Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
Main Page: Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Royall of Blaisdon's debates with the Home Office
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 4 would seek to instate a more proportionate limit of six years for the retention of DNA and fingerprint data for those arrested and/or charged with a qualifying offence such as rape or serious assault. We return to the difficult balance to be struck between protecting people's freedom from police and government interference and protecting their freedom not to become victims of interference or violence from criminals or terrorists. As was mentioned in our debate in Committee, there is no more important series of cases involving DNA evidence than serious sexual crimes, rape and other offences against women, which cause huge anxiety, shame and sorrow for the victims. That fact is one of the major catalysts for the amendments before us.
The six-year limit proposed by my Government was based on Home Office analysis and reflected a proportionate response to the European Court of Human Rights ruling that the blanket retention of DNA violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In Committee I cited the 23,000 criminals a year who go on to commit further offences, and who will not be covered by the Government's proposed three-year retention limit. I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, who is not in his place, whether that figure included minor offences. I confirm that it does, but also that each year 6,000 of those individuals will go on to commit serious crimes including rape and other sexual offences, murder and manslaughter. This analysis comes from the House of Commons Library and from Home Office research given to the Minister, Mr James Brokenshire, in July 2010. I think that the research was buried for some time.
As noble Lords will know, the three-year limit for the retention of DNA comes from the Scottish model, which was based on no real analysis of the risk to public security. The coalition Government made a commitment to the three-year limit based on no new evidence, simply a judgment that this was the appropriate balance between privacy and public safety. The Opposition fundamentally disagree with this judgment. When it comes to offences such as rape and serious assault, we believe that the balance should be in favour of protecting the public and that a more cautious, evidence-based limit should be set.
I was particularly struck by the speech in Committee of the noble Baroness, Lady O'Neill of Bengarve, about the reality of what is stored, and how it is stored, on the National DNA Database, because this reaches the heart of the issue about the invasion of privacy. She said:
“The information that is retained from a genetic profile for the purposes of the forensic database is not revealing information, such as susceptibility to disease or other genetic factors. It is a selection of the DNA evidence that used to be referred to as ‘junk DNA’, which is not known to code for any personally sensitive feature of persons. In that respect it is what in other aspects of privacy legislation is called an identifier. That suggests that in some ways it is less personal than a photograph of someone's face”.—[Official Report, 29/11/11; col. 145.]
I recognise that how far the state should keep sensitive information on its citizens is a sensitive and highly important issue. However, I believe that the noble Baroness’s detailed explanation about the data on individuals and how those data are actually held removes many of the core concerns voiced about the retention of biometric information. If more citizens understood that they would be willing to cede this tiny amount of personal privacy in exchange for the arrest and conviction of murderers or rapists.
The Government have recognised that there will be situations when there is a clear need to retain an individual's DNA beyond the three-year limit. That is why new Section 63F, “Retention of section 63D material: persons arrested for or charged with a qualifying offence”, contains a provision for allowing police officers to apply for a two-year extension to the limit. However, we have serious concerns about transferring the burden of responsibility for these decisions to the police. It would seem that the Government are abdicating responsibility for the adverse consequences that may result from their decision to set a limit of three years.
We know that in practice such a safeguard does not work. In evidence given to the Public Bill Committee, ACPO stated that the Scottish system on which this is based has not led to a single application for an extension,
“because there are 6 million records on the national DNA database. We have always argued that it is impossible to create a regime of individual intervention for a database of 6 million … In effect, the Scottish model has to rely on a judgment being made against an individual profile when it reaches three years”.—[Official Report, Commons, Protection of Freedoms Bill Committee, 22/3/11; col. 9.]
More fundamentally, the thrust of these provisions is to pass the burden of responsibility for these decisions over to the police. The Government, as I said, are abdicating responsibility for the impact on public safety that may result from their decision to limit the retention period to three years, by suggesting that it is up to the police to decide whether the three-year limit or a five-year limit is more appropriate for each individual who is on the DNA database for a serious offence.
Passing that responsibility on to the police would be wrong on any occasion but it is wholly wrong to do so in these straitened times when intense burdens are placed on the police as a consequence of the cuts. The Government are taking a huge and very risky step in the Bill by reducing to three years the limit for which DNA and fingerprint data are retained for those arrested and/or charged with a qualifying offence such as rape or serious assault. Any such move should—indeed, must—be accompanied by robust evidence, but I do not believe that the evidence is there. I ask the Minister to think again.
