National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking all noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House who have contributed to this thoughtful and stimulating debate. It is a great privilege to give the closing speech for the Opposition Benches, having heard from many noble Lords with a huge amount of expertise and experience in the legal, security and ISC sectors.

Before reflecting on the specific provisions in the Bill we would like to see refined, it is worth outlining the context in which your Lordships have received this legislation. The Opposition Benches have long recognised the growing threat posed by hostile state actors and their proxies, and we wholeheartedly support the aim of strengthening the tools available to protect the UK’s national security. Of course, we support the general principles of the Bill and concur with the motivations behind it.

I accept that the Bill goes beyond the IRGC. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, gave a long list of both threats and, sadly, events in the UK in recent years. The Bill rightly should cover state threats in general, but the IRGC is obviously and rightly the first target of the Bill. It is undeniable that the legislative provisions here should have been brought before Parliament long before now.

For many months, noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House have repeatedly called for stronger action against the IRGC, most recently in the Committee and Report stages of the Crime and Policing Bill, where time and again calls were made from many different quarters for proscription of the IRGC or an equivalent. Those calls were resisted, amendments were opposed, arguments were dismissed; the opinion of the House was tested but ignored. Yet we now find ourselves considering a Bill whose principal and primary purpose is to establish a legislative framework through which organisations such as the IRGC may be designated. That raises the question: if the Government accept the need for such a framework, why has action not been taken sooner? The threats posed by the Iranian regime and the IRGC did not suddenly emerge in recent weeks. Had the Government listened to arguments that were made in this Chamber months ago, Parliament would not now be scrutinising significant national security legislation to such compressed timescales. That matters because legislation must be more than well intentioned, it must be effective; where Parliament identifies legislative gaps or ambiguities, it is our duty to address them.

It is in that spirit that we approach this Bill, and it is in that spirit that I wish to address and emphasise a few of the concerns that my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower raised. The first is the prohibited purpose test. As it stands, Clause 2 enables hostile state proxies to receive greater protection than terrorist organisations, because it imposes a greater a burden on the prosecution than the Terrorism Act 2000. Pausing there, the point has been made most powerfully by the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, that we should not expect to simply cut and paste the Terrorism Act into this Bill. I acknowledge that, but the Terrorism Act remains the blueprint, and throughout Jonathan Hall’s report, he uses the phrase “equivalent to powers in the Terrorism Act” again and again. I appreciate the need for subtlety, which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile called for, but, while the threats may be different, these are analogous statutory regimes. They are equivalents. The regime in this Bill should not be weaker than the Terrorism Act and any differences should have a clear rationale.

Returning to Clause 2, there are two conditions for the offence of supporting a designated body. They are inviting support for or expressing a belief that is supportive of a designated body and—this is the additional part—a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety of the UK. The additional requirement that prosecutors must prove conduct as well as the defendant’s prohibited purpose creates an additional evidential burden. It makes it harder to prosecute and harder to secure a conviction, as well as adding another layer of bureaucracy in a process that should be fair but streamlined. As I have said, much of this Bill has been drafted with Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as the blueprint, yet there is no similar provision in the Terrorism Act.

Turning secondly to preparatory conduct, there is a gap in the Bill as drafted in the prevention and prosecution of hostile activity before actual harm takes place. The purpose of national security legislation is to punish hostile activity and prevent it occurring. The Bill focuses primarily on completed acts of support, assistance or financial benefit to a designated body, and that leaves a gap, because it may be entirely feasible that law enforcement agencies are aware of an individual actively preparing to assist a designated organisation but lack the power to intervene until further steps have been taken. That is particularly concerning given the nature of modern hostile state activity, which often relies on recruitment, facilitation, planning and preparation long before any substantive offence is committed.

Parliament has long recognised that challenge in other areas of national security. The Terrorism Act contains a range of preparatory and precursor offences, and it reflects the principle that intervention at the earliest possible stage is often necessary to protect the public and safeguard national security. If the Government believe that designated organisations pose a sufficient threat to warrant the creation of this new designation regime, it is difficult to understand why similar preventive principles should not apply. In the other place, the Government said that the Bill had been deliberately drafted as a targeted and narrowly focused piece of legislation. Ministers stated that the Bill was intended to be narrow, but did not explain why this gap remains. The Bill being narrow does not necessarily mean it is complete. I hope that the Minister will clarify this point, because national security legislation is most effective when it enables disruption and prevention, as well as prosecution after the event.

Thirdly, on uniforms and insignia, the Bill creates an inconsistency with existing national security legislation by failing to address uniforms and insignia associated with designated organisations. It has been established in Parliament that support for dangerous organisations is not demonstrated solely through direct assistance or financial support. We know that uniforms and insignia can be used to demonstrate allegiance to a hostile organisation, they can intimidate communities and political opponents, and they can promote and legitimise dangerous organisations. Section 13 of the Terrorism Act makes it an offence to wear clothing or display articles in circumstances that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation, yet no equivalent provision appears in this Bill. That creates the illogical situation whereby Parliament can determine that an organisation presents a sufficient threat to warrant designation, but public displays of support for the same organisation remain lawful. The Government’s argument is essentially that designated organisations are different from terrorist organisations, but this again does not answer the central question. Why should organisations deemed sufficiently dangerous to be designated under this legislation be subject to weaker restrictions than terrorist organisations?

In closing, I reiterate that the concerns that my noble friend Lord Davies and I have raised are not objections to the principles of the Bill: rather, they are attempts to ensure that the framework we establish is as effective as possible. Legitimate questions have been raised during the course of this debate about the operation of particular provisions and the gaps that remain in the legislation. Narrowness is not a substitute for completeness. If there are weaknesses that can be addressed, Parliament must address them now. We should not leave them to be discovered later, in the course of prosecutions under this legislation. I thank the Government for finally bringing forward legislation in this area, but the task before your Lordships is not simply to welcome the Bill but to improve it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.