Baroness Stowell of Beeston
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Protection of Freedoms Bill
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Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I withdrew a similar amendment in Committee in order to take more time to consider carefully the concerns expressed by noble Lords. Having done so, I am confident about introducing this amendment.
Among other things, Clause 3 sets out the rules governing the retention of the DNA profile of a person arrested for a serious offence but not charged with that offence. In such cases, the police can apply to the biometrics commissioner to retain the DNA in certain circumstances, including where the alleged victim of the offence was a vulnerable adult. As my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said at Second Reading in another place:
“We must protect the most vulnerable in society, so when the victim of the alleged offence is under 18, vulnerable or in a close personal relationship with the arrested person the expectation is that the police will apply to the commissioner for retention”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/11; col. 207.]
Amendment 6 seeks to replace the definition of “vulnerable adult” as used in this context.
Currently, Clause 3 defines a vulnerable adult by reference to Section 60(1) of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. However, as we will see when we consider Part 5, Clauses 65 and 66 seek to amend the definition of a vulnerable adult in the 2006 Act to mean any person over the age of 18 in receipt of a regulated activity—for example, health or personal care. The changes made by these clauses to the definitions of vulnerable adult and regulated activity put the emphasis on the activity and the person carrying out that activity. The Bill no longer attempts to define vulnerability or label a person as a vulnerable adult. As a result, the definition in the SVGA is not relevant in the context of Clause 3.
Perhaps I may explain further. Clause 3, which we are discussing, is about protecting victims of crime. Clauses 65 and 66 are about protecting those necessarily in receipt of personal care or who rely on the support or contact of others. They are two separate things. The amendment therefore draws on the definition in Section 5(6) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, which defines a vulnerable adult as,
“a person aged 16 or over whose ability to protect himself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old age or otherwise”.
The reason why the amendment inserts the definition in full in new Section 63G(10) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, rather than merely referring to the 2004 Act, is that our definition refers to persons aged 18 or over, given that the definitions in new Section 63G(2), as inserted by Clause 3, already include all those under the age of 18. For the purposes of protecting those who are truly vulnerable, we believe that this definition is far more apposite. It will cover and protect more people.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the explanation this evening and for the letter that she kindly sent me following Committee. These are complex issues. I hope that she will forgive me if I am asking questions that she has already answered. Essentially, to introduce a new definition of “vulnerable” complicates the issue in many ways. Although I hear what she says—that this definition is imported from another criminal justice Act—it is not the tried and tested definition of “vulnerable” and it would be far easier if people knew exactly where they stood.
I still have serious concerns about the appropriateness of the new definition. As the noble Baroness said in Committee, I disagreed with the restrictions that the Government placed on the retention of DNA data from those arrested for but not charged with a serious offence. That is a misleading distinction which has serious consequences for victims of crime with historically low charge rates, such as rape. As stated in the letter, the Government recognise that vulnerable members of society should be given special protection in such situations, and new Section 63G aims to provide for the retention of DNA data for those arrested for offences against victims deemed to be vulnerable adults.
At Second Reading in the Commons, the Home Secretary, the right honourable Theresa May, stated, on the conditions where new Section 63F(5) would apply:
“I would expect that application to be made in certain circumstances, such as when the victim has been vulnerable, which may mean there is very good evidence that the individual concerned has committed a crime but the victim is not able or not willing to come forward and see that case through”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/11; col. 206.]
However, the Government’s proposed amendment to the definition of vulnerable adult recognises only those individuals who are subject to mental or physical impairment as being particularly vulnerable to problems in bringing forward a charge of providing evidence.
In particular, the new definition requires that an individual’s ability to protect himself or herself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired. The definition, particularly with the addition of the qualification “significantly”, adds a large element of discretion, leaving judgment of the vulnerability of the victim up to the discretion of the officer dealing with the case. I am concerned that such a definition is open to wide interpretation, which may mean that vulnerable adults are not given sufficient protection under the Bill.
An individual’s circumstances are a key indicator of their vulnerability, as is recognised by the definition used under Section 60(1) of the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which lists a number of different circumstances in which an adult should be classed as vulnerable. The proposed new definition also neglects the fact that the type of offence will often determine the particular vulnerability of the individual and lead to problems which may account for the lack of any charge being made.
