North Wales Abuse Allegations

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am very pleased that my noble friend has made that contribution to the debate. If I disagree with him, it is not because I do not respect his experience and the fact that he was active in politics in that part of the country at the time when this report was being produced. He has a copy and has no doubt studied it. However, if I thought that nothing more was going to come out of this further investigation, all I would say is, “Fine. That is very good”. If there is nothing more to be found, we can rest content that the matter is indeed closed. However, if we find that there is other material, we should know of it. We are right to seek to pursue this matter even though many of the individuals involved may long ago have disappeared.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, on 17 June 1996 I asked the then Secretary of State, Mr Hague, whether all the cases that have been referred to in the appendices to the Jillings report had led to prosecutions. I was told that that was not the case, and that there were names which were still outstanding. Can we be assured that, as a result of what the Government are planning, those outstanding names will be reconsidered with a view to prosecution if at all possible?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am sure that is the purpose of the further inquiries that are being made.

Chilcot Committee: Intercept Evidence

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

The noble Lord makes a very valid point about the importance of intelligence, and why we do not necessarily want to risk losing that intelligence by making use of it as evidence. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support, and I look forward to being slapped around on this by noble Lords from all sides of the House for months to come.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Is there a precedent anywhere for Governments having published independent legal advice?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, as the noble Lord will be well aware, it is the general rule that legal advice is not published.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Marquess of Lothian]

My Lords, I wish to add briefly to what the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, has said. I am puzzled by this sub-paragraph because it does not say “information other than national security”; it says,

“not limited to national security”.

That suggests that anything that cannot be allowed to go to another Select Committee should not be given to the Intelligence and Security Committee. We debated earlier why the ISC should not be a Select Committee, and one reason is so that it can receive information which cannot be passed to an ordinary Select Committee. It may be that this provision is very well meaning and that it touches on advice given to Ministers or on other matters where I think we would all accept there have to be limitations. However, I wonder whether the draftsman has this slightly wrong. One reason for asking for the sub-paragraph to be deleted is in the hope that the Minister, along with the draftsman, will look at it again and come back with something which meets what I think the sub-paragraph is trying to achieve in meaning but which it does not achieve at the moment.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, this concerns precisely the same query as I had during our debate on the previous amendment—that is, I cannot understand what the provision is referring to, although I recognise the wording. The wording comes from the draft of something else that I have read and it must already be known to the agencies. Therefore, some briefing must have been given to the Minister regarding the source and why its inclusion in the Bill is warranted. Perhaps even now at this late stage I can, on a second occasion, ask for the same information. I should like to know the answer. It may be that the provision should simply be redrafted in language which simpletons such as myself can understand. However, at the moment I do not understand what it means.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Marquess of Lothian]

If I may, I will quickly add a word to what the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, said. He talked about this provision creating bureaucracy. In my view it could be worse. It could create an enormous logjam in Downing Street if every single item needed the consent of the Prime Minister. The danger then is that the logjam will continue to grow until you get to a stage where information that should have been looked at either will not be looked at or will be looked at so late in the day that it is not worth looking at.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I have proposed Amendment 31 not because I want to remove completely the intent behind the words,

“is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation”;

but because it needs qualifying further. Under the proposals in this clause, it is possible to block much operational material being brought before the Committee. As I read it, the agencies need only declare that a matter is,

“part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation”,

and they can block it and deny access to the committee. What is the danger in that? It could close the door on a large volume of information.

Let us take as an example operations in Iraq. Because of the merging of operations, one could simply group an operation, which the committee might regard as one that it should be considering, with other operations in Iraq but merge them under a single operation heading and, by taking that action, avoid bringing information about those operations before the committee. Therefore, merged operations may well hide information from the committee to which it should have access. The same would apply to operations in Afghanistan. It could certainly apply to operations relating to drugs in Colombia and, without doubt, it could refer to operations in Northern Ireland. Simply the declaration that they were merged under one operation would mean that the committee could be denied information. I wondered whether the services were aware of this when they were making their submissions during the drawing up of the Bill, so that they were prepared to concede the principle of access to operational information.

That brings me back to my model, because it is only if the chairman of the committee has access to everything that that possible problem can be avoided. The chairman would be in a position to argue with the agency about whether the merging of operations was denying information to the committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

This has nothing to do with the courts. This will be a discussion in the committee with the chairman and the agencies, which is where we may well end up having an argument. The agencies may say no, or Ministers may say, “No, you cannot have it because it is part of some ongoing operation”. They will not know the point at which operations have merged into a long extended operation that might go on for a long time. I am quite worried about this section. I am beginning to believe that the agencies might have conceded on this fact because they knew that they would be able to use this issue of merged operations as a way of avoiding giving information to the committee. The Minister is saying nothing here to reassure me. Perhaps he will give us more detail on Report about what constitutes “ongoing” in the way which the noble Lord, Lord King, has suggested.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, on that subject, when the Minister considers the word “ongoing”, will he tell the House whether it covers a longer period than “current”? I think I would have understood “current” investigations.

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Moved by

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

33: Clause 2, page 2, line 24, at end insert—
“(d) must be approved by Parliament”

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I shall be very brief as the hour is late. I cannot see what the problem is with the Government accepting this amendment, which would simply require that the memorandum of understanding under this clause should be approved by Parliament. It is not as if the memorandum of understanding would include security sensitive information. As I understand it, it is simply about structures. The parliamentary debate would be about the structures that have been established in the detail of the memorandum of understanding. In addition, if Parliament were to give approval during the debate, Members might want to raise issues not covered in the memorandum of understanding. One of these might be regarding the investigator. There was once an investigator to the ISC. If I remember correctly, his name was Mr Morrison, and for reasons I have never understood his employment was terminated. Many Members called for the investigator to be in place and I should have thought this is an example of an area where Members of Parliament might want to question Ministers.

There is also the issue of access to individual officers within the service. When I was on the committee, the arrangement was that it was primarily the directors of the services who gave evidence to the committee, although on occasion it was one or two others. It might be that the memorandum of understanding should be considered by Parliament in the context that there needs to be some flexibility on whether people other than agency directors—perhaps officers from lower down within the ranks—should be called upon to give evidence to the committee. I do not know because this is an area I do not know a lot about. All I am saying is that I think there is room here for a debate in Parliament to consider the detail of the structure, and it is something that we have not debated here today.

My noble friend Lord Rosser dealt in some detail with these issues during the debate on one of his amendments and he sought assurances. I do hope that the Minister can explain today why Parliament will not be approving these matters. I understand that the document will be laid before Parliament, but that there will be no parliamentary debate. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendment 34 in this group, which uses the formal language of the affirmative procedure but comes to the same thing as the noble Lord’s Amendment 33. I tabled the amendment in part because I wanted to seek more information about the memorandum of understanding. The noble Lord may not have seen it, but the Government have today circulated a long note responding to a number of points raised by noble Lords at Second Reading, for which I thank them. The note includes a paragraph on the memorandum of understanding in response to my question about whether we will be able to see a draft of it, or of a framework, to enable further debate.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Did the noble Baroness say that she had seen a draft document or memorandum of understanding? Perhaps I misheard. Could she clarify what she said? I am sorry I could not hear.

[Baroness Hamwee]

No, I said a note from the Government responding to points made by noble Lords at Second Reading.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, again I do not think that my noble friend followed what I said. We will not agree the final memorandum until after the Bill has completed. However, I make it clear that we want to produce a draft of it at an earlier stage as we complete our discussions with the ISC. Once we have an agreed draft, it is our intention to publish it to help inform debate. I hope that this will happen before Report. The Bill is only just starting in this House. It has to go through another place as well. As discussions on this will be ongoing—I must not use the word “ongoing”—as the Bill is considered by Parliament, it would not be appropriate to share the first draft before at least it has been agreed by both parties.

My other point is what I said at the beginning of my remarks: the memorandum of understanding, having been agreed by the Prime Minister and the ISC, can be altered and replaced by agreement at any time. Since it is a working document that can move on and be altered and agreed by the two parties, it would not be appropriate to constantly put it back to both Houses of Parliament for debate and agreement. That is not the position with other memorandums of understanding. Normally there is no parliamentary approval process. That is why I mentioned that this had been to the Lords Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee, which, as far as I know, is perfectly happy with the process.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I will not delay the Committee. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord King, who clearly understands exactly what is being said—namely, that Parliament will be denied the right to approve the memorandum of understanding. I am sorry that I did not see a copy of the letter that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was fortunate to receive. It may have truncated my comments during debate on a number of amendments this evening. However, I suspect that we will have rich pickings in the memorandum and that we will come back to it on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 33 withdrawn.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 2. These two amendments are in my name and that of my noble colleague on the Intelligence and Security Committee, the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, as well as those of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I can introduce the amendments quite briefly, and I hope that we are pushing at an open door. It is, I think, common ground with the Government that the Intelligence and Security Committee will serve Parliament and the public better if it is made clear that it is indeed a committee of Parliament and not a creature of the Government. Since its creation in 1994 the committee has played an independent part, but because the committee is appointed by the Government, it has often been difficult to convince outside observers of its independence. I again pay tribute to the committee, as I did in my Second Reading speech to earlier members of the committee. It is now common ground that it has behaved in such a way that it has come of age and its independence and duty to Parliament can be made clear by adding the words that it is indeed a committee of Parliament. I hope that that is agreed with the Government.

Amendment 2 would have the effect that the Intelligence and Security Committee would enjoy the same rights and privileges as a departmental Select Committee in respect of having parliamentary privilege. Perhaps I may just explain that. Because the Intelligence and Security Committee is created by statute and is not a Select Committee of Parliament, it does not automatically receive the same rights and privileges as, for example, a departmental Select Committee. That is the purpose of writing in the Bill that it should have parliamentary privilege. This issue is important, because the committee’s work has to be conducted in confidence and those who give evidence to it, including not only the intelligence agencies but also others, must have confidence that the security of their evidence will be protected. This is necessary not only for future evidence but for past evidence, because in this litigious age there needs to be assurance that evidence previously given cannot be sought to be disclosed as evidence in any proceedings. To make that clear, this amendment proposes that privilege should apply to the proceedings of the Intelligence and Security Committee as it does to Select Committees of Parliament.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Is there a precedent for this form of committee anywhere within the constitution?

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

There are indeed committees that are set up by statute. I can give the noble Lord three examples: the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament, the Public Accounts Commission and the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission. Those are all similar committees which have been set up by statute but are not Select Committees.

[The Marquess of Lothian]

My Lords, I rise briefly in support of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, on both amendments, to which my name is also attached. I do so because I am also a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I was first appointed to the committee in 2006 and therefore have some years of experience of it.

In looking at the first amendment I feel very strongly that we need to make it clear that this is more than just a committee. The problem that we have faced in terms of credibility until now, as the noble Lord said, is that we were a committee created by statute but appointed by the Prime Minister and reporting to the Prime Minister—who could report to Parliament in due course. Although we exercised what we thought was the maximum independence possible, the public perception was that we were actually a creation of, and therefore a tool of, the Executive. In that regard, less confidence was put in the reports that we produced. My belief has been that if this committee is to work properly—which is what I believe the Bill is about now—we need to make it clear that this is not just a committee hanging in the ether but a committee of Parliament: it is composed of parliamentarians, exercises its oversight of the intelligence agencies on behalf of Parliament and reports to Parliament, although the Prime Minister will ultimately have a veto over appointments and also have access to the reports that we produce. I believe that the simple addition of the words “of Parliament” will make it clear that what I am looking for can be achieved.

I have been told in the past that there may be difficulties about the words “Committee of Parliament”. I am a simple Scottish lawyer, and I have worked very hard to understand what these possible difficulties can be given that, as I said at Second Reading, a committee of Parliament is what we are effectively becoming. I hope, therefore, that the Government will accept that, because I think that the committee’s credibility in exercising parliamentary oversight of the intelligence agencies is an important part of our developing constitution.

I turn briefly to the second amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. I have very little to add to what he said other than this. He talked about the need for those who give evidence to the Committee to be able to do so in the knowledge that their evidence will not suddenly be made public. That is a very important part of the way in which the Intelligence and Security Committee works. It is particularly important in one respect. When the intelligence agencies give evidence to us they will naturally take account of how secure their evidence will be. If they feel that that evidence is not secure then they quite simply will not give us that evidence. We rely on their confidence in us to ensure that they give us the maximum amount of information upon which we can exercise our oversight. Unless we have the protection which is the purpose of the second amendment I believe that that confidence will not be there. I hope, therefore, that the Government will accept both amendments.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I have reservations which I will deal with when I speak to my amendment arguing the case for a Select Committee to take on these responsibilities. Parliament is being required to approve wording which suggests that this committee is controlled by Parliament, but without recognising what the Justice and Security Green Paper of October 2011 says at paragraph 3.19. It states:

“However, under such arrangements”—

that is, the arrangements of a Select Committee—

“the Government would clearly have no veto on publication of sensitive material”.

I repeat:

“no veto on publication of sensitive material”.

In other words, the provision is being introduced as a way for the Government to secure control outside of Parliament, through this half-measure of a committee, over the publication of sensitive material. My view is very simple. If they want to do that, let it be done through a full Select Committee structure. That is the substance of my amendment which will come later.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

My Lords, if I may intervene in this discussion, I seek to bring to it the “veneer of experience”—to quote the Deputy Prime Minister, as the noble Baroness on the Front Bench did on Second Reading—that this House can contribute on these matters. I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who is an excellent member of the committee that I had the privilege to chair for a number of years. In listening to this debate I am absolutely sure that we have reached the time to move forwards. However, I am torn between Amendment 1, the significance of which I have to admit I do not fully understand, and Amendment 3, which proposes moving to Select Committee status. Early in our committee’s discussions we considered the role of a Select Committee, and—if I can stop the noble Lord mucking up my papers—I shall find a quote from a report that our committee produced in 1998 or 1999. We said:

“There are arguments for and against such a status, and we have not as yet formed a view on the issue … Even if thought desirable, however, such changes would take time to introduce, and could alter significantly the structure of relationships between the Committee and the intelligence community”.

I think that, as time has moved on, we have established that sort of relationship.

It is important to remember where we have come from. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, rightly points out that the agencies were not resistant to the establishment of a committee—that certainly matches my own impression, and she knows the situation much better than I do—many serving in the agencies wanted not only an Intelligence and Security Committee but, in their own interest, for that committee to be as thorough and active as possible so that it could carry credibility. As one of the big problems facing the agencies was false allegation and rumour, an independent and credible body would be seen to address and deal effectively with those issues—in secrecy if necessary, and without disclosure of operational information or other evidence, some of which might come from other countries.

