Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

This is an unjust measure. It offends against the traditions of our common law; it offends against the evolutionary history of our constitution; it offends against the doctrine of human rights; it offends against the basic principles of justice in this proud country. I support the amendment.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, Amendments 17, 42 and 43 in this group are in my name.

First, I would like to say that I support everything that has been said about their amendments by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lords, Lord Goodhart and Lord Morgan—although I have not known the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for quite as long as I have known the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. I support them because their amendments are designed to ensure that the imposition of a TPIM notice is a judicial act, and not an administrative act. If a restriction on basic liberty of this sort is to be imposed on British citizens because of allegations of wrongdoing, and it is not to be a part of the criminal justice process, then surely the procedure must contain as much of the rule of law as is possible.

When opening the debate at Second Reading, the Minister said at column 1137 that the Government’s approach to balancing civil liberties and national security in this context is that the Bill should go no further in limiting people’s rights “than is absolutely necessary”. That was the test he laid down, and it seems to me that that is the right test. However, if we are going to apply that test, surely it requires that the restrictions on people’s liberties are imposed only with the prior approval of a judge. If the security services cannot persuade a judge in a closed session—because that is what is going to take place—that the restrictions are needed, then surely they should not be imposed. In an urgent case, the judge would be asked to give temporary approval until the matter can be fully considered.

There was a suggestion at Second Reading that perhaps the judiciary would not want this responsibility. There are two answers to that. First, the Bill confers on the judiciary the responsibility for deciding whether a TPIM notice is appropriate at a later stage. There seems to be no difference in principle if the judiciary is instead asked to make the decision at the outset. Secondly, your Lordships should in any event have no doubt that if Parliament decides that it is appropriate to ask the judiciary to perform this role at the earlier stage, Her Majesty’s judges will perform their duty faithfully and effectively.

That is what I wanted to add on the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. If, however, judicial control at the outset is not to be included in this Bill—which would be most regrettable—and if the imposition of a TPIM order is to remain at the outset an administrative process, then I have an alternative amendment, Amendment 17, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has added her name. The amendment concerns the standard of proof.

Under Clause 3(1), a TPIM notice may be issued by the Secretary of State where she,

“reasonably believes that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity”.

Amendment 17 seeks to substitute a test of the balance of probabilities. I would ask the Minister, in responding to this debate, to explain why it is that reasonable belief should suffice as the test to be imposed by the Secretary of State. A belief may be reasonable but wrong. Why should these sanctions be imposed on a person if the Secretary of State is unable even to be persuaded that it is more likely than not that the wrongdoing has been committed, or will be committed, by the individual concerned?

If the security services, with all the resources available to them, cannot satisfy the Home Secretary that on the balance of probabilities more likely than not an individual is involved in terrorist activities, surely there is no justification for imposing these restrictions on them. Of course, surveillance measures may well be appropriate even in relation to such a person against whom it cannot be shown on the balance of probabilities that they are involved—but that is a different matter and we are not discussing surveillance measures.

I want to speak also to Amendments 42 and 43 in this group which stand in my name. They ensure that when the court assesses the TPIM at a later stage under Clause 9, the court should form its own view on the merits and not apply a judicial review test. These amendments arise out of the concern expressed by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, at paragraphs 14 to 17 of its report. At Clauses 9(2) and 16(6), the Bill provides that when the court reviews the TPIM at the later stage, it should apply a judicial review test. In the control order context, the courts have made it very clear that they will treat the review as an appeal on the merits of the case. The Government’s Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill accept that this enhanced level of scrutiny should also apply to the TPIMs.

The report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, published today, also supports my Amendments 42 and 43. It says:

“The surest way to deliver the intense scrutiny that the Government says it intends is to write it explicitly into the Bill. We therefore recommend that the Bill be amended to make it clear on the face of the Bill that the review to be conducted by the courts at the review hearing is a ‘merits review’ (as opposed to a supervisory review)”.

Will the Minister please accept, as the Constitution Committee and the JCHR have proposed, that it is desirable to make it clear on the face of the Bill that at the later stage the court will be conducting an appeal on the merits, just as is the case in relation to control orders and as the Explanatory Notes state the Government intend to occur?