I note that the noble Baroness says that women who have been subjected to violence are covered under a different clause, although they are not covered by the definition of “vulnerable”. I am glad that that is the case, but it is complicated. They cannot read the Bill and see that they are covered as being vulnerable.
I will not press the amendment to a vote, but there are still questions to be answered. I do not expect the noble Baroness to answer me this evening, but if we could have further discussion about this to sort out some of my remaining concerns I would be extremely grateful.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
On the change of definition of vulnerable adult, as I tried to explain in moving the amendment, it is important that we do not use the definition applied later in the Bill in the context of victims. If we did, we would be at risk of creating the opposite situation from what the noble Baroness wants. Later in the Bill, the definition of “vulnerable adult”, as amended, is intended to define people's vulnerability in terms of the activity in which a person may have to engage with them. As I said, whether it is personal care or whether someone is required to be in close proximity to someone else, we want to define vulnerability as far as whether someone should have the right to access the person.
In this part of the Bill, we are focusing on victims of crime. The fact that we are using a definition that already exists—it predates the definition that the Bill amends later—seems to me a simpler way forward. It is clear which people it is intended to protect. The definition states that it,
“means a person aged 18 or over whose ability to protect himself or herself from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old age or otherwise”.
I understand the noble Baroness’s point about the use of “significantly” and whether or not the definition excludes some people whom she thinks might be captured by the other definition. I disagree. Under the other definition, which is dictated by the nature of the care that people receive, some people who are old may not be in receipt of any specific care that would define them as vulnerable. The fact that they are old would suggest that they are vulnerable in this context, so this definition would capture more people. Also, “otherwise”, at the end of the definition, means that there is discretion for the police in considering who is vulnerable. I would expect the new DNA strategy board to offer guidance to the police on how to consider the definition of vulnerability when they make their application to the biometrics commissioner.
One thing behind the noble Baroness’s concern, which I share, is that in the context of a crime such as rape, and violent crime against somebody, the impact of the crime might make somebody vulnerable. The definition taken from the Domestic Crime, Violence and Victims Act already suggests what the police might consider under the definition of “vulnerable”.
I understand where the noble Baroness is coming from. I was very careful to consider the issues that she raised in Committee and I wanted to explore them with officials in great detail before bringing the amendment back to your Lordships today. However, I am as convinced as I can be that this is a clear safeguard. Women in refuges or secure housing are clearly caught by the other limb of the Bill, meaning that they would have been in a refuge centre because somebody known to them had been violent towards them. That is clearly covered by the other part of the Bill and would mean that, if it was anybody known to the victim, that would allow the police to apply for that DNA to be retained.
I am clear that the wording is sufficiently comprehensive to cover what we are trying to achieve, which I outlined in moving the amendment, and at the same time to protect those who are most vulnerable. I shall of course be willing to discuss further with the noble Baroness outside the Chamber any of her concerns, but I felt that it was appropriate for me to move this amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
The noble Baroness pointed to the words “or otherwise” at the end of the amendment. I may not have been paying sufficient attention to the argument, in which case I apologise, but if this matter is considered further perhaps she would take on board that within this definition the impairment is through only physical or mental disability or illness, and that the last five words are a description of what might cause the physical or mental disability or illness. Therefore, one cannot read “or otherwise” as extending the impairment. I repeat: the impairment is only through disability or illness. As I listened to the noble Baroness, I thought that she was asking us to read “or otherwise” as adding to “disability or illness”, which I do not think it does.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I am sorry if I in any way misled your Lordships. In her definition of those final five words—particularly the use of “otherwise”—the noble Baroness is correct. I was seeking to make it clear that impairment through physical or mental disability could be due to old age or otherwise. I am not trying to introduce something new; I am saying that it is possible for the impairment to be not just limited to old age. I hope that I am making myself clear; it does get rather complicated. However, in simple terms, I think that the noble Baroness is right.
