from the real and immediate risk of a terrorist attack. I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Harris: who asked for that relocation provision? It was this Home Secretary. Why did she ask for it? Because she rightly judged it to be necessary. In what context did she ask for it? It was after the counterterrorism review, after my noble friend's independent scrutiny report and, presumably, after she had very carefully considered, on the advice of her extremely able officials, whether it was necessary and proportionate to do so. Why did she not say, “We’re not going to ask for relocation because we believe it is not necessary any more”? The answer is that she believed that it was necessary in that case, which is but one example of several cases where the conclusion was reached that relocation was not merely proportionate but necessary in accordance with the evidence given by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Osborne.

My conclusion from those cases is that the protection of the public will be diminished, I am afraid deliberately, by the removal of relocation from the main legislation. The current alternative proposed by the Government would allow relocation to be ordered in exceptional circumstances, subject to the enactment of a draft Bill. Generally, Parliament would be required to debate and vote on such measures before they came into force. It would therefore be required to determine whether the circumstances at the time merited such enhanced provisions. That is a clumsy proposal: it is the worst form of legislative disorder. It completely ignores the realities of operational activity against terrorism. The notion of meaningful parliamentary debate in such circumstances beggars belief and invites legal challenge. The Mad Hatter would await his invitation to any such debate with confidence that he would receive it.

I hope that relocation will not be needed at all in due course. I favour a sunset clause in the Bill that would include relocation. Relocation should continue as an element of TPIMs until the end of 2012, after the Olympic Games, and should then be repealed, subject only to affirmative resolutions of each House of Parliament. This would mean that there would be further consideration by Parliament in less than 15 months from now, following proper protection of the public in the intervening period. I hope that the Government will accept that that is a sensible course and will table amendments to that effect. If not, I am prepared to do so myself, because this is a very important lacuna in the provision.

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[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, some noble Lords will remember, as I certainly do, when control orders were first introduced as an emergency measure in March 2005 after an all-night sitting. It was an emergency measure because the suspects then being detained in Belmarsh prison were due to be released within a few days as a result of a decision of the House of Lords in December 2004. The powers granted to the Home Secretary in 2005 were considered to be so extraordinary at the time that the Conservative opposition and the Liberal Democrats insisted on a sunset clause, and they carried the day in that respect. Six years later, those powers are to become in effect a permanent part of our constitution.

I had hoped that when the coalition Government took over, there would be an end to control orders. The coalition agreement promised to reverse the substantial erosion of civil liberties that had taken place under the previous Government and there was to be an extensive review of anti-terrorism measures. These were all good signs. I have not seen the evidence submitted to the review by the security services or the police, but I have seen the rest of the evidence, and I can say that with one exception, all the evidence in relation to control orders was in favour of abolition. Yet, once again, the Government have drawn back.

We are getting rid of relocation, and I am glad of that. Perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that of course relocation is the most effective measure available, but in my view it is also the most inhumane. So there are improvements in the Bill which I welcome. But the fundamental objection is the same as it has always been: British subjects have been placed under severe restrictions so well described by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, for lengthy periods by order of the Home Secretary, who is a member of the Executive, without ever having been convicted of an offence or, until recently, even being told what they were supposed to have done. Such powers are common enough in police states and, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, explained, they may be acceptable in Pakistan and India, but I never expected to see those powers exercised in England, save in time of war when the life of the nation is at stake.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, with great respect to the noble and learned Lord, I really do not think he should be allowed to get away with that. The implication of what he has just said in what I take to be a rhetorical flourish is that what happens in Pakistan, for example, or what has happened in Sri Lanka, is to be equated with what has happened here. Does he not think that our judges, of whom he was one of the most distinguished in this country, have played an extremely sound and controlling role over the exercise of this jurisdiction and have ensured that in fact and in law, it was ECHR compatible?

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I am very glad to hear what the noble Lord has said and I am happy to withdraw any implication that I may have made against what is done in Pakistan and India. However, I never expected to see these powers exercised here. The Secretary of State defends them on the ground that there is no alternative, but there is an alternative. There is another solution and the problem is not almost insoluble, as the right reverend Prelate suggested. The solution lies in covert surveillance. To my knowledge, it is the solution that has been adopted in Germany, for example, and has not been found wanting. Indeed, I believe it to have been adopted in every other western country and it has proved to be successful; control orders have not been relied on. Why should covert surveillance not prove equally successful here?

It may be said that surveillance is more expensive than control orders, and I expect that that is the case. But at least we would have saved the £10 million the Government have spent so far on defending control orders in the courts. In any event, cost should surely not be a consideration when it is the freedom of British subjects which is in issue. It is not as though very large numbers are involved. So far as I know, there have not been more than 12 in any year, as few as eight recently, and not more than 48 in all. Surely we could have found the money, and could still find the money if further resources are going to be made available, to solve this undoubted problem in the way that other countries have solved it; namely, through covert surveillance.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Wednesday 5th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, it has taken a little time for this order to reach us—although it is within the 120 days—and I wonder why that is so. It would have been good to have considered it rather earlier after the order came into effect. However, it means that we have had two helpful reports from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and I have also found helpful briefing that we received within the past two or three days from the Equality and Human Rights Commission.