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, my name appears with others on Amendments 1 to 4, 16 and 18 to 22. Amendment 5 stands in my name only. I accept that the Bill is warranted, but I echo the point that where in extreme circumstances—national security is a fit subject for an extremity—one departs from a fundamental freedom, it seems to be blindingly obvious that there is no less a fundamental duty to minimise that departure. I cannot for the life of me see how we do that by giving to a politician, however distinguished and assiduous, the task of making one of these—I am tempted to say draconian—orders on his or her own. That cannot be right and I echo all that has been said, in particular by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and by my noble friend Lord Goodhart.

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[Lord Faulks]

I agree with what my noble friend Lord Macdonald and many other noble Lords said, that we can trust the judges. As the Bill currently reads, they have the task of scrutinising the imposition of measures on judicial review principles. Experience and the dicta of judges suggest that they will be particularly rigorous in this. This area is not generally considered one where Ministers are permitted quite the same sense of discretion as, say, on an issue of economics, but it is one where judges really can get in among the detail and form a view of a matter. They are only too conscious of the potential limitations of closed hearings and special advocates, and the potential risk that these present to those who are potentially the target of these measures.

On the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, I acknowledge his distinguished pedigree and the pedigree of the amendment, which I think goes back some time to the original control orders, but I respectfully suggest that it is inappropriate. I suggest that the obligation rests on the Home Secretary to protect the security of citizens. It rests upon her shoulders and it is a heavy burden. If one needs to find any emphasis in this from the Human Rights Act, Article 2 provides an obligation on the part of the public authority, the Government, to take measures to protect the life of citizens. Those measures will include appropriate measures to prevent outrages of this sort—that is of course what this Bill is concerned with. In this Bill she has to reasonably believe that an individual is involved in terrorist activity and reasonably consider that a TPIM and its appropriate measures are necessary. That is an exercise that she, with that heavy burden placed upon her, should perform.

As I understand it, this amendment is born out of an outright opposition to TPIMs and their predecessors, control orders. The courts have minutely examined these control orders in a number of cases. They have had various degrees of enthusiasm about them and about the closed hearings and the special advocates, but they said that they could operate unlawfully or they could operate satisfactorily—it would depend on the individual cases. However, they have survived what was a wholesale attack on them as a measure. It was not decided by any court that they were by definition contrary to the rule of law. It was acknowledged by judges in a number of cases that the security of the nation was a potent argument in favour of such orders.

It was not suggested in any of those judgments that it was better for the courts to have the decision in the way that this amendment suggests. I doubt that the courts would really relish such a task. Their job, traditionally, is to scrutinise, to examine the legality of the decision, but not to take upon themselves an essentially executive decision. I suggest that the Secretary of State—knowing, as she will, that her reasonable belief will be subjected to close scrutiny by a process which, correctly, places a heavy emphasis on the freedom of the individual—will exercise that power extremely responsibly, and I suggest that the balance should remain as it is in the Bill.

Finally, I will say something about the question of the standard of proof. If there is a fundamental shift in the way that power is to be exercised, as is suggested by the amendment, and the matter comes to the courts to decide, then it may be that the standard of proof should be the balance of probabilities. That is the test that has evolved over the years to decide civil matters generally. There have been recent decisions that suggest there is no shifting standard, but it remains the standard. It has developed pragmatically because there have to be decisions in civil cases to be distinguished from the higher standard in criminal cases.

However, as I understand the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should the power remain with the Home Secretary, she should not have the decision based on reasonable belief but on balance of probabilities. I respectfully say that that balance of probability test may be appropriate where there is a judicial process to be undergone, but where we are talking about an executive decision, reasonable belief is much more appropriate than the process of coming to a conclusion on a 51:49 basis, which is far more suitable for a judicial determination other than the decision which at the moment would—and should—rest with the Secretary of State.

[Lord Pannick]

Under the Bill as it is at the moment, the judiciary are involved at the later stage. If they are to conduct a merits review, as the Government intend, they will apply the same test as to standard of proof as the Minister has applied in making the order. If the noble Lord accepts that balance of probabilities is suitable as a judicial test at the end of the process, surely the Secretary of State must apply the same test at the beginning of the process.

[Lord Faulks]

What I endeavoured to say was that the balance of probabilities would be appropriate were the courts to be taking that initial decision in place of the Secretary of State, which I understand to be the burden of the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, whereas I understand that the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that the initial stage and the decision to be taken by the Secretary of State should be on the balance of probabilities, and there I suggest that the current test is more suitable.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I am sorry if I misunderstood my noble friend; I am a simple soul in these matters. However, my understanding was that he had suggested that this measure was outside the rule of law. What I was trying to get over is that I do not accept that point. The Bill is going through a proper process and after it has been enacted, by the will of Parliament, it will be subject to review by the courts. That is the important point to remember.