My Lords, I wonder whether I might speak briefly as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, because Members of the House will have the benefit of our report on the Bill, which is in the Printed Paper Office. In that report the committee—which is of course all-party, and beyond party—expressed the view that the scheme in the Bill is more proportionate and more likely than the previous regime under the Crime and Security Act 2010 to pass muster with the Marper judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.
I am not going to bore the House by referring in detail to what the report says, as it explains the issues very briefly and clearly. However, one matter that we expressed concern about, which I think is relevant, is that the committee said that it could not,
“reach a firm conclusion on the proportionality of these measures”,
without fuller information, including statistics on the operation of the National DNA Database, and asked the Government,
“to collect better records on the contribution made to the prevention and detection of crime by the retention and use of biometric material in the future”.
Paragraph 8 of the report states that,
“the measures in the Bill are likely to be a significant improvement on the measures in the Crime and Security Act 2010”.
As for the three-year versus the six-year period, with a renewal of two years, the committee commended and welcomed that as a,
“decision that a narrower approach to retention is appropriate”—
and so on.
The noble Baroness makes the point that Parliament should set a six-year term rather than having a three-year term renewed on application under the Bill. It seems no more rational or sensible to adopt a six-year period than to have a discretionary ability to increase for a further two years for a cause, as experience shows, but it is a matter of judgment about the better approach that one adopts. I say simply that the Government have the support of the committee itself in its report.
I noticed the intervention made by the noble Lord earlier on that point. It would be for the police to decide whether they consider it necessary. I would not want to go any further than that at this stage. They will have to do that. These are matters that will be subject to review by the independent commissioner, which is another safeguard. I know that the noble Lord is not very keen on such safeguards, but I think they are very important.
Across the entire coalition Government we took the view, during the passage of the Crime and Security Bill and in advanced proposals on this Bill, that the correct approach is to ensure that those convicted in the past of serious offences have their DNA added to the database, while those arrested for, but not convicted of, more minor offences should not have their biometrics held beyond the end of the investigation. That is why we encouraged the police to complete Operation Sheen, which the noble Lord might have come across, which identified more than 300 subjects in prison custody who had been convicted of murder, manslaughter or any sex offence but who did not appear to have had their DNA profile recorded on the national database. That operation has been completed recently and has resulted in an additional 376 such individuals having their DNA taken and uploaded on to the database.
Having completed that work, using the provisions of the Crime and Security Act which were agreed in the final days of the previous Government, the police service has embarked on a further operation, Operation Nutmeg, which seeks to chase and sample those with similar convictions who are now in the community. As my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said at Third Reading of this Bill in the House of Commons:
“In June last year, we started a programme to identify individuals in the community who have previously been convicted of either a sexual offence or homicide, and whom the last Government failed to place on the DNA database. That process has so far identified more than 13,000 people whose identities have been passed to local police forces, and we are now working with the police to find the individuals and obtain samples”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/10/11; col. 282.]
I believe that that sets out why we are doing this and why we are getting it right. I also believe the analysis which has been looked at by many independent experts who have considered it closely and, as my right honourable friend the Minister for crime and security said in the House of Commons Public Bill Committee,
“the Information Commissioner states that he ‘does not consider that the evidence presented’”—
that is, the evidence presented by the previous Government—
‘“supports a general period of anything like six years’”.—[Official Report, Commons, Protection of Freedoms Bill Committee, 29/3/2011; col. 212.]
I turn finally to the remarks of the chairman of the Home Affairs Committee as I think they are apposite and they are remarks on which the noble Baroness might wish to reflect. In his contribution at the Report stage of the Crime and Security Bill in the House of Commons, the right honourable Member said,
“There were differences among those of us on the Select Committee on how long the period should be, but we came to the conclusion”—
this is again to stress the balance—
“that a three-year period probably strikes the right balance. We said that the period should not be less than three years—although it could be longer—but that three years was a reasonable length of time”.
The right honourable gentleman went on to say that on the Select Committee,
“there was a consensus that holding the data for six years was too long”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/3/10; col. 48.]