“(5A) The responsible chief officer of police may apply to a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) for an order to retain a sample to which this section applies beyond the date on which the sample would otherwise be required to be destroyed by virtue of subsection (4) or (5) if—
(a) the sample was taken from a person in connection with the investigation of a qualifying offence, and(b) the responsible chief officer of police considers that the condition in subsection (5B) is met.(5B) The condition is that, having regard to the nature and complexity of other material that is evidence in relation to the offence, the sample is likely to be needed in any proceedings for the offence for the purposes of—
(a) disclosure to, or use by, a defendant, or(b) responding to any challenge by a defendant in respect of the admissibility of material that is evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely.(5C) An application under subsection (5A) must be made before the date on which the sample would otherwise be required to be destroyed by virtue of subsection (4) or (5).
(5D) If, on an application made by the responsible chief officer of police under subsection (5A), the District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) is satisfied that the condition in subsection (5B) is met, the District Judge may make an order under this subsection which—
(a) allows the sample to be retained for a period of 12 months beginning with the date on which the sample would otherwise be required to be destroyed by virtue of subsection (4) or (5), and(b) may be renewed (on one or more occasions) for a further period of not more than 12 months from the end of the period when the order would otherwise cease to have effect.(5E) An application for an order under subsection (5D) (other than an application for renewal)—
(a) may be made without notice of the application having been given to the person from whom the sample was taken, and(b) may be heard and determined in private in the absence of that person.(5F) A sample retained by virtue of an order under subsection (5D) must not be used other than for the purposes of any proceedings for the offence in connection with which the sample was taken.
(5G) A sample that ceases to be retained by virtue of an order under subsection (5D) must be destroyed.”
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, as we have previously discussed, the Bill creates a general rule that all individual samples will be destroyed within six months of being taken. This represents a significant step in protecting the civil liberties of those whose DNA is taken in the course of a criminal investigation, as it ensures that the particularly sensitive genetic material, which is generally not needed for identification purposes, is destroyed at the earliest opportunity.
However, as we have proceeded with our consideration of how to implement the provisions of the Bill, prosecutors at the Crown Prosecution Service have made representations to us that, in a limited number of cases each year, it would in fact be necessary to retain the individual samples in order to deal with any subsequent challenge by the defence to the comparison made between the DNA of the individual and that found at the crime scene.
Prosecutors are concerned that, if they are not able to retain samples in these cases, they might be unable to withstand such a challenge and acquittals on technical grounds might result. An example of the type of case where such an issue might arise could be where the crime scene stain contained a mixture of, for example, the blood of both a murder victim and their attacker, and possibly a third person, such as an innocent housemate of the victim. In such a sample, the quantity of material from the victim is likely far to exceed that from the attacker and the innocent third party but, without retaining the reference samples from all three individuals, the chemistry and analysis used to derive the three individual profiles, and thus to make a match to the suspect, might be open to challenge in court.
Amendment 7 would therefore insert into Clause 14 a mechanism to enable the police, very early in a case before any samples had been destroyed, to make an application to the local magistrates’ court to retain all the individual samples in a case for a period of 12 months. That should be long enough in the majority of cases to identify a suspect and complete the pre-trial disclosure process, as part of which it would be established whether the defence intended to mount a challenge to the derivation of DNA profiles and/or matches. If not, the material would be destroyed at that point.
If a suspect had not been identified at the 12-month point, or if the derivation of the profiles and/or matches was still in dispute, the police would be able to apply to the courts to retain the material for a further 12 months, with further such applications available until either the case was concluded or there was no need to retain it any longer. If at that stage a suspect had been identified and criminal proceedings were under way, Section 66 of the Courts Act 2003 would allow the trial judge to deal with the application to continue to retain the samples.
I emphasise to your Lordships that we anticipate this procedure being used in only a handful of cases each year, all of which must be serious crimes on the qualifying offences list. While biological samples will be retained following a successful application, those samples will be able to be used only in the case for which they are taken and no extra profiles will be retained on the National DNA Database.
Given that the concerns of prosecutors would also apply in respect of the prosecution of those arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000, we are making similar provision in Part 1 of Schedule 1.