The group of amendments before us deal with four major points which I will deal with in order. The first one concerns the very simple point of whether the courts should make these orders rather than the Home Secretary. Secondly, we heard the arguments about where the standard of proof should be. A subsidiary part of that was in the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who said that even if we did not accept the first part—that is, shifting the argument to the courts—the standard of proof for the Home Secretary’s decision should be changed. Thirdly, we heard the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, set out in Amendments 42 and 43, dealing with the full merits review. Fourthly, there were arguments about the time limit and how long the TPIM orders should last—whether one year, two years or beyond. I should like to deal at some length with all four points and I hope that I can get them in the right order. Perhaps my notes can assist me in that. It is important that I set out my points.

I should deal first with the proposal for court-paid TPIM notices. I do not agree, as I made clear at Second Reading, that judge-imposed TPIMs represent the right approach for the new regime. I am grateful that on this at least, I have the support of the Opposition Front Bench. They might not like other parts of the Bill but I got the distinct impression that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, agreed with me on that issue. Our view is that it is appropriate that TPIM notices should be imposed by the Home Secretary. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, put it, she is responsible for national security and is best placed to determine what is necessary in the interests of national security, with the benefit of the broader knowledge of the threat picture that sits with her role as Home Secretary.

I emphasise that this is consistent with the approach taken to other executive actions in national security cases, and decisions based on sensitive material. This includes—an example given by my noble friend Lord Carlile—decisions to exclude, deport or deprive people of citizenship on the basis of national security considerations. It is also consistent with the approach taken on decisions to freeze terrorists’ assets—the new legislation which this House approved only last year. It is also consistent with the current provisions under which all control orders have been made.

Noble Lords will appreciate that this is the view not just of the Executive; it is also consistent with views expressed by the courts on the roles properly played by the Home Secretary and the courts in national security matters. The Court of Appeal explicitly recognised in its 2006 judgment, in the case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department and MB, that,

“the Secretary of State is better placed than the court to decide the measures that are necessary to protect the public against the activities of a terrorist suspect”.

In the same judgment, the Court of Appeal also noted that the principle that the courts should pay deference to the Executive on matters relating to state security has long been recognised by the courts in this country, including the Law Lords, and the European Court of Human Rights. This supports the argument that the proper division of responsibilities in the field of national security is for the Home Secretary to make the decisions but for the judiciary to review those decisions, and to review them rigorously, as it always does.

The TPIM Bill provides for extensive, multi-layered court oversight and review of the Home Secretary’s decisions. This includes a requirement for court permission before imposing a TPIM notice, an automatic full review of every case in which a TPIM notice is imposed, and the right of appeal against the Secretary of State’s decisions in relation to, for example, requests to vary the measures imposed or revoke the notice. We think that this apportionment of roles best serves the interests of national security while ensuring that the civil liberties of those who are made subject to TPIM notices are properly protected.

I turn now to the question of the standard of proof. Again, the noble Lord has suggested that his judge-made TPIM notices should be made on the balance of probabilities. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, offered his alternative in Amendments 42 and 43 by suggesting that the same should be imposed on the Secretary of State, were she to be the one making that decision. Although the approaches are different, the question that we need to raise is the appropriate test for imposing a TPIM notice.

The issue of a proper test for the preventive powers now included in the Bill was carefully considered as part of the counterterrorism review conducted by the Home Secretary and the Home Office. The conclusion reached was that it was right to raise the threshold for imposing a TPIM notice to “reasonable belief” from the test of “reasonable suspicion” required to make a non-derogating control order—which is the only kind that has ever been made. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlile for reminding the House that no derogating orders have been made.

The decision was made as part of that review that the standard should be raised to reasonable belief from the test of reasonable suspicion. We believe that raising the threshold to reasonable belief provides an additional safeguard in the new regime compared to the current control order regime. As we made clear when we announced the outcome of the review in January, it is also consistent with the approach that we have taken to the provisions relating to terrorist asset freezing in the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010.

The TPIM regime is a preventive regime intended to protect the public from the risk of terrorism. In reaching the decision to move to reasonable belief, we therefore considered whether changing the threshold in that way could put the public at risk. Our conclusion was that it would be unlikely that any of the cases where we would want to impose a TPIM notice would fail to meet the higher test of reasonable belief.