My feeling at that time was that it was critical that we should establish credibility, because although many of the agencies were in favour of the committee, others were nervous about whether parliamentarians could be trusted, whether information would be secure or whether it would be leaked—all the problems that one might advance. There was a lot of hostility. I recall that, way back in the early 1980s, Jonathan Aitken was an original proposer of an intelligence and security committee, and he was interrupted by an old colleague, Ray Whitney—a distinguished former member of the foreign service, and a Member of Parliament at the time—who said that whatever one says about the Senate intelligence committee, there is general agreement that it has destroyed the American intelligence capability. That was an exaggeration of the sort of strong feeling common at the time. Having had the privilege of serving under the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, who was not the first outspoken advocate of this particular approach, I can attest that there was a lot of resistance to it.

When our committee started out it was very important to establish its credibility. I felt at that time—and members of the committee shared this view; I think that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, was a keen advocate of it—that it was more important to establish the trust of the agencies, to make sure that they were forthcoming with information, because they could switch us off at any time. After all, we were into the “don’t-know don’t knows”, so establishing that trust was important. I believe that that trust, confidence and relationship have been established now—more than established, I hope, given the passage of time. I am therefore very torn between these amendments, Amendment 1 or 2, which propose setting up a Committee of Parliament, or whether there is not an argument for going straight to a Select Committee. I have learnt something today from the noble Lord, Lord Butler. After spending a brief period of 30 years in the House of Commons, I had not understood that the PAC was set up under a different arrangement. One learns something every day. It sounds attractive for the IC to be on the same wavelength.

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Moved by

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, at end insert—
“( ) The ISC shall be a Select Committee of Parliament.”

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I welcome this debate on an issue that I have pursued now for 14 years since 1998. As I foresaw the response that the Minister has given today—that he was unable to give undertakings on privilege—I asked for my amendment to be taken separately. He will now understand why I had it moved from the group containing Amendment 1.

I corresponded with and made direct representations to Prime Minister Blair and others in Downing Street over a number of years. I was supported in doing so by the overwhelming majority of Labour Members of the other House and members of other political parties, with whom I had conversations in the late 1990s. There was overwhelming support for the principle of a Select Committee. I do not believe that oversight is fully credible while the committee remains a creature of the Executive or some halfway house that lacks parliamentary privilege. Privilege is the central issue in this debate—this was raised in the debate on the previous amendment—and that is why I am driven down the Select Committee route.

The problem at the moment is that the committee considers its relationship with the Prime Minister more important to its operations than its relationship with Parliament. The Government’s proposal seeks to address that but, in reality, it will make little difference to the nature of the relationship. I strongly dissent from the view that this relationship with the Prime Minister is more important than the relationship with Parliament, and that is why I favour Select Committee status.

We live on the threshold of an era in which civil liberties and freedoms will be subjected to increasing pressure. In such conditions, one has to beef up systems of regulation, safeguard and oversight. Those systems need to command public support, confidence and trust. I do not believe that, despite the good intentions of its membership and the witnesses who come before it, the ISC, as a creature of the Executive, can possibly meet those tests. What is proposed will in reality make little difference.

The committee needs new and increased powers to call persons and papers and to communicate with other committees. There are times when the information that comes before the committee should, in certain circumstances, be referred to other Select Committees. I shall deal with that in later amendments. This would enable it to carry out its inquiries. It does not mean that security will be in any way breached because mechanisms could be introduced to ensure that that does not happen with the release of material.

It is already acknowledged that the committee needs the power to report directly to Parliament and the argument has been well rehearsed over the years. The ISC needs the power to take evidence under oath: Select Committees have that power. It would not be that it took all evidence under oath but it should have the power to do so. As I say, Select Committees have that power but the ISC does not.

Without going into any details, there are times when the committee might receive assurances on issues where, if those assurances were given under oath, the committee might have the confidence, with the approval of the Prime Minister, to make statements that would be extremely helpful during the course of public debate and in the exercise of reassuring public opinion.

The ISC needs the power to take evidence under privilege. Technically, if a person appeared before the committee today, he could libel another person because he would not be protected by privilege. The committee has none of the powers that are afforded to witnesses giving evidence to parliamentary Select Committees. Above all, the committee should have the power to hold witnesses in contempt if they deliberately mislead the committee, which is what happens in the Commons. If Parliament knew that the committee had the ability to take evidence under oath and to hold witnesses in contempt in the event that they were deliberately to mislead, it would substantially increase the credibility of any reassuring statement that the committee makes.

The arguments are not new. They have been rehearsed at length on a number of occasions in the past, most notably during the passage of the 1989 and 1994 legislation—we go back a long way in this discussion. Those supporting Select Committee status included the noble Lord, Lord Hattersley, then speaking from the Labour Front Bench, the future Secretary of State for Trade, the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson, and the future Minister at the Cabinet Office, now the noble Lord, Lord Cunningham of Felling. All made positive speeches in favour of Select Committee status. In 1989, the entire Labour shadow cabinet, including the shadow Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary voted for full Select Committee status and not a halfway house. I have a copy of the Division List and the entire Labour membership in the House of Lords at the time voted for Select Committee status. We are not arguing new principles today.

Some say that legislation is required if the decision is taken to accord Select Committee status, but that is not altogether clear, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, was saying. It is argued by many that, although some tinkering with the law might be necessary, resolutions establishing the committee—effectively a Joint Committee—carried in both Houses with simple resolutions could cover all the functions of the committee.

I recognise that there is some opposition to the whole proposal. Some argue that the fact that the committee reports directly to the Prime Minister gives individual members of it additional clout, kudos, weight or importance in the political world. That was the view of some on the committee when I was a member. I strongly reject that view. Others argue that no way can be found to restructure the practices and the procedure of the Select Committee so as to ensure executive influence for reasons of national security over material that it may seek to publish. That is simply untrue. A resolution of both Houses could require that the committee sought the approval of the appropriate agency before reporting to the House. The resolutions could further provide that, in the event of a dispute arising between the agency and the committee over the publication of information or evidence in a report to the House, the matter at dispute could be referred to the Prime Minister for his decision and the committee could be required to comply with the decision of the Prime Minister. That is what I referred to during my Second Reading speech as the override.

If in unforeseen circumstances, the committee, or any member of it, were to threaten to breach the committee’s rules and procedure, as agreed by the House in these resolutions, it would always be open to the Leader of the House, on the instructions of the Prime Minister, to dissolve the entire committee or to remove any member of it on a resolution tabled on one day which took effect on the next. There are adequate provisions, although I shall argue on a later amendment that this power would need to be exercised with great caution.

I believe that Parliament could carry resolutions that make the committee as hermetically sealed as any structure that currently exists. We are told that such a committee could not be prevented from taking evidence in public session, if that were the wish of the committee. In response, I argue that a resolution of the House could introduce a general prohibition on the Select Committee taking evidence in public session—resolutions of the Commons can be carried to deal with the issue. It could further place a requirement on the committee to seek the permission of the appropriate agencies and the Prime Minister in conditions of dispute, if it wished to take evidence in public in particular circumstances. It is argued that although a Select Committee is neither more nor less likely than the ISC to leak, as a Select Committee it would have the right to publish reports in a way that could prove prejudicial to the interests of national security. A resolution of the House could introduce a general prohibition on the Select Committee publishing reports without approval. It could further place a requirement on the committee to seek the permission of the appropriate agency and the Prime Minister in conditions of dispute, if it wished to publish a report. Safeguards would be available for every eventuality in the event that it were to be created a full Select Committee of Parliament.

As prime ministerial appointees, members are currently responsible for reporting collectively to the Prime Minister. It is argued that such limited powers to report would not be possible if the committee were appointed by the legislature. There is no reason why the resolution of the House should not stipulate the procedure to be used in the publication of reports. It could require the committee to publish its reports subject to sidelining by the Prime Minister for reasons of national security, as currently happens.

It is also argued that a move to a parliamentary arrangement could lead to greater pressures on Ministers to be accountable as witnesses, with less emphasis on agency heads giving evidence. That argument is not supported by an examination of practices in some of the House’s other committees. In my 11 years on the Public Accounts Committee, Ministers never attended as witnesses. I am not advocating a prohibition on Ministers attending the ISC, but Ministers would be no more likely to attend a House Intelligence Committee than the ISC. With hearings being held in private, there will be no additional pressure on Ministers to attend. I believe that with the right membership, a parliamentary committee is as secure as the ISC. I reject the statement in the Green Paper as I said in an earlier intervention; if the right people are selected there will not be a problem.

I remind the Committee that this is the first real open debate we have had in Parliament on this issue in 14 years. I welcome this debate. We need now to grasp the mettle and not muck around with some interim or secondary arrangement. There is an expectation among colleagues that the system should work. We must be satisfied that the structure we create is going to work so that we have a system that is credible with the public.

[The Marquess of Lothian]

My Lords, I have long been an admirer of the persistence of the noble Lord, both in this House and in the other place. Certainly, in regard to his amendment, that is no exception. I wish to correct him on one point he made at the end. There is no prohibition on relevant Ministers attending the ISC and they have done so on a number of occasions. That is simply a matter of fact.

Over the years that I have been a member of the ISC, I was one of those who thought very carefully about the future of the committee and whether it should be a Select Committee. Although I understand many of the points made by the noble Lord, particularly in relation to privilege, I shall say why ultimately I do not agree with him on making this committee a full Select Committee of Parliament.

Over a long—probably overlong—if broken career in the other place, I served on two Select Committees. Their purpose—I refer to the Select Committee on Energy and the Public Accounts Committee—was to openly take evidence that was available to the public on matters of relevance in terms of energy and of public accounting. The culture of a Select Committee is based on being able to take open evidence. There is no compunction on witnesses at a Select Committee to give full answers; there is no evidence given on oath. But normally a Select Committee is not dealing with confidential information that cannot be disclosed in that forum.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I wish to make a brief point. In doing so, I know that I risk being regarded by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as the siren voice of cautious officialdom—or, in my case, cautious former officialdom. However, I want to raise a question on what the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Deben, said.

The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was that the badging of the security committee would be improved if it were called a Select Committee. I can see the case for that. I think we all agree that the ultimate purpose is that the public should have confidence in the committee’s scrutiny of the intelligence services. However, it was clear from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, that if this were to be a Select Committee, it would have to be hedged around by a very large number of parliamentary resolutions, and that would have the same effect as the constraints that are written into the Bill. The question is: would that make it more convincing if it were a Select Committee when it was a Select Committee unlike any other because it would be so inhibited by those restraints?

They say that something which looks like a duck and quacks like a duck can be regarded as being a duck, but this would not look like or quack like a Select Committee; it would be something completely separate. I suspect that this might reduce, rather than increase, public confidence in it because people would see that it was a Select Committee that did not operate like any other Select Committee and could not really be regarded as a Select Committee in the true sense in which the public understand it.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Could I draw attention again to the noble Lord’s own argument over privilege? The issue of privilege will not arise in the event that it is a full Select Committee because by definition it has everything that the noble Lord proposes in his amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, obviously my noble friend is right to say that times have moved on. All of us can remember as far back as 1989. Things have obviously changed since then. I was merely trying to tease out the official view of the Opposition at this stage, but it does not matter because as we all know, and as a very distinguished Cross-Bencher, the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, made clear, we are all heading in the same direction and at least trying to make sure that we achieve the right thing—a committee that has the appropriate degree of public confidence.

I do not want to re-emphasise what I said earlier about the ISC being appointed by Parliament rather than the Prime Minister, and about its members being free to choose their own chair. That will be debated later, in the context of another amendment tabled by the noble Lord. In parallel with these statutory changes, it is the Government’s intention that the ISC will be funded and accommodated by Parliament. The amendment sets up the ISC as a Select Committee of Parliament. The noble Lord could have achieved that by the simpler means of leaving out the whole of Part 1 and making sure that the appropriate authorities in another place created the Select Committee—but he went down a different route and we are having this debate for the very good reasons that all speakers in the debate made clear.

I will explain why we believe that the ISC should be created by statute. It is to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect against the disclosure of sensitive information. Therefore, the Government do not consider it appropriate for that body to be a full Joint Committee established merely under the Standing Orders of each House, as other Select Committees are.

I hope that the Committee will bear with me if I expand on those reasons. First, in that scenario, the Government would not have a statutory ability to prevent the publication of sensitive material. There are two main problems with this. The risk of disclosure of information that might damage national security could be increased. This might lead to a situation where agency heads find it hard to reconcile their duty to protect information with their duty to facilitate oversight. This could lead to a sharing of less sensitive information and therefore a corresponding reduction in the effectiveness and credibility of oversight.

Secondly, it would not be possible for the most sensitive information to be withheld from the Committee. It is important that safeguards exist so there is adequate provision for those exceptional circumstances where the disclosure of information, even to the Chairman of the Committee, would be damaging to national security and/or would jeopardise vital agency operations or sources of information. The equivalent grounds on which information can be withheld from the Committee under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, have been used very rarely, as those former or current members of the Committee will know. We would expect the similar powers in the Bill also to be used sparingly—only in exceptional circumstances.

Thirdly, there is the appointments process. Again we will deal with that in greater detail later on. Here the Prime Minister has a role, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, in a later amendment proposes a much stronger role for him. That role is important. The ISC is unique in that members of the Committee have access to very important and extremely sensitive information, and it is important that the appointments process has sufficient safeguards to ensure there is as little risk as possible of unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information and the consequences that could do significant damage to national security.

The effect of the noble Lord’s amendment to create a Select Committee is not clear to me. He says it could take evidence under oath. In the Bill, even if we were to accept all the noble Lord’s amendments, the ISC would still be created by statute and safeguards would still exist to protect national security in those three areas I have listed, although admittedly altered to some degree. Unless the noble Lord pursues this suggested alternative policy of deleting the whole of Part 1, his amendment would not create a full Joint Committee because that can be done only by the Standing Orders of each House. It would create an entirely novel body, a Select Committee established by statute.

To what extent would such a body share the characteristics of the other Select Committees? The Bill makes it clear that, even were it amended in other respects according to noble Lords’ wishes, the ISC is different from other Select Committees in fundamental respects—for instance, in relation to appointments and reporting. That being so, I believe it is unclear whether or to what extent changing the ISC in this way would give it the other characteristic of a Select Committee. Indeed, I believe the risk is that describing the ISC as a Select Committee when it has characteristics not shared by other such committees could positively mislead as to the ISC’s true character.