Again I go back to what I said at previous stages of the Bill, that these are questions of balance. We think that we have the balance right; the European Court of Human Rights seems to think that we are getting the balance right; and the chairman of the Home Affairs Committee thinks that that is the case. Three years with the possibility of an extension seems to me to be about right and we think that six years is too long. I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this brief debate and for the information provided by the Minister. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that I have huge respect for the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights but, on this occasion, I do not agree with its conclusions wholeheartedly. I noticed that other noble Lords have noted, as the noble Lord said himself, that the Committee was asking for better recording in future and for more evidence, in effect. It has become apparent during the debate that the coalition Government are now moving towards three years but are saying that, although they want three years, in some cases five years is more appropriate. They are, as many noble Lords would agree, putting that burden on the police.
In my earlier speech, I mentioned that ACPO had said that not one single application for an extension had been made in Scotland. That is very relevant to our deliberations this evening. I completely agree with all noble Lords who have spoken that this is a matter of balance and of which side of the line one comes down on. On these Benches, I think everyone comes down on the side of wishing to preserve people’s freedom to live, protected from crime, rather than having more protection for people’s privacy. We believe that the citizens of this country would prefer that. We are worried that in future—
Does the noble Baroness accept that this is not a “rather than” situation? She keeps using the phrase “rather than”. Of course we all want to protect ourselves against disorder and crime, but it is not a question of “rather than” but of balance. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has been looking at Marper and at the evidence and as an all-party and beyond-party committee it came to the conclusion that the balance was correct. Does the noble Baroness accept that it is a question of balance?
I accept that it is a question of balance, as I have said on numerous occasions. However, I believe that it is also a question of “rather than”. We believe that, rather than people's privacy being the be-all and end-all in this argument, it is more important to retain DNA for a longer period. I see people nodding against me, if you see what I mean. I do not expect all noble Lords to agree with me but on this question of balance we come down on the protection of individuals rather than on the privacy of individuals. That is where we are.
I do not intend to move to a vote but I would be grateful if the noble Lord could come back to me with some more information which I may wish to pursue at Third Reading in relation to the three years and the five years. If this is a key plank within the arguments put forward by the Minister, as I believe it to be, it is very relevant that in Scotland it has not been used on a single occasion. I would like to know why the police in Scotland have not felt able to use this or have not felt it necessary to use it. I would be grateful if the Minister could bring back further information before Third Reading.
My Lords, we are on Report so I intervene with some disquiet merely to say that I do not think that I can add anything to what I have said. I, and other colleagues on these Benches, have been saying that we have to get these things right for a matter of balance. This is also a matter that has been reflected on by the European Court of Human Rights and by our own Joint Committee on Human Rights. They think that three years is about right. We also feel that there should be the ability to extend that in certain cases. I leave it at that.
My Lords, of course I recognise what the European Court of Human Rights said, but my Government, when they came to the view that the period should be six years, believed that it was compliant with the ruling of the ECHR. I was not suggesting that the Minister was going to agree with me; I was asking him to come back with further evidence of the situation in Scotland. There must be some facts and figures. The facts relating to Scotland that I have put before the House have been questioned, and I would like more facts about the situation in Scotland. I would like to know whether it is indeed the case that the police have not asked for an extension from three to five years.
My Lords, with the leave of the House, perhaps I may say to the noble Baroness that asking whether the police have or have not sought extensions is one matter, but asking why not seems to be asking the Minister to prove a negative. I thought, not just now but a few moments ago, she was asking the Minister to explain why not.
My Lords, forgive me if I misled the House. I did not mean to ask why not; I wished to know whether or not the police had asked for an extension. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the explanation this evening and for the letter that she kindly sent me following Committee. These are complex issues. I hope that she will forgive me if I am asking questions that she has already answered. Essentially, to introduce a new definition of “vulnerable” complicates the issue in many ways. Although I hear what she says—that this definition is imported from another criminal justice Act—it is not the tried and tested definition of “vulnerable” and it would be far easier if people knew exactly where they stood.
I still have serious concerns about the appropriateness of the new definition. As the noble Baroness said in Committee, I disagreed with the restrictions that the Government placed on the retention of DNA data from those arrested for but not charged with a serious offence. That is a misleading distinction which has serious consequences for victims of crime with historically low charge rates, such as rape. As stated in the letter, the Government recognise that vulnerable members of society should be given special protection in such situations, and new Section 63G aims to provide for the retention of DNA data for those arrested for offences against victims deemed to be vulnerable adults.