We are therefore satisfied that the change to reasonable belief is unlikely to be prejudicial to national security. At the same time, that represents an increase in the protection for the civil liberties of the individuals concerned. Those favouring the amendment take the view that the threshold should be further raised to “the balance of probabilities”. In that review, we considered that option. However, we concluded that a move to the balance of probabilities for the main TPIM regime would not give us the right balance to ensure that the public will be protected. Again, I stress that it is a question of getting the balance between ensuring the protection of the public and protecting the liberties of individuals.

[Lord Pannick]

Can the Minister tell the Committee a little more about why the balance of probabilities test would not provide sufficient protection for national security?

[Lord Henley]

The test that the noble Lord proposes, as is made clear by the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, is a slightly tougher test than what we suggest, which is that of reasonable belief. If there is a slightly tougher test, that obviously implies that there would be a greater risk to security. We have increased the test from reasonable suspicion to reasonable belief. We do not believe that we should increase it any further. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that argument; but I see that he does not, and I give way yet again.

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[Lord Pannick]

I am simply trying to establish whether an assessment was made that a balance of probabilities test would be positively damaging to national security in this country. Was such a conclusion reached?

[Lord Henley]

I made clear that, as part of that review, we considered moving to that test. I was not in the Home Office at the time, so I do not know what precise consideration was given, but in the end the decision was taken that, yes, we will raise the standard from reasonable suspicion to reasonable belief, but that to take it beyond that would create risks. A decision had to be made on where the appropriate balance should be, and that is why we came down in favour of reasonable belief rather than a balance of probabilities.

I hope that the noble Lord can accept that, but I can see that it is a very difficult one and we will no doubt discuss it in later stages of the Bill. We believe that reasonable belief should deal with the questions raised by the noble Lord. The same applies to his Amendments 42 and 43 when talking about the decision being made by the Home Secretary herself. Again, I noted what my noble friend Lord Faulks had to say on that matter. Possibly they were better words for use with the Home Secretary’s decision rather than when talking about a judicial process. Again, we feel that we have the balance about right.

I turn now to the question raised on the full merits review in the noble Lord’s Amendments 42 and 43, which I mistakenly said were his amendments on the alternative, but that is covered by his Amendment 17, so I correct myself at this stage. His Amendment 42 specifies that a full court review of a TPIM notice under Clause 9 must be “on the merits” and would delete the subsection of that clause which specifies that,

“the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review”.

As the noble Lord explained, these amendments are designed to ensure that the review of an imposition of a TPIM notice provides a full merits review. He articulated the view of the Constitution Committee—yet another committee that has been looking at this—in its report on the Bill: that it should be clear, on its face, in cases concerning TPIM notices. The function of the court is not limited to ordinary judicial review. Such a constitutionally important matter should not be left for clarification in the Explanatory Notes. Similarly, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made it clear that the purpose behind his intention to oppose the question that Clause 9 stand part of the Bill is to facilitate consideration of this same issue.

The Government have been clear that judicial oversight of the process of imposing measures must be a key feature of the new regime. The involvement of the courts is an important safeguard for the rights of the individual, and the Bill takes a comprehensive and multilayered approach to this. As the Explanatory Notes explain, the case law relating to control orders is subject to a particularly intense level of review by the High Court. It is absolutely the case that the Government intend for the same intense level of scrutiny to be applied in court reviews of TPIM notices under Clause 9. All noble Lords will be aware that the courts have not been slow in finding against Home Secretaries of whatever regime for many years in control order litigation, and have used their powers to quash control orders or to give directions to the Secretary of State as appropriate under the current system of judicial review principles, as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in the case of MB.

We are of the view that the courts will apply relevant case law to TPIM proceedings as appropriate. That will, of course, include the case law on the type of review undertaken by the courts in these kinds of cases. In summary, in relation to the full substantive review of each control order, the Court of Appeal ruled again in MB that the High Court must make a finding of fact as to whether the reasonable suspicion limb of the statutory test for imposing a control order is met, and must apply intense scrutiny to the Secretary of State’s decisions on the necessity of each of the obligations imposed under the control order while paying a degree of deference—

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[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I offer the Government my support on this issue of relocation. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, expressed concern that political considerations, as he put it, are trumping national security concerns. I suggest to the noble Lord and the Committee that the issue is more difficult than that. The way in which the noble Lord puts it ignores a vital dimension. The reality is that relocation is a particularly intrusive measure to impose on the subject. It is strikingly damaging to the personal life of the individual and his or her family.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

Will the noble Lord address the evidence given by the deputy assistant commissioner, which I know he will have read, which pays tribute to the effectiveness of that exclusion order?