I hope that that explanation is sufficient for the noble Lord. I wait to see what he says. This has been a useful debate and there will no doubt be further discussions on this matter, but I believe that it is appropriate for the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, perhaps I may say a few words in winding up the debate. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, that I recognise the wording I have used could not be put in the Bill. My amendment is simply my attempt to ensure that there is a debate. I recognise perfectly well that if we were to go down this route, while there would be, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, said, a requirement for something in statute, the body of the change would be incorporated into parliamentary resolutions.

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[The Marquess of Lothian]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, in both of his amendments, to which I have attached my name. Like him, I declare an interest in Amendment 4—on which I shall say no more than he has said. He has argued the case with great eloquence and I hope that the Government will listen to his argument.

In general terms, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, that these amendments are slightly ironic, given what I was saying in answer to his previous amendment. We are asking to be treated like a Select Committee and, once more, this underlines the fact that the argument on that is not polarised. It is not about the theory of a Select Committee but about the practice of one. We may well return to this matter in the future.

I strongly endorse the proposal in Amendment 9 that the chair of the committee should be remunerated in line with the chair of departmental Select Committees. I have served under four Intelligence and Security Committee chairmen, I think, and in each case I have been amazed at the amount of work they are required to do compared with the ordinary members of the committee. The ordinary members do preparation behind closed doors in secure surroundings for an afternoon and then we have the meeting the next day, but the chairman is in almost every day, going through issues, deciding whether they should be brought to the committee. The chairman has a major piece of work. It is therefore only fair that the chairman should be properly remunerated, as he would be if he were a chairman of a Select Committee.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly support the amendment. My parting speech in the House of Commons in 2001 was on the very issue of the payment of chairmen of Select Committees. I wanted to see the development of what you might call a separate career structure in the legislature as opposed to the Executive. When I was a member, the chairman, the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, did excellent work. When I think of the amount of work that he took on, it is inconceivable that we should now push through legislation without taking full account of that work and the need to ensure that it is remunerated.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I intervene very briefly. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for his comments and for those that he made at Second Reading, for which I am grateful. I am not sure whether this amendment can be made retrospective, but it seems an excellent idea. I do support it—it seems logical if a Select Committee chairman in the House of Commons now has it. I understand my noble friend Lord Lamont made the point. The point the noble Lord, Lord Butler, raised is pretty fundamental because it applies to every Select Committee of this House. If the House is not sitting, people do not get any allowance even if those committees are working. The issue goes a bit broader than just changing it for the ISC.

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[The Marquess of Lothian]

My Lords, once again I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, on this amendment, to which my name is also attached. I will not add much to what he said. I think that the real purpose here is to remind the House that the committee has nine members. That is written in to the statute. It is one of the smaller committees involved in the sort of work that this committee is doing and it is very important, in my view, that we retain that number at least. In the absence of this amendment it is theoretically possible that this House might decide that it did not want the two nominations from this House made by the Prime Minister and that the Prime Minister might decide to leave it at that—have a committee of seven in total from the House of Commons and nobody from this House. This amendment would make sure that that cannot happen by ensuring that, were this House or, indeed, the other House to say no to nominations by the Prime Minister to this committee from those Houses, the Prime Minister would be required to make another nomination.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 6 in this group. My amendment deals with the wording in Clause 1(5) of the Bill, which states:

“Before deciding whether to nominate a person for membership, the Prime Minister must consult the Leader of the Opposition”.

I have great reservations about this, and I will explain why. I think that this is the product of muddled thinking. This is an appointment of trust. The appointment requires the Prime Minister’s knowledge of opposition politicians. I think that Ministers very often do not understand what motivates opposition politicians.

As an example I take my own appointment. It is utterly inconceivable that the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, now the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, would have appointed me to that committee. She would have referred to my record in the 1980s when I was running with the hounds on the issue of Peter Wright and we caused some considerable difficulty, I was informed, in the House of Commons. I had endless arguments with the Table Office over the tabling of Questions. On a number of occasions my Questions, which, it was thought, would have breached national security had they been tabled, were submitted to the Speaker of the House of Commons under the appeal procedure. If, in the 1980s, I had applied to be a member of this committee, I feel quite sure that if it had been left to the Prime Minister of the day—I am arguing the converse—the Prime Minister of the day might well have objected to a person like me being a member of that committee.

The problem was that, at the time, people did not know what we were campaigning about. It was about reform of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act and about the need to introduce freedom of information legislation. In both areas we were successful. All I am saying is that, before we go down this route and require the Prime Minister to consult with whomever, we should have in mind that it is possible that people might be blocking appointments in an unfair manner.

Amendment 8 deals with the issue that the chair of the ISC is to be chosen by its members. This is the product of muddled thinking among those who fail to understand the internal dynamics of the committee. It is as if someone has sat down to devise systems of greater accountability that enable them to avoid taking the big question on going for full Select Committee status. In my view, the chairman needs the respect of the agencies, and new members appointed in a new Parliament will have no knowledge of the relationship between the chairman or any member of that committee and the agencies. There is a real danger that the Whips will seek to influence members’ decision about whom to appoint as chairman. It might be that there is an exercise in handing out the jobs going on. I feel that it is wrong that the committee should be placed in a position where it has to choose its chairman at the beginning of a Parliament. New members might be unduly influenced by previous members against their better judgment. As I said at Second Reading, if when I was selected to sit on the committee, I had been asked to vote for the chairman, I would never have voted for the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, because he was not top of my list of popular Secretaries of State, but within a matter of months I realised that he was ideal for the job. You need the experience of being on the committee before you start picking the chairman. What we are doing here is establishing a procedure whereby a chairman will be selected by new members going on to a committee without any knowledge of who they might be appointing.

If a chairman does not fully enjoy the trust of the agencies, there is a danger that that lack of trust may impede the work of the committee by denying access to material that is on the margins of the memorandum of understanding. There will be material on the margins of the memorandum of understanding to which the committee wants access, and it is vital that the chairman is someone who has been picked not by members of the committee but by the Prime Minister.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that the Bill is inadequate without Amendment 5 because it is simply a diktat. The fact that the Houses of Parliament vote on the members is not a really democratic position. We hope to see a more acceptable position.

The question I would put to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, on Amendment 6 is: when he was active on some of these issues, would he have been appointed or recommended by the leader of the Opposition? He says that there was no way in which Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, now the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, would have appointed him. Would the leader of the Opposition have appointed him?

I do not see how else you can do this. It is really down to the calibre, resolution and determination of the leader of the Opposition. In the end, he is in a very powerful position if he says, “These are the people I want. These are the people I think should be from the Opposition”. I do not know—and I do not know whether the noble Lord has any background on this—whether a Prime Minister has refused to accept the recommendation of the leader of the Opposition.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

If my noble friend Lord Kinnock had been Prime Minister, he would not have been put off putting me on that committee because he was well aware of the campaign that we were running and its objectives.

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that comment.

I would like to support opposition Amendment 7. It has not been spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but I imagine that he will speak to it. It says that the chairman of the ISC should be “from the Opposition party”. In principle, I support that. One of the ways for the committee to gain credibility is for the chairman to be a member of the opposition party. However, I would not wish to see it written into the statute in this way. I will, if I may, cite my own experience. We started this committee with considerable uncertainty and considerable reservations in a number of quarters—in some of the agencies and other places—as to whether it would be reputable. A great effort was made by both the Prime Minister and the then leader of the Opposition to get a pretty experienced bunch. They were mainly ex-Ministers, and I think almost all were privy counsellors. The desire was to have a really credible, reputable and senior committee. It was certainly the most senior of all the committees, and in calibre and experience outranked the PAC, which would otherwise be seen as a pretty senior committee. That was the right way to start.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, we have four amendments in front of us, all slightly different but all covering appointments to the committee. I will deal with them in turn. Amendment 5 seeks to ensure that if someone is turned down by Parliament the Prime Minister will have to make another nomination. This is something with which the Government entirely agree. However, the amendment is not necessary as it will be achieved by the current drafting of the Bill. If, under the appointments process in the Bill, the Prime Minister’s nominees are rejected by either House, the Prime Minister will have to make another nomination or nominations after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. This is clear from the fact that the Bill requires the ISC to consist of nine members so if one is turned down another would have to be found. I hope that deals with the point made by my noble friend Lord Lothian, who asked what would happen in such cases. Where we differ is that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, insists that an alternative person should have to be nominated and we would like to keep the flexibility because there are occasions where it is possible for the Prime Minister to be able to renominate. It might be that one reached some sort of impasse in due course but it should be possible on occasions to renominate and that renomination might be rejected. Whatever happens, as the Bill is drafted, a ninth person would have to be put forward.

Turning to Amendment 6 from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, he suggests that it should no longer be necessary to consult the Prime Minister. He said that he would never have been appointed if it had been left purely to my noble friend Lady Thatcher if she had been in opposition. Obviously, if we accepted the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and removed the necessity to consult the Leader of the Opposition, there would be even less likelihood that he would be appointed, because my noble friend—or Mrs Thatcher, as she then was—would have made the decision entirely by herself, without consulting the Leader of the Opposition. We believe that it will be important in retaining cross-party support, just as it was when the original 1994 Act went through, requiring that the committee should be appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. For that reason, the Prime Minister should continue to consult the Leader of the Opposition before he nominates any such person.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

This is quite an important issue. The question is very simple. If the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, had been Leader of the Opposition, would she have allowed someone like me, with my record at that time, to go on this committee? The answer is no, which is why I believe that this provision is wrong.

[Lord Henley]

But the noble Lord is also saying that he wants to delete the ability to consult the Leader of the Opposition and leave it entirely to the Prime Minister. I have to say that the Prime Minister probably would not have appointed him either, so the issue does not arise. What we suggest is that, to maintain cross-party support—I suspect that everyone agrees on this except the noble Lord himself—there should be a degree of consultation between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition on this issue. The simple fact is that consultation did take place and we are all very happy, my noble friend Lord King included, that he was taken on to that committee.

Rather than dealing with the amendments sequentially, I come to Amendment 8 before Amendment 7. It comes from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and relates to the election of the chairman. The noble Lord raises concerns about the Government’s proposals for appointing the chair, arguing that the chair’s appointment should again be made with the agreement of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. I notice that the effect of the amendment would be for the chair to be appointed by the Prime Minister and that there would be no requirement to consult the Leader of the Opposition. So I suppose that the chances of the noble Lord having got on to the committee or being appointed as chairman would be even more remote, but that is something that he can consider in due course.

As we explained earlier, we believe that the changes that we are making to the ISC status are designed to bring it closer to Parliament and increases public confidence in it. That is why the Government propose that the chairman of the ISC will be appointed by Parliament and will report to Parliament as well as to the Prime Minister. The noble Lord seemed to suggest that with a new Parliament, the new Members would not know each other. I suspect that with the experience of the members on that committee, as has happened in the past, it will normally be the case that the committee will know who is the appropriate person as well as anyone. It is quite right, therefore, that those members should make the appointment.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I will look very carefully at the point that my noble friend has made and at the statistics relating to 1997 in particular, which was one of those years in which there would have been a big upheaval, with that particular new Parliament. Off the cuff, I do not know who was on the committee and who came on, although perhaps my noble friend can remember. But in the main, with the relatively experienced parliamentarians who will be on this committee, I think that it is well suited to making the decision itself.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

You might, as a Member of Parliament who had been in the House for years but had no contact with intelligence, not understand the vital nature of the relationship between the agencies and the chairman. It is critical to the whole operation. I cannot see how someone who goes newly on to that committee could have any understanding of that relationship. If the relationship is wrong because the wrong person has been appointed, the committee could be denied information. If the objective behind the Bill is to secure more access to more operational material, we are undermining the whole arrangement. Ministers should reconsider this point. It is all right saying that it is more democratic and accountable and that Parliament is more involved—but if it does not work, do not do it.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, grouped with this amendment are Amendments 11 and 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, on rather different points from mine. I will confine my remarks to my amendment. Schedule 1 provides that members will hold office for the duration of the Parliament in which they are appointed. I do not read later parts of the paragraph, in particular sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), as applying to membership. This raises two issues, which I shall ask about in what is no more than a probing amendment. One is whether there should be a committee in existence during the period when Parliament is prorogued; the second is about the delay in appointing members after the next Parliament has started to sit. On the latter point, I have heard reports that some Select Committees have taken a very long time to be established—up to six months. I am certainly not arguing that the approach of this amendment is the best way of doing it. If there were to be some amendments, the arrangements would need much more detail, but I am worried that there would be an issue if there were a long lacuna. I do not know whether the Minister can help the Committee regarding the position of the current committee. Are members appointed until the appointment is terminated in a positive fashion, whether or not Parliament has been prorogued? Clearly, if an MP is not re-elected, he would not be expected to retain membership.

The ISC is so important that I would be reluctant not to have some sort of formula for unbroken oversight. It could be argued, of course, that its work is largely retrospective so it would not matter if there was a gap, but I would not accept that argument. It occurs to me that one could deal with continuing membership if enough Members of your Lordships’ House were appointed for there to be a quorum over the period of Prorogation, but that is unlikely to commend itself. There is also the question of the period between Parliaments and any delay in appointment once a new Parliament sits. I beg to move.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I want to speak to Amendments 11 and 12, standing in my name. Amendment 11 deals with the words in Schedule 1, paragraph 1(2)(c), which states that,

“a resolution for the person’s removal is passed in the House of Parliament by virtue of which the person is a member of the ISC”.

In other words, there has to be a resolution of Parliament to exclude someone from the ISC. Have those who wrote this Bill thought that through? A resolution in the House of Commons, or even in this House, would mean that the person who is being removed from the ISC, with all the material that they have gained over the years on matters relating to national security and who may well be angry with the chairman and the system, is given free rein to get up on the Floor of the House of Commons and, in their defence on the back of the resolution, say why they should not be removed from the Intelligence and Security Committee. This is a very silly proposal. It is highly dangerous and has clearly been worked up by someone who did not understand the implications of what a resolution of the House of Commons means for public debate. It should be removed.

How could someone be removed from the Intelligence and Security Committee? First, one would go to them privately and explain the reasons why they should resign. I am sure that the Whips and the system have all sorts of ways for removing Members of Parliament without allowing them free rein to get up on the Floor of the House of Commons on the back of the resolution to defend themselves. That is my case for Amendment 11. I seek the exclusion of what I regard as a highly irresponsible proposition.