At Second Reading in the Commons, the Home Secretary, the right honourable Theresa May, stated, on the conditions where new Section 63F(5) would apply:
“I would expect that application to be made in certain circumstances, such as when the victim has been vulnerable, which may mean there is very good evidence that the individual concerned has committed a crime but the victim is not able or not willing to come forward and see that case through”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/11; col. 206.]
However, the Government’s proposed amendment to the definition of vulnerable adult recognises only those individuals who are subject to mental or physical impairment as being particularly vulnerable to problems in bringing forward a charge of providing evidence.
In particular, the new definition requires that an individual’s ability to protect himself or herself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired. The definition, particularly with the addition of the qualification “significantly”, adds a large element of discretion, leaving judgment of the vulnerability of the victim up to the discretion of the officer dealing with the case. I am concerned that such a definition is open to wide interpretation, which may mean that vulnerable adults are not given sufficient protection under the Bill.
An individual’s circumstances are a key indicator of their vulnerability, as is recognised by the definition used under Section 60(1) of the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which lists a number of different circumstances in which an adult should be classed as vulnerable. The proposed new definition also neglects the fact that the type of offence will often determine the particular vulnerability of the individual and lead to problems which may account for the lack of any charge being made.
I note that the noble Baroness says that women who have been subjected to violence are covered under a different clause, although they are not covered by the definition of “vulnerable”. I am glad that that is the case, but it is complicated. They cannot read the Bill and see that they are covered as being vulnerable.
I will not press the amendment to a vote, but there are still questions to be answered. I do not expect the noble Baroness to answer me this evening, but if we could have further discussion about this to sort out some of my remaining concerns I would be extremely grateful.
On the change of definition of vulnerable adult, as I tried to explain in moving the amendment, it is important that we do not use the definition applied later in the Bill in the context of victims. If we did, we would be at risk of creating the opposite situation from what the noble Baroness wants. Later in the Bill, the definition of “vulnerable adult”, as amended, is intended to define people's vulnerability in terms of the activity in which a person may have to engage with them. As I said, whether it is personal care or whether someone is required to be in close proximity to someone else, we want to define vulnerability as far as whether someone should have the right to access the person.
In this part of the Bill, we are focusing on victims of crime. The fact that we are using a definition that already exists—it predates the definition that the Bill amends later—seems to me a simpler way forward. It is clear which people it is intended to protect. The definition states that it,
“means a person aged 18 or over whose ability to protect himself or herself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old age or otherwise”.
I understand the noble Baroness’s point about the use of “significantly” and whether or not the definition excludes some people whom she thinks might be captured by the other definition. I disagree. Under the other definition, which is dictated by the nature of the care that people receive, some people who are old may not be in receipt of any specific care that would define them as vulnerable. The fact that they are old would suggest that they are vulnerable in this context, so this definition would capture more people. Also, “otherwise”, at the end of the definition, means that there is discretion for the police in considering who is vulnerable. I would expect the new DNA strategy board to offer guidance to the police on how to consider the definition of vulnerability when they make their application to the biometrics commissioner.
One thing behind the noble Baroness’s concern, which I share, is that in the context of a crime such as rape, and violent crime against somebody, the impact of the crime might make somebody vulnerable. The definition taken from the Domestic Crime, Violence and Victims Act already suggests what the police might consider under the definition of “vulnerable”.
I understand where the noble Baroness is coming from. I was very careful to consider the issues that she raised in Committee and I wanted to explore them with officials in great detail before bringing the amendment back to your Lordships today. However, I am as convinced as I can be that this is a clear safeguard. Women in refuges or secure housing are clearly caught by the other limb of the Bill, meaning that they would have been in a refuge centre because somebody known to them had been violent towards them. That is clearly covered by the other part of the Bill and would mean that, if it was anybody known to the victim, that would allow the police to apply for that DNA to be retained.
I am clear that the wording is sufficiently comprehensive to cover what we are trying to achieve, which I outlined in moving the amendment, and at the same time to protect those who are most vulnerable. I shall of course be willing to discuss further with the noble Baroness outside the Chamber any of her concerns, but I felt that it was appropriate for me to move this amendment.
My Lords, this amendment is my modest attempt to secure the introduction of a voluntary national DNA database. I suppose I could have introduced the amendment under the voluntary donation provisions in Clause 10; however, on reflection I decided to graft the responsibility for working up the arrangements for establishing such a scheme on to the functions of the National DNA Database Strategy Board. If the amendment appears clumsy, it is because I am not a lawyer.