[Lord Pannick]

I am coming to that, but let us at the outset recognise the impact of a relocation measure. If one is going to adopt a measure or power of this sort, one needs to recognise the striking impact that it has on the spouse and the children. A measure that amounts to internal exile of a person needs a compelling justification.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I know that the noble Lord eats legal authorities for breakfast, probably literally sometimes. I would just like him to give his comments on the cogent judgment and reasoning of Mr Justice Simon in CD, the case to which I referred, in which the judge took the matters the noble Lord has just mentioned into account and reached a considered conclusion. Does he say that the judge reached the wrong conclusion, giving undue proportion to some of the factors he was weighing?

[Lord Pannick]

Of course, the learned judge was considering the exercise of the powers that are contained under the control order regime. The Committee and the House have to consider what is a fair balance—this is the test that the Minister rightly has repeatedly propounded—between national security and the liberty of the individual.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I promise not to intervene on the noble Lord’s speech again but he is ducking the question. Does he not accept that Mr Justice Simon in that case, having weighed up the facts, came to the conclusion that the safety of the state and of the public was better protected by relocation and that it was proportionate to the interests of CD? If so, should we not keep the situation as it was then?

[Lord Pannick]

The noble Lord can intervene as many times as he likes. I welcome his interventions. My answer to his point is twofold. We can always add more and more intrusive measures and protect ourselves more effectively from the perspective of national security. The question is: what is a fair balance? I am assuming that the Government, not just concerned about a particular individual case but looking at these issues as a whole, have concluded that relocation would undermine the fair balance because of its particularly intrusive nature and that the combination of the measures contained in the TPIM and the surveillance measures that can always be imposed on an individual who is not relocated will effectively protect the public. It is true that there is a financial cost, which is the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Does the noble Lord wish to add to that?

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

The noble Lord is being very kind in accepting all these interventions, but this is an important point. If the Government were really confident, they would not be producing a draft emergency Bill or having the provision in this Bill to allow the Home Secretary in an election to use the enhanced measures. I am afraid the fact is that in their heart, and particularly in the noble Lord’s own department, they know that the exclusion provisions are very important. I am sure that, in the future, they are going to have to use the emergency provisions if this Bill goes through. I do not think that the Government have that confidence, and that is the worry.

[Lord Pannick]

We will hear from the Minister in relation to that in a moment. I am satisfied that a sensible and fair way of dealing with what is a very difficult issue, because of the primacy of national security and the particularly intrusive nature of a relocation power, is for the Government to satisfy themselves, as I assume they have done, that relocation powers are not needed. However, given the importance of this power, they recognise that it is sensible to have reserve powers available which, God forbid they are ever needed, can be brought into force. I support the Government on this.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I, too, support the Government and I am very much with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. If my noble friend Lord Carlile succeeds in getting answers to his questions about evidence, I shall consider that there is a huge amount of favouritism going on. That is exactly the sort of thing that we have all asked for on many occasions, but inevitably we are not satisfied because we know that advice to the Government is advice to the Government, and we cannot read their heart as we are being asked to do.

I do not quite understand the distinction between politics and security. For all the reasons we have talked about and will continue to talk about, it is a much more nuanced and complicated—there is probably a geometric term for it that I do not know—picture than a simple polarisation as regards the impact of particular measures. Of course surveillance is going to be costly, but another balance that one must come to is where one puts one’s efforts and spends one’s money.

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Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

38: Clause 8, page 4, line 26, at end insert—
“( ) Directions under subsection (5) must include a direction that the Secretary of State shall provide the individual on whom the measures are imposed with sufficient information about the allegations against him or her to enable him or her at the review hearing to give (if possible) effective instructions to his or her representatives and information to the special advocate in relation to those allegations.”

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 49. These amendments concern the disclosure of information to a person who is the subject of a TPIM. As the Committee knows, in the AF case in 2009 the Appellate Committee of your Lordships' House considered what the principles of fairness require as to the disclosure of information in the context of control orders. I repeat my declaration of interest—I represented AF in the Appellate Committee.