I now turn to Amendment 12, which deals with sub-paragraph (3), which states:

“A member of the ISC may resign at any time by notice given to … in the case of the member who is the Chair of the ISC, the Speaker of the House of Parliament by virtue of which the person is a member of the ISC”.

Why should the Speaker be informed? This is not a parliamentary committee; the Speaker is not a member of the committee and has no relationship with it. The committee is external to Parliament, however we want to describe it. I cannot see any explanation why, other than the fact that those who devised these sections of the Bill believe that it is necessary to have a model where they have the imprimatur of Parliament on the label. I think it is ludicrous, unnecessary, and again it should be removed from the Bill. It is trying to lead the public to believe that this is truly some committee of Parliament. It is not, because it lacks the privileges and the powers that a parliamentary committee has as a Select Committee. That is my case.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I will return to the noble Lord’s amendments in due course, but I will start with Amendment 10 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. This seeks, in effect, to continue the committee’s existence for a period of days after Dissolution until a new Parliament is created. It must be remembered that the absence of the ISC for that short period of Dissolution does not mean that the agencies are unaccountable. There are other mechanisms for agency accountability, not least through their accountability to Ministers, who obviously continue in their role throughout that Dissolution. The absence of the more considered work of the ISC during that relatively short period will not result in some sort of accountability deficit. Naturally, continuity between Parliaments is very important, but it is not necessary to have the old ISC stretch into the next Parliament to achieve this. I assure my noble friend that we do not need legislative provision for a new incarnation of the ISC to inherit the documents, for example, of its predecessor. Under the existing regime this has happened without any difficulty. Furthermore, the provisions in sub-paragraphs (6) and (7) of paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 allow the ISC in a new Parliament to pick up work that was ongoing at the time of Dissolution of the previous Parliament.

I turn to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who seems particularly worried about mechanisms for removing individuals from that committee. He seemed to suggest some sort of equivalent to the idea of the Whips giving them a bottle of whisky and a revolver and telling them to sit quietly in a room until they have resolved matters by themselves. I do not know if that was quite what he was suggesting, but we believe that if Parliament appoints, it is plain that Parliament should also have the power to remove. That fits the broad thrust of what we are doing. That is the reason for the provision that the noble Lord seeks to leave out, ensuring that an ISC member can be removed involuntarily from the committee only by virtue of a resolution passed by Parliament. Again, this is an important safeguard to the ISC’s independence and means that the final say on its membership is with Parliament.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Does the Minister foresee circumstances in which an angry young man or woman who was excluded from the committee on the back of a resolution would, under privilege in the House of Commons, argue a case that might even breach national security? If he, or those who have devised this provision, can foresee such circumstances, does he not think that this provision bears further responsibility, despite what the noble Lord said?

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[Lord Skelmersdale]

My Lords, I wish to say a tiny word on Amendment 17. I note that it begins:

“The ISC may decide to hold some of its proceedings in public, subject to sub-paragraph (2)”,

and so on. I ask the Minister whether there is anything in the Bill to prevent the ISC meeting in public, should it so wish.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, perhaps I may intervene briefly. Amendment 14 says that,

“the ISC shall meet in public save when it determines that members of the public shall be excluded”.

I think that that would put the fear of God into the agencies and I am afraid it would create a climate of suspicion which the committee does not deserve. I am not saying that it should not meet in public on occasion, as I shall explain in a minute, but putting words such as that into the Bill would be very unpopular within the agency. It needs to have confidence that Parliament is able to handle the material with the necessary safeguards.

Amendment 15 says:

“The ISC shall not less than once in each calendar year hold a public question time for which it shall determine applicable procedures”.

In a curious way, there may be something in that amendment. I remember—and the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, may recall—that we did occasionally meet in public. After the Mitrokhin inquiry, we invited journalists in to ask us questions. Therefore, in a way, the structure is there to do it. The question is: what is on the agenda? I can foresee circumstances in which there may well be an item of some controversy or just a general report where the committee may want to meet in public, and the public—basically, journalists—ask questions. However, Ministers may want to ponder over the exact wording of the amendment.

Finally, Amendment 17 says:

“The ISC may decide to hold some of its proceedings in public, subject to sub-paragraph (2) … The ISC may not hold public hearings under sub-paragraph (1) if it might lead to the disclosure of”.

The problem is that if members of the agencies, or indeed Ministers, are brought in as witnesses to answer questions, their refusal to answer, for perfectly legitimate reasons of national security, might send a hare running in the media which gets completely out of control. Although I accept that there are conditions in which the public or journalists should be able to ask questions, we have to be very careful about witnesses who might be called before the committee in those circumstances but who might feel that they cannot answers the questions in open session. The reason that parliamentary Select Committees meet in private is to avoid those very problems.

Therefore, again, I give qualified support but I think that there would be certain conditions under which it would be quite wrong for the committee to meet in public.

[The Marquess of Lothian]

My Lords, perhaps I may intervene briefly to say that there is nothing to prevent the ISC in its present form holding public hearings. Indeed, the Prime Minister in the previous Government, Gordon Brown, called on the committee to hold public hearings, and we have been looking very closely at ways in which this can be done. Therefore, there is nothing in Amendment 17 that I find very difficult because, first, there is the principle and, secondly, the restrictions on it which would be required for any public hearing.

However, following on from what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has just said, the first point to bear in mind is that a public hearing should not end up as a farce in which, because of the subject matter, every significant question that is asked is answered by the famous phrase, “I can’t answer that question”. The credibility of the committee would suffer very quickly if we went down that road. Secondly, it has to be an honest process. We cannot have a subject which is so anodyne and so completely rehearsed that in the end the public see through it. That, again, would be to the disadvantage of the committee.

We are looking closely, whether under this Bill or even before the Bill goes through, at whether we can identify subjects that are of genuine public interest and where the agencies or the sponsoring Ministers will feel able to answer at least the majority of the questions. We are looking at holding a public hearing in which the members of the committee, in its normal form, ask the questions and the answers are given. I think that that is slightly different from the sort of press conference to which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, referred, which we have also undertaken on a number of occasions. This would be a case of the committee asking questions of the agencies, which is, after all, the true role of the committee.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

I suppose it had been in my mind for the reason that I gave about public understanding. The noble Lord raises a very interesting point as to whether one should look at this as not a public exercise. That would raise different and very interesting issues, and perhaps fruitful ones. I am sorry I did not go there in my comments. I beg to move.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I am glad the noble Baroness did not stipulate that the hearings should be in public because that would make it quite impossible for us to carry out this function, which in many ways I have great sympathy with. If we had had the opportunity when I was a member of the committee to interview proposed heads of the agencies prior to them taking over responsibility for the agencies, it would have been helpful to the committee. In so far as it had not been in public, no damage would have been done. Certainly we would have been able to make our concerns or satisfaction known to the agency, and during the questioning of the proposed appointee we could have raised subjects that would have given us, certainly in one case, a little more reassurance than perhaps I felt I had when the particular person was appointed. I think there is merit in this amendment as long as the hearings are in private.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, the issues that have been raised are the very ones that I listened to the noble Baroness to hear as she moved her amendment and to try to see what the aim was. Her amendment does not mention public or private, although in her original comments she spoke of public hearings. It was not until the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, intervened that she conceded that there could be private hearings, which have more value than a public hearing would. I am no wiser and very interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I assume that he will accept the principle. My favourite bedtime reading, the coalition agreement, includes a specific commitment to strengthen the powers of Select Committees to scrutinise major public appointments. I should have thought that this comes under the remit of a major public appointment. The noble Baroness might have done the House a service to tease out whether the Government intend to honour that part of the coalition agreement.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, perhaps I may follow and develop the argument made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee in her final remarks and deal with some of the important features of the Bill.

There is a constitutional principle that the Executive and every agency of government are accountable to Parliament. Parliament is supreme, not the Executive, and it is to Parliament that accountability must be made. If the ISC is to operate effectively and to act as a deterrent against malpractice, it should have the power to examine any document that is held by the security services. As my noble friend said, the ISC members will be nominated by the Prime Minister and approved by Parliament and, presumably, will be security-cleared to the necessary level. If they are to be limited in the documents that they can inspect by reason of the diktat of a Minister, as advised by the security services, there is a breach of constitutional principle. It is not appropriate for there to be legislation to prevent government accountability to Parliament by allowing Ministers to operate in that way.

Under the format of paragraph 3 of Schedule 1, the Director-General of the Security Service and others, if asked by the ISC to disclose any information, can arrange for it to be made available. However, they can also inform the ISC that the information cannot be disclosed because the Secretary of State has decided that it should not be disclosed—the decision of the Secretary of State, presumably, being advised by the security services. Amendment 19 seeks to delete sub-paragraph (1)(b).

If the ISC asks a government department or any part of it to disclose information, the relevant Minister of the Crown—who, under sub-paragraph (5), may be any Minister—must arrange for that information to be made available in accordance with the memorandum of understanding or, as the Bill stands, inform the ISC that the information cannot be disclosed because the Minister of the Crown has decided that it should not be disclosed. Therefore Amendment 20 seeks to delete sub-paragraph (2)(b)

Under sub-paragraph (3), the Minister of the Crown can take the decision not to disclose only if he considers that it is sensitive information and information which, in the interests of national security, should not be disclosed to the ISC. So, again, presumably he is acting on the advice of the security services in coming to the conclusion as to whether it is sensitive information or as to what the interests of national security are.

Sub-paragraph (3)(b) of paragraph 3 states:

“it is information of such a nature that, if the Minister were requested to produce it before a Departmental Select Committee of the House of Commons, the Minister would consider (on grounds which were not limited to national security)”.

So, presumably, on the Minister’s say-so and without advice from the security services, it would be proper for that information not to be released.

The Secretary of State or Minister of the Crown can decide, either on the advice of the security services or on their own initiative, that the ISC is not very important and they can just say, “No, it cannot see this, even if it wants to. It will have to come to its conclusions simply on the documentation that I”—the Minister, acting on the advice of the security services—“think it should see”. Is that what the Bill is about? Is that its purpose? Are we debating the functions, procedures and the setting up of the ISC so that a Minister of the Crown, advised by the security services, can withhold information from it? It is constitutionally inappropriate and I firmly urge these amendments upon the Government.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I have great sympathy with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. It addresses a fundamental flaw in the Bill.

I shall speak to Amendments 22 and 26. Amendment 22 deals with sub-paragraph (3), which states:

“A Minister of the Crown may decide under sub-paragraph (1)(b) … that information should not be disclosed only if the Minister considers that”—

as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said—

“(b) it is information of such a nature that, if the Minister were requested to produce it before a Departmental Select Committee of the House of Commons, the Minister would consider (on grounds which were not limited to national security) it proper not to do so”.

If I remember rightly, that is currently the position under the present ISC, notwithstanding the statement in the Bill. I have not always understood exactly what such circumstances are. I have often wondered what would be the circumstances in which Ministers would take that action. Perhaps the Minister will give an explanation today.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, referred to decisions being taken on a whim. Now that that provision in paragraph 3(3) is be enshrined in the Bill and subsequently become law, we need something more substantial so that we know exactly what is intended by it.

I turn now to the part of the Bill that really worries me—the phrase,

“relevant Minister of the Crown”.

As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said, we are not given an indication of who is to be involved. Are we talking about Parliamentary Under-Secretaries or Ministers of State? The noble Lord, Lord Henley, is, I understand, a Parliamentary Under-Secretary.

[Lord Henley]

A Minister of State.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

He is a Minister of State. Forgive me. However, the point is that for a long time he was a Parliamentary Under-Secretary and, in my view, if he had been in the House of Commons he would have been in the Cabinet. We are not merely talking about the quality of Ministers that we have here in the House of Lords; we are talking about some of the Ministers that we see at the Dispatch Box in the House of Commons. It would be an error of judgment to include in the Bill a provision which would give some of these Parliamentary Under-Secretaries in the House of Commons the power to block information being brought before the ISC. However, that is what I understand the Bill means to do. It means that any Minister, in any department, in any circumstances, could decide that information was not to be made available to the committee.

Why do I have concerns that go up even as far as Secretaries of State? I referred at Second Reading to a particular incident in the committee when the late Robin Cook—I am sorry that he is not here to answer me today—was, in my view, very obstructive before the Intelligence and Security Committee in that he did not want to have certain information brought before that committee. There was quite a discussion in the committee about the fact that he was resisting having that information made available. I quoted the example of the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, for whom I have great regard. Imagine the mindset of the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, in the early 1980s when he had it in for CND and all that, and giving him the responsibility or the power to decide, on his personal consideration, that this information, which the ISC wanted, should be denied to the Select Committee. I believe that it is wrong that Ministers should be in that position. Indeed, as I said at Second Reading, I would trust the heads of the agencies more than I trust Ministers.

For a start, many Ministers lack confidence in this area. As they would have very little experience of how the system works and what goes on inside the agencies, their experience of the agencies may be far less that that of even members of the committee, yet they are to be given the right to decide whether information is to be blocked. It might well be that a junior Minister, lacking confidence, would be unwilling to take a decision to provide information, or allow information to be provided, for career considerations. He or she might worry that by providing that information and taking that risk, because they had not had that experience, they might be damaging their own career prospects. They may well simply be unable to quantify the risk on the basis of their very limited experience and, furthermore, some Ministers might simply make a straight political judgment about whether information should be made available to the committee. That is the very area about which I think considerations should not be made.

I have concerns and I do not believe that Ministers should be involved in this process at all. We go back to my very controversial model, which I put to the House at Second Reading—I put it in the same way that I put the argument for Select Committee status in 1998 and 1999. At that time it was simply ruled out of the question, so I recognise that it will probably be regarded as out of the question today, but I put forward the model that I put forward at Second Reading. First, the ISC should have Select Committee status. Secondly, the chair should be decided by the approval of the Prime Minister, not election by the committee. Thirdly, the chairman should be the critical person in this process.

The chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee should have unrestricted access to all operational material within the agency on operations that have taken place. The chairman should be in a privileged position in the committee and it should be for him to decide whether information should be made available to the committee. That is why I do not want election of the chair. I want the Prime Minister to pick the chair, because I believe that the Prime Minister will know exactly who is capable of handling the material and deciding on the circumstances in which the membership of the committee is given access to the information. I would have—I have to be very careful how I phrase this—trusted the chairman, the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgewater, to take that decision on my behalf, as a member of that committee, long before I would have trusted Labour Ministers, who might not have had the experience that he had gained as chairman of the committee.