I turn briefly to the other amendments in this group. Amendment 8 to Clause 17 is technical and confirms that material taken under the regimes in the International Criminal Court Act and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act is not subject to the rules in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act but to the rules in those Acts.
The amendments to Clause 18 make it clear that, in respect of a DNA profile, the responsible chief officer is the one whose force took the original sample rather than the one in whose force area the forensic science laboratory is located, while Amendment 14 to Clause 21 removes the definition of the phrase “law enforcement authority”, which is not used elsewhere in that clause.
Finally, I take this opportunity to give notice to the House that we are considering whether it would be helpful to clarify further the scope of the regime for the retention and destruction of material under Section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. If we conclude that further clarification would be helpful, I propose to bring forward further amendments to Schedule 1 to the Bill at Third Reading. Naturally, I will give noble Lords proper notice of any such amendments, should they prove to be necessary.
I should have said at the beginning that, in moving Amendment 7, I was speaking also to Amendments 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that explanation of the reasoning behind these amendments. I want to raise a question about a particular part of the amendment rather than to make any point in opposition to the amendments.
The amendments in this group appear to require the application to be made before a district judge in the magistrates’ court. Will the noble Baroness confirm what appears to be the case; namely, that an application could not be made before lay magistrates in the same court? I may be wrong, but if that assumption is right, will the Minister say why this is the case on this issue, since it does not relate, for example, to terrorist activity or threats to national security? As I understand it, the issue simply concerns the case for retention. Is it because there is an existing statute that already provides for this approach? Is it because it is considered that such applications will normally involve complex issues of law? Is it envisaged that such applications will normally be lengthy hearings lasting more than one day? Is it because lay magistrates do not want this responsibility? Is it a lack of confidence in lay magistrates? Or does the reference to “district judge” include lay magistrates? That may possibly be the explanation.
Will the Minister also say whether there is a district judge sitting at every magistrates’ court at which such an application might most conveniently be made; whether it is envisaged that a district judge will hear such applications on occasions outside court sitting hours, away from the court; and what will happen if the district judge who is down to hear the application is off sick on the day fixed for the hearing and, as is often the case, no other district judge is sitting at that magistrates’ court? Will the date for hearing the application have to be rearranged, or in those circumstances would arrangements be made for the application to be heard by a Bench of lay magistrates already sitting that day at the court in question? To cover myself, perhaps I should declare that I am a lay magistrate—but I am not asking these questions in order to tout for additional business.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I will speak briefly on one aspect of the amendment that might be of interest to the noble Lord, in the hope that further advice might wing its way to me. It may be that the specification of a district judge might relate to the fact that the application by the police in the first instance would be ex parte. That may be why the application needs to be made to a district judge rather than to a lay magistrate. I can now confirm that the application will be only to a district judge, not to a lay magistrate, because it is an exception to a general principle requiring discretion, and is not to be used routinely. If no district judge is available, the application could be heard by a circuit judge if one is available. If after that explanation the noble Lord feels that I have not answered all his questions, I will follow up in writing.
“(2A) Sections 63D to 63T do not apply to material to which paragraph 8 of Schedule 4 to the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (requirement to destroy material) applies.
(2B) Sections 63D to 63T do not apply to material to which paragraph 6 of Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (requirement to destroy material) applies.”
“(5A) The responsible chief officer of police may apply to a relevant court for an order to retain a sample to which this paragraph applies beyond the date on which the sample would otherwise be required to be destroyed by virtue of sub-paragraph (4) or (5) if—
(a) the sample was taken from a person detained under section 41 in connection with the investigation of a qualifying offence, and(b) the responsible chief officer of police considers that the condition in sub-paragraph (5B) is met.(5B) The condition is that, having regard to the nature and complexity of other material that is evidence in relation to the offence, the sample is likely to be needed in any proceedings for the offence for the purposes of—
(a) disclosure to, or use by, a defendant, or(b) responding to any challenge by a defendant in respect of the admissibility of material that is evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely.(5C) An application under sub-paragraph (5A) must be made before the date on which the sample would otherwise be required to be destroyed by virtue of sub-paragraph (4) or (5).