The Law Lords decided that a control order is invalid as a matter of law unless sufficient of the case against the individual is disclosed to him so as to enable him to give instructions to his lawyers to answer the allegations against him. If the Home Secretary is not prepared to disclose that much, the control order cannot be maintained. Disclosure to the special advocate does not suffice, said the Law Lords, because the special advocate cannot of course disclose the information to the subject of the order and obtain a response from him.

In the recent Supreme Court case of Tariq v the Home Office, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, explained the principle of law at paragraph 81 of his judgment. He said that in AF,

“the fundamental rights of the individual were being severely restricted by the actions of the executive. Where issues such as that are at stake, the rule of law requires that the individual be given sufficient material to enable him to answer the case that is made against him by the state”.

The TPIM, like the control order, involves severe restrictions on the personal liberty of an individual. Therefore, a TPIM is going to be unlawful unless the AF principle is satisfied. This was addressed in today’s report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. At paragraph 1.20, it addressed the Government’s argument that the AF disclosure obligation,

“does not necessarily apply to all TPIMs because some will not be sufficiently ‘stringent’ to engage Article 6”,

of the human rights convention. The Joint Committee points out:

“This is an argument that the Government has already made and lost”,

in the context of control orders,

“in relation to ‘light touch control orders’”.

The Joint Committee expressed the view, with which I agree, that the AF disclosure obligation applies in all TPIM cases, because they will all involve severe restrictions on personal liberty. I should add that if the TPIM is less stringent, it is likely to be because the subject of the order is not one of the most dangerous individuals and there will therefore be a weaker security argument for non-disclosure of the essence of the case against such an individual.

Disclosure to the individual of the case against him is not just required by law, but is also of enormous importance as a matter of principle. Your Lordships will recall our earlier debate when one of the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in his objections to the proposal of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, that the imposition of the TPIM should be a judicial process, was precisely that the subject is protected by the important disclosure obligations that will be imposed on the Secretary of State. The noble Lord emphasised that.

Amendment 38 would require disclosure of the essence of the case against the individual at the directions hearing. Amendment 49 would make clear that the rules of court must provide for such disclosure.

I have two questions for the Minister. First, does he accept that the AF principle requiring disclosure of the essence of the case against the subject applies in the context of a TPIM, as it does in the context of a control order? Secondly, does he agree that it would be preferable for the matter to be stated in the Bill, to avoid the expensive, protracted litigation which will otherwise inevitably occur?

The Joint Committee's report, which I mentioned, gave its support at paragraphs 1.21 and 1.23 to my two amendments. The Joint Committee added the valuable point that the disclosure obligation should be at the earlier stage of the preliminary hearing, to ensure that the subject of the TPIM can instruct his lawyers—or indeed give information to the special advocate—before the directions hearing. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has tabled drafting amendments to my two amendments. I shall certainly want to consider them and the suggestion of the Joint Committee before Report but, for today's purposes, I welcome the opportunity to hear the Minister's response to my amendments. I beg to move.

Amendment 39 (to Amendment 38)

Moved by

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Amendment 39 (to Amendment 38) withdrawn.

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to the Minister for his careful response and to all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I agree with the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on the need for certainty in this and allied areas of the law. With regard to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to my amendment, by talking about “if possible” I intended to refer not to the possibility of disclosure but the possibility of the subject of the order providing an answer. I respectfully agree with the noble Baroness that it would be wiser to omit the words, “if possible” to avoid ambiguity.

This is a simple but vital issue. Should the Secretary of State be able to impose these restrictions on an individual without telling him why? It is not just a question of fairness. Nothing is more likely to undermine public confidence in a TPIM than for the Secretary of State to make such an order without telling people why. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on the Opposition Front Bench, is not yet persuaded to support my amendment. His position, as he articulated it, appears to be at odds with the ruling in AF which makes it very clear that the duty of disclosure applies irrespective of national security concerns. I am also sorry that I have not yet persuaded the Minister that this matter should be in the Bill. I am still concerned that on a matter as vital as this, it is not good enough simply for the Bill to state that Ministers must act in compliance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, welcome though that is. It is desirable to address the question of disclosure, which has led to enormous quantities of litigation in the past and will inevitably lead to much more litigation in the future if we do not address the matter specifically. It is highly desirable that this matter is put into the Bill in clear, unambiguous terms. We will no doubt return to this matter on Report but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 38 withdrawn.