It is a very serious area and what we are doing now, by going down this route and letting the politicians decide what information gets through, will create problems for the future which we may well regret. In other words, my answer is very simple: keep the Ministers out of it. Let the agencies influence the chairman of the committee. Let them go to the chairman and say, “Chairman, we do not believe that this information should be made available”. If Ministers want to get involved they can go to the chairman and say, “Chairman, we do not believe that this information should be made available”; but give the chairman the final decision. The committee, in those circumstances, would have far more confidence in the arrangement for scrutiny of the services, et al, than is presently the case, or, indeed, will be the case under the provisions in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, perhaps I could briefly explain the problem that arises with the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It is very important that parliamentary committees are well informed. From time to time, under the previous Government and under the present one, the committee has considered inviting someone from the intelligence and security service to provide it with a proper context when it is considering something such as detention without trial for a long period or, for example, the Justice and Security Bill. Under the previous Government, when we tried, we were told that it would not be possible and, therefore, we were not given the benefit of that material. Therefore, we have not tried in relation to the Justice and Security Bill because we are certain that we would find the same refusal.

It seems to me that it ought to be possible for the intelligence and security service to assist a parliamentary committee, on whatever terms are needed, to protect its own position, whether giving evidence in private or in some other way because it is a real handicap. It means that when we produce reports, for example, on this Bill, we are deprived of information that would be very helpful. It makes us look as though we are looking at problems through one eye instead of both. I do not think that we should be put in blinkers. I mention this because it seems to be something that extends to committees other than the one that we are now considering.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Could I ask the noble Lord to attend the debate on one of my later amendments, which deals precisely with that matter?

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I will confine my remarks to Part 1 of the Bill and the Intelligence and Security Committee’s operations. I listened to the very reassuring remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, who poured praise on the committee on the basis of his experience not only as a member but as one of those who engineered the construction of the committee. He was also able to watch that committee’s operation in the early days, when people such as me from the awkward squad in the House of Commons were put on it in an attempt to reassure the public.

I was a member of the committee between 1997 and 2001, under the excellent chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater. In 1998, I set out in a paper to the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair, my provisional views on reform of the committee. Sadly, at that stage my views were rejected; they were a minority view that I had been pushing inside the committee. I wanted a committee of Parliament—not of parliamentarians—under a modified Select Committee structure, especially adapted to deal with the handling of national security issues. I should report that in the late 1990s there had been much discussion in the committee in private on whether we should go down the Select Committee route. I recall one particular day when we were discussing the amendment to the annual report from our committee, where we were hassling over the wording so as not to lead the public to believe that we were going to go down that route but to inform them that there was at least an argument going on within the committee on that matter—and that is 14 years ago.

The debate has now moved on. I hope to deal in Committee with some of the recommendations that I made at the time. However, the heart of my case today is that the model the Government are adopting is wrong. Some of the changes I welcome; but I regard the changes that are being made as essentially cosmetic. They will not meet the concerns of Members of the other House, or the expectation of the public, where they have an interest in these matters. Furthermore, the reforms might perhaps be counterproductive. Let us take the process of appointment. Under Clause 1(3) and (4), the Bill proposes that a person is not eligible for membership unless nominated by the Prime Minister. A member is then appointed by Parliament, effectively under a resolution of the House. At the moment a person is appointed by the Prime Minister on a recommendation of the Whips. I know that over the years members of the committee have tried to convince the public that they are appointed by the Prime Minister; the reality is that all members of that committee were appointed on the basis of Whips’ recommendations, certainly in the House of Commons. The only difference under the Bill is that the House will have to approve, on a resolution—a rubber stamp—the Prime Minister’s recommendations, which means a payroll vote, supported by the opposition Front Bench, backed up with an informal Whip, with bi-party guidance in support. It might even on occasions be a fully whipped vote.

As one of the Commons awkward squad, I was involved in challenging a Select Committee nomination, which very rarely happens in the House of Commons, certainly on only a few occasions over my 21 years there. One never has the support of the Whips, as a challenge is seen as an assault on the workings of the usual channels. What I am arguing, therefore, is that that is no great change.

On the wider issue of ISC operations, there are effectively no changes. On the block on ministerial membership, the length of service, the dissolution of the Commons, the resignation arrangements, quorum and membership cap, determination of procedures, reports, approval by the Prime Minister, and agreements on the remit between the agencies and committee, there is very little change. There is certainly little change on areas which will be set out from the Front Bench by my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon. The only real areas of change are the arrangements on access to operational material and arrangements for the selection of the chairman, both of which I oppose.

Let us take access to operational material. Under present arrangements:

“The position for the present ISC is that the Director-General of the Security Service, the Chief of the Intelligence Service or the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters (as well as the relevant Secretary of State), is able to decline to disclose information because it is sensitive information which, in their opinion, should not be made available. Paragraph 3 removes this ability for the Agency heads to withhold information. The ability to decide that information is to be withheld will instead rest (solely) with the relevant Secretary of State (for the Agencies) or Minister of the Crown (for other government departments)”.

I am quoting from the Explanatory Memorandum. Well: Secretaries of State; ministerial responsibilities. I regret to say that my then right honourable friend Robin Cook is not here to defend his case today; but I was on the committee where Robin Cook had responsibilities in these areas. When he gave evidence to us on one occasion—it has never been made public before, but I am not breaching national security by saying what happened—we were appalled by how defensive he was towards the services. He was most unwilling to provide for us information which the committee felt that it was entitled to hear. That was the view of all members of the committee, including the chairman, at the time. Let us take the position of Michael Heseltine, for whom I have very great regard, in the early 1980s, when he was in pursuit of CND. Are we saying that people like that should be able effectively to veto information being given to the committee when the law provides that the committee has access to operational material? In other words, they would be able to say, “This material cannot be given to the committee”. I have far more faith in the heads of service long before I am prepared to trust Ministers to take particular decisions as to whether the flow of information should be vetoed. To put it more bluntly, I have more faith in the Stephen Landers or the Baroness Manningham-Bullers of this world and in their decisions on these matters than ever I would have in the decision of a Minister of the Crown. Ministers of the Crown on occasions will make thoroughly political decisions; sometimes even their personal credibility might influence the judgments that they make. I think that it is an error of judgment to go down that route.

Under the question of access to operational material, let us take the definition of “sensitive” that might apply to the provision of information to the committee. I quote again from the Explanatory Memorandum on the Bill. Under the present arrangement:

“The position for the present ISC is that information is considered sensitive information, if (among other reasons) it might lead to the identification of, or provide details of, sources of information … or operational methods available to the Agencies; or if it is information about particular operations which had been, were being or were proposed to be undertaken in pursuance of any of the functions of the Agencies. Paragraph 4 extends these parts of the definition of sensitive information … to cover also equivalent information relating to any part of a Government department, or any part of Her Majesty’s forces, which is engaged in intelligence or security activities”.

I read that as meaning that under sub-paragraph (5)(a) and (b) of paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the Bill, we are giving a power perhaps to a junior Minister, perhaps even to a Parliamentary Secretary, to block access to operational material in any department if that Minister, adequate or inadequate, wise or unwise, perhaps even being manipulated, decides that the issue is either national security-sensitive or is not reportable to a departmental Select Committee. That is not a reform; it is a fudge.

Then we have the arrangements for the selection and appointment of the chairman. Under Clause 1(6):

“A member of the ISC is to be the Chair of the ISC chosen by its members”.

In other words, at the beginning of a Parliament, perhaps on a change of government, new members of the committee, without any knowledge whatever of the internal dynamics of the committee which are important, of individual member relationships with the agencies, or of the kind of work to be undertaken, are to be asked to appoint a committee chairman. I regard that proposition as ludicrous. When I was first appointed to that committee in 1997, I would not have supported Tom King as chairman. As far as I was concerned, having just come through 17 years in Opposition, to me he appeared to be an abrasive former Cabinet Minister. However, within a matter of months, I realised that he was absolutely ideal for the job; he was perfect in the chair and I would have supported him all the way; but not at the time, after the general election in 1997. Yet under this arrangement, new members will go into that committee and they will be required to vote for a new chairman of the committee. That proposition is quite ludicrous.

The model is wrong. What is my alternative? For a start, it should be a committee of Parliament, not of parliamentarians. We are going partly down that route. The committee should be a creature of Parliament, not of the Executive. I still believe that it is a creature of the Executive because of the ministerial veto. It is not a Select Committee and yet the Labour Party has supported full Select Committee status right through since the debates of 1988, almost 24 years ago. My noble friend Lord Richard made an important contribution to the debate in this House and my noble friend Lord Hattersley, as the shadow Secretary of State at the time, made a similar contribution in the House of Commons, supporting the Select Committee structure. So why are we still arguing the toss after some 24 years? It is widely known that committee members wanted some change, but I do not know what change or even whether this is what they really want. Is real reform being blocked in Cabinet, or perhaps by some boys in short trousers in Downing Street, or is there some legal reason? What is the reason for the fudge?

I believe that the committee should be a Select Committee, meeting on the Parliamentary Estate, established under a modified Select Committee structure, approved by a special resolution of Parliament, with procedures specifically adapted to deal with the handling of issues of national security. It would have the protection of parliamentary privilege, which could be fully considered by the Joint Committee currently being established to deal with the issue of privilege. It could hold those who deliberately misled it in contempt, which is currently the position with Select Committees. It could take evidence under oath and publish reports with the right of the agencies to request redaction, subject to appeal from agency or committee to the Prime Minister, which I call the security override. It should have the power to refer material to other Select Committees, again subject to the override, and have the power to call for persons and papers under similar arrangements. It would be a credible mechanism for the issuing of statements on issues of national security where the agencies might be in the dock in public opinion, as against the present position of a nod and a wink to sympathetic journalists.

I turn to the issue of the handling of operational information and of sensitive material more generally. As I have said, I completely reject the idea that Ministers should effectively have a veto on the flow of such information to the committee. The chairman of the committee should have open, unrestricted access to all post-operational security material, described in the Explanatory Memorandum as,

“retrospective oversight of the operational activities”.

It would be for the chairman in consultation with the agencies, not for Ministers, to decide on whether any operational information should be withheld from the committee for reasons of national security; or for the chairman in consultation with Ministers more widely where other Select Committee considerations were in mind. The chairman would decide. The chairmanship of the committee would then be crucial. Noble Lords will now see why I do not want it to be elected.

This model would change the entire dynamics of the operation of the committee. For a start, you could not elect its chairman. It would subtly change the nature and form of accountability. That appointment would have to be on the agreement of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition and would be an appointment of trust. Malcolm Rifkind, the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton and others who followed could have done that job and been fully trusted by the agencies to be given access to that material. They would then be responsible for deciding what information the committee was given where issues of the veto arose.

I could go further, although I am still turning it over in my mind. I could argue that there are circumstances in which such a chairman could be given access to pre-operational material on the basis that it could not in any circumstances be disclosed to the committee. Post-operation, of course, it could then fall under the general heading of retrospective oversight and the chairman would then have the discretion, following consultation with the agencies. Noble Lords will note that I have excluded Ministers from the process. The discussions that regularly take place between the Government and the agencies would have no bearing on accountability to the committee. I am proposing a very different model, and I hope that the Government are listening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords—

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I will give way for one last time.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Prior to us going into Committee, might the Minister find out for what reason it is not to be a parliamentary Select Committee, as against the structure proposed? There must be some explanation.

[Lord Henley]

Again, my Lords, I was interested in the noble Lord’s suggestion. I do not think that it is necessarily the right path to go down, but that is the sort of point that we need to argue about and try to reach some agreement on in Committee. I am sure that the noble Lord will put down amendments and that we will have the opportunity to discuss them. I look forward to hearing the views of his Front Bench and other Members of this House.

I have more or less used up my time and have answered a mere tithe of the very good points that have been raised. As I said, we are going to have a detailed Committee stage in due course, when we will get to a lot of these detailed points. I look forward to that process, as does my noble and learned friend. Both of us will write a number of letters over the coming weeks that we hope will at least make it easier to deal with these matters. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.

Universities: Anti-Semitism

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Tuesday 6th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Boswell of Aynho]

My Lords—

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords—

[Lord Janner of Braunstone]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Verma]

I absolutely agree with my noble friend. We see universities as places not only of learning but of great understanding. All the organisations that my noble friend mentioned are at the heart of those tasks of moving forward. However, we take the concerns very seriously and we understand why the noble Baroness has posed this Question and the noble Lord, Lord Janner, has raised it. We are working to ensure that all universities stand up for any students who feel under threat, regardless of their race, religion or background.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, is it not important that we draw a very clear distinction between the actions of anti-Semites and the actions of those who feel passionately about the actions of the state of Israel in the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip?

[Baroness Verma]

My Lords, I do not want to enter into another debate, and that is a separate debate although it is one that we must not shy away from. At the same time, we do not want to lose the greatness of our universities, which allow students to hear contributions that are often very vile but then also allow them to make a judgment as to their response.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I will start by referring to the remarks from my noble friend Lady Browning. It is no secret that, only two days before she left the Home Office, I went to visit her, along with other Ministers, to discuss the whole question of metal theft, because she had identified this as a problem and wanted to get action throughout the whole of government. I suggested then, as a Minister in Defra, that I might be able to help by offering some assistance through the work of the Environment Agency. Two days later I found myself in the Home Office and was very nearly in the position of writing a letter from myself to myself. In the end, the letter came from my successor the noble Lord, Lord Taylor.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for setting out what exactly is the problem. I think that we all understand what it is. I am grateful to him for starting off by emphasising that this is driven by second-hand metal prices. If he cares to look at the way that metal prices have gone over the last few years—sometimes up, sometimes down—he will find that the crime rate for metal theft has more or less exactly followed that line, and that it is on a distinctly upward curve. For that reason I was interested in his new figure for the possible cost of this whole problem to the country, which he put at about £1 billion. I have seen other figures which count the cost to the country and to business, one of about £220 million, another of around £700 million, and I would be interested to know where his figures have come from.

The important point to remember is that very often the actual value of what is stolen is relatively small; the issue is the knock-on effect of that particular crime. For example, when the lead is taken off a church roof, the lead has a value, and a value that is going up, but the real damage then comes from water leaking in and damaging the church. If you remove the wiring that deals with signalling from the railway line, you will have hundreds of hours of delays and major disruption caused to a large number of people—and as someone who spends an awful lot of time on the west coast main line I understand that as well.