(5D) If, on an application made by the responsible chief officer of police under sub-paragraph (5A), the relevant court is satisfied that the condition in sub-paragraph (5B) is met, it may make an order under this sub-paragraph which—
(a) allows the sample to be retained for a period of 12 months beginning with the date on which the sample would otherwise be required to be destroyed by virtue of sub-paragraph (4) or (5), and(b) may be renewed (on one or more occasions) for a further period of not more than 12 months from the end of the period when the order would otherwise cease to have effect.(5E) An application for an order under sub-paragraph (5D) (other than an application for renewal)—
(a) may be made without notice of the application having been given to the person from whom the sample was taken, and(b) may be heard and determined in private in the absence of that person.(5F) In Scotland, an application for an order under sub-paragraph (5D) (including an application for renewal) is to be made by summary application.
(5G) A sample retained by virtue of an order under sub-paragraph (5D) must not be used other than for the purposes of any proceedings for the offence in connection with which the sample was taken.
(5H) A sample that ceases to be retained by virtue of an order under sub-paragraph (5D) must be destroyed.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendment 15 deals with membership of the National DNA Database Strategy Board. In Committee, I moved an amendment requiring rules about the composition of the board to be included as part of the governance arrangements. The Minister reassured me that the Government's rules would include full membership of the board. She said that an independent element in the form of representation from the Information Commissioner's Office and the National DNA Database Ethics Group would be included. She also said that she would be happy to receive suggestions to strengthen the independent element. This is such a suggestion.
My point in that debate and now is that an independent element need not be, and possibly should not be, a member of the board in a representative capacity. Noble Lords will all have experience of boards to which independent members bring exactly that: independence. They come as individuals with not only independence but judgment, experience of the wider world and so on. If they are representatives of other organisations, they have a rather different role to play. My reason for moving the amendment again is not just to respond to the invitation issued in Committee but to ask the Government to bear this in mind and not exclude the desirability of having true independence involved in the governance of the board. I beg to move.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for her explanation in moving her amendment. The first thing I will make clear to her is that we are not averse to including on the National DNA Database Strategy Board someone who is wholly independent in the sense that they have no direct or indirect interest in this field and, as such, can exercise a role akin to that of a non-executive director, as my noble friend explained and illustrated. All I can do at this time is restate what I said in Committee: namely, as she acknowledged, that the governance rules that must be published under the new Section 63AB(6) of PACE will include the full membership of the board, and that membership will continue to include an independent element in the form of representation from the Information Commissioner's Office, the National DNA Database Ethics Group and the Forensic Science Regulator. We do not consider it necessary to specify the membership of the board in the Bill or at this time to specify what my right honourable friend the Home Secretary might include in the governance when it is decided and published, but I am sure that in reviewing the membership of the board she will consider the points that have been made by my noble friend. I think she will want to ensure that we are not so specific in those governance rules that they prevent us changing any of the independent elements of the membership of that board in future, when different organisations might be associated with DNA.
I hope that my explanations have given my noble friend the assurance she needs that we understand the importance of an independent element in the board and that we want to retain flexibility for the future in the make-up of the board. However, we will certainly take into account the points she has made.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for moving this amendment. I have been provided with speaking notes to address some of the points that he has raised but, before I get to them, it occurs to me that perhaps he is raising two different issues here. I speak as someone who worked at the BBC for nine years. Following the noble Lord’s praise for Sky, I do not know whether this will mean that I attract criticism from him, but, as I say, I think that there are two separate matters here.
One is about documentaries or docusoaps, in which broadcasters follow police services and, in the course of filming or making the programmes, they capture footage on film of people doing things that are against the law. In those circumstances, the broadcasters tend to pixelate the images when they are played out. The broadcasters of that kind of imagery clearly have to comply with Ofcom’s broadcasting code and ensure that they do not broadcast images that might jeopardise any legal process that the police service might want to pursue in apprehending the person whom they have filmed. There is a separate issue that the noble Lord spoke more to in moving the amendment. It covers situations where news organisations, including the BBC, Sky, ITV and many others, broadcast CCTV footage that has been released to them by the police, usually in order for them to report on criminal activity and to broadcast the fact of that activity to the general public. In responding to the noble Lord, I will focus my comments on the second category of images rather than the first.