During the course of a somewhat flippant area of debate in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Henley, with a smile on his face, suggested that a special database should be set up for voluntary donors. I think he called it the Baroness Royall database.
I put the same proposition more seriously. I am convinced that there is much support throughout the United Kingdom for the establishment of such a database. I have no evidence, apart from anecdotal evidence and conversations. However, I believe that many people out there would have no problem donating their DNA to such a database. The huge and undeniable benefit of going down the voluntary database route is that it would greatly help to take the stigma out of DNA retention and would help to develop public recognition of the benefit of retaining DNA. The bigger the voluntary database, the lower the level of stigma will be.
It is inevitable that over this century the state will hold more and more information in secure conditions. Better that the collection of such information be organised in a thought-out and structured manner rather than in conditions of panic when the state feels so much under threat that its only response is overreaction, with resultant confusion in policies on law and order.
We are slowly moving into a world where the measure of our freedom is dependent on our freedom to walk where we wish, live where we wish, travel where we wish, interact with others where we wish, transact where we wish and live longer without fear of assault on our person, our possessions and our civil rights. That will require some data to be held on us as individuals. I believe that there are many millions out there who are prepared to invest in the protection of their freedom. For me, the question is not so much the nature of the data to be held—I think that at the end of a national debate we can agree on that—but how we can arrive at a point where the public have swallowed their misgivings and reservations about the secure handling of data. As the former Metropolitan Police Detective Chief Inspector Colin Sutton put it in the Times two weeks ago:
“We are seemingly happy to attach biometrics to our passports—and therefore to our identities—but fearful of DNA. Our data-dependent society requires everyone to be ‘on the system’”.
As the senior judge Lord Justice Sedley put it in the Times on 6 September 2007:
“Where we are at the moment is indefensible. We have a situation where if you happen to have been in the hands of the police, then your DNA is on permanent record. If you haven’t, it isn’t … It also means that a great many people who are walking the streets, and whose DNA would show them guilty of crimes, go free”.
He went on to say that expanding the database to cover the whole population had,
“very serious but manageable implications”.
We then have the very interesting comments of Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys in his evidence to the Commons Home Affairs Select Committee on 3 February 2010. Sir Alec was described by the chairman of the committee as the person who,
“invented techniques for DNA fingerprinting in 1984”,
and as,
“the person who … invented this course of genetics”.
Sir Alec fathered the scheme proposed by the Government in the Bill. It was he who called upon the Home Office to adopt the Scottish model due to his profound concerns over the operation of the DNA regime in England and Wales at that time. To be fair to him, I quote his response to Gary Streeter MP’s questions in its entirety, but briefly. Gary Streeter asked him:
“Do you think it would be fair if the police did not just keep the samples from the people they have arrested who turn out to be innocent but if we were all on the database? How would you feel about that? Would that be a better system than the current system?”.
Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys replied:
“It would be a much less discriminatory system. I do not want to discuss the issue of discrimination against certain classes of our society, but it would get rid of issues of discrimination. I personally would be very uncomfortable with the idea that the police would have such a database. My vision would be of a parallel database … that would allow the police to keep their criminal DNA database and then one can image how those two could possibly interface. Very, very interestingly, the United Arab Emirates has agreed to go ahead with mandatory databasing of the entire population—and without any change in legislation, as far as I can tell. They intend doing that over the next few years. There is an experiment that is about to start which will greatly merit a very careful watch, to see whether it really does impact on criminal detection or whether it is seen by the UAE society as much more of a surveillance tool—which would be my worry, I have to say”.
This is the man who basically invented this whole science.
My amendment is but a tentative step down that route. The reference to “categorising of donors” is the move towards the parallel database. There are a number of questions that would need answers if we were to proceed with a voluntary DNA database. What is the cost to be? Who will pay for it? What is the scale of public support? What security arrangements could be put in place to protect such data? What arrangements could be made for the removal of data? Who would have access to the data? How would one categorise data so as to de-stigmatise the retention of data while allowing for the transfer of data between the various categories?
These questions would be the subject of inquiry, investigation and debate within the National DNA Database Strategy Board, which is what I am recommending in my amendment. I have used the board as a peg on which Parliament would place the responsibility for taking the whole enterprise forward. I beg to move.