We have examples of hospitals which have had to cancel operations as a result of power cuts caused by metal theft. I could give examples relating to the police and others, who have had their communications disrupted as a result of metal theft. Then on top of that we have the further elements of heritage crime. Not only war memorials are being taken; the example that the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, gave of the Barbara Hepworth statue being stolen and melted down is an example of something that went in the opposite direction. Here was something that was of very great value, should one have been able to put it on the market at Christie’s or Sotheby’s, but which when it went into the scrap metal yard suddenly became worth relatively very little indeed, and in fact would very quickly be ground up into bronze granules to be smelted.

The important point to remember about that particular theft is that it indicates just where the problem is. It is obvious that the first person to handle the statue—the first scrap yard owner who took it in—must have known that it was, as they say, hot. You do not often get Barbara Hepworth or Barbara Hepworth-like statues legitimately coming into scrap metal yards. Someone knew that it was stolen property and that they would be able to convert it into cash, while removing most of its value. On a number of occasions I have made the point that we believe that the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964 is—how should I put it?—beyond its sell-by date. We wish to see a reform to that Act as soon as is possible, and we will make sure that we do it.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling this amendment and allowing us to have a debate on the damage that this practice is doing to our infrastructure. I am also grateful to him for highlighting the fact that there have been a number of deaths as a result of this. Although the noble Lord says that it was the perpetrator being killed, we should have some sympathy. For example, a 16 year-old was recently killed taking copper cabling from a power substation. He only did so because it was easy for him to take that copper wire and convert it into cash; and, in the process, someone who did not understand these things killed himself. Moreover, not only are some of the perpetrators being killed; it is likely that, fairly soon, innocent individuals could be killed as they try to sort out the mess caused by these problems.

The House will be aware—the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to it—of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary’s Statement on 26 January, when she announced that we will be bringing forward amendments to the LASPO Bill to strengthen the law in this area. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, that we hope to do this on Report rather than tomorrow or on Thursday, which are the other days when we will debate these matters. This is specifically to deal with the problem of cash. As I say, the real problem is the ease with which people can convert stolen metal into cash, with no questions being asked and no traceability whatever.

In that Statement my right honourable friend indicated that the amendments would create a new criminal offence to prohibit cash payments to purchase scrap metal and to significantly increase the fines for all offences under the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964, which regulates the scrap recycling industry. In effect, once the amendments to the LASPO Bill have been agreed and the Bill has been passed, rather than having a maximum fine of £1,000 for offences under the Scrap Metal Dealers Act, the fine will be unlimited. We will go from an average fine of the order of £350 to a more realistic figure which might encourage some scrap metal dealers to act in a responsible manner.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I understand that there has been some consultation on the proposal for a cashless arrangement. What has been the extent of that consultation? Have the many thousands of small scrap yard operations been consulted? I am not opposing what the Government are doing. I just want to know what the basis is and to what extent it can be justified as a result of any consultation—in other words, that this is not another panic response.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, this is not a panic response. It has been discussed in this House and in another place on a number of occasions and we are all keen to move forward.

I have had discussions with the British Metals Recycling Association, a body which represents scrap metal dealers of all sizes, great and small. It—dare I say it?—not surprisingly, is not keen on the idea of going cashless. That might indicate something about the effect of this measure. We shall obviously have to have further consultations with the BMRA and others in the industry before we bring these measures into effect after they have been introduced into the LASPO Bill.

I was formerly a recycling Minister in Defra. We have a very successful industry and I want to see high levels of recycling of metal continue. However, I want to make sure that the metal that is being recycled is legitimate and has not been stolen in one way or another. We do not want to kill off a successful industry but to properly regulate the criminal elements within it. We will certainly have further consultations with the BMRA and others before we bring the measures into effect after the Bill has received Royal Assent.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Are we absolutely sure that we are not driving this business into the hands of the cowboys?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I could refer the noble Lord to discussions that I have had with other people in the industry, who have pointed out that the high levels of cash in the industry are driving criminality. If we can remove a lot of that cash then we can possibly remove a great deal of the criminality. I am not saying that it will be a magic wand that will solve all the problems—just as revising the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964 will not solve all problems, as his noble friend Lord Faulkner knows well. However, they are steps on the road to better regulating this industry, which is needed.

We are looking for a coherent package of measures to tackle metal theft. Obviously there will have to be further measures and regulation in due course, possibly along the lines of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I do not want to rush into that at this stage. There is an opportunity to go cashless and to increase what are, at the moment, the derisory fines available under the 1964 Act, and we obviously need to do more to that Act in the future.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on his ingenuity in finding a way of bringing forward amendments to this Bill on this subject. His noble friend Lord Faulkner tried to do so but failed. We also gave it some thought, but the drafting of the Bill is such that it is rather difficult.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 3, which stands in my name. Perhaps at this stage I can apologise to the House for not being present during proceedings in Committee, as I was back and forth to and from hospital over a six-week period and was therefore unable to attend apart from a brief debate when DNA was being discussed. I set out my position on two amendments—including the one I will be moving later—on 29 November, when I made clear I was in favour of a voluntary national DNA database. I also apologise because Amendment 3, which I wrote in November, is slightly in error. Instead of it beginning with the words,

“or if the person from whom the DNA sample or fingerprint was taken”,

it should actually have read “and only”. That is my fault.

My amendment would require the authorities to obtain the permission of the DNA sample donor prior to the removal of his or her profile from the database, but does not totally compromise the Government’s intention to introduce their proposed changes. At first glimpse, the House might find it difficult to imagine circumstances in which a donor would resist removal of his or her profile. Furthermore, the House might wish to consider in what circumstances creating this new obstacle might benefit the state.

So why would a donor resist removal, and in what circumstances? A donor may wish to ensure that he or she is ruled out of a police inquiry through a simple DNA data mismatch during an investigation. The donor might feel that by allowing the retention of their profile, they were freeing themselves of suspicion during the police investigation. They may well have personal or particular family reasons for doing so. One has to place oneself in the mind of a person who has been accused of a crime and wants to be free of a potential accusation, or even show that he or she is not involved in criminal activity or is even going straight. It might help that person’s resolve. Some former criminals, even those involved in minor offences, feel that they are constantly under suspicion. This proposal is a psychological aid to rehabilitation.

So what possible benefits could there be to the state? I will not pray in aid the general arguments for the retention of DNA in the fight against crime. That is all well documented. However, there is a reasonable discussion to be had about whether, in the absence of DNA information following its removal, at least some residual information should be held on former donors. It was argued repeatedly in Committee that the proposed retention period was too short in the case of serious cases of rape and other crimes of violence. The Government’s response was the two-year possible extension period.

However, there are surely circumstances in which the state, while not retaining the DNA information, has an interest in at least knowing the whereabouts of a person who has previously been charged with a serious criminal offence. Let us not forget that “beyond reasonable doubt” is a high hurdle. Criminals who are successfully prosecuted often drop off the radar, as do those who are not successfully prosecuted. They move on in the process of seeking to cover their tracks. If DNA information is to be lost, the police should at least have the opportunity of retaining some point of contact, or knowledge of the whereabouts of former donors. Some who have been charged with offences will either surface at a contact address to request removal of the DNA data, to avoid detection in the future, or will steer clear of requesting removal, so as to avoid revealing their whereabouts. This may well happen in the case of people who have moved abroad, outside of what they believe to be UK jurisdiction. However, there will of course be those who have surfaced to request the removal of DNA data as a matter of principle. I fully recognise that these are complicated arguments; I suppose that they relate more to criminal psychology than to any empirical evidence that I am able to offer. But I merely ask the House to consider this as a proposition, perhaps for future legislation, since it is a little late at this stage

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, I hope that I can deal with these two cases relatively briefly. My noble friend Lady Hamwee has brought before the House again the issue of those detained by the police and taken to a police station as a place of safety under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act. My noble friend outlined what that did, but it might help if I briefly outline my understanding.

If a person in a public place appears to be suffering from a mental disorder and in need of immediate care or control, Section 136 of the Mental Health Act allows a police officer to remove that person to a place of safety if the officer thinks it necessary to do so in the interests of that person’s protection or that of other people. I should make it clear that persons detained under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act—my noble friend emphasised this—are not arrested. That is a very important point that we all have to remember. It is an entirely separate regime, focused on the protection of the detained individual rather than the wider public. The powers to take DNA and fingerprints in Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 apply only to those individuals arrested for a recordable offence. If a person was arrested for a non-recordable offence, such as speeding, or if they were not arrested at all but detained under the provisions that we are talking about, as is the case under Section 136, the powers simply would not apply.

If the police were to take biometrics in these circumstances, it would be not only an error on the part of the police but in fact unlawful. Under new Section 63D(2)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, as inserted by Clause 1 of this Bill, if it should get on the statute book, all police officers would be under an obligation to delete material taken in this way. Therefore, I can say to my noble friend that Amendments 1 and 2 are unnecessary in that respect. She shakes her head, but I can assure her that, because the person had not been arrested, that would be the case. Taking biometrics from a person detained under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act is already unlawful.

The police are guided in the way that they take DNA and fingerprints by the PACE code of practice D, which deals with issues of identification of persons by police officers more generally. We will need to update code D in the light of the passage of this Bill and before it comes into force. I am happy to say to the House that we will include in that revision of the code a paragraph to make it quite clear that taking biometrics from those detained under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act is unlawful.

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I cannot believe that that is the intention of the legislation, in which case what are the arguments to be used in determining whether to make that extension from three years to five, and who is to make those judgments? Is it simply going to be on the say-so of an individual police officer? How will that be subject to challenge? Say that an individual who is arrested but not charged is told, “Your DNA is being held for three years”, but then after three years the police come forward and say, “We are seeking an extension of this period to five years”. Is that not a statement by the police that, “We believed you were guilty all along,”? and is there not stigma associated with that? Surely that is not a proper way of managing these things. Perhaps we could have a hard and fast rule that is based on hard evidence.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I do not want to detain the House longer than a few moments. I reiterate what I said in my brief intervention when we last discussed this matter. I simply cannot understand how we could allow the complete disconnect on this issue between the Government and what people think outside the House. When I talk to my colleagues and friends outside politics about this issue, there is universal support for our position. I know one person who is in favour of the Government’s position. Many of my friends who are Conservative supporters just do not believe that the Government are taking this action. I cannot understand how we allow ourselves to slip into a position where this disconnect can develop. Even during the course of this debate, why are Government-supporting Peers, who know what their own supporters are saying on this issue, not objecting more or even privately making representations to the Government on the need to avoid going down this route? What happens when cases begin to surface, as inevitably they will, of people who have committed crimes who could have been picked up in the event that their DNA had been retained?

The Joint Committee on Human rights has obviously expressed a reservation, which I perfectly understand. Effectively it is saying, as my noble friend did, “Where is the evidence?”. I do not believe that there is any evidence that is worthy of this kind of debate. The Government are making a major mistake in proceeding on this basis and, as I say, they are aggravating the disconnect between the people and Parliament.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Before the noble Lord sits down, he wants evidence, but would he agree with me that what the public may or may not think on the matter is not evidence—it is evidence only of public opinion? We should be careful in deciding questions of rights and freedoms in adopting what might be called a populist approach.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

The public’s perception of freedom in this debate is that they will be free of crime, or at least freer, in the event that more DNA was to be retained. That is the general attitude of the public as I understand it. They want freedom, but they believe that freedom comes with the retention of DNA.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, as always, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill for his assistance and advice in relation to what the Joint Committee on Human Rights feels about this issue. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for what she had to say. Certainly, we will do what we can to provide better evidence of the use of DNA in convicting criminals as and when we can. However, I refer the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Hughes of Woodside, and possibly even the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, to the figures. These are some of the figures that we have; obviously, more will become available. Since 2001, more than 4 million people have been added to the DNA database, yet despite that the number of DNA detections has fallen from 33,000 to just over 26,000 in 2009-10. There has been a vast growth in the hoarding of people’s DNA but a decline in the number of convictions. That is an important thing to remember as we look at this amendment.

I also give an assurance to the noble Lord, Lord Hughes of Woodside, who was worried that material taken from crime scenes would be lost. That is not the case. Material taken from crime scenes will still be taken; we are talking about material that is taken from individuals, whether criminals or not. That is a very different matter. My noble friend Lady Hamwee addressed a point of disagreement about whose DNA you should keep and for how long. We know that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, feels that there should be a national database containing everyone’s data. He would like to start with a voluntary database on which we can all put our DNA. We will discuss that when we reach his amendment. That might be hunky-dory and all that but it is not what we want, nor do we think that we should pursue a compulsory line in that regard.

I have explained what evidence we have. That is something we will look at but I also think we ought to look at other matters which influence this decision. The first thing to point out to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, is that they would replace the Government’s provisions, which meet our coalition commitment to adopt the protections of the Scottish model. She says that that model was agreed without any analysis whatever. I have given some figures and we will provide some more in due course but we will also look at the remarks of Mr Keith Vaz, chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, at Committee stage on this Bill in another place. We will also look at what the ECHR had to say with regard to the Marper case referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Dear. I was very grateful to him for his intervention, particularly as he stressed the important point of this being a question of balance. My noble friend Lady Hamwee also stressed that point.

I believe that the party opposite is persisting in its approach to keep the DNA and fingerprints of innocent people for many years, no matter how little evidence was ever uncovered, and to keep huge numbers of individuals’ DNA and fingerprints on the national databases just in case they go on to commit crime in the future. That is not something with which we can agree. The party opposite pays scant regard to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the S and Marper case, which noted with approval the system which has been in place in Scotland for some years. I remind your Lordships that the Scottish system, seemingly endorsed by the European court and on which we have modelled the proposals in the Bill before us today, was put in place by the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006, which was presented to the Scottish Parliament by the then Labour Justice Minister, Cathy Jamieson. I do not think that the Labour Party is in power in Scotland at the moment.

Noble Lords opposite contend that our proposals are in some way a charter for dangerous criminals such as rapists which will allow dangerous individuals to roam the streets, committing serious offences with no way of tracking them down. The contention that every individual suspected of rape or any other serious offence will instantly come off the database as a result of these proposals is just not true. As we have discussed previously and at some length, those charged with a qualifying offence, including rape, will have their DNA held for three years, and the police will be able to apply to the courts to extend that by a further two years. The police will do that and that is similar to what is happening in Scotland. Those arrested for a qualifying offence but not charged—oh! I was wondering whether the noble Lord wished to intervene but he is obviously addressing his Front Bench.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

If I recall correctly, my noble friend on the Front Bench said that there had been no extensions whatever in Scotland and no use of the two-year extension. Is that true? If it is true, on what basis can it be argued that it is going to happen here?