I start by saying that I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Lord that CCTV systems and images are an important investigative tool for the police. There is little point in investing in such systems if the police and others cannot make full use of the images when investigating offences captured on CCTV systems and prosecuting offenders. Where a suspect has yet to be identified and there is reason to believe that the release of CCTV footage will aid the police investigation of a crime and secure justice for the victim, our general approach is that we support images being made available to the public. There will be some cases where this may not be appropriate. However, the BBC programme “Crimewatch” is a great example of where CCTV footage of crimes has been broadcast and, as a result, the public have been able to provide vital information to the police.
We must be alive to the fact that at an early stage of an investigation, before anyone has been arrested for an alleged offence, any CCTV images would at best identify only one or more alleged offenders or wholly innocent persons. We need to be sensitive to such considerations, particularly where the persons visible on any CCTV footage appear to be under 18 and are therefore afforded particular protection within the criminal justice system. The position is different once a person has been arrested for an offence. In those circumstances, the Contempt of Court Act 1981 is engaged. This means that from the time of their arrest, a suspect is afforded a degree of protection in order to ensure that as the accused they have a fair trial.
All these considerations argue for a degree of constraint on the media in publishing personal details of suspects at the pre-charge stage. This is consistent with guidance issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers that sets out the limited circumstances in which police officers might divulge to the media the personal details of those suspected of, but not yet charged with, an offence. The ACPO guidance sets out the principles in this area, including the legal tests of necessity and proportionality, to help police forces make decisions about the release of images of suspects and defendants to the media.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue. It is clearly relevant to the provisions of the Bill, given that one of our objectives is to promote the effective use of CCTV systems. As I said, it must be right that the police should be able to exploit CCTV images as part of their investigation of an offence. If the publication of such images has a role to play in helping identify suspects, the police should not be inhibited from placing them in the public domain. In doing so, they must have proper regard to their duties under data protection legislation and to the need to protect the rights of the accused, and they must have particular regard to the position of children. I hope that, having sparked the debate and listened to my responses, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. I was grateful to her for taking my call earlier today to discuss her amendment. Since speaking to her this afternoon and rereading the notes and advice that I have had on this amendment, I hope I can provide her with more assurance than I indicated earlier, but I will not prejudge that.
As I made clear in Committee, I fully share my noble friend’s concerns about the impact that intrusive noise can have, particularly when it comes from neighbouring properties. I share her concerns that in many cases noise monitoring would already fall outside the RIPA regime because there is not an expectation of privacy. However, in some cases it is possible that noise monitoring amounts to an intrusion of an individual’s expectations of privacy. In such cases it is right that steps are taken to ensure that any monitoring is both necessary and proportionate. The whole point of the RIPA safeguards of necessity and proportionality is that there needs to be an assessment on a case-by-case basis that takes into account the individual facts of the case.
RIPA ensures that public authority surveillance activity meets its obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Without a RIPA authorisation, a public authority that exceeds the bounds or intrudes quite significantly is at risk of an ECHR challenge. However, I share my noble friend’s view that many noise abatement investigations do not engage any private information and are therefore outside the scope of RIPA. I gave a few examples when we debated this issue in Committee; for example, the monitoring of loud music, alarms or machinery; if someone is having a row and it is causing inconvenience to other people they cannot be in a position to believe that that is private. There are occasions when obtaining a RIPA authorisation for noise abatement would clearly be superseded by the need for immediate action—for example, by the police—because the intervention is for a public order incident.
Home Office officials have been discussing these matters with members of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, Defra and London Councils. We have said that we cannot create a general exclusion for any noise abatement measurement or monitoring, especially if the steps taken to investigate it infringe privacy rights. However, I hope I can provide my noble friend with the assurance that she is seeking by saying that we will look again at the RIPA code of practice on surveillance to see whether we can make it clearer that in the circumstances that I have outlined—that is, where no private information is engaged or a where a person would normally be regarded as having forfeited any claim to privacy—a RIPA authorisation is unlikely to be required. I hope that that is sufficient to persuade my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.