My Lords, I was quite attracted by the concept of the freedom to choose voluntarily to do something but in this case it leads us astray. History teaches us that, if there is a large amount of private information out there which a Government think is useful, they will acquire access to it. For example, the USA Patriot Act gives the American Government access to anything they want in the name of trying to fight terrorism. Therefore, these data will not necessarily be secure in perpetuity if someone sees a use for them.
I have also learnt from history that governments who accumulate a large amount of information on their citizens end up using it to control the everyday lives of those citizens. For starters, you only have to look at communist Russia, watch “Dr Zhivago”, or look at East Germany, Albania or all sorts of places, where, at the end of the day, these things are used to control behaviours. I am sorry but I do not trust the people who end up in charge of these things. We need to look 10, 20 or 30 years ahead and we do not know who will be in control then.
Perversely, as a result, it does not necessarily protect citizens. It is not as if this will give an automatic one-to-one match. It would do what this Bill is trying to prevent. The Bill is trying to protect us from the Government trying to accumulate large amounts of data. DNA of course is not infallible. Ultimately, it is vulnerable to contamination of samples and laboratory error. It is only an approximate match; it is not a one-to-one match the whole time. Therefore, there will be errors which could be misused. I think that this amendment concerns a bigger subject and should be left out of the Bill. It does not fit with it.
My Lords, I rise not to support my noble friend on behalf of the Opposition necessarily but, as I said in Committee, as an individual I have a great deal of sympathy with my noble friend’s amendment. Like my noble friend I believe that such a voluntary database would lower the level of stigma and in the future might enhance public confidence in the secure handling of data, which is very necessary. As my noble friend has said today, the state will undoubtedly hold more and more information about its citizens.
I was also very interested to hear of the response by Professor Jeffreys to Mr Gary Streeter MP, which is worth pursuing. I do not know what the Government’s response to my noble friend’s amendment will be, although I suspect that they will reject the amendment. However, it is an interesting suggestion and I hope that, if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, the National DNA Database Strategy Board will look at the proposal as perhaps something interesting to pursue on behalf of the citizens of this country and their safety.
My Lords, the noble Baroness guessed right in that I will be rejecting the amendment or at least not encouraging the House to accept it. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, like Jonathan Swift, made what is described as “a modest proposal” and claimed that I had recommended this policy in Committee with a smile on my face. The noble Lord should not always take me totally and utterly seriously, even in Committee, whether there is a smile on my face or otherwise. I will have to look carefully again at what precisely I said at that time.
If the noble Lord is of the view that he or others should be able to go along and hand in their DNA to the police, I am more than happy for them to do that. I will escort him to the police station in Workington, Carlisle or whatever town in the north-west he finds most convenient. We will go together and I will assist him in that process. Having said that, I do not think that this proposal really has much running for it, although I can see the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, about reducing stigma and other such matters. Those remarks were echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Desai, although he went on to make the important point about those who do not volunteer and whether they would have problems. I will get to that in due course.
I want to make only one or two points about the amendment because I do not think we should waste too much time on it, modest proposal though it was. First, I do not believe that there is a demand for such an idea. The police service has not been demanding the establishment of such a database and I do not believe that there is any great demand for one within civil society as a whole. There might be a few public-spirited individuals such as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and others who wish to come forward and provide their DNA for a database, but I suspect that they would be few and far between. I would also suggest that it is unlikely that individuals such as the noble Lord who did come forward would have any involvement in criminality, and that would be the reason they were happy to put forward their DNA. It is therefore difficult to see what the use might be for such material being stored on a voluntary database.
Secondly, I have a rather more important objection to the amendment, which relates to new subsection (11) where it proposes that the,
“National DNA Database Strategy Board shall, within a period of 12 months of commencement, report to the Secretary of State with recommendations on the establishment”,
of the database, and then in subsection (12) it sets out what the board should do. I do have to say that having the board carry out a feasibility study within 12 months of the commencement of the Bill would be asking rather a lot. The board’s workload will already be high during that period in supervising the establishment of the new procedures required by the Bill. That will take up a considerable amount of its time. The board has no resources to do this and we do not consider it appropriate to require it to do all this extra work at this time.
Having said that, I will put the smile back on my face and say that it is an interesting idea, as the noble Baroness put it, and a modest proposal. No doubt he will be more than happy to hand in his DNA in due course, but I do not think that I can support his amendment at this stage.