[Lord Henley]

I am saying that it is available to the police should that be necessary. That is the important point to get over to the noble Lord. I do not know what the figures are for Scotland. I am not responsible for Scotland. It is another Administration in charge of their—

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

In other words, the Government are proposing an extension of two years for England and Wales. That system already exists in Scotland but the Government do not even know what has happened in Scotland in terms of the use of the two years. Is that correct?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, that provision will be available here; it is available there. That is the important point. The police will have the ability to apply to the courts. Those arrested for a qualifying offence but not charged, where the victim is vulnerable, will also have their DNA held for three years, subject to the approval of the new independent commissioner. The noble Lord may not like that but that is the case.

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Moved by

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

16: Clause 24, page 18, line 14, at end insert—
“(10) The Secretary of State may by regulation introduce a statutory framework for the establishment of a Voluntary National DNA database.
(11) The National DNA Database Strategy Board shall, within a period of 12 months of commencement, report to the Secretary of State with recommendations on the establishment of a Voluntary National DNA database.
(12) The report on the establishment of a Voluntary National DNA database shall include the following—
(a) advice on options for the funding (both public and private) of the DNA database;(b) advice on proposals for the charging of individuals for the taking and retention of sample DNA;(c) advice on the security arrangements governing the retention of DNA samples;(d) advice on the categorising of donors from whom DNA samples have been taken and from which a DNA profile has been derived;(e) advice on the arrangements for the transfer of donor identification between categories;(f) advice on requests for removal of individual DNA profiles from the database;(g) advice on access by a responsible police officer to DNA profile information on the database; and(h) advice as to which statutory organisation and in what circumstances access to DNA profile information shall be given.”

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, this amendment is my modest attempt to secure the introduction of a voluntary national DNA database. I suppose I could have introduced the amendment under the voluntary donation provisions in Clause 10; however, on reflection I decided to graft the responsibility for working up the arrangements for establishing such a scheme on to the functions of the National DNA Database Strategy Board. If the amendment appears clumsy, it is because I am not a lawyer.

During the course of a somewhat flippant area of debate in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Henley, with a smile on his face, suggested that a special database should be set up for voluntary donors. I think he called it the Baroness Royall database.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

He did.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I put the same proposition more seriously. I am convinced that there is much support throughout the United Kingdom for the establishment of such a database. I have no evidence, apart from anecdotal evidence and conversations. However, I believe that many people out there would have no problem donating their DNA to such a database. The huge and undeniable benefit of going down the voluntary database route is that it would greatly help to take the stigma out of DNA retention and would help to develop public recognition of the benefit of retaining DNA. The bigger the voluntary database, the lower the level of stigma will be.

It is inevitable that over this century the state will hold more and more information in secure conditions. Better that the collection of such information be organised in a thought-out and structured manner rather than in conditions of panic when the state feels so much under threat that its only response is overreaction, with resultant confusion in policies on law and order.

We are slowly moving into a world where the measure of our freedom is dependent on our freedom to walk where we wish, live where we wish, travel where we wish, interact with others where we wish, transact where we wish and live longer without fear of assault on our person, our possessions and our civil rights. That will require some data to be held on us as individuals. I believe that there are many millions out there who are prepared to invest in the protection of their freedom. For me, the question is not so much the nature of the data to be held—I think that at the end of a national debate we can agree on that—but how we can arrive at a point where the public have swallowed their misgivings and reservations about the secure handling of data. As the former Metropolitan Police Detective Chief Inspector Colin Sutton put it in the Times two weeks ago:

“We are seemingly happy to attach biometrics to our passports—and therefore to our identities—but fearful of DNA. Our data-dependent society requires everyone to be ‘on the system’”.

As the senior judge Lord Justice Sedley put it in the Times on 6 September 2007:

“Where we are at the moment is indefensible. We have a situation where if you happen to have been in the hands of the police, then your DNA is on permanent record. If you haven’t, it isn’t … It also means that a great many people who are walking the streets, and whose DNA would show them guilty of crimes, go free”.

He went on to say that expanding the database to cover the whole population had,

“very serious but manageable implications”.

We then have the very interesting comments of Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys in his evidence to the Commons Home Affairs Select Committee on 3 February 2010. Sir Alec was described by the chairman of the committee as the person who,

“invented techniques for DNA fingerprinting in 1984”,

and as,

“the person who … invented this course of genetics”.

Sir Alec fathered the scheme proposed by the Government in the Bill. It was he who called upon the Home Office to adopt the Scottish model due to his profound concerns over the operation of the DNA regime in England and Wales at that time. To be fair to him, I quote his response to Gary Streeter MP’s questions in its entirety, but briefly. Gary Streeter asked him:

“Do you think it would be fair if the police did not just keep the samples from the people they have arrested who turn out to be innocent but if we were all on the database? How would you feel about that? Would that be a better system than the current system?”.

Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys replied:

“It would be a much less discriminatory system. I do not want to discuss the issue of discrimination against certain classes of our society, but it would get rid of issues of discrimination. I personally would be very uncomfortable with the idea that the police would have such a database. My vision would be of a parallel database … that would allow the police to keep their criminal DNA database and then one can image how those two could possibly interface. Very, very interestingly, the United Arab Emirates has agreed to go ahead with mandatory databasing of the entire population—and without any change in legislation, as far as I can tell. They intend doing that over the next few years. There is an experiment that is about to start which will greatly merit a very careful watch, to see whether it really does impact on criminal detection or whether it is seen by the UAE society as much more of a surveillance tool—which would be my worry, I have to say”.

This is the man who basically invented this whole science.

My amendment is but a tentative step down that route. The reference to “categorising of donors” is the move towards the parallel database. There are a number of questions that would need answers if we were to proceed with a voluntary DNA database. What is the cost to be? Who will pay for it? What is the scale of public support? What security arrangements could be put in place to protect such data? What arrangements could be made for the removal of data? Who would have access to the data? How would one categorise data so as to de-stigmatise the retention of data while allowing for the transfer of data between the various categories?

These questions would be the subject of inquiry, investigation and debate within the National DNA Database Strategy Board, which is what I am recommending in my amendment. I have used the board as a peg on which Parliament would place the responsibility for taking the whole enterprise forward. I beg to move.

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. He is merely putting forward, probably before his time, something that will inevitably come. The sad thing is, as we have more and more science at our disposal to improve the standard of our lives throughout the world, every now and again it is resisted. There is nothing new in that; it is always happening.

When the noble Lord was speaking, what immediately occurred to me as a good example of scientific progress that is being rejected in some areas at the moment is GM foods. There have even been examples of modern vaccinations being rejected. Clearly, DNA being the most certain of the biometrics currently available is something that will come. It is used in other countries. There is nothing sinister about it. The noble Lord’s idea of a voluntary database is extremely sensible and a very good way of moving forward.

Of course one has to recognise the cultural inhibitions and the emotional barriers to doing these things. I always felt that the problem with the identity card system that the previous Government aspired to and which the current Government have scrapped was not the identity part of it but the cards, because people saw identity cards as being echoes of fascism and totalitarianism of various sorts. In any case, the card itself is quite a dangerous thing. The great thing about biometrics is that if you want to know who someone is, you have the biometric and thus the person. If you want to check whether A is who he or she says they are, you take the biometric. You cannot compare the person with a card, because a good criminal or a good terrorist would ensure that the chip on the card matched themselves, but you can compare them with a fundamental base. This will come. Of course, as the noble Lord said, we are in a complicated society in which people move, but the global economy is nothing compared with the global society in which we will move, and as this happens we have to be able to dispose of resources efficiently to help people who need help rather than those who do not, and of course to fight crime as well. We have to have the means of knowing who people are. What the noble Lord suggests is thoroughly sensible, and as it would give the Government only the powers to do it I hope that they will look at it very carefully.

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, the noble Baroness guessed right in that I will be rejecting the amendment or at least not encouraging the House to accept it. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, like Jonathan Swift, made what is described as “a modest proposal” and claimed that I had recommended this policy in Committee with a smile on my face. The noble Lord should not always take me totally and utterly seriously, even in Committee, whether there is a smile on my face or otherwise. I will have to look carefully again at what precisely I said at that time.

If the noble Lord is of the view that he or others should be able to go along and hand in their DNA to the police, I am more than happy for them to do that. I will escort him to the police station in Workington, Carlisle or whatever town in the north-west he finds most convenient. We will go together and I will assist him in that process. Having said that, I do not think that this proposal really has much running for it, although I can see the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, about reducing stigma and other such matters. Those remarks were echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Desai, although he went on to make the important point about those who do not volunteer and whether they would have problems. I will get to that in due course.

I want to make only one or two points about the amendment because I do not think we should waste too much time on it, modest proposal though it was. First, I do not believe that there is a demand for such an idea. The police service has not been demanding the establishment of such a database and I do not believe that there is any great demand for one within civil society as a whole. There might be a few public-spirited individuals such as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and others who wish to come forward and provide their DNA for a database, but I suspect that they would be few and far between. I would also suggest that it is unlikely that individuals such as the noble Lord who did come forward would have any involvement in criminality, and that would be the reason they were happy to put forward their DNA. It is therefore difficult to see what the use might be for such material being stored on a voluntary database.

Secondly, I have a rather more important objection to the amendment, which relates to new subsection (11) where it proposes that the,

“National DNA Database Strategy Board shall, within a period of 12 months of commencement, report to the Secretary of State with recommendations on the establishment”,

of the database, and then in subsection (12) it sets out what the board should do. I do have to say that having the board carry out a feasibility study within 12 months of the commencement of the Bill would be asking rather a lot. The board’s workload will already be high during that period in supervising the establishment of the new procedures required by the Bill. That will take up a considerable amount of its time. The board has no resources to do this and we do not consider it appropriate to require it to do all this extra work at this time.

Having said that, I will put the smile back on my face and say that it is an interesting idea, as the noble Baroness put it, and a modest proposal. No doubt he will be more than happy to hand in his DNA in due course, but I do not think that I can support his amendment at this stage.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, for his recognition of the inevitability of the developments in DNA biometrics and how, in the end, there will be a national database. I am absolutely convinced of that, although it probably will not happen in my lifetime. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Hughes of Woodside on the question of the pilot. I do not think that this would cost the Government a lot of money. The only cost would be incurred by the strategy board in carrying out the work that is necessary for the purposes of my amendment. The fact is that we might find some great public benefactor, a private person, to fund a pilot which, over the years, might develop into a national DNA database. All I was asking was for the framework for a voluntary database to be considered, not for the Government to spend money on establishing it.

I recognise the concerns of my noble friend Lord Desai on the issue of black marks being put against those who refuse to join in. As I say, it would be voluntary, and in so far as it is voluntary I do not think that that issue would arise. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was not able to intervene on this occasion, because she too is recorded in Hansard as expressing the view that it might have some effect on reducing the stigma generated over the retention of DNA. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon for expressing the hope that we can at least consider this seriously at some stage in the future.

Perhaps I may say to the Minister that this is a debate that is going to carry on. As I have said, I believe it is utterly inevitable that this will happen. It is just a question of which Government will have the courage actually to take on the responsibility of taking the project forward. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

32: Clause 33, page 25, line 17, at end insert—
“(l) any organisation able to transmit images which derive from surveillance equipment that is subject to the code of practice under section 29”

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[Lord Campbell-Savours]

To describe this as a probing amendment is perhaps to stretch parliamentary procedure a bit far. However, I do so in the light of the parliamentary Answer given by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, on 31 August, which referred me to the Bill and the proposed code of practice in response to my Questions on pixelation. I should tell the House that I gave the department notice of the subject behind the amendment, which is, as I said, the issue of pixelation—the deliberate scrambling and distortion of televised images of people, a practice used by TV production teams to disguise the identity of individuals, more often than not for legal reasons. I believe that there is far too much pixelation in the live media. I understand that TV companies tend to follow rules, some say guidance, set under the Ofcom broadcasting code, which appears to call for,

“caution to be required in programmes covering relatively common but illegal behaviour such as dangerous driving, speeding and criminal damage”,

and state that programmes should not,

“condone or glamorise violent, dangerous or seriously antisocial behaviour”.

I further understand that the broadcasters also follow the Information Commissioner's code of practice, which provides guidance on how best to comply with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the eight data protection principles. Page 13 of the Information Commissioner’s code covers disclosure of images from a CCTV system to a third party, which may well be a television company. The effect of my amendment would be in an oblique way to bring those who transmit the images, TV companies, under the umbrella of not only the two codes to which I referred but the new code, in that the two codes, after suitable amendment, would have some regard to the code covering the operation of surveillance cameras as proposed under Clause 29. There might also need to be further amendment to the Data Protection Act.

I readily accept that that is a rather untidy way to raise the issue of pixelation, which in my view is now completely out of control and contrary to the public interest. Broadcasters have become far too sensitive in the use of such images. I perfectly understand why innocent bystanders—that is, people in the crowd—should have their privacy protected under the various codes. Why should a person committing a driving offence, such as driving with no insurance, grossly exceeding the speed limit or being drunk in charge of a vehicle, or urinating in the street, resisting arrest, attacking a person in a public place, being caught in the act of theft, swearing in a public place, using racist language, or swearing at a police officer, breaking into a shop front, as in the recent riots, or being caught in the act of abusing the benefits system or public servants, shoplifting, acting in a corrupt way through bribery—all acts which can be caught on camera—be protected from exposure and transparency by pixelation of their image in the act of wrongdoing?

The camera does not lie. What the camera sees, those present—very often the public at the scene of the incident—can see and witness. To argue, as the broadcasters do, that their actions are intended to ensure that the legal process is not prejudiced is no more than a cop-out. The judgment that the broadcasters should have in mind is not so much whether they are prejudicing legal proceedings, which is rarely the case, as whether transmission would leave them open to a civil action for damages, which could arise only if the transmission of an image misrepresented the action of an individual or individuals.