As the Minister said, this is a curtain-raiser for the Protection of Freedoms Bill. I declare an interest which, when I mentioned it on a previous occasion, I discovered I shared with a surprisingly large number of Members of this House—I was stopped and searched under Section 44 by, in fact, the MoD rather than the Metropolitan Police. I was driving past the Ministry of Defence at the time. That was a random stop and search, although I have to say that I thought, and still think, it is very likely that they needed a middle-aged white woman to tick that box. Actually, they bagged two Peers because I was giving a lift to another, and they found a report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life in my boot—so there was nothing much to trouble them in all this. I was more interested than offended.

I support the order but share some of the concerns expressed by the JCHR. It used the term “unease”—I thought that that was a good one—about the Government’s assertion of necessity without being prepared to provide concrete evidence in support of alleged need. I am using shorthand, but the numbers in the House have reduced and those who are here will know what I am talking about. I am also concerned about what seems to be some confusion between “reasonable suspicion” and “reasonable belief”. The JCHR could not have known that we would debate this matter on the same day as TPIMs, but it made that connection. The JCHR made the point that “reasonable” does not appear regarding the authorising officer’s consideration of necessity for and proportionality of authorisation. When we come to the Bill, which will be amendable, perhaps we can look at the precise terms of the new Section 47.

I take the point that has also been made that placing elements of the code of practice into the legislation—the elements that restrict the use of the powers—would be desirable. It would mean greater clarity, enable breaches to be challenged and make checks on the use of the powers legally binding. There is also the point that we may need to consider further the relationship between these powers and the right to peaceful protest.

Of course I welcome the code and I note—particularly given my personal history—that the selection of individuals and vehicles at random must be within the parameters set out within the authorisation. Can the Minister give a reaction on behalf of the Government to the recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism in his report of last July, at paragraph 8.39, on the revision of the code of practice to introduce full and proper guidance on the exercise of the officer’s discretion to stop and search? It is a longer paragraph than that but I am sure that the Minister will be familiar with it. The JCHR recommended prior judicial authorisation of the power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion. The Minister will not be surprised, as I said in the previous debate, that I am with the committee on that. However, I support the order.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, on this occasion I feel able to support the Government’s proposals unequivocally and without demur. During my time as independent reviewer of terrorism legislation I saw—and I mean saw with my own eyes—Section 44 being overused, misused and occasionally abused. It produced very few, if any, results in terms of counterterrorism intelligence or information, and its passing is not mourned.

The problem was that there was no requirement for reasonable suspicion and it was treated as a random power to stop and search. I had not heard before this evening that my noble friend Lady Hamwee had been stopped and searched. I recall the noble Lord, Lord West, revealing that he had been stopped and searched, and he told me colourfully of the incident.

The passing of Section 44, and the Government’s speedy action in preventing its use, has been welcome, but there was always a gap to be filled as a result. There are going to be events—the Olympic Games are an obvious example but there may be many others—in which there will be reasonably robust intelligence that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that a terrorism act will take place. It is important to allow the police to protect the public at such events by giving them a power to stop and search. It is not a random power and it is not expressed in this order as a random power. I agree with my noble friend that it is desirable that police officers who find this kind of power quite difficult to exercise, particularly if they have come from a different part of the country to carry out crowd control duty, should have as much guidance and as good briefings as possible before they are placed on duty with this power in their hands.

I have some experience of the reviewing of the authorisations which, as the Minister reminded us, used to be for 28 days under Section 44 in geographical areas. During my time as independent reviewer a new look was taken at these authorisations, and greater demands were rightly placed on chief officers to ensure that the authorisations were not simply pro formas but that reasons were given. I hope that the same sort of discipline will apply to authorisations following approval of this order.

I know that the civil servants in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism who scrutinise the applications now have a great deal of experience, which they apply very well in that scrutiny. I therefore believe that as a result of this order we have replaced Section 44 with something that is better, necessary and properly limited in scope.

[Lord Dubs]

My Lords, we all know about the sensitivity of stop and search, and any improvement in the way that it is carried out—as is represented by this remedial order—is all to the good. However, I have one or two questions based upon my membership of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said that the searches would not be random. Am I right in thinking that in the code of practice there are references to random searches? The JCHR was anxious that those references be removed and that the code of practice be devised so that the stop could be,

“justified by the precise nature of the intelligence about the threat”.

Rather than the searches being random there would have to be some intelligence because the order would clearly not be applied unless there was some background knowledge of this sort. It would be desirable to remove the word “random” from the code of practice.

In another report of the JCHR, we suggested that the code of practice be modified to:

“Require the authorising officer to have a reasonable basis for his belief as to the necessity of the authorisation and to provide an explanation of those reasons”.

These would not be large changes, but I wonder whether we might urge that the code of practice be looked at again. Police officers need all the guidance that they possibly can have in dealing with very sensitive situations. We all know that certain communities will feel that they are more targeted than others—notwithstanding the experience of the noble Baroness—and I should have thought that we ought to look again at the code of practice to make sure that it reflects exactly what we want it to reflect and gives our police officers on the street the maximum support for the way they behave.