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[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I am indebted to the noble Baroness for her reply to my amendment. We have had an early canter round a very interesting course. I feel sure that if we had not all been eagerly awaiting the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, there would have been far more contributors to the debate. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 32 withdrawn.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment moved by my noble friend. As noble Lords will know, I have some experience in dealing with crime from the years when I held office in government. Two things became very clear during that period. The first was the enormous value of DNA in solving serious crime. Time and time again, cases came before me involving DNA, including a number of cases that came from the so-called cold cases review, which involved investigating crimes from a number of years before. There were some remarkable discoveries—for example, the so-called Sheffield shoe rapist who was discovered, some 20 years after he had committed, I think, four rapes, two attempted rapes and probably many more, as a result of a match to DNA from his sister who had been arrested, I think, for a driving offence. That would never have come to light but for the cold cases review and if that DNA had not been retained. It is not simply a case of bringing those who deserve it to justice; it is also a question of protecting others from that person. Those who have been convicted, particularly of such serious offences, as a result of DNA are at least off the streets and therefore less likely to cause harm to women, in particular. That is the second point I want to underline.

My noble friend rightly made the point that there is no more important series of cases for DNA evidence than serious sexual crimes, rape and other offences against women. That is the second thing that I discovered in my time. These are difficult cases to deal with and to convict on, but they cause huge anxiety, shame and sorrow. The great tragedy is when they do not result in a satisfactory result. I am therefore extremely worried about the Government’s proposal to remove without a proper evidential base evidence that could be used in just such cases. In the light of what my noble friend said, this change should not take place until and unless there is clear, convincing evidence that it is not going to put more people at risk or leave more criminals on the streets. For that reason, I strongly support this amendment and the other two amendments in this group.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I want briefly to intervene because I feel quite strongly about this subject. I am not a lawyer, but I think I have my finger on the pulse of the people who were my constituents in Workington. The criminal justice system, even under my own Government, was often felt to be completely out of control in the sense that, as far as many people on the street are concerned, the legal system simply does not work in the United Kingdom. There is a total disconnect between the people who stand behind this initiative and the wider public in the United Kingdom. If you were to do an honest poll of people on the streets of Britain, not a poll simply of libertarian opinion, and ask them their view of DNA and its retention, particularly in the context of their lack of confidence in the criminal justice system, you would find overwhelming support for the retention of this material.

The Government have got the balance wrong. They have taken the libertarian position too far and, in the event that this becomes law, they are going to end up with a number of cases surfacing in the national media, particularly in the tabloids, that reveal that people had committed offences and had not been tracked down simply because DNA had not been retained as a result of this legislation. I object very strongly because I believe that the Government are making a major mistake.

From a Conservative position, the Government would do well to look among their own supporters. Among many of the Conservatives who I know and mix with, there is overwhelming support for DNA retention. Many Conservative supporters simply do not understand why the Government are going down this route. I do not know whether they are being driven by the libertarian agenda that is being pushed by the Liberal Democrats in the coalition—they may well be—but if they are, they should take stock of what they are doing because they are making a mistake and they are upsetting their own supporters, who feel as strongly as I do. The Minister will mix with people in the county of Cumbria, where he lives. If he discusses this with his colleagues in the county of Cumbria, he will find the same view: that we should retain this material as it is a way of safeguarding the future of the criminal justice system and making it more operationally effective.

Finally, this is only one of a number of initiatives that the Government are taking in this Bill. They are introducing what some believe to be a more liberal regime in the use of cameras and CCTV. Again, the public support those cameras. I understand that the Government were involved in a consultation exercise earlier this year. I have not seen the result of that consultation exercise, but what interests me is who was consulted. Was it the people on the street, who have strong attitudes on these matters and who invariably fail to respond to consultations, or was it again this libertarian opinion, which worries me when it manages to secure changes in legislation in the form that we see today?

Let me just say where I stand on DNA. I believe that there should be a national DNA bank, established initially on a voluntary basis, whereby we no longer stigmatise the retention of DNA. I believe that millions of people would provide their DNA if only to prove that that is the route we should be going down. Only at the end of a process of introducing voluntary DNA will we be prepared at some stage in the future to take the necessary initiative to store all people’s DNA compulsorily—but let us start with a voluntary basis. There might be some entrepreneur who is prepared to fund that kind of approach to the retention of DNA, but it is only by taking away the stigma that we release ourselves from the arguments that have led to this legislative change that we are confronted with today.

[Lord Condon]

My Lords, I also support Amendment 1, for the reasons set out so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I respect entirely the Government’s wish to revisit the balance and to ensure that there is public confidence in the retention of DNA. I have not been an overstrident defender of police powers or police databases for their own sake. However, this is one area where the Government are in danger of getting it wrong and coming down on the side of a change that will not be in the interests of the public.

It is now 12 years since I retired as Metropolitan Police Commissioner, and there have been more advances in DNA science in those 12 years than in the whole history before that period. More and more cases can be reviewed in a cold case way, particularly in the area of sexual offences and violence, where the database has been invaluable in bringing to justice people who have been vicious assailants of both men and women.

If, as I suspect, the Government are not of a mind to give much way on this amendment, I hope the Minister will at least give us some reassurance on how the advances in science and DNA will not be neutralised by shedding DNA databases, which will be so valuable in looking back as well as forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am so glad that I prompted my noble friend Lord Phillips to speak before me because he put into words much better than I could have done things that I was trying to articulate in my own mind. He mentioned the possibility of a 100 per cent compulsory database, and I too had been working towards that as a question. I cannot, however, follow the suggestion of a voluntary database. I am not a psychologist and I cannot put myself into the mindset of an offender, but it is difficult to believe that a voluntary database would be any sort of deterrent at all.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness. It would dilute the stigma.

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble Lord, Lord Soley, talked about deterrence in the context of a voluntary database. I take the point about stigma, but only a little bit.

On the requirement for further evidence sought in the amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Condon, has said, the science and the technology are both galloping forward very fast, and logically one could make an argument for continually looking for further evidence as the science goes forward and never coming to a conclusion. It is always possible to ask for more evidence, and we will hear from the Minister what evidence the Home Office has looked for. However, I would like to ask him in this context about the post-implementation review mentioned in the impact assessment. There are a number of boxes under that heading that are not completed. Perhaps he can tell the Committee something about the establishment of the criteria for the assessment under a post-implementation review, because that would be helpful.

I am not sure that the amendments in this group that seek to extend the period are entirely consistent. We are in Committee, so I understand that, but to seek to decide whether to increase or decrease the time period while at the same time calling for further evidence before implementing this part of the Bill does not quite seem to hang together. However, that is probably a picky and unworthy argument because, as my noble friend said, the noble Baroness has raised matters that are extremely important.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, I start by picking up on the point made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee about Amendments 1, 7 and 8 not being consequential. I do not know what are the ultimate intentions of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, but I agree with my noble friend that Amendments 7 and 8 are not consequential on Amendment 1. Certainly if the noble Baroness was minded to divide the House on Amendment 1, I would not accept the consequences of the House’s decision as being binding on Amendments 7 and 8. However, I shall leave that to the noble Baroness when she gets to them.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, made clear, Amendment 1 would delay the implementation of these provisions by several months. I remind the House that the provisions in Part 1, Chapter 1 of the Bill represent the response of the Government to the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the S and Marper case, to which the noble Baroness referred, which is already three years old. If the previous Government had implemented compliance legislation when they had the chance in 2009-10, we would not now have more than 1 million innocent people recorded on the DNA and fingerprint databases and we would not have had to legislate again on this subject in this Bill.

The previous Government’s proposals, to which the noble Baroness referred and which she obviously still supports, received at that time virtually no support at all beyond her own Front Bench. She has obviously since then dragged up a bit more support from her Back Benches. Our proposals, which very much adopt the Scottish model, have been welcomed by a wide variety of organisations such as Liberty, Justice, the Law Society, the Criminal Bar Association and GeneWatch. They all gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee in another place and welcomed the Government’s general approach in this area. The Scottish model has also found favour with the Joint Committee on Human Rights and with the Constitution Committee, which have both referred to it.

The noble Baroness referred to evidence from the 2009 analysis, which was based on only three years of evidence, as I understand it, extrapolated to a point where it was essentially of, it could be argued, no real value. I refer the noble Baroness to our analysis, which was published in September and used five years of evidence, looking crucially at the likelihood of conviction. Therefore, further analysis is unnecessary.

However, I can tell my noble friend Lady Hamwee that there will be a post-implementation review, as there always is, and if we failed to include something in our impact assessment again I can only say that Homer nodded on this occasion and that we will make sure that that does not happen in future. I believe that further analysis is unnecessary and our proposals to retain unconvicted persons’ DNA for only three years are correct, and then only in respect of serious offences.

The analysis has been looked at by many independent experts, who have considered it closely. For example, as my honourable friend the Minister for Crime and Security, James Brokenshire, said in Committee in the other place,

“the Information Commissioner states that he ‘does not consider that the evidence presented supports a general period of anything like six years’”.—[Official Report, Commons, Protection of Freedoms Bill Committee, 29/3/2011; col. 212.]

We have consistently supported the adoption of the protections of the Scottish model, and that was a central plank of our programme for government announced last May. We believe that our proposals represent an appropriate balance—and I was very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, for using the word balance—between the rights of those who have not been convicted by a court and the need to protect the public in some of the most difficult cases.

If the noble Baroness would like a little support from her own Back Benches, I can also refer her to the widely respected independent website Straight Statistics, whose board of directors is chaired by her noble friend Lord Lipsey. It has examined the research and reached the conclusion that:

“Despite the limitations of the analysis, acknowledged by its authors, it does suggest that the retention periods allowed under the 2001 and 2003 Acts were unduly long, as were those proposed in the 2010 Bill. The present bill, which is broadly similar to the law in Scotland, gets the balance more nearly right”.

The noble Baroness seemed to imply that we offered full support to the 2010 Bill. Again, I remind her, as I did in my intervention, that that Bill went through in the wash-up, very rapidly. Obviously, we offered it support in that six years was considered an improvement on the situation in the past, but we have not yet brought those provisions into effect and we have no intention of doing so. We think it better to bring forward these proposals, which are more likely to comply with the European Court of Human Rights judgment.

Again, I refer the noble Baroness to comments made by the then Policing Minister, when the noble Baroness’s party was in government, who said to the Public Bill Committee on the Crime and Security Bill that,

“we have obviously considered the judgment”—

that is, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights—

“and how far we can push the boundary of the judgment in relation to our wish to have protection for the public”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Security Bill Committee, 26/1/2010; col. 71.]

In our judgment, we should be seeking a balance, rather than riding roughshod over the rights of the million or more innocent people whose DNA profile is on the database despite them never having been convicted of any crime.

I turn to Amendments 7 and 8, which deal with the period for which we seek to retain the DNA and fingerprints of innocent people, which was discussed at some length in another place. These amendments would replace the Government’s provisions, which meet our coalition commitment to adopt the protections of the Scottish model, with the core of the last Government’s Crime and Security Act, which was rushed through in the run-up to the election. The party opposite persists in its approach to keep the DNA and fingerprints of innocent people for many years, no matter what those people have been accused of and no matter how little evidence was ever uncovered.

The noble Baroness referred to some 23,000 offenders. I was never quite sure where they had come from and whether they were alleged rapists, alleged something else or just people who had been arrested. Similarly, at the Labour Party conference in September, the shadow Home Secretary said that this Government will,

“take 17,000 suspected rapists off”

the DNA database, which,

“will make it even harder to bring rapists to justice”.

Of course, we all believe that increasing the conviction rate for rape and other serious offences is important. But are those on the Front Bench really saying that, in order to increase that conviction rate, we need to keep the details of thousands of innocent people on the DNA database because some of them in the future may go on to commit serious crimes?

I say to the noble Baroness that the conclusions of the report from the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, last year are far more important. She looked at the handling of rape by the police and by criminal justice and made some 23 recommendations in that area. While her terms of reference did not include the criminal law, her report recommended reassessing the essential elements of investigating rape cases, supporting victims to improve the handling of investigations and improving victim support, which would build stronger cases. Her recommendations on that occasion included ensuring that all police officers adopt ACPO’s Guidance on Investigating and Prosecuting Rape and adopting the protocol between the Crown Prosecution Service, the police and local authorities on exchange of information. I say to the Committee that these issues are more likely to be of assistance in increasing the conviction rate for rape than keeping 1 million—or whatever number we think it is—innocent people’s DNA on the national database.

In any event, the contention that every individual suspected of rape will instantly come off the database is just not true. Those charged with a qualifying offence, including rape, will have their DNA held for three years, and the police will be able to apply to the courts to extend that by a further two years. Those arrested for but not charged with a qualifying offence where the victim is vulnerable will also have their DNA held for three years, subject to the approval of the new independent commissioner. We have consistently taken the view, both during the passage of the Crime and Security Act and in advancing our proposals in this Bill, that the correct approach is to ensure that those convicted in the past of serious offences have their DNA added to the database, while those arrested for, but not convicted of, more minor offences should not have their biometrics held beyond the end of the investigation.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I wonder if the noble Lord would answer a question that was asked of me, and which came up in discussion when we were arguing about this the other evening. What is the difference between holding personal information in the form of a photograph—a simple photograph, such as a passport photograph—in a national database, as against holding DNA?

[Lord Henley]

I am trying to remember who it was, but I think the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, made the point that he found somewhat scary the idea that we should have a national database with everyone's DNA on it, which was being promoted by the noble Lord and others of his colleagues. I feel exactly the same as my noble friend and I hope that that is a suitable response to the noble Lord. As I said, the idea that you could hold all that information in the form of DNA is very different from holding photographs. The noble Lord is speaking from a sedentary position but, if I could continue to try to answer him, that is a great distinction from keeping a photograph. I find the idea scary; obviously, the noble Lord does not.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 25 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Before we agree this I wonder whether the Minister can give us advice on the costs of the collection of DNA and its retention. Will the Minister tell us the costs involved in the existing arrangements?

[Lord Henley]

I gave a figure earlier from the impact assessment that the costs on the police were some £10 million. I stick by that. If the noble Lord would like a copy of the impact assessment, I will make sure that he has it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

What is the actual cost of taking DNA from an individual person?

[Lord Henley]

I have not the first idea of the individual cost but I will take advice and write to the noble Lord.

UK Border Security: 30 November

Lord Campbell-Savours Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I would not believe—and I would recommend that the noble Lord should not believe—everything I read in the press. I can assure him and the House that everyone assisting on this matter will have the appropriate training necessary to do the job. Yes, some police will be involved but they will have the appropriate training to do the job that they need to do.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, the Minister said that staff started training in April. What were they training for in April?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, any sensible organisation, knowing there was a risk of such things happening—something which has still not been condemned by noble Lords opposite and I am waiting for that condemnation to occur—would make the appropriate arrangements. The border agency started that last April.